

objectives. This feature of the political elites' behavior goes a long way toward explaining the early consolidation of the state in the nineteenth century and the country's remarkable political stability during most of the twentieth century. Given this political milieu, the struggle of the Mapuche for recognition as a people never had much of a chance, regardless of the economic ideology of those in power. Thus, in order properly to understand their plight, it is necessary to complement the study of policy decisions by recent administrations with an analysis of the evolution of state institutions.

Haughney's detailed account of the frustrated attempts of the Mapuche to defend their rights should be of great interest to scholars seeking to understand the plight of indigenous communities in Latin America and other developing countries. Unfortunately, however, she does not explore the implications for her case study of the current academic debate on the tension between demands for equal citizenship and demands for the recognition of group rights and cultural identity. This debate—prompted largely by the emergence of ethnic-based political movements in several Latin American countries, including Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Mexico—offers valuable insights for understanding the relationship between neoliberal policies and indigenous people. Although Haughney includes in her bibliography the work of some of the prominent protagonists of these debates, such as Deborah Yashar, June Nash, and Donna Lee Van Cott, she does not engage with their theoretical arguments. As a consequence, although it is difficult not to share her pessimism about the political prospects of the Mapuche in Chile, it is also difficult to agree that neoliberal economics is the sole factor accounting for this outcome.

Despite these reservations, Haughney's book is a sharp reminder that though most governments in the region have embraced a progressive discourse on indigenous people, their policies have not significantly changed. Indeed, her analysis of the 1993 legislation offers an excellent illustration of this contradiction. Although this piece of legislation was far from perfect, neither the government nor private investors took it seriously. Thus, it is small wonder that despite the efforts of international agencies to spread the rule of law and democracy, the poor and marginal people in Latin America remain skeptical about the virtues of democracy and the rule of law.

Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West. By Patrick Thaddeus Jackson. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2006. 286p. \$27.95. DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707072015

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Rarely have I enjoyed (and learned from) reading a book as much as this one, whose parts are quite brilliant on occasion but whose overall argument falls well short of

its claim and aim. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson argues with verve and conviction that the Federal Republic of Germany's creation and its subsequent joining in alliances with the United States and its European partners would not have occurred without the invention, the implementation, and deployment of "the West" as a unifying concept of political, cultural, and social identity. Challenging the explanatory powers of realist theories, as well as their international relations constructivist, Marxist, and liberal counterparts, Jackson develops something he calls a "*transactional social constructionist* conception of social reality: *transactional* because the analytic focus is on social ties and transactions rather than putatively solid and stable actors with relatively fixed interests, and *social constructionist* because the causal mechanisms producing policy outcomes involve the social production and reproduction of patterns of meaning" (p. 15, italics in original). This self-labeled "*post-structural* approach" (*ibid.*, again italics in original) allows Jackson to navigate a fine line between the Scylla of contingency and the Charibdis of determinism even though he comes closer to the "agency" side of the ubiquitous agency—structure tension that will remain forever unresolved.

In Chapter 1, appropriately titled "The West Pole Falacy," Jackson offers an eloquent demolition of the concept of "civilization(s)," which he augments with an equally powerful demystification of its often-used sobriquet "Western." Chapter 2 features a presentation of the language of legitimation in which he introduces his interesting concepts of "breaking" and "joining," with the former denoting a speaker's attempts "to capture a commonplace from her opponent and thus dissolve the claimed connection between that commonplace and others" and the latter implying a speaker's attempts "to link a commonplace to others in such a way as to point in a determinate policy direction" (p. 45). Chapter 3 provides a topography of the postwar debates in the United States and Germany, featuring helpful graphics that nicely delineate the possible as well as actual axes of discourse around which various political groupings in both countries allied.

In Chapter 4 Jackson offers a tour d'horizon of what he calls the "power of 'Western Civilization.'" Chapters 5, 6, and 7 provide the empirical core of the book in which he discusses how the tracks were set by an occidentalized discourse for the creation of what first came to be West Germany (also known as the Federal Republic of Germany) and subsequently led to this entity's joining the West, culminating in its accession to NATO in 1955. A rather abstract discussion on "Western Civilization's" stabilizing qualities, its contrived character, and its uncertain future conclude this fascinating but flawed book.

To the fascination first: Rarely have I read an author who displays a better command of such diverse literatures as does Jackson. He is as much at home in all relevant theories of international relations as he is with the

writings of Max Weber, Jürgen Habermas, Anthony Giddens, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, to name but a few of the many theorists whose work he uses in this book. His chapter on the conceptual construct and discursive powers of Western civilization is superb. Ranging across centuries of European and American history, the reader is even regaled with a fine discussion of the introduction of “Western Civ” courses at American universities in the wake of World War I, of which Columbia University’s famed “Contemporary Civilization,” better known as “CC,” was a leading representative (and remains to this day this writer’s most important intellectual experience in life).

And now to the flaws: Bottom line, while I certainly can see that “rhetoric deployments” play a role in political outcomes, shape agendas, and influence players, Jackson’s story in no way alters my belief that interests matter much more greatly than does rhetoric. In other words, I do not see any evidence why the many extant Marxist interpretations of West Germany’s so-called reconstruction—or indeed liberal as well as other explanations featuring structures and politics as conventionally understood—have been rendered invalid by Jackson’s insisting on a conceptual primacy or even a rhetorical sleight of hand around the notion of “the West.” His rendering the Germans as equal partners to the Americans (and presumably the French and British, about whom we read far too little though they, too, presumably are parts of the West) in the West project by introducing the concept of “Abendland”—a notion of “West” with which the Germans identified and “Western” with which they did not—begs of course the temporal question: Why only in 1945 and thereafter? What was the story before—and well after Hegel, whom Jackson features as the main conceptual bridge builder between German romanticism, certainly no friend of the West in any of its meanings, and a more rational-universalist notion common to discourse found in countries west of Germany? It is not the West that the Germans embraced after World War II. Indeed, as public opinion data clearly reveal, the Western powers were seen as occupiers and were disdained, except less than other options, particularly the primacy of the Soviets. Indeed, by barely mentioning any interaction between the Soviets and the Germans, and the Soviets and the Western Allies, Jackson’s story remains seriously one-sided and conceptually incomplete.

“American exceptionalism,” to many of us political sociologists, has nothing to do with the normative notion of America being singularly wonderful, and everything with the major shortcoming of never having a viable socialism/social democracy/communism in the history of this country’s political, social, and economic development. Lastly, by using terms such as “occidentalism,” “occidentalizing,” and “occidentalized” throughout the book, Jackson reveals a normative bent that I would have preferred he lay bare and render explicit. For it is clear that he does not mean this term the way Ian Buruma and Avishai Mar-

galit in their book *Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of its Enemies* (2004) do (Jackson, incidentally, never mentions their book). Instead, following Edward Said—whose widely known concept of “orientalism” denotes a false, illegitimate, and distorted view by the West (most particularly the French and the British, with the Germans nary mentioned) to exert its illegitimate power over the peoples of the Middle East—Jackson’s “occidentalism” has similarly sinister intentions and undesirable qualities. Except that it appears to be self-imposed, since its real mission—other than those of an undesirable domination—remains unclear throughout the book.

The Pedagogical State: Education and the Politics of National Culture in Post-1980 Turkey. By Sam Kaplan. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006. 254p. \$65.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Routine Violence: Nations, Fragments, Histories. By Gyanendra Pandey. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006. 228p. \$55.00 cloth, \$21.95 paper. DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707072027

— Martin O. Heisler, *University of Maryland*

There were relatively few states when the modern discipline of political science came into being, and the most thoroughly institutionalized among them became intellectual as well as normative templates for what states should be. Our initial expectations for the political development of the vast number of new states—an increase from fewer than 60 to more than 200 since the end of World War II—had been conditioned by ahistorical takes on the roles of the social and the cultural in state formation and nation building (see Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, 1960; and not excepting the contributions of Charles Tilly and associates in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, 1975). Two such expectations were that, over time, states’ populations would exhibit more coherent political cultures and increasing social order (with diminishing violence) within frameworks of state-delineated laws and state-centered institutions. The authors of these two books suggest that those expectations are more likely to be met in form and illusion than in substance. For Thomas Hobbes, stateness is hardly sufficient for social cohesion or nonviolent civil existence. They also give reason to ask how well they have been met in the model states of the historic West.

As colonies and other territories gained statehood—or quasi-statehood, in Robert H. Jackson’s seminal terms (*Quasi-states*, 1990)—they faced many of the same challenges of social, cultural, and political consolidation that “old states” had confronted in the past but had deleted from their collective memories (but cf. Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, *The Great Arch: English State Formation*