Digging into the past is only part of the historian's efforts to normalize the field. The second part of the volume, by three Western scholars, offers a critical assessment of the existing literature, research agenda, lines of inquiry, and emergent interpretive themes. Rather than advancing a uniform view over these issues, these chapters clearly register the upheaval a much-transformed field is going through and argue for a more historical and comparative approach to CCP foreign relations than has heretofore prevailed. More collaborative efforts are certainly needed between Chinese and Western scholars to unearth as well as to understand the past, a basis for comprehending the present and predicting the future. Beyond that, there is a need for political scientists and historians to intersect, to borrow from one another, and even to merge so that they can better understand China's foreign policy.

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JAPAN

Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan. By TAKASHI FUJITANI. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1996. xiv, 305 pp. $40.00.

Historians of the Meiji emperor system debate many controversial issues. Some of the livelier ones are: did Japan's modern monarchy stem largely from indigenous ancient traditions, or were its most salient features invented by emulating contemporary Western models? Did the Meiji emperor play a mainly positive role in modernizing and consolidating the state, or did the ensuing xenophobic excesses more than offset any such value? Fujitani addresses these and many other important questions in this thoroughly researched, methodologically sophisticated, and elegantly written monograph. All historians of modern Japan should read it. It will emerge as a classic in the field, and I urge the University of California Press to issue a paperback edition.

Although openly hostile to the emperor system—presumably because it led to repression in Japan and aggression overseas—Fujitani differs from Kōza-ha or Modernist (*kindaishugi*) critics who condemn it for exploiting and perpetuating an anachronistic, irrational feudal ethos. To them, the emperor system's maleficence lay in not becoming "modern" enough. By contrast, Fujitani argues that Meiji leaders—like their counterparts in other modern nations—had on the sovereign stage various forms of pageantry and ritual to achieve statist ends through adroit social engineering. On the one hand, the emperor destroyed local and class differences so as to forge a uniform national consciousness among his subjects—thus fostering Western-style modernity. On the other hand, he duped them into believing that his dynastic line had been central to their lives and had defined their nationality from time immemorial—thus concocting much of what now passes for "Japanese tradition(s)." This dual process corresponds to what Foucault calls the emergence of a "disciplinary" or "surveillance society" wherein all subjects are conscious of being under the ruler's perpetual "gaze."

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My summary does scant justice to the complexity and richness of Fujitani's book, but space limitations preclude a fuller presentation. Here, I offer three observations. First, Fujitani's thesis presumes that there was no political focus on the emperor and little sense of national identity before 1868. People lived in disparate "vertical compartments" (*han*) and "horizontal estates" (*mibun*). Commoners knew little of an emperor who was out of sight and mind; what they did know was confounded by folk beliefs that identified him with local deities (pp. 4–9). So far, so good. But this presumes a bit too much. Fujitani contends that only from the late nineteenth century—and mainly due to government-staged, emperor-centered pageantry—do we find "people who were starting to recognize themselves as the Japanese" (pp. 200, 214). The terms "*Nihon*" and "*Nihonjin*" were not in everyday use as they are now, but the *sankin kōtai,* popular pilgrimages, and a market economy from Satsuma to Matsumae had already produced an unusually high degree of linguistic, religiocultural, and socioeconomic homogeneity. Then in the 1850s a foreign crisis spawned an embryonic form of emperor-centered nationalism in all classes, as seen in the case of Kanno Hachirō, a semiliterate peasant from Mutsu. Having heard rumors spreading "all over Japan" (*Nihon kokujū*), Kanno raced to Uraga "in the 120th [*sic*] emperor's reign" to observe the barbarian Perry (Shōji Kichinosuke et al., eds., *Nihon shisō taikei 58: Minshū undō no shisō* [Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1970], pp. 88–90). Here was a sense of "Japaneseness" that marked time and its passing by imperial reigns. Late Tokugawa thinkers were already citing a need to bring the emperor into plain sight, clarify his role as the spiritual core of the nation, and make him perform rituals designed to instill national allegiance in all people. Unlettered commoners might confuse the emperor with some local deity, but they still held both in reverent awe as *kamisama,* and they recognized the imperial court ranks granted to that local deity or shrine. Thus, certain shared reference points enabled commoners—when "enlightened" by Meiji officials—to accept the emperor as their "master" or sovereign (*nushi*) in a nation (*kuni*) that transcended *han* and *mibun.* Likewise, Meiji commoners could mentally link their local shrines with Yasukuni. This is not to refute or belittle Fujitani's findings, only to suggest that he has brushed aside important historical continuities. Second, I hope Fujitani will in future work examine who derived what material benefits from the emperor system. Surely it did not arise and thrive only as a result of staged pageantry. Third, the bourgeois ideal of conjugal monogamy—among other alien values propagated by the new imperial "couple"—enhanced the basic human rights of Japanese women at that time. We are on tricky normative ground when we argue about how the emperor system "modernized" or "Westernized" traditional Japanese social mores. What is oppressive for Owada Masako in the 1990s was liberating for women in the 1890s.

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Fishing Villages in Tokugawa Japan. By ARNE KALLAND. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995. 355 pp. $38.00.

Given the longstanding scholarly focus on agriculture and agricultural communities in early modern Japan, two books published in 1995 offer a welcome shift in view. David Howell's *Capitalism from Within: Economy, Society and the State in a Japanese Fishery* (Berkeley: University of California Press), documents the emergence

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