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NAPOLEON, CHARLEMAGNE, AND LOTHARINGIA: ACCULTURATION AND THE BOUNDARIES OF NAPOLEONIC EUROPE

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ABSTRACT. *This article attempts to redefine the parameters of Napoleonic hegemony by applying two models to the territories of the Napoleonic empire: one developed by Nathan Wachtel, predicated on levels of acculturation and assimilation to the imperial core; the second, derived from the work of Braudel and Brunet, which detects a European core, based along the Rhine–Rhone axis, a macro-region with a long, if submerged, history. This study concludes that the acceptance of Napoleonic reforms was achieved only in a core region, already predisposed to them.*

I

The 'Napoleonic adventure' is one of the most paradoxical episodes in the history of modern Europe, and the recent shift in scholarly interest towards the political and social impact of imperial rule, has actually deepened the paradox. Stuart Woolf redefined the significance of the Napoleonic period in his aptly titled *Napoleon's integration of Europe*.[1] The problem is simple, yet profound: how could an empire with so short a life leave a lasting impact anywhere outside its heartland? Yet the work of Woolf and countless other scholars, working in different national contexts, shows that Napoleonic rule did exactly this, because the lasting impact of French rule did not always correspond to the amount of time Napoleon held a given area. The Vendée remained 'inexplicable' well into the nineteenth century: 'un pays ... un peuple si étrangement aveugle et si bizarrement égaré qu'il s'arme contre la Révolution, sa mère' as Michelet famously put it.[2] Indeed, when the thesis of François Furet is remembered – that it took even France almost a century to come to terms with its own Revolution[3] – then the paradox not only deepens, but widens, for even the impact of the regime on France, itself, cannot be taken for granted, although in his insistence that Napoleon stabilized the Revolution for the French, Furet perhaps missed the heart of the dilemma his own theory has done

[1] S. J. Woolf, *Napoleon's integration of Europe* (London, 1991).
[2] J. Michelet, *Histoire de la Révolution française* (Paris, 1978 edn), livre III, p. 124.
[3] F. Furet, *La Révolution, 1780–1880* (Paris, 1988).

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much to heighten. The one 'great given' of an earlier historiography – that the Napoleonic empire was the pure and simple extention of France, *la Grande Nation* shared by conservatives and Marxists alike[4] – is now open to question. Juan Pabón saw the whole regime in terms of paradox, and pointed directly to it, when he said Napoleon's claims to the crowns of both Caesar and Charlemagne were incompatible.[5] It must now be asked, which territories were best assimilated to the Napoleonic empire, and why.

II

Napoleon made much of the 'Carolingian analogy',[6] yet when he chose to compare himself to Charlemagne directly, it was with accurate, specific reference to political geography. 'Jusqu'à moi', he told Gourgaud, 'la France se ressentait encore de César. La suprématie du Pape, l'empire d'Allemagne, le Roi des Romains furent détruits par moi. Charlemagne avait beaucoup donné au Pape. L'Allemagne jusqu'à moi, se composait de grands fiefs.'[7] Perhaps the most concrete comparison to be made between Napoleon and Charlemagne is in the geography of the empires they ruled. Almost eerily, however, Edward Gibbon's account of 'The reign and character of Charlemagne', in Book V, Chapter 49 of his *Decline and fall of the Roman Empire*, written only fifteen years before *Brumaire*, had already, in truth, left Napoleon or, indeed, future commentators, little to invent in the way of Carolingian paradigms. The essential for Gibbon's Charlemagne was very close to the essence of the imperial achievement Napoleon himself prized: moving the centre of the empire beyond 'the France of Caesar'. Gibbon's vision of the parameters of Carolingian hegemony offers a remarkably precise insight into the nature of the 'Grand Empire', and of the nuances of the degrees of control Napoleon exercised within it.

To ponder some of Gibbon's more precise observations on the limits of the Carolingian empire, is also to trace the borders of Napoleonic Europe, as both embraced France, Spain, Italy, and Germany. Gibbon is most telling in the details of imperial power, however:

Gaul had been transformed into the name and monarchy of France … Charlemagne pursued, and confined, the Britons on the shores of the ocean; and that ferocious tribe, whose origin and language are so different from the French, was chastised by the imposition of tribute, hostages, and peace. After a long and evasive contest … the reunion of Aquitain [to] France … enlarged to its present boundaries, with the addition of the Netherlands and Spain, as far as the Rhine … [H]e instituted the *Spanish march*, which extended from the Pyrenees to the river Ebro: Barcelona was the residence of the

[4] The classic examples: G. Lefebvre, *Napoleon* (2 vols., Eng. trans., London, 1969–74), on the left. J. Tulard, *Napoleon: the myth of the saviour* (Eng. trans., London, 1984), on the right. J. Godechot, *La Grande Nation* (2 vols., Paris, 1956), gave modern currency to the term.

[5] J. Pabón, *Las ideas y el sistema Napoléónicos* (Madrid, 1944) pp. 69–70.

[6] Notably: H. Rössler, *Napoleons Griff nach der Karlskrone. Das Ende des alten Reiches 1806* (Cologne, 1957).

[7] Cited in J. Tulard, ed., *Napoléón à Sainte-Hélène* (Paris, 1981), p. 415.

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> French governor … As king of the Lombards and patrician of Rome, he reigned over the greatest part of Italy, a tract of a thousand miles from the Alps to the borders of Calabria … Charlemagne was the first who united Germany under the same sceptre … The *Alemanni*, so formidable to the Romans, were the faithful vassals and confederates of the Franks … If we retrace the outlines of this geographical picture, it will be seen that the empire of the Franks extended, between east and west, from the Ebro to the Elbe or Vistula; between north and south, from the dutchy of Beneventum to the river Eyder.[8]

Gibbon's vision of the core of Europe is far from fanciful. Only the fact that Charlemagne got further in pacifying the west of France than did Napoleon detracts from an almost exact parallel, together with the fact that, in 1814, the Bourbon legitimists – unlike the Merovingians – rose again in Aquitaine. Napoleon had to fight to reattach the Midi, the Vendée-militaire and the Massif Central[9] to France after the Revolution, and it is in these regions – rather than in the conquests beyond the 'interior' of 1792 – where the term *réuni* should really be applied. He resurrected the Spanish march in the last, desperate, years of the empire, although his grip on it was less sure than that attributed to Charlemagne by Gibbon. This study attempts to redefine the true core of Napoleonic Europe as an inner empire which did not really equate with the 'old France' of 1792, but to that elusive yet discernible 'union' of eastern France, western Germany, northern Italy, and the Low Countries: 'the provinces of Gaul, between the Rhone and the Alps, the Meuse and the Rhine, [which] were assigned, with Italy, to the Imperial dignity of Lothaire'[10] after the death of Charlemagne, by the Treaty of Verdun in 843, what Fernand Braudel called 'the impossible domain … [t]his isthmic folly'.[11]

Napoleon revived this 'impossible domain', almost more by will than design, as emerges when Charlemagne's failures, *pace* Gibbon, are juxtaposed to the limits of Napoleon's own hegemony. In the north, Gibbon points to the unsteady conquest of Germany north of the Weser; to Charlemagne's failure to push eastwards beyond the Elbe, while in Italy, Gibbon had no doubts that the Carolingian empire stopped south of Rome: 'Beneventum insensibly escaped from the French yoke', despite the nominal submission of its ruler to Charlemagne. In Spain, Gibbon noted how Charlemagne, 'without distinction of faith, impartially crushed the resistance of Christians, and rewarded the obedience and service of Mahometans'.[12] It is less Napoleon's famous remark in Egypt, about conversion to Islam, which springs to mind, than Suchet's use of French troops to collect feudal dues in Valencia, in flagrant contrast to the

[8] E. Gibbon, *The decline and fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. D. Wormersley (3 vols., London, 1994), III, Book V, ch. 44, pp. 125–6.

[9] Besides the vast *oeuvres* on the *Vendée-militaire*, and C. M. Lucas and G. Lewis on the Rhône and Provence: A. Forrest, *The Revolution in provincial France. Aquitaine, 1789–1799* (Oxford, 1996), and I. Woloch, 'Napoleonic conscription: state power and civil society', *Past and Present*, 111 (1986), pp. 101–29.

[10] Gibbon, *Decline*, pp. 132–3.

[11] F. Braudel, *The identity of France*, I: *History and environment* (Eng. trans., London, 1988), pp. 312–13.

[12] Gibbon, *Decline*, pp. 128–31.

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spirit of the Valladolid Decrees, in an effort to win the support of the local aristocracy.[13] The parameters of the European heartland, as conceived by Gibbon, were actually put to the test by Napoleon, less than two decades later. The result was less a vindication of the Carolingian universal monarchy than the revelation that the core of that empire was neither France nor a wider Christendom, but an area – a true 'macro-region' – akin to Lothaire's 'impossible domain'. It was in the limits of his hegemony, rather than in his twin Imperial and Lombard crowns, that Napoleon truly usurped the inheritance of Charlemagne.

By the early nineteenth century, there appeared to be logic to 'Lotharingia'; it became Napoleon's inner empire. Lothaire, as the eldest son of Charlemagne, received the richest prize at Verdun: the provinces centred on the great trade axes of the Rhine, Meuse, Rhone, and Saone, together with the valley of the Po. The conquests of the 1790s – Napoleon's included – had already brought most of this 'isthmic folly' under France, but time – even so short a space of time as Napoleon's adventure allowed him – proved this to be the natural heart of his empire. The 'Atlantic revolution' may have reoriented the commercial wealth of Europe, but one result of the Anglo-French wars was to reinforce the importance of this alluvial core of non-maritime Europe. However fragmented politically, the lands of the 'impossible domain', if extended slightly westwards to include north-eastern France – Braudel's quip 'Paris: is a visit really necessary?'[14] not withstanding – represented the most settled, relatively advanced, part of Europe throughout the early modern period. Revolutionary Napoleonic aggression finally brought it together under a single political hegemony, if not quite under one ruler, forming the economic *raison d'être* of the Continental System, even if the impact of the blockade deprived it of its natural coastal components. This was the natural centre of gravity of the Napoleonic imperial enterprise, much more so than Napoleon's original political springboard, 'old France'.

This choice of terminology is important, as it emphasizes the relative unimportance of official political boundaries for a real understanding of the Napoleonic empire. To speak of a 'state system' or a sphere of hegemony, rather than of an empire, or of France, its allies, and satellite states, denotes a macro-region embracing all three types of state, but also admits that some French departments and some satellite states were not part of the imperial core. International boundaries – least of all those drawn by Napoleon himself, after 1806 – mean very little. At this point, the 'blue banana theory', first developed by Michel Brunet, emerges as the logical extension of Braudel's alluvial axis, to underpin the social, economic, and cultural elements at the core of the Napoleonic state system.[15] Braudel and Brunet defined this 'central belt' as the

[13] M. Ardit, 'La crisi politica de l'antic regim (1793–1813)', *Historia del Pais Valencia*, IV: *Fins a la crisi del l'Antic Regim* (Barcelona, 1990), pp. 213–14.

[14] F. Braudel, *The wheels of commerce* (Eng. trans., London, 1982), p. 110.

[15] M. Brunet, *Les villes europóenes* (Paris, 1989).

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hub of European cultural and economic dynamism in the early modern period, and the configuration of Napoleonic Europe offered here develops the need to relate these concepts to the political context of the last great European empire of the early modern period.[16]

III

Working in the context of the conquest of Spanish America, Nathan Wachtel formulated the process of acculturation in very useful terms for historians of imperialism. He discerned the division of this broad process into 'integration' – the incorporation of foreign elements into an indigenous system – and 'assimilation' – the elimination of indigenous traditions, overwhelmed by foreign rule.[17] His framework greatly enriches the study of Napoleonic Europe. The successful establishment of Napoleonic rule, directly or indirectly, entailed a process of acculturation, which gave full expression to a 'macro-region' in a specific part of Europe, thus reviving and shaping underlying geopolitical forces within Europe.

Wachtel also noted that new empires inherit the internal frontiers of the polities they conquer, which usually fall into three zones: a densely settled, well-administered, core, usually dominated by lowland urban centres and areas of commercial agriculture; then pockets of subsistence agriculture grouped around small, localized, family units – the hinterlands of the indigenous administrative and economic centres; and finally the true periphery of the indigenous polity, the areas where one civilization gives way to another.[18] Despite the many qualifications incumbent on such broad comparisons, there is much in the experience of Napoleonic expansion common to this pattern, not the least of which is the emphasis Wachtel – in common with Gibbon – puts on the concept of the imperial periphery as a 'natural frontier'. This view of the 'core zone' as essentially inelastic contrasts with that developed by Immanuel Wallerstein, who sees an ever-shifting periphery as an integral part of a single, continuously expanding, capitalist world-system.[19]

Napoleon had little trouble absorbing or controlling the great urban centres of northern Italy, western Germany, or the Low Countries, or the adjacent countryside along the river plains. He found support within the ranks of these urban elites, and subservience from the vulnerable, usually landless, peasantries nearby, who became ready sources of conscripts. Only the great ports, devastated by the blockade, deviate from this pattern. As with Spanish America, the inner empire contained marginal zones of scattered village societies, hostile to – and relatively remote from – the pre- and post-conquest

[16] For the 'blue banana' region of the eighteenth century, which resembles 'Lotharingia': 'Introduction', in K. Davids and J. Lucassen, eds., *A miracle mirrored: the Dutch republic in European perspective* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 1–25, especially Map 1.1e, p. 17.

[17] N. Wachtel, 'Acculturation', in J. Le Goff and P. Nora, eds., *Faire de l'histoire* (Paris, 1974), pp. 130–1.

[18] Ibid., pp. 126–7.

[19] I. Wallerstein, *The modern world system* (3 vols., London, 1989), III: *The second era of great expansion of the capitalist world-economy, 1730–1840s*, pp. 130–1, 189.

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urban centres of power, but which proved too weak and dispersed to resist the new imperial regime. In both empires, this second zone was composed of isolated pockets which were 'picked off', and subsequently became more intensely policed than the lowland urban core: the Ardennes, parts of the Black Forest, the northern Apennines from Piedmont to Tuscany, and the Massif Central were areas of fierce resistance to all external authority before and immediately after the Napoleonic conquest, but they were all brought to heel definitively as a result of it, being surrounded – cornered – within more easily controllable areas. The adherence or forcible submission – the difference, if real, is not crucial in this specific context – of the great arteries of Western Europe to Napoleon produced two changes in the spatial circumstances of the hinterlands: the creation of a wide and powerful political hegemony weakened the importance of frontiers between states, where it did not abolish them altogether, and even where it actually created them. Then, in these conditions, former centres of relatively weak states such as Turin, Parma, Genoa, Munich, Stuttgart, or even 'apolitical' regional centres like Clermont, Lyon, or Nîmes, watched contentedly as the forces of the new *imperium* overwhelmed their recalcitrant hinterlands. The result was that many of the most lawless areas of Western Europe were reduced to compliance to external authority for the first time in their histories, well before the end of Napoleonic rule in 1814. Nor did they return to their traditional ways, thereafter: the Rhenish, Belgian, and north Italian frontiers were transformed from centres of banditry into 'domesticated' frontiers and well-policed communities. This was achieved not only through military force, but also because the more developed urban centres around these pockets of resistance wished it so. As Michael Rowe has said of the Rhineland, 'In many cases, the new regime received substantial local support from all social levels. The fight against banditry in the early years of the Consulate is just one example'.[20]

This is not to say that the inner empire was peaceful or easy to govern at the moment of conquest. Rapid imperial expansion, in any historical context, reduces the imperatives of even the most sophisticated *imperium* to the essentials of medieval kingship. The new power must judge its initial success by its ability to extract military service and revenue from its new subjects, and to 'make its writ run' through the enforcement and acceptance of its laws, in this case the Code Napoléon. None of this was assured or achieved without struggle or compromise. Nevertheless, there was much in the essential character of the lands of the 'impossible domain' that, ultimately, made it possible to acculturate them beyond the bare essentials of domination. It was far easier in

[20] M. Rowe, 'Between empire and home town: Napoleonic rule on the Rhine, 1799–1814', *Historical Journal*, 42 (1999), pp. 643–74. More widely: M. Broers, 'Policing Piedmont, 1789–1821', *Criminal Justice History*, 17 (1994), pp. 39–57; X. Rousseau, 'La révolution Pénale, fondement national de l'état? Les modèles français de justice dans la formation de la Bélgique, des Pays-Bas et du Luxembourg (1780–1850)', in X. Rousseau, M.-S. Dupont-Bouchat, and C. Vael, eds., *Révolutions et justice pénale en Europe: modèles français et traditions nationales, 1780–1830* (Paris, 1999), pp. 285–307.

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the 'Lotharingian isthmus' to find social structures amenable to the essence, if seldom to the totality, of a civil society ruled by an urban-centred, professional, bureaucracy and a legal system constructed on property rights, individualism, and a clear division between public and private spheres. These factors were crucial to the success of acculturation here, rather than their adjacent position to 'old France', or even to the length of time they were under French rule. This becomes clearer when the level of acculturation in the inner empire is juxtaposed to those areas comprising the outer empire; in this perspective, the 'impossible domain' actually emerges as a plausible reality, if also as an 'imperial isthmus' within Europe, as a whole.

IV

Beyond the imperial core and its hinterlands lay a periphery from which, inevitably, imperial authority had to withdraw or adopt a policy of genocide, an option open to the Spanish but hardly to Napoleon.[21] For Napoleon, these zones coincided mainly with those areas where feudalism still dominated social and economic relations, and so conditioned structures of local administration; a world devoid of urban centres and educated elites, but also of independent peasantries. The inner empire was, thus, allodial as well as alluvial, in its essence. Northern and central Germany, southern Italy, and inland Spain south of the Ebro were Napoleon's irreducible marches, together with Michelet's 'blind, strange' Vendée. Indeed, just as Wachtel notes how quickly the Spanish withdrew to the limits of the Inca empire,[22] so Napoleon soon failed to assert real control over any of the areas he conquered after 1806, not necessarily because they were recent acquisitions or far from 'old France', but because they were structurally alien to his empire. It was almost an instinctive reaction to abandon Spain south of the Ebro in 1808, and again in 1813, for example.

The Napoleonic empire was built on war, and military exigencies demanded the swift creation of working relationships between indigenous elites and the imperial intruders, even more at local level than with the actual rulers of the old polities. However, it was the existence of urban, sophisticated, societies, possessed of relatively numerous – if ultimately insufficient – literate elites, which sustained and deepened imperial control, a set of circumstances found more readily in 'Lotharingia' than elsewhere. If there was ingrained hatred of the countryside by the town, so much the better. In either case, the urban character of the Napoleonic administrative edifice combined with local conditions resulted in a working compromise that saw men and revenue extracted first and foremost from the rural world. Working out from urban centres through *colonnes mobiles* led by the prefects, the lands of the inner empire yielded millions of conscripts not only from their lowland cores, but also from

[21] Wachtel, 'Acculturation', pp. 126–33.

[22] Ibid., pp. 128–9.

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their hinterlands. As Isser Woloch has pointed out in a specifically French context, by the end of the Napoleonic wars, 'Under the relentless pressures of the state, the most problematic demand imaginable before the Revolution became a cornerstone of the new civic order'.[23] This process was, indeed, the harbinger of the modern state or, at the very least, of tighter, more regular, government control over society which was the springboard for major change in Western Europe,[24] and taxation followed a similar path.[25] But even at this basic level of control, men and money, the easiest sources of both were not always found within 'old France'. Conscription – and with it the whole edifice of local government which was meant, first and foremost, to enforce it – failed not just in the makeshift annexations on the fringes of the empire such as the Illyrian provinces or the Hanseatic departments, nor in Naples, but in the Pyrenean departments and the Vendée-militaire. Thus, the clue to the failure of the regime to impose what it regarded as the true test of its authority lay less in the duration of its rule than in particular preconditions that made a given society, in a specific region, more or less amenable to acculturation within the Napoleonic *imperium*.

When the demands of war led to violent resistance – as happened almost everywhere, initially – what mattered was a refusal on the part of certain key sectors in a given region to allow these salient manifestations of 'anti-revolution' to develop into counter-revolution.[26] This usually meant urban centres that were politically reliable, but which could also, ultimately, impose themselves on their hinterlands with imperial help. In rural areas where the propertied classes were both influential and loyal, the same pattern could emerge, as in parts of Piedmont and, latterly, Tuscany.[27] Set in this context, Napoleon's attempt to rally the nobility of the west acquires its full significance. The imperative was to deny the popular classes, especially those of the

[23] I. Woloch, *The new regime: the transformation of the French civic order, 1789–1820s* (New York, 1994), p. 433.

[24] In addition to Woloch: A. Forrest, *Conscripts and deserters: the French army and society during the Revolution and Empire* (Oxford, 1989); M. Broers, *Napoleonic imperialism and the Savoyard monarchy, 1770–1821: state building in Piedmont* (Lampeter, 1997); A. Grab, 'Army, state and society: conscription and desertion in Napoleonic Italy (1802–1814)', *Journal of Modern History*, 67 (1995), pp. 25–54; Rowe, 'Napoleonic rule on the Rhine'.

[25] The kingdom of Italy acquired an efficient, professional, system of tax administration; Naples did not: A. Grab, 'La politica finanziaria nella Repubblica e nel Regno d'Italia sotto Napoleone', in Istituto per la Storia del Risorgimento Italiano, ed., *L'Italia nell'età napoleonica* (Milan, 1999), pp. 39–113; J. A. Davis, 'The Napoleonic era in southern Italy: an ambiguous legacy?', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 80 (1993), pp. 133–48.

[26] The distinction between the two was first developed in: C. M. Lucas, 'Résistances populaires à la Révolution dans le Sud-Est', in J. Nicolas, ed., *Mouvements populaires et conscience sociale (xvie–xixe siècles)* (Paris, 1985), pp. 473–88; R. Dupuy, *De la Révolution à la Chouannerie* (Paris, 1988).

[27] M. Broers, 'Revolution as vendetta: patriotism in Piedmont, 1794–1821', *Historical Journal*, 33 (1990), pp. 573–97, 787–809; S. J. Woolf, 'French civilization and ethnicity in the Napoleonic Empire', *Past and Present*, 124 (1989), pp. 96–120, 111–12; J. P. Filipini, 'Difesa dell'Impero o difesa della società? Le misure di *haute police* nella Toscana napoleonica', *Rivista Italiana di Studi Napoleonici*, 17 (1980), pp. 9–66.

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recalcitrant hinterlands, the leadership they needed to sustain resistance. Hence, during the massive rural revolts in central and north-eastern Italy in 1809, the great Italian cities stood by the kingdom of Italy;[28] in the same year, a revolt against the mobilization of rural national guards in the Sarre was easily isolated and crushed,[29] a fate that had already befallen the revolt of the Piacentino, in north-western Italy in 1805–6, which had similar causes.[30] Although these events shocked and even demoralized many local administrators, their ultimate futility – above all their lack of elite leadership and the resumption of normal administration soon after their collapse – show that the Napoleonic state had struck deeper roots in these areas than over much of western and south-western France. Whereas in the Rhineland and northern Italy, the new imperial power could count on vital sectors of these regions to stand by it in the face of popular revolt – if not, as it proved, against the armies of the coalition – it felt no such confidence on its western march, where low quotas for conscription and taxation were conceded, to the end. The 'blue islands' were loyal, but not considered strong enough to stem the tide of counter-revolution; until the local nobility was won over, only a retreat from government seemed feasible. Clearly, the longevity of French rule does not always or everywhere provide a real answer as to why some areas came into the Napoleonic orbit and others did not. Deep-seated hatred and fear of the countryside by the town only worked as a weapon for the imperial power where the town was strong enough to resist and penetrate its hinterland. In the Rhineland and northern Italy, the Napoleonic intruders were able to draw upon deep urban–rural animosities and, what is most important, on networks of urban patronage that penetrated the countryside. In convulsed, unstable, conditions, these networks were a source of fear, resentment, and revolt in the rural world, but under strong imperial rule, they could and did flourish, to the benefit of the imperial regime and the local elites. Without them, as in the Vendée, urban loyalty to the regime was impotent, however dependable. On the western, eastern, and southern marches, urban centres were few, far between, and with little influence on the rural world. Even the commercial classes of great ports with feudal hinterlands, such as Naples or Valencia, had little real influence outside them, compared to the seigneurs.[31] Each march had its own variants on the failure of Napoleonic rule, however.

The eastern march of Napoleonic Europe is proof that political loyalty, expressed in diplomatic and military terms, is no real test of acculturation to an

[28] On the north-east: C. Bullo, 'Dei movimenti insurrezionali del Veneto sotto il dominio napoleonico, e specialmente del brigantaggio del 1809', *Nuovo Archivio Veneto*, 17 (1899), pp. 66–101. On central Italy: A. Grab, 'State power, brigandage and rural resistance in Napoleonic Italy', *European History Quarterly*, 25 (1995), pp. 39–70.

[29] R. Dufraisse, 'Une rebellion en pays annexé: le soulèvement des gardes nationales de la Sarre en 1809', *Bulletin de la Société d'Histoire Moderne*, 10 (1969), pp. 2–6.

[30] M. Broers, *Europe under Napoleon, 1799–1815* (London, 1996), pp. 104–5.

[31] On Valencia: Ardit, 'La crisi politica de l'antic regim', pp. 197–8. On Naples: J. Davis, *Società e imprenditori nel Regno Borbonico, 1815/1860* (Rome and Bari, 1979), pp. 17–48.

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imperial political culture: few parts of Europe showed such fanatical devotion to the person of Napoleon as the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, but this revived rump of Poland remained only a military ally; its new, Napoleonic, institutions did not absorb the essence of the Code or the ethos of the bureaucratic state. Westphalia was a fertile recruiting ground for the imperial war effort in terms of conscripts and, eventually, also of officers, as elements of the Hessian nobility, their properties and local power assured by Jerome, joined the *Grande Armée*.[32] Yet, in both these Napoleonic creations, as well as in Berg, the efforts of Beugnot, Simeon, and Roederer to open the way for imperial structures by dismantling the feudal edifice came to grief; their efforts were compromised to the point of betrayal by the creation of the *majorats* and *dotations*, institutions unthinkable in the inner empire.[33] Nevertheless, these areas provided the French with the basics of men and revenue with far greater ease, and in far greater quantity, than the western march, within 'old France'. In this comparative context, it is arguable that Napoleonic hegemony in the states of its eastern march is a case of acculturation in reverse: not only did the new imperial order decline – however reluctantly – to uproot the foundations of the indigenous society and political culture of its eastern march, it actually adopted and extended the system in these areas; in return, it received the 'feudal basics', men and revenue. This bargain bears more than a passing resemblance to the well-established system of conscription in Russia, which was based on an agreement by the state to maintain feudalism in return for the right to conscript serfs.[34] In this sense, the Napoleonic state system truly had overrun its natural limits. To assure its essential needs, the system had not so much to adapt, as to dissolve itself into the indigenous culture and effectively to mimic its nearest rival for great power status in the region, Russia. Napoleon had no more of a policy towards the 'earls' of his eastern march than did Edward I, seeking only that he and his family be the first among them.[35]

The southern march, Spain and the kingdom of Naples, proved equally impossible to assimilate. In central and southern Spain, the Napoleonic empire crashed not only on the rock of military resistance, but on that of seigneurialism, a fact often, if understandably, lost in the sound and fury of the Peninsula War. As in the east, the incongruity of Napoleonic rule is revealed as much through French successes – or, more correctly, by the price paid for them – as through armed conflict. Joseph and most of his marshals detested Spanish seigneurialism: Soult, the military commandant of Andalusia, echoed the attitude of his civilian counterparts in Germany, when he condemned 'les

[32] H. Berding, 'Le Royaume de Westphalie, état-modèle', *Francia*, 10 (1982); G. Pedlow, *The survival of the Hessian nobility, 1770–1870* (Princeton, 1988).

[33] H. Berding, *Napoleonische Herrschafts- und Gellschaftpolitik im Königreich Westfalen 1807–1813* (Cologne, 1973); M. Senkowska-Gluck, 'Les majorats français dans le duché de Varsovie (1807–1813)', *Annales Historiques de la Révolution française*, 36 (1964), pp. 373–86.

[34] R. D. Bohac, 'The Mir and the military draft', *Slavic Review*, 13 (1987), pp. 652–66.

[35] K. B. McFarlane, 'Had Edward I a "policy" towards the earls?', in idem, *The nobility of later medieval England* (Oxford, 1973), pp. 248–67.

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institutions vicieuses qui l'ont régie pendant des siècles, ont énervé la population et détruit l'industrie', still believing that Napoleonic rule – synonymous as it was with the destruction of seigneurialism – could regenerate the area, and that 'nous touchons à l'époque oú ce grand projet doit se réaliser'.[36] It was not Soult who did most to rally support for the French, however, but Suchet, who commanded the heavily infeudated province of Valencia, where a widespread, genuinely popular, anti-seigneurial revolt had seethed since the 1780s.[37] Instead of exploiting it – as Soult implied was necessary when trying to organize local national guards in Andalusia – Suchet, in defiance of Joseph's policy, intervened on the side of the landlords. The result was that 'rural communities were struggling as much against their own landlords as against the French invaders'[38] but Suchet's approach stood out as a model of success in an otherwise dark corner of Napoleonic Europe, precisely because he 'acculturated' to Valencian seigneurialism and to such ancien régime practices as provisioning urban markets through official intervention.[39] In Suchet's satrapy, the empire was assimilated by the indigenous aristocracy. In Naples, Murat imitated Soult and Joseph Bonaparte, his predecessor, rather than Suchet, declaring he wished to be remembered for the destruction of feudalism in his realm. Unlike his counterparts in Germany – who had to contend with a university trained legal profession determined to preserve feudal rights – Murat could count on an administrative urban elite long steeped in anti-seigneurialism, epitomized by Giuseppe Zurlo. Napoleonic rule in Naples represents an unambiguous attempt to assimilate an alien society by the imperial power, in the face of an internal crisis which predated its rule and was not of its making. As John Davis argues, this turned on the creation of a rational administrative structure, at local as well as national level, which it was hoped would foster a convergence of public and private interests.[40] Although Napoleonic reforms did not leave the region unchanged, they were absorbed into existing structures and did not produce the results intended by the imperial and indigenous policy makers. The perpetuation – if by unofficial means and under different legal labels – of seigneurial domination in the provinces, meant that Napoleonic administrative innovations simply did not emerge as the real power at local level, but perhaps even more striking is that when a non-noble, tightly knit, elite of merchants did emerge in Naples, who proved powerful enough to monopolize the grain trade, they, too, escaped state control.[41]

The barrier of feudalism represents the natural limit of Napoleonic

[36] Cited in N. Gotteri, *Soult. Maréchal et homme d'état* (Besançon, 1991), p. 326.

[37] Ardit, 'La crisi politica de l'antic regim', pp. 195–214.

[38] B. Hammet, 'Spanish constitutionalism and the impact of the French Revolution, 1808–1814', in H. T. Mason and W. Doyle, eds., *The impact of the French Revolution on European consciousness* (Gloucester, 1989), pp. 69–84, 74–5.

[39] B. Bergerot, *Le Maréchal Suchet, duc d'Albufera* (Paris, 1986), pp. 143–54.

[40] Davis, 'The Napoleonic era in southern Italy', pp. 137–8.

[41] Davis, *Società e imprenditori*, passim.

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hegemony to the south and east, a reality further underlined by the relative success enjoyed by the French and the states of the Rhenish Confederation in dismantling those pockets of seigneurialism inside the inner empire. They were picked off in similar fashion – if without resort to force – as the hinterlands of the inner empire, with which they were often coterminous. This is not to minimize the importance or magnitude of the anti-seigneurial struggle here. Many states – Nassau and Baden, in particular – quickly realized that political survival depended on the destruction of seigneurial power, which was increased by their territorial expansion between 1803 and 1806, through their absorption of the fiefs of the mediatized Imperial Knights. As von Bieberstein, the chief minister of Nassau, put it, 'If one leaves too many powers in the hands of the mediatized … a state within a state would exist with results which would over shadow all other things once the pressure from above would weaken'.[42] There was far more at stake here, for the leaders of the *mittle staaten*, than meeting their military and financial obligations to Napoleon. But equally, they succeeded, in great part – in this part of Europe – where others elsewhere failed. Strong as the feudal nobility was in these states, it did not dominate them, for the seigneurs were often newcomers, 'refugees' in the mediatized framework created by Napoleon on the Rhine, rather than an integral part of the ancien régime structures of these states, in stark contrast to their position further east, or further south. The anti-seigneurial struggles in the states of the Confederation were 'micro-frontiers' within the inner empire. The failure of the acculturated bureaucracy of the core of the kingdom of Italy in its attempts to integrate the Venetian nobility to their structures is a comparable example of this process in a satellite state. Within Bavaria, the newly acquired Tyrol created the most violent, recalcitrant, micro-frontier of all, mirroring the western march of the Vendée-militaire.[43] However, the Tyrol – and the less violent conflicts between Munich and its many other micro-frontiers with ex-Imperial Knights, ex-Free Cities, and home towns – are reminders that the process of acculturation was not solely – or even mainly – the preserve of the French empire, or of the French. In western Germany, a long political history ensured that the machinery of the state – however weak – belonged to a reforming bureaucracy, not to the seigneurs, as Stein, their champion and fellow, found to his cost in the 'War of Liberation'.[44] Ironically, the fluid political and cultural frontiers of the old Reich ensured that reforming bureaucrats were present in greater force than might be expected in small states: Montgelas, von Bieberstein, and von Reitzenstein were all technically

[42] Cited in B. C. Anderson, 'State-building in early nineteenth century Nassau', *Central European History*, 24 (1991), pp. 222–47, at p. 235.

[43] M. Dunan, *Napoléon et l'Allemagne, le système continental et les débuts du Royaume de Bavière, 1806–1810* (Paris, 1942), pp. 232–72. See also: F. G. Eyck, *Loyal rebels: Andreas Hofer and the Tyrolean uprising of 1809* (New York, 1986).

[44] P. G. von Kielmannsegg, *Stein und die Zentralverwaltung, 1813/1814* (Stuttgart, 1964); K. von Raumer, 'Deutschland um 1800. Krise und Neugestaltung 1789–1815', in K. von Raumer and M. Botzenhart, eds., *Deutsche Geschichte im 19 Jahrhundert*, Band 3/I (Wiesbaden, 1980), pp. 409–30.

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'in foreign service' – and had served Joseph II in the recent past – the hidden advantage of one acculturated *imperium* succeeding another, and bequeathing its heartland to it.

If Spain was the official imperial ulcer, the western march, within 'old France', was its unmentionable hernia. In the light of Isser Woloch's thesis – that the process of conscription drew even the remotest parts of France closer to the state – it is arguable that Napoleon's conciliatory policy towards the western departments actually perpetuated the attitudes behind the original revolt of 1793. If military service truly was *l'école de la nation*, the Vendée was allowed to play truant. Here, the frontier was not defined by the prevalence of seigneurialism as a practical check on the state at local level. Indeed, the reverse was true in western France, as poor or modest noble families increasingly abandoned the countryside for the towns; they were certainly not a dominant force in the village.[45] Yet the frontier was still real enough. As in Calabria and Andalusia, there were the 'blue islands', but Napoleonic policy left the countryside largely to itself. In this context, Napoleon's overtly propagandistic rebuilding of La Roche-sur-Yonne, and its renaming as Napoléonville, was but an impotent, defiant gesture. Its very existence testified to the reality of a western march. In part, this was born of Napoleon's personal respect for those he called 'the giants of the Vendée'[46] who were effectively appeased like the feudal magnates of the east and south. The net result of this policy of laissez-faire towards the counter-revolutionaries was not *ralliement*, but the perpetuation of a sense of separation of this region from the rest of France. Defining the western march is, essentially, an exercise in locating the divide between the western *bocage* and the flatter, more urbanized, eastern plain region, first discerned by Paul Bois in the Sarthe, within Napoleonic Europe.[47] The *bocage* was not just a predominantly rural world, but a rural world dominated by its own hierarchies and elites, an autonomous rural world.

The experience of the south-west, and of Roussillon in particular, shows this Vendean sense of uniqueness was unjustified. Roussillon's history and geography, both political and physical, readily explains its continued rebelliousness on one level, but the nature of the failure of acculturation here also points to deeper currents of rejection, and so helps define the western limits of the 'Lotharingian isthmus'. The continued refusal of the local elites to use the courts in criminal affairs marks a more profound rejection of the state, among a crucial sector of society, than more overt forms of resistance: rural crime and its repression remained within the sphere of private, contractual relations here, and so stiffled official attempts to infiltrate elite networks of

[45] A. Gérard, *Pourquoi la Vendée?* (Paris, 1990), pp. 71–5.

[46] Cited in J.-C. Martin, *La Vendée et la France* (Paris, 1987), p. 132.

[47] P. Bois, *Paysans de l'ouest: des structures économiques et sociales aux opinions politiques depuis l'époque révolutionnaire dans le Sarthe* (Paris, 1960). Gérard, *Pourquoi*, takes a more nuanced view of the economy, and sees the *bocage* as closely linked to a wider economy prior to the 1770s, but recognizes its inherent difference from the east: pp. 37–56.

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patronage. The failure of *ralliement* among the local elites represents a more fundamental failure of acculturation for the imperial regime than even armed rebellion. By 1814, Roussillon was further alienated from the French state than before 1789.[48] Taken together, the Vendée-militaire and Roussillon also underline the continued diversity of France itself, even in the face of the Napoleonic juggernaut, and of the limits of where 'la France bleue' – and the origins of the Maggiolo Line – are to be found. This hypothetical division of France by a line running north-west to south-east, between St Malo and Geneva, was based on levels of literacy, and first devised by Louis Maggiolo in 1879. The western march was still a long way from Braudel's Rhine–Rhone–Saone corridor, the heart of Lotharingia, and the political history of the revolutionary era exaggerated, rather than ameliorated, this fact of geography. Within the Napoleonic *imperium*, there were far more potent, implacable frontiers at work in Europe than those proclaimed by the revolutionaries in 1792.

The fundamental incompatibility of Napoleonic rule with the societies of its marches unfolded in their responses to the introduction of the Code. For Sylvie Humbert-Convain, 'il est certain que de rendre la justice d'après des principes nouveaux, c'est de toutes les transformations sociales celle qui exèrce l'influence la plus grande sur la vie et les moeurs d'un pays'.[49] The Napoleonic Code provided the legal framework for a particular kind of society and, therefore, the limits of its applicability denote the natural limits for Napoleonic acculturation. To the south and east, feudalism was the major landmark; in the west, it was bound up with a complex rejection of the Revolution. But the northern march, along the Weser, was different. The case of the Hanseatic departments is intriguing, for here the Code was rejected not in defence of a feudal or even a rural order, but because it was considered by the indigenous elites as too primitive, particularly with regard to the criminal code, for the highly evolved urban, commercial, society of the German North Sea coast.[50]

The acceptance and durability of the Code – or lack of it – after 1814 reveals its role as a vehicle of integration – the absorption of foreign elements into the indigenous culture, to cite Wachtel – or as a forced assimilation of foreign norms by a subject culture. Broadly, where the Code remained popular marks the territory of the inner empire, as in the Rhineland, where Rhenish elites clung to it as a surrogate constitution under Prussian rule.[51] In such places, the

[48] M. Brunet, *Le Roussillon, une société contre l'état, 1780–1820* (Toulouse, 1986), pp. 483–6, 545–6.

[49] S. Humbert-Convain, *Le juge de paix et la répression des infractions dounaières en Flandre et Hollande, 1794–1815 : contribution à l'histoire du sytstème continental napoleonien* (Amstelveen, 1993), p. 222.

[50] B. Schimdt, 'Continuité et transformations du régime institutionel dans les départements hanséatiques (1806–1814)', in Archivio di Stato di Torino, ed., *All'Ombra dell'Aquila Imperiale* (2 vols., Rome, 1994), II, pp. 49–83; J. Vidalenc, 'Les départements hanséatiques et l'administration napoleonienne', *Francia*, 20 (1973), pp. 414–50.

[51] J. Engelbrecht, 'The French model and German society: the impact of the *Code Penal* on the Rhineland', in Rousseau, Dupont-Bouchat, and Vael, eds., *Révolutions et justice pénale*, pp. 101–7; Rowe, 'Napoleonic rule on the Rhine'.

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Napoleonic system met local needs, however much its material demands provoked violent resistance or surly resentment during the war years. Acceptance and rejection of the Code marks the boundary between areas of anti- and counter-revolution very clearly, for where local elites found satisfaction in it, they integrated Napoleonic norms into their own practices even if they, too, detested imperial rule for the relative loss of power imperial rule entailed, as in Piedmont.[52] The negative responses of the marches were diverse, as is to be expected, but their rejection of the Code is not explicable purely in terms of feudalism, for it does not fit that of the Hansa ports or even, entirely, that of the west of France. A more precise common factor was the challenge the Code made to all forms of corporatism; it attacked any institutional structures – of whatever kind – which had evolved over time. This is well known, but corporatism took many forms, not all of them easily classifiable as retrograde – socially, economically, or politically – in the manner in which French reformers, from Sièyes onwards, were prone to do. This is what the public institutions of the Hansa ports shared with those of the eastern march and Naples, a corporate structure alien to the Code which, in turn, alienated them from the individualist ethos of the Code. Where corporate structures were breaking down or found wanting by those who controlled them, the Code found a welcome; where local elites retained a confidence in corporatism, it was rejected. This was the case in Roussillon, as it was in Lübeck; it was as true of the feudal barons of Naples as of the peasant rebels of the Tyrol. The strength of elite-led corporatism, in its myriad forms, marks the boundary of the Napoleonic heartland, and corporatism could accommodate advanced societies, as in the Hansa ports. Wherever a desire to occlude the relationship between state and citizen persisted, Napoleonic norms remained alien.

It should never be assumed that the process of acculturation to Napoleonic norms ever gained widespread popular favour, even in its heartland, nor was the regime deeply concerned by this. As Michael Rowe has shrewdly observed, '*Ralliement* was a politically inclusive, but socially exclusive process'.[53] Whole territories were integrated technically, but the immediate process of acculturation touched only the elites, if often at a very local, unexalted, level. Indeed, the Napoleonic *imperium* built quite deliberately on the fissure between popular and elite culture that had emerged over the early modern period.[54] Few systems of government were as consistently hostile to popular culture as Napoleon's, and where corporate identities were imbued with a shared culture between elites and the popular classes, anti-revolution transformed itself more easily into counter-revolution than elsewhere, as happened in Spain in 1808. But it failed miserably to materialize in Germany a year later, and the pitiable propaganda campaign launched by the coterie of intellectuals around Stadion

[52] G. P. Romagnani, *Prospero Balbo, Intelletuale e Uomo di Stato* (2 vols., Turin, 1987–90), II, *passim*.

[53] Rowe, 'Napoleonic rule on the Rhine'.

[54] Notably: R. Muchembled, *Culture populaire et culture des élites* (Paris, 1977).

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and the war party in Vienna, led by the Schlegel brothers, only underlines the fact.[55]

It is tempting to consider to what extent the schism between Pius VII and Napoleon might have shattered the process of acculturation in the inner empire, had the military situation not intervened. The Concordat was never popular among the masses, even within the inner empire, as witnessed by the intense religious revivals in regions as otherwise 'assimilated' as Piedmont and the Rhineland after 1814.[56] The resistance of the *petite église* in the west and the Roman clergy was predictable, and in keeping with the limits of the imperial core. The failure of the Concordat to assimilate much of the inner empire beyond 'old France' is equally explicable; there it represented aggressive cultural disruption, rather than a partial restoration.[57] Yet, within France, a secret police report of 1811 asserted the 'le mécontentement se cache aujourd'hui sous le manteau de la réligion ... La réligion de l'État, le culte national ne suffisent point à ces fervents'.[58] In the same year, six dioceses were under interdiction of the state, where 'les evéques se sont montrés dissidents des principes reconnus par tous les autres'.[59] All of them, save Bordeaux, were within the inner empire,[60] and it was noted that a further nine should be also be so classed, with only two – Vannes, in Brittany, and Montepulciano, in Tuscany – falling outside the imperial core.[61] Had these trends continued, the quarrel with the pope could have seen Napoleonic hegemony undermined from its own periphery, the southern march eroding the assimilation effected at the core. The historical reality is that Napoleonic rule retained a largely positive legacy among the elites of the 'Lotharingian isthmus'.

V

The collapse of the empire and, within old France, the Hundred Days, indicate where Napoleonic institutions had taken root, and where they had not. As Napoleonic rule collapsed in the Pyrenean departments, those of the Rhineland and northern Italy, together with the Lombard core of the kingdom of Italy, continued to enforce conscription and collect revenue. On his return in 1815, Napoleon chose not to show himself overtly until he was out of Provence, and into the Rhone–Saone isthmus; as Burgundy and the Champagne prepared to welcome him, the 'blue islands' of the western departments girded themselves

[55] As is even admitted in the pro-nationalist classic: W. C. Langsam, *The Napoleonic wars and German nationalism in Austria* (London, 1930), pp. 66–116. See also: M. Falk, 'Stadion, adversaire de Napoléon, 1806–1809', *Annales Historiques de la Révolution française*, 34 (1962), pp. 288–305.

[56] J. Sperber, *Popular Catholicism in nineteenth century Germany* (Princeton, 1984); C. Bona, *Le 'Amicizie': Società Segrete e Rinascita Religiosa (1770–1830)* (Turin, 1962).

[57] Broers, *Europe under Napoleon*, p. 82.

[58] Archives Nationales de Paris (ANP) AF IV1048, 'Rapport à S.M. sur l'affaire Dastros', undated, 1811. [59] ANP AF IV 1048, Minister of *Cultes* to Napoleon, 4 Sept. 1811.

[60] St Briene, Alpes-Maritimes, Ghent, Tournay, and Troyes.

[61] Münster, Soissons, Limoges, Namur, Grenoble, and Mondovì (Piedmont).

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against a hostile, royalist, countryside, a pattern of responses that reveals much about the success of the process of pacification of the preceding years.[62]

The true test of acculturation, however, came in the decades after 1814, when the constraints of the war effort allowed the heritage of Napoleonic hegemony to be assessed by Europeans in a different context. The relative popularity of the Code and of Napoleonic administrative institutions are the clearest indicators of this: they reveal the extent to which *ralliement* had been achieved, less at the purely political level of 'assimilation' – where external practices eliminate indigenous norms, to return to the definitions of Wachtel – but where the imperial experience had led to the 'integration' of Napoleonic institutions into indigenous societies.[63] For contemporary politics, this meant knowing where the ethos of Napoleonic government had been accepted as a set of principles and practices by more than a narrow Jacobin clique or the handfuls of 'enlightened' statesmen at the apex of power, such as Dei Medici in Naples, Azana in Spain, or even Michael Speransky in Russia. Where the acceptance of Napoleonic ways of ruling, as quite distinct from Napoleonic rule, ceased to be the preserve of peripheral political groups, and became the expectation of the provincial notables, the empire had, in *la longue durée*, found its true core, and that core had a spatial logic.

Braudel argued, with specific reference to the enduring influence of the Treaty of Verdun in Western Europe, that 'history tends to provide frontiers with roots, as if they had been closed by natural accidents; once incorporated into geography, they become difficult to move thereafter', hence the 'impossible' nature of the 'isthmic folly' of Lotharingia.[64] The French revolutionaries embraced this, through the doctrine of natural frontiers; Napoleon tried to set it brusquely aside. On a purely political level, it is a commonplace to castigate Napoleon's frontiers as more artificial even than those of the old order, as his were seldom rooted in dynastic legitimacy, or so flagrantly arbitrary they were devoid of lasting historical meaning. Even at the level of history Braudel termed the 'political', the 'transient' – that which can be reckoned in months, years, or decades – there is scant truth in this. If Napoleonic imperialism is examined in terms of Braudel's other levels of historical development – the geo-political and socio-economic – then the spatial shifts it created acquire profound importance.[65] In his attempts to redefine the map of Europe, it is Napoleon, not the Girondins of 1792, who emerges as the true revolutionary, as he sought, if only half consciously, to revive the 'natural regions' of Europe, to overthrow not only the artificial frontiers of the ancien régime, but the false *soi-disant* 'natural' frontiers of 1792. By almost instinctively seeking to return Europe to the borders of Verdun,

[62] Especially: R. S. Alexander, *Bonapartism and the revolutionary tradition in France: the Fédérés of 1815* (Cambridge, 1991). [63] Wachtel, 'Acculturation', pp. 130–2.

[64] Braudel, *Identity*, I, pp. 312–13.

[65] F. Braudel, *The Mediterranean world in the age of Philip II* (3 vols., Eng. trans., London, 1977), I, pp. 20–1.

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Napoleon threw down a challenge not only to his immediate predecessors – revolutionary 'naturalists' and dynastic diplomats, alike – but to the political nationalists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The emergence of a new imperial hegemony almost instinctively revived the Europe of Verdun, rather than that of Aix-la-Chapelle.

The most profound expression of this is the Continental System: in seeking to reorient the European economy around the central axis of the Rhine–Saone–Rhone corridor, Napoleon stirred the potential for a new Lotharingia, only to be thwarted by the demands of his own war effort, the lobbying of French entrepreneurs, and the enduring adherence to the supposedly artificial political frontiers of the ancien régime, beyond France. It is the failures and deprivations caused by the Continental System which, rightly, preoccupy its major historians, but Louis Bergeron's famous definition of Napoleon's policies as 'a kind of one-way common market' has two aspects embedded in it: its 'one-way' element was the product of transient politics, whereas the acknowledgement of the 'common-market' aspect of Napoleonic policy points to its potential, as well as its limitations: the first corresponds to Braudel's 'political level' of history, the second to his socio-economic and even geo-political levels. To maintain the economic supremacy rooted in the persistence of the political frontiers, Napoleon had to crush many natural trends towards integration, the scotching of the trade treaty between Bavaria and the kingdom of Italy perhaps the most significant among them.[66] There were similar aspirations in central Italy, between the kingdom and the *départements réunis*, particularly between Tuscany and Lombardy, that foreshadow the views of Cattaneo in the 1830s and 1840s. Conversely, the states of the Rhenish Confederation moved steadily towards economic integration in these years and, in 1814, the elites of the Belgian departments were quick to realize that annexation to France had shown how 'natural' Flanders was, as an economic unit. This is not to suggest that political union with France was desired or sought by contemporaries, but it does indicate that the tariff walls set up by the Treaty of the Trianon were another false frontier, as much for what they included as what they shut out: they embraced a recalcitrant, economically extraneous western march, while excluding the demonstrably 'integrated' industrialized parts of Berg, the Rhenish Confederation, and the kingdoms of Italy and Holland. The hopes and petitions of the period point to a demand for more integration, not less, but only within the confines of the Lotharingian isthmus; the west and south-west of France were as excluded from this process as the Spanish march or the feudal lands to the east.

What Geoffrey Ellis has rightly called 'the paradox of the smuggling trade'[67] actually accentuates, rather than detracts from, the underlying cohesion of the

[66] Dunan, *Napoléon et l'Allemagne*, pp. 124–7.

[67] G. Ellis, *Napoleon's Continental blockade: the case of Alsace* (Oxford, 1981), p. 201; R. Dufraisse, 'La contrebande dans les départements réunis de la rive gauche du Rhin à l'époque napoleonienne', *Francia*, 7 (1973), pp. 508–36.

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inner empire as a natural macro-region. The general participation in smuggling on both sides of the Rhine during the blockade only underlines the natural affinity of the both banks with Berg and the Confederation States, and with Bavaria, Switzerland, and the kingdom of Italy, further south. Above all, widespread smuggling in these areas, as in the Belgian departments, did nothing to undermine their fundamental security or the political loyalty to the empire or the states of the Confederation, of many of those most involved in it.[68] In Holland and the Hanseatic departments, however, the blockade struck more deeply into the local economy, as it did in Nantes and Bordeaux, although many in principle welcomed an end to British competition. Stuart Woolf chose his title well – *Napoleon's integration of Europe* – all the more so if Wachtel's careful definition of the term is invoked, but it is apt only in a very specific, and seemingly identifiable, geographic space. When Jacques Godechot condemned Napoleon for his unbridled ambition, in exceeding 'le projet de Charlemagne', perhaps he spoke more truth than he knew.[69]

The conclusion would seem to be that Napoleon was not radical enough in his political vision, that his cavalier way with the map of Europe was not sufficiently sweeping to serve the impulses he unleashed – and these impulses had nothing to do with the political, culturally derived, nationalism of the decades to come. Bismarck and Cavour later grasped the same point as Napoleon, that they were all prisoners of those deeply rooted political frontiers Braudel understood so well. One of the most powerful reactions to Napoleonic rule was a ferocious rejection of the very concept of empire among liberal intellectuals, epitomized by Cesare Balbo in Italy and Benjamin Constant in France.[70] Their riposte to the 'Napoleonic adventure' was the nation-state, and the ideology that went with it; its power tore the kingdom of the Netherlands apart in 1831, a triumph of the subjective over the empirical. Its idealism is epitomized by Mazzini's *The duties of man*, first published in 1844, but its economic particularism was already manifest in the false peripheries of the Treaty of the Trianon: 'The French vision ... of exclusive nationalism', according to Sidney Pollard.[71]

The hesitations of later 'nation-builders' stemmed from the realization that the states they created in the 1860s were, in fact, 'skewered', straddling the peripheries of Lotharingia. The French obsession with the 'Maggiolo Line' is a reminder that the same was long true of France, too. While Jules Ferry remained an advocate of the autonomy of the 'micro-unit' of the rural commune, he came to fear the north–south divide, an attitude described by Mona Ozouf as:

[68] Ellis, *Continental blockade*, pp. 201–8; Rowe, 'Napoleonic rule on the Rhine'.

[69] J. Godechot, *L'Europe et l'Amérique à l'époque napoléonienne* (Paris, 1967), p. 207.

[70] C. Balbo, *Storia d'Italia e altri scritti storici editi e inediti*, ed. M. F. Leuzzi (Turin, 1985), pp. 95–6; idem, *Il Regno di Carlo Magno in Italia e scritti storici minori*, ed. C. Boncompagni (Florence, 1862), pp. 413–50; B. Constant, *De l'ésprit de conquête et de l'usurpation* (first edn, Hanover, 1814).

[71] S. Pollard, *The integration of the European economy since 1815* (London, 1981), p. 24.

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la sensibilité à la petite communauté empêche Ferry, entre elle et la grande communauté, d'apercevoir un autre échelon et de s'y attarder. Les silences de Ferry sur son entreprise colonisatrice – celle de l'intérieur comme celle de l'extérieur – sont ... volontiers, précisément révélateurs d'une obsession : si Ferry n'en parle jamais, c'est qu'il y pense toujours.[72]

If the 'Maggiolo Line' was the 'dog that didn't bark' in the history of Republican France, the problem of the *Mezzogiorno* dominates the history of modern Italy. In Germany, Bismarck's belief that Russia was a natural ally is rooted in his realization that Prussia – as opposed to the new Reich – stood outside the core of Europe. The suspicion of Prussian conservatives was incarnated in the enduring estrangement between the Prussian heartland and its new Rhenish province after 1814. National rivalries made the Rhine a 'tension area'[73] until 1945 while, ironically, it continued to be governed by the same legal code for most of the period, regardless of who ruled it.[74] Wallerstein sees a similar resilience in economic development, as France, Belgium, Western Germany, and Switzerland re-emerged as a 'core zone' in the mid-nineteenth century.[75]

Napoleonic hegemony had its solid core, and its natural limits. Napoleon was wasting his time trying to integrate his marches into a vision of society that had its real home in that 'impossible domain' of Lotharingia. Home, in such a vision, depended on creating new frontiers to accommodate structural realities as atavistic as they were advanced, and home – that most subjective of terms – remained 'the France of Caesar'. In a world governed by politics, even the great can never go home. That is what made Lotharingia 'impossible'.

[72] M. Ozouf, *L' école de la France* (Paris, 1984), p. 407.

[73] For the typology: R. Gross, 'Registering and ranking of tension areas', in idem, ed., *Confini e Regioni : il potenziale di sviluppo e di pace delle periferie* (Trieste, 1973), pp. 317–28.

[74] Engelbrecht, 'The French model and German society'.

[75] Wallerstein, *The modern world system*, III, p. 125.

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