reforms that allow greater political participation are absorbing a number of growing middle-class economic demands. The question is whether the CCP can or will continue to adjust for greater political demands in the future.

Of course, not everyone will agree with the various results presented in this study, but this is an engaging book that examines how China fits into general theories on political development. The data analysis presented here will also serve as baseline comparison for future studies. In sum, this book is a welcome addition to transition literature and the developing field of public opinion research in China.

Regional Economic Voting: Russia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, 1990–1999.
By Joshua A. Tucker. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 444p. $29.99.
DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707070600

— Jennifer A. Yoder, *Colby College*

On the heels of a generation of scholarship on democratic transition and consolidation in postcommunist countries, and after several election cycles, relatively steady economic growth, and the accession of many countries in the region to NATO and the European Union, the theoretical concepts and assumptions derived from studies of mature democracies have increasingly been applied to the new democracies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. One fine example is *Regional Economic Voting* in which Joshua A. Tucker effectively probes and refines the assumptions of economic voting in established democracies to suggest how variations in economic conditions have affected political support for postcommunist parties. In particular, Tucker explores whether—and under what conditions—traditional economic voting assumptions, that incumbent parties and certain types of parties (right-wing parties in established democracies) perform better if the economy is better, are supported in postcommunist cases.

This study makes a number of contributions to the field of comparative politics. First, it brings to front and center the relevance of context—in this case, the simultaneous political and economic transitions in Eastern Europe and Russia. Beginning with the standard hypotheses developed in the economic voting literature, Tucker considers two models for predicting election outcomes, the referendum model and the transitional identity model, and seeks to ascertain which model has stronger empirical support. The referendum model focuses on the governing status of parties, whether incumbent or opposition, and posits that incumbent parties will perform better when the economic conditions are favorable. The transitional identity model hinges on the type of party, which, in the postcommunist setting, cannot easily be dichotomized into right wing and left wing. Tucker, therefore, introduces the concepts of old regime and new regime parties. Old regime parties include not only "unreconstructed communists" parties that continue to identify with the communist ideology, but also "remade" communist parties, many of which resemble West European social democratic parties, and former "bloc parties" that aligned with the communists in "national fronts." New regime parties are either those derived from communist-era opposition groups that initiated the democratic transition or those that emerged as new entities associated with the transition. This transitional identity model suggests that old regime parties are likely to perform better where economic conditions are worse, because they now look preferable to the new regime parties associated with the painful economic reforms.

The study then skillfully offers a number of conditional hypotheses to account for the particularities of postcommunism. These conditional hypotheses concern things such as the uncertainty that confronts voters in these new democracies, the complexity of a system where institutions are changing, and the variety of postcommunist parties and orientations—whether old regime parties are unreformed or reformed, or if new regime parties are consistent in their liberalizing orientation or populist leaning. Ultimately, the author finds more consistent support for the transitional identity model and its hypotheses, but he is careful to note why we may see less support for these hypotheses in the future. In particular, the point is made that although the transition from communism is the last major event to shape the political attitudes of the electorates in Eastern Europe and Russia, it is likely to fade in voters' memories and, perhaps, be replaced by another event or issue, such as European Union membership and its benefits.

Another contribution of the study is that it draws attention to an often overlooked level of analysis for comparative research, the subnational level. As the author notes, the economic voting literature largely ignores the relationship between regional variation in economic conditions and regional variation in the distribution of votes (p. 11). He has chosen to examine the regional level because it allows him to blend case study and general comparative analysis, facilitated by the fact that both economic and election data are available at the regional level. The author examines 20 elections across five cases—Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Russia. The result is a rich data set, the entirety of which is available at the Websites of the author and the publisher.

Although the arguments about economic voting in this book are convincing, the author might have mentioned alternatives to economic voting for explaining election outcomes in postcommunist cases. One alternative explanation might have to do with the relevance of past affiliations, or traditional party strongholds, especially when considering voting at the subnational level. The center-periphery

relationships under communism left their mark on each of these countries not only in terms of economic development patterns, but also in terms of ideology. It may be that some regions are generally more sympathetic to old regime parties. Also, the organizational strength of parties may help to explain electoral outcomes, with some parties having more access to the media, more developed grassroots networks, or greater support of other relevant actors, such as the churches, interest groups, or nongovernment organizations.

Tucker's study was conducted just as regional self-government was introduced in 3 out of 5 of his cases (Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia). Though it is too early to tell if politics in these cases will be regionalized (that is, if regional parties will emerge, if established parties will organize regionally, or if regional identity will become salient to voters), we can explore whether any patterns in voting behavior are discernable. The availability and comparability of data at the regional level provides a fertile ground for further research.

Regional data has been readily available in Germany, which would be a fascinating application of Tucker's framework. It is the most regionalized country in Europe and comprises both an established democracy and a new, post-communist democracy. Studies have examined voting patterns across the east-west divide in Germany (Stoess, 1997; Wessels, 1998), though not necessarily through the lens of economic voting theory. This would be an interesting testing ground for the conditional hypotheses of Tucker's study.

Regional Economic Voting is a valuable study, meticulously executed and thoroughly supported. It is highly recommended for scholars of new democracies, and not just postcommunist democracies. It would also be extremely useful for advanced undergraduate and graduate students as an example of careful conceptualization and operationalization.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma: Russia, Europe, and the United States. By Mikhail A. Alexseev. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 294p. $70.00.

National Security and Immigration: Policy Development in the United States and Western Europe Since 1945. By Christopher Rudolph. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006. 288p. $55.00.
DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707070612

— Gary P. Freeman, *University of Texas at Austin*

Analyses of immigration from the perspective of national security are often greeted with skepticism. In the early nineties I mentioned the work of Myron Weiner, a pioneer in thinking about the security implications of migration, to a scholar who later held a high immigration policy position in Washington, D.C. "A waste of time," came the reply, "worse than that, positively damaging, because immigration has no important security implications and such talk only provides ammunition to anti-immigration activists." In the wake of 9/11, that complacency has been shaken amid a groundswell of interest in security and migration, but there is in some quarters more resistance than ever to linking the two concepts. The recent literature is sharply divided over the legitimacy and necessity of policies that "securitize" migration policy and over the appropriateness of academic analysis set within a security framework. A major theme in the literature is the claim that the securitization of immigration policy is a repressive state strategy designed to capitalize on public fears in the post–Cold War era and to give security forces something to do now that keeping track of communist subversives is no longer on the table.

Those who accept that migration has security dimensions must answer the question of how best to conceptualize and interpret them. The two books under discussion are welcome attempts to advance the rigorous study of these topics. Both make serious efforts to apply social science theory to the study of migration and security, and both achieve considerable success. The authors explore migration politics across a range of countries in the postwar era. Christopher Rudolph carries out comparative analysis of national states, whereas Mikhail Alexseev focuses on an eclectic mix of regional, supranational, and local cases. The dependent variable in Rudolph's study is national immigration policy and his goal is to explicate the behavior of state policymakers in choosing open or restrictive policies. Alexseev, on the other hand, focuses on mass perceptions of immigration threat and feelings of hostility toward migrants. He accounts for these attitudes as a consequence of perceptions of both the characteristics of migrants and the ability of governing authorities to manage population flows. Rudolph wants to know how immigration policy is affected by geopolitical conditions; Alexseev asks how popular concern that migrants might undermine security feeds anti-immigrant hysteria. Neither author is primarily interested in how migration itself might threaten national security.

Rudolph starts from what he perceives to be an empirical and theoretical anomaly. Despite the fact that liberal immigration policy, like free trade, is a public good, promoting national wealth and military power through population growth, states often adopt restrictive policies. Three common explanations for this perplexing outcome—economic interest groups, institutions, and identity—are useful but insufficient. He suggests an additional factor, national security interests, understood to involve three