Reframing Polarization: Social Groups and "Culture Wars"

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ABSTRACT Recent analyses of American politics often invoke the term "culture war" depicting sharp and increasing divisions within the American polity. Most of this research defines culture in terms of values and beliefs about social issues and defines polarization in terms of partisan and issue divisions. I evaluate the claim of worsening "culture wars" by using a conceptualization of political culture that focuses on social groups and measuring polarization as both social group members' attitudes toward their own social in-groups and out-groups, and the effects of group attitudes on partisanship. Analyzing inter-group attitudes from 1964 to 2012 for social group cleavages defined by race, class, age, sex, and religion shows that polarization in attitudes toward social groups is minimal and generally stable, and most group members feel positively toward out-groups. Partisan and issue polarization seen in prior research do not extend to deep or increasing inter-group hostility that could reinforce issue-based and partisan polarization.

For more than two decades, social scientists have pursued the question of whether a "culture war" exists in the United States. Political scientists have invoked the term as a catch-all for putative sharp and rising polarization at both elite and mass levels along party and ideological lines. This research has largely defined polarization in terms of partisanship and ideology, and political culture has been primarily conceived of as beliefs on social issues. Largely absent from this discourse have been conceptualizations of political culture that emphasize social group identities and their effects on individuals' political views and groups' roles as the bases of party coalitions. Although social group identities have historically been politically potent, scholars have not explored whether there has been polarization in group identities and affiliations.

The research on partisan polarization has provided insight into the increasing consistency between voters' ideological and issue beliefs and their party loyalties and votes. This consistency does not appear to have replaced the generally moderate political views of the public with the animosity expressed by political elites (e.g., Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Carsey and Layman 2006; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005; Levendusky 2009). However, to the extent this literature addresses social groups, it looks only at social group members' attitudes on issues, ideology, and partisanship. The focus on polarization as a partisan problem overlooks two important aspects of polarization between social groups. First, social group polarization can lead to conflicts that are more purely "cultural" in nature, that is, about fundamental values and beliefs that are more threatening to social stability. Second, social groups have historically formed the "base" of party coalitions, so increases in polarization among social groups are likely to produce greater partisan division.

To examine social group polarization, I analyze data from the 1964–2012 ANES surveys to assess change in social group members' attitudes toward their social in-groups and out-groups and what effects those attitudes have on their partisanship. This analysis covers a range of social groups defined by race, class, age, sex, and religion. First, I review research using the culture war and polarization concepts and the definitions of culture and polarization used by political scientists. Then, I discuss the potential impacts of individuals' feelings about social groups, both their in-groups and out-groups, and explain the measures and data used in the analysis. Data analysis follows and indicates that polarization between social groups is low and stable over time on major social cleavages and has little impact on party identification. Finally, I examine the implications of my findings for research on the culture war concept and for future work on trends in social group polarization and its political impacts.

RESEARCHING POLARIZATION AND CULTURE

The language of a culture war was introduced into social science discourse in 1991 in James Davison Hunter's eponymous book *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America*, one of several decrying American social fragmentation (e.g., Schlesinger 1991). These and similar works argued that multiculturalism as a critical idea and a social fact magnified social groups' differences, potentially rendering the country ungovernable.

In political science, these concerns have been explored primarily in two diverging bodies of research, one focused on social groups and group-related issues such as multiculturalism, social values, and immigration, and the other emphasizing divisions along the lines of party, initially among elites (especially Congress), and more recently at the mass level. Debate within the second of these research streams was

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galvanized in 2005 by *Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America* (Fiorina , Abrams, and Pope 2005). This book debunked the idea that the mass public was polarized and that polarization was increasing, arguing that apparent mass polarization reflected elite divisions that presented voters with polarized choices, masking the moderate attitudes of the public. Since then, research on mass polarization has largely followed Fiorina et al., defining polarization as partisanship in identification and voting behavior, and exploring how issue positions and deeper values and beliefs widen partisan differences (Abramowitz 2011; Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Coffey 2011; DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996; Evans 2003; Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Hetherington 2009; Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006; Masket , Winburn, and Wright 2012; Pew 2012).

Although the term culture wars is used as shorthand for research into mass and elite partisan polarization, analysis of polarization in terms of the first body of research (on major social groups and opinions about them) has been lacking, despite the central role of social groups in the concept of culture (e.g., Dalton 2000; Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006). Recent research has investigated individuals' basic beliefs and values as components of political culture, but most research on these and other attitudinal differences between social groups continues to focus on their effects on partisan divisions (Baker 2005; Brewer and Stonecash 2007; Carsey and Layman 2006). The rare research defining polarization among social groups in terms of fundamental inter-group attitudes, such as identity and antipathy toward groups, typically is limited to a few social cleavages such as race, religion, and ethnocentrism (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Kinder and Kam 2009).

Here, I build on these streams of research into polarization and culture by assessing individuals' evaluations of social groups as measured by their favorability toward social groups. To measure both the degree of polarization among groups and trends in polarization, I use public opinion data collected between 1964 and 2012 by the American National Election Studies (ANES). The ANES assesses group favorability using "feeling thermometers" asking respondents to rate how favorable and "warm" or unfavorable and "cool" they feel toward social groups on five important group cleavages: race, class, age, gender, and religion. I use these favorability or thermometer measures to assess two types of inter-group polarization, building on Hetherington's (2009) distinction between polarization defined as differences of opinion between groups and polarization defined as the effects of group opinion differences. (In discussing the data analysis I use "feelings," "warmth," and "favorability" to refer to the feeling thermometer ratings).

My approach is two-fold. First, I analyze direct inter-group antipathy as respondents' favorability toward social groups, measured separately for members of the groups on different sides of a cleavage, with the size and trends in the differences between group members indicating inter-group polarization. For example, I compare blacks' and whites' feelings of favorability toward blacks and toward whites in terms of how positively members of these groups rate their own group (in-group) positively and the other group (out-group) negatively. The size of this gap indexes polarization and trends in the gaps indicate changes in the degree of inter-group polarization. This use of group favorability or "thermometer" questions is consistent with an extensive body of prior attitudinal and electoral research on fundamental

Figure 1a

Black-White Thermometers Differenced (1964–2012)



Figure 1b

White-Black Thermometer and Party Identification



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inter-group feelings, including research on polarization in issue opinions and partisanship (Brewer and Stonecash 2007; Evans 2003; Hetherington 2009; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Kinder and Kam 2009). For example, Iyengar et al. (2012) found that thermometer ratings of the "out-party" declined from 1978 to 1988 and that party activists were consistently more polarized than nonactivists.

Second, I use the group favorability measures to assess a second type of polarization: the extent to which beliefs about social groups are linked to group members' partisanship. This analysis calculates the correlation between polarization on the group favorability measures with party identification separately for the different groups on a given social cleavage. The higher the absolute value of the correlation, the stronger the relationship between people's feelings about groups. Thus, while Hetherington's measure of impact is the strength of the relationship between ideological and partisan identifications, I operationalize polarization's impact as the strength of the relationship between group favorability and partisan identification and carry out separate analyses of these relationships for members of the different social groups.

This dual analytic strategy brings culture, in the form of individuals' favorability or antipathy toward both in-groups and out-groups, back into political analysis of the culture war. It captures both the polarization dimension of opinion divergence between groups used by Evans (2003) and his colleagues (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996), Abramowitz and Saunders (2008), and Fiorina and Abrams (2008), as well as the dimension of "sorting" or "conflict extension" used by Layman et al. (2006) and Hetherington (2009). The first measure indicates direct antipathy between social groups, and the latter indicates the degree to which group affiliations are linked to partisan divisions. In the data analysis, I assess historical trends and current levels of polarization using both measures.

Because social group polarization can have grave consequences, the direct intergroup favorability measure is important as an index of the degree of social conflict in a society. When social group divisions widen, political parties and other institutions must manage increasing conflict with the potential for violence. If the cleavages in social groups are tightly linked to partisan differences, this robs the party system in particular and the political system in general of its flexibility in forming coalitions and forging compromises to ease conflict (Dalton 2008). If my analysis indicates that intergroup polarization is intensifying and increasingly implicated in partisan divisions, it would support those scholars who claim there is increasing polarization with a potential for system breakdown (e.g., Abramowitz and Saunders 2008), in contrast to those who argue there is no significant or growing polarization (e.g., Fiorina and Abrams 2008).

Figure 2a

Middle Class Thermometer (1972–1984, 2004–2012)



Figure 2b

Correlations (Pearson's r) (Middle Class Thermometer by Party Identification)



DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

This analysis employs the ANES time series, which incorporated favorability, or thermometer ratings beginning in 1964. I focus on the period beginning 1972 when more social groups were incorporated into the ANES. Inconsistency from year to year in the inclusion of group favorability measures limits the analysis of the group cleavages of class, age,

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



are large, growing, and prime forces in shaping party cleavages (e.g., Carmines and Stimson 1989; Gilens 1999; Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Schlesinger 1991).

Figure 1a plots the trends in feelings toward blacks and whites, calculated as the difference in thermometer scores for the two groups. The two lines represent the mean scores on this polarization measure, which range from -100 to 100, with positive scores indicating more positive feelings toward one's in-group, and negative scores indicating more positive feelings toward one's out-group. The trend clearly shows decreasing, not increasing polarization, with both blacks and whites becoming more evenly balanced over time in their assessments of the two groups. This net measure of polarization declined from 25 points for both groups in 1964 to about 10–15 points in the 1980s; since 1996 it has been historically low at 3–14 points.

Figure 1b presents trends in the correlation (Pearson's r) between the thermometer scores presented in figure 1a and party identification. Although people's feelings toward blacks and whites have become less polarized, they might still contribute to party polarization if these feelings increasingly affect party identification. However, the trend in figure 1b shows little change since 1964 and no evidence of high current polarization. The relationship between group thermometers and party is largely steady among blacks, declining slightly in 1976 and again in 2004, then increasing slightly. Among whites, feeling more positively toward whites was initially weakly associated with Democratic identification, but by 1972 there was no relationship, and beginning in 2000 favoring whites was weakly associated with Republican identification, the same association made previously by blacks. The magnitude of the correlations since 1976 has generally ranged from roughly 0 to 0.15. As a point of comparison, the correlation between an ideological polarization thermometer of liberals and conservatives and party identification was .33 in 1972 and .59 in 2004, and Hetherington (2009) reports that the correlation between ideological *identification* and party identification doubled from 0.28 in 1972 to 0.57 in 2004.[2]

In sum, among blacks and whites, neither the differences in affect toward racial groups, nor the linkage between group affect and party identification has grown substantially. Despite expectations about increasing racial tensions, racial polarization has not occurred.

and gender to favorability toward only one of the two groups on the cleavage. For the racial group cleavage, consistent data on feelings toward both blacks and whites is available, so I construct a difference measure by subtracting the thermometer score for each respondent's in-group from the rating for their out-group. On the religion cleavage, I separately analyze favorability ratings for the groups asked about (Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and Christian Fundamentalists), broken down by the religious group members identifiable within the limits of the ANES data.[1]

Race

Given the prominent role of racial issues in American politics, it would be surprising not to find sharp polarization. Several writers have argued that racial issues and black-white opinion differences

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Social Class and Income

Figures 2a and 2b analyze feelings toward the middle class from 1972 to 1984 and from 2004 to 2012 (the thermometer for "working class" was asked only from 2004 to 2012, and results of data analyses of both measures were similar). Both self-identified working-class and middle-class respondents expressed highly positive feelings, averaging 75 on the 100-point thermometer. These feelings toward the middle class are unrelated to partisanship (figure 2b), with correlations ranging from -.1 to +.1. The results are identical when they are broken down by respondents in the top- and bottom-third of income instead of class.

Feelings toward poor people were assessed from 1972 to 2012 except 1996 (not shown). Middle-class respondents' ratings ranged from 67 to 73 and were consistently lower by about five points compared to working-class respondents' ratings of 72 to 77. Feelings toward poor people were only weakly linked to Democratic Party identification regardless of the social class or income of the respondents, with correlations ranging from about -.2 in the 1980s to about -.1 in the 2000s.

As with race, none of these measures shows high or increasing levels of polarization in either feelings toward social classes or in the linkage between class feelings and partisanship.

Age

Figures 3a and 3b present data on feelings about older or elderly people from 1976 to 2004 (feelings toward young people were asked only in 1972–1980 and 2004). Here again, no evidence of polarization is seen. Feelings are strongly positive among both younger respondents (18–34) and those 65 or older, who are slightly warmer by 3–7 points over the period. The relationship between warmth toward the elderly and partisanship is weak, around -.1 (positive feelings toward the elderly are associated with Democratic identification) for both younger and older respondents. Neither measure indicates growing polarization over time. Analysis of the limited years in which the ANES asked the young people thermometer question indicates similar small gaps in warmth and little effect on partisanship (not shown).

Figure 4a

Women Feeling Thermometer (1976, 1984–1988, and 2004)



Figure 4b

Correlations (Pearson's r) (Women Thermometer by Party Identification)



Gender

Feelings about women and men have seldom been assessed by the ANES. Warmth toward women was asked only in 1976, 1984, 1988, and 2004. As figures 4a and 4b indicate, there is little polarization on this measure, with ratings consistently between 74 and 83, with women slightly warmer. The relationship between thermometer ratings and partisanship is weak and virtually the same for both groups, exceeding .07 only in 1980 for men as shown in figure 4b. As with age, class, and race, polarization as indexed by people's feelings toward their own social groups or their out-groups, and the impact of those feelings on partisanship is weak and stable.

Religion

Religion presents the analytic challenge of assessing multiple

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Figure 5a

Catholics Feeling Thermometer (1964–1976, 1984–1992, 2000–2012)



Note: See footnote 1 and text regarding measurement issues in 2008 and 2012.

Figure 5b

Catholics Feeling Thermometer (1964–1976, 1984–1992, 2000–2012)



Note: See footnote 1 and text regarding measurement issues in 2008 and 2012.

religious groups that can be (and have been) defined in several ways with inconsistent measures. The ANES has asked feeling thermometer questions about Catholics (1964—2012 except 1980 and 1996), Protestants (1964–76 and 2000), Jews (1964–76, 1988–92, and 2000–08), and Christian Fundamentalists (1988–2012). The ANES has used generally consistent measures for respondents' affiliations as Catholics and Protestants. However, there have been serious problems and inconsistencies over time in the measures distinguishing Mainline from Fundamentalist Protestants, a key cleavage in recent accounts of values-based issue polarization (Brewer and Stonecash 2007; Evans 2003; Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006— see note 1). In this section, I analyze the four religious thermometers in turn, first discussing Protestants' and Catholics' responses, then Mainline and Evangelical Protestants when they diverge, with the caveat that the measurement of these two categories mandates caution in interpreting the data, especially after 1996.[3]

Feelings toward Catholics are presented in figure 5a. Catholic respondents' warmth has ranged from 74 to 80 since 1972, while Protestants' warmth has grown from the lower to upper 60s, slightly reducing the gap between the groups. As shown in figure 5b, feelings toward Catholics are at best weakly related to partisanship. For Catholics, warmth toward their in-group is slightly associated with Democratic identification after 1976, except in 2004 and 2012. This may reflect the public criticism of 2004 Democratic presidential nominee Senator Kerry and President Obama in 2012 by some Catholic leaders and secular pundits. The opinions of Mainline and Evangelical Protestants (not shown) are nearly identical except in 2000, when warmth toward Catholics is associated with Democratic identification among Mainline Protestants (r+-.15) and Republican identification among Evangelicals (r = .18) Overall, none of these religious groups have feelings toward Catholics that are negative or strongly partisan, nor are these increasing.

Figures 6a and 6b present the data on feelings toward Jews. Among both Protestants and Catholics, feelings are positive and nearly identical, ranging from about 60 to 70 (figure 6a). Warmth toward Jews is not related to partisanship among either group in most years, but in 2004 Protestants who feel warmly toward Jews are slightly more Republican. A separate analysis (not shown) indicates this shift occurs among both Mainline and Evangelical Protestants.

The feeling thermometer toward Protestants was only asked in 1964—1976, and 2000. Protestant respondents are more positive than Catholics by about five points, with ratings above 60 for both groups (figure 7a). For neither group are positive feelings toward Protestants related to partisanship, with correlations hovering near 0 in all three years (figure 7b). Among Mainline and Fundamentalist groups, positive feelings were nearly identical, although in 2000 positive feelings toward Protestants were weakly associated with Democratic identification among Mainline (r=-.10) and Republican identification among Evangelical (r=.07) Protestants.

Feelings toward Christian Fundamentalists could be expected to evoke stronger and more politically potent feelings, given the attention paid to the political activism of this group and the strong moral traditionalism in political views associated with them. Figure 8a indicates that Protestants feel more warmly (positively) toward Christian Fundamentalists than do Catholics, but the gap has hovered around 10 points, and both groups' feelings toward Christian

Fundamentalists warmed slightly in 2004 and 2008. Figure 8b shows that Catholics' feelings toward Christian Fundamentalists have no impact on their party identification. Among Protestants warmth was moderately associated with Republican identification in 2004 (r = .19; among white Protestants r = .35) and 2008 (r = .15; among white Protestants r = .27).

in 2004 and .27 in 2008, dropping to .12 in 2012. Although these are small effects compared to the impact of ideological thermometers on identification, they are larger than for any other group members on all other group thermometers, and may indicate a slight trend toward greater consistency between feelings toward specific religious groups and partisan identifications. The ANES data for future years

This analysis indicates that there is currently a disconnect between partisan and social cleavages; social group animosity and partisan differences do not reinforce or exacerbate one another, rendering prospects for a real "culture war" on the scale of direct conflicts such as the former Yugoslavia or Northern Ireland reassuringly remote.

For Mainline Protestants (not shown), warmth was related to Republican identification both in 2004 (.28) and 2008 (.10); for Evangelicals the relationship ranged from .12 to .16 from 2004 through 2012. The correlations among white Mainline Protestants ranged from .26 to .35; among White Evangelicals from .32

may indicate whether this linkage strengthens and extends to other religious groups, stabilizes, or weakens.

Overall, as with the social cleavages of race, class, age, and sex, there is little evidence of sharp polarization across religious groups in terms of either group members' feelings toward their in-and out-groups or the impact of their feelings about groups on their partisan attachments.

Figure 6a

Jews Feeling Thermometer (1964–1976, 1988–1992, 2000–2008)



Note: See footnote 1 and text regarding measurement issues in 2008.

Figure 6b

Correlations (Pearon's r) Jews Thermometer and Party Identification



Note: See footnote 1 and text regarding measurement issues in 2008.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS: WHITHER POLARIZATION AND CULTURE WARS?

Is polarization a problem, and has it grown into a culture war? The answer partly depends on how we conceptualize and measure polarization and where we look for its effects. This analysis extended the definition of polarization to incorporate two important, but overlooked, dimensions of political polarization: in-group favoritism and out-group hostility among social groups and their impact on partisanship. By either measure, there is not a high level of polarization on any major social group cleavage in the United States, and polarization has not increased.

This is positive news. Disagreements among the mass public about issues and values, no matter how contested, have not (yet) extended into direct inter-group antipathy. Moreover, basic emotions about social groups are largely unrelated to people's partisan identification. This analysis indicates that there is currently a disconnect between partisan and social cleavages; social group animosity and partisan differences do not reinforce or exacerbate one

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another, rendering prospects for a real "culture war" on the scale of direct conflicts such as the former Yugoslavia or Northern Ireland reassuringly remote.

There are minor exceptions, primarily in recent feelings toward Christian Fundamentalists and in the association between feelings toward Fundamentalists and partisanship among Protestants. This sorting could foreshadow future polarization, but as of 2012 the trend was recent, inconsistent, and small, with correlations above .20 only among white Protestants and no attendant change in their mean thermometer ratings.

It is possible that other group attitudes—for example, attitudes toward other racial groups or recent immigrants, or attitudes among smaller social sub-groups—are more polarized and more consequential for party identification. But in this article, I have explored all of the social cleavages for which there is adequate data.[4] Moreover, prior research on issue, ideological, and partisan polarization would lead us to expect the black-white cleavage and the cleavages of class, age, sex, and religion to be the locus of animosity toward social groups and deep-seated beliefs about equality, the role of government, and justice (e.g., Carmines and Stimson 1989; Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Hetherington 2009; Hutchings and Valentino 2004). If a real culture war were raging in the American polity, feelings toward social groups would be tightly linked with both policy and partisan differences.

The results of my analysis complement recent findings that ideological identifications and perhaps issue positions are becoming "sorted" or part of a "conflict extension" that brings them more in line with partisanship and voting and reinforces existing partisan cleavages (Bartels 2006; Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Hetherington 2009; Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006; Levendusky 2009). At the same time, my analysis does not contradict the argument that opinion on issues engaging fundamental values and beliefs have diverged along partisan lines (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). Specifically, my findings suggest that sorting and conflict extension may be confined to purely "political" attitudes about policies and issues, and have not become linked to deeper "social" beliefs about groups, which would exacerbate inter-group hostility. Thus, opinions about social groups may be compartmentalized from partisan and issue beliefs during the 1964–2012 period. This is consistent with Iyengar et al.'s (2012) finding that partisan group polarization has increased since 1976 while racial polarization has declined. In the future, if polarization of partisan political beliefs intensifies or becomes closely linked to issues that engage social group cleavages, the current relative peace across group cleavages may break down and become a widening gulf. Yet in my analysis the only hint of such a trend is the recent widening of some religious differences.

Words matter, and the term "culture war" serves us badly on many fronts. Metaphors of war are common currency in descriptions of political election "campaigns" and the "war rooms" from which campaigns "deploy" resources to "battleground" states. The language both debases the seriousness of real physical violence and armed conflict and inflates the sense of gravity about differences in partisan, issue, and social group attitudes among the mass public. The term is also grossly inaccurate, as even the growing issue and ideological differences identified in other research are not particularly deep or intense (cf. Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Hetherington 2009), and as my results show, do not extend to inter-group hostility.

The martial metaphor may be somewhat useful in distinguishing the responses of political elites from those of the mass

Figure 7a

Protestants Feeling Thermometer (1964–1976, 2000)



Figure 7b

Correlations (Pearson's r)(Protestant Thermometer and Party Identification)



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Figure 8a

Christian Fundamentalists Feeling Thermometer (1988–2012)



Note: See footnote 1 and text regarding measurement issues in 2008 and 2012.

Figure 8b

Correlation (Pearson's r)(Christian Fundamentalists Thermometer and Party Identification)



Note: See footnote 1 and text regarding measurement issues in 2008 and 2012.

public. While partisan leaders in Congress, campaigns, interest groups, and media may issue calls to arms to "culture warriors," the mass public has not adopted the role of troops taking up arms against one another. The recent sorting among the mass public into more distinctly ideological camps has not degenerated into cultural or civil war. Instead, the intergroup attitudes examined here have been and remain largely civil. This is in keeping with the norms of tolerance and the promise of democratic political regimes to provide an arena in which conflicts originating in civil society can be articulated and resolved without endangering either individuals or society. Perhaps the gap in civility among elites, and between some elites and the mass public, is where we should search for metaphors to characterize cultural differences.

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NOTES

1. ANES measurement of religion over time is problematic. Measures for the three major denominational groups (Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish) were fairly consistent through 2004, but in 2008 the major religion variable resulted in 24% fewer Protestants than in previous years, and in 2012 there was no Protestant category but one for "Other Christian" (to complement the regular Catholic and Jewish categories.) Measurement of Evangelical and Mainline Protestants has been inconsistent, with major changes in definition and measurement in 1972, 1990, and 1998, when there ceased to be a standard measure (see Brewer and Stonecash 2007, fn. 26, 204–5 for an extensive discussion). I reconstructed measures of the four group categories using the multiple available measures in 2000-2012, but restrictions on some 2012 variables limit the accuracy of these measures. My analysis presents data for only Catholics and Protestants, distinguishing Evangelical from Mainline Protestant opinion when the groups' opinions diverge. Given the inconsistent measures, my conclusions about religious polarization among Protestants are tentative and limited, especially from 2004 to 2012.
2. Measuring between-group polarization using correlation coefficients may mask increasing polarization *within* a social group. I tested within-group polarization by examining the standard deviations of the mean scores for each social group, which indicated there was no increase in and low levels of within-group polarization in all groups (see Appendix).
3. There are too few Jewish respondents for reliable analysis of Jewish attitudes toward religious groups (<30 per year since 1984).
4. Favorability ratings of illegal immigrants were measured only in the 1988, 1992, and 2004 ANES, and there is no way to identify the few people who would constitute the in-group. Favorability ratings for Hispanics were asked from 1980 to 2008, but there were more than 50 Hispanic respondents in the ANES only in 1988, 1992, and 2004.

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APPENDIX

Variance in Mean Feeling Thermometers

Standard Deviation for Mean of Differenced "Whites" minus "Blacks" Thermometers:

	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
Whites	24.2	24.0	21.0	20.6	20.9	20.3	23.4	20.7	17.3	18.7	17.4	19.1	20.1
Blacks	27.8	25.0	25.0	20.1	17.3	16.3	20.6	21.7	19.0	18.4	18.2	20.2	23.5

Standard Deviation for Mean of "Middle Class" Thermometer:

	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
Working Class (Self-ID)	16.7	15.6	15.6	15.3					16.1	17.7	17.3
Middle Class (Self-ID)	16.9	15.8	16.6	16.3					17.1	16.6	17.3

Standard Deviation for Mean of "Elderly" Thermometer:

	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004
18–34 Years Old	13.9	14.9	15.7	16.2		15.3	16.1	19.4
65 or Older	14.0	13.2	14.5	14.8		15.1	14.3	13.3

Standard Deviation for Mean of "Women" Thermometer:

	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004
Women	15.1		17.7	18.0				16.8
Men	16.0		17.7	18.0				16.7

Standard Deviation for Mean of "Catholics" Thermometer:

	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
Protestants	21.2	21.7	18.8	16.3		18.8	18.7	17.6		18.1	19.6	17.7	19.3*
Catholics	15.1	17.4	17.1	17.6		17.9	17.7	17.0		17.2	17.3	19.5	18.1

* Note: "Other Christian" was the category in the ANES 2012 main Religion variable.

Standard Deviation for Mean of "Jews" Thermometer:

	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008
Protestants	20.6	20.6	18.5	17.6			19.5	18.7		18.5	18.7	18.2
Catholics	19.5	19.1	18.8	17.4			20.4	17.6		17.5	17.8	19.3

Standard Deviation for Mean of "Protestants" Thermometer:

	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000
Protestants	17.0	17.9	18.0	18.0						19.6
Catholics	19.3	19.0	18.1	15.7						17.1

Standard Deviation for Mean of "Christian Fundamentalists" Thermometer:

	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
Protestants	24.5	22.6	22.9	21.1	22.0	21.8	22.3*
Catholics	22.2	20.9	20.5	19.1	20.3	20.5	19.7

* Note: "Other Christian" was the category used in the ANES 2012 main Religion variable.

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