

persons), all in all, Peckham's book is worth engaging with to get a sense of the current debates on theology proper, and for a rather stimulating proposal on the divine attributes.

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## Brian E. Daley, SJ, *God Visible: Patristic Christology Reconsidered*

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Kirsten Sanders

Boston, MA, USA ([kirstenhsanders@icloud.com](mailto:kirstenhsanders@icloud.com))

That Brian Daley opens *God Visible: Patristic Christology Reconsidered* with the story of Aloys Grillmeier's *Christ in Christian Tradition* is not accidental. Grillmeier's is the standard text in the field and remains, for good reason, an indispensable source for learning the disagreements and compromises that led to Chalcedon's claim of Christ as one person in two natures. His book is known for its now-standard treatment of pre-Chalcedonian Christology as coming in two forms: *logos sarx* and *logos anthropos*. The first account speaks of the incarnation as God becoming flesh, and the second is of God becoming human. Grillmeier largely divides this movement historically, so that conceptions of the incarnation develop steadily from anthropologically deficient ones toward more holistic views of Christ's person as the period of the Chalcedonian council in 451 approaches. That Daley calls his a 'reconsideration' of patristic christology tips his hand: his reconsideration is primarily of Grillmeier.

Daley's concern is not merely methodological. Rather, he argues that Grillmeier trades much for his orderly account of history's 'arrival' at Chalcedon. Grillmeier's Whiggish view of Chalcedonian orthodoxy, in Daley's mind, trades order for the true vision available of God in Christ that is revealed only when the full scope of the history of early christological disputes is considered. Chalcedon for Daley is the tradition's attempt to affirm Nicaea while looking at Jesus. His view shares much in common with Coakley's ideal of Chalcedon's regulative function, but there is more at stake here, too. According to Daley, to consider Chalcedon as the final summation of how Christians should think about Christ is to miss many other interesting and important insights in the interest of order and clarity. In his words:

To see this formula, pregnant with meaning as it is, as in itself the culmination of four centuries of Christian reflection on the person of Christ and the central norm of Christological orthodoxy ever since, is to say at once too little and too much— to force ancient reflection into a seriously distorting frame, by omitting those other themes and details that often seem to have little to do with the council's dense structural analysis of Christ's person, and by focusing simply on what did or did not anticipate the central elements of this definition. (p. 9)

In order to adequately complicate the tidy narrative of Grillmeier, Daley 'revisits' many christological thinkers in his book, beginning with second-century christology and moving through the classic sites of disagreement (e.g., the 'Arian' controversy, Apollinaris and the 'Cappadocian' Gregories, Antioch and Alexandria). At each point he offers his 'reconsideration' of how these well-trod texts might offer something other than a site of stable and predictable disagreement. He introduces his view of Augustine's often-overlooked contribution to patristic christology, drawing from the latter's view of Christ as 'mediator' and 'exchange' as examples of aspects of his thinking that 'clearly anticipate[] the language of Chalcedon' (p. 156).

But where things really get interesting for Daley is *after* Chalcedon, when christological dispute shifted from oratorical to scholastic form. It is here, with a growing emphasis on precise definitions, that concern moves to the ontology of the *person* of Christ. And so it is here that, according to Daley, the true subject of Chalcedonian thought is put on display. Instead of asking what kind of person Christ was in terms of his psychosomatic composition, now the Christian tradition began to ask how it is that the concept of 'person' applied to Christ, and so implicated not only God as human but also the possibility of each human existent becoming also like God. Leontius of Byzantium is the source of the key insight for Daley when it comes to interpreting Chalcedon, inasmuch as Leontius emphasises the 'mode of union, rather than the structure of nature, contains the great mystery of religion' (p. 208). With Maximus the Confessor in the seventh century and the iconodule theologians in the eighth, this insight is strengthened: 'the person of Christ, fully God and fully human in the functional realms where he lives and acts, reveals how God works in the created world to save and transform all of us' (p. 209).

And so it is that the upshot of Chalcedonian christology for Daley becomes clear. The goal is not to figure out what kind of thing Christ is, but rather what kind of relation pertains in Christ between God and the world, between the uncreated and the created, the invisible and the circumscribed. To misunderstand the struggle that led to and followed the Council of Chalcedon is to miss its true takeaway, which is a vision of God revealed in Christ. In Daley's words:

The Gospel is not simply the communication of a deeper understanding of what God is, or what humanity is—although each of those clearly comes to be understood in a new way because of it. Rather, the Gospel is the proclamation of the ontological *union* of God and humanity in a particular person: the news that God's eternal Son and a naturally finite human being now are, in fact, a single historical individual, without either of them ceasing to be what God the Son and that particular human being are in themselves. (p. 208)

Daley's work succeeds in a way few texts can in addressing technical concerns in order to strengthen the proclaimed witness of the Christian church. The writing is clear and at times stunningly perfect: Daley's clarification that 'the divinity of Christ's human nature, one might say, is adverbial rather than substantial' (p. 222) is alone worth the price of the book. Such insights dance and mingle with a movement toward praise that evokes to Thomas the disciple who can call him 'my Lord and my God' only upon *seeing* the risen Christ. Daley's book echoes Thomas' 'complaint' upon of the need for vision upon hearing the other disciples' report of the resurrection. *God Visible* joins Aaron Riches *Ecce Homo* and Ian McFarland's *The Word Make Flesh* in a resurgence of

Chalcedonian scholarship that trade both in analytic clarity and praise, gesturing toward the circumscribed One, ever in our midst. May their tribe increase.

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## Yonghua Ge, *The Many and the One: Creation and Participation in Augustine and Aquinas*

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Jonathan M. Platter

MidAmerica Nazarene University, Olathe, KS, USA ([jmplatter@mnu.edu](mailto:jmplatter@mnu.edu))

What does it mean to speak of creation as participating in God? Yonghua Ge addresses this question through close and patient interpretation of the works of Augustine and Aquinas. His approach and framing for the book are not, however, exclusively historical. Ge is at least partly motivated by the recent renaissance of participation-language, especially as used by Radical Orthodoxy and Hans Boersma. The book can be read both as a scholarly investigation of Augustine's and Aquinas's theologies of participation and as an intervention in contemporary theology. The book is overall successful, elegant and winsome. However, it does not accomplish both of its goals in equal measure.

Both Radical Orthodoxy and Hans Boersma have renewed the idea of participation for English-language theology. In particular, they consider participatory ontology to be the long-needed remedy for our theological and cultural ailments. And yet, so Ge argues, Radical Orthodoxy and Boersma often talk as if a purely 'Platonic' notion of participation will suffice. This leaves their visions of creation largely vulnerable to the criticism of a Platonic prejudice against embodiment, materiality and difference.

To intervene, Ge proposes a closer reading of Augustine and Aquinas on participation. His attention homes in on the relationship of the one and the many in the two thinkers, their understandings of materiality and whether they consistently value difference and multiplicity in their metaphysics. Along the way, Ge strives to widen the gap between Plato and Plotinus on the one hand and Augustine and Aquinas on the other, suggesting that the latter have transformed the idea of participation significantly enough that their views should no longer be associated with their Platonic counterparts without serious qualification.

This reading of Augustine and Aquinas is conducted across two parts and six chapters. The first part is dedicated to Augustine and the second to Aquinas. The ordering and parallel structure of the two parts display a hermeneutic conviction that drives the work, namely that Aquinas can be read as a kind of completion of Augustine's theology, recapitulating his predecessor's thought while simultaneously strengthening it in terms of logical rigour, conceptual precision and metaphysical comprehensiveness. This means that Ge is at least in partial agreement with Radical Orthodoxy in how to situate Aquinas' thought: we are not dealing with Aquinas the Aristotelian, but Aquinas the Augustinian (who is therefore still somewhat 'Platonist').