

1750–1820 is still unresolved. In this reviewer’s opinion, there is a great deal to be said against a perceptible effect of the so-called Agrarian Enlightenment on contemporary agriculture. Verena Lehmbruck counters this with affirmation of the effectiveness of the Agrarian Enlightenment without explaining her position in more detail (44). Further research is indeed urgently needed here. In general, it is important to ask whether the representatives of rational agriculture were not simply following developments that were taking place in the agricultural sector as a result of fundamental changes in the economy as a whole, or whether they actually represented the avant-garde that helped “agrarian modernity” achieve its breakthrough. In other words, were peasants in Germany not able to see their economic opportunities and therefore in urgent need of “enlightenment,” or were they often simply lacking the economic conditions to take on the high risks of intensification?

Following Johann Heinrich von Thünen, it seems that only industrialization created the necessary conditions to make “rational agriculture” profitable and thus “rational” in more and more German regions after 1840. However, in this context, the question remains whether the rapid spread of agricultural associations after 1840 did not serve as an accelerating force for the spread of “modern” or “enlightened” agriculture into almost all strata of rural society. Such a massive organizational substructure to spread the ideas of “rational agriculture” into the capillaries of rural society was simply lacking during the period 1750–1820. From the perspective of development economics or economic history, the diffusion of innovation is at least as important as the innovation itself. Looking at the period 1840–1914 as the late heyday of an enlightened German agrarian economy would connect social history and history of science with current economic history emphasizing the role of human capital, especially for a successful mastering of the post-Malthusian phase in the transition to sustained growth.

These are just further thoughts, however, and not intended as criticism of Verena Lehmbruck’s sophisticated study. The book’s intellectual highlight is the fourth chapter, “Epistemology of the Agricultural Enlightenment,” which among other things analyzes “science” and “scientific” as historical concepts that underwent fundamental changes in Germany in particular during the period, though other chapters also make for more than worthwhile reading.

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## **Nationalism Revisited: Austrian Social Closure from Romanticism to the Digital Age**

**By Christian Karner. New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2020. Pp. vii + 255. \$135 (cloth). ISBN: 978-1789204520.**

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This ambitious study by Christian Karner, a sociologist who has published widely on nationalism, ethnicity, and memory studies in Europe, revisits the topic visited more often than any other in Habsburg and Austrian history: nationalism. The book weaves together a number of “macro” social scientific theories and selected snippets from historians’ “micro” studies of particular nationalist contexts over 200 years. The author’s approach

may frustrate historians, but a patient reading yields some valuable new insights into the ways that nationalists in the Habsburg past and the Austrian present share rhetorical strategies in articulating visions of a golden past, an unjust or corrupt present, and a projected happy future for their nation. The *longue durée* scope helps to show continuities between post-1945 Austrian history and nationalist discourses in the longer Central European past.

The organizing theory of the work is the neo-Weberian concept of *social closure* as developed by sociologists Frank Parkin and Raymond Murphy, which postulates the ways that a status group secures resources, benefits, and privileges for itself at the expense of others. Depending on which group holds such privileges or seeks to gain them, closure follows a logic of “exclusion” or “usurpation” (67). In addition to the closure model, a great many other theoretical frames are introduced over the course of seven chapters. They include: recurring national (master-)topoi, *deixis*, “grammars of identity,” banal nationalism and its “hot” counterpoint, and Bourdieu’s habitus and “universe of the undiscussed” (*doxa*). While there are a few too many theories in play, the author effectively returns to one theme that, to this reviewer, gives the book its greatest coherence: the “palimpsest-like re-writing of ideational and symbolic strands in new contexts” (211). Discursive borrowing and recycling is the thread that holds the study together.

Romanticism is the topic of the first chapter. Karner traces the nationalist features of German Romanticism and its transmission to the Austrian lands. With a growing consciousness of his own “German-ness” (cited, 44), Friedrich Schlegel’s move to Vienna signaled “the definitive arrival of the romantic ethos in Habsburg Central Europe” (46). The next chapter tackles the whole of the nineteenth century, offering a summary of the hardening of national categories and the articulation of various identity grammars used by nationalists, including *binary*, *encompassing*, *assimilationist*, and the grammar of *apostasy* (81). Here, the author selects examples of nationally tinged moments from leading secondary works on the late Habsburg period and subjects them to the “critical discourse analysis” (CDA) of the sociologist. Next comes a chapter on the world wars and the Holocaust. While the author is to be commended for attempting to synthesize multiple, enormous fields of scholarship and apply his organizing theory to it, it is not clear that national closure or its more virulent form, “genocidal closure” (104), helps us understand something new about the period 1914–1945.

From here, the narrative shifts to the (re)construction of a distinctly *Austrian* “national mythscape” (142), the subterranean currents of selective remembering and forgetting of the Nazi period that bubble beneath the Second Republic, and Nazi/pan-German scandals and exposés that periodically rattle the happily neutral “Alpine Republic” of lovers of nature, skiing, music, and food. Karner is excellent on the return of the German nationalist “third camp,” the rise of Jörg Haider and his ideological U-turns, and the reshaping of the political landscape after 1989. In the final two chapters, we hear the voices of Austrian nationalists in the present, who do indeed seem to be recycling vocabulary and discursive schemes from nationalist forebears of the nineteenth century. The quotations Karner pulls from letters to the editor of the twenty-first-century *Kronen Zeitung* (key primary texts in the later chapters), with a few geographical and temporal adjustments, could have come from the dusty archival boxes of the Habsburg era. Swap “Slavs” or “Jews” in for “Turks,” and we could be in the nineteenth century: “The Viennese will soon be a minority, Turkish and other immigrants are assuming power in Vienna’s districts. Goodbye, old, beautiful Vienna!” wrote a *Kronen Zeitung* reader in 2010 (179). Similarly, the schooling debates of the present, in which letters to the editor describe large numbers of non-German-speaking pupils in a classroom as a “veritable catastrophe” (179), draw on the same zero-sum logic as the nationalist rumbles on the “language frontiers” of the Habsburg Monarchy.

The book’s title, which extends into the digital age, somewhat overpromises. While the study does indeed analyze Austrian politics in the past two decades, noting “especially the (New) Right’s prolific use of our digital era’s social media” (205), the study does not explore *why* the Right, and the FPÖ in particular, has had more active and successful social

media outreach on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and blogs. Karner does offer one close reading of a 2017 Heinz-Christian Strache Facebook post in which nationalist argumentative strategies (in this instance, anti-Turkish ones) are presented in an “ironic register” (209). This would be a promising lead to follow: how does the informal, irreverent, even snarky tone acceptable on social media—as compared to the traditional press—feed certain kinds of nationalist expression?

The author is speaking to (at least) two scholarly audiences: sociologists and historians. My hunch is that sociologists will find the first half of the book most useful, while historians will find the post-1945 chapters and analysis of deeper discursive roots undergirding recent Austrian electoral politics to be thought-provoking and highly informative.

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## Imaginary Athens: Urban Space and Memory in Berlin, Tokyo, and Seoul

**By Jin-Sung Chun. Translated by Youngjae Josephine Bae. New York: Routledge, 2021. Pp. 402. \$128 (HB). ISBN: 978-0367639921.**

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What is to be done about politically significant buildings left behind by a toppled government? What does it mean to preserve or repurpose them? Or, if they too are to be toppled, what should be (re)constructed in their place? How authorities in modern Berlin, Tokyo, and Seoul responded to these questions as they built and rebuilt their cities through wars and regime changes is a unifying theme in Jin-Sung Chun’s *Imaginary Athens*. The book uses “a narrative representation of architecture and urban planning” to illustrate “how memories linked to a certain geographical imagery can heavily impact the creation of a country’s capital” (xii). Chun expertly shows that the three cities share not just comparable experiences, but that seemingly coincidental, superficial similarities in their design and structure are, in fact, traits revealing deep genealogical bonds. Berlin had “once served as a model for Tokyo,” which in turn, through Japanese imperialism, “served as a model for modern Seoul” (xiii). By combining histories of German influence on Japanese modernization and Japanese impact on East Asian Westernization, Chun’s book makes innovative and meaningful progress in Asian-German studies.

The book comprises five main parts: a prologue, three substantive chapters, and an epilogue. The prologue lays out the theoretical and methodological foundation that undergirds the book. To consider “the process through which Berlin, Tokyo, and Seoul were turned into modern capitals,” Chun applies Michel Foucault’s discursive formation that “comprehensively embodies architectural design, urban planning, and how citizens react to them” (17).

Chapter one traces the emergence and implementation of the idea of Berlin as “Athens on the Spree.” As Prussia rose from the late 1700s, there was a corresponding need to expand and embellish its capital. The Prussian state architect Karl Friedrich Schinkel was instrumental in molding the appearance of central Berlin. Schinkel was active in the era of Prussian classicism, a “Greek fever” that gripped Prussian elites. Schinkel’s neoclassical portfolio includes the Neue Wache, the Altes Museum, and the Royal Theater. But he is best remembered “as the one who discovered the tectonic order . . . an architectural principle that values a perfect harmony between form and function” (53). Schinkel envisioned tectonics also as a principle of state