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War of the British Worlds: The Anglo-Argentines and the Falklands

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Abstract The 1982 Falklands War was shrouded in symbolism, bringing to the fore divergent conceptions of Britishness, kinship, and belonging. This article casts light on the persistent purchase of the idea of Greater Britain long after the end of empire, addressing a case that would normally be deemed outside its spatial and temporal boundaries. By highlighting the inherent contradictions of this transnational bond, the South Atlantic conflict had a profound effect on an underexposed British community with a lingering attachment to a "British world": the Anglo-Argentines. As they found themselves wedged between two irreconcilable identities, divisions threatened to derail this already enfeebled grouping. Yet leaders of the community, presuming a common Britishness with the Falkland Islanders and Britons in the United Kingdom, sought to intervene in the conflict by reaching out to both. That their efforts were met with indifference, and sometimes scorn, only underlines how contingent and frail the idea of Greater Britain was by 1982. Yet this article also reveals how wide ranging the consequences of the crisis of Greater Britain were, and how its global reach was acutely put to the test by pitting different "British worlds" against each other.

On 31 March 1914, Harrods' only overseas branch opened to the public on Buenos Aires's elegant Florida Street. The luxurious store epitomized the extent of British influence in Argentina, as one prominent newspaper editorial proclaimed: "The English community in particular has reason to feel proud of this magnificent establishment conceived by English brains, financed by English capital." This "Mecca of society," as the store was branded, was enjoyed both by the almost thirty thousand British subjects living in the republic and by wealthy Argentines, yet it was not the only British icon in the capital.[1] Only ten minutes away from Harrods was an imposing replica of Big Ben, known as Torre de los Ingleses. It had been commissioned by the British residents of Argentina as a gift to the nation on the centennial of the May Revolution, which had paved the way for Argentina's eventual independence from Spain in 1816. Erected at the heart of Plaza Británica in the stylish *barrio* Retiro, the clock tower was just steps

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[1] "The Mecca of Society: Harrods," *Buenos Aires Herald*, 29 May 1914; Andrew Graham-Yooll, *The Forgotten Colony: A History of the English-Speaking Communities in Argentina*, rev. ed. (Buenos Aires, 1999), 267.

away from yet another British symbol that would be inaugurated the following year: the majestic Central Argentine Railway terminus. Other smaller British firms and establishments also proliferated around Buenos Aires, as we can glean from the advertisements routinely displayed in the two main English-language newspapers of the city—the *Buenos Aires Herald* and the *Standard*—for shops and businesses that projected a "British" commercial image. For example, on 2 April 1914, the pages of the *Standard* enticed readers to taste "Pickwick Marmalade" and "the 'Tiffin' Pickles" at the "Victoria Tea Rooms," and enjoy "Luncheons and Teas" at "Le Five O'Clock" while purchasing "artistic Afternoon Tea sets" at "Mappin & Webb" or developing photographs at "Imperial."[2]

Sixty-eight years later, we find a different scene entirely. In order to celebrate the "recovery of the Malvinas" on 2 April 1982, Harrods (Buenos Aires) was festooned with Argentine flags, and placed advertisements in all major national dailies with the slogan "La gran tienda argentina adhiere al Gran Momento Nacional" ("The great Argentine store supports the Great National Moment"). That such a symbol of Britishness was now presented as "la gran tienda argentina" signifies a conscious shedding of the British reputation that had hitherto been an asset to the store.[3] Businesses and organizations with even the slightest links to Britain went out of their way to publicly declare their support for the Argentine cause. Thus the Asociación de Cultura Británica emphasized its Argentine origins, financing, and character, as did the refrigerator manufacturers McLean, declaring, "we manufacture cold, but we are boiling with rage about our Malvinas."[4] Like Harrods, by saying "our Malvinas," McLean was invoking the rhetoric of group solidarity, emphasizing its local roots in order to dispel any doubts about its loyalties among Argentine customers. Meanwhile, a prominent pharmacy in downtown Buenos Aires, La Franco Inglesa, chose to drop the word "Inglesa" from its name after the sinking of the *Belgrano* in early May 1982.[5]

To some extent, this change in rhetoric could be seen as a tactical adjustment at a time of uncertainty and growing anti-British feelings in Argentina. In fact, several urban landmarks with British connections were "nationalized": Plaza Británica became Plaza Fuerza Aérea, while its clock tower was rechristened Torre Monumental. Yet these stories also typify the changes that the Anglo-Argentine community at large underwent as a result of the Falklands War, as it found itself wedged between what had become two irreconcilable identities. While several Anglo-Argentines publicly expressed their support for Argentina, this stance was by no means unanimous. Rather, identity and loyalty became the subjects of fierce debates within the community. And while the war prompted many Anglo-Argentines to support Argentina's cause, it also inspired them to reach out to the Falkland Islanders—on the basis of a shared Britishness—in order to assuage their fears. All of these factors illustrate the widening breach within the Anglo-Argentine community and the deepening fissures between them and the "British world" that was integral to their self-definition.

[2] Advertisements, *Standard*, 2 April 1914.

[3] Advertisement, *La Nación*, 4 April 1982.

[4] "Asociación de Cultura Británica es Argentina," *Crónica*, 10 April 1982; Advertisement, *Crónica*, 17 May 1982.

[5] Advertisement, *Crónica*, 6 May 1982.

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This article explores the wider implications of the Falklands War in a "British world" context by analyzing the Anglo-Argentine community's reactions to the conflict.[6] Most works on the Falklands conflict tend to treat the Anglo-Argentine angle of the story as a bizarre sideshow with little bearing on the political stakes of the confrontation.[7] Yet while the role of Argentina's British community in the military encounter was almost negligible, their story acquires new importance when viewed through a transnational lens. Recent works on British history from such perspectives have introduced useful conceptual frameworks such as "Greater Britain" (a term that originated in the nineteenth century) or the more recent term, "British world."[8] These concepts refer to the idea of an expansive Britishness, a global community that encompasses the effect of more than a century of imperial endeavor and unites peoples from the remotest corners of the earth in the belief that they shared a common identity, culture, and material interests.

The serial crises of belonging that erupted among multiple self-styled "British" communities around the globe in the era of decolonization are now increasingly studied as part of a wider rupture in the capacity of Britishness to resonate globally at empire's end.[9] Tamson Pietsch proposes the study of "British world spaces," as a way of overcoming a lack of clearly defined temporal and spatial boundaries in British world scholarship. She describes these spaces as "multiple and intersecting" yet also "limited" and unequal. These different spaces are based on material networks and exchanges, on "the ideational tools of an imagined 'global Britishness'" and on the physical places where British societies are enacted.[10]

This article focuses on a case that would normally be deemed outside the spatial and temporal boundaries of the "British world." While scholars have recently expanded the geographical scope of British world studies, Argentina has not yet been prominently considered.[11] James Belich's *Replenishing the Earth* encompasses

[6] The terms "Anglo Argentine community" and "British community" do not adequately describe the community in demographic terms. A good analysis of the demographic makeup of the community can be found in Graham-Yooll, *The Forgotten Colony.* The "Falklands/Malvinas" dichotomy is politically charged; I will use the terms interchangeably according to local emphasis.

[7] For example, Lawrence Freedman, *The Official History of the Falklands Campaign*, vol. 2, *War and Diplomacy*, 2nd ed. (London, 2007), 92–94; Klaus Dodds, *Pink Ice: Britain and the South Atlantic Empire* (London, 2002), 164–82.

[8] Charles Dilke coined the term "Greater Britain" in his 1868 travelogue, and it was later adopted and developed by John Robert Seeley and James Anthony Froude. See Charles Wentworth Dilke, *Greater Britain: A Record of Travel in English-Speaking Countries During 1866 and 1867*, 2 vols. (London, 1868); John Robert Seeley, *The Expansion of England: Two Courses of Lectures* (1883; repr., New York, 2005); James Anthony Froude, *Oceana or England and Her Colonies* (1886; repr., London, 1912).

[9] For example, see José E. Igartua, *The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada, 1945–71* (Vancouver, 2006); John Lambert, "An Unknown People: Reconstructing British South African Identity," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 37, no. 4 (December 2009): 599–617; James Curran and Stuart Ward, *The Unknown Nation: Australia after Empire* (Carlton, 2010); Jimmi Østergaard Nielsen and Stuart Ward, "'Cramped and Restricted at Home?' Scottish Nationalism at Empire's End," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 25 (December 2015): 159–85.

[10] Tamson Pietsch, "Rethinking the British World," *Journal of British Studies* 52, no. 2 (April 2013): 441–63, at 463.

[11] Phillip A. Buckner and Carl Bridge, "Reinventing the British World," *Round Table* 92, no. 368 (January 2003): 77–88; Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich, "Mapping the British World," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 31, no. 2 (May 2003): 1–15; Phillip A. Buckner and R. Douglas Francis, eds., *Rediscovering the British World* (Calgary, 2005); Stuart Ward, ed. *British Culture and the End of Empire*

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Argentina but it does not explicitly examine this community from a Greater British perspective; it emphasizes how trade relations over social and cultural forces shape national identity.[12] In John Darwin's account of the "orphans of empire," those "settlers and expatriates" who remained after the end of empire, both formal and informal, the story of the Anglo-Argentine community ends with the nationalization of the British-owned railways in Argentina in the mid-twentieth century.[13] This article argues that the Anglo-Argentines' identification with Britain continued into the early 1980s, when war, rather than economics, dealt the most severe blow to their sense of Britishness. Using files from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, some of the very limited declassified material from the Argentine president's office, British and Argentine media sources, diaries, memoirs, and interviews, I consider Anglo-Argentine reactions to the Falklands War within a "British world" framework. While we must recognize the unique features of the Anglo-Argentine crisis in 1982, it also forms part of a larger process involving embattled Britons in disparate parts of the world at empire's end, from Kenya to Rhodesia, from Northern Ireland to Gibraltar.[14]

A growing body of literature on the Anglo-Argentine connection has focused on trade links and informal imperialism, but the history of the Anglo-Argentines as a community has received less attention.[15] In its heyday, the British expatriate and

(Manchester, 2001); Duncan Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860–1900* (Princeton, 2007); James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783–1939* (Oxford, 2009); Bill Schwarz, *Memories of Empire*, vol. 1, *The White Man's World* (Oxford, 2011); John Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830–1970* (Cambridge, 2009); Gary B. Magee and Andrew S. Thompson, *Empire and Globalisation: Networks of People, Goods and Capital in the British World, c. 1850–1914* (Cambridge, 2010). Neville Meaney, "Britishness and Australia: Some Reflections," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 31, no. 2 (May 2003): 121–35, at 123–24.

[12] Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, 179–80, 537.

[13] See John Darwin, "Orphans of Empire," in *Settlers and Expatriates: Britons over the Seas*, ed. Robert A. Bickers (Oxford, 2010), 329–46, at 343–45.

[14] For analyses of "embattled Britons" in Rhodesia since the Unilateral Declaration of Independence and in Ulster during the Troubles, see Donal Lowry, "Ulster Resistance and Loyalist Rebellion in the Empire," in *"An Irish Empire"? Aspects of Ireland and the British Empire*, ed. Keith Jeffery (Manchester, 1996), 191–214; Donal Lowry, "Rhodesia 1890–1980," in Bickers, ed., *Settlers and Expatriates*, 112–49; Schwarz, *White Man's World*; Philip Murphy, "'An Intricate and Distasteful Subject': British Planning for the Use of Force against the European Settlers of Central Africa, 1952–65," *English Historical Review* 121, no. 492 (June 2006): 746–77; Carl Watts, "Killing Kith and Kin: The Viability of British Military Intervention in Rhodesia, 1964–5," *Twentieth Century British History* 16, no. 4 (December 2005): 382–415. For Kenyan settlers, the Emergency, and Mau Mau, see Joanna Lewis, "'Daddy Wouldn't Buy Me a Mau Mau': The British Popular Press and the Demoralization of Empire," in *Mau Mau & Nationhood: Arms, Authority and Narration*, ed. E. S. Atieno Odhiambo and John Lonsdale (Oxford, 2003), 227–50.

[15] H. S. Ferns, "Argentina: Part of an Informal Empire?," in *The Land That England Lost: Argentina and Britain, a Special Relationship*, ed. Alastair Hennessy and John King (London, 1992), 49–61; Andrew Thompson, "Informal Empire? An Exploration in the History of Anglo-Argentine Relations, 1810–1914," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 24, no. 2 (May 1992): 419–36; A. G. Hopkins, "Informal Empire in Argentina: An Alternative View," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 26, no. 2 (May 1994): 469–84; Alan Knight, "Rethinking British Informal Empire in Latin America (Especially Argentina)," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 27, no. S1 (March 2008): 23–48; Colin M. Lewis, "Britiain, the Argentine and Informal Empire: Rethinking the Role of Railway Companies," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 27, no. S1 (March 2008): 99–123; David Rock, "The British in Argentina: From Informal Empire to Postcolonialism," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 27, no. S1 (March 2008): 49–77.

settler community in Argentina mattered because it both was the largest British community outside the empire and the United States and played an important role in Argentina's socioeconomic life. The community emerged in the early nineteenth century largely due to the policies of British foreign minister George Canning, and it had its belle époque around the turn of the twentieth century due to sizeable British investments in Argentina and very close trade relations between the two countries. Many of Argentina's Britons occupied influential positions as *estancieros* (large landowners), merchants, bankers, and business people. By 1914, however, the community's influence had started to decline due, in part, to Britain's diminishing role in the Argentine economy. The 1933 Roca-Runciman Treaty, a commercial agreement that advantaged Britain and greatly benefited the Anglo-Argentines, generated widespread resentment in Argentina toward British domination and British residents. In the immediate post–World War II era, the British-owned railways were nationalized and British-Argentine trade relations rapidly deteriorated.

The Anglo-Argentine community's attachment to its "British" identity persisted throughout these developments. Many Anglo-Argentines had shown their loyalty to Britain in World War I (somewhat fewer did so in World War II), contributing financially and sending thousands of volunteers to fight with the British. Both World Wars saw the extension of community institutions that had protected and projected Anglo-Argentine "Britishness" for decades. Schools, social and sports clubs, churches—mainly of Anglican and Presbyterian denominations—and other ethnic institutions, such as charities, hospitals, and cultural institutes, helped keep the community united and passed on values and traditions to new generations. By the end of World War II, however, diminishing numbers and financial strains forced many such institutions to open membership to non-Anglos. A period of growing nationalism and political instability in the republic during the 1950s and 1960s—featuring three coups d'état and alternating military and civilian governments—inflicted severe wounds in the community's life, prompting some Anglo-Argentines to leave the country.

In 1982, the number of community members was estimated at one hundred thousand—including about 7,500 short-term residents and some seventeen thousand British passport holders (with a further thirty thousand entitled to citizenship). Anglo-Argentines were geographically dispersed around the country, but the largest concentrations were in Buenos Aires and its surrounding areas. Generational fissures became accentuated as younger Anglo-Argentines integrated more fully into Argentine life. Exogamy was increasingly common, yet many still adhered to their "Britishness" even though it was becoming evident to them that the object of their loyalties was largely an imaginary concept. The Falklands War violently magnified the contradictions inherent in their attachment to a "British" identity.[16] In what

[16] For the history of the community, see Deborah L. Jakubs, "A Community of Interests: A Social History of the British in Buenos Aires, 1860–1914" (PhD diss., Stanford University, 1985); Graham-Yooll, *The Forgotten Colony*; Roger Gravil, *The Anglo-Argentine Connection, 1900–1939* (Boulder, 1985); Klaus Gallo, *Great Britain and Argentina: From Invasion to Recognition, 1806–26* (New York, 2001); Florencia Cortés-Conde, *Los Angloargentinos en Buenos Aires: Lengua, Identidad y Nación Antes y Después de Malvinas* (Buenos Aires, 2007); Rock, "British in Argentina"; idem, "The British of Argentina," in Bickers, ed., *Settlers and Expatriates*, 18–44; Gordon Bridger, *Britain and the Making of Argentina* (Southampton, 2013); Ferns, "Argentina"; Alastair Hennessy, "Argentines, Anglo-Argentines and

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follows, I first focus on the outreach efforts of the Anglo-Argentine community and the reaction these provoked in Britain and in the Falklands. In the following section I look at community opinions as expressed in letters from Anglo-Argentines and editorial and opinion pieces in the *Buenos Aires Herald*. By highlighting key features of a "marginal" British community in the decades after decolonization, we can shed fresh light on an underexposed British world. An analysis of the Anglo-Argentine communities' interaction with other "British worlds" in the Falklands and the United Kingdom provides new insights about the relational qualities of national identity: crises of reciprocation can and do undermine forms of collective identification that might otherwise endure. Transnational bonds rest on assumptions of sameness that, if tested by conflict, can rapidly unravel—eroding, in turn, the internal cohesion of the localized groupings that claim to make up that global community. This particular case is a clear example of how the Falklands War magnified an underlying crisis of Greater Britain, liable to cause divisions, doubts, and tensions within British communities.

"WE DO NOT FEEL THAT OUR SITUATION HAS BEEN FULLY CONSIDERED": PLEADING WITH BRITAIN

Shortly after the Argentine recovery of the Malvinas was announced on 2 April, the Junta reassured Britons in Argentina that they would be protected from any anti-British attacks. Yet a feeling of foreboding loomed over the community, which was exacerbated by the announcement that a British Task Force would set sail to the South Atlantic within days. Prompted by this state of uncertainty, influential Anglo-Argentines took immediate action. Both community organizations and prominent Anglo-Argentine personalities attempted—in different, and sometimes contradictory ways—to influence Britain's actions in the South Atlantic. The deployed rhetorical devices ranged from references to their common ethnic roots and traditions to their shared history of opposing fanaticism, and from loyalty to the crown to their long-standing business partnership. In doing so, they implicitly invoked the idea of Greater Britain, emphasizing the shared emotional, cultural, and material interests between Britain and Argentina.

Within a week of the Argentine invasion, messages from four different Anglo-Argentine organizations landed on Prime Minister Thatcher's desk. On 7 April the British Community Council (BCC), established in 1939 as a coordinating body to centralize "the cultural, philanthropic and charitable activities of native born Britons and peoples of British descent living in Argentina," urged Thatcher "to seek a peaceful solution to this situation and give due consideration to the strong British presence in Argentina and the size of the community living here."[17] Five days later, the Association of British and British-Descended Farmers in

Others," in *The Land That England Lost: Argentina and Britain, a Special Relationship*, ed. Alastair Hennessy and John King (London, 1992), 9–48; Callum A. MacDonald, "End of Empire: The Decline of the Anglo-Argentine Connection 1918–1951," in *The Land That England Lost: Argentina and Britain, a Special Relationship*, ed. Alastair Hennessy and John King (London, 1992), 79–92; Dodds, *Pink Ice*.

[17] The National Archives (hereafter TNA), G. T. Murchison (BCC) to Thatcher, 6 May 1982, FCO 7/4640/W4.

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Argentina, an organization established for the occasion, sent another cable to Thatcher.[18] This telegram expressed the belief that the Falkland Islanders would be able to adapt to living under the Argentine flag in the same way as Argentina's Britons had long done: "for years, in some cases generations, we have lived and worked happily under Argentine governments of differing political persuasions. We have led our traditional, British way of life without any hindrance and our experience has led us to believe that the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands have nothing to lose and much to gain by coming under Argentine rule." In a pointed postscript, the farmers also reminded Thatcher about the community's loyal contribution to Britain's war effort during the Second World War.[19] Other messages from Anglo-Argentines to Britain would highlight this point as well—perhaps as a way to fend off arguments that they were Argentine at heart.[20] Here the Anglo-Argentines were following a long tradition replicated all over the British world in times of crisis, emphasizing the sacrifice of servicemen in imperial wars—the ultimate display of authentic loyalty and proof that the common transnational bond uniting Britons across the globe was not merely biological, but one involving familial duties. These reminders of past sacrifices for the "mother country," in turn, served to create a shared narrative among community members.

Messages continued to arrive on the prime minister's desk until the end of the conflict, although they became more sporadic.[21] In what was perhaps the final attempt by members of the Anglo-Argentine community to influence British decision making, on 31 May a group of women wrote to Queen Elizabeth II "in the hope that Her Majesty's influence will rectify the erroneous course taken by Mrs. Thatcher and her Government regarding the Malvinas Question." In this heartfelt plea, the queen was asked "to understand the feelings of those attached to Great Britain by ties of blood and tradition," and she was reminded that "not so long ago, men of our blood gave their lives in a war against the totalitarian governments of that time, fighting against despotism and fanatic inhuman policies." Furthermore, by breaking a British "tradition of honour and behaviour," the women continued, the actions of the previous weeks made the "British and their descendants resident in Argentina shameful of the acts and deeds of the actual [*sic*] British Government."[22] These women invoked the incongruity between the British values they had inherited and their historically loyal stance on the one hand, and the United Kingdom government's actions on the other. By positioning themselves as loyal Britons, they echoed attitudes adopted by Rhodesian and Ulster unionist rebels during the 1960s and 1970s, when "loyalty" meant rebellion against Westminster and Whitehall. However, unlike the sympathy that Rhodesians had received in parts of Britain in

[18] G. A. D. "Tony" Emerson, the self-appointed chairman of the institution, later admitted this fact. It was reported that he had "gone round collecting signatures from principal British estancia owners," finding "only two British estancieros, both over 70, who felt the UK was right to respond with force." TNA, Anthony Williams to P. R. Fearn, 29 April 1982, FCO 7/4640/25.

[19] Cited in Christopher Thomas, "Dispute on Views of Islanders," *Times*, 14 April 1982.

[20] See the letter sent from a "British" school in Buenos Aires to Thatcher, which contained a list of past pupils who had fought in the war: "Una Nota a Margaret Thatcher Ha Remitido el Colegio San Albano," *La Razón*, 19 April 1982.

[21] "San Albano," *La Razón*, 19 April 1982; TNA, G. T. Murchison (BCC) to Thatcher, FCO 7/4640/36b; TNA, G. T. Murchison (BCC) to Thatcher, 27 May 1982, FCO 7/4548/122.

[22] Quoted in Graham-Yooll, *The Forgotten Colony*, 298.

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the 1960s, the Anglo-Argentines' pleas gained little traction in London. The prime minister's reply was invariably a polite "no"—acknowledging the British community's contribution as well as expressing some sympathy for their plight, while stating in no uncertain terms that "the Falkland Islanders have made it clear that they wish to remain British."[23] This attitude was well captured in a Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) document prepared in advance of an interview by an Argentine journalist: "We have given attention to the views that have been expressed but we have heard nothing which leads us even to begin to question the rectitude of our action in defending the rights and freedoms which are the basis of Western democracy."[24]

Other organizations, such as the Emergency Committee of the British Community expressed the expectation that emphasizing the long-standing admiration for Britain in Argentina might prove sufficient to convince London against military retaliation. They cabled Downing Street to repeat the argument that the Islanders would be able "to continue working in peace as indeed 17,000 British subjects already do under the Argentine flag."[25] On 15 April, the British Chamber of Commerce in the Argentine Republic highlighted the historically "fruitful partnership between Argentine and British interests" over the decades. "Generations of Britons" living in Argentina had always "found respect and even admiration for British values and way of life," and this "long history of friendship," the message warned, could be "destroyed in one day but would require decades to repair."[26] This telegram had the dual purpose of appealing to commonalities while issuing a severe warning against going to war. On one level, this replicated the pleas of "abandoned Britons" deployed by the Falkland Islanders during the 1960s and 1970s, though it contained an additional element of threat: Britain would also suffer from the breakdown in the relationship.[27]

As the British forces retook South Georgia on 25 April, institutions changed tack: if thus far they had stressed common interests, sentiments, and culture, now they criticized the British government. A press report from the Co-ordinating Committee of the British Community in the Argentine Republic (a grouping cobbled together by representatives of the BCC and the British Chamber of Commerce) expressed unconditional support for Argentina. The document revealed disappointment at the perceived British obduracy towards Anglo-Argentine efforts, in sharp contrast with the openness of the Argentine nation.[28]

[23] TNA, FCO to BISBA, 22 April 1982, FCO 7/4547/43; see also TNA, Thatcher to BCCA, 20 April 1982, FCO 7/4547/31.

[24] TNA, R. J. Chase (SAmD) to N. M. Fenn (News Department), 28 May 1982, FCO 7/4548/127. This was a draft reply prepared by the FCO for an interview by an Argentine journalist.

[25] TNA, Emergency Committee (BA) to Thatcher, 13 April 1982, FCO 7/4547/16.

[26] TNA, BCCA to Thatcher, 15 April 1982, FCO 7/4547/20. A copy of this telegram, moreover, was sent to the Confederation for British Industry (CBI): TNA, BCCA to CBI, 15 April 1982, FCO 7/4547/36.

[27] For a good account of the Falklands dispute in the 1970s, see Aaron Donaghy, *The British Government and the Falkland Islands, 1974–79*, ed. Effie G. H. Pedaliu and John W. Young (Basingstoke, 2014). On the "abandoned Britons" phenomenon, see James Curran and Stuart Ward, *The Unknown Nation: Australia after Empire* (Carlton, 2010), 26–57.

[28] Michael Field, "Anglo-Argentines Back Junta 'After Britain Initiates Hostilities,'" *Daily Telegraph*, 28 April 1982.

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Individual Anglo-Argentines also paid personal visits as well as making telephone calls to British politicians and members of Her Majesty's Government. A key figure was the influential businessman Bruce Carlisle. An FCO official described him as "an old acquaintance of the Secretary of State and … an important if elderly member of the British community in Buenos Aires."[29] From his arrival in London in mid-April until late May, Carlisle tried to persuade several British ministers not to go to war with Argentina. While not sent as an official representative of the community, he was close to the chairman of the BCC, Guillermo (Bill) T. Murchison, and to members of the Argentine Junta. At a meeting with the foreign secretary, Francis Pym, Carlisle claimed to have a unique insight into Argentine society and politics. The Argentine government, he ventured, "was not a Fascist military junta but Argentina's best Government for 35 years." His British roots, moreover, meant that he also understood the likely British response to aggression: he knew that the British "although slow to react, were implacable once stirred up." Lastly, the British community possibly held the key to assuaging the Islanders' fears: "if the experiences of British people in Argentina was [*sic*] explained to [the Islanders] they would come to see the advantages of Argentine sovereignty."[30] This belief, in fact, was central to the stance taken by many Anglo-Argentines on the crisis, who saw their community as the perfect mediator between Britain and Argentina.

Taking a slightly different slant, Tony Emerson, a British-born farmer living in Argentina and chairman of the Farmers' Association, took advantage of his return to the United Kingdom to try to negotiate a settlement with the British government. Though he introduced himself as a "moderate" Anglo-Argentine, whose "loyalties were with Britain over the Falklands crisis," he did not hide his sympathy for the Anglo-Argentines.[31] In an effort to stave off an impending crisis, Emerson also stressed his unique vantage point as a member of the British community, offering to give guidance to his "'moderate' friends in Buenos Aires."[32] He and the other prominent Anglo-Argentines who traveled to the United Kingdom met politicians such as Kenneth and Mark Carlisle (the latter, a cousin of Bruce Carlisle) in the House of Commons, and Lord Montgomery (son of the famous field marshall from the Second World War, and president of the Anglo-Argentine Society in London), in the higher chamber.[33] These politicians, in turn, passed on the messages received. If this implied agreement with their views, it never amounted to more than a perfunctory plea on their behalf. For all the rhetorical fanfare deployed by Anglo-Argentine institutions and individuals, their attempts to appeal to a Greater British link with the United Kingdom in order to arrest a full-scale war aroused little sympathy in Britain. Neither sentimental nor material arguments resonated with British decision makers; if Anglo-Argentines had taken their special position vis-à-vis the United Kingdom for granted, these political failures were beginning to manifest the weakness of that bond.

[29] TNA, Anthony Williams to Private Secretary, 14 April 1982, FCO 7/4547/14.
[30] TNA, J. E. Holmes to P. R. Fearn, 16 April 1982, FCO 7/4547/23.
[31] Tony Emerson, "How Argentina's Brits Are Bearing Up," *Times*, 24 April 1982.
[32] For example, see TNA, Anthony Williams to Sydney Giffard, 19 May 1982, FCO 7/4548/109.
[33] TNA, Kenneth Carlisle to Francis Pym, 14 April 1982, FCO 7/4547/14b; TNA, Mark Carlisle (MP) to Francis Pym, 30 April 1982, FCO 7/4477/86.

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"A GROTESQUE PARODY OF ENGLISH LIFE": THE ANGLO-ARGENTINES THROUGH UK EYES

This lack of reciprocity extended beyond the political realm as, by and large, the plight of the Anglo-Argentines did not gain much purchase in the United Kingdom. As far as the British public was concerned, letters from constituents to their MPs during the conflict suggest that British voters rarely considered the Anglo-Argentines, and those that did were mostly individuals or organizations with strong links to Argentina.[34] A few mentioned the threats to the welfare of the British community, and others submitted proposals as to how to protect the Anglo-Argentines.[35] Yet these are the rare exceptions that prove the rule: the affinities between the British and Anglo-Argentine peoples were distinctly one-sided.

Most UK newspapers did not fail to mention the tensions and fears of retaliation that the community experienced, or to report about the telegrams from the various Anglo-Argentine institutions;[36] but only a handful wrote about the conflict of loyalties that afflicted the members of the group.[37] In contrast to other settler communities around the British world, the Anglo-Argentines were commonly described as aberrant Britons by virtue of their wealth and social status.[38] The vehemently pro-Thatcher *Daily Express* took the most disparaging line in this regard, with a report at the end of April accusing the "British 'fat cats' who back the Argentine Junta" of hypocrisy. Their claim to Britishness, the reporter stressed, was no more than a façade disguising their desire to preserve a "rich and splendid" lifestyle, "even if it means siding with the enemy in a time of war." These Anglo-Argentines, he added, were "not British in any legal sense," since they "were born in Argentina, they speak Spanish and they carry Argentinian passports." Admittedly, they still preserved certain "British" traditions: "they still speak English at home, and in their clubs," they "send their children to English-language schools and they still toast to the Queen."[39] But this did not automatically grant them the status of "fellow Britons," capable of stirring widespread support in the British domestic arena: unlike the Falkland Islanders, the Anglo-Argentines had lost their kith and kin

[34] TNA, P. J. Fleming (Latin America) Ltd. to Dudley Smith (MP), 23 April 1982, FCO 7/4478; TNA, Plaid Cymru to Thatcher, 28 April 1982, FCO 7/4477/80b.

[35] TNA, John A. F. Lough (Hants) to Robert Adley, MP, 7 April 1982, FCO 7/4476; TNA, Plaid Cymru to Thatcher, 28 April 1982, FCO 7/4477/80b.

[36] See Paul Connew, "Britons Quit as Violence Flares," *Daily Mirror*, 7 April 1982; Ted Oliver, "Gentlemen's War … Children's Peril," *Daily Mail*, 27 April 1982; "Run for Your Lives," *Sun*, 24 April 1982; Jeremy Morgan, "Warnings Heighten Britons' Fears," *Guardian*, 26 April 1982; Christopher Thomas, "Expatriate Britons Are Getting out Fast," *Times*, 7 April 1982; Jimmy Burns, "English-Language Paper under Siege," *Financial Times*, 5 May 1982; Christopher Thomas, "A Community's Fears Grow," *Times*, 6 May 1982; Frank Taylor, "Britons Advised to Quit Argentina Temporarily," *Daily Telegraph*, 6 April 1982.

[37] For example, see Thomas, "Expatriate Britons"; Andrew Whitley, "Few Hopes of Magic Formula among Anglo-Argentine Community," *Financial Times*, 10 April 1982; Peter Taylor, "The Anguish of the 'Anglos,'" *Sunday Telegraph*, 18 April 1982. Only a few published articles recount the experiences of Anglo-Argentines growing up in Argentina, such as Graham-Yooll, "Days in the Life of an Anglo-Argentine Schoolboy," *Guardian*, 10 April 1982; Euan Cameron, "An Argentinian Childhood," *Spectator*, 1 May 1982.

[38] For example, see "Cricket and Polo as Usual for Anglos," *Times*, 2 July 1982.

[39] Ross Benson, "British 'Fat Cats' Who Back the Argentine Junta," *Daily Express*, 29 April 1982. Many Anglo-Argentines had ceased to speak in English in public in order to avoid being identified as British.

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relationship to Britain. A third of the Falkland Islanders—ruled out for British citizenship under the 1981 Nationality Act—would have been of no interest to Britain. Neither did speaking Spanish have anything to do with the law. Perhaps what this reveals is not a coherent argument but a rhetorical strategy of "othering": in time of war, Britain could not afford to show any sympathy for the Anglo-Argentines, who seemed to support the enemy. Britons in the United Kingdom understood the Anglo-Argentines' bilingualism as a signifier of foreignness; attempts to accentuate their "British" traditions resulted in ridicule for being antiquated, and thus inauthentic, aberrant Britons.

Sometimes Anglo-Argentines were criticized for being duplicitous, which pushed them further out of the realm of being truly British. In the aftermath of the conflict, the *Spectator* published a long, anonymous letter from an Anglo-Argentine woman expressing her pain at the realization that the Britain she cherished no longer existed, which provoked angry comments among readers.[40] Deriding the hypocrisy of the Anglo-Argentines' self-styled Britishness, one reader retorted, "Had we acquiesced in the takeover she would, I am confident, have preened herself on being a citizen of a confident thrusting nation rather than poor old decadent Britain."[41] It is instructive that an oft-highlighted issue within the United Kingdom—namely, social and economic inequality—was being transposed onto this particular case in order to dismiss the claims of a British community in a hostile country. As I discuss below, there were echoes of this view in the Islands also, where wealth and business interests undermined the validity of Anglo-Argentine Britishness.

There was a certain degree of sympathy for the community in some British quarters, but it did not translate into the sort of vociferous support that the Islanders were afforded during the war. Rather, these feeble feelings of affinity only served to place the Anglo-Argentines at one remove from the United Kingdom. Perhaps the most sympathetic coverage came from the *Telegraph*, whose treatment of the matter revealed a superficial appreciation of their Britishness (or Englishness)—though this seemed more a narcissistic sympathy than a bond of kinship that would spur Britons to their defense. One piece described the typical Anglo-Argentine as "more English than the English in his principles and behaviour, more Argentine than the Argentines in patriotism,"[42] while another remarked that most were "indistinguishable to the naked eye from the middle to upper crust of the Home Counties."[43] A long piece published two days after the Argentine invasion, moreover, recounted vivid scenes at the Richmond Tea Rooms in downtown Buenos Aires and at the Hurlingham Club—where British sports such as cricket, golf, and polo converged in an atmosphere redolent of upper-class Britain in decades past. Moving towards the southern (and notably less wealthy) districts of the capital, one could find St. George's school, "a handsome establishment said by many to be 'more English than the English.'" All of these institutions were said to "have perpetuated what can only be described as a vigorous 'Englishness.'"[44] Yet this was no plea for Argentina's Britons. This subdued warmth towards the Anglo-Argentines

[40] Alexander Chancellor, "Notebook," *Spectator*, 26 June 1982.
[41] John Christopher, "The Falkland Islands," *Spectator*, 10 July 1982.
[42] Nicholas Shakespeare, "Down in the Land of the 'Ancient Brit,'" *Daily Telegraph*, 24 April 1982.
[43] Taylor, "Anguish of the 'Anglos.'"
[44] Frank Taylor, "Why Evita's People Are Rejoicing," *Sunday Telegraph*, 4 April 1982.

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remained very shallow, becoming in the pages of the *Telegraph* a mere curiosity, rather like a museum piece dusted off for exhibition. Becoming "more British than the British" was not uncommon in other realms of the British world—or indeed in other former European colonies—particularly where there was a fear of assimilation by a larger culture or ethnic group. Since the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Rhodesia, this form of hyper-Britishness had acquired distinctly pejorative connotations; such rhetoric of renunciation placed Anglo-Argentines among a larger group of aberrant Britons who had long been disowned by Britain. Even more to the point, some of those articles contained an element of British self-congratulation for "civilizing" Argentina: "More than any other colonial power," one report concluded, "we provided them, through the forerunners of today's Anglo-Argentines, with the foundations of a civilised life."[45] Statements of this sort—describing no more than an interesting historical fact—barely elicited support for the community, and reflected the general attitudes towards Argentina's Britons in the UK national media: their treatment was scant and lukewarm at best, and derisive at worst. Lacking support in the print media and public opinion, their hopes of success in other political arenas were limited.

The British community's efforts did not fare any better in Westminster. The number of MPs and Lords who brought up their plight in debates is almost negligible, and most of them were members of the opposition. For the most part, the focus was on the welfare of the seventeen thousand British passport holders in Argentina who could expect to be protected by the UK government—but this topic was generally afforded only a brief mention, rather than a developed argument.[46] Only on one occasion during the entire conflict did the House of Commons debates refer specifically to the roughly one hundred thousand Argentines of British descent, most of whom had no legal links with the United Kingdom.[47] The Anglo-Argentines were mentioned more frequently in the House of Lords, albeit only by three Lords: Lord Montgomery of the Anglo-Argentine Society in London, former Labor commonwealth secretary Philip Noel-Baker, and Lord John Monson.[48] The latter, in fact, dismissed this issue as a "red herring": "Of course we feel for them and of course we sympathise with them," he declared, "but their interests cannot rank very high in our order of priorities."[49] As with the media, few British politicians were prepared to make a strong case for the Anglo-Argentines, perhaps because it did not seem politically expedient and safe to do so: there was precious little pressure both from constituents and the media for action on behalf of the community's plight.

Finally, while the safety of British residents and passport holders in Argentina did receive a certain amount of attention from FCO officials in Whitehall and from the War Cabinet, the documents dealing with their fate reveal prevailing attitudes about the Anglo-Argentines in official circles.[50] As is evident from the British government's

[45] Taylor, "Anguish of the 'Anglos.'"

[46] See, for example, the contributions by Ioan Evans and Frank Allaun (both Labour), Speeches to the House of Commons, 7 April 1982, Parliamentary Debates, 6th ser., vol. 21, cols. 982, 1011–12.

[47] Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 29 April 1982, 6th ser., vol. 22, col. 1043.

[48] Speech to the House of Lords, 14 April 1982, Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., vol. 429, col. 321; Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 29 April 1982, 5th ser., vol. 429, col. 997; Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 20 May 1982, 5th ser., vol. 430, col. 831.

[49] Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 14 April 1982, 6th Series, vol. 21, col. 362.

[50] TNA, HLG 118/2989; see also TNA, FCO 7/4619; CAB 148/218.

response to their pleas, UK officials considered the Anglo-Argentines as British only insofar as they were British citizens or subjects. Descendants without dual nationality "should be regarded as fully-fledged Argentines without any formal connections with this country," stated one official brief for the War Cabinet. Similarly, the de facto British ambassador in Buenos Aires during the conflict (based at what became part of the Swiss Embassy when diplomatic ties were broken) explained why a mass evacuation of British subjects from Argentina had never materialized.[51] The Anglo-Argentines remained in Argentina "because they are so deeply integrated into Argentine society so as to feel, and be, part and parcel of it. True, they retain the external trappings which mark them out as of British culture, but, after living the vicissitudes of this country they are as Argentine as the next Argentine, be his origin Italian, Spanish, German, Lebanese or Arab. They are at heart Argentine."[52] In essence, this message expressed a preference for civic over ethnic nationalism, yet what ultimately defined the Anglo-Argentines' identity was their sentiment: because they were "at heart Argentine," they were not considered British. Perhaps this emphasizes the chasm between the FCO and the Anglo-Argentines, who were invoking a Greater British link with the United Kingdom, showing how obsolete that worldview had become in official British eyes. Indeed, in the heyday of empire putting down roots outside Britain did not entail ceasing to be British "at heart," because the object of one's loyalty was not defined by place of birth or residence, but by bonds of kinship, sentiment, and tradition.

Another exchange between Foreign Office diplomats reveals the intensity of this difference in views: to some, the Anglo-Argentines' attachment to Britain was detestable. In a letter from Buenos Aires to Whitehall from May 1982, David Dewberry enclosed some cuttings from the *Buenos Aires Herald* on the Anglo-Argentine dilemma, as well as a letter from the daughter of a very prominent member of the community. Interestingly, he concluded with amusement that their change of allegiance would be a salutary event. "Anglo-Argentine 'society,'" he remarked, "has for many years been a grotesque parody of English life as it might have been in the twenties. We should not mourn its passing." At the receiving end, Robin Fearn did not find them "amusing but tragic"—yet they were only so because "Argentine propaganda lies" would persist among members of the community, not because the British link was fading away.[53] Dewberry's criticism was a common accusation against similar "minority" British communities the world over. White Rhodesians and Ulster unionists, and sometimes also Kenyan settlers, were often regarded as feverish, anachronistic, and old-fashioned societies, who flaunted their loyalty in ways that many people in the United Kingdom considered embarrassing.[54] Embarrassment, as a clear marker of "otherness" within the scope of national identity, placed those who invoked it outside the main group, thus excluding the Anglo-Argentines from the British world they claimed to inhabit.

[51] When Britain broke diplomatic relations with Argentina, the British Embassy was taken over by the Swiss Embassy, which ran a British Interests Section (BISBA) there. See Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 7 April 1982, col. 960; see also TNA, FCO 7/4115.

[52] TNA, D. Joy (BISBA) to P. R. Fearn (SAmD, FCO), 13 May 1982, FCO 7/4619/26.

[53] TNA, D. A. Dewberry (BISBA) to P. R. Fearn (SAmD), 13 May 1982, FCO 7/4548/102.

[54] For an example, see Bickers, ed., *Settlers and Expatriates*.

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In sum, in most areas of British public life, the Anglo-Argentines' messages seem to have had very little impact, if any at all. While there were some lone voices defending their cause, these were very much on the fringes and politically ineffective. Most people, unaware of their loyalty dilemma, remained indifferent, while some cast aspersions for what appeared to be collusion with the Junta in order to protect their interests. Accusations of this kind need to be handled carefully; a brief glance at the domestic political context in Argentina can provide a more nuanced picture.

The period since the overthrow of Perón in 1955 had been one of instability, growing social unrest, and a downward-spiraling economy. The British community deteriorated during this time, not only because of the financial strains it endured, but also due to cases of violent persecution. By the early 1970s, several left-wing armed guerrilla factions, and their right-wing counterparts (notably, the "Triple A" death squad), had been established. Members of the British community and their institutions became targets of terrorist acts, such as kidnapping and murder—generally from left-wing groupings—which explains why many in the community greeted the March 1976 coup with a sense of relief. The new Junta vowed to put an end to guerrilla terrorism; they would also implement a neoliberal economic system that favored many Anglo-Argentine business leaders. However, the brutal Proceso de Reorganización Nacional imposed by the Junta, purporting to transform Argentine society and its economy by means of widespread censorship and state terrorism—including abduction, torture, and execution—had disastrous effects for the country. By 1982, the Proceso had claimed the lives of thousands of people, the economy was in tatters, and there were growing public manifestations of social discontent.[55]

The fact that some Anglo-Argentines served in the armed forces may have facilitated cooperation, and they may have played a role in ensuring the protection of the community.[56] The Junta sought to at least portray a public image of protector of the community, regularly approaching leading members of the community to ask about the well-being of the Anglo-Argentines,[57] citing the Anglo-Argentine telegrams at the United Nations, and encouraging Argentine diplomats to remind the United States of Argentine appreciation for the British community.[58] A convergence of interests thus may have led to harmonious relations between some members of the community and the Junta. More broadly, the Anglo-Argentines' support for

[55] Luis Alberto Romero, *A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, trans. James P. Brennan (University Park, 2002); Santiago Marino and Glenn Postolski, "Relaciones Peligrosas. Los Medios y la Dictadura entre el Control, la Censura y los Negocios," *Revista de Economía Política de las Tecnologías de la Información y Comunicación* 8, no. 1 (April 2006): 1–19; Alejandro García, *La Crisis Argentina, 1966–1976. Notas y Documentos de una Época de Violencia Política* (Murcia, 1994). For specific examples of guerrilla attacks on the British community, see Graham-Yooll, *The Forgotten Colony*.

[56] Timothy J. Lough, interview by the author, 27 January 2015. On the good relations between the Navy and the Anglo-Argentines, see also Tony Emerson, "Argentina's Brits," *Times*, 24 April 1982. For further evidence that the Navy had provided them with protection, see TNA, Anthony Williams to P. R. Fearn, 29 April, FCO 7/4640/25.

[57] Lough, interview. Timothy Lough was regularly invited to meetings at the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[58] Presidencia de la Nación Argentina, Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Altántico Sur (Informe Rattenbach): Anexo, Informe Final, Documentos Recuperados (henceforth IR-AIF-DR), Tomo IV, "Carta al Presidente del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU," 16 April 1982; IR-AIF-DR, Tomo III, 12 April 1982; ibid., "Argumentos para la conversación con el General Alexander Haig," 9 April 1982, fols. 3–4.

Argentina's views on the Malvinas would earn them the praise of other Argentines during the conflict.[59]

Assuming a shared, common Britishness, the Anglo-Argentines envisioned themselves at the intersection of the views, interests, and cultures of three societies—Argentina, Britain, and the Falklands. The fact that their message did not resonate in the Falklands or Britain, however, speaks volumes about how and why the Falklands War brought about an identity crisis among the Anglo-Argentines: long-held assumptions about Britain as "home" were finally revealed to be a mirage. This would prompt some to look for a new form of national identification in *argentinidad*.

"FRIGHTFULLY BRITISH": THE ANGLO-ARGENTINES IN STANLEY

During the conflict, Anglo-Argentines also tried to reach out to the Falkland Islanders on the basis of a shared Britishness. The Islanders' reaction to these initiatives is indicative of the chasm separating the "British worlds" that each grouping claimed to inhabit. A key episode concerned the visits to the Falkland Islands by a delegation of Anglo-Argentines on 16 and 23 April. The idea seems to have originated from a proposal made to Dr. Richard Cutts, Anglican bishop of Argentina and the archbishop of Canterbury's Episcopal Commissary to the Falklands, to allow a group of Anglo-Argentines to join him on his planned pastoral visit to the Falkland Islands. But in the face of public controversy, the archbishop of Canterbury halted the proposal. Cutts apologized to the prime minister, explaining that his intentions had been "purely pastoral and non-political," and that he had acted on the archbishop of Canterbury's request to further "the cause of reconciliation and justice." But his stance on the crisis was no secret: his signature had featured very prominently in the telegram from the Emergency Committee to Mrs. Thatcher.[60] The first delegation, made up of six Anglo-Argentines, and not including Cutts, finally traveled to the Falklands on 16 April. During this brief visit, they met members of the Falklands' Executive Council as well as several locals, whose reaction was almost uniform: distant, cool, and ultimately not prepared to accept any advice from the Anglo-Argentines.[61]

Despite having failed on their first attempt, the delegation returned the following week to propose building a separate town for the Argentines, allowing the Islanders to keep their way of life and customs. They claimed they had submitted this scheme to Lieutenant General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri (who had ousted General Roberto Viola in December 1981 to become president of Argentina); the fact that

[59] This was often reflected in the Spanish-language media in Argentina. See "Argumento Falaz Invalidado," *La Prensa*, 20 April 1982; "La Comunidad Británica en la Argentina," *La Prensa*, 3 May 1982; "El Caso del 'Herald,'" *Clarín*, 9 April 1982; Douglas Grant Mine, "Cómo Viven el Conflicto los Anglo-Argentinos," *La Nación*, 11 April 1982; Arturo Nieva Woodgate, letter to the editor, *La Nación*, 9 April 1982; "Comunidad Británica: Por la Paz," *Crónica*, 8 April 1982.

[60] TNA, Bishop Cutts to Thatcher, 14 April 1982, FCO 7/4547/15. See also TNA, Draft reply to Bishop Cutts, 18 April 1982, FCO 7/4547/27.

[61] See Ian J. Strange, *The Falkland Islands*, 3rd ed. (Newton Abbot, 1983); Smith, *74 Days*, 56, entry for 16 April 1982; Strange, *Falkland Islands*, 260; Graham Bound, *Invasion 1982: The Falkland Islanders' Story* (Barnsley, 2007), Kindle edition, loc. 2126–30. Some Islanders' accounts differ on the number of Anglo-Argentines making up the delegation: see John Smith, *74 Days: An Islander's Diary of the Falklands Occupation*, 2nd ed. (Hampshire, 2002).

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they had flown in the presidential airplane meant that he at least approved of their efforts.[62] On arrival in Stanley, the deputation announced their proposal over the radiotelephone and summoned a public meeting at the post office, eliciting firm rejections from the Falkland Islanders. The post office meeting was particularly ill-tempered, to such an extent that "it almost broke into open violence and all you could hear were cries of 'Get out, and stay out.'"[63]

The locals' responses to the proposals reveal how suspicious the Falkland Islanders were of the British community in Argentina: "Most people here consider that they are only there as long as their pockets are full," explained one.[64] "Although most frightfully British," added another, "they are completely in the grip of the Argentines. They don't appear to have any real loyalty; only a noxious mixture of greed and snobbery, probably more dangerous than the Argentines themselves."[65] A young Falkland Islander grumbled, "[t]here is no creature worse than an Anglo-Argie—their loyalty is purely to their pocket and the country which best suits their pocket at the time and NOTHING else."[66]

This instance points to radically different understandings of what was at stake. As one Falkland Islander complained, the Anglo-Argentines seemed to think that maintaining "the islanders' 'way of life'" meant keeping the superficial existence of "a simple, camp community."[67] Needless to say, the Anglo-Argentine community would not have shared this assessment. After all, they valued "British identity" and "traditions" very highly. Here, perhaps, a *Buenos Aires Herald* editorial may reveal other aspects of how the Anglo-Argentines viewed the Falkland Islanders. While stressing the importance of common descent, the editorial also exposed the widely divergent worldviews of Falkland Islanders and Anglo-Argentines, describing the "Kelpers" as "an insular people," whose "ties with Britain are based on what they are familiar with (the history of their ancestors, the language and the Falkland Islands Company, to which many of them owe house and home)." In contrast to the charges leveled from Stanley, the Falkland Islanders were said to hold "no direct links with Britain itself either socially [or] politically." The Falkland Islanders' suspicion was depicted as simply an issue of geographical isolation and language, which could be easily overcome—and thus the optimal solution lay with the Anglo-Argentines: "if people from the mainland of their same descent and speaking their same language can make contact with them, their eventual return to normal life, this time under Argentine rule, will be made much easier."[68] Yet perhaps in the eyes of the Anglo-Argentines it was not just a matter of maintaining a simple way of life; there was a deeper discrepancy between the two communities. For the Anglo-Argentines, the Falkland Islanders' fixation to remain under British sovereignty showed that they did not have a true appreciation for what it meant to be "British." These

[62] Strange, *Falkland Islands*, 265, entry for 23 April 1982.

[63] Letter from Nap Bound to anonymous (UK), late April 1982, quoted in Bound, *Invasion 1982*, loc. 2137–41. See also Smith, *74 Days*, 74–75, entry for 25 April 1982; Strange, *Falkland Islands*, 266.

[64] Bound, *Invasion 1982*, loc. 2141–43.

[65] Smith, *74 Days*, 74–75, entry for 25 April 1982.

[66] Private Papers of T. J. D. Miller, April–June 1982, 25 April 1982, Documents 3921/84/19/1, Imperial War Museum.

[67] Strange, *Falkland Islands*, 265. *Camp*, deriving from the Spanish *campo*, is the term used to designate areas outside Stanley.

[68] "A Fine Sentiment," *Buenos Aires Herald*, 14 April 1982.

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contrasting views underline the conceptual void that had opened up between Falkland Islanders' and Anglo-Argentines' respective understandings of "British identity" and "traditions." They epitomized one of the fundamental differences between the two "British" communities separated by the Argentine Sea—namely, the importance attached to British sovereignty in order to protect British values and traditions. Understanding the dysfunctional dynamics between these self-styled British communities—the rhetoric of "othering" informing their relationship, a failure of trust, and a lack of empathy for each other—provides a unique insight into the dwindling conceptual purchase of the British world: both groupings individually claimed to be part of Greater Britain, yet they simultaneously rejected each other's vision of Britishness, thus stressing the fragmented nature of this supposedly global community. While British world arguments resonated in parts of the United Kingdom in relation to the Falklands during the war, the divergent views of Falkland Islanders and Anglo-Argentines demonstrate the limited reach of this concept by 1982. Indeed, Greater Britain had always been understood as a global concept uniting communities across the globe in all directions, and not merely between colony/dominion and metropole.

The Falkland Islanders' icy reception did not stop the Anglo-Argentines from trying other initiatives, however. About three weeks later, prompted by the escalation of the conflict, the BCC proposed to the British prime minister that a temporary cease-fire be declared in order to evacuate the Falklands' children to Anglo-Argentine homes in mainland Argentina.[69] This plan seemed altruistic to the Anglo-Argentines but was spurned by Falkland Islanders. While there is no evidence of any official response from London, some London-based Falkland Islanders spoke out against it, stressing the level of mistrust for the Anglo-Argentines and asking them, instead, to persuade "the Argentines to remove themselves from the islands," while in the Falklands the proposal was not even considered.[70] These criticisms did not go unnoticed among the Anglo-Argentines, who condemned those who had rejected this initiative, yet it also led others to censure the BCC for its "naive misunderstanding of island opinion."[71]

In one sense, it is not surprising that the outreach efforts of the Anglo-Argentines were spurned by the Falkland Islanders, given that their islands had been forcibly invaded by Argentina. Yet their rejection of a Greater British link with them is more complex. In terms of ethnic origins, sentiments, and culture, many Anglo-Argentines were as close to the Falkland Islanders as Britons in the United Kingdom. It was perhaps because the Anglo-Argentines accepted Argentine rule, and especially because they stood at the opposite end of the spectrum on the issue of the Falklands dispute, that they were depicted as foreign. This would also feed into doubts and disagreements among the Anglo-Argentine community about their Britishness.

[69] G. T. Murchison (BCC) to Thatcher, 17 May 1982, quoted in Graham-Yooll, *The Forgotten Colony*, 291.

[70] Nicholas Timmins, "Truce Call to Take Children Away," *Times*, 19 May 1982; Smith, *74 Days*, 123, entry for 18 May 1982.

[71] "Save the Children," *Buenos Aires Herald*, 20 May 1982; R. F. V. Cooper, letter to the editor, *Buenos Aires Herald*, 14 July 1982.

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"BETRAYED AND HEARTBROKEN": A COMMUNITY DIVIDED

The Falklands conflict forced the Anglo-Argentines to reevaluate their national identity. The parameters for the debate were often set by the *Buenos Aires Herald*, the only remaining major daily of the Anglo-Argentine community by 1982. The *Herald*'s editorial stance since the mid-1960s had made a distinction between the Malvinas' sovereignty and the Falkland Islanders' way of life; and while it supported Argentina's claim, it showed a degree of empathy towards the Falkland Islanders, who shared common roots, language, and traditions with the Anglo-Argentines. Their experience as a British community in Argentina, moreover, provided the framework through which they saw the Falkland Islands' future under Argentine sovereignty.[72]

With the invasion of the Malvinas in April 1982, the newspaper reflected anxiety over the fate of the community in Argentina, prompted in part by instances of ostracism, bullying, and criticism of community members by their Argentine peers. The *Herald* presented itself as "an integral and necessary part of Argentine national life," and it sought to find a place for the Anglo-Argentine community *within* the Argentine nation, alongside other ethnic groupings, thus providing a solution to the problem of successfully integrating the Falkland Islanders into Argentina.[73] Around mid-April, the newspaper changed leadership, as the British-born editor, James Neilson, was forced to flee to Uruguay. Dan Newland, the American-born interim editor-in-chief, took a far more explicit pro-Argentine (though not unambiguously pro-regime) stance to highlight the corruption in Britain's manner of waging war, seeing in the escalation of violence the true and perfidious intentions of London. Whether or not the external pressures from the Junta were connected to the changes in the newspaper's editorial line, what is most significant is that the opinions expressed in the *Herald* had the capacity to frame the wider debate in the community.[74] Here again, the views of individuals often differed from that of community institutions, but the former tended to couch their views in response to statements from the latter.

Though many Anglo-Argentines chose to keep a low profile during the crisis, the war undoubtedly caused ruptures among families and friends.[75] Public and private letters can give us a glimpse of the discussions that took place among Anglo-Argentines. A key theme under scrutiny was the meaning and significance of "British values," enacted in the local British spaces of churches, clubs, schools, and charities. The key events of the war prompted many Anglo-Argentines to question the applicability of those traditional British values to Britain itself, echoing some of the editorials from the *Herald*. The war, in fact, seemed to show that the United Kingdom had veered very far from the path. One reader of the *Herald*, for

[72] See, for instance, the following editorials: "The Malvinas," *Buenos Aires Herald*, 30 November 1968; "Solution in Sight?," *Buenos Aires Herald*, 27 November 1980.

[73] "Taking It to the Street," *Buenos Aires Herald*, 7 April 1982; "A Greater Nation—I," *Buenos Aires Herald*, 11 April 1982; "A Greater Nation—II," *Buenos Aires Herald*, 12 April 1982.

[74] For examples of the *Herald*'s coverage of the war, see "Britain Turns Aggressor," *Buenos Aires Herald*, 26 April 1982; "Delayed Reaction," *Buenos Aires Herald*, 7 May 1982. On the Junta's pressures, see Thomas, "Dispute," *Times*, 14 April 1982; also Dan Newland, interviewed by the author, 8 February 2015. Newland maintains that he was motivated by general anti-war feelings, rather than by "fear of censorship of any kind."

[75] Catherine E. Kirby, interview by the author, 14 June 2014.

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example, felt "betrayed and heartbroken" because, though she had always been proud of the British values of "chivalry, fair play and honesty" (inherited through her "pure Anglo-Saxon ancestry"), the British government's actions to recover South Georgia had shown that "none of those virtues apply." The war had proven to her that those virtues, in fact, applied more readily to Argentina, leading her to declare: "As far as I'm concerned, as from yesterday I am 101 percent Argentine."[76] The novelty of this discovery reveals how uncritical and naïve many Anglo-Argentines had been in their views of Britain until then. They were undergoing a similar experience to that of millions of Britons around the globe who had "discovered" after the end of empire that the country they had long cherished as "home" was a far cry from their idealized image of Britain. Other members of the British community expressed similar views. An Anglo-Argentine woman wrote to the *Spectator* in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, dejected to find how false was the "picture of a wise, mature mother country" that she had always cherished. This had led her to the discovery "that I was in fact an Argentine."[77] Another woman, writing to Mrs. Thatcher in the aftermath of the sinking of the *Belgrano*, felt "ashamed at Gt. Britain's abominable behaviour." The country that prided itself of doing "everything on principle" had been found not to have any at all. Like the previous writer, this woman chose to express her change of allegiance categorically—enclosing her British passport with the letter as proof.[78] This feeling of despondency at the apparent loss of British values in the United Kingdom was reflected in numerous other letters to the *Herald*. For instance, an Anglo-Argentine, though "proud of [her] British heritage," was "distressed to see that this 'present haughtiness of demeanour' will bring about a loss of British influence and prestige in South America."[79] Another reader lamented the British government's apparent relentlessness in "butchering our young lads so that they can keep their third-rate citizens living in feudal times, all in the name of democracy."[80]

Closely linked to British values was the attitude of "dishonesty" that many Anglo-Argentines ascribed to the Conservative government's execution of the war—a view exacerbated by Britain's disregard for the community's initiatives concerning the Falkland Islanders' future. If Britain claimed to uphold "its sacred responsibility for the rights of the British subjects," asked one vexed reader, why had "the 17,000 strongly pro-Argentine British subjects just across the water from the Malvinas not [been] consulted"? For the author of the letter, this showed not so much Britain's indifference towards the Anglo-Argentines as its skullduggery. Otherwise, he continued, why were they not being protected from the "brutal fascist dictator" that the British politicians and media constantly talked about?[81] Another bone of contention was the issue of loyalty. This ranged from devotion to their country of birth or adoption (Argentina) to allegiance to the British crown—in most cases, clearly distinguished from the British government. The loyalty owed to Argentina was construed as a debt of gratitude, as to "turn against the Argentine would be like

[76] F. Désirée White, letter to the editor, *Buenos Aires Herald*, 29 April 1982.
[77] Chancellor, "Notebook."
[78] TNA, D. A. Dewberry (BISBA) to P. R. Fearn (SAmD), 13 May 1982, FCO 7/4548/102.
[79] Lida von Schey, letter to the editor, *Buenos Aires Herald*, 12 May 1982.
[80] Winifred Violet Colson de Allamprese, letter to the editor, *Buenos Aires Herald*, 11 June 1982.
[81] Edgar Calder-Potts, letter to the editor, *Buenos Aires Herald*, 10 June 1982.

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biting the hand that fed them."[82] After making wartime contributions to Britain—"a country," one writer remarked, "which most of us barely knew"—now the time had come to show gratitude towards Argentina, "a country which we do know."[83] Another writer, irked by the *Daily Express*'s ridiculing the "British 'fat cats'" who supported the Junta, argued that not many Anglo-Argentines had been able to toast "the king on the battlefields during the last World War," since "many of them fell in battle and could not return to toast the welfare of *their* country, the Argentine Republic."[84] These writers embraced a new definition of Anglo-Argentine identity, one based on country of birth or adoption, rather than on blood, tradition, and values, which had rapidly lost their capacity to resonate meaningfully. Likewise, the idea of home had come to acquire a different meaning for many, as reflected in a letter published in the Spanish-language daily *La Nación* blaming Prime Minister Thatcher for inciting Anglo-Argentines to hate Britain: "I used to visit Great Britain," she stated, "and every time I arrived there I felt like I was at home. From now on, I will never again set foot on British soil."[85]

The theme of home and national allegiance was further explored in a letter from Catherine Kirby to the *Herald* at the end of June, which displayed the thought process experienced by many Anglo-Argentines. A key idea in her letter was that allegiance to another country had become obsolete. She reflected on her struggle as an Anglo-Argentine to find her "national conscience." While her generation had mixed more with "the 'natives'" (meaning Argentines of non-British descent), they had also inherited the British values of "fair play" and "team effort." Crucially, however, a sense of "English 'arrogance'" prevalent among the Anglo-Argentine community was causing a "dual 'national conscience,'" leading them not to feel at home in either country. The solution lay with accepting Argentina as "our home and … be proud to be part of it"—using their British values for the advancement of their nation.[86] This was not a decision to be taken lightly; it constituted a radical shift for most Anglo-Argentines. As an Anglo-Argentine from Rosario stated in a private letter, for most members of the British community the war had "meant—probably for the first time in our lives—almost total identification with Argentina," partly because their initiatives had been unreciprocated both in the United Kingdom and in the Falklands. Indeed, the Falkland Islanders' snub to Argentina's Britons seemed to have elicited new levels of exasperation: "the idiots," she grumbled, "wouldn't even entrust their children to the care of Anglo-Argentine families who offered to take them while the fighting went on."[87] Bill Schwarz's work on the

[82] A. C. de Daniell to Ronald Hansen, undated, May 1982, quoted in Ronald Hansen, Saturday Sidelight, *Buenos Aires Herald*, 22 May 1982.

[83] Margaret Hamlin, letter to the editor, *Buenos Aires Herald*, 14 May 1982.

[84] Donald Ryan, letter to the editor, *Buenos Aires Herald,* 10 June 1982, emphasis mine.

[85] Delyth Lloyd de Iglesia, letter to the editor, *La Nación*, 15 June 1982. For another letter from an Anglo-Argentine in the Spanish language press, see Arturo Nieva Woodgate, letter to the editor, *La Nación*, 9 April 1982.

[86] Catherine E. Kirby, letter to the editor, *Buenos Aires Herald*, 25 June 1982.

[87] Nell Shakespear to Deborah L. Jakubs, July 1982, quoted in Deborah L. Jakubs, "Straddling the Fence No More: The Falkland/Malvinas War and Its Impact on the Anglo-Argentine Identity," in *Intellectual Migrations: Transcultural Contributions of European and Latin American Émigrés—Papers of the Thirty-First Annual Meeting of the Seminar on the Acquisition of Latin American Library Materials (SALALM)*, ed. Iliana L. Sonntag (Madison, 1987), 100–6, at 104–5.

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Central African Federation in the 1960s observes how similar tensions came to a head due to what he terms an irreversible failure of "mutuality" between British settlers in Africa and their masters in London. While these differences were long inherent to the Greater British relationship, decolonization prompted them to turn "into outright antagonism."[88]

In some cases, this deep disillusionment with Britain tacitly emulated the attitudes adopted by other British communities since the onset of decolonization. White Rhodesians and Ulster loyalists had in different ways professed loyalty to the idea of Britain while promoting disobedience to Westminster. This was a line of argument that some Anglo-Argentines followed, maintaining that to side with Argentina in the war did not mean disloyalty to the queen or to their British identity. One reader, echoing the cries of other embattled British loyalists around the globe, went as far as to call "patriot[s]" all those "who condemn what Britain is doing here," while those who approved of it "might as well have been born in Weissnichtwo, for all they know of the meaning of the word British."[89] Another conceded that people were entitled to support the British campaign, yet they would be "very wrong to imply that those who did not agree with the view were in any way less loyal to Her Majesty than himself."[90] Opinions such as these were bound to generate rifts within the community.[91] One writer, for example, derided the apparent community-wide change of loyalties, sarcastically suggesting that Anglo-Argentines donate their decorations "to the local Patriotic Fund for sale to numismatists."[92] Another, British-born author lambasted those who, "after deriving great benefit from their British connection in the past," had decided to abandon their Britishness when it became less convenient to them.[93]

Thus the panorama of Anglo-Argentine public opinion that we glean from these letters is a complex one, and one that highlights the extent of discord. The divergent views of Anglo-Argentine individuals and organizations show here that despite the appearance of an unequivocal embrace of the British world ideal at the institutional level, the war had magnified the latent contradictions within the concept of Greater Britain in each person's understanding. At a more global level, this failure of mutual identification not only drove a wedge between the various "British" communities implicated in the crisis, but also affected the internal cohesion of the individual groupings themselves.

THE ANGLO-ARGENTINE DILEMMA

These divisions were the result of a deeper change in the thinking of many Anglo-Argentines, whereby blood and tradition had ceased to be regarded as determinants

[88] See Bill Schwarz, "'The Only White Man in There': The Re-Racialisation of England, 1956–1968," *Race & Class* 38, no. 1 (July 1996): 65–78, at 69.

[89] M. S. Waterhouse, letter to the editor, *Buenos Aires Herald*, 14 May 1982.

[90] G. H. Gibson, letter to the editor, *Buenos Aires Herald*, 11 August 1982.

[91] This was compounded by what many regarded as blatantly pro-Argentine coverage from the *Herald*. See Gerald S. Milman, letter to the editor, *Buenos Aires Herald*, 3 June 1982; Jackie Henderson, letter to the editor, *Buenos Aires Herald*, 10 June 1982; Geoffrey Green, letter to the editor, *Buenos Aires Herald*, 10 June 1982; Peter Cressall, letter to the editor, *Buenos Aires Herald*, 17 June 1982.

[92] Reginald Stuart, letter to the editor, *Buenos Aires Herald*, 12 May 1982.

[93] R. F. V. Cooper, letter to the editor, *Buenos Aires Herald*, 12 May 1982.

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of national identification. Devoid of this object of allegiance, many turned to their place of birth or residence, coming to see it in a new light. In their efforts to understand their place within the Argentine nation, Anglo-Argentines met difficulties not unlike those of the "new nationalist" drive in the British world in the wake of empire, where erstwhile British communities had sought to create new national myths rooted in their territories, new histories, flags, and anthems.[94] It was far from a teleological and unproblematic evolution; in this global context of the unraveling of Greater Britain, the changes within the Anglo-Argentine community reveal the wide reach of the crisis of Britishness.

This transformation within the Anglo-Argentine community was analyzed in a *Buenos Aires Herald* opinion piece from 13 May. Written by the columnist Ronald Hansen, it was a very conscious effort by an Anglo-Argentine to come to terms with the identity dilemma facing the community, and provoked many responses—both in favor and against. Hansen was a so-called true Anglo-Argentine: he was born in Argentina of British parents, was educated in a "British" school in Argentina, and was an active member of the community.[95] Hansen focused on the recent infighting within the community. These differences reflected the inability of some "to grasp the process of change that has taken place in their midst." The war had brought to the fore the desire of many "individual community members … to affirm their real identity and break out" of what he called an "uneasy, largely self-imposed condition of foreigners in their own country." The key catalyst, however, had been Britain's belligerent attitude. Anglo-Argentines, finally and irreparably "alienated," were led to "attack the Rubicon they really wanted to cross years ago." Thanks to this, the "the vast majority of Anglo-Argentines have now realized clearly where their loyalties lie." But there remained "those Anglo-Argentines … who still value their British ascendancy over their Argentine nationality." They had a choice between accepting the Argentine stance or continuing to live "in a ghetto of their own creation."[96]

Although Hansen's analysis had its merits, he ultimately missed the point. There was nothing unique about this "self-imposed condition of foreigners in their own country." The sense of a common kinship, material interests, and values and traditions that transcended political and geographical borders, was not the sole preserve of the Anglo-Argentines. Rather, it was shared by communities scattered around the globe that saw themselves as part of a "British world." It was the sheer extent of this global dispersal of people that rendered "Greater Britain" plausible as an object of civic loyalty. That Hansen was unable to think comparatively suggests how this sense of a global Britishness had evaporated among members of the community. In this light, the attitude of many Anglo-Argentines in rejecting Britain was based on a newfound awareness that those commonalities no longer existed.

The question remains, however, as to whether the Falklands War produced an irrevocable rupture within the community. While many divided families made amends

[94] On "new nationalism," see Stuart Ward, "The 'New Nationalism' in Australia, Canada and New Zealand: Civic Culture in the Wake of the British World," in *Britishness Abroad: Transnational Movements and Imperial Cultures*, ed. Kate Darian-Smith, Stuart MacIntyre, and Patricia Grimshaw (Melbourne, 2007), 231–63; A. G. Hopkins, "Rethinking Decolonization," *Past and Present* 200, no. 1 (August 2008): 211–47.

[95] Hansen also had Danish ancestry. Newland, interview; Cortés-Conde, *Angloargentinos*, 123.

[96] Ronald Hansen, "The Anglo-Argentine Dilemma", *Buenos Aires Herald*, 13 May 1982.

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after the conflict, circumstances in Argentina made a "return to normality" very difficult.[97] Despite a spell of cordial relations in the 1990s, official antagonism towards Britain has been prevalent since the 1980s—with poor trade relations playing an important role. There have been numerous demonstrations of public hostility towards Britain, such as the April 1984 attack on the George Canning statue in Plaza Fuerza Aérea, in which a group of war veterans and activists pulled the figure off its pedestal and cast it into the river Plate.[98] Other permanent changes in the urban landscape—in addition to the ones mentioned at the outset—reflect a similar anti-British logic, such as the renaming of Avenida Canning and its corresponding underground station in Buenos Aires after Raúl Scalabrini Ortíz, an eminent twentieth-century Argentine writer, who had vehemently denounced British "colonialism" in Argentina.[99] Moreover, important "British" icons disappeared: Harrods (Buenos Aires) closed down in 1998; the English Social Club in Lomas de Zamora, struggling to recruit new members, had to shut down temporarily in 2002; and the iconic Richmond Tea Rooms gave way to a Nike store in 2011, to the chagrin of many Anglo-Argentines.[100] Although there were other factors at play here, these closures also reflected their rapidly shrinking core clientele.

The demography of the community is clearly changing, reflected by the BCC's rebranding itself the Argentine British Community Council in 1993.[101] Anglican and Presbyterian churches have long conducted their main services in Spanish. And sporadic reports in the British media since 1982 confirm that the community's Britishness is rapidly fading out.[102] It is estimated that some fifteen thousand Anglo-Argentines currently live in the Buenos Aires area. The younger community members are now largely Spanish speaking and their loyalties unmistakably lie with Argentina.[103] Thus, although an expatriate British community still exists (as in countless other global cities), this no longer evinces the same peculiar characteristics that typified the Anglo-Argentine mentality prior to 1982.

The cumulative weight of the evidence presented here suggests that the Falklands War was a transformative event for the Anglo-Argentine community, bearing out Pietsch's notion that British world identities were inherently relational. The failure of the Anglo-Argentine initiatives in London and Stanley dashed hopes of averting a war by appealing to a shared Britishness, thereby rendering their object of

[97] Kirby, interview; Lough, interview.

[98] The statue was restored in 1994, but placed instead in Plaza Mitre. For an account of this event, see Federico Lorenz, "Los Jóvenes y la Guerra de Malvinas: a Propósito de la Película *Los Chicos De La Guerra*," *Cine y Formación Docente* (Buenos Aires, 2005), 1–16.

[99] See Julio Cardoso, ed., *Malvinas En La Historia: Una Perspectiva Suramericana* (Lanús, 2011), 165.

[100] Willy G. Bouillon, "Fin de una Historia Muy *British*," *La Nación*, 7 August 1998; Colin Barraclough, "End of the Club for Anglo-Argentines," *Daily Telegraph*, 12 May 2002; Daisy Goodwin, "Last of England," *Guardian*, 6 March 1999; Uki Goni, "Legendary Buenos Aires Cafe to Make Way for Nike Shop," *Guardian*, 21 August 2011.

[101] ABCC, "About the ABCC: The Why and the Wherefore," http://www.abcc.com.ar/about-the-abcc-the-why-and-the-wherefore, accessed 10 March 2015.

[102] "Heartbreak Choice as the Anglos Break Their Old Links and Throw in Their Lots with the Argentines," *Daily Mail*, 15 April 1983; Phillip Hay, "Falklands Factor Ensures Divided Loyalties at the Club," *BBC Listener*, 8 January 1987; Gabriella Gamini, "Anglo-Argentines Bat on in Defence of Tea and Scones," *Times*, 30 March 1992; Goodwin, "Last of England"; Sophie Campbell, "A Flavour of Britain Down Old Buenos Aires Way," *Financial Times*, 23 April 2005.

[103] See Cortés-Conde, *Angloargentinos*, 61.

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loyalty obsolete in the eyes of many. Among the Anglo-Argentines, British, and Falkland Islanders, notions of Britishness were diverging. When Anglo-Argentines invoked loyalty to Britain in the two World Wars, mutual commercial interests, British descent, values, and traditions, they still appeared to believe in Greater Britain's power as rhetorical signifier; they became disabused of this assumption when faced with the responses from Britons and Islanders. What is striking is not that Britain and the Falkland Islands rejected the Anglo-Argentine proposals but that the British community in Argentina had so readily anticipated that their understanding of "Greater Britain" would be reciprocated. With their expectations shattered, Anglo-Argentine resentment at British hypocrisy intensified. This rejection foregrounded fundamental differences over unifying qualities, thus making a transnational idea of identity increasingly unviable. If Greater Britain had endured as a global civic idea for decades, it was largely thanks to a mutual understanding of a shared inherent sameness. By 1982, this belief had faded almost entirely, and the Falklands War served to highlight the fictional qualities of the Anglo-Argentine assumptions of "being British."

The story of the Anglo-Argentines needs to be more firmly placed within a "British world" framework. As in other parts of the declining empire, from Rhodesia to Australasia to Hong Kong, the Falklands conflict produced conflicting visions of "Greater Britain" not only among societies physically distant from each other, but also *within* those societies. This brought to the fore the fragmented, contingent nature of the British world enacted in Anglo-Argentine society. Looking at the community within a "British world" framework suggests that by the early 1980s the so-called Anglo-Argentine connection had all but vanished, while the sentiments of kinship were highly asymmetrical and generally unreciprocated. Even the localized iteration of a British community in Argentina was merely a remnant of the influential grouping of yesteryear. The community of interest between the Anglo-Argentines and Great Britain had evaporated long before 1982, and most Anglo-Argentines were aware that the golden age of the British community had been fading for decades. Nevertheless, here was a community that, to some extent, still believed it was part of a broader communion of a Greater Britain transcending geographical boundaries. This reveals how an idea that in every other respect was almost entirely obsolete could persist in more isolated British communities, particularly where Britons were not constitutionally linked with the United Kingdom: perhaps because they had never "officially" been part of the empire, its members were able to continue believing that they were part of a wider community long after is dissolution. It is remarkable that it took the Falklands War to disabuse many Anglo-Argentines of their imagined British connection, after that link had previously weathered the nationalization of the railways and the rise of militant nationalism in Argentina. And yet in that sense they were by no means atypical; their experience was emblematic of the fate of Greater Britain in other parts of the world that held on to the bitter end—the "orphans of empire," in John Darwin's resonant turn of phrase.[104] Often a pronounced crisis is required for ideas of community and cultural affinity to be put to the test. The Anglo-Argentine story suggests that notions of community can survive, unchallenged, long after the material links that traditionally sustained them have dissolved.

[104] Darwin, "Orphans," 330.

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