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Nicholas Blomley
Rights of Passage: Sidewalks and the Regulation of Public Flow. Abingdon, UK: Routledge-Glasshouse, 2011, 134 p.

This is a brilliant book, the more so because the author is able to outline and develop the thesis, including its intellectual inheritance, concisely. It is also wonderfully modest both in aim and outlook, although it should be acknowledged that the book is potentially of wider importance, since it offers a material way of working with the emerging literature on legal technicality, including the significance of police, as a socio-legal resource. That work, which forms part of the intellectual inheritance of *Rights of Passage*, raises tremendous possibilities but also potential pitfalls (such as a retreat to doctrinalism), which Nicholas Blomley neatly avoids here. In addition, that work is asking us, as socio-legal scholars, to treat human and non-human objects equally—Emilie Cloatre uses the helpful descriptor "socio-legal objects"—and Blomley demonstrates the equal measure given to socio-legal objects (humans, benches, bins, newspaper boxes, etc.) by his research participants.[1]

The book's thesis, in sum, is that there is a collision of understandings about use of the sidewalk across a range of expert, technical, and political logics—whether administrative, judicial, or political—although those logics have different inputs. In these logics, pedestrianism, which is the focus of Blomley's book, is the unencumbered ability to move from point A to point B; it is about flow and circulation—as Blomley puts it, "the successful sidewalk is one that facilitates pedestrian flow and circulation" (p. 4). This output is neutral as to the nature and type of obstruction. That the book has left me feeling uncertain about how best to resist these logics and outputs is, I think, one of the author's aims (see, in particular, the conclusion), a point to which I return at the end of this review.

Blomley does not seek to produce a further account of what he labels "civic humanism," the logics of which are discussed in chapter 2 and which is characterized as having "an emphasis upon the social and political effects of the sidewalk, understood in relation to the human subject" (p. 17). Blomley's point is that pedestrianism is overlooked or not taken seriously by academics and activists from those angles: to take pedestrianism seriously implies a different way of engaging with and resisting it. The book is at its strongest in the two chapters

[1] Emilie Cloatre, "TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patents in Djibouti: An ANT Analysis of Socio-legal Objects," *Social and Legal Studies* 17, 2 (2008): 263-81.

about *administrative pedestrianism*—the ways in which flow and circulation have become neutral, common-sense knowledges of street engineers, to the extent that Blomley's administrator–engineer research participants struggle to accommodate matters outside those knowledges; in chapter 5, in particular, Blomley reinserts the history of the production of these knowledges into our appreciation of the subject, and of the transformation of chaotic use into orderly use as a result of emergent urban governance techniques.

It may be that one could quibble with Blomley's description of judicial pedestrianism, dealt with in chapters 6 and 7, when considering the question from my own jurisdiction (the UK). Here he is perhaps too reductive in characterizing (UK) judicial logics of pedestrianism as based on the right to pass and re-pass, which one takes from the law on easements. That logic, while clearly present, is nevertheless susceptible to a reasonableness challenge based on a free-speech defence (as illustrated in Brian Haw's predominantly solo anti–Iraq war protest in Parliament Square, London). In other words, there are different currents in operation (as subsequently dealt with in Mr Haw's further engagement, this time with the peace demonstrators in the square). But this is not Blomley's focal point, and, in any event, the pass/re-pass logic is strong in these cases.

As I have indicated, Blomley finishes his book with a series of important observations, arguing that other characterizations, such as Randall Amster's discussion of the sit/lie ordinance in Tempe, Arizona, that fail to see through the lens of pedestrianism miss important dynamics about publicness and the public interest. Blomley's argument is that pedestrianism appeals because of its common sense, its ability to reframe ethico-moral and commercial issues apparently neutrally and, in so doing, to neutralize alternative frames, particularly rights-based frames. He is careful not to overstate his case—his point is that pedestrianism has a "highly persuasive and powerful rhetoric. How could one conceivably oppose 'circulation,' and defend 'obstruction'?" (p. 108).

All of this leaves a quandary for those seeking to oppose London's Westminster City Council by-law consultation, which seeks to go beyond a sit/lie ban targeting homeless people on sidewalks to make a criminal offence out of "distribut[ing] any free refreshment in or on any public place." This is explicitly framed as a proposal to stop soup runs to the street homeless (although the by-law excludes commercial operations). The basis for this by-law is expressed not in terms of the pedestrian logic but, I would argue, in terms of a more deeply ingrained mentality, derived from a peculiar conjunction between a welfarist settlement and the Vagrancy Act: "The council believes that homeless people should make use of building based services (via the commissioned street outreach teams), rather than living rough and making use of soup runs, that nobody need sleep on the streets"[2]; further, it is said that the council has to respond "proportionately" to the balance between the homeless / rough sleepers, on the one hand, and local residents/businesses, on the

[2] Letter from City of Westminster, February 24, 2011, http://transact.westminster.gov.uk/docstores/publications_store/Draft%20Rough%20Sleeping%20and%20Soup%20Run%20Byelaw_Consultation%20Letter.pdf.

other. The language of rights, through proportionality, is here inverted on the homeless. Civic humanism and pedestrianism are not explicit features in this debate, but a persistent feature is the belief that nobody need sleep rough in London (soup runs, by this logic, apparently perpetuate rough sleeping by making it possible). If those seeking to resist the new by-law are to take Blomley on his own terms, I suspect that they should argue from "*within* pedestrianism" (p. 111; original emphasis), disrupting the notion of public space (commercial and non-commercial uses); but the point is that this consultation has not been constructed neutrally in these terms.

In short, I would recommend this book to anyone who professes an interest in law and society scholarship and protest.

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Cheryl Suzack, Shari M. Huhndorf, Jeanne Perreault, and Jean Barman *Indigenous Women and Feminism: Politics, Activism, Culture.* Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011, 344 p.

This innovative and richly informative collection of essays demonstrates the urgent need to conceptualize Indigenous feminist projects and, importantly, also clarifies and develops a distinctive framework of Indigenous feminisms—an area of academic inquiry that is still growing in Canada.

While the book is organized into three parts around the themes of "politics," "activism," and "culture," most of the chapters clearly touch on all three aspects simultaneously. Part 1, "Politics," reflects the multiplicity of perspectives: the authors examine the relevance of feminism to cultural traditions specific to the Inuit (Grey); Indigenous women's leadership in the context of Native feminist ethics, drawing on the ceremonies of the Navajo, Hopi, and Pueblo (Tsosie); gender and tribal politics in early Cherokee writings (Donaldson); and Indigenous women's leadership in the early twentieth century, specifically Oneida, Six Nations, and Blackfoot women leaders (Hilden and Lee).

Part 2 explores the many historical and contemporary sites of Indigenous women's activism, including the possibilities and limits of Western feminism for Indigenous feminism (Anderson); the agency of different Indigenous women in British Columbia at the "cusp of contact" (Barnum); forms of coalitional feminism between Black and Indigenous women in late-nineteenth-century America (Zackodik); case law on Indigenous women's bid to have band membership reinstated in Canada, and the role of the "Aboriginal-woman-as-feeling-subject" in generating identity and exposing the limits of law (Suzack); and Ainu women's activism in Japan and their disjunctures and commonalities with feminism, including Japanese feminism (Lewallen).

Part 3, "Culture," is the largest section of the book; here the focus shifts to art, and specifically to considering Indigenous women dramatists (Hundorf),