

Defending the city, defending votes: campaign strategies in urban Ghana*

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ABSTRACT

Rapid urbanisation in African democracies is changing the way that political parties engage with their constituents, shifting relations between hosts and migrants. This article examines the strategies that parties use to maintain and build electoral support in increasingly diverse contexts. Drawing on in-depth interviews and ethnographic research in Accra, Ghana, we find that some urban political parties rely on inclusive forms of mobilisation, promoting images of cosmopolitanism and unity to incorporate a broad grassroots coalition. Yet in nearby constituencies, parties respond to changing demographics through exclusive forms of mobilisation, using narratives of indigeneity and coercion to intimidate voters who ‘do not belong’. Two factors help explain this variation in mobilisation: incumbency advantage and indigene dominance. In contrast to most scholarship on ethnicity and electoral politics in Africa, we find that these varying mobilisation strategies emerge from very local neighbourhood-level logics and motivations.

* We thank Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, CDD-Ghana, Josef Woldense, Noah Nathan, Alhassan Ibn Abdallah, Nii Addo Quaynor, and members of the NPP and NDC party offices in Ayawaso Central and Odododiodio constituencies. We also thank the reviewers and editors at JMAS for their feedback. Authors received financial support from the Social Science Research Council. All errors are our own.

INTRODUCTION

How do political parties mobilise and persuade voters in highly competitive urban contexts? The growth of multi-party politics across Africa has generated a set of theories about the mechanisms of political mobilisation. Several scholars have focused on how politicians use patronage (Lindberg 2010), ethnic identity (Posner 2005; Elischer 2013), violence (Klaus & Mitchell 2015) or fraud (Asunka *et al.* 2017) to alter or win elections. Other scholars examine why and how parties rely on political intermediaries to consolidate support (Koter 2013; Baldwin 2014). Yet many of these studies overlook the significant variation in party organising at the subnational level, especially within cities. As a result, we still know very little about how parties build and consolidate support and the factors that help account for distinct mobilisation strategies across urban electoral constituencies.

In multi-party African states, urban-based political campaigns pursue a range of strategies to gain the support of increasingly diverse publics. Drawing on evidence we collected during Ghana's 2012 pre-election campaigns, we find that in Accra, some constituency-level parties relied on *inclusive* forms of mobilisation: promoting images of cosmopolitanism and unity to incorporate a broad grassroots coalition. Yet in nearby constituencies, parties responded to changing demographics through *exclusive* forms of mobilisation. Rather than building multi-ethnic coalitions, party actors consolidated an ethnic core, using fear and coercion to patrol the boundaries of political and ethnic membership. Why do political campaigns become *exclusionary* in some urban contexts but not others?

A growing literature examines the logics of voting behaviour and political mobilisation. Yet few studies focus on subnational variation in electoral campaign strategies. We build on new research about local ethnic geography that emphasises the importance of intra-urban variation in electoral politics by analysing the micro-level variation in party mobilisation, particularly within cities (Ichino & Nathan 2013; Nathan 2016a). Specifically, we theorise the relative exclusive or inclusive character of a party's campaign strategy within the electoral constituency.

We find that two factors strongly affect a party's mobilisation strategy. The first is whether a political party can claim 'indigene dominance', which may occur when the majority of a party's supporters make 'first-comer' claims to the city or a particular region of the city (Lentz 2013). The second factor is incumbency advantage. We distinguish between two forms of incumbency advantage. 'Single incumbency'

exists when the parliamentary candidate belongs to the party in power at the constituency-level. 'Double incumbency' exists when the parliamentary candidate belongs *both* to the party that holds the constituency-level seat and to the governing party in the national government. We find that political parties are most likely to mobilise exclusively when the party benefits from a 'double incumbency advantage' and where it can exploit indigene dominance.

Understanding how parties mobilise in African cities today is particularly important as the continent rapidly urbanises. Ghana is notable in Africa for its relatively high levels of political competition and urbanisation. And while Ghana has avoided the large-scale electoral violence on the scale experienced by other countries such as Kenya, Zimbabwe or Cote d'Ivoire, elections have at times exacerbated or re-shaped local conflicts (Jockers *et al.* 2010; Bob-Milliar 2014).

The theory of party mobilisation that we present emerges from a paired case study comparison between two electoral constituencies in Greater Accra. We rely primarily on ethnographic research and in-depth interviews with constituency-level party officials and interest groups during the pre-electoral period between September 2011–August 2012.¹ By immersing ourselves in the daily activities of local party officers and activists over the course of the electoral campaign we trace the narratives, organisation and security tactics of each party. This combination of methods was key in gaining the trust of respondents, enabling us to uncover neighbourhood-level political logics and motivations. This approach also provides an important contribution to existing research on voting behaviour and party mobilisation, which tends to rely on survey data and newspaper reports. While survey data is key in understanding voting behaviour, it limits the inferences one can draw about the strategies of political party actors. Similarly, analyses based on media reporting can only account for a narrow slice of the statements and actions made by party activists, given that the media rarely captures the quotidian organisational and mobilisation work that comprise political campaigns.

POLITICAL MOBILISATION IN AFRICA

How do local party activists mobilise electoral support? Existing studies tend to focus either on explaining the logics of individual voting behaviour (Eifert *et al.* 2010; Hoffman & Long 2013; Ichino & Nathan 2013) or on political campaign strategies (Osei 2012; Horowitz 2016). Both approaches emphasise the centrality of ethnic identity as an

‘informational heuristic’ to predict the distribution of goods or the implementation of policy (Bates 1983; Fridy 2007), or to serve as coordinating mechanisms linking politicians and voters (Wantchekon 2003; Posner 2005; Ferree 2006).

We focus on theories that specify party mobilisation rather than voting behaviour because our outcome of interest is the strategies that local parties use to mobilise electoral support. One dominant approach analyses whether parties rely on programmatic or ethnic and clientelistic appeals. A central claim is that parties make ethnic or clientelist appeals, yet rarely make appeals along ideological or ‘politically substantive’ lines (van de Walle 2003). More recently, scholars ask why or when parties might refer to one type of appeal over another. Explanations range from the size or composition of the party’s core ethnic group vis-à-vis rival groups (Posner 2005), to the effects of political uncertainty (Bleck & van de Walle 2013), particularly in environments of low party institutionalisation (Kuenzi & Lambright 2005).

A second set of studies asks whether parties design their campaigns to target core or swing voters (Weghorst & Lindberg 2013). Emerging research demonstrates that in many multi-ethnic contexts, parties cannot rely only on their co-ethnic ‘core’ and hence must also gain the support of non-coethnics (Arriola 2012; Horowitz 2016). For example, Horowitz (2016) finds that parties in Kenya focus first on attracting the support of swing voters outside their ethnic core areas. Koter emphasises that while clientelistic appeals are ubiquitous throughout much of Africa, ethnic voting is not (Koter 2013: 188). Politicians can mobilise outside their ethnic core by coordinating with local intermediaries, such as chiefs or local powerbrokers (Baldwin 2014).

We build on the observation that ethnic identification is a central feature of electoral politics, structuring the preferences of voters and the lines along which politicians mobilise support. Our focus, however, is on how campaign strategies play out in urban, ethnically diverse and politically competitive contexts where there is a strong two-party tradition, and where party identification is relatively stable.² This is especially important in light of recent findings suggesting that the salience of ethnicity should diminish as countries urbanise (Robinson 2014). Yet the focus on ethnic and programmatic campaign appeals largely overlooks how the growth of cities – their historical development and unique politics of claim making – shapes the strategies that local parties use to forge and defend political identities within increasingly diverse and dense spaces.

We aim to build on existing theories of party mobilisation in Africa in three key ways. First, our unit of analysis is the local electoral

constituency. This shifts the level of analysis from national or cross-national level studies that tend to focus on the statements of national-level politicians to the micro-level, investigating variation within cities. Relatedly, we suggest that because existing studies have focused either on voting behaviour or on the public statements of national politicians in media reports or at national rallies, scholarship has largely overlooked key sources of local variation in party mobilisation strategies.

Second, existing scholarship on party mobilisation takes little account of the political history from which mobilisation strategies emerge.³ A long literature suggests that parties establish patron-client relationships to garner support (van de Walle 2003), satisfy informal norms (Paller 2014), induce turnout or monitor voters (Stokes *et al.* 2013), or use populist strategies to induce support (Resnick 2013). As we document, these patronage strategies are often locally rooted and vary across neighbourhoods, especially with respect to settlement histories, migration and land ownership claims. Our analysis situates urban political campaigns within their unique historical contexts. We examine political mobilisation as part of a grassroots struggle for control and authority over the city, where leaders and politicians use long-standing grievances over land claims to exacerbate local divisions and solidify electoral support (Onoma 2010; Lentz 2013).

Third, because political campaigns emerge out of a unique historical context with differing claims to indigeneity and belonging, parties draw on distinct narratives to devise strategies to defend political boundaries. Understanding how Ghana's two major parties politicise the identities of their terrain – from the growing slums to the vibrant market spaces – helps explain how local politicians interact with increasingly diverse publics to expand their political coalitions. Anthropologists and historians emphasise the politics of belonging in contemporary Africa (Geschiere & Gugler 1998; Lentz 2013), but studies of campaign politics rarely draw on this literature. We combine these findings with insights from studies of party politics and mobilisation, enabling us to conceptualise strategies along a spectrum ranging from inclusive strategies, such as GOTV campaigns, to strategies of fraud (Asunka *et al.* 2017), intimidation, coercion and even violence (Klaus & Mitchell 2015).

A THEORY OF INCLUSIVE AND EXCLUSIVE PARTY MOBILISATION

We begin with the observation that in the ethnically diverse constituencies of urban Accra, party activists mobilise based on the highly localised

ethnic and political identities of voters that are unique to particular neighbourhoods, markets or polling stations (Ichino & Nathan 2013). Combining insights from the literature on party politics and experience from our own fieldwork, we investigate three salient features of political mobilisation strategies that include the *party narrative*, *party organisation* and the *security apparatus*. The party narrative refers to how officials and supporters project the mission of the party. This concept draws from theories that emphasise the importance of party manifestos (Morrison 2004; Elischer 2012), but extends to the way that party activists frame the identity and goals of the party at the local-level. The narrative can be communicated through speeches, party meetings, one-on-one interactions, pamphlets and other party paraphernalia. Party organisation refers to the structure of the party, and how the party elite is formed and connected to ordinary voters (Osei 2016). This includes its methods of voter recruitment, tactics of coalition building or party factions (Bob-Milliar 2012), and relationships with brokers and intermediaries. The security apparatus, or political party vigilantism, refers to the mechanisms that parties use to protect their votes (Gyimah-Boadi 2001). In the context of weak formal institutions, political parties often do not trust that state institutions have the capacity or will to protect the integrity of the electoral process.⁴

Our main aim, however, is to theorise how these dimensions of party mobilisation vary across local electoral boundaries. We begin by proposing two key factors that help explain variation in party mobilisation: indigene dominance and double incumbency advantage. Indigene dominance is possible when a significant portion of a party's potential voter base see themselves as 'first-comers' or indigenes to the space encompassed by the constituency. The strength of this identity at the local level can powerfully affect how party actors forge a party identity and the degree to which they use nativist political appeals. These nativist appeals solidify a core indigenous voting block, framing non-indigenous as opposition voters and targets of harassment and intimidation. This frame gains political salience when migrants comprise a significant proportion of the local population and vote differently from the indigenous population. In such cases, indigenous residents may view ethnic outsiders as a threat to local political power, and by extension, to local control over land and resources.

Constituency-level parties might also benefit from double incumbency advantage. Being part of the governing party at the national level matters because it means that the party branch office has greater access to state funding and the state's security apparatus relative to opposition parties.

These resources facilitate an exclusive party strategy because the party has the ability to empower and solidify an indigenous voter base. More so, with greater access to state funds, the party can afford to pay-off supporters who use fear and coercion to prevent outsiders from voting. Local parties from the governing side also benefit from greater protection from state security forces such as the police or military, and hence have greater capacity to use violence against rivals with impunity from the state. Being in power at the constituency level provides a legitimising mechanism, providing the party with a mandate based on holding the popular support of the majority local population. This enables party officers to pursue anti-outsider policies and strategies by subscribing to the will of the people.

Party officials may rely on exclusive methods if they believe that electoral victory hinges on preventing ‘ethnic outsiders’ from gaining power at the constituency level. The dominant party narrative, organisational apparatus and security apparatus delineate between residents ‘who belong’ and those who do not. Parties that rely on this exclusive strategy are also more likely to use violence or coercion to defend political territory and intimidate outsiders from participating in politics.

By contrast, parties that rely on inclusive mobilisation strategies believe that incorporation facilitates party victory. Rather than targeting appeals to particular ethnic groups, inclusive party building relies on crosscutting appeals that promote a diverse electorate and a multi-ethnic coalition. The party’s organisational strategy relies on a diverse set of intermediaries to reach potential swing voters. And unlike exclusive parties who deploy security forces to keep strangers from voting, inclusive parties do not patrol their boundaries through explicit displays of force. They instead emphasise the importance of peace and order and rely on more subtle strategies to monitor political rivals. [Figure 1](#) summarises the distinction between exclusive and inclusive party mobilisation on the three dimensions of party mobilisation.

Inclusive and Exclusive Party Mobilisation		
	Inclusive	Exclusive
<i>Party Narrative</i>	‘Open to everyone’	‘Outsiders don’t belong’
<i>Organisational Structure</i>	Leadership open to most groups	Leadership restricted to indigenous core
<i>Security Apparatus</i>	Vigilance and public reporting	Intimidation and coercion

Figure 1 Inclusive and Exclusive Party Mobilisation.

We make three broad predictions about the effects of double incumbency advantage and indigene dominance in urban constituencies. First, we suggest that where constituency-level party actors have a double incumbency advantage and where a majority of their supporters identify as indigenous, party activists are more likely to pursue an exclusive mobilisation strategy. Second, we expect that rival parties who claim indigene dominance but lack incumbency advantage may also use exclusive mobilisation methods, but largely as a defensive response. Third, in the absence of either double incumbency or claims of indigene dominance, parties are more likely to pursue inclusive strategies of party mobilisation, even where a party might benefit from single incumbency. [Figure 2](#) provides a summary of this theory.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Strategies of political mobilisation in urban Ghana have their roots in the struggle for Independence in the 1940s (Fridy 2007). Politicians and elites formed important alliances with ordinary people at the grass-roots, particularly with ‘disgruntled commoners’ such as returned ex-servicemen, unemployed youth angry about rising prices of goods, and ‘elementary-school-leavers’ who had little chance of social mobility (Austin 1970; Gocking 2005). The Convention People’s Party (CPP) and the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) existed side by side with the youth associations, fighting to gain their support and hoping to subsume them into party organisations.⁵ Drawing from these important historical insights about how political parties operate within Ghanaian neighbourhoods, we develop a research design that attempts to uncover why political parties use distinct tactics across different electoral constituencies in Accra.

We select our cases to evaluate a set of theoretical predictions about the effects that indigeneity and incumbency have on constituency-level party politics. Specifically, by selecting electoral constituencies in Accra – Ayawaso Central and Odododiodio – where candidates face similar levels of electoral competition, our design enables us to identify additional factors that can account for varying logics and strategies of political mobilisation. While we focus on two constituencies, we suggest that our findings generalise to other constituencies where the first-comer community comprises more than 40% and where the party benefits from a double incumbency advantage.⁶ All lands within the AMA fall under customary authority of the Ga stool, allowing us to

	<i>Double Incumbency</i>	<i>No Incumbency</i>
<i>Indigene Dominance</i>	EXCLUSIVE	EXCLUSIVE
<i>No Indigene Dominance</i>	UNCERTAIN	INCLUSIVE

Figure 2 Explaining Variation in Party Mobilisation.

hold customary authority and land tenure regime constant. We selected our case studies based on four factors. Table I summarises each of these criteria.

First, we select cases where all parties face relatively equal levels of electoral competition, which we measure based on the margin of victory between the first- and second-place parliamentary candidates over the past four parliamentary elections (1996, 2000, 2004, 2008). Table II shows the vote margins in each election from 1996–2012. In this regard, electoral competition acts as a scope condition rather than an explanatory variable. Second, we select cases where there is variation along our two main independent variables – incumbency advantage and indigene dominance. Third, we analyse whether parties have the ability to claim indigene dominance – whether they operate in a demographic context in which the indigenous population comprises approximately 40% of the constituency’s population (e.g. the Ga in Odododiodio).⁷ Figure 3 illustrates the ethnic composition of the two constituencies.⁸ As the results show, the Akan in Ayawaso Central comprise nearly the same size of the constituency’s population as the Ga in Odododiodio. A difference is that Akan in Ayawaso Central are still regarded as outsiders because Ga leaders maintain custodianship of the land. Hence, residents who identify as Ga still hold significant formal and informal power.

Ayawaso Central is situated in the centre of Accra (Figure 4) and includes the neighbourhoods of Alajo, Kotobabi and New Town. Residents in the constituency experience high levels of poverty, rising land prices, entrenched patron-client relationships and competitive elections. In each election since 1996, the NPP has secured the parliamentary seat of Ayawaso Central. In consecutive parliamentary elections,

TABLE I.
Paired Case-Comparison: Ayawaso Central and Odododiodio
Constituencies

	<i>Electorally Competitive</i>	<i>Presidential Incumbency</i>	<i>Parliamentary Incumbency</i>	<i>Type of Incumbency Advantage</i>	<i>Indigene Dominance</i>
Ayawaso Central (NPP)	Yes	No	Yes	Single	No
Ayawaso Central (NDC)	Yes	Yes	No	Single	No
Odododiodio (NPP)	Yes	No	No	None	Yes
Odododiodio (NDC)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Double	Yes

TABLE II.
Vote Margins: Ayawaso Central and Odododiodio Constituency

	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
Ayawaso Central <i>Parliamentary</i>	NPP: 34.6 NDC: 33.8	NPP: 56.6 NDC: 37.3	NPP: 53.4 NDC: 43.6	NPP: 49.1 NDC: 47.8	NPP: 49.5 NDC: 48.5
Ayawaso Central <i>Presidential</i>	NPP: 50.3 NDC: 47	NPP: 57 NDC: 39.5	NPP: 57 NDC: 40.2	NPP: 50.4 NDC: 48.2	NPP: 49.9 NDC: 49.6
Odododiodio <i>Parliamentary</i>	NPP: 32.9 NDC: 35.4	NPP: 51.4 NDC: 43.9	NPP: 46.4 NDC: 52.4	NPP: 41.7 NDC: 57.2	NPP: 36 NDC: 63
Odododiodio <i>Presidential</i>	NPP: 44.7 NDC: 53.1	NPP: 50.7 NDC: 46.6	NPP: 46.8 NDC: 51.9	NPP: 55.7 NDC: 41.5	NPP: 37 NDC: 62.4

First round margins reported (%).
Source: *Peace FM Online*.




Figure 3 Ethno-Linguistic Profiles of Odododiodio and Ayawaso Central
Constituencies.

Source: 2010 Ghana Census.



Figure 4 Location of Ayawaso Central and Odododiodio within Greater Accra.

Most sub-metros in Greater Accra align with constituency boundaries. Ashiedu Keteke overlaps with the boundary of Odododiodio Constituency.

Source: World Bank/AMA Ghana.

the margin of victory between each party has grown closer. The presidential vote margin in Ayawaso Central was closest in 2012 when the NPP candidate Nana Akufo-Addo defeated the NDC candidate John Mahama by only 0.33% (218 votes). Many existing theories would predict coercive and exclusive forms of political mobilisation. Yet in Ayawaso Central, party officers rely on more inclusive mobilisation strategies.

Like Ayawaso Central, Odododiodio constituency is rapidly growing, with migrants settling in the slum neighbourhoods of Old Fadama, Agboghloshie and Ga Mashie. Bordering beachfront property and the Central Business District, land values are high, elections are competitive and spaces are ethnically diverse. But unlike Ayawaso Central, parties in Odododiodio use much more exclusive tactics to win elections. Prior to 2016, the NDC governed the constituency and the national-level and used this 'double incumbency' and the connections that come from

such political power to direct patronage to its indigenous base, and to insulate itself from prosecution when it used coercive tactics.

CAMPAIGN STRATEGIES IN AYAWASO CENTRAL AND
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The Party Narrative

Ayawaso Central

The NDC and NPP in Ayawaso Central rely on party narratives that emphasise openness, unity and patriotism. For example, in a focus group with NPP constituency leaders, the constituency secretary explains that the party ‘is for anyone’ and must be ‘there for everyone’ (NPP Constituency Secretary 2012 focus group). A member of the executive committee agrees: ‘In Alajo we have Akan, Ewe, Northerners, Muslims. So we are inter-related. We are a family’ (Alajo chief 2012 Int.). For the NPP, this narrative is particularly important because the party is often criticised for being the party of the Akan or for the elite who are out of touch with ordinary Ghanaians. Additionally, while many new Ewe migrants⁹ or residents from the North sympathise with the NDC, party activists on the ground place significant emphasis on the idea of a diverse and multi-ethnic family. In turn, local opinion leaders buy into this narrative of inclusivity and hospitality. A local Ga chief of Alajo town, who aligns himself with the NPP, highlights these inclusive norms by explaining the origins of neighbourhood names:

We welcome outsiders ... we welcome those who come to us. Alajo is a *Sisala* word.¹⁰ It means, *they welcome everybody who comes to their midst ...* When you come, we have to receive you nicely. Whatever you need, we have to give it to you ... we become family. You can walk through Alajo without fear. (Alajo Chief 2012 Int.)

This discourse of openness becomes more salient during elections when both political parties highlight the cosmopolitan nature of the constituency, aiming to pull in new voters by stressing that Ayawaso Central is ‘for all tribes’. In recent years, calls for more openness have been a key strategy that parties have used to mobilise *Zongo* communities.¹¹ In particular, the NPP has incorporated ‘Zongo development’ into its overarching narrative as a way to erode its image as a party dominated by the Akan ethnic group.¹²

Ododiodiodio

In contrast to Ayawaso, the main narrative feature of both political parties in Ododiodiodio constituency is exclusion along ethnic lines. In particular, the NDC espouses a narrative of ethnic nationalism, promoting a vision of the constituency that 'belongs' to the Ga ethnic group. Rather than attempting to broaden its political coalition to members of different ethnic groups, the NDC party has created a party narrative that privileges a select group of voters: party insiders of the Ga ethnic group. These core supporters make up a club that demand patronage benefits in exchange for mobilising voters. These local leaders extend beyond mere 'party appendages' and have independent power at the grassroots through their ability to provide jobs for youth, control land needed for development and infrastructure projects, and maintain informal power as traditional authorities. The goal of the party is to keep core loyalists happy by excluding new members in the coalition of political decision-makers.

Drawing support from the indigenous ethnic group in the constituency backed by access to incumbent resources, the NDC espouses a message that its party *and* Accra is primarily for the Ga: only indigenous Ga can participate in decision-making for the city. These tactics thus limit participation of non-Ga and middle class residents (Nathan 2016b). A majority of Ga youth perceives the NPP to be the party of the Akan. One young man constantly talked about how 'we [the NDC] cannot let them [the NPP] in' (Nii Addo Quaynor 2012 Int.). He mentioned how the NDC has never lost a polling station in the heart of central Accra. When he discussed NPP-NDC, he stressed the importance of 'keeping them out'. The NDC signaled this narrative of territoriality by posting banners at every neighbourhood entrance. The narrative did not distinguish between the NDC and Ga nationalism; instead they reinforced one another. Additionally, all party meetings were held using the Ga language, excluding a significant portion of the population from participating in the deliberations.

The NDC did not always rely on exclusive strategies. During the 2000 electoral campaign the NDC lacked a true incumbency advantage. This was because many of the cabinet members in the Rawlings government were sympathetic to the opposition NPP, splintering the power of the incumbent party. At the local level, the NDC struggled to maintain support, and shifted to a more inclusive campaign strategy, broadening its political coalition to include non-Ga voters. The party aligned with an Akan cabinet member, but he defected from the NDC shortly after the

elections. This political betrayal stung NDC executives. A campaign strategist explains: 'You can't trust those people over there. So we don't touch them. Initially we thought we could, but we don't want them' (NDC campaign organiser 2012 Int.). Hence, the NDC continues an exclusive party strategy to prevent ethnic outsiders from gaining support.

The distrust of *those people over there* has historical roots. While the mobilisation by political parties along these lines extends to the pre-Independence struggle, the distrust of Akan people dates back to the pre-colonial and colonial eras. The Ga have long feared the dominance of the Akan, and worried that they might attempt to take over control of their city. These fears intensified when the Akan were accused of selling black Africans captured during warfare to slave traders in the 18th and 19th centuries (Wilks 1993). Today, these fears are subsumed into a fear of the NPP political party. An interview with the NDC campaign strategist reveals how lingering war myths between Ga and Akan continue to shape political narratives today:

[The Ashantis] couldn't even come to Accra. They were stopped at Katamanto and then the old Ashantis ran into Dodowa Forest. There is a Ga saying, 'You don't know what is in Dodowa Forest'. This is used as a warning, 'be careful – you don't know what they are up to'. They have this higher-than-thou attitude toward all tribes. We are *here*. They have *come*. (NDC campaign organiser 2012 Int.)

This emphasis on indigenous control of the city shapes a political narrative among many Ga residents that outsiders – the Akan – are 'creeping in' or 'invading' their city. The NDC even calls them 'parasitic groups'. Ga chiefs limit their economic power by preventing powerful Ashantis from owning land in Accra.¹³

On the other side, the NPP tries to signal an inclusive party narrative. This is partly because the party gained many supporters as Akans migrated into the city. They devised specific ethnic messaging to Akan traders in the marketplaces. For example, the NPP used registration as a way to inform potential voters about their agenda and to promote party membership. A foot soldier explains: 'The main thing is to get your people [to register]. And then we have floating people in the system, maybe they don't believe NDC or NPP, you see these people you have to educate all of them to register. When they register they automatically *belong to you*' [italics emphasised by authors] (NPP youth coordinators 2012 focus group).

The strategist emphasises how the party tries to get voters to ‘belong to the party’. Rather than emphasising membership in a national political community, as was the case in Ayawaso Central, party narratives are much more focused on exclusive and particularistic alliances to the specific constituency branch. Once residents are ‘marked’ as NPP or NDC, their benefits are restricted to their political affiliation and their allegiance is known in the neighbourhood.

But party activists must also counter the conventional wisdom that the NPP is an Akan-based party. They do this by tapping into indigene dominance, claiming that they are the best local party for the Ga nation, and that the majority of their supporters are in fact Ga. Resorting to a style of ‘ethnic outbidding’ (Chandra 2005), mobilisers rely on similar strategies to the NDC, or what we call defensive exclusionary mobilisation. For example, party leaders would often bring in Ga luminaries or respected elders from the Ga nation to advocate on their behalf.¹⁴ In addition, they made specific concessions to Ga customary authorities to show allegiance to Ga traditions. Finally, candidates from both parties must come from prominent Ga families in the historic neighbourhood of Ga Mashie and must be able to demonstrate their long-term commitment to the Ga nation.

Organisational strategies

Ayawaso Central

The NDC and NPP offices manage complex political campaigns aimed at capturing the diverse identities and interest groups at the grassroots. The NPP constituency secretary explains that the party’s attention to the grassroots is relatively recent: ‘In the previous years, our party was not based on the grassroots’ (2012 Int.). But after the NPP’s defeat in the 2008 elections, the constituency office formed a committee to investigate its defeat. The party assigned polling station executives to mobilise and monitor the grassroots. Polling station executives and foot soldiers spend most of their time doing door-to-door campaigning. Executive party members emphasise that because ‘we have [here] predominantly the Ewe, the Ga, and people of Northern descent ... [and the Akan in the trading center], foot soldiers play a critical role in mobilising the ‘heterogeneous society’ that comprises Ayawaso’ (NDC executive committee 2012 focus group).

In a diverse and growing area, the constituency branch uses two main strategies for targeting voters: reaching out to official party committees

and ‘opinion leaders’ who act as brokers. Party committees comprise hierarchical relationships between executive members and sub-groups. The party developed these committees to mobilise important interest groups, notably women, youth and Muslims.

During campaign periods, markets across Accra become contested political spaces that candidates of every level try to claim as their own.¹⁵ Mobilising and organising the marketplace has thus become a primary aim of the women’s committee. In a focus group with women’s party coordinators, a participant describes her political activities: ‘in the market that is closer to me, I form a little meeting in the market. Some will make cakes and bread and do sewing ... [Women coordinators] must now become like evangelists, selling our party wherever they meet’ (NPP women’s coordinators 2012 focus group). Market women represent an important interest group and vote bank for parties across urban Ghana. But not all parties engage with markets in the same way. These spaces are gendered and often viewed as the space of migrants. In less inclusive neighbourhoods, markets and market women are often actively excluded from party politics. In others, market women may face discrimination or outright attacks if the party views market vendors as an electoral threat. Ayawaso Central provides a case where the inclusion of women – and the incorporation of more diverse market spaces – is an electoral asset rather than threat.

Muslim residents also comprise an important political interest group in Ayawaso Central, many of whom came from northern Ghana, Burkina Faso and other neighbouring countries. Many of these residents live in the Zongos of Kotobabi and New Town. The state has treated these residents as both a political threat and asset since Kwame Nkrumah’s regime. Notably, in 1969, the Busia Regime passed the Alien Compliance Order, which required all non-Ghanaian ‘aliens’ who did not secure a residence permit to leave the country (Kobo 2010). As a way to ‘correct’ for this history of exclusion and displacement the NPP created the Nasara Club (NPP ward coordinators 2012 focus group). Nasara clubs have become a critical way for the NPP to incorporate Zongo interests, enabling the office to win over a portion of the ‘Zongo vote’ and incorporate a formerly excluded community. While Nasara clubs exist at every level, the NPP office in Ayawaso Central has made serious investments in the club to ensure that Nasara is a highly visible extension of the party. These well-institutionalised campaign strategies are a key tactic for solidifying the support of core voters and incorporating new voters.

Beyond these formal structures, the party also relies on informal party brokers, notably chiefs and religious leaders. Politicians establish coalitions with chiefs to mobilise voters, access land and bolster personal power (Baldwin 2014).¹⁶ They may also attach themselves to specific sides in chieftaincy and land disputes to gain electoral support (Logan 2009). Chiefs, meanwhile, rely on their linkages with politicians to secure state goods and direct the flow of patronage into their community and personal pockets.

The alliance between the chief and the politician is critical because it can determine the state's land policy. For example, while the NPP is seen as the *de facto* party of the Akan ethnic group, it is also seen as the more market-oriented party. In the context of Accra politics, the NPP has aligned itself with certain Ga Chiefs who tend to be more interested in selling or leasing Ga land to outsiders. Many indigenous residents view such an alliance as a threat to their land claims and tenure security.

The NPP also relies on chiefs as brokers to incorporate groups who might not otherwise vote NPP, including Northerners and Ewes. Polling station coordinators in Ayawaso Central explain the importance of these opinion leaders: 'Ewe area chiefs can influence voting. [Ewe] people believe that chiefs have the final say over their lives and livelihood. In Akan communities, the youth have the most influence. In the Ga communities, it is the parents' (NPP polling station coordinators 2012 focus group). Party activists perceive these differences and devise specific strategies to target each group. While families are an important factor shaping how younger Ga residents vote, local chiefs play an important role in party politics. A Ga chief of Alajo town suggests that chiefs engage in politics more than the politicians themselves: 'I can only advise him ... We don't go on platforms but we sit in our homes and there we do the politics. And we can play the politics better than the politicians' (Alajo Chief 2012 Int.). By 'playing politics' he refers to the role that chiefs play in advising and talking to followers so that they 'understand,' as several community members explained.

Religious leaders can play a similar role in mobilising support for candidates across different urban constituencies, helping candidates to accumulate 'spiritual power' and religious followers (Paller 2014). This has intensified in the last 20 years with the rise of Pentecostal and Charismatic churches, leading to a public sphere dominated by religious authorities. Politicians are expected to consult with religious leaders, incorporate them into their electoral campaigns, and extend cash-filled envelopes in exchange for votes. Women's coordinators in Ayawaso Central emphasise the role of Church leaders: 'the pastor is

an opinion leader so whatever he says, [the congregation] will do' (NPP women's coordinators 2012 focus group).

Chiefs and religious leaders are important political players in elections across Ghana. But as the Ayawaso Central case illustrates, brokers in more inclusive environments are more diverse in terms of the groups they represent and seek to mobilise.

Strategies of mobilisation also reveal a particular brand of patronage politics. Residents expect their representatives to provision collective goods such as schools, drains and roads. But many voters also expect more personal rewards, including help with funerals, weddings, school fees or smaller rewards such as party t-shirts or free lunches. These expectations extend beyond the *quid pro quo* transaction of a vote in exchange for cash or kind. Rather, people expect goods from their candidate because they see themselves as members of a collective group with a common identity and set of goals. As a respondent explains, 'we are all one family. The MP supports us with drinks to help keep us together to become one family' (NPP women's coordinators 2012 focus group). Scholars have compared this patronage expectation to the father figure (Schatzberg 2001; Lindberg 2010). Supporters of the NPP emphasise how the outgoing MP did not exclude recipients from his patronage network based on ethnic or political affiliation. Instead, the party balances a fine line between rewarding core followers while signalling their willingness to care for residents outside the core. This patronage strategy is distinct from the more exclusive patronage practices in Odododiodioo that follow close ethnic and familial lines and rely partly on the party's willingness to undermine or revoke goods and services to outsiders.

Odododiodioo

The NDC in Odododiodioo constituency runs a sophisticated political campaign aimed at capturing the interests of the Ga ethnic group. The party focuses on three major facets of winning the election: fundraising, organising and campaigning. For example, MP aspirant Nii Lantey Vanderpuye spent most of his time with the fundraisers, local 'big men' who could be counted on to raise revenue. Most of these people spoke to each other in the Ga language and are childhood friends of the candidate.

Youth groups comprised the organising committee including keep-fit clubs, soccer teams, boxing associations, hometown associations

(regional tribal groups), church choirs and friends associations. Officially, these groups are not aligned with any politician. But Ghanaian politicians who are successful at mobilising the grassroots use these existing social groups to consolidate support. Co-opting these groups is a key campaign strategy. The campaign had an umbrella term for all groups that supported the candidate: 'Friends for Nii Lantey Vanderpuye'. While the groups included members from many ethnic groups, the majority of the organised youth groups comprised Ga youth.

The campaign team was in charge of big-picture electoral strategy. The team was embedded in neighbourhood politics, focusing more on winning the constituency than partnering with national party leaders to devise a strategy that would improve its chances of winning across the country. Campaigns wanted to win the primaries by a large margin to signal to national executives that the candidate was not a 'back-bencher', but a powerful politician who could be trusted with a ministerial portfolio. The party paid close attention to selecting 'the most marketable candidate'.

The well-developed party structures made the NDC a dominant force in constituency elections. The party established organised branches that corresponded to each polling station. A highly organised party structure made it easier for the politicians to distribute resources and messages to grassroots supporters (Bob-Milliar 2012). The party also collected data on the branch executives and their followers, pioneering a data gathering initiative that was ahead of its time. These data allowed the party to make projections about how many votes it would need to win, and whom it would target as potential voters.

The campaign team was made up of local assemblymen, branch and constituency leaders, as well as other neighbourhood leaders who had political ambitions. Importantly, these brokers represent a narrower set of interests in Odododiodio constituency than in Ayawaso. They have close ties to Ga customary authorities – and in most cases come from prominent Ga families.

Residents from Odododiodio recall what it was like to have MPs who were also ministers, noting that in the 1990s when the neighbourhood had 'one of its own' as MP and minister, family members and relatives were supported, but they no longer see such benefits. Notably, all of these messages focused on the Ga strongholds of Odododiodio constituency, paying very little attention and expending very few resources to other neighbourhoods.

Incumbency advantage shaped the patronage distribution process as well. Even though NDC candidate Vanderpuye was not an elected

representative, he built sheds for the fisherfolk, a ‘floating’ interest group. Vanderpuye’s patronage signalled that he would take care of the fisher folk once in power. The fisher folk are key, as one NPP party organiser explains: ‘These fishermen. They are few but they make noise. Every election they come out with a slogan, and even the elites will follow ... they tend to sell the constituency’ (NPP ward coordinators 2012 focus group). Yet the NDC could rely on an exclusive patronage strategy by promising to protect the fisher folk from outsider trawlers who used more modern techniques that threatened the livelihoods of the small-scale fisher folk. The NPP candidate encountered greater scepticism: ‘[The NPP candidate] has equally come to promise – but a promise is promise. But you can’t know until you are in power. But [the voters] want to base their vote on what they have already seen’ (Fisherfolk 2012 focus group). This incumbency advantage strengthens political support.

To counter the growing power of the NDC, the NPP also established patron-client relationships with powerful Ga leaders, such as chiefs, traditional healers and pastors. The NPP parliamentary candidate explains: ‘Even though most people were NDC before, because I am a son of the land, most of them [tend] to support the NPP for the parliamentary elections, even though they may still vote NDC for president’ (Victor Okaikoi 2012 Int.). But these connections also require the NPP to distribute patronage to Ga strongholds to gain political support. Indeed, because the Ga community claims indigene dominance, the NPP participates in chieftaincy disputes to mobilise electoral support. As multi-party politics has become more entrenched, the NPP has been drawn into the chieftaincy conflicts because traditional authorities have sought the influence of one political party or another to support their leadership claims. The NPP reaches out increasingly to certain Accra chiefs because they see it as one of the best ways to gain new voters. Following the successful model advanced by the NDC during earlier elections, the NPP noticed that distributing patronage to certain factions of Ga leadership facilitates electoral victory. The NPP parliamentary candidate in Odododiodioo constituency explains the ‘symbiotic relationship’ between politicians and chiefs:

The chiefs ... tend to have a voice. They are banned from participating in politics, but in reality they can drop a word here and there. And their followers tend to know which way they [the chiefs] want them to go ... During election periods the politicians need the influential chiefs and leaders. After elections, the chiefs need the politicians to keep them alive and in power – to feed them. (Victor Okaikoi 2012 Int.)

'Feeding' the chief refers to politicians providing municipal contracts to customary authorities, often in exchange for land to use for development purposes. In addition, politicians will provide job opportunities for youth aligned with certain chiefs, bolstering their status and reputations in the neighbourhood.

It is important to note that both parties use patronage to consolidate a narrow, ethnically Ga voter base. In the case of Odododiodioo, these organisational strategies overlap with already existing cleavages – embedded in a longstanding chieftaincy dispute that divides the Ga nation (Sackeyfio-Lenoch 2014). By tapping into claims of indigene dominance, each party tries to make the case that they serve the true interests of the Ga nation, in the process contributing to exclusionary tactics during campaigns.

Provisioning party security

Ayawaso Central

The third area where we observe variation in mobilisation strategies is in the mechanisms that parties use to protect their votes. In more inclusive political environments, party leaders use subtle strategies of vigilance and public reporting to ensure that rivals do not alter the electoral outcomes through cheating and fraud. These inclusive strategies are largely a function of Ayawaso Central's heterogeneous support base, and specifically, their need to incorporate Akan and Northern migrants alongside indigenous Ga. In addition, more inclusive strategies emerge when the party cannot rely on state security forces to provision security. Party members draw a sharp contrast between Ayawaso Central and the far more contentious politics in Odododiodioo, saying that 'here, we won't allow these things to happen'.

The main concern among NPP activists is that the rival NDC will import voters from core NDC areas in Volta region. But even as party members speak about NDC strategies to import voters, they point to their maturity and restraint: '[The NDC] is trying to do whatever to provoke the NPP. But [the NPP] is not [responding]. This shows the maturity of the party. But they are not [able to provoke us]. It shows how educated the people are. It teaches you, 'when I walk with these people I will be safe' (NPP polling station coordinators 2012 focus group). The respondent's comments illustrate how the NPP in Ayawaso Central tries to elevate itself above the potentially violent electoral context. Party members do not emphasise their ability or intent to

intimidate 'imported voters' from the Volta. Instead, the party promotes the image of a safe and open political space. Nonetheless, party operatives still strategise on how to monitor the activities of the rival NDC. Party members whisper about 'advanced security networks' on the ground. These foot soldiers are instructed to observe and report any suspicious activity rather than engage or antagonise NDC supporters.

Ododiodio

The NDC's double incumbency advantage enables it to use coercive and violent strategies to ensure that the rival party does not threaten its electoral victory. Emboldened by its control of the security forces and the local police station, the NDC used macho men to intimidate voters and prevent outsiders from registering in the constituency. Macho men first gained a central role in party politics under Kwame Nkrumah. First termed 'verandah boys' who were affiliated with the Convention People's Party, macho men have played a key role in party mobilisation since their role in organising support during Independence (Nugent 1996). Politicians continue to hire out young men to intimidate opposition voters, organise followers or act as bodyguards.

Ga ethnic chauvinism and the claim of indigene dominance provide the political rationale behind these exclusive mobilisation strategies. Rather than relying on inclusive strategies to try and build a larger coalition of support, the NDC is able to restrict power to its decision-making core. The most effective strategy is to limit outsiders' ability to register to vote in the constituency: challenging them during voter registration.¹⁷ The NDC campaign strategist explains: 'I am limiting their numbers in the voter's register. If they come I will challenge them. They don't live in this community. They come to trade. We have done our research. We know who resides in the area. We know who are NPP and NDC' (NDC campaign organiser 2012 Int.).

Such detailed knowledge of each voter came up many times in discussions with party leaders and residents. The house-to-house visits provide a census of potential voters, as well as a demographic count of who lives where. The boundaries between ethnic group and political party blurred when discussing politics with residents. The NDC had a notebook of the voters register with Akan names circled. They targeted these people to prevent them from voting. Moreover, the NDC would 'challenge' any potential registrant speaking Akan-Twi, using the Akan language as a

proxy for support for the NPP. Labelling potential new voters as strangers was a powerful campaign strategy that aligned with the Ga sense of indigene dominance.

These exclusionary political strategies can quickly become coercive and sometimes violent. For example, with limited resources at their disposal, the NDC sent foot soldiers to ‘quell registration’ in areas dominated by ethnic outsiders: the railways and marketplaces. These led to confrontations between the foot soldiers and individuals trying to register to vote. The NDC Parliamentary candidate allegedly sent his macho men to polling stations to intimidate Akan registrants. Physical confrontations broke out between representatives from both parties, leading to what media outlets termed daily clashes. One polling station was shut down. The NDC hoped that by sending out macho men to the polls, they would quell turnout and scare people away from registering. At first, the NPP used language that emphasised cosmopolitanism to make the case that Accra is for all Ghanaians. A foot soldier described the strategy:

[We] go to these areas where we have large populations of non-Gas and try to encourage them to register ... they can go to their places of origin, or even the places they live, rather than where they spend most of their time ... we have to tell them, ‘look, register and vote at Odododiodioo because we need your votes here’ (NPP executive members 2012 focus group).

But the NPP had to shift to a defensive exclusive strategy given the context in which they operated: an electorally competitive district where the opposing party claimed indigene dominance and incumbency advantage. This forced the party to use exclusionary and coercive campaign strategies, resorting to ethnic outbidding and its own claims to indigene dominance. The women’s organiser explains, ‘They always intimidate us because they have a propaganda secretary so we do not want to sit down and watch them cheat us in 2012. It will never happen’ (NPP youth coordinators 2012 focus group). The youth coordinator explains their response:

No one will distract NPP from registering ... in terms of vigilance. We are talking about ... ‘Go and register. Vigilance. Register. Sacrifice one day for your party...we won’t sit down for anybody to intimidate our followers. Not anybody will intimidate our followers. So if we get there and somebody tries something funny then we also have to try something funny. (NPP youth coordinators 2012 focus group)

The NPP had to signal to its supporters – and its Ga supporters in particular – that it was willing to match the NDC’s exclusionary and coercive

tactics. It had to make the case that it, too, would defend the city for the Ga. Unable to rely on the state security forces, the NPP sought to take matters into their own hands and encourage their own macho men to stand their ground. As the NPP candidate explains, 'We are also aware of the fact that the other side will try to destruct the voting in our strongholds. So then you have to plan for security' (Victor Okaikoi 2012 Int.). The NPP invested in private security arrangements to counter the more violent strategies of the NDC. The NPP candidate explains how his strategy shifted:

People tend to use violence as a tool of politics ... when a couple of my members were [attacked] last week, I actually hired a security company ... but unincorporated, you can say that. These land guards and other strong boys. And I came to my senses. I brought them in and we had a talk. I had 150 of them ... and my opponent put out nearly 400 people in the street, with machetes and all that. (Victor Okaikoi 2012 Int.)

The candidate describes these tactics more as a performance to show strength, rather than about instigating real violence. 'The other side is happy with the threat of violence rather than the infliction of actual pain maiming or killing. They just want to be feared', Okaikoi explained. 'I have a list of 20 people from my side that have been hurt. Some are very serious. All of these incidents have been reported to the police, and nothing has been done'.

Both parties have to signal strength. The candidate's comments suggest that both sides must demonstrate that they have the capacity to use violence, without actually inflicting harm. In the end, the conditions of indigene dominance combined with double incumbency advantage contribute to an electoral context that relies on exclusive campaign strategies that have the potential to become coercive and violent.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we examine a set of factors that can affect how parties organise and mobilise electoral support in Accra. In highly competitive electoral districts, parties use very different mobilisation strategies depending on the ethnic composition and whether the party benefits from double incumbency advantage. In particular, we introduce the concept of 'indigene dominance' to show that when a political party claims significant support from an indigenous group that comprises the ethnic majority of a constituency, their political strategies are often exclusionary. These exclusive strategies have the potential to

become violent when parties benefit from double incumbency because parties can use coercion without being sanctioned by the state.

These conditions are not deterministic. Rather we theorise how organisational factors interact with institutional conditions to contribute to relatively peaceful or coercive campaigns. Our research design is limited in that it specifies indigene dominance as the most critical explanatory variable. But without the benefits of incumbency, parties are limited in their exclusionary tactics. Nonetheless, more research is needed to determine the effects of these variables across a broader set of cases.

In Ghana's most recent 2016 election, five of the 34 electoral constituencies that comprise Greater Accra had the potential for indigene dominance and double incumbency advantage. We expect these constituencies to be most vulnerable to exclusive and coercive electoral politics. Further, we suggest that these distinct patterns of mobilisation are likely to generalise beyond Accra to other African cities characterised by high levels of party competition and increasing ethnic diversity. There is preliminary evidence to suggest that indigene dominance and incumbency advantage shape exclusive mobilisation in other democracies in West Africa. For example, in Abidjan, local parties relied on narratives of indigeneity to prevent outsiders from registering and voting, contributing to electoral violence in 2011. Beyond West Africa, we expect this theory to generalise to regimes with high levels of multi-party competition, ranging from competitive authoritarian regimes to consolidated democracies.

The study of political mobilisation and electoral campaigning in urban Africa is timely as the continent urbanises rapidly, and more countries hold national and local elections. Urban areas tend to be particularly competitive, and more ethnically heterogeneous, containing the conditions that scholars suggest might lead to electoral violence. But not all competitive and ethnically diverse districts lead to exclusionary tactics and violence. This points to the need to move beyond ethnic diversity and political competition as explanatory variables.

Instead, our study is one of the first to investigate the mechanisms of political mobilisation in urban Africa, paying close attention to the behaviours and strategies that politicians and parties actually use, and uncovering the incentives and motivations that drive their political decision-making and behaviour. These include the party messages and narratives, organisational apparatuses of electoral campaigns, and security strategies. To understand how these vary across districts, sustained ethnographic research and in-depth interviews are needed to build

trust with party activists and politicians, as well as gain access to private offices where activists make campaign decisions. The ways that local political parties relate to their constituents and control their political space and territory are necessary yet under-studied elements of electoral politics. In contexts of ethnic diversity and intense competition, indigene dominance and incumbency advantage often reinforce exclusionary political mobilisation, laying the groundwork for potential electoral violence.

NOTES

1. See references for list of interviews.
2. Ghana is exemplary of these conditions (Gyimah-Boadi 2009).
3. An important exception is Nugent (1999: 289), which emphasises the country-specific 'repertoire of politics'.
4. For an analysis of how politicians deploy 'vigilantism' in Kenya, see David Anderson (2002).
5. These two distinct political traditions form the basis for the two dominant political parties today, the NPP and the NDC.
6. In 2016, these constituencies include Ablekuma South (51%), Dadekotopon (45%), Korle Klottey (42%) and Ledzokuku (49%) (and Odododiodioo).
7. Forty per cent is a high enough proportion to influence electoral outcomes and form a sizeable voting block, as well as lead to the perception that the group 'controls' the politics of the constituency.
8. Noah Nathan provided us with these figures, based on Ghana's 2010 census. The breakdown in each constituency is as follows: Odododiodioo: 40% Ga, 23% Akan, 18% Mole-Dagbon, 7% Ewe, 12% 'Other'. Ayawaso Central: 39% Akan, 24% Ewe, 14% Ga, 17% 'Other', 6% Mole-Dagbon.
9. An ethnic group whose homeland is the Volta Region.
10. Sisala is a language spoken in North-western Ghana and Burkina Faso.
11. *Zongo* refers to 'stranger's quarters'. Early inhabitants were Muslims from the north and surrounding countries, as well as freed slaves.
12. This strategy was successful in the 2016 elections.
13. Some Ga leaders take great pride in the fact that they would not allow the Asantehene to own land in Accra.
14. For example, Sheikh I.C. Quaye, Mike Oquaye and Stanley Nii Agjiri-Blankson made frequent visits to the constituency during the campaign.
15. During the authoritarian regime of Jerry John Rawlings (1981–1992) for example, a group of market women at Accra's Makola Market served as a de facto representative group for the opposition.
16. Chiefs control and sell land in trust of the communities (Boone 2014). Lands under traditional authority cover about 75% of the country's territory (Onoma 2010).
17. A 'challenge' is a legal strategy that parties use to question the legitimacy of a registrant.

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