

Douglass's case this is especially important given that he wrote across media and genres. Despite the preeminent place of his three autobiographies and speeches in scholarship on Douglass by political theorists and philosophers, "Douglass's speeches, lectures, journalism, autobiographies, and visual arts commentaries *all* demand our attentiveness" (p. 4, emphasis in the original); to this list I would also add his novel, *The Heroic Slave*. Yet most of the essays in the volume draw precisely on the most often referenced texts, his autobiographies and his speeches, and thus do not demonstrate attention to a broader range of texts that could potentially destabilize our understandings of Douglass in productive ways, as called for in the introduction.

Another important omission in the volume is its lack of attention to Douglass's hemispheric/transnational investments and how they shaped the arguments he made about U.S. politics. Roberts notes, "Scholarship by philosophers and political theorists over the past two decades overwhelmingly advance readings of Douglass as a preeminent thinker of America and American political thought" (p. 4). This persistent framing has the unfortunate effect of portraying Douglass (and other African American thinkers) as more provincial than he actually was. It is important to pay attention to Douglass's hemispheric engagement with the Caribbean and Latin America not only because it gives us a more accurate understanding of his political ideas but also because those writings reveal Douglass as a theorist of a human right to migration and an advocate of multiracial immigration to the United States: this understanding can serve as a critical resource at a moment when nativism and anti-immigrant discourses have become ubiquitous in U.S. politics from the Trump administration to the ADOS (American descendants of slaves) movement for reparations.

Compiling a companion to such a prolific and wide-ranging thinker as Douglass is no easy task because he defies easy categorization. Roberts and the contributors to the *Political Companion to Frederick Douglass* have done an admirable job of presenting us with many diverse and compelling views of Douglass.

Popular Sovereignty in Early Modern Constitutional Thought. By Daniel Lee. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2016. 375p. \$85.00 cloth, \$39.95 paper.
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— Jacob T. Levy, *McGill University*

This extraordinary work of scholarship reinterprets central questions in early modern political thought through an analysis of the vocabulary, concepts, and debates the early moderns inherited from the medieval and Renaissance Roman legal tradition. To most readers I suspect that this project may sound obscure, but to a few it will

be immediately apparent both how valuable and how difficult it is. The normative materials out of which early modern European political ideas were built were primarily juridical: rights, contract, property, jurisdiction, trust, and so on. With the partial and exaggerated exception of England, in western Europe that meant that the materials were those of the Roman law as it had been expounded, developed, and glossed from about 1100 CE onward. The importance of this civil law tradition for medieval and early modern legal and political thought is hard to overstate; it is also famously hard to grasp. Although Justinian's compilation of Roman legal materials and arguments, whose medieval recovery inaugurated the tradition, is available in modern languages, much of the medieval commentary and gloss remains available only in Latin. It is moreover deeply difficult material, presented not in treatises but in marginalia and scholarly apparatuses to the Roman materials, with arguments that unfold over generations. This leaves readers of early modern political and legal theory at a serious disadvantage: we read texts that draw on centuries of legal argument we do not recognize or understand.

The reinterpretation of early modern political thought in light of the recovered Roman law is the book's method, not its topic. Its topic is the complex emergence of the idea of permanent popular sovereignty, sometimes meaning an attribute of the people that passively underlies and justifies all public authority and other times meaning that the people themselves must be involved in governing in some fundamental way. Daniel Lee reinterprets Grotius, Bodin, the monarchomachs, and Althusius—and to a lesser degree Hobbes and Rousseau—in light of the legal materials and arguments they drew on, to show how they shaped the idea (or rival ideas) of authority that ultimately vests in the people. The research contribution of the book is provided in a substantial introduction, three chapters on the Roman law tradition, and six chapters on early modern theory.

This combination of method and topic has the particular merit, and challenge, of putting Bodin and Grotius in the central place that they probably deserve in early modern political thought, but never seem to be accorded because of their major works' forbidding length and density. Grotius was a civil lawyer, and any but the shallowest reading of his political works quickly gets drawn into juridical questions that the modern reader finds utterly mysterious. But Lee is even more interested in Bodin, the only author to be the subject of two chapters. He argues that, when we get past the slivers of Bodin's writing that are readily available in English and read his work with an understanding of the legal debates in which they are situated, a thoroughly different Bodin emerges: not the familiar absolutist, but an important theorist of popular sovereignty and delegated authority.

The medieval legal disputes over sovereignty surveyed by Lee centered on such questions as whether the ostensible shift of sovereign authority from the Roman people to the emperor had been a revocable concession or an irrevocable transfer; whether the emperor could be understood to be an office with law-governed delegated authority instead of himself being the source of all legal authority; whether the Senate retained some legislative authority even under the emperors or *all* power to make laws had been transferred; and whether sovereignty was a kind of property, such that the people as the original sovereign could retain a right of reversion even while allowing usufruct to the emperor. In each of those pairs, the former choice tended to favor the possibility of ongoing, possibly perpetual, popular sovereignty. An important subsequent debate about how to reconcile Roman law with the pluralistic social order of the Middle Ages concerned whether intermediate powers such as feudal lords or cities held authority that was delegated from the emperor or could govern in their own right. All of these debates shaped not only the vocabulary but also the concepts available to early moderns who sought to understand the legitimate foundations and limits of political authority, the idea of officeholding, and the place of “the people” who might have given authority to emperors and might do likewise with modern kings.

Lee carefully and clearly explains such problems as the interwoven meanings of *imperium*, *iurisdictio*, and *dominium* in medieval legal thought, allowing the reader both to understand what such concepts had meant in ancient Rome and what they came to mean to civilians a millennium later. He shows how the significance of the Roman example shifted from one argument to the next. Was the Roman people’s transfer of authority foundational for the whole European order? Was it of only antiquarian interest? Or was it—most importantly for his account—an example that might show the rightful relationship of peoples to their rulers in all the kingdoms and states of the world?

Although the book is deeply impressive, its conclusions are of course not final. The interpretations Lee offers of the early moderns are striking and provocative, and competing accounts will have to contend with them, but contention remains possible. It seems to me, for example, that he overstates the commitment of Althusius and the sixteenth-century French school of Calvinist constitutionalist resistance theorists known as monarchomachs to a holistic popular foundation for legitimate authority. Juridical arguments that Lee develops in his earlier chapters about the independent authority of intermediate governing bodies tend to fall out in the later ones, as his attention shifts decisively to “the people.” But I would argue that Althusius and the monarchomachs emphasized institutional pluralism as much as and sometimes more than those popular founda-

tions. They are not straightforwardly forbears of the modern idea of a unified sovereign people parceling out governing authority; the concept of “the people” is more pluralistic from the outset. But Lee offers valuable evidence for his account, and those who, like me, want to push back on one point or another will still likely draw on his own account of the legal ideas those theorists used.

Lee shows mastery of materials from across centuries, languages, and disciplines. He combines them in a way that is powerful and convincing, animated by clear theoretical questions as much as by historiographic ones. This book would be a major accomplishment from a scholar who had been working on these questions for decades. For a first book, it is astonishing.

Popular Sovereignty in Early Modern Constitutional Thought ought to shift the historical sensibility of political theorists and philosophers in at least two crucial ways. With respect to the Middle Ages, it should lead to a rebalancing of the recovery of Aristotle and the recovery of the Roman law. The former was intellectually crucial, but it tends to be wildly overemphasized compared to the latter in, say, the teaching of medieval political thought. Aristotle and Aristotelians gave the medievals an intellectual structure for thinking about the moral status of politics and law. But the Roman law and its interpreters provided the resources for thinking about rightful authority, institutional design, and the rules of justice—as no less an Aristotelian than Aquinas freely recognized. We do a disservice to our students when we let the law disappear from the Middle Ages, and the disservice tends to perpetuate itself as successive generations grow less familiar with Roman than with Greek inheritances.

With respect to early modernity, a different rebalancing is called for: between *contract* and all the other legal concepts that enter into the foundations of political thought. Metaphors of contracts are not absent from Lee’s history, but neither are they central compared with, say, the relationship between property ownership and authority. Is sovereignty owned? Is jurisdiction or office owned? For example, the *Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos*, a major text of the monarchomachs, is often glossed as an offshoot of social contract theory. There are contract metaphors at work in it, but as Lee emphasizes, the title deliberately invokes the legal action of a *vindicatio*, a procedure of property law whereby ultimate owners could vindicate their claim against others with lesser rights over the land. The *Vindiciae* is one of the works that treats authority as subject to a kind of ownership, and it portrays the people as having the right to reassert its status as its owner. Lee shows a rare ability to trace such movements back and forth between private law and public law concepts over these centuries. Without saying so—maybe without intending so—he demonstrates the gross inadequacy of political theorists’ habit of ignoring private law except in the case of the contract that supposedly founds public law.

We cannot understand early modern political thought, or the ideas we have inherited from it, without understanding the mix of jurisprudential materials out of which it was built.

Restructuring Relations: Indigenous Self-Determination, Governance, and Gender. By Rauna Kuokkanen. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. 384p. \$74.00 cloth. doi:10.1017/S1537592719002342

— Kouslaa Kessler-Mata, *University of San Francisco*

In this book, Rauna Kuokkanen takes on an ambitious project that manages to contribute to and expand multiple disciplinary subfields at the same time. Substantively, this work focuses on the limits of our existing understanding of self-determination by considering the experiences of indigenous peoples in settler states, with a particular focus on how restructuring gender norms through colonization has affected contemporary indigenous political institutions and discourse. This book details a range of gender norms in indigenous communities before contact and how they were recast to create new, foreign forms of domination within those communities into the present. Kuokkanen argues that, absent indigenous approaches to gender, current law (international and domestic), political institutions, and debates all fail to acknowledge an indigenous right to self-determination. Such a failure is a function of a myopic concern for individual rights in discussions of self-determination and the continued, unspoken gender-based domination within and outside of indigenous communities.

In the context of political theory, Kuokkanen provides an indigenous feminist analysis to build a concept of self-determination that arises out of the perspectives of indigenous peoples from across five countries: Canada, Greenland, Finland, Sweden, and Norway. Through this innovative, methodologically rich approach, she identifies the “norm of integrity” (p. 24) as an imperative for indigenous self-determination. This norm is diminished and eroded by violence and inequality in the settler colonial context. Kuokkanen incorporates Jennifer Nedel-sky’s theory of relational autonomy and Iris Marion Young’s contributions to the debates on nondomination to show how such violence operates at the hands of states and internally in indigenous communities whose gender norms have been compromised. Her 76 semi-structured interviews consider “three dimensions of self-determination: the concept of self-determination, current status of implementation, and its relationship with violence against women” (p. 10). This innovative move—structuring a normative concept based on the collective and shared expressions of individuals in communities—is monumental enough in itself for the subfield. But Kuokkanen does not stop there in making noteworthy contributions.

Indeed, Kuokkanen’s methodological approach incorporates and draws on the unique dynamics of doing social science research in Canada, where indigenous people have had an arguably stronger say than in other countries in the contemporary construction of research methods that are to be used in their communities. This partnership in research (“by and with, rather than on and for,” p. 10) is also reflected in her incorporation of a research frame more common among decolonial and indigenous studies scholars than among political scientists. Namely, Kuokkanen uses a kind of network analytic approach to identify participants where the focal point of the network is, self-consciously, the researcher herself. By relying on her personal network to identify research participants, she argues that she is using “an Indigenous research method of relationality” (p. 10). This approach is complemented by textual analysis of a variety of governance documents, policy and media statements, meeting minutes, and so forth, which are used to identify institutional gender structures and highlight the way in which gender violence is being insufficiently addressed by those institutions.

On the whole, this book marks exceptional developments in and for political science, a few of which I note here. First, although inductive reasoning is not new to political theorists, the basis and source of such reasoning are rarely, if ever, empirical qualitative research. To be crass about it, those of us using inductive approaches most often rely on our own good reasoning as rooted in the textual analysis of other scholars. We are not in the business of surveying (literally) the range of possible theoretical considerations for a concept under study by asking others what they think and allowing them to shape it. I appreciate that Kuokkanen has made this intentional, explicit shift toward a multimethodological approach to political theory, and I also acknowledge that doing so can come at a cost, which I address shortly.

Second, although accepted and common among scholars in post- and decolonial studies, the intentional incorporation of her own positionality as an indigenous feminist and the reliance on her own personal network for research purposes are still relatively new and sit at the margins, marked as “suspect” in most political science circles. To the extent that Kuokkanen’s approach marks a shift toward empirical inclusivity, it is noteworthy. It also enables us to direct our attention to debating the merits of, purposes for, and frames used (and taught) in political science, which often rely on notions of objectivity and distance from the subject of our study to create a veneer of validity. Although Kuokkanen’s work does not explicitly address this particular debate, it provides a solid foundation for the conversation and ought to be included in graduate school curriculums for its methodological contributions.

In many ways, this book picks up where my work (Kessler-Mata, *American Indians and The Trouble with*