

POLITICAL THEORY

Tocqueville, Covenant, and the Democratic Revolution: Harmonizing Earth with Heaven.

By Barbara Allen. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005. 400p. \$80.00 cloth, \$25.95 paper.

— James T. Schleifer, *College of New Rochelle*

This book is a remarkably original effort to develop a fresh understanding and appreciation of Tocqueville's "new science of politics." The covenant or "federal" theology of the New England Puritans is Barbara Allen's point of departure, and she strongly reminds readers that it also served as the point of departure for Tocqueville's analysis of America, in particular, and of democratic society, in general. Allen argues that Tocqueville's new political science is essentially a prescription for a democratic society in which political culture reflects the beliefs, values, and behaviors of covenantal religion. Her thesis is that Tocqueville's vision of a healthy democratic society is fundamentally a portrait of a society grounded in the Protestant covenant tradition.

This argument has many dimensions. The work, as a study of theology, carefully defines covenant theology and describes how it was not simply a religious matter but fostered a certain kind of political culture, shaping the fundamental relationships between religion and society, and broadly influencing all aspects of political culture (see Chap. 1). In Tocqueville's terms, religion served as the point of departure that affected everything else. At the same time this book, as a study of American history, carefully delineates the ways that "federal" theology came to shape the contours of American political development.

In analyzing the political culture that emerged out of Protestantism, Allen especially stresses voluntarism, constitutionally guaranteed liberty of conscience and legal separation of church and state (p. 108 and Chaps. 3 and 4), associational pluralism (see Chap. 5), and federal institutional arrangements. According to the author, Tocqueville insists that democracy, to be healthy, needs a moral core, and she asserts that the moral core praised and desired by Tocqueville was based on what he had seen in America: a nation profoundly shaped by the covenantal tradition, not as any specific religious or doctrinal stance but as a broader political culture of values, ideas, behaviors, and institutional preferences.

Allen offers a sound reading of Tocqueville's work. Drawing from *Democracy in America*, the *Ancien Régime*, and other important letters and essays, she thoughtfully summarizes his key clusters of ideas and calls for a more nuanced reading, one that recognizes the complexity and ambiguity of his conclusions about democratic society and that admits his own doubts and uncertainties. For example, she discusses Tocqueville's ambiguous, even contradictory, treatment of family, women, and gender equity

(Chap. 7), of race, race ideology, and colonialism (Chap. 8), and of cultural heterogeneity (Chap. 9). In addition, despite her emphasis on American lessons, Allen is very aware of the larger French and European context of Tocqueville's ideas; she is especially good at discussing the impact on his thinking and writing of the doctrinaires and the Great Debate in France during the 1820s, of the emerging issues of Algeria and of abolition in the French colonies, and of growing social and economic problems in France during the 1830s and 1840s. Finally, the volume, drawing on Tocqueville's catalogue of democratic dangers, offers a challenging critique of current American attitudes and behaviors, including the dangers of "democratic proclivities toward simplifications" (p. 262), the inability to deal with doubt and nuance, and the preference for "simple dichotomies" (p. 223). (Also see pp. 108, 117, 119, 156, 162, 165, and 186.)

This book also offers some useful correctives. The author rightly reminds readers, for example, that Tocqueville understood the concept of association broadly; for him, it meant not only private groupings but also public, legal arrangements, such as cities, towns, counties, and other governmental units. And her analysis of tyranny of the majority and the power of public opinion is especially perceptive (see especially Chap. 6). She recognizes that from the beginning, Tocqueville worried about the power of the majority to operate psychologically on individuals or on the minority to impose its intellectual authority, to prevent even the imagining of certain thoughts and opinions, and to create a numbing and despotic conformity.

The book also develops two themes too often ignored by interpreters of Tocqueville's work (each of them is stated explicitly by Donald Lutz in his Foreword, on pp. ix–x). First, Allen holds to the superiority of the 1835 volume of *Democracy* over the 1840 volume (this judgment was commonly made by nineteenth-century readers, but it has come to be considered almost heretical over the past century). And second, she stresses the importance of what Tocqueville experienced in the New World as a catalyst for growth and change in his ideas. The heart of her argument is that he learned new lessons in America, lessons that were derived from the covenantal tradition and that pushed his thinking in new directions and led him to think about democratic society in new ways.

While Allen's thesis is expressed well and persuasively, a few questions remain about the tightness of the links she wishes to draw between Tocqueville and covenant theology. Her argument rests primarily on his treatment (in the 1835 *Democracy*) of New England Puritanism as a model for blending the spirit of religion and the spirit of liberty (and especially on his praise for John Winthrop's definition of civil liberty). She also stresses the idea that the covenantal tradition had so permeated and shaped the American society of the early nineteenth century that most of what Tocqueville saw and heard was an

unstated manifestation of covenantal thinking. But what can we make of an interpretation of Tocqueville that is so deeply Protestant and American? How will this viewpoint be read and understood by readers who are totally unfamiliar with the covenantal tradition, or by those who prefer to stress the European roots and contexts of his thinking?

Allen's book is an extremely dense, complex, and wide-ranging work. She is a master of many fields; her long notes are especially rich and demonstrate not only her familiarity with the literature relating to Tocqueville but also her knowledge of covenant theology and of American history and political theory. Her discussion is far too detailed and nuanced to be adequately treated in a short review; it demands focused attention on the part of the reader. But the intellectual journey is well worth the effort. This book breaks new ground and is an important contribution to Tocqueville scholarship. But beyond that achievement, it is also a thoughtful and stimulating work about the American political condition, its roots, its enduring qualities, and its present dangers.

The Rise and Fall of the Caucasian Race: A Political History of Racial Identity. By Bruce Baum. New York: New York University Press, 2006. 352p. \$45.00.

Ethics Along the Color Line. By Anna Stubblefield. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. 216 p. \$16.95.

— Mark Q. Sawyer, *UCLA*

There is a tendency in political science to see identities as given and fixed. They are placed in equations and used to predict things, but the content of those identities and our normative understanding of them remain a mystery. For that reason, *Ethics Along the Color Line* and *The Rise and Fall of the Caucasian Race: A Political History of Racial Identity* are essential books both for political theorists and those working in other fields of political science. Both add analytical rigor to our use of race as social scientists and implore us to keep in mind normative questions as we explore the contours and meanings of race as a socio-political construct.

Ethics Along the Color Line, as a work of analytical philosophy, challenges us to explore the ethical and analytical uses of racial identity. The book is most concerned with first intervening in debates about the nature of racial identities and then exploring if those debates have consequences for normative uses of race for political and social organization. Anna Stubblefield takes up what she refers to as descriptive arguments, largely drawing upon classical works from W. E. B. DuBois and more contemporary works of Charles Mills and Lucius Outlaw, in order to challenge interventions of authors such as Kwame Anthony Appiah and Paul Gilroy who argue that race is an imag-

ined phenomenon and a poor ethical basis for developing group action and solidarity. By situating this discussion within the context of social scientific works that demonstrate the quotidian manifestations of race, Stubblefield argues that race matters as a category of experience and analysis. Further, by examining the development of racial identities in the U.S. and international contexts, she forces us to engage white racial identity as both an analytical and normative context. This book moves beyond the tendency to study race as white racial attitudes and forwards a perspective whereby the identities and attitudes of whites and racial minorities are all considered part of the explanatory framework.

Although Stubblefield sides with Outlaw—who agrees that race is quite real in the everyday experience of individuals and groups—she argues that this does not necessarily guarantee the prescriptive potential of race to solve problems of justice and inequality in society. Thus, she seeks to move beyond the debate between Outlaw and Appiah by suggesting a division between descriptive and prescriptive accounts of race. While the author spends the majority of the book discussing the descriptive nature of race, her innovation is primarily in the prescriptive parts. Here, she argues that it is an ethical necessity to take race into account, and this is best served by thinking of the “races” as “families.” She finds that thinking of races in this way invokes an ethic of care, a responsibility for those within the family, and a recognition of the conditions and responsibilities to those outside the family. Therefore, for her it is ethical for blacks to act out of a feeling of racial solidarity; and in order to achieve racial justice, whites must recognize their racial group interests and their obligation to blacks and other minorities as members outside their family.

I agree with this argument but wish Stubblefield had spent more time developing it. Her analogy depends upon the belief that those in families recognize some responsibility to those outside the family. But such responsibility is not necessarily built into the conception of family, which, as noted, can easily degenerate into forms of exclusion. Perhaps it is here where the differences between the disciplines of political science and analytical philosophy are most evident. For political scientists, the theoretical positioning on the nature of race in contemporary societies is far more compelling than the vignettes used to form the foundation for the normative argument.

The Rise and Fall of the Caucasian Race: A Political History of Racial Identity is much more familiar as a work of political science coming out of the field of political theory. Bruce Baum also takes aim at Paul Gilroy's *Against Race: Imagining Political Culture Beyond the Color Line* (2001). Gilroy argues that it is unethical to use race as a basis for social scientific analysis or political action. Baum states: “People who have been racialized as Caucasians must acknowledge our historically racialized identities as

Caucasian—along with the social and material advantages it entails—even as we work with others to end the myth of a ‘Caucasian race’” (p. 19). Like Stubblefield, Baum argues that excavating the historical manifestations and complex meanings of racial categories is the first step toward a recognition of the role of race in organizing modern societies.

By tracking the historical development of the conception of Caucasianness and race itself, Baum seeks to understand the sociopolitical “work” that race has done in organizing modernity. Although he begins with the Middle Ages and moves to the defeat of the Moors in Spain, the Enlightenment looms large in his account, for during this period, biblical discourses about race were ultimately replaced by a discourse of racial science used to justify the projects of colonialism and the transatlantic trade in human beings. Like Charles Mills, Baum argues that Enlightenment thinkers like Locke and Kant are themselves implicated in the construction of certain groups (specifically people of African descent and indigenous peoples) as racial others deemed outside the Enlightenment project.

Baum tracks the interplay between European thought and the development of racial policies in the United States. He argues that between 1840 and 1940, there is a decline in the sense of a unitary Caucasian race, which can be classified as a “fall.” This is reflected in U.S. immigration policies and continental racial science, and it is interrupted only by the rise of Nazi racial science and the rehabilitation of a conception of the Caucasian race. However, this points to a potential alternative story that is not developed because of the scope of the book.

Baum’s work focuses almost exclusively on continental Europe and the United States. The variety of race concepts employed through varied practices of chattel slavery and colonialism is thus not captured. His book sometimes reads as if the continental thought inevitably manifested itself in the particular set of racial formations that come to characterize the history of U.S. racial politics. However, it is worth noting that British, Spanish, Portuguese, and German practices varied widely around the globe and that there were salient differences in racialization in regions within the United States. Thus, where Baum notes the “fall” of the Caucasian race, it is perhaps the case that there always existed multiple interpretations or uses of similar strands of racial thought and that what he is tracking is which strand became dominant at various points in time in one particular national context. That being said, the general arch of the story is well documented. He ably connects the development of the U.S. postcolonial nation to the ongoing dialogue and development of race science occurring in Europe. A further project would have been to engage these developments in Latin America, the Caribbean, India, Africa, and Australia, as well as in the United States and Europe. But it is perhaps unfair to ask an author to so expand the

scope of the book, though we could gain more analytical clarity by a clearer formulation.

Baum’s point is that the Caucasian race, racial science, and Enlightenment thinking are inherently racial projects built to exclude a range of groups. By examining the development of the conception of the Caucasian race, the author reveals how that identity functions as a powerful myth that organizes social, political, and economic interactions. Thus, he concludes that we must be more cognizant of the myth itself in order to understand the role race plays in contemporary U.S. society.

While these two books focus on the work of political theorists, such as Hawley Fogg-Davis, Mills, Michael Hanchard, and Tommie Shelby, and those in the field of American political development, such as Ira Katznelson, Cathy Cohen, Paul Frymer, Jennifer Hochschild, Alvin Tilley, Michael Dawson, and Rogers Smith, it is important for those from other subfields to begin to incorporate the key points. The works of Stubblefield and Baum and the others mentioned cause us to place racial identities themselves at issue and call on us to deploy analytical and normative tools to assess those identities in the construction of modern societies. The insights of these two works add a needed dimension to the study of race in political science that I hope scholars beyond the field of theory will take to heart.

Family Feuds: Wollstonecraft, Burke, and Rousseau on the Transformation of the Family. By Eileen Hunt Botting. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006. 258p. \$65.00.

— Wendy Sarvasy, *California State University, East Bay*

This book reminds us of the importance of theorizing the family/state relationship. Eileen Hunt Botting argues that while Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Edmund Burke proposed different versions of a patriarchal structuring of the family in contrast to Mary Wollstonecraft’s egalitarian version, the three eighteenth-century theorists shared a view of the function of the family as providing the relational and moral foundations for the state. To relate as a father, husband, son, wife, sister, or daughter was to learn how to sympathize, and to work for a common purpose, both of which were absolutely necessary for developing patriotic feelings and civic virtue. The significance of the book goes beyond taking us back to the Enlightenment origins of the notion of the family as an agent of political socialization. It raises crucial questions about Wollstonecraft’s status as a canonical democratic theorist; it also suggests fascinating implications for how political theory could make a contribution to our contemporary conversations on gay families, religion and the family, and the clash of civilizations and the family.

To construct her argument, Botting presents a careful, nuanced reading of the political and theoretical development of each theorist’s position. Her interpretive method

uncovers internal logics and intentions that interconnect an impressive range of writings. She constructs the theories of Rousseau and Burke so that their influences on and similarities with Wollstonecraft can be emphasized. This method leads to the conclusion that Wollstonecraft won the debate on the best family/state relationship, because the egalitarian structuring of the family is the dominant view today within liberal-democratic states.

Chapter 1 analyzes five books by Rousseau and presents the logic of his functional analysis of the agrarian family suited for a small republic. Rousseau assumed that the corrupting dangers of women's sexuality would be overcome only through a patriarchal ordering of the family. He criticized the mixing in public of the sexes. Though he confined women to the family, he opened up the possibility of the empowerment of women by allocating to wives and mothers the role of reinforcing in their husbands and inculcating in their male children the virtues they needed to be good citizens. Rousseau also proposed a more humane approach to the education of children.

Chapter 2 uncovers the genealogy of Burke's defense of the hierarchical family "as a transcultural moral foundation of stable civilizations and political regimes" (p. 73). Chapter 3 provides an interpretation of Burke as a philosopher who supported his political defense of the hierarchical family with a combination of Christian natural law and an aesthetic theory that rested on a gendered notion of qualities and virtues. Unlike Rousseau, Burke was not focused on defending only his vision of the healthiest family. In his condemnation of the practice of the British East India Company to repress the polygamous family, he championed the practice in India of noble men having more than one family. For Botting, Burke's tolerant attitude demonstrated his support of "the hierarchical family in all its culturally unique manifestations" (p. 83).

Chapter 4 makes the case for Wollstonecraft as a systematic political theorist because of the metaphysical, theological foundations of her thought, which evolved through three stages. She began as "a traditional trinitarian Anglican"; she moved on to become "a rationalist Socinian Christian Dissenter"; she ended up "a Romantic deist, skeptic, and possible atheist" (p. 134). The middle phase is the most relevant. In this period, she argued that the function of the family as "a schoolhouse for the moral and civic virtues" (p. 11) would be achieved only if women's rational capacities were educated and if the family was constructed on an egalitarian basis. Her central insight was that the hierarchical family structure undermined the ability of the husband/father and the wife/mother to perform their crucial roles as teachers and practitioners of civic virtue and love of country. Botting defines three characteristics of Wollstonecraft's required egalitarian structure of the family: equal rights between wife and husband, equal inheritance rights among the children, and a respectful relationship between parents and children.

Botting's presentation of this eighteenth-century conversation on the family as "a kind of sibling rivalry" (p. 191) has important implications for thinking about the place of feminist theory within the canon of political theory. For a modern audience, we can bracket Rousseau's gender biases as anachronistic, and simply add women to his notion of citizenship. Yet this approach hides the crucial contribution of feminist political thinking. Without Wollstonecraft in the canon of democratic theorists, we cannot answer the question of how we thought our way out of the patriarchal family structure to envision an egalitarian family structure that could support a healthy democratic state. By showing how Wollstonecraft's theory was absolutely necessary for the actualization of what Rousseau and Burke intended for the political function of the family, Botting makes the definitive case that Wollstonecraft belongs in the canon.

Finally, *Family Feuds* suggests three areas in which political theorists drawing on the Enlightenment approach to the family could contribute to contemporary discussions of the family. The first area involves the debate over gay marriage and family values. By focusing on the family as the inculcator of civic virtue, Botting's analysis suggests the need to enlarge the discussion of the kinds of values that are important within the family and whether or not the sexual orientation of the parents is the crucial factor. Why cannot civic virtue be taught by two fathers or two mothers? The second area refers to the relationship between religion and the egalitarian family. Botting's privileging of the Christian theological foundations of Wollstonecraft's vision of the family reminds us that gender equality has deep roots in Christianity. The third area shows how the Enlightenment treatment of the family challenges a simplistic understanding of the relationship between the East and the West. Rousseau argued for segregating men and women at the theater and in public spaces; Burke defended polygamy. Wollstonecraft equated the position of women in the West with "the concubines in an 'eastern harem'" (p. 84). By uncovering the richness of the Enlightenment conversation on the family, Botting makes an invaluable contribution to a rethinking of the genesis of the Western commitment to gender equality in the family.

The Economy of Esteem: An Essay on Civil and Political Society. By Geoffrey Brennan and Philip Pettit. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 339p. \$59.50 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

— Bo Rothstein, *Göteborg University*

Much of social science has been devoted to the analysis of different mechanisms for social steering. The most well-known are the "invisible hand" market and the "iron hand" state. In many studies, these systems of coordination have been put forward as the only two that are available, and we have seen endless amounts of energy going into the pros and cons for each in different areas. In this book, two

renowned scholars, one an economist (Geoffrey Brennan) and the other a political philosopher (Philip Pettit), put forward a third mechanism that they argue has largely been neglected, namely, esteem. The central idea is that while people are motivated by material benefits and by the incentives given by laws and regulations, they are also motivated by the opinions other people hold of them. In addition to material rewards, we also want other people we care about to think well of us. The authors argue that this esteem mechanism has largely been overlooked in modern neoclassical economics but that it was a major part of earlier economics, not least in Adam Smith's "A Theory of Moral Sentiments," which was published in 1759, 13 years before "The Wealth of Nations."

This book is original in that it contains both positive and normative arguments for the importance of esteem and also because it blends economic analyses about the different equilibria with philosophical reasoning and, to some extent, policy prescriptions. The latter seems motivated, at least in some part, by the authors' experience of a recent trend in many governments to submit public universities to "a pattern of relentless scrutiny and continuous accounting that consumes an extraordinary amount of time, demoralises and destabilises those in the business of education, and makes the education profession less and less attractive to young talent" (p. 6). The esteem mechanism is presented as an alternative to the "pseudo-market" type of steering that, according to the authors, has seriously damaged academia.

The book has many original and surprising analyses of how esteem works and what makes esteem different from material rewards. While the market is driven by "the invisible hand" and laws by the "iron hand" of the state, the force behind esteem is defined as the "intangible hand," which is grounded in civil society. The central arrangements for esteem to work are that general norms can be established so that there is a common understanding of what constitutes good and bad behavior; secondly, that the relevant actions become known to the civil society/general public; and thirdly, that people find it worthwhile to react (give esteem or disesteem) in the appropriate way. In all three cases there are problems (the proper general norms may not be established, the associations in civil society may be driven by vengeance or in-group loyalties, and people may fail to react due to the problem of collective action), and the authors discuss them all in a thorough manner. These are very difficult questions that pervade much of social science and discussion about public policy.

While this is a very creative piece of analysis, there are a few points where I find the discussion less convincing. The authors argue that esteem is different because it cannot be bought, sold, or exchanged. This is a strange argument since we live in a political world that, to a large extent, is dominated by organizations that make a living out of doing precisely this. The political sphere, at least in

the countries I know, is today filled with political lobbyists and public relations consultants who trade in esteem. Also in academia, I have seen people trade esteem ("you cite/invite me, I cite/invite you . . ."). Secondly, there is at least one part of economic analysis in which esteem has not been as neglected as the authors argue. This is theories about the firm and organizational theory more generally in which conceptions focusing on the importance of "commitment," "trust," leadership, and "organizational culture" have taken central stage (e.g., Gary Miller, *Managerial Dilemmas*, 1992). The reason is a result from noncooperative game theory showing that firms and organizations cannot be steered only by incentive schemes because in order to make such schemes work, those who are going to construct them need "correct" information about the nature of the tasks from those who are going to work under the schemes (otherwise the incentives will be dysfunctional). But if those in the latter group know that this information will be used against them (e.g., to speed up their work), they are not going to provide such "correct" information. This problem is the reason why real existing organizations rely not only on material rewards to steer their employees but also on different types of "esteem" (employee of the month, training to induce organizational commitment, promoting the esteem of leaders, etc.).

The authors end the book with a policy-oriented chapter about the ways in which the esteem mechanism could be used. Since giving esteem (or disesteem) often seems to be a more efficient steering mechanism than giving material rewards or incentives by law, this appears to be very promising. Unfortunately, the chapter is more about what to avoid than what to do, and the reason given for this is the lack of empirical information about the type of institutional arrangement that can influence esteem. This is a little surprising since one of the most discussed developments in public policy and public administration is the rise of "the audit society." Governments have become more interested in establishing institutions that evaluate the performance of public authorities than in steering them by strict regulations. This is very much geared toward the issuing of publicly available reports that contain evaluations of performance and thus present esteem or disesteem in the way that is discussed here. A connection to this literature would have been a valuable addition to *The Economy of Esteem*.

Sufficient Reason: Volitional Pragmatism and the Meaning of Economic Institutions. By Daniel W. Bromley. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006. 256p. \$35.00.

— Eric MacGilvray, *Ohio State University*

The purposes of this book are twofold: first, to call into question what the author takes to be the dominant economic approach to explaining institutional change—and thus public policy outcomes—and second, to offer an

alternative explanatory approach rooted in what the author calls “volitional pragmatism.” According to the dominant view, institutional change can (or should) be explained “endogenously” in terms of the utility-maximizing choices of individuals: “In the received story, institutions change—machinelike—when it is efficient for them to change. And if they do not change, then it is efficient that they not change” (p. 214). When, contrary to theoretical expectations, institutions change or fail to change in a way that economists take to be inefficient, then this is said to be the result of collective (political) interference with and distortion of otherwise efficient individual choices. Such interference is explained by appealing to the irrationality or ignorance of political actors (Daniel Bromley calls this the “dimwit conjecture,” p. 124) or, perhaps more commonly, by the fact that the political process has been captured by “special interests.”

Bromley finds this familiar story wanting in two major respects. Methodologically speaking, the choice-theoretic models on which it relies are deductive in nature, and their value must therefore be measured by their ability to use general axioms about human behavior to generate reliable and testable predictions about particular social outcomes. Although he grants that this is, in principle, a perfectly legitimate method of explanation, he argues that in practice, welfare economists are often more faithful to their “analytical engines” than to the empirical phenomena that they claim to study: “Deduction can readily find confirming evidence for its theoretical discoveries, and the avid deductivist will then declare satisfaction.” In such cases “we do not explain events—we justify them” (p. 102). This line of argument will be familiar to many political scientists (see especially Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory*, 1996), though it is interesting (for this reader at least) to see it applied to the economic literature from which political scientists have drawn so much inspiration.

From a normative standpoint, Bromley argues that the standard economic claim that only Pareto-efficient institutional changes are to be approved or expected is nugatory, because according to standard economic theory “[f]or any possible [institutional] setting, we can rely on a competitive market and the associated atomistic bargaining therein to produce and sustain a Pareto-optimal state” (p. 123). The appeal to efficiency, therefore, does little if anything to distinguish better from worse outcomes. The usual response to this dilemma is to take the status quo, tacitly or not, as the institutional baseline, and to regard any deviation that cannot be shown to result from atomistic bargaining and/or changes in relative prices as Pareto-inefficient and therefore economically unsound. The obvious practical implication of such an approach is to render those whose interests are well served by the status quo arrangement immune to (legitimate) political interference with their established “rights.” Bromley argues

against this view that “[t]he only intellectually honest (and theoretically correct) way to consider . . . new institutional arrangements is to inquire as to whose will—whose interests—are to govern the creation of these new institutional arrangements. . . . All other questions are bogus and merely diversionary” (p. 50).

Bromley suggests, borrowing a term from the pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce, that an “abductive” approach to explanation provides a better means of explaining institutional change than the currently dominant deductive models. The key feature of abduction is that it is problem-driven; it begins not with behavioral axioms but with (what a given inquirer takes to be) a surprising or anomalous result. The abductive inquirer works back from the observable phenomena to identify a plausible explanation for this result, and then tests this explanation by applying it to further cases. Bromley holds that in the realm of human behavior, our explanations should be expressed in terms of final rather than efficient causes; we must appeal “not [to] desires (or preferences) but *reasons*” (p. 31). According to this view, institutional change results not from the “mechanical” pursuit of Pareto efficiency or utility maximization, but rather from a collective effort to bring about a desired but uncertain future state of affairs—what the author calls, following the economist G. L. S. Shackle, a “created imagining.” When we act with the reasonable expectation of bringing about such a state of affairs, then we are said to have *sufficient reason* for pursuing institutional change.

Taken together, the appeal to abduction, final causes, and “created imaginings” defines the method of inquiry that Bromley calls “volitional pragmatism”: “volitional” because of its emphasis on the human will in action, and “pragmatism” because of its problem-driven, experimental approach and its prospective orientation. This book is therefore of interest not only as a thoughtful and thought-provoking contribution to the ongoing debate over the utility of rational choice theory, but also as a creative and fruitful application of pragmatic philosophy in the realm of empirical social science.

Bromley’s practical aim is to make welfare economists more receptive to state-centered approaches to institutional change, and if economists and political scientists often place undue faith in the wisdom of markets, he sometimes places undue faith in the wisdom of democratic politics. The case for the market rests not only on an appeal to Pareto efficiency, but also on an appeal to the superiority of decentralized over centralized decision mechanisms. Bromley does not, despite a couple of swipes at Friedrich Hayek, directly confront this line of argument, and his enthusiasm about “the expansive and inclusive considerations that emerge from the political process” (p. 202) will strike many political scientists—and many ordinary citizens—as being rather starry-eyed. Nevertheless, this book provides a useful corrective to the often

unthinking allegiance to markets in current political and academic discourse, and provides a rich conceptual and theoretical apparatus for thinking through the alternatives.

A Kinder, Gentler America: Melancholia and the Mythical 1950s. By Mary Caputi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005. 232p. \$58.50 cloth, \$19.50 paper.

— Joseph H. Lane, *Emory & Henry College*

Given the controversies that have plagued the present administration, it is little wonder that critiques of neoconservatives have been produced by scholars from all perspectives. Even Francis Fukuyama, widely reputed to be one of the great neoconservative thinkers, has released a trenchant critique of neoconservatives' ideas and policies (*America at the Crossroads*, 2006). In her contribution to this growing chorus, Mary Caputi argues that neoconservatives have used and abused history in creating a mythical image of America's past, an idealized narrative about American life in "the fifties" that she contrasts with the complex historical strata of the chronological 1950s. She argues that the neoconservatives have cultivated, popularized, and exploited a misleading and incomplete image of a "kinder, gentler America" to generate a peculiarly powerful melancholia that haunts us with the memory of what we (supposedly) were and what we might (erroneously wish to) be again. Only by seeing through this idealized vision of that decade can we "understand that America's true identity is not located in some mythological register of time" and thus "let go of the worries and sadness that drive the need for foundations" and moral certainties (p. 27).

Caputi's account of the pathologies lurking in our popular imagination of the fifties is compelling. Her major "texts" for exploring the limits of this comfortable image are two recent films—*Pleasantville* and *Far From Heaven*. Her reading of the films is sharp and detailed. She discusses how both filmmakers skillfully employ the pastiche of fifties-inspired television plots to reveal the human costs associated with the decade's (purportedly) black-and-white sexual moralities. In *Pleasantville*, she finds a perfect parable of the trap that melancholy for a "hidden substrate," some untroubled and now lost past, creates in Americans (pp. 28, 98–100). In her analysis of *Far From Heaven*, she discusses how "the patina of wholeness" (p. 115) and domestic normalcy often hid both repressed desires and harmful prejudices.

She parses her reading of the films out into the various chapters of the work, building toward the suggestion that a more nuanced understanding of the fifties will provide the basis for a more colorful and diverse, open-ended, performative, and satisfying vision of America's potentialities that will open us to "the new" (pp. 122, 131, 168). The strategy works remarkably well, even though her decision to focus her analysis on these two films limits much

of the discussion of the repressive character of the period to issues of sexuality and gender roles (see pp. 23, 92–96, 133–38, et al.) when she might have made more of the political intolerance that all too often passed for patriotism (see pp. 121–27). The book is not as broad as it might be, and too dense for most undergraduates, but the perspectives offered on the films could be used as the basis for very useful class discussions in courses on American politics and culture.

The heart of Caputi's argument, however, is deeper than her oft-repeated assertions that these two films reveal a 1950s that is far less idyllic than the "Honey, I'm home" image of domestic bliss and social stability that is often invoked in political discourse (pp. 24, 98, 108, 118, et al.). She wants to demonstrate that our imagination of the fifties is making us anxious, alienated, and disappointed with our public and private lives in the present. I agree with Caputi that this concept of melancholy may explain Americans' longing for idealized pasts that can serve as problematic keys for untangling thorny contemporary dilemmas and inaccurate templates for an uncertain future (p. 72). Given our infatuation with retelling the story our Founding, we should not be surprised to discover that Americans cling to a "vener of cohesion" that offers the appearance of a plan or destiny to explain our 200-plus years of surprising dislocations, innovations, and unforeseen changes (pp. 71–82, 114–15, 130).

However, I found her efforts to extract a precise reading of melancholy from the works of Julia Kristeva and Walter Benjamin to be distracting and unnecessarily obscured by the repetitive use of jargon. The tendency to overuse technical concepts, often without any direct application to American public discourse, is most evident in the second chapter. This discussion of Kristeva and Benjamin's works is a *detour de force* in which it is easy to lose sight of both the United States and the 1950s. Benjamin's explorations of German tragedy (pp. 47–52), Baudelaire's lyric poetry (52–69), or the over-rich twilight of the Parisian arcades (84–92) may be useful vantages for seeing the emptiness and longing that pervade our visions of suburban Edens, but we could apply these insights more productively to our own times if the focus were kept on the contemporary, political manifestations of our unease.

Moreover, while the origins of Kristeva and Benjamin's concepts of melancholy are explored in great detail, the rhetoric of the Right, through which we are told this melancholy has pervaded our political language and trapped our political projects in unrealizable aspirations, is explored in a disappointing and cursory fashion. Caputi oversimplifies our political landscape, writing as though all post-Reagan conservatives are neoconservatives. She cites figures as diverse as Ronald Reagan, Pat Buchanan, Ralph Reed, Newt Gingrich, Allan Bloom, Rush Limbaugh, and Russell Kirk as though they share a single and coherent philosophy (e.g., pp. 98–105), but this is a dubious

assumption. Meanwhile, Irving Kristol, who is widely credited as the intellectual founder of neoconservatism, is discussed only briefly (p. 102), and neither William Kristol nor Fukuyama is mentioned at all. A more accurate account of conservatism's political use of the fifties should take seriously the possibility that the Right, like the Left, is "a diffuse and variegated group of people whose politics frequently conflict" (p. 139).

In short, Caputi commits the very sin that she criticizes. She chides those who celebrate the mythical fifties as a period in which the problems facing America could be understood clearly in black and white for failing to see that indeterminacy and confusion, a surplus of incomplete meanings and competing claims, must always be with us in making political judgments. She reminds us that our political lives are "overripe with meaning" and that any clear narrative is simply not to be had in "chronological" time (pp. 26–27, 70, 137–38, et al.). And yet, she offers an alternative, but equally totalizing, narrative that obscures the tensions, cross-cutting cleavages, and surpluses of meaning that circulate from the Left to the Right and back again (as neoconservatism itself came out of the Left to lead the Right). A unified conspiracy of right-wing misreaders of history is charged with providing all of the unrealizable dreams that fuel our persistent melancholy. America's political discourse is both fascinating and frustrating, but it merits a more thorough discussion and cannot be reduced so easily to simple dichotomies.

In spite of this disappointing oversimplification, *A Kinder, Gentler America* provides a provocative reading of two fascinating films, a dense introduction to the works of Kristeva and Benjamin, and a suggestive but incomplete application of the insights gained to American political discourse. It would be more valuable if it contained a better reading of the last, but this book raises many worthwhile questions.

Beyond Gated Politics: Reflections for the Possibility of Democracy. By Romand Coles. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005. 376p. \$75.00 cloth, \$25.00 paper.

— C. Douglas Lummis

In 1859, two years after England crushed the Indian Uprising, John Stuart Mill explained why the rules of international morality do not apply to "barbarians": "In the first place, the rules of international morality imply reciprocity. But barbarians will not reciprocate. They cannot be depended on for observing any rules. Their minds are not capable of so great an effort, nor their will sufficiently under the influence of distant motives" ("A Few Words on Intervention," in Mill, *Essays on Politics and Culture*, ed. Gertrude Himmelfarb, 1962).

Mill is particularly referring to Indians. Leaving aside the pomposity, what is stunning is the boneheaded igno-

rance. How could this learned, usually fair-minded man write something so blatantly false? It would be comforting if we could lay the blame either on imperialism generally or on Mill personally. More troubling is that he may have here disclosed a failing in the political philosophy of which he was the leading exponent: liberalism.

The suspicion is supported by the essay as a whole. Mill argues that the English are so fair-minded, so well-intentioned, so egalitarian—so *liberal*, in short—that colonized peoples should consider it a benefit to be ruled by them. And given the high level of their discourse, there is no compelling reason for them to listen to voices from outside.

Romand Coles sees a similar problem in contemporary liberalism: He accuses it of being a systematically bad listener. His chief target is John Rawls, who has argued that liberalism must set up strict rules for what kinds of reasons are admissible in public discourse. Especially repugnant are "comprehensive doctrines"—religious or philosophical systems of the sort that have "believers": "[R]easons given explicitly in terms of comprehensive doctrines are never to be introduced into public reason" (*Political Liberalism*, 1996, p. 247).

Where, Coles asks, does liberalism get the authority to be the gatekeeper? It does so by claiming to be above the fray—not an interested party, but a disinterested set of rules. As with Mill, by claiming that liberalism is fairness itself, Rawls grants it hegemony over all other systems of thought, and establishes whole categories of people who need not be listened to.

The trouble, Coles points out, is that these are real people, with real concerns. Rawls, Coles says, legitimates "exclusion both of expressions of suffering and possibilities that exceed political liberalism's limits" (p. 12). Max Weber once held out the hope that some day new prophets would arise and show us the way out of the iron cage of industrial capitalism. But presumably prophecy also will be disallowed. This is how the gatekeepers enforce liberalism as the End of History.

Coles's book is a long argument that political theory, and especially liberalism, needs to pay attention not only to speaking and writing but also to listening. He introduces an interesting group of theorists to illuminate the subject. From Thomist Alisdair MacIntyre he draws the point that "only within a teleological horizon can we grasp and nurture a vulnerability to the ateleological aspects of human historicity" (p. 79), which I venture to restate as: Only if you believe something yourself will you be able truly to hear the unexpected words of the other. Put differently, the claim of liberalism *not* to be a comprehensive belief system may be one of the reasons for its inability to hear anything but its own voice.

This poses a dilemma: How do you both believe something and entertain the possibility, as a good listener must, that you might be wrong and the other right (Coles's

“vulnerability”)? He finds MacIntyre the believer a better listener than Rawls the neutral umpire, but in the end argues that he falls into about the same trap, taking on “the unreceptive confidence of we-who-are-better-than-the-others-because-we-are-more-vulnerable” (p. 99). (Coles never fully explains how he himself is going to stay clear of this trap.)

In Mennonite John Howard Yoder, Coles finds an extraordinarily humble and flexible form of Christian fundamentalism. Jesus’ teachings, Yoder writes, “deny absolute authority to any other epoch, especially to the present” (*The Priestly Kingdom: Social Ethics as Gospel*, 1984, p. 87). This makes Yoder remarkably open to other non-Christian philosophies, but does not prevent him from supporting excommunication.

The chapter on Jacques Derrida is interesting but, I thought, took him somewhat off track. For example, when Derrida writes of being commanded by the other’s secret gaze, and of being “bound [to the other] by an absolute, unconditioned obligation, by an incomparable, non-negotiable duty” because “the other is totally other” (*The Gift of Death*, 1995, p. 55), this is formulated at an entirely different level from that of political discourse. A gaze is not a statement of belief, and by “non-negotiable duty” surely Derrida does not mean the duty to accept the other’s ideas as correct.

In the chapter “Feminists of Color,” Coles begins by introducing Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.’s *Disuniting America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society* (1993), with which the subject changes from what kind of public arguments are permissible to what kind of cultures are admissible, and from thence to identity politics. In Gloria Anzaldúa’s *Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza* (1987), Coles finds an ethos far more accepting of difference than Schlesinger’s assimilationism. It is worth mentioning, however, that the comparison is not between similar entities: Mestiza is not a country.

Coles promises a number of times that he is going to tell us how his political activism has contributed to his theorizing. For me, it was fairly anticlimactic to learn that by activism he means Saul Alinsky—style organizing. And in this chapter the theme again shifts, this time in an Alinskyite direction. It is no longer a matter of *learning* to listen to marginalized people, but of *teaching* them to listen to each other. And while earlier Coles seemed to argue, with MacIntyre, that honest listeners must be frank about their own beliefs, now, with Alinsky, we learn that the Organizers must set their own beliefs aside and defer to the needs of the organized. “Gated politics,” it turns out, means “the various physical, symbolic, visceral and psychological walls between neighborhoods, people of different races and classes, citizens and foreigners, and so on” (p. 223). The Organizer teaches people how to break through these, unite, and make their power felt at city hall. And yes, it usually is city hall where they end up. At

the beginning of this book, Coles describes the “perfect storm” toward which democracy seems to be heading—“mounting waves of transnational corporate and financial power, myriad fundamentalisms, neofascist megastates, gargantuan media conglomerates, ruthless neocolonial power, bloody state and nonstate terrorism and environmental catastrophe” (p. ix). At the end, we are introduced to a mode of organizing that boasts such successes as getting a school bond issue passed or getting a job training program established. These are laudable goals, but hardly a response to the problem posed. (To his credit, the author does acknowledge this gap.)

Despite these quibbles, I found the book’s main argument compelling. Discourse requires not only good talking but good listening, and for academics, politicians, and other wordmongers, the latter is far harder to do. And we need to take seriously Coles’s disturbing argument that among political theories, liberalism may be one of the worst listeners of all.

Pluralism. By William E. Connolly. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005. 208p. \$69.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Pluralism and Liberal Democracy. By Richard E. Flathman. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005. 232p. \$40.00.

— William A. Galston, *The Brookings Institution*

During the past century, thinkers have explored “pluralism” under at least five different rubrics. *Political* pluralism emerged in Britain, and then migrated to America, as a reaction to doctrines of plenipotentiary state power. William James counterposed *metaphysical* pluralism to philosophies that claimed the ability to comprehend all truth in single, unified doctrines. Isaiah Berlin drew a distinction between monism and *value* pluralism—the thesis that worthy goods and principles are heterogeneous and cannot be combined into a single best way of living, for individuals or communities. James Madison enjoyed a midcentury revival in the theory of *interest group* pluralism. Most recently, John Rawls has cited the *fact* of pluralism—the diversity characteristic of modern societies under circumstances of liberty—as a challenge that legitimate liberal societies must address.

William Connolly and Richard Flathman are two well-known contemporary theorists who have endorsed pluralism, variously understood, as the best basis for both understanding and practicing politics. Their pluralism is more than a Rawlsian “fact”; diversity is to be prized as a positive good, not merely accepted as a (perhaps regrettable) necessity. Connolly is more drawn to what I have called metaphysical pluralism, Flathman to the idea of each individual as singular. Both invoke James in support of the view that the reality of the world exceeds the reach of any single perspective or view (Connolly, p. 71; Flathman, p. 24 and 188–89, n. 8).

This is not to suggest that our authors agree on everything, or even on essentials. Connolly describes himself as a “Deleuzian with a liberal streak” (p. 155), while Gilles Deleuze makes no appearance in Richard Flathman’s book. This makes a difference. Connolly faithfully engages Deleuze’s touchstones, especially Spinoza and Bergson, and appropriates their metaphysical insights on immanence and time for his own purposes. By contrast, Spinoza and Henri Bergson make only cameo appearances (and play no structural role) in Flathman’s book, which addresses traditional themes of moral and political philosophy through analytical exegeses of Hannah Arendt, Stuart Hampshire, and Michael Oakeshott. Not surprisingly, James is the principal point of overlap.

The titles of the two books point to other differences. Connolly characterizes his book as an attempt to consolidate and extend ideas about pluralism that he has been developing over two decades (p. 5). Flathman seeks to contribute to “pluralist and liberal theory” (p. 17) and sees pluralism as both enriching and buttressing the “kind of liberalism” he hopes to defend. Flathman opposes both antiliberal pluralism and weakly pluralist liberalism in the name of a robust liberal pluralism (or pluralist liberalism). Whichever permutation of noun and adjective he might prefer, I doubt that he would be tempted to characterize his liberalism as a “streak.”

One may wonder whether someone who describes his relation to liberalism in Connolly’s terms can adhere to it seriously. (To say that someone has a “wild streak,” after all, is to suggest that wildness is a subordinate and perhaps fugitive element of a character that tends in a different direction overall.) Connolly shares the belief of sober (realistic rather than utopian) liberals that decent social order, national or transnational, is a fragile achievement not to be taken for granted, and he therefore rejects as potentially “disastrous” Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s call for the radical transformation of “Empire” (p. 155). Although he prefers Spinoza’s account of evil to Augustine’s (he calls himself a “neo-Spinozist of sorts” [p. 45]), he is determined to preserve what he calls the “language of evil” to identify the “most horrible and devastating actions taken by some human beings against others” (p. 22). He rejects what he calls “unitarianism” (also known as monism) as the basis of decent politics under modern circumstances: The attempt to impose a single creed, overtly religious or ostensibly secular, on the diverse populace of a territory is bound to spawn evil, in the form of “persecution, forced conversions, refugees, boat people, ethnic cleansing, and worse” (p. 29). On this view, he argues, the most basic problem of political ethics is not how to “get participants to obey a universal moral source that they . . . profess in common” but, rather, how to “negotiate honorable public settlements in settings where interdependent partisans confess different existential faiths and final sources of morality” (pp. 33–34).

Connolly’s goal, or norm, is thus a version of *modus vivendi* in which citizens arrive at common actions on the basis of diverse motives and reasons (p. 9). What makes it “honorable,” I take it, is that no group is compelled to give up its creed in the name of another’s. It is when a group refuses to accept this settlement—resorts to violence although others seek neither to silence nor colonize them—that a political order based on *modus vivendi* can use force in legitimate self-defense.

It is a bit harder to say what makes Connolly’s form of *modus vivendi* politics liberal. As far as I can tell, he does not invoke the idea of individual rights. Indeed, he would seem to have no argument against (and perhaps no objection to) the contention that groups within a liberal order may organize themselves illiberally, so long as they do not prevent or disable dissenting members from leaving. He insists, however, that pluralism is not the same as relativism. While pluralists practice, and celebrate, a form of tolerance, they must also “set limits to tolerance” (p. 42).

Connolly’s main connection with the liberal tradition, however, comes not through endorsing its principles but rather appealing to a specific “sensitivity.” One is or is not a liberal more on the basis of *how* one believes than *what* one believes. Liberals acknowledge that their beliefs, however well supported and deeply held, lack self-evidence for others and resist definitive demonstration. Liberals understand that what seems certain to them, from the inside, inevitably appears contestable from the outside. This acceptance helps nurture a distinctive stance toward difference, one of “forbearance and presumptive generosity” (p. 64). By contrast, beliefs held ungenerously generate what Connolly calls “evil within faith”—the tendency to define one’s faith as “absolutely authoritative for others” and to use violence “until it is professed by everyone” (p. 18).

This distinction invites a further question: What is it about holding belief that supports the sensitivity of generosity or its opposite? Connolly’s answer runs as follows. Each of us is inhabited by an “existential faith” that defines our identity (p. 26). Confrontation with others’ faith can evoke doubts about the adequacy of our own, destabilizing the secure sense of our identity. The ensuing internal disturbance can lead to the demand for “revenge” against the source of the disturbance (p. 27). The best antidote to this spirit of repression is the ability to accept some risk to the stability of one’s own identity (p. 31). Connolly does not quite tell us what makes possible the capacity to accept such a risk. We may speculate that it has something to do with fortitude, or perhaps an inner strength that is secure because it is flexible rather than brittle.

However this may be, the stance of receptive generosity helps define the central civic virtues needed to sustain a pluralist political order, virtues that the pluralist regime may legitimately single out for reinforcement through “education and discipline.” Indeed, Connolly insists, the “expansive pluralism” he endorses “*supports the dissemination of*

general virtues across diverse faiths" (p. 48; his italics). This is a key respect in which pluralism and relativism part company, and it may well involve greater modification of the internal character of many faiths—a more substantial regime-driven homogenization and domestication—than Connolly acknowledges.

It would be an exaggeration to say that this emphasis on pluralist civic virtue marks a divide between Connolly and Flathman, who acknowledges that the pluralist thinkers he investigates (James, Arendt, Hampshire, and Oakeshott) all underscore the importance of certain qualities of character for a viable and worthy pluralist order (p. 180). While the endorsement of "vigorous individualities" is "pluralism at its most inspiring" and should be the "center-piece of liberalism," each individuality must be "tempered" in response to being "situated" among diverse others (p. 185). In Flathman's view, however, this tempering must be undertaken with caution and even reluctance. In particular, there is insufficient reason for liberals to emphasize rationality and deliberation at the expense of the passions, emotions, and diverse sensibilities that define so much of the plurality we actually encounter (pp. 178–79).

Flathman is too good a reader of Oakeshott to reduce liberalism to an ethos, sensibility, or canon of civic virtues. Rules, laws, and institutions matter, all the more so as liberal societies seek to secure the coexistence of individuals and associations with competing purposes. Flathman wrestles with Oakeshott's central distinction between civil and enterprise associations, ultimately concluding that Oakeshott's theory of obligation as "adverbial" (roughly, pertaining to the way we act rather than the end we seek) is incomplete at best (p. 175). Flathman does not say how much this conclusion complicates the basic thrust of Oakeshott's account (quite a bit, in my view). Nor does he go into detail concerning the balance to be struck among institutions, virtues, and sensibilities in sustaining the pluralist liberalism he prizes. Simply contrasting the outlook of pluralist thinkers with liberals who emphasize the role of "mechanical devices and arrangements" (p. 181) hardly settles the matter.

It is striking that neither of these books engages the other major scene of pluralist contestation today—whether Berlinian value pluralism supports, undermines, or is neutral with respect to liberal democracy. But it would be churlish to conclude my review on that note; each helps us understand the complex ways in which the pluralist sensibility opens the path to a richer and more psychologically realistic liberalism.

Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights. By Carol C. Gould. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 288p. \$70.00 cloth, \$24.99 paper.

— John Horton, *Keele University, UK*

In her book, Carol Gould extends the argument she developed in *Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Coop-*

eration in Politics, Economy and Society (1988) by addressing both the problems and potential benefits of increasing global interconnectedness. In particular, she is concerned to explore and, so far as possible, resolve the tensions between human rights and democracy, seeking in the process to reconcile a robust conception of human rights with the recognition of social and cultural diversity.

Those familiar with Gould's earlier work will know that human rights are central to her theory of democracy. As she reprises that argument here, the foundational principle is "freedom as agency or the capacity for choice," which, she claims, "characterizes all human beings" and which in turn gives rise to "an equal and valid claim—that is to say, a *right*—to the conditions of self-development on the part of each human being" (p. 34). Democracy—the "equal right to participate in decision making concerning the common activities in which individuals are engaged" (p. 35)—is one of the rights to which people are entitled. From an exposition of her foundational principle, Gould moves to an exploration of the meaning and applications of democracy in the face of increasing globalization. Beginning with general philosophical and conceptual issues, such as the tensions between justice and democracy and between universalism and cultural relativism, she proceeds to discuss more specific issues: democratic management and the Stakeholder Idea, the democratic potential of the Internet and other computer technologies, and the relationship between terrorism and democracy. Along the way, she explores a multitude of issues that relate to the political tensions associated with human rights. The body in politics, racism and democracy, cultural identity and group rights, women's human rights, the possibility of global democracy, the compatibility of human rights and democracy in a globalized context, and the global democratic deficit and economic human rights—all of these are examples of the varied themes that the author addresses.

Although Gould claims that her book "goes against the grain of much current political theorizing" (p. 5), it would be at least as true to say that her conclusions are broadly in line with a familiar strand of left universalism. Basically, she argues for much greater democratization within the constraints of a robust conception of human rights. The difficult part, of course, lies in showing precisely how this is possible. There is much of interest in the detail of her arguments and in her critical engagements with a vast array of contemporary political theorists; her discussion of global democracy, for instance, is particularly perceptive. She is well versed in current debates, is sensitive to many of the tensions within democratic theory, and is an intelligent and generally fair-minded critic of the ideas of others. Why, then, am I ultimately a little disappointed by the book?

A large part of the answer, I think, lies in Gould's reluctance to face up to some of the really hard questions

and to the challenges they pose to the left liberalism she espouses. So, for instance, although she is well aware of many of the problems with the idea of “needs,” she rather gives the impression of resolving them without actually doing so. The claim that “the identification and interpretation of needs have a socially constructed aspect and also involve a personal ascription of these needs to oneself” (p. 98) is immediately followed by the assertion that we have a need for, among other things, art. But many people can and do live worthwhile lives without art. Why not, say, a need for religion, or the “spiritual,” which is lacking from her list? Or, to give another example: When she claims that a linguistically differentiated cultural minority has a “group right to provide the means for the perpetuation of that linguistic community” but not the right to “insist that all of its members [be] required to be educated only in that language” (p. 124), she simply passes over the hard question of whether the minority culture has a right to insist that all its members be educated in its language as a first language. Or, again, there is little real effort to address the problems posed for her conception of democracy by environmental problems that may have catastrophic consequences for future generations. Surprisingly, her response to the objection that future persons cannot participate in democratic decision making appears to be that we must “narrow the participation requirement to make it more manageable” (p. 226), not to find a better way of including the interests of future generations. Unfortunately, this tendency is at its most marked in the final chapter on terrorism in which some optimistic sentiments about human solidarity are combined with the largely uncomprehending parochialism with which so many Americans seem to view terrorism post 9/11.

Ultimately, although she is not unique in this, I worry that Gould’s political prescriptions float free of any viable conception of political agency. Some might say that this is merely an empirical matter, and not the province of political philosophy. But I am not complaining that she does not offer practical mechanisms for effecting change, only that we need to have some conception of how her theoretical prescriptions could be brought about in a way that both is consistent with her theory and has at least a modicum of empirical plausibility. For instance, given the way a globalized economy works, many of Gould’s proposals for economic democratization require near-universal simultaneous changes in the global market. But we have very little idea of what political agency could bring these about, and probably none at all of how they could be brought about democratically. In fairness, many readers will not be exercised by these concerns to the extent I am. And, as I said earlier, there is indeed much that is worthwhile in the detailed discussion and argumentation.

Indeterminacy and Society. By Russell Hardin. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. 192p. \$39.95 cloth, \$14.95 paper.

— Dan Sabia, *University of South Carolina*

Russell Hardin aims in this wide-ranging text to explain the sources of indeterminacy in social life, its implications for theory, and its consequences for practice. Indeterminacy marks circumstances in which individual and collective actors cannot determine the results or outcomes of their choices, not so much because of lack of power or causal ignorance (which might be remedied) but because the social world characteristically presents them with stochastic and strategic problems, and therefore forces on them stochastic and strategic choices. The two problems are distinct but often related. Stochastic problems arise whenever choice carries with it the possibility of harm; in many social and political contexts, the possibilities and the identities of those harmed may or may not be known, and these factors matter in ways Hardin discusses.

The author emphasizes strategic problems, however, in part because stochastic problems in contexts of collective choice often arise due to possible outcomes that are produced by strategic interactions. Here, individual choosers select strategies to advance their interests, and outcomes depend on what all involved in the interaction choose to do; but what all will choose to do is contingent and cannot usually be known, and so outcomes are unpredictable and strategies indeterminate. Supposing that iterated prisoner’s dilemma “is a good model of much of the life of exchange and cooperation” (p. 6), Hardin argues in Chapter 2 that in fixed number iterated play, rational strategies cannot be theoretically specified. Demanding, as some rational choice theorists do, that there be some determinate rational strategy (such as always-defect on the basis of the well-known backward-induction argument) “is not sensible, which means that there is no best strategy” (p. 21).

Hardin’s central thesis, that indeterminacy is unavoidable and pervasive for these reasons, is correct, and he contends that this is a truth too often ignored or denied. Although the contention is exaggerated, it is not without merit. Since indeterminacy is extensive, our desire for determinate social theories and for social and political mastery should be restrained, but this is a prescription often resisted. Hence, part of Hardin’s effort is spent criticizing those thinkers and schools of thought, in economics, law, and political, social, and moral theory, who have mistakenly developed or defended determinate responses to problems of indeterminacy. Included are game theorists and economists who suppose that choice theory is determinate (e.g., Harsanyi in game theory), theorists who assume that welfare can be cardinalized (e.g., Bentham’s utilitarianism), and theorists who assume that unconditional rules of conduct can be justified (e.g., Kant’s deontological ethics).

The author also discusses thinkers who have dealt with indeterminacy more or less successfully, either by adopting what he terms “pragmatic responses” and “tricks,” or “by making indeterminacy an assumption or conclusion of the analysis, as in Arrow’s theorem” (p. 6). Pragmatic responses are helpful, though limited and possibly misleading; making indeterminacy a fundamental assumption is not misleading but it is often limited. Hobbes’s solution to the problem of social order is exemplary. He justified the necessity of government, primarily, by adopting the principle of mutual advantage *ex ante*, a normative principle championed by Hardin throughout the text. The principle asserts that we should adopt a collective choice or policy when, *ex ante*, it serves the interests of each and all. Hobbes contended that social order, and therefore government, does precisely this. But while this is motivating insofar as we all do share an interest in order, we also have other divergent and conflicting interests, and these may well lead us to disagree about the sort of government we think best. This indeterminacy Hobbes avoids by adopting the “trick” of contending that “we know too little about the effectiveness of various forms of government to be very confident of the superiority (for our own interest) of any one form over any other” (p. 43). He invokes, in other words, the principle of insufficient reason in order to secure the conclusion that, given our indeterminate circumstances, we should accept government—any government.

The principles of mutual advantage and insufficient reason are often employed by Hardin to describe ways of dealing with problems of indeterminacy. Stochastic policy and institutional choices, for example, may serve shared interests, and sometimes, the risks they carry are known in the aggregate but are unknown at the individual level (e.g., vaccination policies, creating a criminal justice system). Then mutual advantage *ex ante* can be motivational and ignorance functional; when individuals know or suspect they will be harmed, institutional and policy proposals are likely to be opposed and may be stymied. On the other hand, many concrete policies are not obviously advantageous to all, and that knowledge may justify pragmatic responses, such as sanctioning the theoretically suspect move of making interpersonal comparisons of utility at the policy level, when doing so secures broad, mutually advantageous, institutional goals.

In the last of the eight chapters in his text, Hardin again observes that institutions, such as a criminal justice system, can often be justified *ex ante* “as mutually advantageous in our expectations (although the choice between alternative institutions [e.g., what kind of criminal justice system] may not be),” and that specific policies often cannot be justified in this manner (p. 125). This leads him to argue for a “two-stage theory” of government, in which institutions and broad policy goals come first, implementation and more concrete decisions second. He thinks this

means that those who administer institutions and implement policies that serve mutual advantage should be compelled to perform their roles and tasks, rather than be granted discretion to serve the larger purposes of the institution (pp. 126–27). More plausibly, it leads him to the related conclusion that if we accept what are always imperfect institutions on the grounds of mutual advantage, we must “to some extent” permit mutual advantage considerations to trump specific considerations of justice (e.g., as accepting a criminal justice system means knowingly allowing some miscarriages of justice) (p. 129). It also leads Hardin to again defend pragmatically accepting the making of interpersonal comparisons of welfare in some policy contexts.

Indeterminacy thus makes of Hardin a consequentialist in moral and social theory, where consequences are, in general, judged in terms of welfare construed ordinarily, rather than cardinally. And it makes him a political institutionalist who believes that indeterminacy is often resolved “mechanically” or pragmatically, as opposed to theoretically. Institutions resolve our collective problems “mechanically” when the principle of mutual advantage leads us to select this or that specific institution, even though that principle is not likely to entail the specific choice made. And institutions may “even impose [determinate] theory on us,” as they do when they force us to accept injustice in a mutually advantageous institution like a criminal justice system, and when they force us to accept interpersonal comparisons of cardinal utility to implement institutional goals (p. 121).

Space considerations require ignoring in this review other arguments and themes canvassed in Hardin’s text, including his mostly appreciative discussion of Coase’s theorem in Chapter 5 and mostly critical assessment of John Rawls in Chapter 7. Overall, I found some of the arguments repetitive and not always well organized, and should note that much of what is on offer here has been presented by Hardin elsewhere, not just in various articles but in his earlier books, particularly *Collective Action* (1982) and *Morality Within the Limits of Reason* (1988). But like those earlier efforts, this text makes worthwhile and provocative contributions to rational choice theory in particular, and to social and political theory more generally.

The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global.

By Virginia Held. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 220p. \$45.

— Joan Cocks, *Mount Holyoke College*

In her latest book, Virginia Held elaborates on themes from previously published articles to explicate and defend the ethics of care. For those unfamiliar with this well-developed tendency of feminist thought, she reviews its evolution from the 1980s writings of Sara Ruddick, Carol Gilligan, and Nel Noddings to the more recent work of theorists including, among many others, Eva Kittay,

Annette Baier, Joan Tronto, and Selma Sevenhuijsen. Held also underlines the differences between the ethics of care and dominant moral and political perspectives, including Kantian universalism, utilitarianism, liberal contract theory, and virtue theory. She proposes that care is, compared with justice, the more basic value, on the grounds that society can exist without the latter but not without the former. She recommends that men and women participate equally in care activities; that care infuse citizen as well as familial relations; and that society beat back the imperializing thrust of the market ethos and the conflict-mongering thrust of the militarized state to improve the well-being of children, the elderly, the sick and disabled, the community, culture, the environment, and deprived regions of the world.

Historically, women have devoted themselves to domestic care work or at least have done most of the nursing, cooking, cleaning, child-rearing, and cultivation of personal relationships on which society relies. Women's care has both nourished men and freed them from the tasks of tending to the immediate needs of others so that at least a few of them could write academic books. Perhaps this is why many modern male moral and political philosophers have been able to ignore the crucial importance of caring relationships to self and society, positing instead the self-sufficient, self-interested, and essentially self-authoring self as the human norm and ideal. In contrast to such delusions, Held embraces a relational rather than individualist notion of the self. The very capacity of the self to survive and thrive, she reminds us, is a function of every human being's dependence—especially but not exclusively in childhood, illness, and old age—on others who care particularly for each one. She affirms the central role of love and empathy in human development (for true care is not simply a matter of mechanical behavior) and valorizes affection for family members, neighbors, friends, and fellow nationals as the glue that creates social bonds without which individuals would wither—although she also dreams of expanding “the multiple ties of care . . . to encompass the whole human community” (p. 166). Held asserts that without the values of loyalty, nurturance, mutuality, and cooperation, no one would identify enough with others to want to uphold the different values of rational detachment, impartial treatment, fairness, and individual rights promoted by the ethics of justice. Hence, the ethics of care is the truest and broadest foundation of moral life, and the ethics of justice secondary and limited.

While *The Ethics of Care* clarifies the evolution and principles of that tradition, many of its chapters circle around similar ideas. This has the effect of making the book seem helpful at the beginning, repetitive in the middle, and a bit tiresome by the end. By condensing her analysis, Held could not only have tightened the book's formal structure but also cleared room to confront one of the thorniest aspects of care work today. This is the grow-

ing trend of female migration from poor countries to rich ones to perform care work for strangers under what are often highly exploitative conditions, while leaving behind children, spouses, and parents for whom they care in the emotional sense of the term and for whom they otherwise would be caring in the practical sense. Especially given her scorn for neoliberal globalization, the author is inexplicably silent on the numerous ways in which the ethics of care goes awry as both the cause and consequence of the contemporary international division of care work.

More problematic than what the book says too much or too little about, however, are certain features of its orientation to the world. Held periodically alludes to the criticisms that have been leveled against the ethics of care: that it reinforces the image of women as nurturers and provides allies of the traditional sexual division of labor with ammunition (Look how important you women are when you stick to *kinder, kirche, and küche!*); that its focus on particularistic relationships directs attention away from oppressive social structures; that it exalts caring above all other values; that it is cloying and smarmy in its wish to turn citizen relations into caring relations; that it is naive to think that “if we only cared more” the world would be harmonious and peaceful. Not all theorists in this tradition are vulnerable to these charges, but Held frequently is. Yet instead of defeating her critics with rigorous counterarguments, she attempts to satisfy them with pious shoulds (“Within caring relations of family and friendship, we should make room for treating others equally and for respecting their rights” [p. 136]) and woulds (“In a society increasingly influenced by feminism and the values of care . . . society would learn to bring up its children so that fewer would sink to violence or insist on pursuing their own individual interests at the expense of others” [p. 153]). She sees liberal individualists as her main foes, but leftists who share her disdain for market hegemony as well as her admiration of solidarity and democratic citizenship are nonetheless still likely to find her book mawkish. In fact, for her emphasis on mother love, social cohesion, social trust, and particularistic loyalties, Held is bound to appeal most to communitarians and religious conservatives, even if they will not be thrilled with her call for greater male participation in care activities, the preservation of a limited place in law for the rhetoric of individual rights, and sustained government efforts to rein in the power of corporations and the military.

Held slides seamlessly back and forth between asserting the centrality of care to society and urging us to embrace caring as our supreme goal and ideal. She thereby elides the possibility of saying yes to the empirical claim but no to the normative one. She also conflates social relations and caring relations in many of her descriptions and prescriptions, as if to be “in relation” is automatically to be in a caring relation, and as if care ought to be what all relationships are most fundamentally about. One might

emphatically agree that people are constituted through their relations to others and propped up by relations of dependence for long chunks of time, without proposing that those relations are always or even usually the milk-and-cookies sort that the author portrays. In turn, caring is crucial, and it can be delightful, but one of the points of growing up is to be able to indulge in connections that offer quite different pleasures. From friends, we might sometimes prefer wit or intellectual stimulation or excitement; from lovers, edginess or mystery or the capacity for great physical passion; from citizens, exhilarating oratory, courage, or the sparks that fly when political positions clash. The wide variety of imaginable and desirable adult-to-adult ties should make us balk at Held's hopes to replace a liberal model of social relations as "contracts between self-interested strangers" with an ethics-of-care model of social life based on "the relation between a mothering person [!] and child" (p. 77). One does not have to be a fan of liberal individualism to find something unappetizing, if not downright creepy, about that!

Political Obligations. By George Klosko. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 276p. \$74.00.

— Joseph R. Reiser, *Colby College*

Do citizens have even a *prima facie* moral obligation to obey the law of a reasonably just state? Most contemporary political theorists think not. George Klosko disagrees with these philosophical anarchists, and in this book he explains why. In the first, longer section, he builds upon his earlier work, *The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation* (1992, new ed. 2004), to produce a new, multi-stranded argument for the existence of a moral obligation to obey the law. In the last four chapters, Klosko examines, empirically, what constitutional courts in three liberal states, and a selection of ordinary people in the United States, have to say about the nature and foundations of political obligations.

In Klosko's view, a successful theory of political obligation must satisfy four conditions. First, it should show that all or nearly all the members of society are obliged to obey its laws (i.e., obligations should be *general*). Second, it should yield obligations that are limited by a more fundamental respect for basic rights. Third, it should demonstrate that governments may validly oblige citizens to support all or nearly all of the wide range of activities normally undertaken by the governments of modern, Western democracies (i.e., obligations should be *comprehensive*). Finally, the successful theory should explain why citizens have obligations specific to one society in particular.

Klosko agrees with the consensus of the literature that consent cannot successfully be invoked to justify the existence of political obligation in any modern state. Few of us have expressly consented to the institutions and laws by which we are governed, and, given the high costs of exit,

tacit consent cannot reasonably be inferred from anyone's refusal to emigrate. Although some more sophisticated consent theories have been developed to answer these, and other, familiar objections, Klosko devotes a chapter to demonstrating, persuasively, why these reformist consent theories too must fail.

The foundation of the work's constructive argument is "the principle of fairness," which holds, according to the pithy formulation Klosko borrows from John Rawls, that "we are not to gain from the cooperative labor of others without doing our fair share" (p. 5, quoting Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 1971, p. 112). It is easy to see that this principle holds when the benefits cooperatively produced can be restricted to those who have contributed to their production. Thus, for example, it would be obviously wrong to take produce from a communal garden one had done nothing to cultivate or otherwise support.

Klosko argues that this principle of fairness can also operate to generate obligations with respect to "non-excludable" public goods, such as clean air and national defense, which will be enjoyed by everyone if they are provided to anyone. The argument for the existence of political obligations grounded upon this principle proceeds in two steps. First, the author shows that some of the public goods now supplied by the modern, Western democracies are necessary for the living of minimally adequate lives and are worth the cost of providing them, which, in his view, establishes the existence of an obligation to contribute to their production. Second, he contends that the relevant obligations are owed to the state by showing that the public goods in question can only be supplied by "traditional states," which he defines as states possessing both an effective monopoly of force within the territory they control and "authority," understood as the power to create valid obligations (pp. 57–58).

Although the argument from fairness justifies political obligations that are general, it cannot justify obligations to support the provision of goods not strictly essential to the living of adequate lives and so fails the test of comprehensiveness. The principle of fairness is not, however, the only moral principle relevant to the establishment of political obligations. Klosko also invokes two further principles, the natural duty of mutual aid and the common good principle. The first is the relatively familiar principle that all persons have a natural duty to contribute to the well-being of others, when the burdens of doing so are relatively light. The second principle is novel; it holds that the shared provision and enjoyment of necessary goods creates a community, and that members of a community thus constituted are obliged to contribute further to the common good of such a community. If successful, the set of arguments derived from these three principles would, as the author demands at the outset, justify obligations that are general, limited, comprehensive, and particular.

The argument of *Political Obligations* is often ingenious, and Klosko is particularly effective at demonstrating the weaknesses in many of the critics' arguments against the existence of moral obligations to obey the law. His effort to integrate empirical evidence about what governments and individuals think about obligation is innovative, but the relationship between opinion and moral justification is less straightforward than he seems to suppose. Consider, for example, his argument from the principle of fairness. The crucial step in that argument is the claim that "non-traditional states" or other entities without authority cannot in fact produce the public goods required for acceptable lives. The discussion on this point is disappointingly brief and rather abstract, although the question of which institutions can supply certain goods is an empirical one. The analysis is abstract because Klosko considers nontraditional states as hypothetical, implicitly assuming that the existing liberal states he uses as a point of reference in fact possess authority. But that is precisely the point denied by the philosophical anarchists he aims to refute.

All states indeed claim to wield authority, as the evidence from their legal systems makes plain. But the focus group data Klosko reports suggest that ordinary people do not wholly share the legal system's perspective. The interviewed subjects repeatedly distinguished between laws they felt bound to obey (laws against rape and murder, for example) and laws they felt free to disregard (laws against speeding). In this respect, the individuals' view of obligation resembles the philosophical anarchists' view, as the author concedes. Nevertheless, the laws are widely obeyed in the modern, Western democracies, and essential public goods by and large provided. In other words, existing states may not be the "traditional states" of Klosko's definition, and the success of such states may not in fact demonstrate the practical necessity of attributing authority to the state.

Whether or not all its arguments ultimately succeed, *Political Obligations* poses sufficiently powerful challenges to the philosophical anarchist position that anyone working on questions about political legitimacy and the authority of law will need to consult it.

A World Beyond Politics? A Defense of the Nation-State. By Pierre Manent. Translated by Marc LePain. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006. \$35.00.

— Peter Augustine Lawler, *Berry College*

Has the world outgrown politics? The conviction that it has, according to the French political philosopher Pierre Manent, is what animates sophisticated European thought today. The self-understandings of the creature, the parent, and, above all, the citizen have increasingly been displaced by that of the individual. And what an individual *is* is determined by the individual, and whatever he or she decides for him- or herself is dignified and deserves our

respect. The idea of dignity is being liberated from any particular human content, from any particular conception of human goodness or morality. That means, among other things, that the idea of human rights has been liberated from any conception of civic or national obligation. So the idea of compulsory national military service is an affront to the individual's dignity, and in the name of human dignity the Europeans increasingly seem even to believe that they can unilaterally become pro-choice on war.

Not only has irksome and hazardous military duty become optional, but so too have the individual's ties to family and church. Religion, to the extent that it exists at all, has been redefined not as the loving duty of a creature to his or her Creator but as a kind of therapy for those still able to be lonely. The understanding of universal freedom of the human individual is increasingly unconditioned by any particular human limitation. European individuals increasingly seek to experience their freedom as liberation from embodiment. The nation-state is a political body, shaped by both a particular piece of territory and some common conception of purpose. It is necessarily particular or parochial, and it is based on the distinction between one's fellow citizens and all human beings. The political community—from the Greek polis to the modern nation-state—has been based on the premise that there are limits to the human powers of knowing and loving. And the individual, of course, seems to be located in a body that shapes and limits his or her possibilities. A man is not free to be a woman, and an individual cannot choose whether or not to be born or die. But to be an individual is to refuse to accept the goodness or permanence of any limits to choice or consent, any barriers to defining one's own identity. The pure autonomy that the individual seeks is possible only if he or she sees nothing good or necessary connected with embodiment.

Individuals, as individuals, are neither male nor female, and now both Europeans and Americans increasingly believe that it is essential to our dignity to say that marriage, in truth, can be between any two individuals, or not defined by either heterosexuality or having children. Manent is to be praised for his manly and nuanced combination of a defense of gay rights and opposition to same-sex marriage as fatally destructive of an indispensable social institution. But nobody today really believes European individuals are going to listen to him.

For them, marriage is whatever two or more individuals define it to be, and so they can choose to liberate their union altogether from reproduction or even bodily passions. We must free the individual from all dogmas about natural limits to human powers. For that reason, individuals welcome the separation of sex from reproduction that began with the contraceptive revolution and that is on the way to being perfected by biotechnology. If the biotechnological promise, in effect, to transform

reproduction into manufacturing becomes real, then human sexuality can be freed from the passionate deformation that comes by connecting it with birth and death, and women—liberated from every feature of the necessity of childbearing—can finally become individuals identical to men.

Amazing is the extent to which Europeans use contraception to exercise real control over their bodies. They have shown that they have won a great victory over nature by being able freely to enjoy one another's bodies without being stuck with producing more bodies. But surely, European individuals delude themselves if they believe that they have freed themselves from the necessity of having babies; their birth dearth, as Manent explains, is just beginning to have devastating social and political consequences. Individuals experience themselves as so liberated from love for their families and countries that they do not do what is required to provide for their futures. For the isolated individual, the whole universe disappears with one's own biological demise. What individuals really do is detach sex from the various social forms of human love; their denial of the body, ironically, reduces what people do to the mechanical motion of two (or more or less) bodies.

Manent also shows us that the liberation of the sovereign, dignified individual from all allegedly oppressive social or political ties is, at best, ambiguous progress for those genuinely concerned with the future of democracy. Democracy, individuals believe, is good only insofar as it protects their individual rights or autonomy, and one of their rights is freedom from the constraints of political life. From this view, the overcoming of the idea of national sovereignty—the deconstruction of the nation-state—is Europe's victory over the final obstacle to the free flourishing of a democracy composed of equally sovereign individuals.

Democracy, however, is also self-government of a particular people; that requires, of course, the effective participation of active citizens in a common political life. And from this view, the replacement of the nation with the European Union is a movement from democratic political life to dominance by an oligarchic, bureaucratic machine imposing meddlesome policies alien to the lives of the particular peoples that compose that union. The real promise of Europe is to indefinitely increase the individual's opportunities by depriving the individual, for his or her own good, of the power that comes from democratic citizenship. The inability of Europe to define itself as a political community—to limit and direct itself both with a particular extent of territory and a common conception of moral purpose—is really its participation in the individual's quest to liberate himself (or, better, itself) from “the sad necessity of having a body” (p. 68).

This postpolitical tendency, Manent adds, is becoming universal. One piece of evidence seen, of course, in our country, is the global transfer of power from democratic legislatures to relatively unaccountable judiciaries. Courts

throughout the world are increasingly less concerned with local laws, customs, and traditions in rendering judgments. Instead, they attempt to rule directly with universal human rights—the rights of individuals—in mind. They attempt to grasp those rights without any political mediation, or freed from the constraints of national constitutions or accepted views of the limits and direction human beings are given by nature or society. If nothing else, Manent should alert Americans to the stakes really involved in resisting the judicial activism of our time.

Manent's book, as a whole, is a profound reflection on Alexis de Tocqueville's observation that democracy, without artful direction, moves in the direction of individualism, or a world full of apathetic, contentless human lives guided by the mistaken judgment that love and its attendant obligations are more trouble than they are worth. Not only is the book informed by the whole tradition of political philosophy and a firm grasp of European history, but its author is also distinguished by his accurate and amusing attention to the features that distinguish contemporary culture from all its predecessors. Manent may be the best student of political philosophy alive, and this is probably his most penetrating, wonderful, and accessible book. *A World Beyond Politics?* certainly deserves to be the most influential political analysis written in this century so far.

Manliness. By Harvey C. Mansfield. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006. 304p. \$27.50.

— Anne Norton, *University of Pennsylvania*

Harvey Mansfield gives the book to us, in the first instance, as a response to feminism. Feminism, he argues, has sought to erase all differences between the genders, a project which must ultimately fail, for those differences are founded in nature. Feminism has succeeded, however, in diminishing the value and suppressing the practice of the virtue of manliness. The author sets himself the task of restoring that virtue.

Mansfield's contentious relation with feminists and feminism is known well beyond the academy. For many years, he has been a veritable Parsifal of manliness, searching for the spear that would heal and complete the wounded men of his time. One might expect the book to be familiar and so, in the first instance, it is. Nevertheless, there are some surprises here. Not least of these is the author's considered judgment of the use and worth of manliness.

Mansfield's conservative colleagues may be surprised to see how many examples of manliness are drawn from popular culture and how closely his method parallels their conception of postmodernism. Looking for manliness? Look at Tarzan. Look at John Wayne, Clint Eastwood, Gary Cooper, Humphrey Bogart, Ted Nugent, Jesse Ventura. Mansfield appears to have taken the signifier for the signified, the simulation for the Real Thing.

Readers of the *Iliad* will be surprised to see an account of Achilles nearly as bowdlerized as Hollywood's *Troy*: Agamemnon steals Achilles' "girlfriend" (p. 61). They should also be surprised to see Achilles cited as the apex of manliness. Achilles, after all, is not quite a man at all, being half divine on his mother's side, and brought up by a teacher who (though very wise) was a bit of a horse's ass.

Is Achilles manly? Achilles is certainly a fabulous performance of the masculine—and the feminine. So beautiful that he was dressed as a girl, Achilles has all the passionate, possessive sexuality that Nietzsche saw in women. He is unrestrained, he is impulsive, he wants attention, he runs to mama. He rants, he whines, he sulks in his tent. Achilles is a man, a lovely man, beautiful and beloved, but he is not manly. Hector is manly. Hector does not seek out war, but he takes on the burdens of war when the mistakes of others bring war on his city. Hector is responsible: for his family, his soldiers, his people. He is called to "endure the hard work of fighting without respite" with no expectation of divine aid (*Iliad* Book 13:3). He is respected by his enemies. Yet his is not the manliness Mansfield calls us to admire.

Mansfield writes that "the manly man struts and boasts" (p. 50), and he cites, in defense of this surprising assertion, a surprising source, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, in "The Negro Family": "The very essence of the male animal, from the bantam rooster to the four-star general, is to strut" (251, n.1; U.S. Department of Labor, March 1965, ch. 3). They should have watched those John Wayne movies more carefully, those professors. Cowards, villains, and the callow young are the ones who strut and boast.

Perhaps this is one of Mansfield's provocations, to be filed with the section in praise of imperialism. In each case, race and empire, Mansfield turns to an exceptionally rich field of inquiry but restricts it to accord with the political correctness of the Right. One might look at the examination of the link between manliness and violence drawn with such force by Richard Wright. One might ask why manliness shows itself so vividly among African Americans and the working class; why white slaveholders, colonists, and the wealthy are so often depicted as effeminate. One could also read the material more thoroughly. Kipling's "Ballad of East and West" does indeed make manliness the moment of equality between the imperial power and the subaltern, but it does far more. Kipling shows the sacrifice of sons in a patriarchy, the erotics of colonial dominion and military camaraderie, and the constrained strategies of the subaltern.

The back of Mansfield's book mentions "the courageous police and firemen in New York City on September 11, 2001." (I could not find them in the text, but I may have managed to miss the passage somehow.) That is manliness, but it is incomplete. Police and firemen display that courage every day. There is nothing particular to 9/11 about it: It is the ordinary pattern of their lives. We should

praise them for that, men for their manliness, the women for their courage and their devotion to duty. Perhaps the men would rather be praised in that way. They are all likely to shrug off such praise.

I think Mansfield knows this. He knows some of the same men I know, though I was sorry to see no allusion to their courage, their steadfastness, their manliness. These professors, growing old now, fought in Europe and the deserts of North Africa, led their men in the invasion of Italy, flew fighter planes in the Pacific, fought for Jerusalem in the '48 War, and never spoke much of it. Why talk about John Wayne and Ted Nugent, when you know men like these? They remind me of my father, a veteran of three wars, who commanded ships and holds infants with a more than maternal gentleness. They remind me of Hector, who removed the shining helmet that frightened Astyanax (*Iliad* Book 6:467–79).

One might suspect that Mansfield's reticence was occasioned by a sense of the modesty of these, his exemplary colleagues, or the men (if not the women) whose vocation is not strutting or boasting or Achillean self-assertion, but to serve and protect. I think, however, that it is instead a consequence of the argument. Mansfield's admiration for manliness is more limited (and his conception of manliness more utilitarian) than the title of the work—or the initial chapters—might suggest. The portrait of manliness as aggressive, competitive, and boastful prepares the way for a subordination of manliness to higher virtues, and the manly to higher beings.

As he turns, in the later chapters of the work, to Plato and Aristotle, the author gives manliness, as he sees it, a subtle treatment and less elevated place. Manliness is an effect of the governance of certain natural and "brutish" capacities: "As the dog defends its master, so the doggish part of the human soul defends the human ends higher than itself. In this defense the paradox is that the lower defends the higher and thus asserts the value of the higher" (p. 206). A constrained and cultivated *thumos* [spiritedness] becomes courage and a principled self-assertion. The manly man is to be governed by the less manly, but more philosophic, man—or woman.

Mansfield's return to an indifference to gender and his subordination of manliness to higher virtues would be more welcome if it were less connected to the production of social hierarchies, less likely to reduce service to the commons to contemptible womanliness. Manliness becomes the virtue of cannon fodder. The conviction that it is natural, right, and just that the "lower defends the higher and thus asserts the value of the higher" falters before the example of Hector. In epics, in history, in quotidian experience, we have all seen the higher prove its value in defense of the lower.

One might wonder if the study of manliness is a task to which the author—or any (at least any straight) man—is well suited. I have a high regard for the abilities of Harvey

Mansfield. He is, among other things, an eminent and admirable scholar of Machiavelli. He should not need me to remind him of Machiavelli's precept that the people, not princes, know princely rule best.

When Homer sought to describe the character of Achilles, he turned to the feminine: "Sing goddess, of the anger of Peleus's son Achilles/ and its devastation, which put pains thousandfold upon the Achaians,/ hurled in their multitudes to the house of Hades strong souls of heroes, but gave their bodies to be the delicate feasting of dogs." We have seen many men, some no doubt with the strong souls of heroes, hurled to Hades. We have seen other men given to dogs. If one thinks of these things, it is difficult to regard a manliness of strutting, boasting, and self-assertion without shame.

Beyond the First Amendment: The Politics of Free Speech and Pluralism. By Samuel P. Nelson. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005. 240p. \$50.00.

— Charles R. Epp, *University of Kansas*

In this ambitious and fertile book, Samuel Nelson proposes to reconceptualize the theory of freedom of speech independently of American constitutional law. The effort offers insights into the limitations of constitutionally founded free speech theories and an intriguing proposed alternative, which Nelson dubs the "pluralist" framework. His framework seems especially suited for honoring justifications for freedom of speech other than the search for truth or democratic debate and for addressing restrictions on speech by authorities other than government (e.g., private employers).

Roughly the first half of the book seeks to reject standard justifications for freedom of speech, each of which, Nelson argues, is limited by the First Amendment framework and therefore protects only certain types of speech. Chapter 2 focuses on "libertarian" theories, the author's term for the dominant approach in First Amendment law (perhaps better called "progressive" after their origins in the Progressive Era and American pragmatism), which justify freedom of speech for its service to democratic deliberation and advancement of truth in the marketplace of ideas. He argues that libertarian theories are well suited for analyzing governmental threats to political speech, but distort some types of speech, particularly in the arts, by forcing them into the category of "political" speech, and generally do not adequately address nongovernmental threats to speech, "market failure" in the marketplace of ideas, and the possibility that some speech ultimately may undermine democracy itself.

"Expressivism" (Chapter 3) justifies freedom of speech as a good in itself (not, as the progressives would have it, in service to public deliberation) that is essential to individual creative self-expression and self-realization. Nelson argues that existing expressivist theories are well suited

for defending artistic and religious speech but fail to explain why speech as a form of self-expression should be protected when other forms (e.g., religious practices) may be regulated. Expressivist theories, he argues, also fail to adjudicate between the value of self-expression and other goods that may be harmed by such expression. He proposes revising expressivist approaches by identifying speech as an act of the human individual essential to the pursuit of freedom.

Egalitarian theories, the subject of Chapter 4, justify freedom of speech on the basis of the value of equality of either status or respect. Theorists favoring equality of status, Nelson argues, ignore the problem of private restrictions on speech and would extend protection to much hate speech, views that he describes as problematic. Theorists favoring equality of respect, he argues, provide no original defense of freedom of speech (and, indeed, they probably were not aiming to provide such a justification) but, rather, focus on justifying a hate speech exception to freedom of speech. Neither line of theory, in Nelson's view, offers a compelling comprehensive justification for freedom of speech.

Having identified various limitations of prominent theories of freedom of speech, the author devotes the second half of the book to his alternative pluralist framework. In the tradition of John Austin (*How to Do Things with Words* [1962]), Nelson defines speech as an act that is meaningful only within the context of shared conventions and of recognition by hearers. In context (of the "intent" of the speaker and recognition by the audience), we may categorize a number of types of speech acts (some are political, some artistic, some religious, and so on) and, it turns out, Nelson believes that accurately categorizing particular speech acts is crucial for assessing the extent to which they should be free of restriction. As different speech acts serve different purposes and pose different sorts of challenges to competing values, his framework "seeks to identify the type of speech act an event represents" (p. 146) and then seeks to balance the value of that act against competing social values. Thus, an act is art if its local observers see it as art; it is a political speech if its immediate hearers perceive it as such; it is a provocative slap if its immediate hearers perceive it that way. Whether or to what extent particular speech acts should be protected, Nelson seems to suggest, depends on a case-by-case assessment of the benefits and harms of the speech.

Although the author often suggests that his framework offers to protect speech more broadly than do dominant theories, I am left wondering whether its protections ultimately would be less vigorous. Although the framework would protect some speech from private regulation, it also appears to be conservative in its orientation: Speech acts are more easily defensible within the framework if they fit comfortably within established and relatively localized conventions. Speakers seeking to defend their right

to speak “may often have to do more than simply prove that a speech act was performed” (p. 154) because, in his framework, much depends on how it is perceived. For Nelson, whether a particular act that is clearly intended as a communication even qualifies as “speech,” and, if it qualifies as speech, whether it deserves protection, depends on the “reaction” of listeners and the act’s “effects” (p. 154). Thus, he suggests, flag burning (at least near a veterans’ parade) should not be a form of protected speech because many veterans perceive it not as speech but as a virtual slap in the face; whether an instance of guerilla street theater should be protected depends on whether it communicates a comprehensible message to bystanders (pp. 154–56). Although Nelson at one point celebrates speech as crucial to individual creative development, it becomes clear that under his framework any speech act that challenges observers by crossing or playing with conventional boundaries appears to be on shaky ground. With conventions so privileged, I suspect that in any applications of the framework to particular cases, the relative political power of the groups in question and, more fundamentally, the conventionality of their claims would play a significant role in fixing the identity of disputed speech acts (are they art? political satire? and so on) and their level of protection.

Beyond the First Amendment is a provocative, well-written effort in normative legal theory. It suggests the rich possibilities available to political theorists of freedom of speech if they found their thinking in the traditions of political theory rather than in constitutional law.

Machiavelli’s Liberal Republican Legacy. Edited by Paul A. Rahe. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 388p. \$75.00.

— John Langton, *Westminster College*

This collection of original essays by a distinguished team of political theorists and historians may well be, as John McCormick proclaims on the book’s dust jacket, “the best and most accessible source for the ‘Straussian’ perspective on Machiavelli’s influence over modern political thought.” But unfortunately, no explicit effort is made in *Machiavelli’s Liberal Republican Legacy* (hereafter *MLRL*) to review the fundamental principles of Leo Strauss’s hermeneutical strategy or even his basic “thoughts on Machiavelli.” Indeed, Strauss’s name is only mentioned once (p. lvi) in passing in the text, and his perspective, while it fundamentally guides the plot of the book, is so muted, so submerged, so “esoteric” that one needs to be something of a Straussian to detect it.

For this reason, I would strongly encourage even scholars who have read some Strauss to reread his discussion of Machiavelli in *What Is Political Philosophy?* (1959) and in the “Introduction” to his *Thoughts on Machiavelli* (1958) before plunging into this volume. In about 15 pages in these two pieces, Strauss outlines, as I see it, the three

major themes or paradigmatic arguments that the contributors to *MLRL* seek to defend, develop, and extend, while refuting the “highly misleading” (p. xxi) rival interpretations of Machiavelli and his legacy advanced by John Pocock, Quentin Skinner, and the other proponents of the Cambridge School’s more historically oriented or “historical” approach to the study of political thought and discourse.

To help make the Straussian perspective in *MLRL* more transparent, I wish to describe these three themes briefly and indicate where each is worked out in the book. First, in contrast to John Pocock’s claim that there is “an essential continuity in republican thought, stretching from Aristotle to Machiavelli” (p. xx), *MLRL* contends, closely following Strauss, that Machiavelli founded modern political philosophy when he initiated a “sharp break” with and “repudiation of the classical tradition” (pp. xxxiv–xxxv), that he was a “teacher of evil” (pp. 95, xlii–xliii), that he advocated a “rapacious” Roman republicanism (pp. xxii, lix) and believed he had discovered how to recreate an imperialistic republic that could master the world the way Rome did (p. lxii). This paradigmatic argument runs throughout, but it is primarily explicated in the book’s “Introduction” (Paul A. Rahe) and “Prologue” (Markus Fischer).

Second, in contrast to the Cambridge School’s contention that there is an essential continuity between Machiavelli’s republicanism and that which evolved in England and France between 1650 and 1748, *MLRL* maintains with Strauss that Machiavelli’s aggressive, militaristic, morally unrestrained republicanism (p. xxii) was toned down, “mitigated” (pp. xxiii, xxvi), and eventually transformed into a more successful liberal republican ideology, as it was adapted to bourgeois rights and values by Hobbes, Locke, Sidney, and a host of other thinkers (pp. xxiii–xxvii). This theme is developed and elaborated in chapters that explore the acceptance, rejection, and modification of Machiavelli’s ideas by Marchamont Nedham and Harrington (Rahe), Locke (Margaret Michelle Barnes Smith), Sidney and “Cato” (Vickie B. Sullivan), Hume (John W. Danford), and Montesquieu (Paul Carrese).

Third, in contrast to Pocock’s famous claim that the founding of the United States represents a “Machiavellian moment,” *MLRL* argues, as Strauss does, that while the American founders embraced “on occasion the devices of Machiavellian statecraft,” their “prime concern” with “justice” meant that their “use of Machiavelli was circumscribed and constrained,” that “they adopted his means only when they deemed it unavoidable” (pp. xxvii–xxviii). This theme is explored in essays on Franklin (Steven Forde), Washington (Matthew Spalding), Adams (C. Bradley Thompson), Jefferson (Rahe), Madison (Gary Rosen), and Hamilton (Karl-Friedrich Walling).

Given the recent advocacy by so many prominent Straussians of such Machiavellian policies as expansionary

internationalism, full-spectrum dominance, and preventative war, I cannot resist noting here that *MLRL* ends with this remarkable observation by Walling (p. 278): “When it comes to waging war and remaining free at the same time, the American republican empire has been both more successful and more deserving of success than any other nation in history. The chief credit for this remarkable accomplishment belongs to Alexander Hamilton.”

Although I am not a Straussian and, in fact, approach the study of political theory from an evolutionary, naturalistic, and leftist perspective, I found all of the essays in *MLRL* to be meticulously researched, worth reading, and in some cases particularly informative and provocative. But let me conclude by pointing out some significant weaknesses or limitations in this generally impressive volume. First, the term *liberal republican* is never formally defined, and nowhere is any attempt made to specify operationally the cluster of beliefs a thinker must embrace to be classified as a liberal republican. Even more crucially, the title of this book clearly implies that Machiavelli’s writings contain a legacy of liberal republicanism that was bequeathed to posterity as an intellectual inheritance. But everything in this book indicates that this suggestion is highly misleading. Machiavelli endorsed the “freedom of the ancients” (p. xlvi), but, as Barnes Smith observes (p. 49), he had no conception of modern, liberal freedom, of individual rights to life, liberty, and property. And while there are some bourgeois elements in Machiavelli’s view of human nature, society, and the good life (pp. 19–20), Sullivan (p. 86) suggests that it was probably Algernon Sidney who first systematically “reconciled” Machiavellian republicanism and modern liberalism and created an actual legacy of liberal republicanism. Finally, I might note that *MLRL*, like the Straussian paradigm in general, does not provide a comprehensive, compelling theory of the process of belief selection that produces the evolution, the change and continuity, in a tradition of thinking over time. We are told that the American founders essentially repudiated Machiavelli’s *realpolitik*. But why? The answer cannot simply be that they all just decided to reject his evil teachings in favor of freedom and justice. This overly rationalistic response simply ignores how culture and political context shape the acceptance and rejection, the modification and adaptation, of beliefs by whole groups of thinkers, such as the American founders.

Despite these reservations, I would strongly recommend this volume to all scholars who are interested in Machiavelli’s influence on the evolution of that peculiar species of liberal republicanism that continues to survive and thrive in the United States. This is not just a book by Straussians for Straussians, but reading some Strauss certainly makes it better and more accessible.

The Concept of Constituency: Political Representation, Democratic Legitimacy, and Institutional Design. By Andrew Rehfeld. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 280p. \$75.00.

— Suzanne Dovi, *University of Arizona*

Most democratic theorists do not spend much time defining, let alone discussing, the concept of constituency. They assume that what is crucial to democratic institutions is the manner in which votes are distributed (equally and justly), not how democratic institutions define and draw electoral constituencies. Andrew Rehfeld’s insightful and important book challenges these assumptions. For Rehfeld, democratic theorists need to think about constituency because constituencies are “the quintessential institution of official exclusion”: How democratic institutions define constituencies determines whose interests are catered to and whose interests are ignored.

Rehfeld also takes a provocative position on how constituencies ought to be determined in democracies. He argues that democratic institutions should not necessarily arrange citizens’ political lives around where they live. For the author, territory-based constituencies—what he calls “territorial constituencies”—hold significant practical and normative costs for democratic institutions. For instance, he holds that territorial constituencies have contributed to the explosion of public policy “pork.” He does not see “local pork” as an inevitable feature of democratic politics, or even as a political device used to facilitate political compromise. Rather, territorial constituencies “skew” legislative decisions toward merely local interests, and away from the public good.

The main purpose of this book, though, is to initiate a public debate about how constituencies are drawn in contemporary democracies. Democratic citizens should not simply draw their constituencies according to what is presumed “given” or “natural”; rather, they need to consent consciously to the organization of constituencies.

The Concept of Constituency is organized into three parts. The first, and analytical, part provides an extensive discussion of the meaning of constituency and identifies 10 different normative justifications for territorial constituencies. The second part is historical: It explores how and why electoral constituencies in the United States came to be based on where citizens live. The third part is normative and offers three arguments. The first argument contends that territorial constituencies are ill-suited for large nation-states. The second proceeds by sketching “a default position” that should be used in assessing existing ways of arranging constituencies. On this default position, constituencies should be permanent; each constituency should in composition resemble the nation as a whole; and individuals should not decide the composition of constituencies. Electoral constituencies that do not correspond to this default position violate the legitimacy of democratic

institutions and therefore require additional justification. The third argument provides a thought experiment as a heuristic device for exploring alternatives to territorial constituencies. In this thought experiment, every citizen is randomly assigned to a single-member electoral constituency for life. In particular, the author argues that each constituency should “look like the nation they collectively represent” and “in no way be based on where a person lived” (p. 210).

This is a rich and provocative book. For instance, it raises the issue of whether the United States should “count” House members’ votes in proportion to the size of their constituencies or whether U.S. citizens should be allowed to group themselves by selecting which features of their identities they would like as the basis of their constituencies (voluntary constituencies). Rehfeld raises another interesting issue when, in the course of discussing the need to differentiate authorization and accountability, he considers whether democratic citizens should be given two votes—one to signal their assessment of their representative’s past performance and another to signal which representative they endorse for a particular election. These are just some examples of the many interesting ideas explored in the book.

Some of Rehfeld’s arguments are, by his own admission, speculative. In particular, his arguments assume, without sufficient evidence, that his policy proposals are tenable, that they would have certain effects, and that those effects would be desirable. This makes the arguments difficult to assess. For instance, it is unclear whether one could in fact design random constituencies that would “resemble the nation as a whole” without taking into account where any particular constituent lived. Rehfeld’s argument is also predicated on the assumption that constituencies organized differently, for example, around work or religion, would produce entirely different interests, such as vocational and theological interests, respectively. It is uncertain, though, whether the elimination of territorial constituencies would, in fact, significantly diminish local pork. Nor is it clear that a particular community subjected to illegal dumping of hazardous waste could gain enough political clout to fight these violations effectively, when its voice is “randomly” distributed, and so diluted, across the national constituencies. With territorial constituencies, a representative of such a community who possesses sufficient political clout could trade his or her vote to secure the required enforcement of the relevant environmental regulation. (As far as I can tell, it is an open question whether Rehfeld would, or would have to, consider this as an instance of local pork). In short, it is not clear whether we should, with the author, assume that eliminating all the leverage that territorial constituencies provide would be an unqualified good. Assessing these assumptions would require amassing empirical evidence that we do not currently have.

That said, what is most impressive about the book is that it succeeds in opening up a new and important area of inquiry, one that underlies and informs existing theoretical discussions of political representation. Rehfeld often flags explicitly that his arguments are meant to be suggestive. The suggestive character of this book ought to be kept in mind, especially by those readers who want to keep constituencies territorial. In particular, his arguments are unlikely to persuade those who are skeptical of relying on technologies, like the Internet, to safeguard democratic practices or who favor democratic practices that require citizens to have face-to-face meetings. Indeed, his rejection of territorial constituencies might anger some oppressed groups whose identities are inextricably tied to certain locations, for example, Native Americans whose religious practices are tied to sacred lands. Rehfeld’s willingness to accept a House that would be 100 percent Republican or 100 percent Democratic might also strike some as antideliberative and even dangerous. Such objections, though, do not touch the main point of the book—namely, that democratic citizens need to rethink their blind attachment to territorial constituencies and to deliberate about and consent to the design of their constituencies.

In conclusion, *The Concept of Constituency* is a thought-provoking and insightful book that is a must read for anyone interested in political representation, democratic legitimacy, and institutional design. In particular, Rehfeld’s discussion of the concept of constituency challenges the institutional reforms posed by theorists of group representation. For this author, the current emphasis on being present in legislatures is misplaced. Institutional reforms, like gerrymandering electoral districts, gender quotas, and even proportional representation, will fail unless theorists of group representation change how democracies organize constituencies. More importantly, Rehfeld’s “default position” provides a normative argument against contemporary redistricting efforts in the United States. Following his thinking, redistricting should not be left to individuals and therefore not to members of state legislatures. The failure of democratic theorists to address how democracies ought to organize their electoral constituencies allows “the quintessential institution of official exclusion” to persist.

Democracy Past and Future. By Pierre Rosanvallon. Edited by Samuel Moyn. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. 312p. \$40.00.

— Aurelian Craiutu, *Indiana University*

One of France’s leading political theorists and historians, Pierre Rosanvallon played a key role in what came to be known as the Second Left, and has spent most of his distinguished academic career rethinking the history of democracy in France. Under the guidance of Claude Lefort

and François Furet, Rosanvallon learned to transcend intellectual fashions, reviving interest in a study of “the political” that moves beyond the mere functioning of politics.

Edited by Samuel Moyn, this book brings together most of Rosanvallon’s important essays on the historical evolution of democracy in France. It ends with a postscript written specially for this collection, in which the author discusses the mixed political regime of the moderns and analyzes the main elements of what he calls “indirect democracy.” The selected essays cover five major topics: the study of politics in history, democracy and the drive to unity, political rationalism in France, civil society, and the future of democracy. The topics of these essays are judiciously chosen to reflect both the diversity and unity of his work. The English reader would have benefited from the inclusion of another significant text of Rosanvallon on the history of the idea of democracy, a good example of both conceptual history and political theory at their best (an English version of this text was originally published in the *Journal of Democracy* in 1995).

Democracy Past and Future will appeal to a wide audience of political theorists interested in the future of democracy and liberalism, and will be of special interest to scholars of representative government and modern French thought. Through its own brand of progressive politics, this book can speak to those on the Left who seek new possibilities for expanding the empire of democracy in the modern world. But some of Rosanvallon’s ideas can also appeal to those on the Right who, concerned with the attrition of the political in modern society, search for an alternative to the predominantly legalistic and normative approach pioneered by John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, and their disciples.

The first two methodological essays in this collection shed fresh light on Rosanvallon’s approach. His aim is to write a new history of the political, defined simultaneously as a *field* and an always contentious *project* (or process), through which the explicit or implicit rules of a particular community are elaborated. As a field, the political designates “the site where the multiple threads of the lives of men and women come together” (p. 34). Yet this definition risks conflating the political and the social, while insisting on the interdependence among the economic, social, political, and cultural spheres. Preferring to refer to “the political” rather than to politics, the author claims that in a democratic society, the political is an essentially open and uncertain field, whose indeterminacy reminds us of democracy’s equivocations and tensions.

Inspired by nineteenth-century historians such as François Guizot and Edgar Quinet, Rosanvallon has an ambitious goal: the writing of a “global” or comprehensive history that links political reflection on the present to the comprehension of the past. Rosanvallon believes that in order to give depth to political analysis, attention to contemporary problems can (and should) never be dissociated from the investigation of their historical origins.

This belief underlies his investigation of rationalism as the cornerstone of democracy in France (pp. 117–43) and the complex relationship among market, democracy, and civil society (pp. 147–86). The author rethinks democracy by following the thread of its history as it has been spun. In other words, the main goal of the history of the political is to follow the trials and errors, the conflicts and controversies through which individuals sought to improve their condition and justify the legitimacy of the institutions under which they lived.

Rosanvallon’s history of the political draws on various resources from social history, political sociology, political theory, and intellectual history. His focus on France and the legacy of the French Revolution ought to be seen as “a point of entry into the general problematic of democracy rather than a treatment of a nation as an end in itself” (p. 245). In “Political Rationalism and Democracy in France” (pp. 127–43), he shows how the history of democracy in France, with all its equivocations, was marked from the outset by the limits of democratic voluntarism and political rationalism. Few cases illustrate better the original path of French liberalism than the career and writings of Guizot, the subject of Rosanvallon’s important book *Le Moment Guizot* (1985).

How does Rosanvallon’s project compare with those of other contemporary political theorists, such as Rawls, Habermas, Michel Foucault, Leo Strauss, and Quentin Skinner? If, for Rawls, political theory is a means to formalize reality, Rosanvallon’s historical approach respects the complexity and antinomies of political reality, rather than hoping to eliminate them through an imposition of normativity. In his view, Foucault remained “prisoner of an excessively narrow approach to the phenomena of power” (p. 75) and determination. Contrary to what Foucault believed, not only is the political field organized by determined forces, but it is also the territory of open and unpredictable experimentation and exploration. Furthermore, contrary to the classical history of ideas, Rosanvallon’s history of the political does not limit itself to a commentary upon the great texts. Drawing inspiration from the history of mentalities, it takes into account other important sources, such as the press, public opinion, parliamentary speeches, and so forth. Ideas, mentalities, institutions, and events are studied together in an effort to shed light on the “historical nodes around which new political and social rationalities organize themselves and representations of public life undergo change” (p. 62). At the same time, his approach differs from that of the Cambridge School insofar as his philosophical history of the political refrains from dismissing all arguments about the timelessness of philosophical quandaries.

In spite of Rosanvallon’s claim that his project amounts to writing a “philosophical” history of the political, philosophy does not seem to loom large on his agenda. His analysis of modernity significantly differs from that of

Pierre Manent, whose sources of inspiration are Tocqueville, Montesquieu, and Strauss. Furthermore, one might be surprised by the absence of any substantive references to Raymond Aron. This oversight might be explained by the fact that Aron espoused a different view of the political that drew a clearer dividing line between the political and the social; moreover, he did not go as far as Rosanvallon to stress the openness and indeterminacy of the political. It should not be forgotten that Aron was a critic of the 1968 revolutionary moment whose ideas exercised an important influence on Rosanvallon and Lefort.

It is refreshing that Rosanvallon's history of the political offers no recipe that can be mechanically applied, and that he conceives academic life in such a way that it becomes an integral part of the civic experience broadly defined. The contemporary ramifications of his philosophical his-

tory of the political center around the notion of "indirect democracy" (p. 244) and seek to repoliticize democracy by securing "powerful new arms for the critique of democracy" (p. 249). A committed observer, he seeks "to heal the division between political theory and political history, so as to arrive at a point at which the two enterprises fuse" (p. 67). Through his own historical forays, he offers "instruments of understanding and tools for practical involvement" (p. 71) that suggest the possibility of a new relation between erudition and civic involvement, between intellectual labor and political life. Rosanvallon's work amounts to an elegant invitation to rediscover the virtues of a historically minded political theory that pays respectful attention to the past and follows attentively the contours of reality.

AMERICAN POLITICS

Congress, the Press, and Political Accountability.

By R. Douglas Arnold. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 296p. \$52.50 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

— Brian F. Schaffner, *American University*

The relationship between members of Congress and local media outlets has long been understudied by political scientists. This failure to fully explore one of the critical links between citizens and their representatives has left us with an incomplete understanding of how, or even whether, the local news media facilitate representation and accountability. R. Douglas Arnold's new book takes a significant step toward addressing this gap with an ambitious and rich study of the local news media's role in providing (or not providing) the information necessary for citizens to hold their elected officials accountable. While Arnold notes that citizens may receive information about their House members from various sources, he argues that local newspapers are unique among these information providers because, ideally, they act as independent monitors as well as forums for the airing of diverse opinions. Ultimately, however, he finds that many newspapers fall far short of this ideal by failing to produce adequate congressional coverage.

The key finding in Arnold's analysis is that there is substantial variance in the type of congressional coverage produced by local newspapers: Some papers produce exceptional coverage of House members, while others fail to produce a minimal standard of information that would be necessary for citizens to reasonably hold incumbents accountable. Specifically, newspapers with more resources and fewer House members to cover tend to provide the

best coverage. Representatives also attract more coverage when they do newsworthy things, such as running for higher office or becoming the subject of ethics violations. His analysis reveals that unfortunately, reporters do not find legislative activities such as bill sponsorship or committee work particularly newsworthy. An even more troubling finding is that only 6 percent of the news stories referred to anyone who criticized the incumbent's performance; most criticisms were confined to editorials and letters to the editor. This finding only further underscores that citizens may not be receiving the type of information they would need to fully evaluate the performance of their representatives.

There is much to commend in Arnold's book, not the least of which is the impressive data that he brings to bear on this relatively new area of study. Indeed, local congressional news coverage has not been heavily studied at least partly because of the difficulty in collecting data from news outlets across more than 200 local media markets in the United States. Not only does the author present a wealth of data, but he also does so in a thoughtful way that allows him to say a great deal on the subject. His inclusion of both large and small market newspapers allows him to analyze coverage in papers as different as the *Los Angeles Times* and the *Idaho Falls Post Register*. These newspapers clearly operate in very different environments with very different resources, factors that influence the production of local congressional news, according to Arnold's findings. The scope of his analysis is also illuminating, as the study includes everything that appears in the newspaper, including editorials and letters to the editor. There are important differences in news stories compared to opinion coverage, namely, that opinion coverage tends to be more critical of House members while news coverage is typically neutral or positive. It is also notable that Arnold

tracks coverage throughout an entire Congress, providing far more context than previous studies that have focused only on congressional campaigns. Yet despite the overwhelming amount of analysis presented, he does a nice job of highlighting the key findings and tying things together at the end of each chapter.

Because the book is one of the first comprehensive examinations on the relationship between House members and the local media, there are, naturally, many avenues left unexplored (a point Arnold himself discusses in the final chapter). One of the most intriguing aspects for all scholars of representation is the process through which the news media may facilitate accountability. According to the author, there are at least two ways that the news media can play this role. First, the local media may encourage accountability by providing citizens with information they can use to determine whether their representatives are performing their jobs well. In this conception, the news media and citizens are the central actors; reporters must produce information about incumbents and citizens must also consume and use that information. This process is Arnold's focus, and he produces a first-rate examination of whether local newspapers provide sufficient coverage and how citizens use that information.

A second way the local media may facilitate accountability is by influencing the behavior of incumbents. Members of Congress who are aware that the local media in their districts are watching and reporting on them may be more careful to provide better representation to their constituents than those who draw less attention back in their districts. In this way, accountability is less attributable to what the media actually report (or whether citizens consume that coverage) than it is to incumbents acting strategically to avoid unfavorable coverage. This idea is an important one because it means that accountability relies less on citizens, whom political scientists typically view as cognitive misers, and on the media, who are often indicted for the quality of their political coverage, than it does on politicians concerned about the story that local reporters might write if they misstep. As a result, Arnold argues, House members who are most likely to win coverage are also most likely to do the best job representing their districts.

Of course, this is merely a hypothesis presented by the author, and a direct test of the idea is beyond the scope of his book. Examining this aspect of the local media's role in promoting accountability would necessitate a study of legislative behavior as ambitious as his analysis of local news coverage. But this untested hypothesis is just one example of the many exciting new directions that Arnold's analysis suggests to future scholars. Indeed, this is one of the central contributions of ambitious studies in previously understudied areas; they often provide us with as many new questions as they do answers. Arnold's fine book provides both.

Campaigning for Hearts and Minds: How Emotional Appeals in Political Ads Work. By Ted Brader. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006. 280p. \$60.00 cloth, \$24.00 paper.

— David O. Sears, *University of California, Los Angeles*

This book examines the effects of emotions aroused by televised ads in political campaigns. Its psychological theorizing about emotion goes beyond the now-familiar portrait of a "cold-hearted citizen" borrowed from cognitive psychology and rational choice theories. But it also goes beyond the tradition in political behavior research on party identification, candidate evaluations, online processing, and the like of treating affect simply in terms of positive or negative valence. Rather, this research takes seriously the unique features of qualitatively different emotions, building off the "affective intelligence" model of George E. Marcus and colleagues.

The core of the empirical analysis consists of results from two experiments manipulating enthusiasm and fear arousal, respectively. Ads embodying music and images associated with desirable outcomes were hypothesized to arouse enthusiasm, thereby increasing subjective involvement in politics, enhancing viewers' confidence in their prior preferences, and so polarizing the audience. Threatening audiovisual cues, by primitively signaling danger, were expected to arouse fear, and thereby a search for new information among the politically self-confident, perhaps disengagement among the less competent, and the possibility of successful persuasion.

The experimental designs nicely balanced experimental control with verisimilitude. Each experiment presented a 15-minute excerpt of a local television news program, in which a 30-second campaign ad was embedded, represented as taken from an actual ongoing (but quite low-profile) primary campaign in Massachusetts, counterbalancing which candidate sponsored the ad. The experimental manipulations varied only the visuals and music in the ad, holding constant the verbal message (positive for enthusiasm and negative for fear). The subjects were eligible voters from the general population, tested at a variety of research sites across the state, set up to resemble family living rooms.

The pattern of the data is generally consistent with the hypotheses. The results are wisely presented separately for the two categories of dependent variables, involvement and persuasion, highlighting comparisons between the two emotions. Enthusiasm consistently and significantly increased campaign involvement relative to the positive-message-only control condition, whereas fear increased involvement only among the more politically informed. The findings on persuasion are more uneven. Enthusiasm did increase the weight that viewers placed on their prior preferences, while fear tended to increase the weight placed on new information, such as issues and traits, consistent with the idea that it instigates a

search for new solutions to a more threatening world. An unusually large number of analyses on persuasion are presented and their statistical significance sometimes falls short of conventional levels, and so the strength of the case comes more from consistency across conceptually different analyses than from any single finding. Still, in fairness, perhaps the miracle is that anything systematic came out at all, given the brevity and unobtrusiveness of the manipulations, and with the verbal messages held constant.

At the same time, no two experiments about a single minor election, with a modest number of cases (total $N = 286$), can be asked to definitively stake out newly opened territory. The omnibus experimental manipulations simultaneously varied several audiovisual elements, and so precisely what was manipulated is not certain. The verbal messages differed across experiments as well. To ensure that the single brief campaign ad remained an unobtrusive piece of the longer broadcast, the manipulation check was delayed to the end of the session, not asked of all viewers, and focused on a limited number of emotions. It yielded significant differences, but not large ones, and cannot reveal the relevant strengths of the two manipulations or what other emotions might have been manipulated as well. Even having a college class later rate the four ads on a wider variety of emotions might have fleshed out the exact nature of the manipulations.

The book as a whole nicely balances the experimental results with several other elements. An early engaging chapter systematically summarizes, in terms of six general beliefs, the conventional wisdom of citizens, academics, journalists, and consultants about the effects of emotional appeals. This is a nice contrast to the usual anecdotal catalog of others' mistaken speculations that we empiricists usually provide to demonstrate the superiority of our scientific analysis. The lengthy chapter on the psychology of emotion is perhaps justified by the relative paucity of such literature reviews in political science. Another welcome element is a content analysis of the emotional appeals used in real campaigns, describing the emotions that consultants do in fact try to arouse.

One helpful implication emphasized here is that, conventional wisdom to the contrary, emotion is not Mr. Hyde to reason's Dr. Jekyll. Ads contain both; emotion may be adaptive rather than merely the vehicle for blind transfers of affect from irrelevant symbols; aroused emotions do not seem to systematically interfere with other desirable civic orientations, such as efficacy and citizen duty; and almost all of the effects of emotions obtained here are stronger among the more politically sophisticated than among the less sophisticated. Conceptually separating emotion and reason (or cognition) is often useful, and they do operate somewhat differently, but they work hand in glove, neither with uniformly beneficent or malign effects.

The contrast between enthusiasm and fear initially seemed a somewhat narrow starting point for opening up the new territory of emotional arousals in campaign ads. Yet enthusiasm and fear also seem to be quite different from each other, not merely oppositely valenced mirror images, and apparently among the most common emotions typically used in campaign ads. Their asymmetrical effects profitably stimulate thought about emotion in politics beyond the specific focus on campaign advertising. If the author is correct, enthusiasm tends to strengthen the effects of routine and predilection, while fear may drive a search for new information and openness to change. Political leaders plainly often attempt to arouse them. Franklin Roosevelt's campaigns featured "happy days are here again." Hitler often alluded to the corrupting effects of Jews and other groups on German society. Constant reference to "terrorism" and "9/11" have been staples of the Bush presidency's rhetoric. It is to be hoped that future research will provide more information about whether such efforts do have the interestingly asymmetrical effects described here.

Finally, a cautionary note might be raised about political science's current infatuation with experimental techniques. Traditional survey findings of modest media and campaign effects have long diverged from the behavior of campaign practitioners who pump massive amounts of money into televised appeals, as well as from contemporary experimental research claiming more widespread effects of news coverage and political campaigns. As the author wisely reminds us, experiments are more useful for telling us what *can* happen under some necessarily limited circumstances than for telling us what *does* happen under the typical and more varied circumstances of real life. These particular experiments may have had more ecological validity than is often the case, however, given the thoughtful efforts to enhance their realism, as in other similar work by Shanto Iyengar, Donald Kinder, Nicholas Valentino, and their colleagues.

Electoral Politics Is Not Enough: Racial and Ethnic Minorities and Urban Politics. By Peter F. Burns. Albany:

State University of New York Press, 2006. 192p. \$60.00 cloth, \$21.95 paper.

— Linda Faye Williams, *University of Maryland*

In their 1984 book *Protest Is Not Enough: The Struggle of Blacks and Hispanics for Equality in City Politics*, Rufus Browning, Dale Marshall, and David Tabb argued that political incorporation of ethnic and racial minorities through an electoral coalition with white liberals was the key for minority access to power in urban areas of the United States. By means of conventional coalition politics, African Americans and Latinos could get what they wanted from government.

Now 22 years later, Peter Burns challenges Browning, Marshall, and Tabb's conclusion. By extending the assessment of political leaders' responsiveness to African Americans and Latinos in northeastern cities, Burns finds that electoral coalition politics is overrated as a progenitor of responsiveness to minority interests. Unconventional politics (especially civic and community organizing) tends to be more influential in encouraging leaders to respond favorably to African American and Latino interests.

What counts most in explaining why Burns reaches a different conclusion from Browning, Marshall, and Tabb is the long shadow cast by the traditional and unreformed politics of northeastern cities, compared to the reformed municipal politics of western cities. Political structure matters, Burns concludes. Conventional channels provide responsiveness to minority interests in the West because reforms limit the extent to which public officials use government as a patronage tool, but electoral politics provides limited receptiveness to minorities in the East because officials have the flexibility to use patronage to enrich themselves and their allies, rather than rewarding diverse constituencies in their electoral coalition.

To make this argument, Burns conducts a comparative case study of four middle-sized Connecticut cities (Bridgeport, Hartford, Waterbury, and Stamford). With considerable sophistication, he establishes that although all four are nonreform cities, they vary substantially according to the demographic, socioeconomic, political, and unconventional factors that might influence levels of responsiveness to African American and Latino interests. These and other variations allow him to test for the influence of a host of antecedent, causal, and intervening variables that, according to the argument of previous literature, influence responsiveness to minorities.

Having established the appropriateness of his cases, Burns then provides a systematic comparison of white, African American, and Latino leaders' perceptions of minority interests and the factors that affect awareness. Consistent with a growing number of studies, he finds that Latinos are faring less well than African Americans on a number of political dimensions and that these differences often lead to conflict. The variable that proves to have the most explanatory power for understanding differences between blacks and Latinos, as well as variations in their influence among the four cities, is extraelectoral resources. The level of minority civic organization influences leadership awareness.

Next, Burns assesses the extent to which leaders deliver on minority policy preferences. He uses two policy arenas of particular relevance to African Americans and Latinos: education and public safety. Regarding both, he finds that receptiveness to African American and Latino policy preferences is a concomitant of nonconventional channels—the interaction between community groups and officials, not electoral or socioeconomic variables regarded as important in previous research.

Through an in-depth case study of Bridgeport, Burns demonstrates how the process of using unconventional resources to promote policy responsiveness works. This study leads him to encourage neighborhood groups to collaborate, beginning with the development of a communication network, and to build organizational resources and consistent messages across groups (that is, to engage in what Robert Putnam has called “bridging capital”). In fact, although it is not Burns's aim to develop grand theory in this book, his empirical work advances both regime theory and social capital theory. In particular, his findings on the import of service-providing neighborhood groups supports Putnam's views on social capital, and the responsiveness to minorities in Bridgeport supports Clarence Stone's conclusion that “government creates relationships with actors who control non-electoral resources” (p. 115). Given both the author's theoretical contributions and the thoroughness of his empirical work (based on more than 200 elite-level interviews, electoral results, census reports, and other aggregate data), *Electoral Politics Is Not Enough* is a tour de force that should be read by scholars and practitioners alike who are interested in urban and/or minority politics.

To be sure, however, as with any work, there are flaws and sins of omission. For example, since one of Burns's key efforts is to show that things work differently in northeastern cities than they do in the western ones analyzed by Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, his analysis would be more convincing if it included at least one of the same policy arenas measured by those authors (for example, municipal appointments, employment, or contracts). There also should have been a chapter focused on the role of federal programs in affecting cities' responsiveness to minority demands. The book would benefit from a fuller discussion of whether—and if so, in what ways—federal social programs stimulate demand-protest, civic organizing, and electoral mobilization by increasing the availability of minority resources and leaders (and by contrast, whether the evisceration of federal urban programs in the last three decades deflates these activities and developments and fundamentally alters the political context that made minority gains possible). In short, while Burns is nothing short of brilliant in systematically describing and explaining the internal influences on what minorities can achieve in city politics through nonconventional channels, the analysis of contemporary racial politics in U.S. cities also needs to consider systematically the external influences on what minorities can be expected to achieve and what they actually achieve.

It should be noted that the book also occasionally demonstrates a facile treatment of race, ethnicity, class, and their intersections. For example, despite his disclaimers, the author demonstrates a tendency to blame Latinos for not being more politicized, better organized, and more skilled in amassing organizational resources. He barely

addresses the reality that organization is itself an easier task to accomplish for more affluent groups. Relatedly, Burns fails to adequately tease out the ironies of the class dimension. For example, he finds that it is a city with a more substantial white working class (Bridgeport) that has white leaders who express greater awareness of African American and Latino interests, and it is the city with the most affluent whites (Stamford) whose leaders express least awareness. He interprets this finding to indicate that socioeconomic composition does not influence policy responsiveness to minorities. Could it be, however, just the opposite? Where minorities are joined by a sizable nonaffluent white population, the policy preferences for most whites, African Americans, and Latinos are similar—a development that stimulates leadership awareness and responsiveness on behalf of all traditionally excluded groups. Finally, in a few instances, Burns draws conclusions for which he provides no reputable supporting data and where the logic is questionable. For example, near the end of the book, he downgrades the importance of both electoral politics and descriptive representation by declaring that many minority elected officials maintain as much, if not more, allegiance to the official political apparatus as to their racial/ethnic communities. Yet he provides nothing more than anecdotes from a few African American and Latino leaders to back up this claim.

These are relatively minor quibbles, however, in an otherwise excellent book. Not only does Burns provide some hard and systematic thinking about the consequences of different patterns of political institutions, mass political behavior, organizational resources, and leadership in four northeastern cities, but on a broader scope, the book also develops and tests a model of urban political change. The author's model demonstrates that both structural and political contexts affect the likelihood of success of various participatory strategies; traces political change from the roots of participation to policy responsiveness; examines the relationships among protest, civic, and electoral politics; and provides a comparative study of African American and Latino political activity. Given the scope of the project, the book not surprisingly proves to be far more than a sequel to Browning, Marshall, and Tabb. Instead, it sheds new light on the well-traveled ground of urban politics and provides innovative building blocks for advancing a deeper understanding of the complex relationships among race, place, and representation in America.

Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives. By Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 336p. \$70.00 cloth, \$24.99 paper.

— Randall Strahan, *Emory University*

In this volume, Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins elaborate on the “cartel” theory of parties in the U.S. Con-

gress that was first set forth in their earlier book, *Legislative Leviathan* (1993), and present a substantial body of new evidence in support of this theory. The central thesis of the new book is that a form of party government has been present continuously in the House of Representatives since the adoption of the Reed Rules in the 1890s.

In contrast to analysts who view party influence in terms of the ability to maintain unity in floor voting and enact a party program, Cox and McCubbins argue that party government and party influence in Congress primarily involve *negative agenda power*—the capacity of the majority party to keep off the legislative agenda those issues that are opposed by a majority of its members and that would evoke deep splits if allowed to come to a vote. In keeping with the earlier formulation of their theory, legislative parties are said to exist to protect party members' collective reputation with the voters and maintain (or win) majority status. The majority party acts like a cartel by seizing the most important offices in the legislature and distributing them among its “senior partners,” with the understanding that the procedural powers of these offices will not be used to advance legislation opposed by a majority of their party. When the majority party is unified over policy, it may delegate more authority to leaders to enforce party discipline and advance new legislation, but the exercise of this positive agenda power is the “superstructure” of party government, not its “bedrock.” Efforts at enforcing party discipline are said to be limited to “corralling a few votes on the margin” and are of secondary importance to controlling which issues get voted on (pp. 4–5). Thus, for Cox and McCubbins, the appropriate test of party influence in Congress is not how often party leaders can get members to vote in support of party measures, or whether newly passed legislation reflects the preferences of the median member of the majority party, but whether the majority party succeeds in blocking consideration of legislation most members of the party oppose.

The authors derive a series of implications from their theory and theories positing nonpartisan agenda-setting processes and marshal a formidable body of evidence to show that the majority party has consistently exercised negative agenda power in the House since the adoption of the Reed Rules in the 1890s. Drawing on roll call data reaching back to the 1870s, they show that after adoption of the Reed Rules, the majority party in the House has rarely been “rolled” (a majority of the majority party outvoted) on rules changes, procedural votes, or votes on final passage. They also develop a measure indicating the proportion of bills that move policy in the ideological direction favored by the majority party, and they show: 1) that a sustained increase in that proportion occurs after the 1890s, and 2) that the variation in this measure over the period from the 54th to 105th Congresses is explained better by spatial models, in which the majority party controls the agenda, than by nonpartisan models. The authors

also examine the important question of how independent of the majority party the House Rules Committee became during the era of the conservative coalition (1937–60), concluding that the committee blocked liberal legislation but rarely *advanced* measures opposed by the majority of House Democrats. Here, Cox and McCubbins encounter the limitations of relying primarily on evidence from roll call votes; recent research by Eric Schickler and Kathryn Pearson has uncovered numerous additional cases during this period in which the majority party was rolled on issues on which recorded votes were not taken. Whether the form of party government posited by this theory was not at least partially displaced during these years remains an open question. The final section of the book briefly contrasts the cartel agenda theory with John Aldrich and David Rohde's conditional party government theory and presents some suggestive evidence in support of Cox and McCubbins's claim that increased majority party homogeneity tilts party government toward greater positive agenda control.

The authors make a strong case for the central importance of the majority party in setting the agenda in the modern Congress. But precisely how the use of negative agenda power constitutes the "responsible party government" referred to in the title of the book is a question that could have received more attention. If the bedrock of party government is a form of agenda control in which the majority party prevents consideration of proposals that would result in the passage of legislation reflecting the preferences of the median House member, party government would seem to consist primarily of the prevention of policy changes preferred by legislative (and possibly popular?) majorities. The sense in which this is *responsible* government is unclear.

Setting the Agenda represents state-of-the-art empirical political science in the rational choice institutionalist mode, exhibiting both the strengths and some of limitations of that approach. Cox and McCubbins's theoretical arguments are explicit and precise, and the implications of those arguments and competing explanations are subjected to careful empirical tests. However, by working within a spatial theory framework in which legislators are assumed to have fixed preferences, this approach inevitably misses important aspects of how parties and leaders influence legislative politics. As R. Douglas Arnold, Joseph Bessette, Joseph Cooper, C. Lawrence Evans, Richard Fenno, and other scholars have argued, leaders influence what happens in Congress not only by controlling the agenda and using selective incentives to corral votes but also by taking advantage of opportunities that arise to shape legislators' preferences. Still, Cox and McCubbins make a powerful case for viewing agenda control as a persistent and fundamental dimension of party influence in the modern U.S. Congress. Even readers who may not be persuaded that this mode of analysis captures the full range

of contributions parties and leaders make to congressional politics will benefit from a close reading of this study.

The Future of Organized Labor in American Politics.

By Peter L. Francia. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. 216p. \$42.00.

— Immanuel Ness, *Brooklyn College, City University of New York.*

As the spiraling decline of organized labor continues unabated, the U.S. labor movement is becoming more insignificant to workers. In 2004, union density in the private sector declined to a postwar nadir below 10%. As membership drops, so does union capacity to mobilize members in the electoral sphere. But since 1995, when John Sweeney and the New Voice slate toppled Lane Kirkland as president of the AFL-CIO, Peter L. Francia argues, labor unions are more effective politically than ever. This belief is rooted in Francia's quantitative research of congressional elections in the Sweeney era from 1994 to 2002.

Francia candidly asserts that his work "is *not* a book about unions in the economic arena" (p. 17) and "not a historical analysis." The primary data for the book are statistics derived from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Research Association, Federal Election Commission, other polling organizations, and some interviews with union officials (pp. 18–19). While the data analysis is meaningful, the absence of history complicates an evaluation of Sweeney vis-à-vis his two predecessors, George Meany and Kirkland.

At its core, *The Future of Organized Labor in American Politics* portrays Sweeney as if he were a venerable captain of a sinking ship. That unions are relevant in the political sphere is significant to Francia inasmuch as labor is using a strategic approach to spending on advertising a new ideological program more popular among workers, and is allocating money in competitive elections (pp. 21–51).

Francia's finding about mobilizing members to vote at a higher rate even as Republican power grows is already well known among labor scholars. However, his data analysis provides fascinating new evidence of the magnitude of spending in congressional races. In 1996, Sweeney and the New Voice political operatives were certain that greater political spending and activity would elect sympathetic members of Congress. As corporate PACs "decreased spending from 1988 to 2002" (p. 29), labor expenditures on campaigns expanded "twenty-eight-fold . . . from 1994 to 2002" (pp. 29–30). Francia asserts that the "strategies changed in the Sweeney era" (p. 31) as campaign expenditures went to candidates in competitive congressional races; however, he does not comparatively examine the Kirkland era when Democrats controlled the Congress.

In Chapters 4 and 5, Francia examines Sweeney's record in communicating and mobilizing members and advertising its positions to the public. He shows that strategic

allocation of money elected several Democratic candidates and reduced the margin of Republican victories. While corporate spending declined marginally, union spending expanded significantly as corporate PACs outspent labor by a reduced 4:1 ratio. Yet the fact that corporate spending continued to *decline* between 1994 and 2002 as Republicans actually gained and expanded their majority in Congress leaves one to wonder if corporate contributions to candidates translate into greater influence than does labor money.

As a political scientist studying interest groups, I know that pondering labor in the electoral arena is complicated, perhaps accounting for Francia's problematic assertion of the dearth of scholarship in the field on labor. To many political scientists, including Francia, the AFL-CIO and constituent unions are part of a broader labor movement. But conflating organized labor with other interest groups diminishes the centrality of labor in U.S. society.

Nonetheless, the author's data are intriguing. In 2001, the AFL-CIO spent less on lobbying than did the National Rifle Association, the American Association of Retired Persons, American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), and the Trial Lawyers of America. Most likely the federation's diminished spending on lobbying is due to a hostile Republican Congress.

One of Francia's suggestions to reverse labor's decline is to try to appeal to moderate Republicans, who are more likely to hold key committee chairs than Democrats. But labor does not seem to have had much influence even when Democrats were in control. From the 1950s to 1990s, for example, unions failed to reverse the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 (though, granted, Senate Republican filibusters explain many such failures).

The passage of NAFTA severely weakened unions and laid the groundwork for Sweeney's triumph over Kirkland. Under Sweeney, the hemorrhaging of union power is a matter of life and death for the federation. Why then is Sweeney so cautious in pursuing what Francia maintains is a progressive ideological agenda? Sweeney initially opposed organized labor's protesting the November 1999 World Trade Organization negotiations in Seattle, a defining event that seemed to push labor's agenda more than any election could.

Throughout, the book emphasizes the need for unions to devote resources to organizing in order to succeed in the electoral arena, because union members provide "the manpower to counter the financial power of business in congressional elections" (pp. 142–43). But in the fragmented AFL-CIO, national unions set policies independent of the federation. Sweeney's prescription for union revitalization through organizing is bound to fail. Ironically, those national unions that bolted the AFL-CIO in 2005 to form the Change to Win (CTW) federation are the Service Employees International Union (SEIU),

UNITE/HERE, and others that have devoted more money to organizing new members.

Organized Labor has failed to mobilize electoral support for its platform during Sweeney's ten years as president despite success in mobilizing its own members. But for most observers unions are in rapid decline. The book's primary failure is methodological. While Francia asserts at the outset that his study is not historical, fundamentally Francia compares the AFL-CIO under Sweeney to the Kirkland era, and does not provide any framework for the crucial legal obstacles that must be removed if labor is to rebuild a robust labor movement. The statistical data on union spending in the electoral arena is illuminating to those studying interest groups and unions today. But Francia asserts repeatedly that recruiting new members is essential to the revitalization of organized labor, which he believes will use the Democratic Party to challenge Republicans. By failing to root the labor movement in American historical development, Francia is unable to identify signal moments when unions rapidly expanded (for example, in the postwar strikes and insurrections that were crucial to galvanizing organized labor power in the electoral arena). Unfortunately, Francia's methodology fails to provide the analytical framework to comprehend the relationship between labor power on the ground and organized labor's influence in the electoral arena.

In Defense of Negativity: Attack Ads in Presidential Campaigns. By John G. Geer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006. 218p. \$47.50 cloth, \$19.00 paper.

— Richard R. Lau, *Rutgers University*

This book begins with a series of quotes from scholars and media pundits arguing that negative political advertisements are uncivil, mean-spirited, emotion-laden distortions of the truth, which not only smear their target but also mislead voters and undermine the political process itself; in short, they are the scourge of democracy. Or so the conventional wisdom goes. But John Geer asks us to reject the starting assumption that attack ads are bad. In fact, he argues that democracy *requires* candidates to attack each other. His argument is simple but powerful: All advertisements, by their very nature, exaggerate the truth. But this point applies equally to negative *and* positive ads. We cannot expect political candidates to fairly discuss their weaknesses along with their strengths. That is the role of the opposition, and it can only be done by offering criticisms of the opposing candidate or party. The real questions, then, are 1) whether negative ads perform their role effectively, or instead distort and confuse the vote choices citizens must make; and 2) whether attack ads, in performing a role that seems to be required of them, nonetheless undermine the democratic political system of which they are a crucial part.

In Defense of Negativity is organized into seven chapters. After an introduction that previews many of the surprising points to be made in the book, the second chapter describes the extraordinary data collection that forms the basis of the analysis: a content analysis of the *appeals* included in virtually every (795 in total) televised ad from the major presidential candidates between 1960 and 2000. The strength of this data set is the incredible detail with which every ad is coded. The major unit of analysis is not the ad itself but the themes or appeals that are made in the ad—and there is an average of just over 12 made in every ad. The only important weakness of the data is also discussed—that we do not know how often the different ads were aired during the campaign—forcing Geer to assume that all ads were shown with equal frequency. While it is surely not true, I cannot imagine this assumption introducing any serious bias into the results. And as Geer argues, his focus is on the content of the appeals within the ads—on the messages the candidates want to send—rather than on estimating the effects of the ads on voters.

The author's theory—and preliminary evidence for it—is presented in the third chapter, which should be required reading for both scholars who study political campaigns and the journalists who try to cover them. Geer first establishes three criteria for judging whether ads inform the public: 1) Do they involve issues or policy? 2) Are claims backed by evidence? And 3) do they expose the ground on which the candidates disagree? He then argues that there is a fundamental asymmetry between positive and negative ads because candidates face different constraints when promoting themselves and attacking their opponent. In a nutshell, the argument is that *while candidates are rarely challenged about claims they make about themselves, they feel compelled to provide evidence whenever they attack their opponent*. This asymmetry leads to a difference in the content of the appeals typically made in positive and negative ads. It is very difficult to provide evidence that supports or disputes a claim that some candidate holds a particular value, but policy claims can often be supported (or challenged) by past behaviors (e.g., votes in Congress) or clear records of performance or accomplishment. This leads Geer to predict many more value appeals in positive ads but a preponderance of evidence-backed policy appeals in negative ads, a prediction that is clearly borne out by the evidence. These facts make negative ads generally superior to positive ads on all three criteria for informativeness, and seriously undermines the claims underlying any fears about negative ads weakening democracy.

Geer also argues that all candidates who make it to the presidential level are of high quality, leaving relatively few avenues for person-based attacks. This fact is not true for candidates for lower offices, however, leading him to predict many more character-based attacks in campaigns for lower offices than for the presidency. This chapter led me to think of several related hypotheses of my own. While

neither one of us has any evidence for these predictions, this is just what good theories do: They inspire additional hypotheses, and they can be extended beyond the domain in which they were originally presented.

The next two chapters look specifically at the nature of character- and issue-based appeals in presidential ads. Geer shows that relatively few attacks at the presidential level are character-based, and that they have barely increased over time. Thus, the overall rise in negativity that has occurred since 1960 is due primarily to an increase in policy-based attacks backed by verifiable evidence—a trend which, now that the evidence is before us, should alarm few observers of the American political scene. Chapter 5 on issue-based appeals is another particularly strong one, including numerous theoretically driven hypothesis tests I do not have the space to describe, but which again led me to generate several additional hypotheses of my own, exactly what good theories should do.

The penultimate chapter takes a closer look at the 1988 presidential campaign, widely viewed as the most notoriously negative in recent history. Geer dispels several points of accepted truth about that campaign (which I have repeated regularly to my students), including the purported “facts” that it was unusually negative to begin with, and composed mostly of attacks from the Republicans. The final chapter is devoted to an attempt to find explanations for the observed rise in negativity, which he places firmly on the increasing polarization of the parties, who now clearly have much more to fight about than they did 40 years ago.

All told, this book has a great deal to recommend it for undergraduate and graduate students alike. This is what high-quality social science is all about. It should become required reading for all journalists and political pundits before the next round of federal elections.

The American Constitution and the Debate over

Originalism. By Dennis J. Goldford. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 305p. \$75.00 cloth, \$29.99 paper.

— Howard Schweber, *University of Wisconsin, Madison*

The most common way to think about questions of constitutional interpretation is in terms of the debate between originalism and living constitutionalism. Both sides in that debate assert their fidelity to the true meaning of “the text” by talking about something else, the original understanding of the ratifiers or contemporary societal norms. Dennis Goldford wants to restructure that discussion; he wants to open up the black box of “the text” and make it the subject of the discussion. This, he insists, is the only way to resolve the “Madisonian dilemma” of reconciling democratic values with the idea of a binding constitution.

As Goldford points out, both originalism and conventional nonoriginalism treat the text “positivistically,” as a manifestation of something else that stands behind its

terms. As a result, both theories deny the text's "autonomy." The reason is that both theories—but especially originalism—are caught in the grip of a fear of indeterminacy: "Fearful of what it considers the potential semantic anarchy of the text, originalism goes to the other extreme and denies its semantic autonomy" (p. 159). This is important, as originalists are quite correct to identify commitment to the text as a requirement for democratic legitimacy. But the originalists' fear of indeterminate language undercuts their claim to resolving the tension between democracy and textual commitment: "Originalism claims to be the only theory by which the Constitution democratically binds the future, but the theory's distinction between the constitutional text and the original understanding actually undermines the democratic and binding character of the text" (p. 150).

Goldford's proposal is that we move outside the originalism/nonoriginalism debate altogether by restoring the "binding capacity of the language" without an appeal to any outside set of limiting or informing principles. The result, the author says, would not be to leave judges free to impose their policy preferences, as originalists fear; the language of the text itself would impose constraints. At the same time, an "interpretive" approach would respond to the second major flaw that he sees in modern constitutional theories, the search for a single right answer. Language constrains, but it does not dictate a single outcome, unlike the false certainties of originalist historiography or living constitutionalist invocations of the requirements of modern moral reasoning. Thus, says Goldford, read properly, the text can be granted "semantic autonomy" with little genuine risk of "semantic anarchy" (p. 164). The argument thus breaks into two parts, an objective description of the constraints inherent in a commitment to interpretive textualism (pp. 195–200) and a prescriptive argument for a constitutional discourse in which disagreement is understood "not as error or heresy, something to be avoided and eliminated, but rather as naturally, essentially, and inescapably political" (p. 290).

The descriptive, objective element of the argument is by far the more problematic. Goldford proposes that we should conceive of the Constitution "ontologically," as constitutive of our social environment, which is the source of its binding authority to impose constraints: "We live in the world constituted by the Constitution. . . . As such a living text, the Constitution is already a structure of constraint" (p. 267). What gives the Constitution this power to define and structure social reality is "intersubjective meaning," which "constitutes the individual," a bit of neo-Kantianism borrowed from the communitarian theories of Charles Taylor (p. 272). As a result, law as social practice occupies a level of reality that is inaccessible to our conscious consideration, a "point of its own that is independent of what any particular interpreters might understand it to be at a given time" (pp. 272–73). This is an undeveloped and not very plausible argument. Taylor's

theory was based on a model of a tightly knit community that provided the entire social environment of development from birth; it is extremely difficult to conceive of "America" in these terms, let alone to see how the constitutional text—which the vast majority of Americans have never seen—becomes the core element of each of our collective consciousnesses.

Goldford's argument is more plausible in its prescriptive moments, as when he declares that the Constitution's binding authority "relies ultimately on the reader's *willingness* to participate as an active subject in the activity of constituting meaning; we are actively self-constituting as political subjects and objects simultaneously" (p. 275, emphasis added). That is, he comes close to presenting an argument to the effect that the resolution of the Madisonian dilemma lies in a shared commitment to treat the Constitution as though it were an element of intersubjectively shared meaning. The Constitution, in this view, defines the language of a particular discourse that participants willingly and consciously adopt as an expression of their commitment to constitutionalism: "The 'deep structure' of the Constitution, therefore, is . . . the ongoing, concrete, historical practice of constitutional discourse" (pp. 277–78), which determines "a structured range of legitimate answers for the rightness of which one can only persuade, not demonstrate" (p. 279).

This latter, prescriptive argument seems to be the argument that Goldford actually wants to make. Read this way, he is joining in with a growing literature that focuses on applying theories of textuality to the study of constitutionalism, including the New Originalist theories of Keith Whittington (with whom he has far more in common than he recognizes). But the argument remains undeveloped: Is Goldford appealing to the idea of customary discursive conventions growing out of historical practice? Is he claiming that the Constitution's text generates the historical practice of constitutional discourse? Or is it his assertion that we ought to undertake to think of the Constitution as though one of these claims were true in order to fulfill our duties as actors in a constitutional system? Ultimately, the relationship among the political, literary, and social psychological arguments remains unclear. What we are left with is a sharp, provocative critique of many of the standard categories of constitutional discourse, a suggestion of a direction for further development, and a strong argument for the desirability of escaping the increasingly sterile categories of the originalism/nonoriginalism debate.

Globalization and the Politics of Pay: Policy Choices in the American States. By Susan B. Hansen. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2006. 248p. \$24.95.

— Herman Schwartz, *University of Virginia*

During the past 50 years, U.S. trade negotiators have consistently tried to pry open global manufactured goods and

services markets and to transform publicly regulated service sectors into contestable markets. Most analyses have focused on this strategy's effects on wages and work conditions in the target countries. Susan Hansen provides a detailed empirical consideration of what that strategy means back home at the level of U.S. states. The book's primary contribution is to link two research domains—state and local politics (SAL) and international political economy (IPE)—that are usually strictly segregated not only inside American political science departments but also across universities. Unfortunately, however, the author, a SAL specialist, neglects about a decade of helpful findings from the IPE literature.

Hansen argues that globalization has not caused a race to the bottom with respect to wages and work conditions, although low wages are connected to worsening social conditions. She constructs a composite measure of state labor costs based on wages, unemployment insurance benefits, worker's compensation, the level of unionization, and the presence of "right to work" legislation. She notes (p. 59) that this composite measure has "been heading downward since 1970." But she argues that this has more to do with local political factors like Republican Party control over government than it has to do with globalization. Different chapters in the book consider the causes for differences among the states with respect to this metric, the social consequences of slow wage growth, and offer some policy suggestions for remedying slow wage growth and social problems.

The book is marred by a fundamental confusion between the absolute level of labor costs and their level relative to output. Businesses care about labor costs relative to workers' productivity, not wage levels per se. Very high wages matched by very high productivity in quantity and quality terms are not a burden on business and will not in and of themselves cause job losses. Similarly, very low wages are not inherently attractive to businesses if productivity and quality are too low to permit profitable production. But Hansen's composite measure captures neither the absolute level of wages nor relative unit labor costs (wages in relation to output). It is thus not a reliable indicator of the trends she is trying to capture.

This can be seen in the author's very first figure (p. 12), which compares labor wage cost trends in the United States and European Union via two indices. While it is true, as the figure shows, that U.S. wages have grown more slowly than EU wages, this does not logically imply, as Hansen says (p. 11), that "labor costs since 1970 have tended to be far lower in the United States than in most European countries." Indeed, the opposite was and remains true: On either an absolute or purchasing power parity basis, manufacturing wages in the United States remain higher than in most EU countries, largely because productivity in U.S. manufacturing has grown faster than nearly all EU countries for the past 25 years. This is one major

reason why the *relative* cost of U.S. labor has declined. But this does not mean that, strictly speaking, the United States is a low-wage economy in the same sense that China is a low-wage economy. Nor does it mean—as the inevitable terminological confusions might suggest—that average wages are falling in the United States even if "state labor costs" are falling.

Similarly, Hansen's major finding (p. 135) that states with a high composite state labor cost are also states marked by high levels of exports, high wages, and high employment is not surprising. Increased globalization—increased exposure to world markets—has increased pressures for specialization in the U.S. economy. Consequently, high-wage, high-quality, high-productivity sectors like aircraft and capital goods have benefited from the possibility of greater exports, while medium-wage (in a global context), low-productivity sectors like garment assembly have been displaced by import competition from truly low-wage producers in Asia and elsewhere. Globalization thus not only could but should have heterogeneous effects rather than homogenizing effects, should create more diversity rather than a race to the bottom. A sector- rather than state-specific analysis might have shown this more clearly, particularly since most manufacturing sectors are fairly geographically concentrated.

Hansen's policy prescriptions for wage stagnation and social ills focus largely on increasing human capital and sorting out the health care mess. In this respect, there is a clear connection between her core metric and the outcomes she examines. The core small business constituency of the federal Republican Party is hostile to action on both fronts. Can individual states offer solutions in the face of federal paralysis? The IPE literature suggests that even relatively small economic units have considerable latitude with respect to competitiveness-enhancing but socially responsible supply side policies. But the author's findings suggest that there will be a strong Matthew effect in which only states with strong unions (e.g., Massachusetts) or strong commitments to high-tech industry (e.g., California) can find their way to wage-enhancing health or human capital solutions.

Globalization and the Politics of Pay is laudable for its effort to connect issues in SAL and IPE. The use of aggregate figures for a diverse, continental scale economy like the United States often conceals more than it reveals. Hansen's effort to discern the degree of heterogeneity is helpful. Similarly, the comparison of that multisector economy with one-sector economies like, for example, Finland is an odd way, to say the least, to discover policy-relevant information or causal patterns. Here, too, Hansen at least points in the right direction by trying to break the U.S. economy down into its component parts. But this book is only a very tentative first step toward a nuanced analysis of the consequences of globalization for local wages in the United States.

The Politics of Precedent on the U.S. Supreme

Court. By Thomas G. Hansford and James F. Spriggs, II. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006. 176p. \$29.95.

Judging on a Collegial Court: Influences on Federal Appellate Decision Making. By Virginia A. Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist, and Wendy L. Martinek. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006. 192p. \$39.50.

— Chris W. Bonneau, *University of Pittsburgh*

It is all too rare when books are more than the sum of their individual articles. Fortunately for scholars of judicial politics, both *The Politics of Precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court* and *Judging on a Collegial Court* are exactly that. Despite the fact that earlier incarnations of several chapters previously appeared in print, both books significantly improve upon the earlier analyses and make independent and important contributions to the literature on courts. In fact, some of the results presented in *Precedent* contradict previous research published by the authors (see, for example, p. 123).

Both *Precedent* and *Judging* are examples of theoretically based empirical work that moves the literature beyond the attitudinal model. While both books build off the attitudinalist tradition, they both find that other factors matter as well. In *Precedent*, Thomas Hansford and James Spriggs find that the law itself matters. Justices cannot simply vote their policy preferences; the need to provide legally sound justifications for their decisions means that they are constrained by precedent (though not all precedents constrain equally). In *Judging*, Virginia Hettinger, Stefanie Lindquist, and Wendy Martinek examine decision making on the U.S. courts of appeals. They find that in addition to attitudinal factors, the unique institutional position of the courts of appeals affects behavior in important ways. Both these books are well grounded in the literature and develop the literature in significant ways as well.

The central question motivating the Hansford and Spriggs book is simple, yet understudied: “when and why the [Supreme] Court develops law through the interpretation of its precedent” (p. 2). Throughout the book they distinguish between two types of precedent interpretation: positive and negative. A “positive” interpretation of precedent occurs when the Court favorably uses a past case in a current case, while a “negative” interpretation occurs when the Court limits, distinguishes, or overrules a past case in a current case. The authors illustrate these different types of interpretations with examples from the Court’s history. Theoretically, they argue that the interpretation of precedent is best illustrated by the interaction of both legal and attitudinal factors. That is, precedent is not only a constraint on the justices but also an opportunity for them to influence legal policy. They find that “justices do not change law simply based on their policy preferences or on the existing state of precedent; they do so

based on an interactive relationship between these two factors” (p. 130).

There is much to like in this book. The empirical analysis is carefully executed and accessible even to those without training in higher-level statistics. The authors make use of extensive footnotes to be explicit about every coding decision they make. In sum, the analysis is an example of science at its best. Some readers may quibble with how certain concepts are operationalized, but Hansford and Spriggs do an excellent job of justifying their choices, and all the choices made are plausible and theoretically defensible.

However, I do have a minor quibble with the design in Chapter 6. In this chapter, the authors seek to answer the question “When deciding a particular case . . . how does the Court choose to interpret existing precedents?” (p. 93). In selecting their cases to address this question, they treat the universe of past cases as available precedent for a given case. So, for a case decided on January 22, 1996, “the set of precedents for this . . . case includes all precedents decided from the start of the 1946 term up to and including January 22, 1996” (p. 96). The authors justify this choice because alternative measures are underinclusive in the range of 10%–27% (pp. 95–96). While this may be so, it seems to me that there must be a better alternative between existing underinclusive measures and inclusion of all the cases (which is certainly overinclusive of relevant precedents). Not surprisingly, variables measuring whether the case was in the same issue area (either broadly or narrowly defined) are statistically significant in the empirical analysis (p. 100). This overinclusiveness also may explain the somewhat divergent results of this chapter, compared with Chapters 4 and 5 (p. 107). The authors are aware of this and argue that it is better to be overinclusive than underinclusive (p. 107), which is undoubtedly true. I just wonder if maybe that is a false choice.

Unlike *Precedent*, *Judging* focuses on the U.S. courts of appeals, for years an understudied and largely forgotten institution, though there have been several excellent studies done in recent years. Using data from 1960 to 1996, Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek focus on two types of dissensus: horizontal and vertical. When judges on a panel disagree with one another and write either a concurring or dissenting opinion, this is horizontal dissensus; when the courts of appeals reverse a district court decision, this is vertical dissensus (p. 5). While the authors admit that both forms of dissensus are relatively rare (p. 4), they argue that it is important to understand the dynamics of judicial decision making on the courts of appeals because these are effectively the courts of last resort for the vast majority of cases.

Given the fact that courts of appeals “serve as the de facto (if not the de jure) court of last resort in the overwhelming majority of appeals” (p. 13), one wonders why dissent is so rare in these cases, compared to dissent on the

U.S. Supreme Court. That is, since the courts of appeals handle 600 cases for every one disposed of by the U.S. Supreme Court (p. 13), why is there not more dissensus on the courts of appeals? What makes them different from the Supreme Court? The authors do a good job of explaining the determinants of dissensus on these courts, but leave open the question of why it is so rare compared to both the Supreme Court and other “effective” courts of last resort, such as state supreme courts. One possible explanation is that many of the cases the courts of appeals handle are routine. However, the authors limit their analysis to published opinions that are “generally issued in the more important policymaking cases” (p. 133, n. 23). Given that the courts of appeals are similar to the Supreme Court on many institutional features—term, method of appointment, the fact that this is the last job for most judges (p. 23)—the reader is left wondering about the relatively low rate of dissensus. Some discussion of this, especially grounded in the literature, would have strengthened the book.

Methodologically, *Judging* is well executed, and the results are carefully explained so that readers with little or no statistical training will not have problems understanding the analysis. There are two issues regarding the development of the models, though, that readers might be curious about. The first is the fact that the authors limit their analysis to three-judge panels and omit en banc decisions. It seems to me that (at least in Chapters 3 and 5) the authors could have easily included such decisions in their analysis (with a variable denoting such) or conducted separate analyses only on en banc cases. Is dissensus higher in these cases? One would think so, given that en banc cases tend to involve highly salient issues and that circuits tend to be more ideologically heterogeneous than panels. Are the determinants the same? Do they vary by circuit? Questions like these would have fit in nicely with the scope of the book.

Second, and perhaps more significantly, I think the analyses in Chapters 3 and 5 would have benefited from formalization. For example, on page 42, the authors hypothesize that appellate court judges are likely to reverse trial court decisions that deviate from the judges’ ideology. On page 98, they find that “[w]hile ideological disagreement influenced an individual circuit judge’s decision to dissent, no such relationship emerges in our analysis of the panel decision to reverse the district court judge.” This may be true, but it seems to me that the theory (and thus the model specification) is incomplete without including the Supreme Court (and perhaps the whole circuit). For example, let’s say the trial court makes a conservative decision upholding an illegal search. The appeals court is liberal and would like to overturn the trial court. The authors would predict a higher likelihood of reversal here. However, suppose the Supreme Court is conservative and is likely to side with the trial

court if they decide the case. How would the appeals court behave now? It seems to me that they are not more likely to reverse given that they are likely to be reversed by the Supreme Court (and presumably, these judges have the same aversion to reversal as lower court judges). What if the Supreme Court were liberal? Now, the appeals court is likely to reverse the trial court. Basically, it seems to me that the courts of appeals would behave differently, depending upon the preferences of the Supreme Court. (The same analysis can also be carried out using the full circuit, since the case could be heard en banc after the panel makes its decision.) Failure to take into account the fact that the courts of appeals are able to be reversed may account for some of the anomalous results. That being said, the analysis in *Judging* still represents a major step forward in our understanding of judicial behavior on courts other than the U.S. Supreme Court.

In sum, both *Precedent* and *Judging* will be of interest to scholars of the judiciary, and they will be cited regularly and routinely assigned in graduate classes in judicial politics. In many ways, they represent the best of the scientific enterprise: Scientific research is a cumulative enterprise, and just as these books built off prior studies, future studies will build off them.

Politics, Policy, and Organizations: Frontiers in the Scientific Study of Bureaucracy. Edited by George A. Krause and Kenneth J. Meier. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004. 352p. \$65.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

— Matthew Potoski, *Iowa State University*

In this important book, coeditors George A. Krause and Kenneth J. Meier, along with their chapter authors, make a strong case for a theoretically informed and empirically advanced social science study of government bureaucracies. Although other social science disciplines have been rigorously studying public and private organizations for some time, the study of government bureaucracies has had a somewhat marginal position in political science. The current cadre of political scientists “scientifically” studying the bureaucracy, including many of the contributors to this volume, attests to the growing prominence of this subject in the discipline.

The book is organized with sections on theory, methodological technology, and empirical studies. Meier and Krause nicely frame the chapters with succinct introductory and concluding chapters that summarize previous research, place their book in the broader context of the literature, and outline future research directions and how they might be pursued. Consequently, an important test for edited volumes is passed: The chapters are more compelling when read together than standing alone.

Most bureaucracies research during the past 20 years or so draws on principal agent theory or, lamentably, too often a version of it stripped down to fit the data on

hand. This approach worked fairly well so long as the underlying normative question (if not the goal) was to have bureaucracies be responsive to their more democratically accountable overseers in the judiciary and particularly the legislative and executive branches. The comforting conclusion from many studies is that bureaucratic responsiveness does occur, if unevenly. However, a fundamental insight underlying the important theoretical contribution by McNollgast and Kathleen Bawn, among others, is not simply that administrative procedures can structure bureaucratic discretion, but also that under some conditions, bureaucratic discretion can be desirable in its own right, for example, perhaps because bureaucracies have more expertise to solve technically vexing problems. And bureaucracies may enjoy discretion not necessarily out of design but through the alignment and authorities of their political overseers, as Thomas Hammond shows in his chapter.

The theoretical chapters offer interesting perspectives on bureaucracies that go well beyond the question of responsiveness or the shirking/discretion question. The fact that bureaucracies enjoy discretion, whether by design or political circumstances, raises important questions about the ends to which they deploy their autonomy. The chapter by Krause shows that bureaucracies' preferences for autonomy are likely to be variable, depending on factors such as political and policy uncertainty, a conclusion that raises profound questions if bureaucracies can lobby their political overseers. The chapter by David Spence argues that bureaucratic policymaking can "fulfill voters' wishes irrespective of the ability of elected politicians to control what agencies do" (p. 105). Although I am not entirely convinced by his analysis, Spence's reasoned and well-researched argument would be good fodder for graduate seminar discussion.

The chapters in the methodological technology section are quite strong, though more in a general sense than for the new methods they present. Andrew B. Whitford's insightful chapter uses computational analysis to illustrate an intriguing theoretical model that might have been included with the volume's theory chapters. The chapter by John Brehm, Scott Gates, and Brad Gomez presents an analysis of police officers' time allocation based on a Dirichlet distribution, but more interesting is their focus on how managers and peers influence (literally) street-level public safety enforcement. This is precisely the type of inside-the-black-box perspective Meier and Krause call for in their concluding chapter. A sharper focus on what happens within bureaucracies leads Brehm, Gates, and Gomez to look for theoretical guidance in sociology, organizational theory, and psychology.

The empirical chapters investigate such topics as differences between federal and state policy implementation, rule making, and goal setting. Taken together, they

are good examples of current bureaucracies research—technically well executed, though sometimes overly narrow in their theoretical framing and ambitions. Steven J. Balla and John R. Wright, for example, in an otherwise first-rate analysis of how consensual procedures slow down rule making, might have taken into account the agencies' political overseers and veto points, although this may have required some simplifying assumptions. Quibbling further, it would have been nice to see some more comparative studies. Kevin B. Smith's chapter comparing government and nonprofit schools provides an interesting angle that could be applied to other policy areas. Cross-national studies would also have been a valuable addition to the book.

All in all, *Politics, Policy, and Organizations* offers an important contribution to political studies of government bureaucracies. It deserves to be read by scholars working in the area and anyone else looking for a thoughtful primer on the state of the field, and it would be a good fit for graduate seminars. Taken broadly, Krause and Meier's book also suggests a more ambitious goal for bureaucracies scholars in political science. Bureaucratic organizations are not unique to governments, nor is their study confined to political science. As political scientists move in the empirical directions the editors propose—"getting inside the black box of bureaucracy, taking theory more explicitly," and so on (p. 293)—they should look to sociology, public administration, economics, organizational studies, and the other fields that have been scientifically studying public and private bureaucracies for a long time. Effective political science bureaucracies research will not only learn from what these fields have accomplished but also point to where they are headed, a process that is already slowly taking place. In 10 years, I would be happy to see another Meier and Krause volume making the case for what political scientists have contributed to the scientific study of bureaucracies, not just in political science but in the social sciences in general.

If the Workers Took a Notion: The Right to Strike and American Political Development. By Josiah Bartlett Lambert. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. 259p. \$49.94 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

— Bart Dredge, *Austin College*

Josiah Lambert's book succeeds at several levels, asking us to take seriously the rights and obligations once thought intrinsic to work and citizenship, especially in the context of the ever-malleable right to strike. One finds here a comprehensive history of organized labor in the United States dependent upon, and effectively situated in, an analysis of the crucial and fundamental right to strike—a right that has over time substantially changed in meaning and usefulness as a weapon in the struggle between capital and labor. This book is perfect for upper-level

students in labor or political history, but is far more satisfying than such a recommendation suggests. While those new to this history will find themselves fascinated by accounts of strikes and the often violent reactions they engendered, more seasoned scholars will also be asked to think through their understanding of civil society and labor activism in a new and refreshing way. Well organized and tightly expressed, this volume should receive a wide and appreciative audience.

Lambert first offers an exciting survey of the history of American labor, but always in the context of the politics of judicial decision making and legislative reactions to powerful political and economic interests. Students new to this history will benefit from the chronological treatment of major events, organizations, and individuals that marked the first generations of labor conflict in the United States. The early uses of conspiracy statutes, the application of court injunctions, and the often frustrating and impotent application of executive power all receive close attention here, as do the unflinching efforts to suppress the activities of those who attempted to organize in their own behalf. The author then leads seamlessly to union, civic, and governmental efforts to create lasting industrial peace and to find an approach to labor struggles that might, to some minimal degree, balance the relationship between workers and management.

Still, the value of this book lies beyond the well-described treatment of the standard moments of industrial and labor history. Lambert makes his most satisfying contribution as he explains the dramatic and costly shift in political and economic power that resulted from the ever-changing conception of the political and moral basis of the right to strike. From a critical and fundamental right of citizenship based on civic republican principles, workers have found their right to strike reduced to a commercial arrangement that is at the same time practically limited and politically vulnerable. From a radical expression of the citizenship demands of free labor, the strike has become insecure, divorced from other political and cultural struggles, and subject to increasing suppression and erosion. Lost in this exchange has been the role of the strike in extending political rights of participation and representation to the workplace; the ability to challenge the often docile and acquiescent quality of free labor; and the greater social justice that can come from working people insisting upon and exercising greater economic power.

To explore this further, Lambert shifts attention away from the typical understanding of the strike as an instrument used to level the economic playing field and force employers to the bargaining table. While crucial, this use of power itself depends upon the expressive power of the strike—a power that permits workers to find decency and meaning in their experiences with mass production and other modern forms of labor. Striking workers can reclaim

their human and political dignity in a context in which defiance is often very costly, while engaging in the self-governance inherent in the full citizenship of free workers. It is necessary to address these points because as Lambert makes clear, while often thought a tool for pressing demands pertaining solely to wages, benefits, and working conditions, the strike should represent much more. At a time when many understand political freedom to involve little more than the pulling of a voting lever every four or so years, this reconsideration of the nature of the strike and its implications for freedom and democracy should generate wide discussion.

To have lost this richer sense of participation is to have lost a lot. We are left with an image of striking workers as engaged in a narrow struggle over “pure-and-simple” unionism that has abandoned any notion of free workers existing not simply as factors in production but as self-governing citizens whose rights and obligations cannot be reduced to commercial arrangements alone. The advent of modern models of industrial relations has served the state by reducing civil strife and has satisfied business by leaving fundamental economic relationships unchallenged—but workers have found themselves less powerful, less certain, and, in some ways, less free. The choice to withhold labor has not been completely destroyed, of course, but the degree to which the strike could represent an efficacious expression of individual and collective self-determination has changed, perhaps beyond repair.

As he continues, Lambert describes contemporary events to demonstrate the deep costs of the shift in our understanding of the right to strike. He addresses the effects of World War II, the successful passage of the Taft-Hartley legislation, the inability to see labor as a constituent part of the broader Civil Rights struggle, the onset of costly legislation making possible permanent striker replacement, and other changes. He also challenges recent legal scholarship, addresses the role of shifting party alliances, and questions the emergence of rising presidential powers as he wends his way through these issues. Doing so, he reveals the weakened state of organized labor as it struggles to survive the increasingly feeble condition of the strike and to regain political and economic power.

One can always find a shortcoming in a work of even this density—perhaps more about other means by which organized labor has challenged capital, such as the controversial “corporate campaigns,” or a discussion of intentional ties to other social justice organizations—but that is no criticism here. Lambert presents a sophisticated and tightly structured argument, and I am certain that watching future developments in American labor will be richer for those who have read *If Workers Took a Notion* and considered all that the author has offered.

Not Working: Latina Immigrants, Low-Wage Jobs, and the Failure of Welfare Reform. By Alejandra Marchevsky and Jeanne Theoharis. New York: New York University Press, 2006. 336p. \$75.00 cloth, \$22.00 paper.

— Lawrence M. Mead, *New York University*

This is an ethnographic study of how welfare reform affected Mexican immigrants in Long Beach, California, in the late 1990s. Poverty research is dominated by impersonal statistical studies. Ethnography is valuable for giving more hands-on sense on how the poor react to social policy. The authors know the welfare field well, and they write well. They are, however, much more hostile to welfare reform than are most experts. The major issue their book raises is whether we can take their position seriously. (Full disclosure: I am myself a proponent of reform whom the authors criticize.)

Most scholars think that welfare reform was a considerable, if incomplete, success. It drove the welfare rolls down by 60 percent, sharply raised work levels among single mothers, and reduced poverty, without causing much hardship. It did not, however, get most of the leavers out of poverty immediately, assure them advancement, or address the work problems of poor men.

The Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC), the leading evaluator of welfare reform programs, tracked the implementation and effects of reform in several localities, including Los Angeles County. Alejandra Marchevsky initially did her fieldwork as part of this study. The project write-up, much like the scholarly consensus, found that welfare reform had moved many welfare mothers into jobs without widespread hardship, but without making them much better off. By national standards, California was liberal, paying high benefits and putting less pressure on families to work or leave welfare than elsewhere (Denise F. Polit et al., *Welfare Reform in Los Angeles: Implementation, Effects, and Experiences of Poor Families and Neighborhoods*, 2005).

Marchevsky and her coauthor, Jeanne Theoharis, find, to the contrary, that welfare reform kicked immigrant families off the rolls and denied them other benefits illegally, forced them into the unskilled jobs they could already get, denied them access to education for better jobs, and failed to provide affordable child care. Reform was racist and nativist, determined to drive Mexican women off welfare and into the low-wage economy.

Whom should we believe? Different conclusions might reflect different evidence. *Not Working* rests entirely on the testimony of the 14 immigrant recipients whom Marchevsky interviewed. One might think that number too few. How they were selected is not fully explained, and they might have been unrepresentative. The immigrants' case workers were not interviewed, and so we have merely the mothers' word about how they were treated.

On the other hand, the recipients do not sound unlike those portrayed in other research. The authors claim that the women "had worked long before welfare reform, and worked, and worked, but . . . could not get out of poverty" (p. 205). But they also indicate that most of the mothers were not working at the time they were interviewed (pp. 143, 150, 157). Much of the point of reform was to get mothers to work more consistently. And while the mothers do criticize welfare, they also accept personal responsibility for much of their predicament (pp. 190–91).

So the reason for the authors' negative verdict is probably not that the evidence they developed was atypical. Rather, it is their interpretation, in two respects. First, they take a radically determinist view of the causes of poverty and dependency. They see the mothers as hopelessly trapped within a racist and unequal society. Racism denies them equal opportunity, while a "post-Fordist" economy seeks only to force them into low-wage work. Welfare reform is the handmaiden of these pressures, not any protection from them.

Second, they reject the moral premise of reform, which is that adult recipients, if employable, should work alongside the taxpayers on whom they rely. Instead, they reaffirm entitlement—the principle, still favored by many liberals, that poor mothers deserve aid on the basis of need alone, whether or not they work. Society, the authors believe, is blind to the adverse conditions it creates. Despite liberal rhetoric, it accepts no responsibility for poverty, all of which is thrust onto the recipients as individuals.

One might call these premises wrong, or at least unreasonable. The mothers interviewed claim more "agency" and "power" for themselves, and hence more responsibility, than the authors allow them (p. 191). The fact that welfare reform put so many mothers to work refuted the belief, held by many academics, that most poor were unemployable. If Mexican women are so oppressed in America, why would they come here? The idea that welfare adults should have to work is endorsed by the vast majority of the recipients themselves, as well as the public. Welfare reform did not reject all responsibility for poverty; if it had, welfare would simply have been abolished. Rather, and quite reasonably, the onus for both poverty and its solution was divided between the recipients and the society. They had to work, while government also helped them with new benefits.

How to apportion responsibility for social problems between the individual and the society is always judgmental, however. Complaint—the projection of one's problems onto the environment—is always possible. So the authors' views cannot be called simply false. The deeper objection to them is moral. By painting the poor as powerless, they demean them. The society impugns them as "alien," "hypersexual," and "criminal," the authors write (p. 44). But it is they who use such language, not

government. They end up diminishing the very people they claim to defend.

By rejecting all obligations for the poor, the authors insult their readers. Who made us responsible for all of the world's problems? Arguments for antipoverty programs must make some appeal to the interests and values of those paying the bills. The authors' determinist and condescending style utterly fails to do that. One cannot call it wrong on its own premises, but it is self-indulgent. They end up claiming all understanding for themselves, thrusting all responsibility on society, and leaving the recipients with little of either. That view does not generate realistic ways to understand poverty or change it.

Popular Efficacy in the Democratic Era: A Reexamination of Electoral Accountability in the United States, 1828–2000. By Peter F. Nardulli. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005. 284p. \$39.50.

— Paul Allen Beck, *Ohio State University*

Peter Nardulli's book blends syntheses of previous research and new empirical analysis to address the question of the capacity of American voters to hold political leaders accountable through elections—to achieve, that is, “popular efficacy.” The book begins by interpreting previous scholarly research as depicting voters as “manageable fools” because of their limited cognitive abilities for political evaluation (Chapter 2) and their habitual reliance on party identifications to dictate their vote choices (Chapter 4). Given this, why do politicians pay attention to public concerns? The original empirical analysis of the book answers this question. It shows how variations in and deviations from the normal vote are related to exogenous forces beyond the control of politicians, rather than habitual party loyalties or political strategies. The realization that their fortunes are tied to forces beyond their control, in turn, induces strategic politicians to be responsive to the public's core concerns.

The book's central empirical analyses relate local (county/city) presidential results from 1828 to 2000 to various demographic, performance, and partisan indicators—measured at the local level where available and at higher levels of aggregation where local measures are unavailable. Multielection moving averages of presidential results determine each electoral unit's normal (or party) vote—the aggregate-data operationalization of Philip Converse's well-known concept. Changes in this normal vote and deviations from it in vote results suggest the presence of exogenous (i.e., nonparty) influences. The development of this rich data archive is a valuable contribution itself, but it is how these data are employed to address important democratic-theory questions about voting behavior that constitutes the major contribution of *Popular Efficacy in the Democratic Era*.

The impact of a work typically depends on its new or unexpected results, and this book provides a number of them. Chapter 6 compares the “machine model” of steadfast partisan loyalties against the “pluralist model” of partisan loyalties contingent upon a party's representation of social groups. The machine model is supported only at the tail end of the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century. Even during this period and throughout the entire 1872–2000 period analyzed, the pluralist model fits voting patterns much better. Rather than serving as a reservoir that party elites can draw upon at any time, Nardulli concludes, partisan loyalties must be earned continuously by the parties' responsiveness to social groups. Moreover, with social change, the social bases of the parties themselves change—sharply (critically) in 1932 and 1952, more slowly (secularly) at the turn of the twentieth century and in response to the Civil War. So important are these group bases of voting in the book's macro-level account that they should be receiving more attention in voting behavior specialists' micro-level studies.

Chapter 7 systematically examines electoral changes that denote various realignment-triggered electoral eras. While the analysis confirms the familiar critical elections of 1856, 1896, and 1932, it adds 1836 and 1952 as turning-point contests. Nardulli fixes 1952 as the start of the “Civil Rights era” in which white southerners began to move into the Republican Party. (Even if this migration began in 1952, though, the label ignores the class, not race, basis of the pre-1960s movement that other scholars have demonstrated.) He also finds that in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, when political parties are thought to have had their greatest hold on voters, most locales experienced substantial changes in presidential voting patterns.

Chapter 8 turns to “electoral perturbations” (i.e., temporary deviations) from the normal voting patterns and their relationship to exogenous factors (economic conditions, war and peace, crime) versus endogenous factors that parties control (home state, war hero, and incumbent candidates, and party control of government). Although incorporating such variables into the analysis often required a shift to state and national aggregates, the results are worth the price. Some findings are familiar: Economic conditions are powerful influences on electoral results, and presiding over wars erodes the electoral strength of the incumbent party. Other results are surprising: Crime rates have little effect on Democrats, while increasing crime rates hurt incumbent Republicans. The often-touted home state, war hero, and incumbent advantages turn out not to be advantages at all. Monopoly control of all branches of government over time depresses support for the majority party. That exogenous forces influence voting results more than those easily manipulated by strategic elites, Nardulli concludes, makes voters less “manageable” and politicians more attuned to popular wishes.

Chapter 9 turns to the distribution of presidential election results over time across various levels of competitiveness and fidelity to party (normal vs. deviating vs. endorsement elections). While competitiveness is very rare at the local level, it increases at each higher level of aggregation—and is especially pronounced in the states before the Civil War and nationwide through 1884, then occasionally after World War II. Surprisingly, normal elections were far more common prior to the Progressive era and have been rare ever since. In this sense, the Progressive reforms seem to have realized their goal of increasing accountability.

Addressing questions about voting behavior from the standpoint of aggregate election results is a challenging enterprise. Nardulli deserves compliments for his effort in building a valuable subnational election data archive, his caution in drawing inferences from aggregate data, his creativity in devising aggregate indicators of voting patterns and their possible determinants, his methodological sophistication (including his ingenious estimates of electoral college impacts), and the novel results his analysis has produced. This short review cannot do justice to the book's contributions.

At the same time, one experiences the uneasiness about what the indicators are actually measuring that is common in aggregate analysis. For example, a normal vote estimated solely from election results for such a visible office as the presidency is a questionable indicator of the underlying partisanship of an electorate, especially one with many independents and varying rates of turnout. Nor is it obvious that party control of the legislature is a useful surrogate for political machine strength, that nationally measured indicators can capture the effects of economic conditions adequately, or how crime rates should affect the vote prior to modern times. In my judgment, Nardulli also overstates the negativity of the survey evidence on voter capabilities, neglecting the “cognitive miser” characteristics of decision making by both masses *and* elites and understating the roots of party identifications in issue- and group-oriented responses to political competition. Finally, the identification of 1952 as a turning point election begs for further exploration, especially given its position as one of two foundational elections for the Michigan model.

Despite these problems, this is an important book for scholars of voting behavior, American politics, and democratic theory. One of its great strengths is how well the empirical results are brought to bear upon democratic theory questions. Some may be uncomfortable that accountability, in the end, depends upon politicians' fear of electoral risks from forces beyond their control and, especially, that these forces are based more on performance than policy. Nonetheless, by empirically demonstrating these risks, their sources, and their consequences, *Popular Efficacy in the Democratic Era* has added

valuably to our understanding of political accountability in America.

First Person Political: Legislative Life and the Meaning of Public Service. By Grant Reeher. New York: New York University Press, 2006. 216p. \$65.00 cloth, \$21.00 paper.

— Carolyn N. Long, *Washington State University Vancouver*

At a time when public disillusionment with elected leaders and political institutions is increasing rapidly, it is refreshing to read a book that highlights the selfless nature of public service.

This book explores what motivates people to run for state legislative office, what influences them while serving, and why they decide to stand for reelection or voluntarily leave the legislature. The revelation here—that elected officials are primarily motivated to serve the public good—emerges from the personal, compelling stories of legislators from three northeastern states.

To present these stories, Grant Reeher draws primarily on detailed interviews with 77 legislators of the Connecticut, New York, and Vermont lower statehouses during the mid-1990s. The interviews were semistructured to allow the author to draw conclusions across his population, but open enough to allow the legislators to speak freely of their experiences in public life. He also personally observed these legislators in a variety of settings, including activities common in a legislative workday (committee meetings, floor sessions, informal meetings with colleagues and lobbyists), and in their districts. A more limited follow-up telephone interview in 2004 and 2005 with a third of his interviewees provided updates on what took place since his initial contact. Information from the public record and a survey of 233 legislators from the same three states rounds out his methodological approach.

The introductory chapter reviews the public's low regard for politicians and government. At the state level, Reeher explains, this is reflected in the term limits movement and the increased use of initiative and referenda over the last 15 years, both of which limit the power of elected representatives. More broadly, he points to survey data that illustrates the public's suspicion that elected officials are motivated by personal and private interests and the overall decline in civic engagement.

Reeher identifies several sources of the problem, including negative and expensive political campaigns, the media's emphasis on scandal and corruption, uncivil commentary by the political punditry, and the tendency of political rivals to engage in investigation and litigation as tools to destroy one another. Political scientists are also identified as one of the likely culprits; during the last several decades, legislative scholars increasingly used rational choice theory to illustrate that legislative behavior is primarily motivated by self-interest, rather than promotion of the public good. It is such a perception that

Reeher hopes to counteract in this book. His aim, he candidly states, is to provide “a measure of *respect* for and a sense of the *dignity* of elected office” (p. 19).

The chapters that follow chronologically trace legislators’ lives. “Arriving” discusses the motivations behind candidates’ decision to run for office and their experiences on the campaign trail. These personal stories show us that candidates, many of whom come from politically active families and previous involvement in social and political organizations, are strongly committed to public service rather than personal ambition. “Serving” describes legislators’ experiences while in office, including what they did or did not enjoy about their service and the challenges faced. Almost all of the legislators interviewed discussed personal satisfaction with the job and their love of service, especially if they were successful in helping others through constituency work or if they were able to solve a major policy issue. Also clear, however, is dissatisfaction with the loss of friendship and camaraderie in an increasingly hostile legislative and campaign environment, and frustration with the amount of time required to effectively serve. “Staying and Going” details the difficult decision to stand for reelection or retire from the legislature. The reasons provided are varied, but all reflect the fact that “many legislators agonize over the decision” (p. 137)—torn between their investment in the job and satisfaction from their work, on the one hand, and family and professional obligations and dissatisfaction with the more negative side of politics, on the other.

The concluding chapter, “Falling Down and Standing Up,” contains Reeher’s insights about five problems that emerged from his interviews and personal observations: ambition and ego, partisanship, top-down leadership, incompetence, and prejudice. While these problems do not individually or collectively diminish the amount of good he discovered in his subjects’ legislative lives, he addresses them here to illustrate the multifaceted nature of public service in a state legislature today.

This is a wonderful read. The book realistically portrays the various stages in a legislator’s life and the challenges one faces while in office. Reeher takes pains to protect the anonymity of his interviewees and allows these stories to be told through the use of largely unedited, extensive quotations wherein the legislator frequently covers a variety of subjects. This is, however, both a blessing and a curse. It is fascinating to read such candid commentary, but at times one has to search for meaning within a particularly long passage. Fortunately, Reeher highlights main points at the end of large excerpts and also provides a useful summary at the end of the major chapters.

One minor quibble concerns the presentation of the material, rather than its content. Passages from the interviews, questions posed, updates on the legislator, and text from the author are not easily distinguishable, and often commentaries from several different legislators are pre-

sented in such a manner (separated only by asterisk) that it is difficult to tell them apart. While this does not diminish the quality of the book, it affects its readability.

First Person Political is an important contribution to the study of legislative behavior. We learn about legislators as people, and their personal stories convincingly reflect commitment to the public good. The fact that Reeher addresses the more seamy side of politics in the final chapter also illustrates his effort to present a balanced view of legislative life. He largely succeeds in his effort to present a more humane and, many would argue, more accurate picture of why people choose elected office.

The Politics of Democratic Inclusion. Edited by Christina Wolbrecht and Rodney E. Hero. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005. 352p. \$69.50 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

— Rogan Kersh, *Syracuse University*

Are edited volumes an endangered species? Publishers report poor sales of most titles, junior faculty are advised not to publish in them lest tenure committees frown, and a scant few feature pathbreaking research. Yet occasionally, an essay collection reminds us of the considerable benefits of this scholarly genre. The best edited volumes are oriented around a compelling theme, address that core from diverse perspectives, and feature a collection of expert authors working at a high scholarly pitch. *The Politics of Democratic Inclusion* is one such book.

Editors Christina Wolbrecht and Rodney Hero begin by persuasively casting democratic inclusion—defined as “political incorporation, representation, and influence of various disadvantaged social groups” (p. 4)—as foundational to the American political order. This is hardly a new topic among political scientists or historians. But collectively, the chapters address the subject from a fresh angle, viewing *institutions* as essential constraints on and abettors of inclusion in the U.S. polity.

The volume is organized into three sections; reading each provides an unusually coherent look at one vital aspect of the interplay of institutions and democratic inclusion. The first section concerns diversity within and across groups: Here, one focus is, as expected, the myriad (and oft-changing) ways in which inter- and intragroup differences affect issues like immigrant incorporation and social acceptance of minorities. But each chapter in this section also investigates institutions’ role in group definition and delineation. Thus, for example, Jennifer Hochschild’s powerful study examines the ways in which “skin-tone hierarchies” intersect with formal-legal routes to exclusion and inclusion. Michael Jones-Correa similarly integrates institutional concerns into his overview of immigrant incorporation, outlining the complex dynamics arising from the federalist U.S. polity’s multiple, fragmented institutional layers. Dennis Chong and Reuel Rogers distinguish black Americans’ experience of inclusion from that of

other minority groups, while attending to the institutional effects of that separate consciousness: These are evident in patterns of voter turnout, party membership/participation, and other indices of political engagement.

Chong and Rogers's attention to elements like party involvement and campaign activities provides a neat transition to the volume's second section, which features five chapters devoted to mediating institutions—interest groups, parties, social movements—as (often imperfect) agents of inclusion. Separate contributions by Paul Frymer and Jan Leighey each take up the effects of political parties on African American mobilization and incorporation. Together they drive home an important point. The two-party system typically “is thought to promote the inclusion of racial minorities and groups otherwise disadvantaged in terms of wealth, resources, and power,” in Frymer's words (p. 122). Both authors instead demonstrate that the party system tends to *discourage* blacks' participation; their explanations differ in respects, but the overall argument is convincing—and disturbing. Such a conclusion is further affirmed by Miki Caul Kittilson and Katherine Tate's comparative attention to U.S. and U.K. political parties and inclusion. Their chapter also addresses the importance of political opportunity structures (an underutilized concept in studies of American politics) in shaping the intricate relation of parties and minority representation.

Parties are again at issue, this time concerning immigrant incorporation, in Kristi Andersen and Elizabeth Cohen's ambitious chapter. These authors trace patterns in immigrants' political engagement across time, identifying three principal factors that influence democratic inclusion: institutions, public policy, and differential characteristics of immigrant groups. Their stark reminder that, across U.S. history, large swaths of the immigrant population were not integrated into political and civic life raises an intriguing question about interest groups' role in this process: Will these “non-party institutions” facilitate inclusion “in more or less effective and desirable ways?” (p. 202). Anne Costain provides a partial answer in her chapter on social movements, describing the trajectory from outsiders' movement to established interest group as engendering an “endurance of struggle” that is “among the most effective [means] historically for winning political access for excluded groups” (p. 119).

Social movements mark a rare success story, especially compared to parties, in terms of mediating institutions' incorporation of out-groups. The primary governing institutions of the U.S. state, as explored in the book's third section, fare little better. Presidents, like parties long heralded as icons of democratic inclusiveness, are shown by Patricia Conley to have hindered as often as advanced incorporative changes. Though a small number of presidents, such as Lincoln, Lyndon Johnson, and FDR, have played vital roles in opening the political system to histor-

ically excluded groups, attention to these figures obscures the wide “variation in presidential responsiveness” (p. 328). A similarly demythologizing account of federal courts is supplied by Michael McCann and George Lovell. By a different path they arrive at a conclusion similar to Gerald Rosenberg's in *The Hollow Hope* (xxxx): that courts are a poor source of enduring change for “excluded, exploited, or subaltern groups in the United States” (p. 276).

David Canon's chapter on racial interests and congressional representation revisits his memorable *Legislative Studies* piece of a few years' vintage. Readers unfamiliar with descriptive representation, racial redistricting, cumulative voting, and other hot-button topics will find this an expert summary. Whether Congress, the “people's branch,” serves more generally as an avenue to democratic inclusion is left an open question here.

Especially welcome were two chapters on non-national institutions. Susan Clarke's treatment of urbanization and “splintering citizenship” reminded me how unfortunately rare are accounts of city politics in studies of U.S. governance. Hers was also one of the volume's strongest theoretical treatments of democratic inclusion, questioning established models and offering two intriguing alternatives, both based around local governance. Also locally oriented is Kenneth Meier's chapter on school boards, and education bureaucracies more generally: The widening gap between U.S. schools' aspirations to teaching tolerance and acceptance and actual classroom practices continues this book's sobering assessment of the state of democratic inclusion in past and present-day America alike.

At the time of this writing, debates about immigration were front and center in Washington, with serious commentary on all sides expressing genuine perplexity about how to proceed. Balancing a desire to aid 12 million illegal immigrants (most of them essential low-wage workers) seeking some form of amnesty and road to citizenship with fears of international terrorism seems as thorny a problem as has existed in the turbulent history of U.S. immigration policy. Public officials in search of illumination would do well to pick up *The Politics of Democratic Inclusion*, both for a deeper understanding of the issues involved and a set of searching policy discussions.

American Mythos: Why Our Best Efforts to Be a Better Nation Fall Short. By Robert Wuthnow. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006. 298p. \$29.95.

— David Fott, *University of Nevada, Las Vegas*

Robert Wuthnow's insightful book examines the stories that we Americans like to believe about ourselves, not so much for the purpose of discovering whether those stories are true—though he presents plenty of evidence to show both truth and falsity in them—as for the sake of showing what the United States needs to become a better nation. The falsity in those “narratives” makes our perceptions of

ourselves biased (p. 1), he argues; but because they function at the level of “deep meaning” behind our collective thinking (p. 25), we rarely question their validity. Such questioning should be the work of “reflective democracy” (p. 3), a combination of opinions from experts and the masses. Since the United States is a country of immigrants, Wuthnow relies on interviews with “new immigrant elites because they provide a particularly interesting informational context in which to examine ideas about cultural renewal” (p. 9). It stands to reason that elites will be more interesting than the masses, but is Wuthnow’s sample a good way to gauge the prospects for democracy? “Cultural renewal” involves families, schools, and civic associations, but it is not always clear what he means by *culture*. At times he gives the word an entirely intellectual meaning (e.g., “basic values and . . . taken-for-granted understandings of what it means to be good people and to live responsibly in a good society” [p. 14]).

Wuthnow welcomes the increased attention to diversity in our society, but he recognizes that the resulting proliferation of special-interest groups and identity politics is problematic. He tries to strike the right balance between the individual and the group by analyzing “various meanings of the *self*. . . or perhaps better, the human person” (p. 40). Unfortunately, he forgets that correction as he proceeds to argue that the right balance involves fostering “strong selves” who contribute to their communities (p. 42). The term *self*, with its philosophical baggage, preserves the psychological inwardness that Wuthnow wants to overcome. Is it safe to say that his diction betrays a bias toward individualism? There is other evidence: “personhood is achieved only as people *lose themselves* in service to others” (p. 50); “embedded selves” are “*constrained* by their social locations” (p. 54, emphases added). He may complain about our overemphasis on individual rights, but he shows a fondness for certain terms—values, empowerment, lifestyle—that reinforce that emphasis.

The first chapters to delve into immigrants’ narratives concerns privilege. The privilege enjoyed by many immigrants is generally considered to be justified by their psychological adjustment in giving up their former homes for a chance at success. But “it is hard to imagine that we are a noble people if losing our homes is the price of privilege” (p. 80). The author rightly directs our attention to the heavy cost all Americans pay when rootlessness is a precondition of success.

Another American narrative is that of the self-made person. According to Wuthnow, it encourages hard work and sacrifice, but it also reinforces the questionable equation of success in life with distinction in one’s career and omits the roles played by luck and society. Such stories habituate Americans to look for morality in private, not public, life; when it comes to philanthropy, instead of seeking systemic improvements they will “place their bets on helping the few whose lives may with time emulate

their own” (p. 127). The positive side of that coin, which he sees, is that most Americans believe that industriousness leads to success, and so they work hard.

Wuthnow finds serious problems with the shibboleth that America’s religious vitality serves both religion and liberty. Active religious communities should feature a great deal of charitable work and social and political discussion. But the diversity that prevents one sect from gaining control also seems to lead most Americans to consider all religions true; indeed, many people believe that the purpose of religion is not to provide access to spiritual truth but to make their own lives more comfortable. As a result, religion becomes privatized. The author cites one survey of religious Korean Americans, many of whom performed volunteer work in their churches and neighborhoods but who were less likely than other Americans to be politically active. He concludes that they were not “significantly contributing to the vitality of American democracy” (p. 153). But he neglects Tocqueville’s distinction between civic and political associations, both of which contribute to democracy. Nevertheless, Wuthnow cogently explains how democracy suffers when religion is privatized: Right and wrong become matters of private opinion; politics is shaped more by charisma than by principle; and those who still believe that their religion is exclusively true tend to be better mobilized for political success.

Wuthnow is an ethnic pluralist, not an assimilationist. But he too quickly dismisses assimilation as aiming for a society of people who “think and behave like white Anglo-Saxon Protestants” (p. 164). He is not content with what sociologist Herbert Gans called “symbolic ethnicity”: preserving the trappings of an ethnic tradition while ignoring that tradition when it becomes inconvenient. He realizes that many Americans are thus content but counters that symbolic ethnicity merely strengthens stereotypes without providing for interethnic dialogue. He argues for more ethnically conscious educational and hiring policies and stronger extended families.

Many Americans believe that immigrants may save them from their materialistic ways, but they are unwilling to abandon the fruits of commercial society. It is not true, Wuthnow argues, that such a society eliminates all traces of ethnicity, but it does become oligarchic, and we should also worry when the logic of the marketplace extends itself to other areas, especially to religion.

The concluding chapter, “Venues for Reflective Democracy,” is disappointing, because Wuthnow does not identify any venues. Reflective democracy, he says, requires that the public be not only politically informed but also able to examine its cultural assumptions. But when the first condition is poorly met, what are the chances for the more difficult one? He recognizes that town meetings and other public forums have never fulfilled that function, civic associations are not sufficiently diverse, higher education disproportionately serves the

young, and the mass media do not offer much deep cultural analysis.

I should not end negatively, because this book contains keen reflections that make it well worth reading. Wuthnow gives a compelling account of the transformation of American society from an era of conformity in the 1950s to an era of good feelings today (pp. 42–48). He chides the establishment liberalism of the *New York Times* for

simultaneously defending the rights of Muslim schoolgirls in France and Germany to wear scarves and warning them that if they wear the scarves they may understandably be branded fanatics (pp. 155–56). He shows how a society that encourages immigrants to privatize their religious beliefs develops a bland sameness, despite ethnic diversity (p. 162). *American Mythos* is a significant contribution, especially to the current debate over immigration.

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Ethnic Politics after Communism. Edited by Zoltan Barany and Robert G. Moser. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. 296p. \$19.95.

— D. Christopher Brooks, *St. Olaf College*

In the wake of communism's collapse, dire predictions of intractable ethno-religious conflict throughout the post-Soviet and East Central European territories were the order of the day. Although ethnic violence overshadowed opportunities for political transformation in the Caucasus and Balkans during the 1990s, many of the potential fault lines of ethnic conflict have weathered the tumultuous period of transition either without incident or via institutionally regulated means. While it is fortunate in human terms that the latent ethnic tensions in most instances fell short of their genocidal potential, the failure of political science and sociology to predict accurately the scope of ethnic conflict resulting from the implosion of communist regimes highlights the limitations of social science, especially when the events it purports to explain are rapidly unfolding. With a firm grasp of these limitations and 15 years of hindsight, Zoltan Barany and Robert Moser, in their edited volume, reassess the impact that regime change and state collapse have had on identity and ethnicity and, in turn, how ethnicity and nationalism have shaped the transitions from real socialism.

Adopting an explicitly constructivist tone, the editors selected contributions that focus on the manner in which ethnicity, identity, and nationalism function as both dependent *and* independent variables in the states and societies of postcommunist Eurasia and Europe. The flexibility endemic to such an approach affords the contributors an opportunity to explore the manner in which ethnicity contributes to our understanding of a range of political topics with general appeal in a circumscribed geopolitical region. Their book is rife with theoretical insights and empirical findings valuable to comparativists of various stripes and thin on major errors and omissions.

First, the temporal distance between the events comprising the collapse of communism and the publication of this volume affords a timely consideration of ethnic poli-

tics that speaks definitively about very specific events, trends, and outcomes while remaining highly relevant to the transitions—democratic or otherwise—experienced by postcommunist societies. However, one striking feature of the book that Roger Peterson's conclusion highlights (pp. 225 and 233) is the collective downplaying of the importance of the “legacies of communism,” popularized in Barany and Ivan Volgyes's edited work, *The Legacies of Communism in Eastern Europe* (1995), to ethnic politics in the region. While Peterson, perhaps, is correct in his belief that legacies play an important role in shaping the landscape against which ethnic politics take place, their conspicuous absence from most works indicates correctly that as we move further away from 1989 and 1991, communism's immediate and causal impact will wane.

Second, this work intersects in important ways with broad literatures in comparative politics. Mark R. Beissinger's chapter concerning the imperial nature of the former Soviet Union and the implications of its collapse for minority politics and national self-determination should be of particular interest to students of regime change and democratization. Many of the other chapters draw heavily upon ethnic conflict and politics literature as they squarely engage, challenge, and affirm many of the traditional approaches to the topic, including primordialist, instrumentalist, and rational choice theories. Furthermore, a privileging of constructivist approaches lends itself to alternative explanations of ethnic political behavior, such as the impact of international regimes (Will Kymlicka), elite leadership (Daniel Chirot), political institutions (David Laitin, Moser, and Charles King), and structural factors (Barany). Finally, this work should appeal to comparativists interested in ethnicity or the postcommunist world and makes important contributions on the institutionalization of international rights (Kymlicka), migration and the trafficking of women (King), elections and party system development (Moser), requisites of social mobilization (Barany), and citizenship and assimilation (Laitin).

Third, this volume effectively transcends the empiricist versus area studies debate promulgated first by Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl (“The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Attempt to Go?” *Slavic Review* 53 [Spring

1994]: 173–85) and Valerie Bunce (“Should Transitologists Be Grounded?” *Slavic Review* 54 [Spring 1995]: 111–27). While contributors to *Ethnic Politics after Communism* were selected by the editors on the basis of their expertise on the politics of ethnicity and the breadth and depth of their knowledge of the postcommunist world, the deftness with which their arguments are advanced and the attention given to the region’s historical and cultural peculiarities are inspiring and illustrative of thorough research.

A major strength of this collection is the manner in which it is tied together exceptionally well by the theme of empire collapse eloquently advanced by Beissinger. While the sustenance of the imperial theme is not readily apparent in the subsequent chapters by Laitin and Barany on linguistic assimilation and ethnic mobilization, respectively, the impact of the communist empire’s collapse is revisited in various forms and with increased clarity as the book proceeds until it crescendos in King’s chapter on migration. And Kymlicka’s chapter on attempts to define, codify, and implement international regimes to protect minority rights serves as an appropriate coda to the volume as a whole. But it is from this chapter that a key opportunity to bring the theme of empire back full circle is missed by the editors. The degree of influence and cultural hegemony exerted by the European Union, especially on European postcommunist states, to defend the rights of ethnic groups parallels closely Beissinger’s evaluation of the former Soviet Union as “the first of a new form of empire whose crucial contributions were its denial of its imperial quality and its use of the very cornerstones of the modern nation-state system . . . as instruments of nonconsensual control over culturally distinct populations” (p. 17). While direct comparisons of the former USSR to the European Union as empires might be tenuous if not objectionable, one is left with a distinct impression that ethno-religious groups’ potential to achieve national self-determination, political rights, or cultural autonomy may be truncated by the gravitational pull of liberal empire to the West.

Citizens Abroad: Emigration and the State in the Middle East and North Africa. By Laurie A. Brand. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 264p. \$85.00.

— Laura K. Landolt, *Virginia Wesleyan College*

This book charts new territory by taking *emigration*, and the policies of sending states toward their citizens abroad, seriously. Laurie Brand’s comparative examination of state emigration institutions and policy across Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, and Jordan places her in an excellent position both to critique and to contribute to literatures on transnationalism and citizenship that are myopically focused on immigration to the North and host country policies toward migrants. Most intriguingly, early research led Brand to frame her investigation in terms of broader

questions about the contemporary reconfiguration of “sovereignty in the international system” by home states in response not only to host state actions but also to the changing demands, material resources, and experiences of émigré communities (pp. 10–11, 222).

Through careful historical case studies, Brand seeks to build theory about the institutionalization of émigré policy. She asks: “What are the ‘elements that drive or shape states’ policies toward various forms of emigration?” and “Are these state institutions ‘indicative of changes in the contours of the nation, in the practice of sovereignty, and perhaps even more broadly, in the world system?’” (pp. 3, 8). Underlying her questions is a concern with state resilience, and the ways in which “borders, security and state identity” are produced and reproduced through home states’ changing relationships with nationals abroad (p. 23). Each case study is both structured and informed by this “sovereignty-security-identity” nexus.

Brand initiates her discussion by identifying an expanding disjuncture between sovereignty over people and sovereignty over territory (p. 31). Because of her focus on the creation and evolution of home state institutions as a means for states to retain sovereignty over people abroad, she symbolically reclaims global populations of the “stateless, expatriates, guest workers and dual nationals” for the international system. At the same time, she moves beyond the inside/outside dichotomy still common in contemporary discussions of sovereignty, and explores more fluid notions of citizenship and participation (pp. 30–31, 36–37). Perhaps most importantly, the author does not deny the agency or resilience of stateless populations, and the case studies are most lively and compelling when she is able to recount actual cases of bargaining between expatriates and state representatives (pp. 163, 214). Indeed, in these accounts, emigrants become “key actors” in histories of “national political development” (p. 219).

Each country case includes investigation into “macro-historical,” “international politics,” “economic,” “domestic political,” and “security/stability” explanations for state policy toward nationals abroad (pp. 14–18). State efforts to expand sovereignty over people located outside of national territory are initiated for a number of reasons and take many forms. Morocco was quick to visualize émigrés as “cash cows,” and designed a number of policies to attract and facilitate expatriate remittances and, later, investment. In terms of debates about brain drain from developing countries, it is particularly interesting to note state efforts to train workers and facilitate emigration not only as a means to gain needed hard currency but also to expand and improve bilateral ties. In the case of Jordan, which was relatively slow to recognize the direct value of remittances to the domestic economy, state officials understood that labor exports to Gulf states were tied directly to foreign aid receipts (p. 189).

The status of émigrés in host countries proved a particularly valuable set of explanations for changes in home state policy. Located by Brand within the category of “macro-historical” explanations, status includes “evolution of the distribution and size of the community/ies, their degree of economic” and political “integration (and success) in the receiving state, and their self-perception” (p. 15).

Across the cases, home states appear more likely to deploy sovereignty claims as “control over” rather than “protection of” émigrés. Tunisia represents the most extreme case in which expatriate labor was initially conceptualized as functionally equivalent to domestic employment (p. 94). Expatriates were ultimately viewed “as part of the domestic body politic” and “were subject to the same surveillance and harassment regarding political opinions and activities as were their compatriots back home” (p. 128). But sovereignty as “control over” is also negotiated by all parties concerned. Successful home state control over émigrés depends partly on a confluence of interests between home and host states, as well as a weakened status among émigré groups.

Perhaps the most fascinating aspects of the case studies concern negotiations between émigrés and home states over citizenship. Not surprisingly, states were concerned about how expatriates might influence domestic political stability—whether by demanding greater democratization (Morocco, Tunisia), by shifting the balance of domestic power among confessional groups (Lebanon), or by shifting loyalty to competing Palestinian leaders (Jordan).

In Morocco, Tunisia, and Lebanon, Brand argues, changes in émigré status in host countries (longer-term stays, greater opportunities for integration, decline of identity with the home state among successive generations) encouraged states to reconceptualize émigrés—from subjects into citizens—in order to successfully negotiate some form of continued sovereignty over them. In Morocco, for example, the state humanized its subjects in order to “maintain some claim on the communities’ energies and resources” (pp. 79, 113). The unanswered question here is: How much of Morocco’s domestic liberalization can be ascribed to direct and indirect émigré influence on the state? While it is not possible to answer this question definitively, the effort might produce interesting results.

Finally, Brand notes the importance of host state characteristics and policies, but this set of actors is rather peripheral to her account. Here, she self-consciously mirrors the traditional focus on the interaction between host states and resident foreigners by substituting a near-exclusive focus on the relationship between home states and émigrés. There is no reason, however, why future research could not offer a more equal treatment of all three sets of actors in struggles over sovereignty, security, and identity. Indeed, Brand’s accounts are so cogent, considering all the moving parts involved, that a more careful consideration

of the role of host states should not overly complicate the analysis or the narrative.

Fujimori’s Peru: Deception in the Public Sphere.

By Catherine M. Conaghan. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005. 328p. \$29.95 cloth, \$25.95 paper.

— Moises E. Arce, *University of Missouri-Columbia*

In her book, Catherine M. Conaghan traces the major events of the presidency of Alberto Fujimori, starting in 1990 with his rise to power out of political obscurity and continuing through his departure from office in disgrace in 2000 after winning a highly controversial third term. The author characterizes the Fujimori regime as a “permanent coup,” whereby government officials repeatedly eviscerated the country’s constitution and subverted the rule of law. A central theme of the book is the Fujimori government’s inability through various unsuccessful attempts to completely dominate the political discourse despite persistent and sophisticated efforts to control the public sphere. As Conaghan writes, “The history of the Fujimori presidency is a chronicle of wrongdoing and complicity, but it is also a story about resistance and the limits of public deception in modern politics” (p. 13). The book is enriched with excellent primary sources and recent investigative reports that became available only after the collapse of the regime, and which had not previously been so cohesively compiled into one comprehensive narrative.

The book recounts the numerous actions that the Fujimori regime undertook to remain in power, the most significant of which was the widely publicized 1992 *autogolpe*. Other important measures included the 1993 constitutional referendum, which helped to “formalize” the authoritarian tendencies of the postcoup regime and allowed for Fujimori’s first reelection in 1995; the approval of a new law that allowed the then president to seek a third presidential term; the dismantling of the Tribunal Constitucional because the majority of its members opposed Fujimori’s third electoral bid; and the referendum initiative on the reelection, which was stopped by his congressional majority.

The analysis of these events shows that Fujimori initially was personally and directly involved in sabotaging the country’s democratic order, whereas in the later years of his presidency, other institutions (e.g., Congress, the Supreme Court, the Jurado Nacional de Elecciones, etc.) would help to further orchestrate alterations to Peru’s constitution and other laws in order to consolidate this “permanent coup.” Fujimori followed these alterations from the sidelines, and cleverly defended the autonomy of the other institutions, which were, of course, controlled by his government. Moreover, in contrast to his first reelection in 1995, which was largely staged within the Congreso Constituyente Democrático (CCD), his second

reelection in 2000 was a much more elaborate scheme. Key to these actions was the work of Vladimiro Montesinos, who served as Fujimori's longtime national intelligence advisor. Montesinos was the "go-to guy" whose chief mission was to secure Fujimori's third reelection (p. 224). Montesinos "paid off everyone who mattered" (e.g., legislators, judges, election officials, media executives, etc.) and his bags of money proved hard to refuse for many (p. 13). On this subject, the chapter that deals with media collusion is an interesting novelty of the book. This is a subject that has received little systematic attention by students of Peru, and as Conaghan elaborates, not all of the media owners sold out to Montesinos's wallet (p. 160). There were important exceptions to the widespread corruption that ended up crippling the Fujimori regime.

Equally important is the author's analysis of the major steps that the "opposition" took to challenge the increasing power of the Fujimori regime. She notes that Peru's opposition was not in any shape or form similar to Chile's Concertación or Poland's Solidarity (p. 247). Instead, it was small, dispersed, and lacking a unified strategy. Many authors who have studied the Fujimori regime have simply chosen to write off the existence of this opposition because of its ineffectiveness in quelling Fujimori's authoritarian project. But Conaghan does an excellent job of tracing several events that highlight its importance. The efforts of the opposition to unmask the regime were constant, but so was the intimidation and selective repression by the government against those who dared to speak up.

The concluding chapter poses an interesting proposition that is worth mentioning. Conaghan cites one of the main conclusions of the report prepared by the Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR), which was created in 2001 and investigated Peru's counterinsurgency war of the 1980s and 1990s. The CVR report concludes that Peru's internal conflict "was a major contributor to the country's 'moral decay' that culminated during the Fujimori administration" (p. 253). In Conaghan's words, "The conflict created a tolerance for authoritarian measures, a willingness to sacrifice legality, an indifference to the abuse of authority, and an overarching sense of impunity" (pp. 253–54). The political violence desensitized both elites and the masses, and made them prone to disregard the importance of democracy and the rule of law. The elites who could have stopped Fujimori and Montesinos "opted to cash in or to accommodate and just keep quiet" (p. 254), which the author identifies as an "elite failure" (p. 253), a problem that is certainly not a novelty in Latin American history. The Fujimori story is compelling and intensely disturbing because of the extent to which the consolidation of the regime rested on "an astounding collapse in public ethics, morals and common sense" (p. 253). In this analysis, the counterinsurgency and "old-fashioned avarice" were important factors in the collective collapse, but the author also suggests that neoliberal economic reforms

in Peru may have created a situation in which not only the lower classes but also the middle and upper classes became "unhinged and atomized" and more likely to "play along" as a coping strategy in the face of the intense job and financial insecurities of the 1990s (p. 254). This is an interesting observation and worthy of future analysis.

In all, *Fujimori's Peru* is an excellent book. It is a must-read for students of Peruvian politics and Latin American democracy. It clearly enhances the scholarly understanding of the challenges of democratic rule in the developing world.

Political Culture and Institutional Development in Costa Rica and Nicaragua: World Making in the Tropics. By Consuelo Cruz. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 302p. \$80.00.

— Christina Schatzman, *Arizona State University*

Political culture has remained an attractive subject since works such as Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (1963) propelled it to the fore of comparative politics in the 1960s. Over the last four decades, different approaches to political culture sought to provide theoretical leverage on an array of political phenomena, including political participation, modernization, democratic development, and state building. The appeal of the concept of political culture lies primarily in its intuitive logic: Individuals, organized into groups, are responsible for the creation of political realities. While these realities may certainly be influenced by an array of exogenous factors, their creation is dependent on individuals' perceptions and preferences. Critics of political culture research suggest that attributions of political culture are frequently deterministic or difficult to falsify scientifically. In *Political Culture and Institutional Development in Costa Rica and Nicaragua*, Consuelo Cruz analyzes political culture employing what she refers to as an integrative approach, a rational-structural culturalism that recognizes the direct influence of morally driven, rational political actors on institutional norms.

While Cruz's comparative analysis focuses on Central America, a good part of the book is dedicated to "redefining political culture" (p. 4). Specifically, building on the conceptualizations of political culture operationalized in works including those of Ronald Inglehart (*Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*, 1990) and Robert Putnam (*Making Democracy Work*, 1993), Cruz explains that "[o]ur understanding of culture itself has shifted significantly" (p. 28) since these works first appeared. Building on constructivist foundations emphasizing identity as an intersubjective construct, she "tries to avoid functionalism and voluntarism" (p. 29) by 1) assuming that political invention is delimited by credibility or truth; 2) understanding that rhetorical politics may in fact destabilize political actors'

goals by shifting “the collective field of imaginable possibilities” (p. 30); and 3) accepting that political actors are “embedded in the same collective field of imaginable possibilities” (p. 30) while focusing solely on what “political actors make discursively explicit” (p. 31).

Cruz then seeks to show how her reconceived, rhetorical approach to political culture helps to explain democratic development. Utilizing a most-similar-system design, she chooses two “small, peripheral economies” that are both “former possessions of the Spanish Crown” and, therefore, are both Catholic and Spanish speaking (p. 8). Focusing mainly on the endogenous differences in the postcolonial experiences of her Central American cases, she traces the process of collective identity formation and political development in Costa Rica and Nicaragua over five centuries. In doing so, she draws from a diverse body of literature analyzing the development of political institutions—which she refers to as “regimes of arbitration”—and the ways in which their construction was dependent on the normative scheming of political actors pursuing particularist agendas through the manipulation of rhetorical frames. The author highlights the intrinsic differences between neighboring Costa Rica and Nicaragua in their collective identities, how those differences have shaped the moral dispositions of political actors and, by structuring the field of imaginable possibilities, have helped to influence political development in these two cases.

While the historiography is well documented and thorough, a number of issues rooted in comparative methodology are worthy of note. First, while the case selection is interesting given the developmental difficulties in Nicaragua in contrast to Costa Rica, little time is dedicated to explaining the case selection, its rationale, weaknesses, and generalizability. In fact, the deduction of the comparative research design is left to the reader to glean and begs the question of why the case selection is limited to these two countries. Certainly the impressive depth of the historical analysis is the first assumption to spring to mind. However, given that the analysis spans five centuries and is rooted in the process of independence from the Spanish Crown, why not analyze all of the countries that sought independence from Spain through the Plan of Iguala or those comprising the United Province of Central America? Given that the design is not cross-regional as implemented, such an extension may, at least, provide a greater test of the political culture thesis as proposed, given the diversity in the region.

This leads to a second point concerning Costa Rica’s “exceptionalism” and the theoretical leverage provided by the analysis. Costa Rica is credited with developing a robust regime in a vulnerable neighborhood thanks to a “narrative of collective virtue” (p. 264) and a belief in the importance of virtue, harmony, and stability—what Cruz calls “normative realism.” This is in direct contrast to Nicaragua, whose national narrative promoted a “Manichean system of normative scheming” (p. 146). As Cruz

points out, “Costa Rica remains *the* Central American exception” (p. 8). But rather than understand this exception by considering the importance of such factors as resources, commerce, access to indigenous labor, relationship with the Crown, and regional centers of power, or the level of liberal/conservative conflict, she often dismissed these factors outright and is content to subsume exceptionalism under “political culture.” As an example, in response to frequent socioeconomic explanations, the author contends that “in fact, the countries’ (Costa Rica and Nicaragua) endowments of indigenous labor were not radically unequal” (p. 34). But she gives no evidence of this other than a discussion of later labor shortages, given the decimation of the Nicaraguan indigenous population. However, this does little to address the perception of endowments and how that perception affects reality. There is little work done to dissuade readers from other approaches, while one is left with the frequently nagging impression that this historical construction is difficult to falsify.

Third, Cruz’s approach is at times muddled by her attempt to integrate too much into political culture. While trying to avoid the pitfalls of functionalism and voluntarism apparent in other work, she suggests that her central arguments flow from rational choice, structuralism, and culturalism (p. 6), while engaging the “complex relationship among history, structure, and agency” (p. 17). The problem is that while her broad-mindedness is a virtue, she does too little to show how all of these discourses can truly be incorporated within her “political culture” approach.

The book offers an in-depth historical analysis of the role of political actors anchored in an environment of norms, rhetorical frames, and culturally bound possibilities. It offers an impressive historiography of Costa Rica and Nicaragua since the Spanish conquest, and argues for a political culture approach that integrates history, structuralism, and individual agency into our understanding of paths to development. Unfortunately, the book tends to suffer from the same limitations of many political culture analyses, despite its attempt to reconceptualize political culture and its breadth of historical material. However, it does highlight the importance of political actors in shaping their own destinies, which is as central now, as new democracies struggle for survival, as it was at the dawn of Latin American independence.

Governance in Contemporary Germany: The Semisovereign State Revisited.

Edited by Simon Green and William E. Paterson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 350 pages. \$75.00 cloth, \$35.00 paper.

— Sarah Elise Wiliarty, *Wesleyan University*

This is a rare thing indeed. Edited volumes tend to contain a hodgepodge of contributions only loosely centered

around some theme. The hapless editors are too often left to finesse an introductory link among a series of articles that are, in fact, only vaguely related. In the present case, however, we have an edited volume planned and implemented around a clear vision. If not for the list of contributors (luminaries in the scholarship of German politics), one might easily take this book for a single-authored text.

The goal of *Governance in Contemporary Germany* is to reexamine an important concept in German politics and comparative politics more generally: Peter Katzenstein's semisovereign state. Katzenstein's original 1987 volume, *Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semi-sovereign State*, sought to explain why policy change in West Germany had been incremental, even after changes of government. He proposed that the structures of the West German state and society were not conducive to far-reaching policy shifts. His book illustrated how a decentralized state combined with highly centralized societal actors to make radical policy change nearly impossible. Katzenstein argued that three "institutional nodes"—political parties, cooperative federalism, and parapublic institutions—structured state–societal links in such a way that policy change was subject to the influence of both a range of societal actors and various actors within the state. He illustrated this interaction through an examination of six policy areas: economic management, industrial relations, social welfare, migrant workers, administrative reform, and university reform.

A great deal has happened in Germany since the publication of the landmark 1987 study. A decade and a half after German unification, with European integration much further along, the question is whether Katzenstein's model still holds up. Furthermore, he had argued that the incrementalism of West German policy making was a strength. By moving slowly and taking multiple interests into account, West Germany tended to produce sound policies. In the postunification era, two challenges to Katzenstein's take on German politics have emerged. First, under the motto "Berlin is not Bonn," some scholars have argued that the new Germany would take its "rightful" place in international politics, in other words, that Germany would be more inclined to pursue its national interest and less inclined toward multilateralism. Domestically, according to this line of thought, the addition of the former East Germany, combined with European integration, would put such strain on the German model that the positive results of state–societal cooperation would be lost. In other words, the new Germany would no longer be semisovereign. By contrast, other scholars have argued that incrementalism would remain but that this style of policymaking would be detrimental, rather than beneficial, in a quickly changing, globalized world. In other words, the new Germany would still be semisovereign, but this would no longer be advantageous. Gridlock would replace incrementalism.

Governance in Contemporary Germany evaluates Katzenstein's model in light of the developments of the 1990s and 2000s. The upshot is that his model largely holds up, though there have been some significant changes, particularly in economic policy and social policy. One of the major strengths of the later book is that it closely follows the structure of Katzenstein's original volume. After the introductory chapter, the new book examines the three "institutional nodes" of policymaking: political parties, federalism, and parapublic institutions, then goes on to address most of the same policy areas that he originally investigated. University reform is dropped from the list as no longer sufficiently relevant. Two important new policy areas are added: environmental policy and European policy. The book also includes an important introductory chapter from Wade Jacoby on institutional transfer and how the unification process may have affected the validity of Katzenstein's model. Katzenstein himself contributes the concluding chapter.

The individual chapters are all worth reading, but I focus my remarks on some of the broader insights of the book. The three chapters on the institutional nodes are especially interesting. They point out that despite a great deal of continuity, specific changes are having important ramifications, mostly negative ones. In the chapter on party politics, Thomas Saalfeld finds that the increased frequency of *Land* elections and the fact that the national governing coalition has not often controlled the Bundesrat have made party politics more conflictual. In the chapter on federalism, Charlie Jeffery touches on a topic that recurs throughout the book. German society has become less centralized and less homogeneous. This shift in the societal half of the equation has a critical effect because the state must more frequently step into the void left by formerly more effective societal actors. Andreas Busch raises a second recurrent theme: The parapublic institutions are still functioning well as shock absorbers, but the quality of the policy in some cases is declining. The chapters on industrial policy and immigration also observe that the incremental policy style of the semisovereign state continues, but that this mode of policymaking is no longer effective in the face of vast societal change. Katzenstein's final chapter shines even in this excellent book.

One regrettable omission in both this volume and Katzenstein's original is gender relations and the role of women in German society and politics, themes addressed only tangentially in the chapters on economic policy and social policy. Gender relations is an area of German society that is undergoing significant change. Who would have thought, for example, that Katzenstein's use of feminine pronouns—controversial in 1987—would already have found justification in reality? Despite this oversight, this volume constitutes an absolute "must read" for scholars of German and European politics. It is also highly recommended for scholars of comparative politics more

generally, particularly those interested in evolving state-societal balance.

Mao and the Economic Stalinization of China, 1948–1953. By Hua-yu Li. Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 2006. 266p. \$75.00 cloth.

— Wonik Kim, *Louisiana State University*

At the heart of Hua-yu Li's argument is the policymaking process of the early People's Republic of China (PRC). Between the years 1948 and 1953, the PRC began its massive and far-reaching socialist transformation. The author suggests not only that Mao Zedong played the decisive role in the drastic policy shift but that he also helped clarify various convoluted economic issues, as well as ignored Stalin's advice on how to achieve socialism.

In late September 1953, the Chinese regime announced the so-called general line for socialist transition, aimed at eradicating any residual capitalist elements in the existing economic structure and replacing it with a Stalinist economic system. The result was the rapid collectivization of agriculture, Soviet-style heavy industrialization and nationalization, and the complete ideological penetration of the lives of individuals by the state. This socioeconomic program is of great significance for understanding the whole picture of the Chinese political economy because it directly entailed the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, both of which are understood as human and political catastrophes.

The "general line" took the nation by surprise. The gradualism and flexibility of the mixed economy of the "New Democracy" that had infused the period of Yanan and the early years of the PRC abruptly gave way to ideologically driven radicalism. The policy shift of 1953 put an end to the disputes, confusion, and policy experiments that had developed soon after the revolution of 1949 when the Chinese ruling elite were faced with the necessity of resolving numerous and imminent economic issues. The most pressing of the economic problems was whether or not the existing mixed economic system, with private ownership, should be maintained, discarded at once, or phased out gradually. The timing of the socialist transition was based on the current conditions "necessary" for the transition. Finally, the leaders were faced with the task of defining the nature of the future socialist economy in China and the generic question of what specific actions to take ("what is to be done?"), reminiscent of the Bolsheviks' preoccupation.

Li organizes her work chronologically, beginning in 1948, and traces the cumulative formulation of the general line that grew out of a change in Mao's thinking. She identifies two major reasons for the drastic policy change from the mixed economy to a Stalinist socialist model. First, Mao was inspired by Stalin's *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik): Short Course* that

justifies the Soviet experience of the 1920s and 1930s. He relied exclusively on this text as a "sacred" manual for China's policy formation in the late 1940s and early 1950s. When faced with possible and actual disagreements from his subordinates over various economic issues, Mao used the *Short Course* to justify and defend his position. He "intervened at every opportunity to promote radical positions during disputes and was ready to adopt policy options that were in tune with Stalinist ideas as presented in the *Short Course*" (p. 175).

Second, Li's subtle but powerful narratives of Mao's belief system provide an intriguing finding that although Mao was a dedicated Stalinist, he had "strong feelings of personal rivalry toward Stalin and of national rivalry toward the Soviet Union" (p. 3). These personal and nationalist sentiments put great pressure on him to achieve socialism in China faster than Stalin had done in the Soviet Union, and made him even shrewdly ignore Stalin's pragmatic and moderate advice.

There are numerous studies on the Sino-Russian relationship and Soviet influence on Chinese policies, but few systematic studies have been conducted to carefully document the role of the Soviet Union in Chinese economic policymaking and to unpack the mysteries of the economic policy shift of 1953. Discussions of the Soviet impact have often been assumed but not documented. The main strength of Li's study lies in the author's well-documented historical accounts of the underresearched period from the late 1940s and the early 1950s. Employing the archival materials released in China since the mid-1980s and in Russia since the early 1990s, and drawing on her field research and interviews in China, the author successfully reconstructs a vivid political picture of the complex policymaking process. With her impressive command of primary sources, she presents a richly contextualized historical discussion of how Mao skillfully employed both persuasion and threats to ensure that other main party leaders (e.g., Lui Shaoqi) carried out his socialist blueprint. The most invaluable analysis I found in this work is the careful tracing of the diffusion of the socialist economic blueprint from Lenin to Mao via Stalin: The original idea by Lenin was modified and applied by Stalin until finally imported by Mao.

Li goes to great lengths to provide "thick descriptions" of the events of those crucial years, but surprisingly she fails to place her arguments in current theoretical studies on political economy. Her analysis is fundamentally based on the "ideas matter" thesis that highlights the adoption and spread of new ideas on the role of economic ideas in policy and institutional change, of which there is now a large body of literature. In addition, her period of analysis is limited to the five years from 1948 to 1953, and readers whose interests are driven primarily by a desire for more information on the subsequent change (if any) of Mao's economic thinking after 1953 must look elsewhere.

Overall, however, this dense and original study is an invaluable contribution not only to the much-neglected topic of Mao's role in early PRC economic history but more broadly to the literature on the political economy of China.

Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and Middle East Politics Today. By Marc Lynch. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. 293p. \$ 24.50.

— Mahmud A. Faksh, *University of Southern Maine*

The book delves into the crucial subject of the new independent media and politics in the Middle East. It examines the changing landscape of Arab public discourse consequent to the proliferation of the new Arab media—al-Jazeera, Abu Dubai TV, al-Manar, al-Arabiya, al-Hurra, and a host of other satellite television stations—over the past decade. The study contends that these new Arab media outlets have freed the dissemination of information from the shackles of state control, challenged old taboos on open discussion, and generated free debate about pertinent political and social issues—culture and identity, political reform, Palestine, Islam and modernity, and Iraq, among others. All this marked the birth of a new diverse Arab public sphere, which ended the previously controlled and muted Arab public discourse and posed a challenge to the future of Arab politics and to U.S. diplomacy.

Of all the new Arab media outlets, the author argues that al-Jazeera served as the leading and most influential public platform (*minbar*) for Arab critical voices across the Middle East and in the Diaspora that were denied expression under authoritarian and semiauthoritarian Arab regimes. In the process, it has truly revolutionized Arab public discourse on Arab political issues, especially on Iraq and Palestine, which is challenging the contrived monolithic discourse, dominated by the “voice of the state,” and has spawned a genuine transnational Arab public universe. More specifically, al-Jazeera's novel approach to Arab politics—freely aired open and unscripted public arguments and disputations on the most sensitive issues—is seemingly empowering individual Arabs to assert their independent opinions in the public arena, thus “defining a new kind of Arab public and a new kind of Arab politics” (p. 2).

The author correctly assumes that this cataclysmic transformation of Arab political culture is “vital to any meaningful pluralist politics” (p. 2). But this raises the question: Is the new open Arab public sphere really paving the road to a liberal, pluralist politics, as the author seems to imply? The answer is simply no. Indeed, as the study shows, the emerging Arab public discourse, open and free though it may be, remains cloistered in an Arab narrative anchored in Arab-Islamic identity and culture, spewing populism, anti-Westernism driven by past and present grievances (colonialism, the plight of the Palestinians under occupation, the suffering of the Iraqi people under the weight of the U.S.-

imposed sanctions, the subsequent U.S. occupation, and perceived or real Western double standards), and obscurantist Islamism—all the antithesis of a civic liberal culture that promotes tolerance, trust, compromise, and reason in the marketplace of ideas. It is doubtful that such a populist, identity-based public enclave can provide the foundation for liberal reforms in the Arab world.

Another pitfall of the new Arab public sphere, as the author points out, is that it is deeply fractured on internal and external issues and policies and lacks the institutional mechanisms to aggregate it and channel it into constructive political action to address the real problems of the Arab order and the need for reform in the region.

Coupled with these limitations, which render the Arab public sphere weak and helpless, is the growing influence of religious identity and culture in public debates that are tending in an illiberal direction, which the author addressed only marginally under “Islamist Publics” (pp. 83–88). Indeed, the Middle East today is in the throes of an ongoing struggle for the soul of Islam: a struggle between moderate Islam and militant Islam that is shaping the area's evolving cultural dynamics and its worldview. The struggle between the two contending voices of Islam is so pervasive and intense in the Arab public arena that it rendered the modernist-secularist discourse inconsequential. The few and far-between voices of modernism and secularism are increasingly on the defensive in the name of religious identity and cultural authenticity—the axiom of the Islamists' discourse. The heavy weight of religious culture, as the defining perimeter of what is permissible in public life, is threatening to eviscerate the already shrinking zone of liberal-reformist ideas and to cast society in a stagnant, conformist religious mold.

These limitations notwithstanding, the author rightly maintains that the new vocal Arab public still matters. Arab governments, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Yemen, and even Syria, among others, are now more disposed to be attuned to these voices and to adjust somewhat their domestic and foreign policies under the heavy pressure of mass opinion. These policy adjustments, albeit limited, serve to add a measure of legitimacy to unpopular regimes by identifying with popular Arab causes, like the Iraq and Palestinian tragedies.

In his concluding chapter, the author addresses the challenge that the new assertive Arab public presented to the United States, as the target of increasing invectiveness and heightened animosity. He counsels a U.S. public diplomacy course that encourages dialogue and engagement, rather than resentment and confrontation. To counter the rampant anti-Americanism of the Arab street, the author calls for serious acknowledgment and keen awareness by the United States of the emerging Arab public sphere and the employment of imaginative public diplomacy that would promote mutual communication and understanding and facilitate the spread of liberal tendencies.

However, one may add here that judging by the current administration's record in dealing with foreign publics, U.S. diplomacy has not risen to the challenge. The misguided approach of the Bush administration in dealing with the Arab public sphere as an enemy to be overcome in a "war of ideas" or a contender "to be manipulated via a public relations" campaign (p. 250) has proven to be a colossal public policy failure. The failure of American diplomacy is most evident in the latest tragedy to engulf the Arab lands this summer: the war and destruction in Lebanon, which widened the chasm between a galvanized Arab public opinion and the United States more than ever.

Overall, the study represents a significant contribution to the emerging field of the media and politics and the budding literature on the new electronic media and Arab politics. It is a highly scholarly study, extensively researched, well documented, and lucidly written, combining a wealth of data and keen analysis, which offer an excellent understanding of the nature, evolution, and impact of the Arab media and the rising Arab public sphere.

Finally, there are few minor name spelling and typing errors, such as "Bathina" instead of Buthaina (p. 8), "Bishar" instead of Bashar (p. 232), and "a since" instead of a sense (p. 152), which went undetected and should not detract from the high quality of the study.

The Russian Military: Power and Policy. Edited by Steven E. Miller and Dmitri V. Trenin. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004. 272p. \$50.00 cloth, \$25.00 paper.

— Mark Kramer, *Harvard University*

When Russia became an independent state at the end of 1991, it inherited the bulk of the Soviet armed forces and the Soviet defense industry. The Russian government initially tried to persuade the other former Soviet republics to preserve a unified military force, but in May 1992, after those efforts had proven fruitless, Russian President Boris Yeltsin established a separate Russian army on the basis of what had been left over from the Soviet Union. Because the Soviet military had been deteriorating since the late 1980s, sweeping reform of the new Russian army seemed an urgent priority. Economic, military, social, demographic, and political considerations all pointed to the need for a much smaller army equipped with state-of-the-art weaponry and configured for plausible combat scenarios. Advocates of reform hoped to place the Russian military under strict civilian control, including parliamentary oversight, and to replace the mass, conscript-based system of the Soviet army with a fully professional force. They also hoped to devise a completely new military doctrine that would be appropriate for the realities of the post-Soviet era.

Yet despite great hopes in the early 1990s that wide-ranging military reform would soon be implemented, very little progress has actually been achieved. The Russian army

is still configured mainly for an all-out war against the United States and other Western countries, a contingency that is no longer plausible. Although the army has shrunk in size, the reductions have been made haphazardly, rather than in accordance with sound strategic objectives. The senior officer corps is still bloated, whereas the number of noncommissioned officers (whose role in modern combat is crucial) is grossly inadequate. The army still relies predominantly on conscripts, many of whom are poorly motivated, poorly trained, poorly equipped, and poorly fed. Draft evasion is still rampant, and the prestige of serving as a military officer remains low. The army is still plagued by the systematic, violent abuse of servicemen by higher-ranking personnel, a practice known as *dedovshchina*. Despite repeated pledges by the Russian General Staff to crack down on *dedovshchina*, the bullying, if anything, has increased in recent years. Defense spending, which plummeted in the 1990s, has increased since 2000, but the production of new weapons remains problematic, and research on the next generation of armaments has been negligible. The defense budget itself is as opaque as ever, and civilian control of the military is still tenuous at best. Overall, the Russian army today retains most of the weaknesses, but very few of the strengths, of the old Soviet army.

This peculiar feature of the Russian state is the focus of *The Russian Military*, edited by Steven Miller, a leading expert on international security affairs, and Dmitri Trenin, a former army colonel who is now one of Russia's foremost civilian experts on military issues. The editors have brought together an outstanding group of contributors, mostly from Russia, who collectively provide a comprehensive assessment of the status of the Russian armed forces. Anyone seeking a better understanding of Russian politics, civil-military relations, and military performance will profit from reading this volume.

The book begins with an excellent introduction by Miller, who provides a lapidary overview of Russian military policy and civil-military relations since 1992. Miller does such a good job of explaining why proposals for military reform have been stillborn that some readers may be tempted to skip the subsequent chapters. If so, that would be a mistake. The other contributors—Pavel Baev on the deterioration of the Russian military, Aleksandr Golts on the bleak social and political conditions of the Russian army, Alexei Arbatov on the rationale for genuine military reform, Roy Allison on Russia's military involvement in regional conflicts and peacekeeping operations, Vitaly Shlykov on the economic constraints of Russian defense policy, and Rose Gottemoeller on Russia's increased reliance on nuclear weapons to make up for its weakness in conventional forces—address their respective topics with admirable cogency. The political, social, military, doctrinal, and economic dimensions of the Russian armed forces are covered fully. The discussion is rounded out by Trenin, whose succinct concluding chapter returns to the themes

of Miller's introduction and highlights the major points in the other chapters.

No one will come away from this book feeling any optimism about the future of the Russian army. Proponents of military reform in Russia had hoped that the advent of Vladimir Putin as Russian president, after nearly a decade of abortive reform proposals under Yeltsin in the 1990s, would finally lead to a thorough restructuring and reconfiguration of the armed forces. But those hopes were quickly dashed when Putin, for reasons discussed by Miller and Baev, proved "much more cautious" about military reform than most observers had expected (p. 60). In June 2004, shortly after the book went to press, the Russian parliament adopted amendments to the country's Law on Defense that seemingly deprived the Russian General Staff of its control of military operations and subordinated the General Staff to the Ministry of Defense, rather than leaving it as an independent entity. Because the General Staff has been one of the greatest obstacles to military reform, these amendments, if they had amounted to much, would have substantially increased the prospects for sweeping reform. But it is now clear that the amended law has had almost no appreciable effect on the General Staff or on the Russian military more generally. As a result, Russia has remained under what Arbatov describes in his chapter as "the tyranny of the conscript-based, mass-mobilization army that it now possesses," an army that imposes an "unacceptable burden" on "Russia's effort to craft a serious and effective security policy" (p. 116).

Looking back on the record of the past 15 years, Trenin concludes that "the Russian military has thus far failed to adapt to the new economic environment at home and the new strategic environment abroad" (p. 220). Golts underscores the pernicious effect of corruption on the Russian military, not least among the forces deployed in Chechnya. Most units of the Russian army, as Golts and Baev argue, are unfit for any type of combat. Baev maintains that "the Russian military has deteriorated so badly [since the early 1990s] that instead of providing security it has become a major source of insecurity for the state it is supposed to protect" (p. 43). Readers of *The Russian Military* will find it hard to dispute this judgment.

Federalism and the Welfare State: New World and European Experiences. By Herbert Obinger, Stephan Liebfried, and Francis G. Castles. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 378 pages. \$75.00 cloth, \$34.99 paper.

Decentralizing the State: Elections, Parties, and Local Power in the Andes. By Kathleen O'Neill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 286 pages. \$70.00.

— Daniel Ziblatt, *Harvard University*

As the literature on federalism and decentralization experienced a revival in recent years, comparative research has tended to fall into two categories. The first examines the

origins of institutions, seeking the causes of decentralization and federalism. The second explores the consequences of decentralization and federalism for such outcomes as fiscal performance, economic growth, and the welfare state. The two books under review respectively make important contributions to each field. In both instances, we see that federalism and decentralization remain lively topics of concern for comparative politics.

In her book on the causes of decentralization in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s, Kathleen O'Neill begins by rightly pointing to the important distinction often made between historical cases of federalism, where states "selected" their institutional forms at their founding, versus contemporary instances of formerly centralized states pursuing strategies of decentralization. Her theory is clearly intended to encompass cases that fall into the latter category. *Decentralizing the State* is a comparative treatment of the experiences of decentralization in Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela in the 1980s and 1990s, with some discussion of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. The author's central aim is to explain why and when the national governments of her empirical cases "effectively decentralized," defined very specifically as the joint adoption of fiscal and political decentralization. She reviews and dismisses a range of plausible hypotheses that might at first glance seem to explain "effective decentralization," including international pressure, pressure from "below," efficiency concerns, and fiscal crisis. Instead, she argues and then demonstrates with a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis that electoral incentives shape the push for decentralization. In brief, her argument is the following: National governments decentralize when national executives believe that their own political party can expect to gain more votes at the subnational level than at the national level in future elections.

The analysis proceeds in three main steps. First, a formal model is brought to bear on the problem, making the author's basic intuition more explicit. Second, she analyzes 26 episodes of decentralization across five countries, conducting regression analysis and carefully reconstructing vote totals at local and national elections for more than 40 years. Here, the proposed argument that national executives choose to decentralize when it is in their parties' electoral interests convincingly holds up against the evidence. However, only two of the seven alternative theories are actually subjected to this same rigorous analysis, although O'Neill at several points sensibly suggests that these competing arguments contain a "partial explanation" (p. 28). Thus, the reader is left wondering: What role do these alternative arguments actually play? The third part of the book contains its empirical centerpiece: in-depth case analysis of her five main national cases. O'Neill has a keen eye for relevant evidence and demonstrates the importance of electoral factors in motivating decentralization reforms. In the last chapter, she modestly reflects on the

limits of the argument when applied to other Latin American cases.

Overall, the parsimonious work is convincing as far as it goes. But parsimony is achieved, arguably, at the expense of conceptual and theoretical nuance. First, as O'Neill concedes in the last chapter, her conceptualization of "effective decentralization" (as joint fiscal and political decentralization) fails to distinguish the various dimensions of decentralization. To dichotomously code cases as "decentralized" only when *both* fiscal and political decentralization occurs uses an expansive category that may miss much of the action. Again, as she implies and other scholars have demonstrated, the interaction and sequencing of different types of decentralization, including "administrative" decentralization (which is altogether absent from this analysis), is crucial. Would the story look different if a graded or multidimensional operationalization of decentralization were used, rather than a dichotomous one?

Second, in terms of theory, for similar reasons there is a bit of slippage. At times, the book's stated aim is to explain "decentralization's preconditions" (p. 15), and at other points, the purpose is to develop a more modest "theory of political motivation" (p. 44). O'Neill convincingly makes clear that political executives, when unconstrained by legislatures, will prefer and thus seek decentralization if it is in their electoral interest. However, it is arguable that what she calls "a theory of political motivation" is insufficient as a theory of "institutional outcomes." Indeed, one can ask: Under what conditions can national executives actually translate their preferences into institutional outcomes? And, further, how well does such a theory, centered exclusively around national executives, hold for the more complex situations in which national legislatures and other actors, such as subnational elites and bureaucracies, also shape decentralization plans? Finally, do not the genuine "problem-solving motivations" of political elites who are attempting to solve real governance problems deserve some consideration? In sum, O'Neill's carefully constructed work sets a useful baseline for others who might be interested in exploring how electoral incentives intersect with other factors that determine why and when decentralization occurs.

Turning from causes to an exploration of consequences, *Federalism and the Welfare State* is a collected volume of essays that examines, in a theoretically disciplined fashion, six established federal democracies (Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States). The work makes the case that federalism does matter, but not in the straightforward fashion that conventional approaches assume. Classical public choice approaches, the authors note, view federalism as a "competition among jurisdictions" and as a vehicle for restricting the growth of the state. Similarly, historical institutionalists emphasize the role of fragmentation and "veto-players," regarding federalism as a constraint on welfare states. The central

argument in this volume adds nuance to these traditional claims: Federalism does not exert a uniform impact on social policy. Instead, it is mediated by the *type* of federalism and the timing of federalism's development vis-à-vis the historical process of democratization

The book is structured around a synthetic introduction and conclusion (written by the editors), as well as six national case studies. First, the authors ask why quantitative cross-national findings demonstrate that federal political systems, other things being equal, spend much less than unitary states on social welfare? And, given this empirical regularity, what explains the diversity among federal systems? Here the authors aim to refine the most obvious contrast between two "families" of federalism: *intrastate* European federal systems (Germany, Switzerland, and Austria) that one might suspect are more "generous" welfare states and *interstate* Anglo-Saxon federal systems (Australia, Canada, and the United States) that one might imagine are less generous. As the case studies reveal, such a neat divide overlooks commonalities across types and diversity within each type.

Second, the authors adopt an alternative approach, summed up in the words of the author of the Canadian case, Keith Banting, who writes, "Different models of federalism have distinctive implications for social policy, and . . . different models of federalism can co-exist within an individual federal state" (p. 90). The authors identify two institutional factors that cluster in different national systems in different formations. The first factor can explain the diverse timing and early development of welfare states. If welfare states were created in *nondemocratic* regimes, as in pre-1920 Austria and pre-1918 Germany, they served the function of regime legitimation, giving rise to early and expansive welfare programs. By contrast, if welfare states were implemented in already *democratic* federations (Canada, the United States, Switzerland, and Australia), institutional veto-points were robust and subnational units often already carried out many welfare functions, delaying welfare state policies and limiting their early growth.

The second factor is the type of federalism. Here, the authors demonstrate diversity among the basic institutions normally associated with federalism, such as upper chambers, constitutional courts, constitutional referenda, formality of intergovernmental relations, and the decentralization of public finance. The authors accept the conventional view that veto-points inhibit welfare state growth. But when such veto-points are absent, they note, federalism can in fact contribute to expansion of welfare states. For example, Herbert Obinger demonstrates that Austria's weak upper chamber failed to block key social policy legislation in the 1970s and 1980s, contributing to welfare state growth (p. 205). Philip Manow identifies Germany's anomalously highly *centralized* fiscal system as a source of its expansive welfare state (p. 224). And Keith Banting argues that unlike most policy areas shaped by Canada's classical

“separate jurisdictions” federalism, its universal health system was facilitated by a “shared cost” style of federalism that reduced veto-players in this arena alone (p. 111).

The third step of the book’s argument entails the ambitious effort to expand the range of outcomes being explained. Not simply explaining the timing of welfare state adoption, nor its overall level of expenditures, the authors are also interested in the dynamics of retrenchment, the prospects of policy innovation, and the “feedback” effects of the welfare state on federalism. The conclusions can be summarized in three observations: First, the findings confirm veto-player theory that federalism is status-quo preserving, usually blocking retrenchment efforts; second, the authors identify five conditions of policy innovation (pp. 341–43); and finally, they specify the welfare state’s intended and unintended “feedback” effects on federalism.

In sum, this is a wide-ranging and compelling collection of essays that is essential reading for comparative scholars of welfare states and federalism. If there are any criticisms to be made, it is only with regards to the scope of the book’s ambition and the degree to which competing arguments are successfully engaged. First, the range of questions asked (the welfare state’s timing of development, level of expenditures, and dynamics of retrenchment) are not easily captured by a single “synthetic” theoretical framework that the authors aim to construct (pp. 42–44). Second, with a single-minded focus on federalism as a determinant of welfare state development, we are left not knowing how precisely to weigh federalism’s impact vis-à-vis other traditional arguments. Nevertheless, the authors have successfully highlighted novel and underappreciated features of federalism, leaving it to future research to assess how much these factors matter when weighed against variables highlighted by other approaches.

Europe and the Politics of Capabilities. Edited by Robert Salais and Robert Villeneuve. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 328p. \$90.

— David K. Jesuit, *Central Michigan University*

This innovative edited collection seeks to help shape the academic and policy debate over the future of the welfare state in Europe by introducing and advocating Amartya Sen’s “capabilities approach.” Since the editors’ primary objective is to promote a particular set of policies, there is little effort by contributors to explain policy variation across European Union member states or over time, which is the collection’s main weakness. Rather, this distinguished group of academics and practitioners evaluates European economic development policies and prescribes a course of action consistent with the capability approach.

Since Sen received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1998 and published *Development and Freedom* (1999), his view that economic growth is best facilitated by enhancing individual capabilities and freedom has become very

influential in the field of development economics. However, his “capability” approach does not figure prominently in the comparative welfare state literature. According to the editors, the “true question for social policies is . . . to struggle against inequality of capabilities and to open for all an effective freedom” (p. 1). Thus, rather than focusing on job creation, economic and social policies should foster the development of individual capabilities affecting actors and workers, as well as communal capabilities affecting firms and territories, which would in turn stimulate economic development (p. 6).

More specifically, the editors argue that Title XI of the Treaty of the European Union (Social Policy, Education, Vocational Training and Youth) should be given “absolute priority” over Title VIII (Employment) (p. 11). In addition, they assert that EU initiatives, rather than national solutions, are essential if collective and individual capabilities are to be enhanced (p. 6). Adopting such an approach ultimately requires reforming and strengthening the EU’s neocorporatist system by promoting multilevel frameworks such as the European Social Dialogue (ESD) and the European Employment Strategy (EES). Significantly, the contributors find that the “open method of coordination” (OMC), which currently enables member states to determine their own individual employment policies within these programs, must be rejected and Europe-wide benchmarks (though not of a statistical nature) established if these programs are to be effective (p. 15). Member states often invoke the principle of “subsidiarity” (the notion that policies should be formulated at the lowest feasible level), but the editors believe that this principle must be reinterpreted so that “common” European norms override national variations (p. 16). None of this is to say that the contributors favor a top-down approach involving significant new legislation by the European Council; instead, they favor a multilevel decentralized approach entailing a prominent role for subnational public and private actors. Indeed, this tension between European and national and subnational political and policy authority represents the most compelling intellectual development of this book.

The strength of this collection, which is organized into three sections and includes 18 chapters, is its focus on EU programs and their relationship to local economic development. For example, Serafino Negrilli finds that factors such as inadequate local administration and an overwhelming number of participants have limited the effectiveness of Italian “Territorial Pacts” (pp. 86–87). Similarly, Pierre-Paul Zalio’s case study of Marseille in the 1990s argues that local capabilities, including “not only financial but relational and deliberative resources” are vital for spurring economic growth (p. 106). Other contributors come to similar conclusions, encouraging more energetic participation by local elites—even at the expense of national actors—from both the public and private spheres. Indeed, Jacky Fayolle and Anne Lecuyer find that the EU’s regional

Structural Funds have a limited positive effect on regional economic growth because the nation-state is “impeding the effectiveness of EU structural policy” (p. 156).

In the concluding chapter, Robert Salais contrasts a typology of social welfare states based upon the capability approach with Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s familiar “three worlds” scheme. Arrayed along two dimensions, “freedom for what” and “equality of what,” Salais offers four possibilities (p. 296): the “market world,” consisting of the Anglo-Saxon countries; the “well being world,” including the Scandinavian social democracies; the “status world,” comprising the continental corporatist regimes; and the “capability world,” which combines the preferred features of the Scandinavian social democracies with the most admired aspects of the conservative corporatist regimes (but includes no members at present). As Salais concludes: “If Europe were to follow a capability approach and adopt an ethics of objectivity, it would refuse to assert normative priority among the three classical models of the Welfare State (Anglo-Saxon, Continental or Scandinavian), or between them and the market” (p. 292).

This late attempt to situate the volume within the broader comparative welfare state literature was much appreciated. However, I am not convinced by Salais’s attempt to locate the capability approach within the “Worlds of Welfare Capitalism”—or, at the very least, the preceding chapters do not support his assertion. Perhaps if a case study of a Scandinavian social democracy had been offered in addition to continental countries such as France or Italy, his argument might have been more persuasive.

I would argue that the capability approach as described by the contributors is neoliberal corporatist, with a large degree of European federalism included. For example, the editors acknowledge that in “retaining the positive aspects of liberalism while removing the negative ones, a capability approach offers a credible alternative to so-called ‘neoliberalism’” (p. 8). Thus, the capability approach assumes that the marketplace is the most efficient mechanism for translating individual human capacity, enhanced by public policies, into genuine choice and economic growth. How then do we end up with a cross between continental welfare states and Scandinavian social democracies? Furthermore, little effort is made to examine public policies directed toward vulnerable groups such as children, the poor, or retirees. In fact, when he addresses pension reforms in his concise history of social security provision, Noel Whiteside argues that the capability approach would “offer citizens a second or third active life” (p. 270). In other words, the elderly must keep working. These features are not portrayed in Salais’s “Capabilities World” typology, which seems more like Tony Blair’s “Third Way” to me.

In conclusion, scholars interested in European regional and employment policies should add this volume to their reading list, while those who are more interested in examining European social policy toward vulnerable groups or

reframing the debate over the welfare state can afford to overlook this contribution.

Democracy Without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One-Party Dominant State. By Ethan Scheiner. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 286p. \$70.00 cloth, \$27.99 paper.

— Greg Kasza, *Indiana University*

The resilience of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is the most remarkable feature of the Japanese political system. The party sustained majorities in both houses of the Diet and ruled the cabinet alone from its founding in 1955 until 1989. It was one of the few ruling parties in the industrialized democracies to survive the oil crises of the 1970s, and it somehow managed to escape the voters’ wrath over innumerable corruption scandals. The party’s image in public opinion surveys became so negative in the middle to late 1970s that political scientist Ichiro Miyake coined the term “negative partisans” to describe the many voters who backed the LDP in elections despite professing negative images of the party.

The LDP lost its majority in the upper house in 1989 and in the lower house in 1993, when the party split. A coalition of its former adherents and opposition parliamentarians then organized a government that reformed the electoral system, which had grossly overrepresented rural districts favoring the LDP. The recession that started in the early 1990s undermined the LDP’s reputation for economic prowess, and pundits heralded the dawn of a new era in Japanese politics. But within less than a year, the LDP had recovered to lead a coalition government of its own, and it has continued to rule in coalition with one or two small parties ever since. Ethan Scheiner’s new book seeks to explain how the LDP managed to pull this off.

Scheiner’s contention that clientelism underlies the LDP’s success comes as no surprise. The prowess of LDP politicians at buying the support of farmers, the self-employed, construction workers, small and big business, and other constituencies has been well documented over the years by Nathaniel Thayer, Ronald Hrebenar, Jacob Schlesinger, and many others. Scheiner’s contribution is to place clientelism in a broader institutional context to explain why it has had a more profound and lasting impact on party competition in Japan than it has in other political systems where clientelism has also flourished. To accomplish this he uses the comparative method, examining Japan alongside Italy, Austria, Sweden, Mexico, and, more selectively, other political systems as well. In this respect, his work follows in the footsteps of T. J. Pempel’s edited volume, *Uncommon Democracies* (1990).

Scheiner argues that it is the combination of clientelism, fiscal centralization, and institutional protections for the LDP’s clients that has made it so difficult for the opposition parties to mount a sustainable challenge. Borrowing from

Herbert Kitschelt, Scheiner uses clientelism to refer to “benefits that are awarded to people who supported the party and withheld from those who are found, on the basis of some kind of monitoring, not to have supported it” (p. 15). Fiscal centralization exists where the budgets of subnational governments depend heavily upon financial transfers from the central government. The main institutional protection for the LDP’s clients is the prevalence of single-member districts in the new, post-1993 electoral system.

Due to clientelism and fiscal centralization, local officeholders must rely upon connections to the national ruling party to win benefits for their districts. This makes it difficult for non-LDP politicians to build a local power base in the rural districts that depend most heavily upon public works and other government expenditures. Voting behavior in Japan tends to be candidate-centered rather than issue-centered, and since many of the most attractive candidates for national office are those experienced in local politics, the opposition parties have a hard time recruiting effective candidates to run for parliament in rural districts. Although rural districts are not as overrepresented in the new electoral system as they were previously, one-third of today’s single-member districts are in rural areas, and the LDP wins an overwhelming majority of those seats. Even if the opposition should win some 60 percent of nonrural seats, it would still control only about 40 percent of all seats in the lower house.

In sum, clientelism, fiscal centralization, and the preponderance of single-member districts in the new electoral system have conspired to create “two parallel party systems” in Japan since 1993, a rural party system in which the LDP predominates and an urban party system in which there is greater party competition. Opposition parties have been unable to win favor with the rural electorate, and this is the key to the LDP’s continued success. This is an original conclusion, since the impact of the rural electorate attracted much more attention before the 1994 electoral reform than it has since.

Scheiner’s analysis might benefit from a rethinking of some key concepts. His strict definition of clientelism makes it hard to determine if clientelistic or programmatic policies have mattered more to the LDP’s longevity. For instance, the protection of farmers from foreign competition and their remarkably favorable treatment under the income and property tax laws do not qualify as “clientelism” because the benefits of these measures are general and not limited to the LDP’s supporters. Given the LDP’s widespread backing among farmers, however, to label these policies programmatic rather than clientelistic seems to be a distinction without a difference. A broader definition of “clientelism” seems to be in order.

The book identifies the phenomenon to be explained as “one-party dominance,” but the arrangements that Scheiner places under this rubric include the LDP’s solitary rule before 1989, its rule with changing coalition partners since

1994, the postwar rule of Sweden’s Social Democratic Party and Italy’s Christian Democrats with one or several coalition partners, the dominance of Mexico’s PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) in both its authoritarian and democratic phases, and the dominance of *two* parties in postwar Austria. The rationale for choosing these particular cases for comparison demands a more thorough explanation based on a more rigorous typology of party systems.

Scheiner discusses the competitiveness of the opposition parties only in terms of their ability to form a non-LDP government. This leads him to understate the changes that have occurred since 1989. In his view, “the opposition was unable to make serious inroads” into the LDP’s power in the 1990s (p. 53). But this was the decade in which the opposition parties formed a government for the first time in more than 35 years (however briefly), revised the electoral system (however ineffectually), and eroded the LDP’s electoral base enough so that it is now unable to pass laws without the support of other parties. Since the LDP’s coalition partners may now claim a share of the state’s resources for themselves, does clientelism in the 1990s and early 2000s not serve their interests as well as those of the LDP? By defining “competitiveness” solely in terms of alternations in power, the author neglects or downplays these dynamics.

These issues aside, this book makes an important contribution to our understanding of Japan’s contemporary party system. To some, it might appear that the LDP’s side payments to its favored constituents have declined since 1993. The government has sharply reduced its costly purchase of the rice crop, it has repealed the Large Retail Store Law protecting small businesses and the self-employed, and in the early 2000s it has reduced its public works budget, which had attracted severe criticism. Scheiner demonstrates that the residual use of clientelistic policies (broadly understood) in the context of fiscal centralization and the new electoral system still suffice to make the LDP Japan’s most powerful political party. The more things change, the more they remain the same. Scheiner makes effective use of statistics and qualitative interviews to document his points, and a brief book review cannot do justice to the richness of his comparisons (Chapter 4 in particular is an excellent piece of comparative analysis). It will be intriguing to see how his analysis works out in light of the reforms introduced by current Prime Minister Jun’ichiro Koizumi, whom Scheiner identifies as an opponent of clientelistic politics.

The Politics of Sexual Harassment: A Comparative Study of the United States, the European Union, and Germany. By Kathrin S. Zippel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 274p. \$80.00 cloth, \$34.99 paper.

— Sally J. Kenney, *University of Minnesota*

Why was Germany so much slower than the United States to outlaw sexual harassment? What role have feminist

organizations, academics, women in political parties, and femocrats (governmental equality officers) played in generating this policy change? How did the European Union act to require member states to legislate given that most member states were opposed? Does it matter that German policymakers have framed the problem largely as a gender-neutral violation of dignity, rather than as an individual right not to be discriminated against on the basis of sex? Is it better to rely on individual litigants to enforce the law or work through collective bargaining agreements and labor councils? And what are the implications of the findings of sexual harassment policy for the future of this issue, feminist policy change, and the policy process more generally? Kathrin Zippel answers these questions and more in her well-researched, comprehensive, and clearly written book.

Unlike scholars such as Tom Rochon in *Culture Moves* (1998), Zippel, a sociologist, focuses on what she defines as the *politics* of sexual harassment rather than culture. Her empirical study hones in on the history and structure of social movements, the organization of industrial relations, the role of courts, the dominant discourses that frame public policy—in short, the political opportunity structure. The book's greatest contributions are to the fields of public policy and social movements, although scholars and practitioners interested in sexual harassment, comparativists, and Europeanists will find it a useful contribution to their fields.

Zippel finds very different paths to policy change in the three systems. Because judges heard the horror stories of individual victims firsthand, because sex discrimination law offered a convenient frame, because loosely organized groups could piggyback on the initiative of individual litigants more easily than mobilize a legislative campaign, and because litigation captured the attention of the media and employers, policy change happened early in the United States largely through progressive legal interpretation. Europeans recoiled at the scandals that Paula Jones's and Anita Hill's charges generated, argued that Americans were puritans who had no respect for privacy, and concluded that sexual harassment was only an American problem. Valuable ideas and expertise diffused from the United States, but carried baggage. Feminist bureaucrats (femocrats) in the European Union and Germany joined forces in a transnational advocacy network, but first had to demonstrate the prevalence of the problem, aided by the occasional scandal. More than two decades of efforts at the European level generated first "soft law" (mere recommendations to member states) and finally legal requirements, due to the fortuitous placement of individual commissioners and bureaucrats. Translated into Germany as a uniquely European vision of a violation of dignity, however, sexual harassment lost its context in sex discrimination, and the absence of sanctions makes it ineffectual. The consensual, corporatist approach to labor relations effectively shut out feminist voices and marginalized the concerns of women workers.

This thoughtful comparative account of one policy across jurisdictions offers some important insights about the future trajectory of feminist policy change. Contrary to some of the policies deriving from second-wave feminism, policy change in the future (particularly in the European Union and Germany) is likely to come from expert scholar-activists, women in political parties, supranational organizations, and women who have a toehold as equality officers in unions, public employment, and even corporations. Effective as those players may be in setting the agenda and securing policy change, feminists' inability to influence, let alone control, implementation renders significant behavioral changes a long way off. Rather than the boomerang effect that Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink find among transnational networks working to influence states and international organizations, Zippel finds a ping-pong effect in three federal systems—the United States, Germany, and the European Union—where innovation may occur at either the state or federal level. In Germany, pressure for change at the national level may come both from innovative progressive states (i.e., below) as well as the European Union (i.e., above).

Perhaps because Zippel approaches her subject as a sociologist rather than a historian, we get only tantalizing glimpses of the compelling stories of the women in the German Green Party who challenged their leader, or the debate in the German parliament where no men showed up, or the coup European Union Commissioner Anna Diamantopoulou orchestrated, or the strategic brilliance of individual scholar-activists, or the litigants with harrowing tales to tell. Zippel's structural institutional account condenses the dramatic story of policy change. Given her expertise, I would also have welcomed more of her own analysis of debates over sexual harassment within feminism. Near the end (p. 222), she seems to concur with Vicky Schultz's scathing critique of Catharine MacKinnon in calling for refocusing on gender devaluation rather than on sexuality. Zippel criticizes German policy because it has eschewed the gender oppression framing in favor of the frame of dignity and a concern about bullying or "mobbing." She insists that gender and gender stratification must be a central frame, yet never really situates herself within feminist debates.

Moreover, because the United States compares so favorably with Germany in naming the problem early, framing it as sex discrimination, and imposing penalties, Zippel risks painting too optimistic a picture of policy in the United States. She clearly recognizes its limitations. She ends the book with a call to go beyond merely creating policy to *punish* sexual harassers and the employers who give them their power. Instead, she calls for methods that would offer redress for victims and *prevent* sexual harassment. The high numbers of summary judgments granted to plaintiffs (p. 175), the changing composition of the judiciary, the increasing hostility to discrimination plaintiffs generally,

the ineffectiveness of internal procedures, and the enormous economic and psychological costs of litigation make one wonder if the policy change on sexual harassment has been symbolic in the negative sense of Murray Edelman—creating the impression of justice while perpetuating injustice.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Peace Operations and Global Order. Edited by Alex J. Bellamy and Paul Williams. New York: Routledge, 2005. 242p. \$115.00.

— Terrence Lyons, *George Mason University*

The literature on peace operations has been dominated by case studies and by efforts to glean policy-relevant lessons in order to improve ongoing or future peacekeeping operations. More explicitly theoretical studies that seek to embed such interventions within the broader debates in international relations or comparative politics are more recent and less developed. *Peace Operations and Global Order* contributes to these debates by bringing insights from critical theory that raise new questions about how peace operations and the post–Cold War international system shape one another.

This critical theory approach seeks to challenge the assumptions that underlie the prevailing global order by investigating the interests that are served by current international institutions, norms, and practices, including peacekeeping and other peace support operations. It joins Roland Paris's *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict* (2004) in arguing that postconflict peacebuilding is concerned with the maintenance and reproduction of a particular neoliberal type of international order and builds on the more far-reaching examination of globalization and conflict in Mark Duffield's *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Security and Development* (2001). The contributors contrast critical theory approaches from “problem-solving” or managerialist approaches that accept the liberal order as a given and conflict as an aberration. Unlike problem-solving frameworks, critical perspectives investigate how interventions may serve the interests of the interveners more than the recipients, and how peacekeeping is part of a larger set of international policies that may generate as well as resolve conflict. Rather than accepting peace operations as discrete activities in response to empirical events, this collection asks how intervening states and agencies are implicated in the very creation of these crises.

The editors' introduction positions this volume in the larger debates on peacekeeping, United Nations reform, and new concepts of sovereignty. Part I includes chapters by Alex J. Bellamy and Michael Pugh that argue that critical approaches can both expose the persistence of injustices sus-

These are quibbles and hopes for future writing, however. Zippel has written an impressively comprehensive, carefully researched, thoughtful, and important book that offers insights across fields and disciplines.

tained by the current global order and uncover the potential for structural transformation. The nature of the neoliberal peace and the experiences of those that are the object of peacekeeping (those who are peace-kept) are the focus of Oliver P. Richmond's contribution. He suggests that a “peace-as-governance” consensus exists within the United Nations based on neoliberal assumptions about states, democracy, and markets that are rarely questioned. This New York consensus may promote stability at the expense of justice.

Part II of the collection broadens the discussion of peacekeeping and includes chapters on specific themes and cases. Paul Williams draws on the cases of Rwanda and Sierra Leone to consider how international financial institutions contribute to conflict that then is managed by peace operations. Tarja Väyrynen analyzes the UN discourse on gender and peace operations to assess whether commitments to mainstream gender have been met. Roland Bleiker discusses whether human security is a better starting point than the state to create new ways of resolving conflict in Korea through nonstate interactions, and Eli Samnes uses critical security studies concepts to analyze the UN preventive deployment in Macedonia. The Bleiker piece seems somewhat out of place, while Williams and Väyrynen demonstrate that looking beyond a narrow focus on the peace operation itself provides us with additional insights. Bellamy and Williams's concluding essay engages the debates about the reform of UN peacekeeping and proposals relating to privatized peace operations and regionalized peace operations in particular.

The literature on the relationship between multilateral intervention and international relations has been shaped in part by the most important cases in the news and the most prominent reform proposals under debate at the time of writing. Famine in the Horn of Africa, humanitarian intervention in Somalia, the multiple failures of Rwanda, the prolonged crises in the Balkans, wars seemingly driven by greed in West Africa, and now the consequences of preemptive intervention in Iraq have each generated important insights regarding how international order and multilateral intervention relate.

The chapters in this volume were originally published as a special issue of *International Peacekeeping* (Spring 2004), and some were presented at conferences in 2002. Kosovo and the Balkans, therefore, are the touchstone cases referenced here, and major reports of the early 2000s on reforming international organizations and norms are

the focus of critical analysis. Bellamy and Williams's concluding essay critiques the Brahimi Report (2000), while David Chandler's contribution explicitly focuses on the study by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (2001). The rapidly changing debates on multilateral intervention and global order today are shaped with reference to terrorism, preemptive war, Iraq, and the new thinking represented by the UN Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change report, *A More Secure World* (2004).

This rapidly changing terrain leaves some of these contributions out of sync with current reference points. Despite this, the importance of the underlying arguments calling for a more theoretically informed and rigorous investigation of the relationships between peace operations and international relations remains. This volume makes its contribution by questioning how assumptions embedded within policies and practices of multilateral peace operations often serve the existing global order and by proposing a theoretical framework for analyzing peace operations within a broader context of international relations.

Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge. Edited by Thomas Carothers. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006. 350p. \$50.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

— Miles Kahler, *University of California, San Diego*

The checkered history of rule-of-law promotion is only one part of a larger program of external intervention that has aimed to reshape economic policies and political institutions throughout the post-Cold War world. Those efforts—labeled good governance, state building, and post-conflict intervention—have, if anything, intensified and broadened since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This dispassionate and valuable evaluation of rule-of-law promotion reflects directly on the record of international assistance for legal reform, as well as the likely success of that even more ambitious agenda. Two introductory essays by Thomas Carothers, well known for his research on democracy promotion, offer a critical account of international assistance for legal reform, emphasizing the knowledge deficit that plagues claims of successful international influence. The following chapters attempt to fill that knowledge gap, at the same time underlining obstacles to sharper evaluation and learning on the part of donors and practitioners.

Just as the Washington consensus in economic policy expanded from a pragmatic short list of recommendations centered on macroeconomic policy to a broader, politically useful, and rigid vision of market reforms, so the agenda of legal reform has produced its own rule-of-law orthodoxy. Questioning that orthodoxy is the task set for the second, and most successful, portion of this work. Rachel Kleinfeld's target is conceptual confusion: the meld-

ing of several, sometimes conflicting, definitions of rule of law in this capacious term. Rather than examining the ultimate ends implied by rule of law (ranging from a government bound by law to simple law and order), she finds that practitioners have too often lapsed into narrowly defined reforms of individual legal institutions, reforms that become ends in themselves. Frank Upham levels an even more telling critique of efforts to transfer Western or American legal institutions to other societies, pointing out that both the United States and Japan failed to fulfill many rule-of-law prescriptions during their successful economic development. Upham also notes that the leading industrialized democracies continue to display diverse legal institutions that do impede their political or economic success. Wade Channell describes the historical amnesia of legal reformers, who have seldom looked back at the law and development movement that rose and fell in the 1960s and 1970s. Channell also sketches the organizational and political reasons for a failure of learning among legal reform practitioners. In two chapters, Stephen Golub undermines the automatic relationship posited between legal reform, on the one hand, and economic development and poverty alleviation, on the other. His alternative to the existing orthodoxy—legal empowerment—appears as yet another orthodoxy, however, one that is close to the hearts of leading foundations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Its alleged superiority has been subjected to no more systematic evaluation than the prevailing orthodoxy.

Regional case studies, presented as a preliminary avenue of evaluation for international rule-of-law promotion, are generally less successful than these conceptual forays. Detailed narrative, careful assessment of the role of external influence, and unconventional conclusions mark Matthew Spence's outstanding account of criminal justice reform in Russia. Spence argues that a top-down approach to legal reform worked in the Russian case, but only because particular political circumstances permitted international donors to play a limited catalytic role. Matthew Stephenson provides a skeptical review of the "Trojan horse" assumptions that undergird support for legal reform in China. Legal reform in the interests of economic development could diffuse to other legal sectors, but the mechanisms for that diffusion are decidedly vague. Two other comparative accounts (David Mednicoff on the Middle East and Laure-Hélène Piron on sub-Saharan Africa) draw on their authors' experience in these regions, but give little means for evaluating that experience and the lessons that are drawn from it. Only Lisa Bhansali and Christina Biebesheimer attempt a more systematic, quantitative assessment of the significance of legal reform, and, as they freely admit, their analysis is wanting. Benchmark data is missing; the only outcomes that can be measured are very narrow ones (due process); and those outcomes cannot be causally related to larger social and political ends (of the

kind that Kleinfeld urges). Most important for the task at hand, no clear estimate is offered of the influence of international intervention as compared to domestic variables.

In his brief conclusion, Carothers does not do full justice to these compelling criticisms of rule-of-law assistance. Legal reform is deeply political, not technical, and to pretend otherwise is a convenient fiction. That simple conclusion, shared by all of the authors, should, however, point to additional investigations that are missing here. The political prerequisites for successful legal reform are an essential precursor for understanding when and how to intervene. The authors divide, for example, over the value of a “top down,” state-centric approach or a “bottom up,” demand-creation effort based in civil society. Political context is certainly a key determinant of the efficacy of one approach or the other. In similar fashion, the ways in which reform in one part of the legal system may or may not reinforce or undermine change in other sectors is also shaped by the wider politics of legal reform. Local knowledge—both legal and political—is essential, and by the accounts of these authors, it is rare among practitioners. The authors, for the most part, avoid the simple panacea of more resources, emphasizing instead that politically astute delivery of legal assistance, rather than its sheer scale, will be more consequential. The need for more systematic and rigorous evaluation is urgently required—and it is far from clear that current assistance programs are framed with an ultimate goal of evaluation in mind. Finally, the authors describe, but cannot resolve, the overriding dilemma of all external assistance programs. Too much assistance of the wrong kind and local ownership of reforms is undermined; too little and reforms stall in the face of limited resources and political resistance.

Trading Blocs: States, Firms, and Regions in the World Economy. By Kerry A. Chase. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005. 322p. \$70.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

— Alan M. Rugman, *Kelley School of Business, Indiana University.*

The focus of this book by Kerry Chase is that the process of international trade liberalization has resulted in the development of three major regional economic blocs: the European Union, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and a partial regional agreement in Asia largely driven by Japan. These three economic blocs are known in business schools as the “triad” of Europe, North America, and Asia. In *The Regional Multinationals* (2005), I have shown that the majority of international trade and investment takes place within these triad blocs rather than between them, and that even the world’s largest 500 firms average over 72% of their sales within their home region. Basically, the analysis by Chase is fully consistent with such findings.

Chapters 2 and 8 develop an analysis of the political economy of trade in a regional context. Chapter 2 devel-

ops a model where the key independent variables explaining trade policies are aspects of scale economies and data on intraregional trade. There are two key elements to this theory. First, the triad regional trade agreements have been developed due to lobbying pressures by firms seeking economies of scale. Second, the regional agreements have also been driven, especially in more recent years, by firms seeking rules to guarantee access to production-sharing networks that cross national borders. It is the interplay between these two factors that explains the rapid economic growth of the EU and NAFTA, in particular, and which should lead to an eventual regional trade agreement in Asia.

Chapter 3 and 4 are case studies that test the theoretical model in the interwar period. Chapter 3 applies it to Britain, Japan, and Germany. It is found that British firms achieved scale economies in manufacturing through the use of Imperial Preferences. These effectively locked in the British Commonwealth market for sales, but also tied in the resources and other value chain inputs required to develop a successful production network. In contrast, Japan and Germany lacked an effective economic empire, which, Chase argues, was one incentive for Japanese economic imperialism in Southeast Asia and for German expansion, leading to their military adventures in the Second World War.

Chapters 5, 6, and 7 test the basic model across the core triad regions of the EU (Chapter 5), NAFTA (Chapter 6), and Japan (Chapter 7). These chapters are fascinating in that Chase is able to develop convincing evidence that the dual aspects of the theory are required for successful regional integration. Significant coefficients leap out for scale and intraregional trade variables, and these are interpreted by the author in a novel manner. For example, scale economies and production networks were not fully developed in the EU until the 1992 measures were introduced. Similarly, although the Canada/U.S. Autopac was in effect, full scale economies and production network efficiencies were not realized in NAFTA until the Canada/U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) of 1988 came into effect. Both in Europe and North America, production-sharing networks had been developing, but it was not until 1992 and 1988, respectively, that multinational enterprises (MNEs) were able to fully develop these networks in clusters spanning the national borders of each region. Chase shows, correctly, that outsourcing and offshoring are the mirror images of production-sharing networks. Thus, the concerns of trade unions about job losses are largely misplaced since home-based MNEs need to outsource within regional clusters in order to achieve efficient manufacturing production. Although he does not discuss this, the same logic for outsourcing and offshoring now applies to the service sector.

Another theme runs throughout the book. This is that multilateralism, in particular the successful rounds of trade liberalization at the GATT and World Trade Organization, is fully consistent with the new regionalism. Chase states that “extant trading blocs do not pose a threat to the

multilateral trading system” (p. 261). The reasoning here is that the creation of the large trading blocs in the EU and NAFTA has been driven by firms working in accord with states. In simple terms, this means that regional trade agreements are efficiency driven. In fact, they often represent a set of rules being put in place to recognize the reality of existing regional economic integration, often driven by MNEs seeking production-sharing networks across borders. The author develops an interesting sub-theme to the effect that while the EU discriminates against “outsiders,” the result is simply to speed up the substitution of foreign direct investment (FDI) for exports. This is efficiency enhancing; for example, FDI in the EU by U.S. MNEs turns the U.S. firms into “insiders.” Similarly, NAFTA’s legal instruments to exclude outsiders, such as the rules of origin, also lead to Japanese MNEs increasing their FDI in the United States at the expense of exports. Thus, both in the EU and NAFTA, the deepening of the regional trade agreements has led to increased inward FDI and cross investments by MNEs. The result is a greater degree of international integration by MNEs operating across the broad triad regions.

The analysis in this book by a political scientist is more consistent with the thinking in business schools by scholars of international business. Indeed, many of the theories and cases in *Trading Blocs* were anticipated by international business scholars in work published some ten to twenty years ago. In contrast, the work by Chase would raise tensions with traditional trade economists, such as Jagdish Bhagwati since they are still influenced by fairly static concepts of comparative advantage. Chase has positioned his theory as a dynamic one that cleverly integrates increasing returns to scale with the more recent development of production-sharing networks, where the latter is difficult for economists to model. Economists traditionally ignore the strategic dimension of MNEs and the alliances and joint ventures that are often required to develop successful and efficient production-sharing networks across borders. My conclusion is that this book will be more favorably received in business schools than in economics departments. Its reception in political science departments will depend partly on the legacy of vested interests. Chase himself states that “these findings challenge work in the field that explains trading blocs in terms of alliances and power politics, transaction costs in multilateral negotiations, and intergovernmental bargains among nations” (p. 257). However, my reading of the book is that his focus on economic efficiency and the role of MNEs in developing economies of scale and production-sharing networks across national borders is fairly consistent with these related explanations of multilateral trade liberalization. In other words, the new regionalism created by MNEs is the driver behind globalization in terms of the increased international economic integration we all observe in the data on trade and FDI.

Governing Water: Contentious Transnational Politics and Global Institution Building. By Ken Conca. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005. 456 p. \$70.00 cloth, \$28.00 paper.

— Neil E. Harrison, *The Sustainable Development Institute and the University of Wyoming*

Ken Conca presents what is close to a definitive statement of the transnational politics of water, but his larger purpose is to demonstrate and correct the inadequacies of current theories of international environmental politics (IEP). This well-written and well-argued book is a theoretical advance on the regime theory commonly used in IEP and has garnered two prestigious prizes: the Harold and Margaret Sprout award and the Chadwick F. Alger Prize.

In the first two chapters, Conca critiques the institutional forms of most international environmental agreements and the theory that both supports those forms and directs empirical inquiry into them. He argues that an “international” environmental perspective encourages the application of “border-reinforcing” regime theory. But many environmental problems are not tied to “a particularly obvious, immediate, and physically tangible transnational effect” (p. 14), the type of problem for which regimes may be effective. He argues that the “bordered, statist, and functional-realist features of the regime form prevent it from confronting the problem of protecting the planet’s places” (p. 25). Thus, his central question is “whether other institutional forms . . . can emerge where regimes have failed to take root” (p. 9).

Using water as his substantive case, Conca seeks to demonstrate the constraining effect of what he calls the “metanorms” of knowledge, territoriality, and authority. After a sketch of the world’s water problems in Chapter 3, he offers chapter-length case studies of each of four critical water governance institution-building processes. He then uses case studies of Brazil and South Africa to show how these processes interact in national water policy processes.

To illustrate his scathing critique of regimes and their limitations, Conca uses two very different international agreements commonly perceived as successes—Montreal and Basel. As he puts it, “if Montreal is a detective story, Basel is a morality play” (p. 36). But there are similarities, too. Both are regimes that stay outside state boundaries, presume state competency, and feign reliance on objective, scientific analysis.

For Conca, the weakness of the regime approach is that regimes are institutions “in which rules are contested, but roles are not; in which nature is territorialized; and in which legitimacy demands that knowledge be stabilized” (p. 41). While not all countries are treated equally by regimes, their roles are relatively fixed as the authoritative subjects of the regime and their primary objects. Nonstate actors, some of which are critical to the problem at hand, have little influence and no authority. The regime approach also assumes that most of nature sits still within borders

and only concerns itself with the parts that do not. With this focus, it ignores the transnational character of economic, social, and political institutions, and treats natural systems piecemeal as, for example, problems of internationally shared river basins rather than watersheds, potentially supporting further commodification of nature into state rights. Finally, regimes use science to stabilize the problem of knowledge in order to make it amenable to political solution, allowing “the currencies of knowledge” to become weapons in states’ search for power over regime rules.

Just as regimes have failed effectively to manage most global environmental problems, theory has failed to generate alternate, more holistic, problem framing and broader environmental governance goals. Having enslaved themselves to an excessively narrow definition of regimes as “formal, voluntary, negotiated institutions” (p. 64), theorists have been unable to conceptualize how to hybridize authority, de-territorialize nature, and destabilize knowledge. Conceptions of political institutions as the result of power in the pursuit of interests fail to recognize that all action occurs within an increasingly cohesive, powerful, and global normative context that legitimizes rational-functional institutional instruments and is unable to address most global environmental problems. More fertile ground for growing institutions that resist the hegemonic normative context and premature closure around a narrow regime form lies in issues in which state authority is contested, the quality of local governance is central, and ecological goals are persistently ambiguous. For Conca, the point of theory “is less to predict patterns of institutional development by guessing at the winners than to identify spaces where alternative institutional forms may be found, studied, understood, and nurtured” (p. 71).

Top-down, centralized governance imposes rational-functional institutional forms; bottom-up processes generate novel ideas and institutional forms. Conca shows that unlike Montreal, “a global rivers regime . . . is a bottom-up process of norm diffusion and normative convergence over time across separate regimes at the basin level” (p. 95). Throughout his analysis of the four institution-building processes in global water governance—development of a formal regime, networking among water experts, social opposition to large dams, and the debate over commoditization of water—the author shows how bottom-up pressures have promoted novel norms that have enlarged and enriched the discourse about global governance of water. For example, in the case of water commoditization, the liberal market norm subscribed to by states and multinationals has been opposed by the idea of water as a human right pressed by norm entrepreneurs. Thus, he concludes that effective institutions should be thought of “not as something to be designed but rather as something to be nurtured” (p. 384).

Conca advises us to “visualize a process of struggle among competing and often conflicting norms that are marked

by more complex spatial distributions across multiple [social] sites” (p. 382), implying an ontological reformulation. IEP might be conceived as a dynamic tension between issue-specific bottom-up and top-down processes. Theoretical and empirical interests would then be extended well beyond the usual suspects of states and international (intergovernmental or nonstate) organizations to all actual and potential participants in environmental governance processes. Similarly, positivist epistemology should finally be discarded in favor of some derivative of evolutionary epistemology in which hypotheses about reality are selected for their contribution to increasingly effective action. The prizes notwithstanding, to fully honor Conca’s work, his colleagues should begin a wholesale reconsideration of IEP theory.

Children’s Human Rights: Progress and Challenges for Children Worldwide. Edited by Mark Ensalaco and Linda C. Majka. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005. 288p. \$82.50 cloth, \$32.95 paper.

Freedom from Want: The Human Right to Adequate Food. By George Kent. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005. 290p. \$49.95 cloth, \$26.95 paper.

— Lawrence J. LeBlanc, *Marquette University*

The body of literature on international human rights has grown tremendously in the last three decades or so. The two books under review here expand this body of literature and aim to contribute to our understanding of the development and growth of human rights regimes—systems of norms, rules, and decision-making procedures—in two different but related areas: The volume edited by Mark Ensalaco and Linda Majka deals with the rights of the child; George Kent’s work focuses on the right to food, or, more precisely, on what he calls the right to adequate food.

While the two volumes address certain common issues to which we shall return in a moment, they grew out of different concerns and experiences. *Children’s Human Rights* grew out of an international symposium on the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which was held at the University of Dayton in March 2001. The substantive chapters of the book were written originally for the symposium. One of the most impressive things about the volume is that it is truly an interdisciplinary enterprise, with scholars in the social sciences, law, education, and public administration taking part in the symposium and writing chapters. In contrast, *Freedom from Want* grew out of Kent’s earlier research and writing on the political economy of hunger and the place of children in the international political economy. Like his earlier work, this new effort provides a good conceptual scheme—particularly regarding the historical and philosophical foundations of the right to adequate food and the ways and means of implementing the right—which other human rights scholars could use in their research and writing on other specific rights.

These differences aside, readers of the two books would find that they cover certain common issues and problems that make them interesting companion pieces, even if they are not necessarily of comparable quality in all respects. Both provide coverage of the historical context in which the debate and discussion over the meaning of the rights under consideration have taken place, and these parts of the books throw light on the status of the rights of the child and the right to adequate food, respectively, in international law. Clearly, as the volume by Ensalaco and Majka shows, the adoption of the Convention on the Rights of the Child by the United Nations General Assembly in November 1989 was a defining moment in the history of the development of international norms and rules regarding children. We know that international documents proclaiming or affirming the rights of the child date back at least as far as the League of Nations period. But the Convention established more clearly than any other instrument a truly international legal regime. The Convention entered into force in September 1990, less than one year after its adoption, and it then quickly became the most widely ratified of all human rights treaties. In fact, by July 2006, it had been ratified by 192 parties. Only two of the current UN member states—Somalia and the United States—have not ratified it.

The widespread acceptance of the Convention has made it the principal source of international human rights norms and rules regarding children. Although several contributions in the Ensalaco and Majka volume make and discuss this point, the best one was written by Ursula Kilkelly, who shows that the Convention has set standards that have been and/or could be useful in advancing children's rights by international courts (such as the European and Inter-American human rights courts) and domestic courts. Indeed, her comprehensive analysis of numerous cases in which courts have grappled with children's rights in an international law framework makes her contribution one of the high points of the volume.

There is no international legal regime comparable to the Convention on the Rights of the Child regarding the right to adequate food. But in his book, Kent shows that the provisions of various global and regional international instruments (e.g., the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child)—as well as the conclusions of many international meetings and conferences, and the operating principles of numerous international governmental and nongovernmental organizations—combine to establish a right to adequate food. His impressive and comprehensive coverage and analysis of these developments make the several chapters in which they are addressed—especially Chapters 1 through 7—required reading for human rights specialists.

Another important issue also addressed in both volumes is the matter of the implementation of the inter-

national norms and rules regarding the rights they are concerned with, and this is done mainly through the use of illustrative case studies. The mere elaboration of international human rights standards does not, of course, mean that respect for the rights will necessarily be achieved. Indeed, as the research in these two volumes demonstrates, action by individual states is very important so far as the implementation of human rights is concerned. Thus, despite the widespread ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the state of millions of children throughout the world remains deplorable and depressing. Several cases studies in the Ensalaco and Majka volume do a wonderful job of illustrating this point. Jaro Bilocerko-wycz provides an especially good and comprehensive analysis of sexual trafficking in postcommunist Europe, looking at the causes and evolution of the problem and how concern for the problem—or the lack of it—among governments has played out since the early 1990s. Richard Maclure and Melvin Sotelo present the results of a fascinating case study of children's rights in Nicaragua, demonstrating the need for effective collaboration among many groups to improve the lot of children—and what happens when that necessary collaboration is missing. Laura Leming and Raymond Fitz provide a good companion piece to the Maclure and Sotelo chapter in their study of the problems that arise in addressing the plight of children on the “margins”—those without access to power and economic resources, as well as those who are literally on the margins in terms of geographical location. Rosemary Saari and Jeffrey Shook provide an excellent analysis of U.S. adherence to a large number of international conventions and other agreements that are relevant to juveniles. And Linda and Theo Majka present an compelling case study of child farm workers in the United States.

Kent uses a mix of case studies and thematic chapters in a part of his book that he labels “Applications.” Here, we have chapters that examine the actions of courts in India to compel the distribution of food from food stocks to the hungry; the efforts of groups like Citizenship Action and political parties in Brazil to integrate the right to adequate food in the political process in the late 1990s; and the opposite movement so far as the United States is concerned, that is, the history of denial that there is any such thing as a “right” to food recognized by the United States. In addition to these case studies, several chapters examine the right to adequate food in the context of groups (e.g., infants, victims of HIV, refugees) or thematic issues (e.g., water and trade).

Of the two volumes, *Freedom from Want* is qualitatively the most impressive. It is well organized and written, and Kent's arguments regarding the right to adequate food as an international human right are backed up with extensive documentation and persuasively laid out. One might have wished for more actual case studies, rather than the mix of case studies and themes that Kent included in the

“Applications” part of the book. At least a common standard of approach, or a set of common questions or issues to be dealt with, should have been employed to give the chapters a more even quality. But these are relatively minor flaws, and they are outweighed by the high quality of the scholarship that pervades the book as a whole. Indeed, this is a book that should be read by the community of international human rights scholars in the broadest sense, not just those who are in political science but in the social sciences and humanities generally. It could be used as required reading in courses and seminars on human rights and on international organization that are offered to advanced undergraduate and graduate students.

Children’s Human Rights also makes a good contribution to the literature on human rights, specifically regarding the rights of the child. However, there are a couple of disappointing features of the volume that detract from its potential value. One is that there is virtually nothing that looks at the work of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, which functions as the main implementing mechanism under the framework of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. It is hard to imagine how concern for the implementation of the Convention would not lead to substantial discussion of the work of the Committee. Like other committees that function under other human rights conventions, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has faced serious problems in fulfilling its mandate. Compliance with the terms of the Convention is, of course, a major issue, and a major concern of scholars in the field of human rights. But while quite a few of the chapters address issues related to substantive compliance, that is, to compliance by states with the established norms and rules regarding the rights of the child, virtually no attention is given to procedural compliance, that is, to compliance with the procedural requirements of the Convention. The Convention requires that state parties submit good and timely periodic reports, but the vast majority of these reports are not submitted at all, are submitted late, or are of very poor quality. Despite the lack of compliance with this requirement, a substantial backlog of reports has yet to be dealt with. Some attention should have been devoted to this problem. Indeed, one of the chapters could have been devoted exclusively to the work of the Committee, the problems it faces, and its prospects for the future.

A second weakness of the volume has to do with the uneven quality of the chapters and with gaps in the coverage of issues and problems related to children’s rights, the inclusion of which would have made for a fuller and more comprehensive treatment. To be sure, such problems often arise in interdisciplinary projects of this nature. For one, funds are obviously not unlimited, which lack could have a substantial impact on the quantity as well as quality of participants. And some participants may not be able to follow through on publication commitments. But even with this in mind, it would have been good to

see more attention devoted to some of the serious problems covered in the book. For example, there could have been more depth in the treatment of cases in which child soldiers have been used and the related problem of reintegrating these soldiers into their respective societies. Moreover, more could have been done on the issue of the economic exploitation of children, especially of children in the so-called Third World.

Despite these shortcomings, on balance this book is a valuable addition to the literature on the rights of the child. Some of the chapters, as noted, will be of interest to a broad range of scholars and intelligent readers who are interested in human rights. In addition, the interdisciplinary nature of the research enterprise should help to attract a broad audience. The book would be a fine addition to a reading list in human rights seminars and courses offered at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels.

Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia’s Surplus Male Population. By Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea M. den Boer. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004. 329p. \$37.00 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

— Katherine Palmer Kaup, *Furman University*

One in six Chinese men is unlikely to ever find a wife, according to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing (p. 261). There are currently over 111 million more men in China than women, and 120 men to every 100 women in the 15–34 age category. India’s skewed sex ratio is also rapidly approaching the 120:100 ratio. What happens to societies that explicitly select for disproportionate numbers of male offspring, through abortions of female fetuses, infanticide of girls, neglect of female infants, or other forms of direct and indirect violence against girls and women? It is to this question that Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea M. den Boer turn in their extensively researched and richly detailed book.

The authors conclude that high-sex-ratio societies in which there are “surplus men” and “missing women” (the latter term referring to the number of females who would be predicted to exist were it not for gender bias in mortality) have a propensity toward chronic violence and persistent social disorder. Though analysts from a variety of disciplines have for decades debated the origins, extent, and implications of exaggerated gender imbalances in Asia, Hudson and den Boer are among the first to argue that nations with disproportionately high numbers of single males may be more prone toward interstate conflict. This conclusion derives in part from blending two relatively new subfields of security studies: environmental security, which considers the role of scarcity and inequality in producing conflict, and human security, which examines how the security of individuals is related to the security of nations (p. 1). The authors’ predictions for China’s and India’s development in the twenty-first century are bleak: Not

only will democracy likely not take root in China and India find its current democratic system challenged, but both countries will also be unable to resolve their primary international territorial disputes given the “unstable context produced by skewed sex ratios” (p. 263). Although gender imbalances may not be sufficient or necessary to spark violence within and between societies, the authors argue that they nonetheless may “amplify, aggravate, or trigger” such violence (pp. 5, 221). Indeed, they contend, nations with high sex ratios are predisposed to “see some utility in interstate conflict” (p. 263) as a tool for sending their “bare branches” (men who will never marry due to the dearth of spouses) away from national population centers.

Hudson and den Boer begin their argument by tracing the historical origin of sex-selection practices within and outside of Asia. They discuss how religion and rigid social systems of hypergyny (marriage of women to men of higher social status) contribute to the continuation of sex-selection practices long after the conditions that originally led to their practice subside. They then focus their discussion in Chapters 3 and 4 on historical and contemporary sex-selection practices in India and China, which, they argue, account for more than 90% of Asia’s 90 million missing females. In a nuanced critique of existing studies on Asia’s sex ratios, the authors point out that much of the current literature fails to account for variations in sex ratios over time, region, class, caste, tribe, and age category.

Chapter 5 outlines several characteristics and behavioral tendencies of bare branches culled from theories and empirical findings in sociology, anthropology, psychology, criminology, economics, political science, and security studies. Most bare branches belong to the lowest socioeconomic class, are likely to be unemployed, are transient with few ties to the communities in which they look for work, and live and socialize with other bare branches in bachelor subcultures often ostracized by mainstream society. The authors examine “seven facts”—including that males in general are more violent than females, unmarried males commit more violence than married males, and low-status males commit more violence than high-status males—to conclude that bare branches are more likely to turn to vice and violence than other males (pp. 192–200). Using as evidence several historical examples from China and India as well as medieval Portugal of bare branches engaging in widespread intrasocietal violence, the authors conclude that the strategies bare branches use to improve their own lot often lead to significant violence in society and a further decline in the status of women. They also conclude that government efforts to promote domestic stability under these conditions often leads to intersocietal violence as governments seek to distract bare branches in foreign adventures. The final two chapters offer policy options to combat increasingly distorted sex ratios and the violence the authors argue follows from them.

Bare Branches provides a valuable compilation and analysis of historical and contemporary studies of sex ratios in Asia. The authors argue that “the masculinization of Asia’s sex ratios is one of the overlooked stories of the century” (p. 264), and their work raises the previously ignored question of how distorted gender balances alter nations’ security calculations. The study offers an insightful hypothesis that societies with large numbers of bare branches may be more prone to armed conflict than others. Further research is needed, however, as the authors themselves acknowledge, to confirm their hypotheses. A larger sample of historical cases from societies with not only high sex ratios but also low and normal sex ratios is necessary to strengthen their argument. Though the authors show an impressive command of the histories and politics of both India and China, by underestimating the degree of ethnic tensions in parts of China (p. 257), some of their policy proposals (pp. 244–45) could well lead to increased social unrest, rather than its cessation.

Protecting Human Rights: A Comparative Study, Advancing Human Rights. By Todd Landman. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005. 218p. \$54.95 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

— Beth Simmons, *Harvard University*

Political scientists have finally begun to take international law seriously. Todd Landman’s new book is an admirable example of this new trend. Situated at the intersection of international relations and comparative politics, it is a sustained study of the role of democratization, development, international socialization and international law on governments’ human rights practices since the mid-1980s. It is a global quantitative study that comes to some very different conclusions from the existing literature in this genre. In contrast to the pathbreaking work of Cona Hathaway (“Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” *Yale Law Journal* 111 [8, 2002]: 101–99) and Linda Camp Keith (“The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?” *Journal of Peace Research* 36 [no. 1, 1999]: 95–118), the key finding in Landman’s study is that international treaty law has contributed to improvements in human rights behavior. How does he come to this unorthodox conclusion, and what does this mean for our understanding of international law and democratic development?

The answer to the first question is *slowly*, and by way of empirical rather than theoretical argumentation. One of the strengths of the book is that readers are afforded a good long descriptive look at the data on rights practices and treaty ratification from many different angles. Ratification rates for each of the six core human rights treaties are graphed over time and by region. Their variance is examined. Unweighted (a three-point scale representing no action, signature, ratification) and weighted (multiplied by the extent of reservations added) measures are

compared graphically and in tables. A similar approach is taken with the key dependent variable, for which Landman has five different measures (the political terror scale based on Amnesty International reports and U.S. State Department reports; Freedom House's measure of political rights and civil rights; and Hathaway's torture scale). Bivariate relationships are exhaustively explored. For those whose tastes tend toward visual displays of descriptive data, Chapters 4–6 are a feast. But the main findings are simple: Democracies ratify these agreements more readily than do autocracies, and third- and fourth-wave democracies ratify more readily with fewer reservations than do the established democracies. Unfortunately (though predictably), the third- and fourth-waves' actual rights practices tend to be far worse.

Landman's is one of the few accounts of treaty commitments that takes reservation making into account. Reservations—entered when governments ratify a treaty—are a way to “customize” an obligation to reflect the preferences of the ratifying actor. Many people think, as the author apparently does, that reservations reflect a lower level of commitment to a treaty and an attenuated intention to comply. Fully half of the scores of models in the book compare ratification with a ratification discounted by the extent of reservations. In this reviewer's view, this is an overly formalistic account of governments' intent. Reservations have practically nothing to do with intent to comply; in fact, the relationship might well be the opposite of that offered by Landman. For example, 15 African countries have signed *all six* core human rights treaties, but have *never* entered reservations or made declarations. They include Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, and Togo. In Central and East Asia the list of nonreserving treaty members continues with a variety of states that are not obvious nominees for the honor of most intensely committed to international human rights law: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Cambodia, and the Philippines. Similarly, in Europe, the list features Albania, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Portugal, Yugoslavia, and Macedonia. In Latin America, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Peru, St. Vincent, and Uruguay round out the list of nonreserving six-treaty members. In fact, two of the strongest predictors of reservation making are a high commitment to the rule of law and GDP per capita. Reservations have much to do with legal capacity and the likelihood that the treaty will be enforced in *domestic* law.

It takes a long time to get to the controlled models that are standard in the social sciences. But they are important contributions to our understanding. Landman's general strategy is to use time-series cross-sectional analyses, examining first the ratification decision and then the rights indicators as dependent variables, followed by a two-stage

estimation that endogenizes treaty ratification with “instrumental” variables to explain rights practices. In addition to treaty commitments, five types of explanatory variables are tested: democracy, wealth, interdependence, conflict, population, and three regional dummy variables. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 (pp. 138–41) contain the key results: The more committed a country is to a key rights treaty, the stronger the improvement in rights practices.

Since the contribution of the book is this particular empirical result, it is useful to take a close look at the model that produces it. Landman uses an “instrumental” variable to endogenize treaty commitments, but he runs into the same problems most people do who take this approach: He does not really have a valid instrument for ratification. Ratification is modeled as a function of democracy, wealth, and membership in intergovernmental organizations and the presence (not well defined) of nongovernmental organizations (p. 136). While these are correlated with ratification, unfortunately none of these can remotely be thought of as affecting human rights practices *only* through their relationship with ratification; quite the contrary, according to Chapter 4. I am not aware of anyone who has yet published a credible IV model of treaty ratification and compliance, and so Landman's effort should be considered progress even if he has not solved the problem of endogeneity.

Curiously for a comparativist, there is very little comparative politics in the author's account of treaty ratification and human rights behavior. There is but one domestic variable in his many specifications of rights norms and practices: democracy. He uses the polity scale as well as a categorization of regimes (“old,” “second,” “third,” and “fourth” wave) to stand in for domestic institutions. There are no varieties of autocracies. The institutions of governance *among* democracies are assumed not to be important, despite the fact that ratification procedures differ in important ways, federal structures may complicate ratification, and changes in governmental partisanship might have an important bearing on rights practices. Nevertheless, were these factors to be added to his quantitative analysis, they probably would not modify his central finding about democracy, which many scholars have found indeed to be robust. Whether the more controversial finding that treaties account for human rights behavior would stand up to a better specified model of domestic politics is less certain.

This underspecification of the political and/or sociological processes associated with the embrace of international law and good rights performance is related to my central concern with the book as a whole. Landman takes no clear position on *why* certain states make the counterintuitive move to commit themselves and ultimately to change their behaviors based on legal commitments. Do treaties function as screens, such that only the best rights practitioners are willing to sign? Such a view might be

informed by theories of credible commitments with steep ex ante costs, but the author does not draw on this literature specifically. Are treaties effective constraints ex post? If so, how do commitments on paper become politically relevant to government actors? Or are treaties a manifestation of “world culture” that government officials imbibe and mimic as a result of their socialization through inter-governmental organizations? Landman has done an excellent job of undercutting a constant refrain of political realists by showing that the international human rights regime is relevant to real politics. Now we need to know why.

Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order. By Jeffrey W. Legro. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. 272p. \$39.95.

— John A. Vasquez, *University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign*

When do states (decision makers and their publics) rethink their world? Why and how does this happen? Change in ideas, shifts in paradigms, the overthrow of ruling ideologies have long been the focus of various theoretical perspectives. Here these questions are framed and analyzed through constructivist lenses.

Jeffrey Legro looks at the role of collective ideas in encouraging and restraining change in foreign policy, specifically whether the orientation of states is toward integration with the world and its prevailing order, separatism (isolationism), or revision of the status quo. His book builds on Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane's *Ideas and Foreign Policy* but takes a more constructivist perspective. His aim is to show that the collective foreign policy ideas for any period are important—not by demonstrating that they “trump” other variables, like “power or interest groups” (p. 13), but that they interact with them to form “a structure within which individual and group decision making takes place” (p. 22). For Legro, the dominant ideas of a period form an ideational structure in which foreign policy is made and transformed. Radical policy change is not likely to take place without a prior change in the dominant ideas.

The first question the author asks is what makes for a change in ideas. Here, he posits that it is usually some external shock, typically associated with dramatic failure, that leads to a questioning of ideas and potentially to their collapse. The prevailing ideas will not be replaced, however, unless there is some alternative set of ideas in the wings that can take over. To understand change one must understand both the *collapse* of “old thinking” and the *consolidation* of “new thinking.”

Such a framework enables Legro to move away from solely arguing that ideas are important and move toward studying ideas in their own right. In more behavioral language, ideational change becomes a legitimate dependent variable worthy of its own analysis. He is at his best in

delineating the factors that bring about collapse and consolidation. The psychological literature has long seen success and failure as key variables, and Legro draws on these—arguing that a stark failure of the old ideas to fulfill expectations, coupled with an early success of the new thinking, are most apt to bring about a shift in collective ideas. Scholars will find his categorization of the various scenarios particularly insightful (see pp. 33–38).

Although the focus is on fundamental orientations in foreign policy, the framework seems relevant to any shift in ideas, including shifts in paradigms or research programs. Indeed, those working on intellectual history will find Legro's framework more precise and informative than existing frameworks, like Thomas Kuhn's, which simply talks about paradigm displacement without really specifying the conditions that encourage displacement. An even more relevant area is the analysis of prevailing ideology. Other than a quote from Marx early in the book on the limits of man making his own history, Legro does not really engage this literature. One would like to have known what he thinks of Marx and Engels' *The German Ideology* and Karl Mannheim's *Ideology and Utopia*.

Instead, Legro focuses on realism, a not surprising choice given the debates within international relations. His comments on John Mearsheimer's offensive realism are particularly telling, showing that contrary to expectations, the United States failed to balance against a hegemonic move in 1930s Europe and waited for a German declaration of war (pp. 72–74). For the author, it is not the polarity of the system that explains U.S. behavior but shifts in U.S. attitudes (ideas). The United States did not balance when it was supposed to because the dominant ideas in the country in the 1930s were not realist, but isolationist. This ideational structure constrained even the shrewd Franklin Roosevelt, who was both a lion and a fox, from going to war with Hitler until there was an external shock. According to Legro, collective ideas can prevent states from reacting, in a timely manner, to their strategic circumstances (p. 44). It seems that realist balancing will only work well when leaders and publics follow realist ideas and construct their world around it. Those constructions themselves do not just arise automatically from materialist conditions. This is an ironic twist that constructivists will enjoy and realists will need to answer.

The heart of the book consists of four case studies that test and elaborate the theoretical claims. In the case studies, Legro wants to determine whether collective ideas play an intervening role in foreign policy change or whether that change can be explained by relying solely on the external shift in power (or threat) and/or the influence of interest groups.

The chapter on the United States makes a persuasive case for the way in which collective ideas were crucial in the shift from isolationism to internationalism. An especially nice feature is the content analysis of all State of the

Union addresses from 1908 through 1950. Despite this quantitative analysis, Legro does not really mine the behavior work on American foreign policy, such as the research on the mood theory or on critical foreign policy issues.

The chapter on Germany nicely shows how ideas make for continuity from the Kaiserreich through the Weimar Republic and to the early part of Hitler's reign. Each case study illustrates the need for new ideas to be consolidated to effect change. Legro also argues that it is not just the individual (for instance, Mikhail Gorbachev) who is crucial; it is collective ideas that are a key factor in the reorientation of foreign policy, although claiming that any Soviet reform leader in 1985 would eventually have made the same decision may be going a bit too far (p. 155). Nevertheless, the cases provide impressive evidence for the importance of ideational structure. Foreign policy change is not a function of just external strategic considerations or internal domestic interests.

Rethinking the World is an original and important contribution to the ideational research program that advances our knowledge about collective ideas and foreign policy change. It deserves serious and wide attention.

The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century. By Robert J. Lieber. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 268p. \$28.00.

— Jeremy Pressman, *University of Connecticut*

This volume joins a cottage industry of books on the proper American role in a post-9/11 world. In it, Robert J. Lieber advocates an active U.S. foreign policy based on American primacy.

Lieber writes that September 11, 2001, fundamentally changed the international threat environment by making clear that Islamist terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) pose an imminent threat to the United States. The United States cannot respond to this threat with a policy of deterrence because anti-American transnational terrorist organizations are not rational and thus cannot be deterred. Instead, Washington must maintain American primacy and, when necessary, use preemptive military force. American primacy “rests on preponderance across all the realms—military, economic, technological, wealth, and size—by which we measure power” (p. 17). The United States is the only superpower and, according to the author, will not face a peer competitor in the coming years.

Being the world's only superpower inevitably draws opposition, however. A major source of anti-Americanism is the mere fact that the United States is so powerful; U.S. dominance, not the particular U.S. policy adopted or the party or personality of the president, leads to “envy,” “resentment,” and “alienation” (p. 183). When combined with terrorism and WMD, this resentment has the potential to kill many Americans. In response, the United States must often act quickly and forcefully, as the Bush admin-

istration has argued. The United States must “be prepared for self-reliance, preemption, and even prevention when necessary” (p. 148). While critics claim that this stance is a break with past American policy, Lieber notes past examples, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and the first Gulf War (p. 44).

Lieber discredits other putative U.S. options to respond to the terrorist threat. The United States cannot press the international community to do more because the United Nations and international community “are mostly incapable of acting or inadequate to the task” (p. 4; also pp. 35–36). The United States cannot withdraw from world affairs because most foreign states want American involvement, the nation provides many public goods, and the defense of U.S. national interests requires international engagement. After describing his grand strategy, the author looks at four cases that allow him to illustrate and expand his overall argument. In Chapters 3–6, he covers Europe, the spread of American culture, the Middle East, and Asia. The European Union will not emerge as a superpower rival, and the American-European “legacy of common values remains fundamental” (p. 65). U.S. culture, such as Hollywood films, is dominant, but reactions against globalization and the spread of American culture are used to mask internal problems. Iraq was “a serious strategic threat to the region” and its leader was “a reckless expansionist” (p. 137; also p. 141). On the WMD and terror threat after Iraq, Lieber renders a “positive,” if somewhat tentative, verdict (p. 144). In Asia, nearly everyone wants the United States to stay in order to dampen regional rivalries.

Lieber ends with an assessment of anti-Americanism and attributes its growth to globalization, American primacy, and tensions between identity and modernization (pp. 182–84). He considers various flavors of anti-Americanism. While he concludes that U.S. policy implementation and public diplomacy need improvement, he emphasizes that the country's policies are not “chiefly responsible for triggering hostility.” Rather, such reactions are “inevitable” given America's superpower status (p. 202).

The American Era bridges the policy and scholarly worlds and sits comfortably with similar efforts of greatly varied perspectives by Robert Art, Noam Chomsky, Niall Ferguson, Michael Mandelbaum, Stephen Walt, and the like. Lieber's work would have benefited from a more systematic presentation of existing viewpoints on the question of U.S. direction in a post-9/11 world. He puts most other thinkers into three categories: anti-Americanists (my term for p. 27, note 30), realists, and liberals. The first do “not warrant serious attention here,” which seems like a problematic decision given that Lieber later notes that these thinkers “are commonly read and cited as explanations of U.S. policy” (p. 33). He includes realists of many different stripes, making it difficult to accept his broad characterizations of realism. The differences, for instance, among Hans Morgenthau, James Baker, Kenneth Waltz, and

William Wohlforth are as important as the similarities. Since Lieber is defining his grand strategy for the United States, his argument would have been better served by framing other thinkers by their preferred U.S. grand strategy, rather than by the simple realist/liberal dichotomy.

The book enters several long-running arguments in international relations. Lieber does a good job of explaining why he thinks primacy is a viable long-term strategy, in contrast with balance-of-power theorists who foresee the inevitable rise of a counterbalancing coalition. Yet why he claims a great power (the United States) is more effective than the international community (the United Nations) is less clear. Most of the UN failings were also U.S. ones (pp. 4, 35). He also draws much attention to the rapid U.S. military victories in Afghanistan and Iraq. But he concedes that postwar Iraq “proved to be vastly more difficult and costly than American policymakers had anticipated” (p. 130). While he derides the UN performance on Iraq, he says that the agency has a “significant role to play, not least in burden-sharing and in contributing to the perceived legitimacy of collective action” (p. 4). Though he concludes otherwise, his own argument suggests that a UN/U.S. combination is the best option. One wanted more from Lieber on the China question. He expects liberal integration to pacify China (p. 171). Could Chinese resentment over U.S. primacy and preemption ever bubble over?

Finally, the sections on the Iraq war are a restatement of the discredited Bush case for war without much added. Lieber, like Bush, juxtaposes 9/11 (or Al Qaeda) and Iraq despite the fact that there was no meaningful connection (e.g., pp. 24, 140). He makes the case on the basis of security and human rights without setting Iraq in a comparative context; Saddam Hussein is far from alone. North Korea and Iran are largely absent from this book even though both have become greater security threats under Bush. With one exception, relevant sections avoid mentioning North Korea (pp. 164, 174, 200–201). At best, one can say that critics of the Bush case for war will be disappointed, while supporters of the war will hear a familiar tune.

Demilitarizing Politics: Elections on the Uncertain Road to Peace. By Terrence Lyons. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005. 232p. \$49.95.

— Timothy D. Sisk, *University of Denver*

When a peace agreement is negotiated in civil wars today, there is a seemingly reflexive turn toward democratization as a way to move social conflicts from the battlefield to the halls of parliament; such agreements invariably entail a political transition requiring divisive and inherently difficult electoral processes. Terrence Lyons captures the complex and often contradictory dynamics of elections in the wake of civil war peace agreements in his well-designed, thoroughly researched, and coherently argued book. The

principal argument of *Demilitarizing Politics* is that the conduct of war itself creates institutional structures of conflict that linger into the postwar period and that critically inform postwar electoral politics.

The book is grounded in two significant literatures in comparative politics and international relations: democratization, with its focus on transitional sequences, pact making, and “founding” elections, and peace building, which evaluates how domestic actors and the international community can create conditions for durable settlements after the guns fall silent in post–Cold War civil wars. Lyons’s contribution to the literature on democratization and peace building lies in his careful, theoretically informed analysis of the crowning moment of many peace implementation processes: an election event that is usually managed or monitored by the international community through which a country’s transition from war to democracy is consolidated.

Elections are pivotal turning points in a peace process, Lyons argues, because they are often a “key culminating event in the peace implementation process” (p. 2). From the international community’s perspective, as he shows, they are often an opportunity to pronounce success in peace building and allow for the exit or disengagement of what has become known as complex, multidimensional peace operations.

The study’s conceptual orientation is found in neoinstitutional analysis of conflict dynamics that combines structural conditions of conflict (e.g., class or ethnic relations) and agency factors, namely, patterns of collective action that inform how states and rebel forces mobilize and build viable organizations capable of sustained involvement in war. Using a path-dependency perspective, Lyon analyzes the evolution of these structures and agents in the war-to-peace period and the ways the institutional incentives to which they respond are, or are not, transformed during uncertain and turbulent transitions. When state military forces and rebel organizations are “demilitarized” prior to electoral events, elections can further peace and democratization objectives. Here, the author builds on earlier research found in the democratization literature that emphasizes path dependency in transitions from authoritarianism to democracy (e.g., see Adam Przeworski, ed., *Sustainable Democracy*, 1995) and demobilization of combatants in peace implementation processes after civil war (e.g., see Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth Cousens, eds., *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, 2002).

Lyons argues that “to demilitarize entails creating and reinforcing the incentives and opportunities for the institutions of wartime based on violence, insecurity and fear (such as militias, black markets, and chauvinistic identity groups) to transform themselves into institutions of peacetime based on security and trust that can sustain peace and democracy (such as political parties, civil society, and open economies)” (pp. 3–4).

For demilitarization, three conditions are required. First, interim administrations (or transitional regimes) are required, and they must especially organize independent election management bodies. Second, militarized organizations, including the state and rebel forces, must be effectively transformed into viable political parties. Third, demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of forces—security sector reform—must be sufficiently advanced such that democratization norms are not challenged or threatened by military action.

All told, the key to successful transition from war to peace through demilitarization is a function of the incentive structures for the protagonists to develop electoral strategies in the pursuit of their aims, as opposed to incentives to pursue military options. These incentives arise from strategic interaction among war protagonists that build confidence during interim regimes (such as sharing power) and by credible commitment from the international community through security-providing peace-keeping operations. So, much of the analysis must be placed on how the incentive structure for protagonists in war and peace evolves in the critical period of the postagreement phase in the run-up to elections.

Lyons grounds his thematic analysis in seven case studies that illustrate a broader universe of cases of war-terminating elections in the post-Cold War era. The first four cases are illustrations of when lingering institutional structures of the war period that preempt the possibilities of elections reinforcing peace and fostering democracy; these are Angola (1992), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1996), Liberia (1997), and Tajikistan (1999 presidential, 2000 parliamentary). Three other cases illustrate elections that can move both peace and democratization forward because politics, to a larger extent, was further demilitarized before the voting took place; Cambodia (1993), El Salvador (1994), and Mozambique (1994) are found to be relatively more successful.

What explains relative success? In the more successful cases, Lyons finds that “relatively strong interim regimes, consultative processes, consultative processes to manage the challenges of implementation and electoral administration, successful programs to transform militias into political parties, and processes of demobilization that fostered confidence all contributed to a new institutional context that served to create a bridge from war to peace and democratization” (p. 77).

The book's conclusions focus on the importance of electoral management by newly created institutions, by the international community, or in joint election administration structures. These administrative bodies can only be effective, however, when military forces are provided by the international community (i.e., United Nations peacekeepers, according to Lyons's examples). Second, security sector reform is best achieved through joint verification and collaborative structures that involve domestic actors (state forces and rebels) and international over-

sight of the demobilization process. Third, elections cannot be held off for too long—the peace process, if it fails to progress, becomes vulnerable to war recurrence—but the international community should not endorse or push for elections to be held when demilitarization is insufficient or incomplete.

Demilitarizing Politics is sound research that deserves the attention of scholars and policymakers alike: Both democratization and peace building will remain salient themes in the years ahead. While this book might have more fully addressed important democratization and peace-building concerns, such as electoral system choice and campaign mobilization, election-driven violence, or the presidentialism versus parliamentary debate, overall it provides a well-argued analysis of the centrality of addressing the core problem of security in building sustainable peace through democracy after civil war.

Trading Voices: The European Union in International Commercial Negotiations. By Sophie Meunier. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. 248p. \$35.

— Karen J. Alter, *Northwestern University*

One often hears that integration in Europe magnifies the political voice of European countries on the international scene. The larger size of the European Union market surely makes investment in any particular European country more attractive, and importers are certainly more eager to satisfy a regulatory requirement if doing so will give them access to the entire European market. But does unity bring negotiating clout, too? This is the question Sophie Meunier investigates in her book *Trading Voices*.

Cutting against the expectation of rising political clout are the complaints of political negotiators who note that Europe often sends to negotiations national and European-level diplomats who disagree with each other. Indeed, it often is not clear where the buck stops—or as Henry Kissinger put it: “If I want to talk to Europe who do I call?” The reason is that the European Union has a shared executive branch (the Commission and the Council), two legislative branches (the Council and the Parliament), and two civil bureaucracies (Committee of Permanent Representation [COREPER] and the Commission). The authority of each institution can vary by issue; thus, the Commission can have authority to negotiate on behalf of European states for certain issues, yet member states retain the authority to bargain on their own in other issues. Sometimes the voting rule to adopt an agreement is unanimity, which magnifies the voice of obstinate states, and other times the voting rule is qualified majority. Sometimes the European Parliament needs to be involved in the making of political agreements, and other times it does not. And if any European actor thinks the Commission has botched procedure, overstepped its authority, or not selected the correct voting rule, the negotiated outcome can be

challenged in front of the European Court of Justice. All of this can make negotiating with Europe frustrating—but does not per se undermine European clout.

Meunier's analysis takes this complex nature of European Union politics as a given. Building on Robert Putnam's insight that domestic political divisions can be both a liability and strength in international negotiations, Meunier charts where a common or divided voice creates bargaining leverage in political negotiations. Putnam showed us that internal divisions are a negotiating liability when the bargaining partner can pick off domestic actors, choosing to satisfy the domestic faction closest to the partner's ideal point. Internal divisions will create strength when the negotiator can force the bargaining partner to give concessions by credibly claiming that certain deals would not be sellable at home. Meunier operationalizes this insight by looking at the extent of autonomy delegated to the Commission negotiator (its negotiating competence) and the voting rules to adopt an agreement. Going beyond Putnam, she adds that it matters whether or not Europe is defending the status quo (in which case it can veto any deal that aims to change the status quo), compared to situations where Europe is trying to change the status quo (in which case negotiating partners can block agreements). The bottom line of the argument is that the ability of the Commission to claim that its hands are tied at home and the ability of bargaining partners to pick off the European factions closest to their position varies, depending on the extent of Commission negotiating competence, the voting rule to adopt negotiated agreements, and whether Europe aims to defend or change the status quo.

Where the EU is conserving existing policy and requires unanimity to adopt an agreement, integration brings strength because any one country can veto international policy change, and thus collectively, European countries maximize their bargaining leverage. Where the EU is trying to reform policy and the voting rule is unanimity, integration undermines the EU because negotiating partners can encourage the member state closest to their position to undermine the EU's negotiating position. These two situations are the most likely to lead to failed negotiations with the EU. Where the EU is trying to conserve existing policy and the voting rule is qualified majority voting, the collective negotiating power is lower than what it might be if the voting rules were unanimity. But the Commission will have more flexibility, and so the chance that negotiations will succeed is higher. Where the EU is trying to change existing policy, and the voting rule is qualified majority, negotiating partners will be unable to exploit divisions within Europe, and so integration is not a liability, and perhaps even a strength.

These arguments are illustrated through carefully selected cases that create variation in Commission negotiating competence and voting rule. The cases—the Kennedy Round agriculture negotiations, the Uruguay Round agricultural

negotiations, negotiations over the Open Sky Agreement, and negotiations regarding public procurement rules—include both “offensive bargaining” where the EU is trying to change the status quo and “defensive bargaining” where the EU is trying to block efforts to change policy. Meunier gets some of the best leverage for her argument where the Commission's bargaining authority changes over time, allowing her to show that it was the bargaining authority, and the voting rule needed to support the Commission's agreement, that influences whether unity is providing political leverage in negotiations.

The best thing about this book is the clarity in writing, which itself reveals a clarity of thought. One wishes the EU were a less complex institution, so that the answer was a little more hummable. But the EU is what it is. Meunier provides an excellent guide for thinking through how political complexity complicates Putnam's simple two-level story. She also is mindful that the rules themselves reflect preferences of governmental actors who are cautious in delegating away negotiating authority. In this way, her argument carries beyond Europe, because it shows us that there really is a great variety of ways to delegate authority to negotiators, yet tie their hands at the same time, and these ways affect bargaining outcomes.

Overall, the study brings the best of social science tools to answer the question of how integration theoretically affects international negotiations. Such things as the skill of the negotiator, understandings shaping negotiating positions, domestic political factors underpinning national positions, and larger international political contextual factors are outside of the framework, but not forgotten in the case study discussions. Indeed, one appreciates that in the conversation of whether integration brings strength, Meunier never forgets that strength is not the only thing that matters. Strength is worth little if negotiations stalemate, to the detriment of all. Collective strength is also not the same as collective benefit—there are distributional consequences across actors.

Translating the book's insights into a negotiation manual for issues beyond Meunier's cases will take some work. Anyone who negotiates with the European Union must first—as she did—invest in understanding who in Europe answers the telephone for your issue. After one figures this out, her framework provides a ready way to think through the political consequences that will follow from the voting rules and the level of discretion granted to the Commission.

The Killing Trap: Genocide in the Twentieth Century.

By Manus I. Midlarsky. New York: Cambridge University Press, 480p.
\$75.00 cloth, \$28.99 paper.

— Michael Barnett, *University of Minnesota*

An impressive body of work is emerging that aspires to explain what appears to defy explanation: genocide. Although most of these studies focus on individual cases,

scholars are increasingly developing theoretical frameworks and applying a comparative method to explain not individual genocides but the very phenomenon. Manus Midlarsky's highly ambitious, original, and impressive book aspires to bring us closer to understanding genocide in the contemporary age. Avoiding monocausal explanations that locate homicidal tendencies either in cultural or strategic variables, Midlarsky draws from international relations theory, comparative politics, and psychology to explain what makes genocide imaginable and executable. Written with controlled passion by a scholar deeply committed to using social science theory and methods to understand this highly emotional topic, *The Killing Trap* is an invaluable contribution to genocide studies.

The book is divided into six parts. Part I briefly surveys the literature on genocide; rightly claims that theory has a place for explaining events that appear to be produced by the idiosyncratic conjunction of historical forces; and defends the author's use of a highly restrictive definition of genocide—"the state-sponsored systematic mass murder of innocent" people defined by a "particular ethno-religious identity, with the purpose of eradicating that group from a given territory" (p. 10), which limits his case selection to the Holocaust, Rwanda, and Armenia.

Part II presents the theory. Various background factors prepare the ground. There must be a social differentiation that creates a minority group that both is treated as distinct from the dominant culture and, over time, can be constructed as a possible threat to its identity and survival. Also present is a prior history of mass killing against minority groups. These episodes were not "dry runs" but, rather, contributed to making state killing an acceptable policy. Last, but most important, is "loss," which Midlarsky defines fairly broadly and includes both past and future losses. War, either domestic or international, can cause the government to treat the minority group as a threat to the state; whether it sees mass killing as a solution depends on its adoption of an "imprudent" realpolitik, defined as the use of brute force to accomplish the state's goals.

Midlarsky also wants to understand why the state shifts its policy from mass killing to genocide—that is, when it is no longer content with killing a subset of that population and now aspires to exterminate all who are classified as having that identity. To understand this critical shift, he draws from prospect theory; it helps explain why state leaders might react to future losses by taking extraordinary risks, even to the point of concentrating resources away from the war to the genocide. Yet such a policy, to be successful, requires a legion of associates. Why do "ordinary" people follow? Borrowing from experimental psychology and the concept of "altruistic punishment," Midlarsky argues that a critical role is played by an actor, motivated not by personal gain but rather by a commitment to the group, who is willing to punish those who do not contribute to the collective "good." His framework, then, aspires to explain the background and

triggering causes of genocide, why mass killing becomes genocide, and why there are varying rates of killing over time and space.

Relying on already published work, Part III applies the theory to the critical cases of the Holocaust, the Tutsis, and the Armenians. Because of his own interests and the relative abundance of literature on the Holocaust, it commands most of the author's attention; the value of his narrative is immediately apparent as he interrogates critical issues of the Holocaust, including when and why mass killing became genocide and why in some parts of Europe there were enthusiastic killers, in other places reluctant accomplices, and in others dissidents. Part IV provides a series of fascinating but at times disjointed considerations of the magnitude and the kinds of killing, and the analysis rightly incorporates the extent and possibility of rebellion by the victims. Part V examines cases of mass killing that, in his view, fell short of genocide, such as Cambodia, and those instances that seemed primed for genocide but where it did not occur. He concludes the book by comparing the different cases, considering consequences, and speculating about the possibility of prevention and response, given his analysis.

Any book that aspires to unlock the dynamics of genocide should be judged not only on whether it accomplishes this (impossibly ambitious) goal but also on whether its shortcomings suggest areas for future research. Four areas stand out. One is the impact of past episodes of mass killing. Midlarsky points to their presence but provides little systematic evidence of their importance. Do past killings contribute to a belief that mass killing is an appropriate state tool? Does it contribute to a "culture of violence"? How, exactly, does the past become embedded in the present? We also need more sophisticated, dynamic, models regarding the rates of participation and the production of collective violence. Although Midlarsky points to a variety of factors, his reliance on "altruistic punishment" potentially misses the mixture of motives of these enforcers and of those who will follow. The model also has a static quality when, in fact, there is a dynamic element to collective violence. For instance, in *The Order of Genocide* (2006), Scott Straus argues that a dynamic interaction between the civil war and local elite competition shaped the rates of participation in the Rwandan genocide. Furthermore, while Midlarsky rightly considers situations where genocide did not occur even though all the conditions were present, these cases of "dogs that do not bark" need greater treatment. Finally, we need not only more systematic comparisons across cases but also a comparison of existing explanations of these instances. The author, at times, shows how his argument overlaps with or contrasts with some explanations, but there are surprisingly few accounts that systematically survey the range of existing accounts.

Although I do not hold out the possibility for a theory of genocide, and, thankfully, we continue to have more variables than instances, contributions like *The Killing*

Trap bring us closer to an understanding of what seems incomprehensible.

From Resource Scarcity to Ecological Security: Exploring New Limits to Growth. Edited by Dennis Pirages and Ken Cousins. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005. 280p. \$60.00 cloth, \$24.00 paper.

— Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, *Northwestern University*

With the near quadrupling of the world population in the last century, the melting of the polar ice cap, and the increased frequency of hurricanes such as Katrina and other “natural” disasters, the issue of ecological security is receiving renewed attention. Ecological security focuses not only on threats resulting directly from environmental degradation but also on the economic ramifications of failed environmental policies, military threats that stem from conflicts over scarce resources, and ecologically related health risks. The idea of ecological security achieved a measure of popularity during the 1980s as researchers and policymakers began to consider the broad security implications of crises related to natural resources. In this new volume, the editors and contributing authors try to forecast the potential security ramifications of current environmental trends over the next 30 years. Ecological security serves as an umbrella term throughout the volume for evaluating the risks to humanity created by inaction, weak policies, or slow implementation of environmental policies regarding population, water, food, energy, global climate change, deforestation, and biodiversity.

Because the study of ecological security deals with risks to humanity, the interests it addresses are global in scope rather than local or national. The assumption underlying research in this area is that human society, regardless of national or ethnic origin, has a common interest in devising and implementing preventive environmental policies in order to protect both the earth and its inhabitants. The idea that human society has common interests that occasionally override national or local interests has its precedent in earlier studies of global civic society (for example, Paul Wapner, *Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics*, 1996). However, a more controversial notion is that environmental problems should be viewed in security terms and that policymaking should be motivated on this basis. Some environmentalists have balked at the portrayal of environmental problems in this fashion, partly out of concern that it biases discussions of solutions almost exclusively toward governmental action. Several researchers have further argued that the reconceptualization of environmental issues in security terms is both superfluous and analytically confusing (Daniel Deudney, “The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security,” *Millennium* 19 [3, 1990]: 461–76).

From Resource Scarcity to Ecological Security seeks to demonstrate how the concept of ecological security can unify our understanding of the social, economic, and public

health effects of environmental problems. The book provides a historical perspective on a broad range of environmental issues, based on a retrospective assessment of *The Global 2000 Report to the President* (published in 1980). The contributing authors analyze the progress that has been made in specific areas since the publication of the report and outline future challenges. Individual chapters discuss current trends of resource use and environmental degradation and examine the potential ecological risks to human populations produced by globalization.

The book opens with two chapters on demographic trends that review fairly common predictions that the world population will grow at a moderate rate due partly to declining birth rates in industrialized countries and the consequences of AIDS in many developing countries. These two factors are also shown to contribute to the aging of the population, creating a variety of potential socioeconomic problems in societies that lack social institutions and economic resources to support the needs of the elderly. Both chapters present excellent data, but the discussion of the implications of an aging population for ecological security is somewhat disappointing.

In an excellent review of global water problems, Ken Conca first establishes that water is a global resource despite local variation in supply, demand, and quality. The impact of water on the food supply, human health, and biodiversity makes it an essential component of ecological security. With growing concern over expanding global water withdrawals, Conca calls for additional study of water distribution, allocation, and pricing systems to identify and address unsustainable patterns of use. Marc Cohen’s chapter on food policy stresses that food shortages—the original concern of early environmentalists—proved to be a less significant problem than anticipated, whereas inequality and conflicts over food distribution now have the potential to create serious security threats. The chapter also emphasizes that adherence to principles of social justice is critical for achieving the goal of sustainable food production.

Two chapters in the volume are devoted to energy issues. Alongside growing energy demand and long-term resource depletion, Heather Conley and Warren Phillips add the problem of concentrated supplies to the list of energy concerns that are likely to create greater security threats in the future. The second chapter on energy focuses on technologies for replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy sources, including wind, solar, water, and biomass, focusing mostly on the United States. The authors are optimistic that these technologies will account for a growing portion of world energy consumption as they become more cost-efficient in the future.

Although *The Global 2000 Report* did not discuss climate change directly, the editors include two chapters on this topic, owing to the scientific evidence that climate change is already severely affecting living conditions in some regions of the world. Mathias Ruth examines variations in

vulnerability and capacities to adjust to climate change by geographic region and economic sector. He also reviews policies designed to mitigate and adapt to climate change and offers lessons on decision making and institution building. Jacob Park adds in his chapter a detailed historical review of international policymaking on climate change,

The last two chapters of the book focus on deforestation and biodiversity. The authors discuss the ecological, economic, and security effects of deforestation and damage to ecosystems. Despite increased awareness of the importance of preserving forests and ecosystems, the consumption demands of a growing population and the absence of strong international institutions for fighting deforestation pose a formidable challenge to conservation efforts, especially in parts of the world where local political institutions are weak.

In their conclusion, Dennis Pirages and Ken Cousins argue that in order to reduce the risks of ecological insecurity, especially in light of the pressures of globalization on both human society and nature, we must develop policies to increase social equity and participation, and build more flexible, future-oriented institutions.

The strength of this book lies in its detailed treatment of current environmental problems and future sustainability trends. As in many edited volumes, not all contributions are of equal significance, but most chapters are well presented and serve the book's goal of reviewing major trends in the global environment. Some chapters also provide interesting insights into the potential effects of environmental degradation on ecological security. However, despite its security angle, the volume does not fundamentally revise our understanding of feasible solutions for global (or local) environmental problems. Readers would have benefited from a more systematic treatment of the concept of ecological security in the different chapters and more extensive analysis of the role of institutions in solving environmental problems. As the contributors discovered upon revisiting *The Global 2000 Report*, predictions are a risky endeavor when scientific uncertainty continues to limit our understanding of the relationships among various ecological problems. However, Pirages and Cousins convey an important message that researchers and policymakers must develop a comprehensive view of ecological risks to human society and integrate considerations of social empowerment and social justice in the design of public policy.

Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats. By Daryl G. Press. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. 218p. \$32.50.

Deterrence by Diplomacy. By Anne E. Sartori. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. 176p. \$32.50.

— Patrick M. Morgan, *University of California, Irvine*

In Cold War deterrence, nothing was more important or disturbing than the *credibility* problem. Success depended

on conveying credible threats, yet it was hard to see how to make retaliatory threats credible in mutual nuclear deterrence, particularly in extended deterrence or to prevent conventional attacks. It was also hard to make nuclear retaliation threats credible against nonnuclear powers; nuclear use would arouse condemnation, set an awful precedent, and stimulate nuclear proliferation. In fact, how were retaliatory threats of any sort made credible?

Various answers included being able to fight and win any kind of prospective war, building the capacity to defeat any limited attack and not have to escalate one to an unbearable level, and resting deterrence on the fact that the deterrer might retaliate if attacked by losing control, reacting irrationally, or setting off uncontrollable escalation. Each was unattractive in various ways. An additional solution was to bolster retaliatory threats by having previously upheld lesser commitments, and to adopt other security measures that projected resolve. This meant treating one's commitments as interdependent; defending one bolsters the credibility of the others. This was an appealing solution and it has been very influential in U.S. national security policy ever since. However, it was hard to show a logical or empirical connection between upholding commitments with bearable costs and ones with potentially unbearable results. This approach could also readily become open-ended, inviting military overextension, declining public support, and eventual military failures (as in Vietnam) that reduce, not maintain, credibility.

The Cold War vanished but the credibility problem did not. Doubts about deterrence just shifted focus: Can deterrence be credible against terrorists, rogue states, or a China bent on seizing Taiwan? The books by Anne Sartori and Daryl Press reexamine the credibility problem by suggesting theoretical adjustments and providing new evidence. While not asking precisely the same question, they overlap considerably. Each offers a concise, tightly argued analysis, with a clear theoretical position tested via elegant and creative research. Each clearly covers a complex subject. And their carefully developed conclusions point in opposite directions!

Does a defender's prior behavior shape a challenger's assessment of his threat credibility in a crisis? Press says "no." A challenger (or deterrer) does not assess credibility on the basis of the deterrer's (or challenger's) reactions to prior challenges. Each weighs whether the opponent has serious interests at stake and the military power to carry out threats. Citing the importance of interests and available power fits classic deterrence thinking; dismissing the deterrer's prior behavior as irrelevant does not. The common view, particularly among officials, has been that appearing soft now makes for trouble later.

Press rejects numerous variants of a "past action theory" of deterrence credibility in favor of a "current calculus theory." Theories of deterrence and, more broadly, coercive diplomacy explain how to manipulate an opponent's

cognitive processes, yet studies of deterrence rarely explore those processes. Press does so, using official records from crises, ones often cited on how past behavior shapes credibility, to trace the internal discussions of officials. In 1939, he reports, German policymakers largely ignored prior British and French “appeasement” behavior: “German leaders overwhelmingly tied their assessments of Allied credibility to their assessments of the balance of interests and power” (pp. 74–75). In the Berlin crises of 1958–1961, Nikita Khrushchev repeatedly backed off his threats but Soviet credibility with British and American officials did not shrink. In the Cuban Missile Crisis, those retreats over Berlin again had no effect on U.S. officials; the rising Soviet stake in Cuba and the growing Soviet ability to hit the United States with nuclear weapons were the important considerations.

Press concludes that “less expensive and symbolic acts of diplomacy” can help bolster credibility but are not critical, while fighting wars to preserve credibility is unnecessary, even damaging if they turn out badly. Credibility stems from having vital interests at stake and a powerful military capability. He asserts that a preoccupation with reputation has rigidified American foreign policy, instigating more fighting than is necessary for deterrence credibility.

That prior behavior is not the key to credibility is not a new view. Press’s main contribution is to provide more empirical backing for it. The absence in internal discussions of credibility being assessed by officials on the basis of prior behavior is very interesting. So is his finding that the same officials saw their government’s future credibility as resting on its current actions (“... investing in their own reputation but ignoring everyone else’s—is puzzling”; p. 158)!

Can a deterrer’s earlier behavior affect estimates of its credibility? Sartori says “yes.” The prior behavior usually cited is from prior confrontations, but she innovatively broadens this. She contends that a reputation for honesty in *diplomatic communication* is an important asset, particularly for effectively communicating threats. She asserts that “when a state is caught bluffing, it acquires a reputation for doing so” (p. 13), and for a time this inhibits its ability to communicate persuasively. States know this and so in conflicts they often honestly indicate whether they have important interests at stake in order to have more credibility on this later. Deterrence theory emphasizes having a reputation for resolve, but in fact one for honesty is more important. In deterrence theory, backing down is dangerous, conveying weakness. However, acquiescing often honestly shows that one’s vital interests are not engaged, and thus invoking those interests in a future conflict is taken more seriously. A confrontation forces participants to assess what each values and how strongly, and a reputation for honesty is an important element in those assessments. One implication is that, contrary to suggestions in rational choice literature, signals in confrontations may not have to be costly to be effective.

Sartori offers a case study and a model. The case study is China’s failure in the Korean War to convince the United States that it would intervene if United Nations forces approached the Yalu River. This is traced to China’s not carrying out earlier threats to invade Taiwan. The United States downplayed Beijing’s threats, not because it thought China’s military capabilities were inadequate but because it felt China had no major interest at stake—UN occupation of North Korea would pose no threat—and because of the past bluffing over Taiwan. However, she cites U.S. *scholars* on what U.S. officials thought. Only one *official* from that time is quoted on this point (p. 37, n. 31). Thus, the case insufficiently illustrates her analysis. It might even fit the Press analysis—the United States did see China as weak militarily and as having no major interests at stake. These were serious misjudgments, which Press claims are less likely in major confrontations (p. 23), but at least they were the sort of judgments he asserts take place.

Sartori bolsters her argument in additional ways. She presents a “reputational theory of diplomacy,” modeled via a game theory format. The model’s assumptions are that war is costly, that leaders care unevenly about issues and thus in confrontations they must assess how their opponents value specific issues, and that such situations and interactions are iterated. As leaders rationally update their conclusions in a crisis, evidence of past bluffing helps determine opponents’ credibility, and so states typically avoid bluffing in their diplomacy.

Sartori also analyzes Correlates of War data on more than 1,300 crises in militarized international disputes. The concept of a bluff and the way its impact on a state’s reputation declines over time are carefully operationalized. Being caught bluffing in the years before a confrontation makes a state about 40 percent more likely to be threatened with force and 20 percent more likely to fail in attempting deterrence (p. 113). Thus, “reputations for honesty—as distinct from reputations for resolve—affect the course of international disputes” (p. 107). Paralleling classic deterrence analysis about credibility, she concludes that to gain a reputation for honesty, acquiescing when appropriate must be supplemented; “the defender must actually be willing to fight more often if deterrence fails in order to obtain this greater credibility” (p. 110).

This finding that the balance of forces matters—deterrence failure is about 9 percent more likely when the challenger has a significant advantage—agrees with the Press analysis and other empirical studies. However, “[W]hen the defender has recently been using its diplomacy honestly, it is more likely to find deterrence success—regardless of whether it is strong or weak compared to its challenger” (p. 119). While Sartori does not directly say so, her analysis implies that American policy should be adjusted differently. Fighting to maintain credibility makes some sense when it honestly reflects a government’s interests, but this can be overdone since there are cheaper ways

to get the same result. However, backing down now is harmful later if it displays a bluff.

In his analysis, Press neglects the distinction between general and immediate deterrence. Leaders' concern about not looking weak has reflected a desire to build credibility in advance of crises and, in particular, to *discourage challenges*, that is, to reinforce general deterrence. This suggests an alternative explanation for the intriguing Press findings. In a crisis, the other side may have credibility, regardless of its past behavior, because of its dangerous, provocative steps that helped create the crisis. Those steps suggests that it thinks it has important interests at stake and the military ability to defend them; its having generating a dangerous situation shrinks the impact of any prior backing down and the utility for observers of relying on that to predict what it will do. Yet participants can still see backing down as dangerous in making their general deterrence less reliable. Thus, his case studies may be of limited value in assessing the impact of prior behavior in noncrisis deterrence.

The Sartori analysis does not fully consider the logic of the interdependence-of-commitments position. Being honest where one has a commitment but no interests at stake worth fighting for sounds sensible. But if commitments are believed to be interdependent, there is little difference in the interests at stake among them—the credibility of one's "major" commitments are at stake in challenges to its "minor" ones. The honest stance is, therefore, that all commitments are so important you will fight. What that builds is less a reputation for honesty than a history of consistency, making nondefense of any prior commitments damaging to future credibility.

These very interesting studies offer challenging new approaches to a classic deterrence problem. It is good that the problem continues attracting such able analysts. Each book deserves careful attention and will certainly stimulate further discussion.

International Democracy and the West: The Role of Governments, Civil Society, and Multinational Business. By Richard Youngs. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 232p. \$99.00.

— Michael McFaul, *Stanford University*

In his seminal article published nearly 30 years ago, cleverly called "Second Image Reversed," Peter Gourevitch outlined a set of arguments for why and how to study the international causes of domestic outcomes. This framework had a profound effect on several literatures, but only a minor ripple in the study of regime change. A handful of international relations scholars, including John Owen and Mark Peceny, have made important contributions to this field, and a smattering of comparativists have added the international dimension to their list of independent variables that influence regime type, but the subject could not

be considered a mainstream field. In fact, the third-wave transitologists gave only passing attention to the international dimensions of democratization. Laurence Whitehead did write an important chapter on international dimensions of democratization in the four-volume study on transitions from autocratic rule edited by Louillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Lawrence Whitehead. Yet, in one of the introductory essays in this study, Schmitter wrote that one "of the firmest conclusions that emerged . . . was that transitions from authoritarian rule and immediate prospects for political democracy were largely to be explained in terms of national forces and calculations. External actors tended to play an indirect and usually marginal role" (in O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe*, 1986, p. 5). Scholars and policy analysts writing about democratization after the end of the Cold War have devoted more attention to international factors, yet the subject is still grossly neglected. This absence of scholarship is all the more surprising given the foreign policy debates in Washington, Brussels, Moscow, and Tehran about the role the United States in fostering "regime change."

If one book can fill this void, it is *International Democracy and the West*. This important book offers readers a comprehensive review of both the theoretical literature as to why regime type matters for international security and prosperity and an exhaustive accounting of the different kinds of international influences on domestic political development. Richard Youngs manages to bridge the artificial gap between comparative politics and international relations in a manner that should interest scholars in both subfields.

The book begins by reviewing the theoretical debates about the relationship between domestic regime type and international security and international investment. The restatement of the democratic peace debate will be familiar to most international relations scholars, though the author's discussion of this debate is sophisticated, nuanced, and succinct, making it especially useful for teaching purposes. Less familiar will be his discussion about the relationship between regime type and regime change, on the one hand, and international investor behavior, on the other. Most provocatively, Youngs seeks to demonstrate "growing support from international capital for more democratic systems" (p. 16) in the 1990s. He assembles the arguments for why some international investors preferred what he calls "low intensity" democracy, a system in which a strong executive and weak parliament can work closely with international financial institutions to check populist demands and carry out economic reforms needed to stimulate growth and attract foreign investment. In sum, Chapter 1 ends by suggesting why democracy is good for peace and good for prosperity.

Chapter 2 then traces how these theoretical arguments influenced the foreign policies of the Western powers in

the 1990s. Youngs shows that a greater appreciation for the importance of democratic development did influence American and European international actions in the 1990s in new ways. For instance, the 1994 United Nations–led intervention in Haiti marked a unique historical moment in which military force was used to “defend democracy.” He also shows how punitive democratic conditionality seeped into Western treaties and agreements in the 1990s, while budgets for democratic assistance also increased dramatically in this same period. In this discussion of democracy and Western strategic interests, Youngs also chronicles some of the debates regarding the “hard” cases, such as China, Iran, Iraq, and Algeria, showing in a careful way that the growing attention given to democracy promotion does not translate neatly into effective or consistent policy.

Chapter 3 provides a similar discussion of strategy for international business in promoting transparent and responsible government. This chapter covers issues and activities not often included in research about democracy promotion. And that is exactly the author’s point—it is not only states and nongovernmental organizations that can influence regime change but also international business. As he acknowledges, the new ideas about the positive benefits of democratic expansion have influenced the international business community to a lesser extent than they have impacted the foreign policies of Western states. But the impact is still noticeable and not trivial, especially regarding the Corporate Social Responsibility agenda that emerged in the 1990s. Youngs demonstrates that corporate leaders began to feel the negative and unpredictable consequences of autocratic rule and governance breakdown, including unchecked corruption, privileged treatment for local companies with ties to the dictator, seizure of property rights under the banner of nationalism, restrictions on foreign investment, and general instability. The discussion, however, ends inconclusively. While explain-

ing why business should have an interest in democracy, or more modestly, good governance, and also suggesting through some anecdotal evidence that some business leaders have modified their behavior to reflect a greater concern for good governance, Youngs ends by admitting that “significant variation on democracy-related debates emerged between MNCs [multinational corporations] operating in different sectors and from different home countries” (p. 127). He has outlined a research agenda about changing corporate strategies that more detailed studies of business decision making must now advance.

In Chapter 4, Youngs then extends his analysis of strategies of democracy promotion to international NGOs. In the chapters on governments and business, he seems to be looking hard for evidence of the impact of new ideas about the benefits of democracy on policy. In this chapter, somewhat surprisingly, he finds less concern for pressing for democracy since the international NGOs discussed want to keep their focus on human rights and maintain their distance from government-driven efforts to promote democracy. The finding is counterintuitive, especially as the reader—after reading about new government and business strategies for promoting democracy—is poised to think that the NGO community should be even more concerned with pushing democracy.

As an analysis of the strategies followed by governments, business, and NGOs to promote democracy, this book has no equal. What is especially refreshing is the inclusion of non-American actors and the private sector into the analysis. The book does not, however, evaluate the impact of these changing strategies on cases of democratization or democratic consolidation (or the lack thereof) in any systematic way. It is to be hoped that such an analysis will be the subject of Youngs’s next book. No one is more qualified to undertake such a much-needed study.