Duff concludes *Heidegger and Politics* by restating his initial thesis in light of his prior analysis. What emerges is a view of Heidegger's politics as two stances both equally discontented with any stable, everyday political order. They are both politics of "radical suspicion" (p. 186). Heideggerian politics either generates a radically revolutionary mode of "perpetual . . . rejection of the tranquility, stability, and sham permanence of the settling-in everyday" or else leads to a "quietist awaiting" that views regimes as different as Soviet communism and liberal democracy as equally fallen away from proper existential awareness (pp. 190, 192). The former was presumably the path of the young National Socialist Heidegger, the latter of the reticent philosophical eminence discontentedly biding his time in Cold War Europe.

What both of these seemingly contradictory stances share is a radical rejection of all the ideas, concepts, thoughts, and traditions of prior philosophy and its metaphysics of presence. Rights, social contracts, virtue, justice, humanism, conservative traditionalism, libertarian markets, socialism—all the major ideas and concepts of past political thought are viewed as hopelessly implicated in the mistakes of theoretical thinking. Quietism and radical revolution are the consequence of Heidegger's philosophical radicalism, centered on discontent and anxiety. Thus, central to Duff's case for Heidegger's politics is his view that his philosophical radicalism entails the disavowal of everyday theoretical concepts.

This leaves Duff's Heidegger in a deeply strange spot. For it means his politics becomes utopian in the strictest etymological sense of the term—either demanding a kind of permanent revolution that is hard to see translated into any kind of real-world politics or vanishing into private quietism regardless of regime type.

It is here that certain questions emerge for Duff's admirable study. First and foremost: Does Heidegger's critique of theory really entail the rejection of theoretical concepts? After all, Heidegger is not typically read as rejecting absolutely all the fruits of theoretical reflection—scientific, technological, or otherwise. Instead, he is frequently read as demanding a thinking that grounds everyday concepts beyond the categories of theory. If Heidegger's principle animus toward theory involves the problem of grounding, then it is not so clear that a Heideggerian might not appropriate later theoretical concepts from science, politics, ethics, religion, and other arenas, albeit now properly grounded in ontology. The debate would then shift to what form these theoretical concepts might retain after deep ontological reflection.

This at least opens the possibility that Heidegger's philosophical radicalism does not entail such a narrowing of politics. Specifically, I wonder if the very political pluralism that Duff so lucidly sees as possible in Heidegger's thought has been sufficiently radicalized. Duff frequently wrestles with how existentially abstract Heidegger's basic concepts are (pp. 167–70). This points to the possibility that his entire philosophical framework is so abstract that it can legitimately house possibilities beyond quietism and revolution. I believe that this is because Heidegger's thought is, in important respects, relativistic or at least prepolitical. Regardless, any such future case ought to grapple with Duff's impressive work.

The Cosmopolitan Potential of Exclusive Associations: Criteria for Assessing the Advancement of Cosmopolitan Norms. By Bettina R. Scholz. London: Lexington Books, 2015. 242p. $94.00 cloth.

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— Lior Erez, *European University Institute*

Within contemporary liberal philosophy and political theory, it is now commonplace to view moral cosmopolitanism as the default position. Even philosophers defending the normative significance of national identity, state sovereignty, or partial loyalties do so with reference to the cosmopolitan core belief in the equal moral worth of individual persons. However, as the apparent recent surge in nationalist and xenophobic politics demonstrates, the acceptance of this abstract theory among philosophers does not necessarily reflect the views of the masses. For committed cosmopolitans, therefore, it is imperative to ask not only the theoretical question—concerning the right normative conclusions to draw from cosmopolitan core beliefs—but also the strategic and motivational question: how cosmopolitan norms can be advanced in the real world. *The Cosmopolitan Potential of Exclusive Associations* is an important contribution to the latter question, as Bettina Scholz explores the ways in which membership in voluntary, not-for-profit associations could generate and maintain such norms.

Scholz's analysis is an interesting synthesis of cosmopolitan moral philosophy, constructivist approaches in international relations, and civil society scholarship. Uniquely, with regards to the first, it is clear that the author is not engaged in a defense of any particular cosmopolitan theory, or indeed in a defense of cosmopolitanism at all: A more cosmopolitan world is simply assumed to be desirable (p. 5). Instead of advancing a particular, comprehensive account of cosmopolitanism, Scholz draws on Mark E. Warren's work on the effects of civil society associations on democratic norms (*Democracy and Association*, 2001), and employs cosmopolitan theory as a resource for developing evaluative criteria for the effects of associational membership on the development of cosmopolitan norms. Thus, for example, membership in associations can strengthen commitment to institutional norms and generate new transnational institutions; it can foster emotions of empathy and a recognition of a shared humanity; it can generate shared identities across borders;

and it can facilitate new public spheres for democratic deliberation. These effects, importantly, are often unintended by the founders and members of these associations, who are not necessarily motivated by cosmopolitanism. Indeed, Scholz's engagement with empirical work on the development of norms leads to a valuable insight: Support for cosmopolitan norms, however partial, can arise from transnational associations that are not consciously cosmopolitan and are often, by definition, exclusive in their membership.

Scholz demonstrates this evaluative framework by considering one historical and three contemporary case studies: The British Abolitionist movement in the nineteenth century; the humanitarian aid organization Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders, hereafter MSF); the International Olympic Committee (IOC); and members of the Anglican Communion opposed to liberal interpretation of the Bible and to the inclusion of gay men in the ordained ministry. In each of these cases, Scholz analyzes the institutional, developmental, shared identity, and public sphere effects, and (perhaps more importantly) the tensions and trade-offs among these effects. For example, in the case of MSF volunteers, while "the common experience of working in traumatic or difficult situations may build the developmental effect of empathy" (p. 131), the professional nature of this work does not cultivate a sense of shared community between volunteers and their patients. In the more controversial case of the Anglican Communion, while the exclusion of gay men and women from aspects of membership is clearly in tension with cosmopolitan norms of equal respect (p. 185), Scholz also points out that the debate has facilitated new avenues of transnational deliberation, including a recognition of similarities between conservative Anglicans in North America and Africa, and empowerment of Anglicans in the global south (pp. 175–81).

Each of these chapters is similarly structured around the four categories of effects, which at times leads to some unnecessary repetition: They work better, in this reader's view, as stand-alone pieces than as a development or elucidation of the general theoretical framework. Nonetheless, the dilemmas and tensions presented in them remain salient and important, and the radical difference between the aims and motivations of the three contemporary cases under examinations——MSF, IOC, and the dissident Anglican ministers—strengthens Scholz's point that the cosmopolitan effects of associations should be examined independently of the intentions of their members.

This important insight, however, raises several questions and avenues for future research. The first of these regards the scope of the framework. Scholz's reliance on civil society scholarship delimits the kinds of associations in which she is interested, to match the traditional focus on associations within the nation-state. Specifically, cases in the book are limited to nonstate, not-for-profit, nonviolent, voluntary associations (pp. 7–9, 21–23). Yet if what we are interested in are the *effects* of membership, rather than the *ends* of membership, why must it be so? After all, scholars of "embedded" or "rooted" cosmopolitanism have pointed to the cosmopolitan potential of states (e.g., Lea Ypi, *Global Justice and Avant-Garde Political Agency*, 2011); nonvoluntary associations, such as the nation (Kwame Anthony Appiah, "Cosmopolitan Patriots," *Critical Inquiry,* 23(3), 1997); and even violent associations, such as the armed forces (Toni Erskine, *Embedded Cosmopolitanism*, 2008). The case of for-profit associations is even clearer: Ever since the days of Adam Smith and Karl Marx, it was noted that commercial society is inherently cosmopolitan, in that capital aspires to transcend the boundaries of the state and other particularist loyalties, as Scholz herself mentions in passing (p. 99). Of course, all of these examples are at best imperfectly cosmopolitan in the normative sense, and in some respects harmful to cosmopolitanism; but is this not true for the cases considered in the book as well?

Another question that remains ambiguous is whether the effects considered pertain to the members of the association or to nonmembers as well. As Scholz clearly states, she is not interested in addressing "cosmopolitanism from the perspective of an individual moral agent . . . [but] in understanding how associations can contribute to the advancement of cosmopolitanism" (p. 10). This, combined with the insight that these effects are often unintended by members, and that they may be only imperfectly advancing cosmopolitan norms, leads me to think that there is a place in Scholz's theoretical framework to consider the effects on the institutional obligations, identities, and attitudes of nonmembers as well. It seems plausible, after all, that the existence and actions of such humanitarian organizations as MSF and such international sports associations as IOC have at least the potential to advance cosmopolitan attitudes outside of their direct members, be it their audience, their patients, their victims—or even otherwise-unaffected third parties. A clear example of this may be the international protest surrounding the 2014 World Cup in Brazil, where the failings of one transnational sports association (FIFA) had the effect of advancing norms of global solidarity.

These limitations of scope need not detract from the valuable insights of this book, which will be of interested to scholars in the fields of political theory and international relations alike. While both abstract philosophical work and empirical scholarship on the emergence of norms are undoubtedly important, it is crucial to recognize the value of works such as Scholz's, which seek to bridge the gap between the normative and the descriptive, and do not shy away from acknowledging the messy and complex reality of politics.

Liberalism in Practice: The Psychology and Pedagogy of Public Reason. By Olivia Newman. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015. 216p. $37.00 cloth.

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— Monica Mookherjee, *University of Keele*

It seems ever more vital for political philosophers to understand the practical workings of liberal democracy. Liberal societies continually encounter fraught controversies on issues like same-sex marriage and the integration of different faiths. Polarized opinions on these matters call for deliberation based on public reasons, wherein simple appeals to fixed principles seem often to fall short. Different sides in the debates seem to offer views that appear reasonable from their own points of view. Against this background, Olivia Newman's timely and clearly written defense of a "practical" liberalism advances an innovative view based on an internally differentiated concept of human psychology.

The central concern of *Liberalism in Practice* is that familiar accounts of liberal public reason underestimate the fact that people typically hold different values, and exhibit different character traits, across the many "domains" of life (Chapter 4). For instance, a ruthless CEO may be tolerant and generous in his or her personal life. This point leads Newman to question the generally held liberal assumption that the stability of political values depends on finding their source in citizens' own "comprehensive," nonpublic worldviews. While the assumption seems attractive, she astutely observes that it risks being exclusionary. Because liberals are committed to the fact of human diversity, it is exactly the citizens whose private worldview does not seem to yield liberal political values whom liberals should attempt to persuade into accepting a public ethic of fairness, equality, and reciprocity.

Newman responds to this predicament by drawing skilfully on recent developments in empirical and cognitive psychology. The insights of this literature lead her to query not only the "moralized" Rawlsian conception of public reason but also pragmatic, "modus vivendi" approaches, which characterize political commitment as a Hobbesian project of shoring up self-interested power. Considering both positions improbable, the author locates a third-way liberal justification that she views as "dispositional." Because people can and do switch contextually between different values, it is possible to learn to practise political toleration. By drawing on Claude Lévi-Strauss's concept of *bricolage,* among others, her main claim is that the tendency for contextual thought may be exploited creatively through educational programs that support a reasoned search for public consensus between different worldviews. In contrast with feminist writers who are wary of strong distinctions between the public and private, Newman builds on the human ability to "compartmentalize" to suggest a compelling new ground for liberal practice.

The book is notable for considering a wide-ranging, cross-cultural literature in empirical psychology, and for drawing from both Western and Eastern traditions. By demonstrating the frequency of "role-dependent" reasoning globally, Newman aims to accommodate integralist religious believers, and to offer them a psychologically sustainable liberalism. Integralist citizens present a challenge for liberalism by sometimes wishing to apply values that seem intolerant in the public domain. It may be unrealistic to suppose that very conservative believers would find resources within their personal worldview to support lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender rights, for instance. However, it would be equally implausible to regard any tolerance on their part as purely self-interested. The more likely situation would be that the religious integralist often respects others' civil rights due to having a settled disposition to do so. If liberal political practice may be understood, then, as a matter of being inured, or as a question of experience, it seems timely to focus on the possibility of teaching and learning liberal values through a certain pedagogy.

Newman's practical focus is refreshing, given the sometimes technical nature of the theoretical literature on liberal public reason. The book contributes to a growing research base, such as in the ongoing work of, amongst others, Gerald Gaus, Stephen Macedo and Meira Levinson, concerning religious accommodation and civic education. The themes of this book also dovetail usefully with scholarly debates around "deliberative" forms of democracy.

Most generally, this work is valuable for its implicit advocacy of the broader values of liberalism, such as inclusion, pluralism, tolerance, and humanism. But a number of questions appear to arise from this focus. One might be whether Newman's psychological realism explains the practical workings of liberal democracies, or whether it actually justifies them morally. Even if it achieves the former, it may be that this form of liberalism will continue to seem unpromising, or even misguided, to some who insist on alternative moral truths. For the author's underlying idea seems to be that liberalism is an act of persuasion first and, perhaps secondarily, a metaphysically grounded morality. But leaving aside the possibility that not all liberals would agree on this point, it invites us to ask whether we ourselves are persuaded by liberalism, and whether being "persuaded" means discounting other forms of human connection and organization. How much persuasion is apt when confronted with illiberalism? And where does the borderline fall between persuasion and coercion?

These are obviously difficult questions, and Newman seems right finally to conclude that "the promise of liberalism is not in theory but rather in the lived experience