

engagement with Hong Kong. However, Hampton's treatment of it is brief and superficial. His main focus is on the Man lineage from rural Hong Kong, which at one point dominated Europe's Chinatowns. He takes from James Watson's 1975 study on the London Mans the thesis that Hong Kong immigrants maintain a "cultural distance" from Britishness, an idea he sees borne out by Timothy Mo's novel *Sour Sweet* (1982). However, the Mans are an elite business group who came to form what Watson later called a "wired diaspora." They are not typical of the United Kingdom's Chinese communities, which have often formed ties to surrounding working-class communities. Most of Chinatown's other lineages have been unraveling at speed.

As Hampton notes in his introduction, he wrote his book from English-language sources, even, in the case of one chapter, having been advised by "Cantonese-speaking experts" that Chinese sources would not "add substantively" to it (180n2). This is a sad lapse in a book otherwise free from colonial presumption. Hong Kong is and always was overwhelmingly Sino-phone. Chinese who lived under British rule have expressed strong views on cultural imperialism, and many would resent the idea that they have little worthwhile to say about it.

The biggest flaw in Hampton's book lies in his reified understanding of ethnic and cultural identity. For him, Britishness is a static property marked by a set of ways and values that form the basis for "subjective identification." He concludes that the great majority of Chinese in the colony, rather than "self-identify" with or "assimilate" to British values, rejected "affective Britishness" and, at best, adopted a self-interested "instrumental Britishness." A more fertile approach, consonant with today's celebration of mixed ethnicities and circulating cultures, would see identity not as a fixture but as an intercultural transaction. Young East and Southeast Asians in cities in the United Kingdom, including British-born Chinese and youngsters from Hong Kong, China, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, and elsewhere, have created a new syncretized identity, avowedly British in some respects, Asian and cosmopolitan in others, that they call "Oriental" (as distinct from British Asian, used for Britons of South Asian descent). This identity has been brewing in the United Kingdom since before Hong Kong's retrocession. Cantopop, a unique blend of Chinese, other Asian, and Western elements created in Hong Kong, is its music. Hong Kong culture is a main conduit through which Chinese martial arts entered British youth culture, just as an Anglicized version of Chinese food has, in the last half century, become a staple part of British diet. Perhaps because of his Anglocentric perspective, Hampton misses these developments.

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JONATHAN HOGG. *British Nuclear Culture: Official and Unofficial Narratives in the Long Twentieth Century*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016. Pp. 231. \$114.00 (cloth). doi: 10.1017/jbr.2017.44

"Cold War culture" and "nuclear criticism" have long been mainstays in the study of twentieth-century American literary and cultural history; as one of the Cold War's primary belligerents and the only nation to use nuclear weapons in wartime, the United States has held a privileged position in articulating the discourses by which they were understood and encountered—an encounter that was generally taken to be universal. Jonathan Hogg's *British Nuclear Culture: Official and Unofficial Narratives in the Long Twentieth Century* challenges this assumption by arguing for a distinctly British nuclear culture, or rather *cultures*, as his history of the nuclear age in Britain (running from Ernest Rutherford's earliest experiments with radiation in 1898 to 2014) focuses not only on local and regional particularities, but also on the plural, overlapping, and often contradictory narratives of the nuclear age that

emerge in different media, ranging from journalism and protest pamphlets to, more recently, video games. Hogg complements scholarship that has drawn on government documents made accessible by the United Kingdom's Freedom of Information Act 2000 with an exhaustive scouring of newspapers, advertisements, film, television, and oral histories to locate as many explicit references to nuclear weapons and nuclear power as possible, it seems. Such striving for comprehensiveness seems a worthy endeavor for an attempt to open up a new window on British postwar history, beyond the well-established narratives of the end of empire and the rise of the welfare state.

As Hogg's subtitle suggests, his aim is to bring to light "unofficial" narratives of the nuclear age that contest the "official" narratives of what Peter Hennessey has termed "the secret state"—the largely hidden apparatus of Whitehall that sought to normalize nuclear weapons within both British policy and daily life. The official narrative made nuclear deterrence appear natural and possession of an independent nuclear arsenal inevitable and reasonable, while transforming the physical space of Britain with bunkers, bases, and bombers overhead. Resistance to the official narrative was treated by politicians and journalists alike as pathological: Hogg details recurring representations of the long-running Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament as unwashed bohemians and childless single women. Nuclear anxiety and the fear of annihilation were taken to be inexorable facets of modern life, to be conveniently repressed without protest. Complicit with this official narrative, Hogg argues, is the work of an earlier generation of British nuclear historians who have focused almost exclusively on governmental and scientific elites acting in a social vacuum, taking for granted the legitimacy of the hidden, undemocratic structures they describe.

The unofficial narratives are predominantly grounded in that nuclear anxiety, a phenomenon that manifests itself in diverse and occasionally unexpected aspects of everyday life. For instance, Hogg observes how, from the earliest days after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, women, and mothers in particular, questioned the continued relevance of the family unit if their children would confront a bleak future, if any future at all. British national identity was also affected by the bombings; many citizens expressed their shock and horror that their country was complicit in such atrocities. Britishness itself was at issue, as the territorial landmass of Britain was sufficiently small to be vulnerable to even a modest nuclear attack—there were common rumors that the island could be destroyed with a single bomb—prompting a meager civil defense program in the 1950s. Nuclear destruction became a recurring trope in fiction, popular television, and film, expressing an inchoate, amorphous fear of annihilation with varying degrees of nuance. Perhaps most poignant is Hogg's account of "The Family That Feared Tomorrow" (95–102), about the *Daily Mirror's* reporting of a Blackburn couple who committed filicide and suicide, leaving behind a note that saw no future for their children facing the prospect of nuclear annihilation. The tale demonstrates the intertwining of the official and unofficial narratives, as the *Mirror's* coverage gave concrete expression to the profound impact of nuclear anxiety, while simultaneously suggesting that the couple's acting upon their anxiety was abnormal and that idealized images like the traditional family could provide compensatory relief for it.

Hogg traces these competing narratives through their ebbs and flows, much as Paul Boyer has done for American nuclear history in *By the Bomb's Early Light* (1985). Hogg starts with the pre-history of the nuclear age, in which set-pieces of the mysterious powers of the atom were established. He follows with the immediate aftermath of the war, in which the prospect of atomic warfare was analogized to the Blitz. The 1950s and 1960s saw the rise of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and its famous Aldermaston Marches, which were met with countercultural suspicion and red-baiting. By the 1980s, Hogg argues, skepticism towards the official narrative had hardened into a common refrain of popular music, such that "the nuclear referent became something rumbling in the background" (134). His analysis is least compelling when he gets to the post-Cold War period, precisely because the distinctively British features of nuclear culture have been homogenized into the globalized entertainment market, where nuclear weapons often function as a punchline or a MacGuffin in films and video games, and public fear has shifted from global

destruction to localized terrorist attacks. Our present, Hogg concludes, does not demonstrate that the nuclear threat has entirely abated, but only been rendered innocuous under such empty representations, allowing “the secret state” to continue unfettered.

*British Nuclear Culture* is an important book for mapping the terrain of this lightly trodden field. Jonathan Hogg has done the journeyman’s work of marshaling diverse bodies of cultural production to adumbrate this particular national zeitgeist; indeed, at times his account seems like a catalog of explicit references to the nuclear. However, Hogg’s attention to the visible, overt aspects of nuclear culture risks neglecting its latent effects which appear, like neurotic symptoms, divorced from their origin. If, as Hogg contends, “what we might call ‘British nuclear culture’ therefore became a persistent backdrop to everyday life, appearing more visible around times of crisis, but always there as a brooding corner of British culture” (4), then “nuclearity” should manifest itself in cultural representations that do not take the nuclear as an ostensive referent. Whither should we locate, for instance, important postwar works like George Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1949), William Golding’s *Lord of the Flies* (1954), or Doris Lessing’s *The Golden Notebook* (1962), in all of which the nuclear plays a small but unexamined role? Texts like these would seem to operate upon what Walter Davis terms the “nuclear unconscious,” where nuclear anxiety appears only at the margins, to be repressed or deferred but nonetheless registered. Such a hermeneutic is, by his own admission, beyond the scope of Hogg’s inquiry, but he has nonetheless laid the groundwork for scholars to pursue the more delicate lineaments of British nuclear culture in the future.

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KATY LAYTON-JONES. *Beyond the Metropolis: The Changing Image of Urban Britain, 1780–1880*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016. Pp. 203. \$110.00 (cloth). doi: 10.1017/jbr.2017.45

In *Beyond the Metropolis: The Changing Image of Urban Britain, 1780–1880*, Katy Layton-Jones seeks to challenge the stereotype of dark satanic mills and grinding poverty that has come to dominate representations of industrial towns in the nineteenth century. She argues for a more nuanced understanding of these towns and their representation, drawing on a wide range of visual evidence. This includes topographical prints and railway guide vignettes, advertisements, panoramas, and views applied to promotional goods and souvenirs.

Rather than suggesting that urbanization wrought an abrupt and unattractive change in the environment or its representation, Layton-Jones emphasizes the continuity between the industrial town and the Georgian townscape. She draws attention to the different ways artists were able to accommodate the growing scale and novelty of the industrial town by utilizing various types of urban prospect. Her assertion that the exciting new industrial sites illustrated in guidebooks posed a challenge to the dominance of more historical towns as tourist attractions is a valuable one. Visual representations of Manchester, Liverpool, Bristol, Leeds, and Sheffield helped to shape ideas and raise awareness of places that had previously been remote or largely unknown.

Layton-Jones traces the origin of the stereotype of the demonic city to the influence of the social problem novels of the 1840s and 50s. The most famous example is Dickens’s *Hard Times*, published in 1854, but in the same years we also find examples of the genre that demonstrate a more balanced approach that is worthy of consideration here. One such novel is Elizabeth Gaskell’s *North and South* (1855), which, like *Hard Times*, also appeared in *Household Words*. It offers a reappraisal of her earlier representation of the harsh life in an industrial town, *Mary Barton* (1848). In this classic *bildungsroman*, the central character undergoes a gradual shift in perception of the industrial town of Milton (based on Manchester), from initial