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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Critical Security History: (De)securitisation, ontological security, and insecure memories

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Abstract
This article makes a case for incorporating the concept of 'Critical Security History' (CSH) into security studies. While history plays a powerful role in a cornucopia of security stories, we contend that it often goes unnoticed in scholarly research and teaching. Against this backdrop, we present a detailed guide to study how history is told and enacted in non-linear ways. To do this, the article outlines how CSH can contribute to securitisation and ontological security studies. As shown, this lens casts a new light on the legacies of (de)securitisation processes and how they are commemorated. It also illustrates that ontological security studies have only begun to call into question the concept of historicity. Working through these observations, the article marshals insights from Halvard Leira's notion of 'engaged historical amateurism' to entice scholars interested in 'doing' CSH. While acknowledging that this research agenda is hard to achieve, our study of the 2012 Sarajevo Red Line project helps to illustrate the added value of trying to 'do' CSH in theory and in practice. We end with some reflections for future research and continued conversations.

Keywords: Critical Security History; Securitisation; Ontological Security; Memories; Engaged Amateurism

Introduction

On 8 May 2018 Valentin Inzko, the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, warned the United Nations Security Council that progress in this country could not be taken for granted.[1] Speaking candidly about rising political tensions, he registered explicit concern about,

> the recent readiness among some politicians to refer to the possibility of a renewed conflict, including controversial statements by senior Bosniak politicians suggesting that a rearming effort was underway to 'respond' in case of a hypothetical war.[2]

The fact that rearmament[3] and renewed conflict cannot be dismissed over a decade after the end of the 1995 conflict that resulted in the death of an estimated 100,000 people is alarming.[4] It also

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[1]Several other empirical case studies and postconflict sites could obviously have been chosen to make this point. We selected Valentin Inzko's report as a way to create empirical consistency with our discussion of Sarajevo Red Line project later on in the article.

[2]UN News, '"Fabric of Society" at Risk in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UN Security Council Told' (2018), available at: {https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/05/1009182} accessed 10 September 2018.

[3]In early 2018 concerns were raised over an increase in arm sales to the Bosnian Serb police. See Julian Borger, 'Arms shipment to Bosnian Serbs stokes EU fears', *The Guardian* (13 February 2018), available at: {https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/13/bosnian-serb-police-arms-purchase-stokes-eu-fears} accessed 10 September 2018.

[4]United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 'Case: Bosnia-Herzegovina' (2018), available at: {https://www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/cases/bosnia-herzegovina} accessed 10 September 2018.

illustrates that history does not simply reside in the past. On the contrary, Inzko's report reveals that the boundaries between what happened 'then' and what is happening 'now' are hard to draw with any precision. The events that he documented also weave the past, present, and future together. Evidently, what happened 'then' and what is happening 'now' will actively inform how this country will negotiate processes of collective remembering and reconciliation going forward.

This article is prompted by a wish to explore how histories are never fully secure. At first glance, this objective may appear to be too simple. Everyone knows that history does not abide to a linear arc even if victors construct it. It is also plain that 'facts do not speak for themselves'.[5] On the contrary, a wide canon of scholarly work has already exposed how histories are told, remembered, and forgotten in selective ways.[6] As Jenny Edkins put it, 'producing a narrative is a form of forgetting'.[7] Related works have shown that processes of memorialisation and commemoration are sites of political power struggles. As Jay Winter surmises, 'a cacophony is inevitable'.[8] However, the former bodies of work tend to pay less attention to the specific entanglement of history and security. What is equally surprising is that very few critical security studies scholars have explicitly foregrounded the intricate interrelations that exist between history and security. Certainly Thierry Balzacq's claim that 'every securitization is a historical process that occurs between antecedent influential set of events and their impact on interactions; that involves concurrent acts carrying reinforcing or aversive consequences for securitization' remains overlooked.[9] Arguably then both sets of literature fall short of offering a CSH conceptual framework.

Recently, Brent J. Steele sketched what this kind of framework might entail.[10] One of his studies focused on how the United States collectively 'remembers' the atomic bombings as being 'necessary' to 'save lives' that would have otherwise been lost in an invasion of the Japanese main islands. According to Steele, however, this process of collective remembering reinforces powerful security logics and 'master narratives'[11] that justify the use of overwhelming force in wars.[12] To disrupt these linkages he draws from additional historical accounts. This generates alternative 'if-then' propositions that allow readers to imagine another cause for why the Japanese surrendered.[13] In a follow-up study, Steele noted that CSH would involve, 'focusing on the ways in which history is recalled and remembered'.[14] However, neither of his studies brings

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[5]Molly Andrews, *Shaping History: Narratives of Political Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 2. This point resonates with Cox's famous claim that '[t]heory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose'. See Robert W. Cox, *Approaches to World Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 87, emphasis in original.

[6]See, among others, Claire Alexander, 'Contested memories: the Shahid Minar and the struggle for diasporic space', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 36:4 (2013), pp. 590–610; Duncan Bell (ed.), *Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship between Past and Preset* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Stephen Hopkins, 'The Chronicles of Long Kesh: Provisional Irish Republican memoirs and the contested memory of hunger strikes', *Memory Studies*, 7:4 (2014), pp. 425–39; Maria Mälksoo, 'Criminalizing communism: Transnational mnemopolitics in Europe', *International Political Sociology*, 8:1 (2014), pp. 82–99; Jay Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

[7]Jenny Edkins, *Trauma and the Memory of Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 113.

[8]Jay Winter, 'Film and the matrix of memory', *The American Historical Review*, 106:3 (2001), p. 864.

[9]Thierry Balzacq, 'A theory of securitization: Origins, core assumptions, and variants', in Thierry Balzacq (ed.) *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve* (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 14.

[10]Brent J. Steele, 'Maintaining (US) collective memory: From Hiroshima to a critical study of security history', *Critical Studies of Security*, 1:1 (2013), pp. 83–100; Brent J. Steele, 'Critical Security History and Hiroshima', *Critical Studies on Security*, 3:3 (2016), pp. 303–07.

[11]There are multiple and competing ways to define 'dominant', 'prevalent', 'hegemonic', and/or 'grand narratives'. Our conceptualisation of a 'master narrative' draws directly on the work of Paul Nesbitt-Larking who defines them as, 'socially embedded and broadly shared frameworks of knowledge and experience that are understood and communicated in the form of stories'. See Paul Nesbitt–Larking, 'The ideological work of narratives', *Political Psychology*, 38:3 (2017), pp. 571–8.

[12]Steele, *Maintaining (US) Collective Memory*, p. 83.

[13]Ibid., p. 96.

[14]Steele, 'Critical Security History and Hiroshima', pp. 304–05.

different critical security approaches into conversation with each other. Nor do they fully address the inherent difficulties posed by doing CSH in theory and in practice.

To overcome these limitations, this article engages with two central approaches in critical security studies – securitisation and ontological security. Obviously, these are not the only two approaches we could have chosen. Postcolonial security studies continue to challenge Western centric accounts of history and International Relations.[15] As Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey point out, 'Eurocentric historical geographies and periodisations are very much in evidence in the common narratives of world history that underpin security studies.'[16] Feminist security studies have also sought to challenge hegemonic and masculinised histories.[17] Cynthia Enloe, for instance, purposefully documents wartime lives that 'make it harder for listeners to deny that Iraqi women had their own stories'.[18] In sync, poststructural security studies explicitly interrogate and deconstruct historical narratives and the insecurity they create.[19] For similar reasons David Campbell argues that 'to proclaim the end of the cold war assumes that we know what the cold war was'.[20] A systematic presentation of how CSH could and should engage with all these approaches is beyond the scope of our study. Yet we do hope that this article will provide an invitation for such studies to be undertaken. In short, this piece represents the *start* of ongoing CSH conversations rather than a definitive end. Read in this way, our article offers a particularly promising avenue to break down oppositional thinking across the field of critical security studies.[21]

Before outlining how the present article contributes to securitisation and ontological security studies it is necessary to explain why these two security approaches were selected.[22] First, both fields of study have been influenced by the central *zeitgeist* of critical security studies – namely that security is a social construct that is inescapably open to contestation. Working from this baseline, securitisation and ontological security scholars have highlighted the powerful role played

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[15]See, for example, Anna M. Agathangelou and L. H. M. Ling, 'Postcolonial dissidence within dissident IR: Transforming master narratives of sovereignty in Greco-Turkish Cyprus', *Studies in Political Economy*, 54:1 (1997), pp. 7–38; Neta C. Crawford, *Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization and Humanitarian Intervention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); John M. Hobson and Alina Sajed, 'Navigating beyond the Eurofetishist frontier of critical IR theory: Exploring the complex landscapes of non-Western agency', *International Studies Review*, 19:4 (2017), pp. 547–72; Edward W. Said, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1995); Robbie Shilliam, *Race and the Underserving Poor: From Abolition to Brexit* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).

[16]Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, 'The postcolonial moment in security studies', *Review of International Studies*, 32:2 (2006), p. 334.

[17]See, for example, Matthew Kearns, 'Gender, visuality and violence: Visual securitization and the 2001 war in Afghanistan', *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 19:4 (2017), pp. 491–505; Meredith Loken and Anna Zelenz, 'Explaining extremism Western women in Daesh', *European Journal of International Security*, 3:1 (2017), pp. 45–68; Annick T. R. Wibben, *Feminist Security Studies* (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 4–10.

[18]Cynthia Enloe, *Nimo's War, Emma's War: Making Feminist Sense of the Iraq War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), p. xi.

[19]David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992); Roxanne Doty, *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (London: Routledge, 2006).

[20]Campbell, *Writing Security*, p. 15. In the same passage, he also acknowledges that 'In considering the issue of where we go from here, there is a tendency to uncritically accept a particular story of how we got to be here.'

[21]See, for example, C.A.S.E. Collective, 'Critical approaches to security in Europe: a networked manifesto', *Security Dialogue*, 37:3 (2006), pp. 443–87; Faye Donnelly, 'Critical security studies and alternative dialogues for peace: Reconstructing "language barriers" and "talking points"', in Oliver P. Richmond *et al.* (eds), *The Palgrave Handbook of Disciplinary and Regional Approaches to Peace* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Lene Hansen, 'Conclusion: Towards an ontopolitics of security', in Thierry Balzacq (ed.), *Contesting Security: Strategies and Logics* (New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 219–31; Juha A. Vuori, *Critical Security and Chinese Politics: The Anti-Falungong Campaign* (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 1.

[22]We would like to thank the reviewers for asking us to elaborate on our selection process.

by language, images,[23] and material actants.[24] All of these features are compatible with our attempt to develop a more robust CSH approach. Second, we argue that securitisation and onto-logical security approaches contain a limited focus on history that can be further developed via CSH. Engaging with securitisation, for instance, reminds us that the legacies of (de)securitisation are all difficult to leave behind or navigate going forwards. Turning towards ontological security studies we remake the case for starting with the concept of 'historicity' left unproblematised and unpacked in earlier studies.[25]

The remainder of article proceeds as follows. First, we make a case for why CSH is necessary to unpack causal historical narratives in IR. The next section focuses on the implications of placing history centre stage in the lively debates occurring in securitisation studies. The third section explores the productive inroads that become possible when CSH and ontological security are put into conversation with one another. Building on Halvard Leira's notion of 'engaged historical amateurism',[26] the final section reflects on the 2012 Sarajevo Red Line project to tentatively illustrate how these ideas might be put into action. The conclusion draws together the major claims of the article and reflects on how to continue CSH conversations in critical security studies and beyond.

Making a case for Critical Security History

Conceptually, the meaning of Critical Security History is layered. By design, it seeks to acknowledge that history is inescapably told, experienced, remembered, and felt differently by different groups of people at different points in time. This is why David L. Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah sought to make 'a conversation of equal but different cultures' possible.[27] Motivated by a similar goal, CSH seeks to carve out spaces in which alternative voices, stories, memories, and feelings can surface. At its core, it is 'critical'[28] in its scepticism of causality and unproblematic historical

[23]See, for example, Lene Hansen, 'Theorizing the image for security studies: Visual securitization and the Muhammad cartoon crisis', *European Journal of International Relations*, 17:1 (2011), pp. 51–74; Axel Heck and Gabi Schlag, 'Securitizing images: the female body and the war in Afghanistan', *European Journal of International Relations*, 19:4 (2012), pp. 891–913; Benjamin J. Muller, '(Dis)qualified bodies: Securitization, citizenship and "identity management"', *Citizenship Studies*, 8:3 (2004), pp. 279–94; Michael C. Williams, 'Words, images, enemies: Securitization and international politics', *International Studies Quarterly*, 47:4 (2003), pp. 511–31. On the relationship between ontological security and images, see Christine Agius, 'Drawing the discourses of ontological security: Immigration and identity in the Danish and Swedish cartoon crises', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 52:1 (2017), pp. 109–25; Brent J. Steele, '"Ideals that were really never in our possession": Torture, honor and US identity', *International Relations*, 22:2 (2008), pp. 243–61.

[24]In securitisation studies, see Claudia Aradau, 'Security that matters: Critical infrastructure and the politics of protection', *Security Dialogue*, 41:5 (2010), pp. 491–514; Stephane J. Baele, Thierry Balzacq, and Philippe Bourbeau, 'Numbers in global security governance', *European Journal of International Security*, 3:1 (2017), pp. 22–44; Michael Guggenheim, 'Building memory: Architecture, networks, users', *Memory Studies*, 2:1 (2009), pp. 39–53; Iver B. Neuman, 'Halting time: Monuments to alterity', *Millennium*, 46:3 (2018), pp. 331–51. In ontological security studies, see Filip Ejdus, '"Not a heap of stones": Material environments and ontological security in International Relations', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 30:1 (2017), pp. 23–43; Bahar Rumellili, 'Identity and desecuritisation: the pitfalls of conflating ontological and physical security', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 18:1 (2015), pp. 52–74.

[25]See Jakob Eberle, 'Narrative, desire, ontological security, transgression: Fantasy as a factor in international politics', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, Online First (2017), pp. 1–26; Marco A. Vieira, '(Re-)imagining the "Self" of ontological security: the case of Brazil's ambivalent postcolonial subjectivity', *Millennium*, 46:2 (2018), pp. 142–64.

[26]Halvard Leira, 'International Relations pluralism and history – embracing amateurism to strengthen the profession', *International Studies Perspectives*, 16:1 (2015), pp. 23–31.

[27]David L. Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah, 'Prelude to a conversation of cultures in international society? Todorov and Nandy on the possibility of dialogue', *Alternatives, Global, Local, Political*, 19:1 (1994), p. 29.

[28]The term 'critical' has many different meanings in IR. Some even argue that critical theory overlaps with problem solving theory. See, for example, John M. Hobson, 'Is critical theory always for the white West and for Western imperialism? Beyond Westphalian towards a post-racist critical IR', *Review of International Studies*, 33:1 (2007), pp. 91–116. In this article, we use the term 'critical' as it is invoked within critical security studies writ larger and write small. Ultimately, what is at stake in these ongoing debates is a call for scholars to acknowledge that security cannot be told in one way, that our current stories

storylines. Ironically, however, CSH also calls us to take causality very seriously, perhaps much more seriously than the ways in which it is casually invoked by political leaders and/or laypeople and/or social scientists. As Milja Kurki argues, 'we can, in fact, think of causation as a "common-sensical" intuitive notion with a multiplicity of different meanings, none of which entail laws or determinism'.[29]

CSH engages causal historical narratives through two levels of analysis. The thinner, and far more common, critique challenges the dominant 'cause' of a historical event by proposing a different one. Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry 1992 study falls into this category. Challenging the storylines espoused by the 'Reagan Victory School,[30] they simply moved to study other causes. By extension, their 'new' perspective foregrounded additional factors, including Mikhail Gorbachev's reform efforts and the 'increasingly superior performance of the Western economic system', to determine why the Cold War ended and who 'won'.[31]

Most 'critical' security history is of this nature – exchanging one cause for another. Hidemi Suganami believes that all social scientific explanations rely on some form of narration like this.[32] Yet this thin type of CSH still accepts that causes can be linked to outcomes. The problem with this kind of positivist explanation is that it overlooks the ways in which these causal narratives become politicised and mobilised. Put another way, it occludes the reflexive feedback loops that occur between the subjects and objects of politics.[33] Once again Deudney's and Ikenberry's argument epitomises this limitation. In the end, they were interested in reconsidering, 'the emerging conventional wisdom before *it truly becomes an article of faith* on Cold War history and comes to distort the thinking of policymakers in America and elsewhere'.[34]

Lucian Ashworth's engagement with the 'Appeasement' myth[35] provides a richer template for critiquing historical narratives and the tendency, '[t]o tell the story as though the ending is an inevitability.'[36] Although it is not explicitly labelled as a CSH study, he seeks to challenge the historiography of IR by calling our attention to *contingency*.[37] As Ashworth argues, 'it does not matter how in tune with the realities of power you are [when] the complexities of human political life can often give a high premium to *plain dumb luck*'.[38] That said, Ashworth deploys contingency to call out the importance of agency versus structure in historical narratives.[39]

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are unequal and that we all have to engage in a lifelong project of being reflexive if we are to uncover and disrupt granted 'master narratives' that envelop our work and in our lives. See, for example, Christopher Browning and Matt McDonald, 'The future of critical security studies: Ethics and the politics of security', *European Journal of International Security*, 19:2 (2011), pp. 235–55; Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds), *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases* (London: University College London Press); David Mutimer, Kyle Grayson, and J. Marshall Beier, '*Critical Studies on Security*: an introduction', *Critical Studies on Security*, 1:1 (2013), pp. 1–12.

[29]Milja Kurki, 'Causes of a divided discipline: Rethinking the concept of cause in International Relations theory', *Review of International Studies*, 32:2 (2006), p. 190.

[30]This 'School' of thought credited the end of the Cold War victory to Reagan's military buildup and the ideological assertiveness he undertook during the 1980s that led to bankrupting the Soviet Union. For further information, see Alan P. Dobson, 'The Reagan administration, economic warfare, and starting to close down the Cold War', *Diplomatic History*, 29:1 (2005), pp. 531–56.

[31]Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, 'Who won the Cold War?', *Foreign Policy* (1992), p. 136.

[32]Hidemi Suganami, 'Narrative explanation and International Relations: Back to basics', *Millennium*, 37:2 (2008), pp. 327–56.

[33]Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and its Implications for the Study of World Politics* (London: Routledge, 2011).

[34]Deudney and Ikenberry, 'Who won the Cold War?', p. 124, emphasis added.

[35]Lucian Ashworth, *A History of International Thought: From the Origins of the Modern State to Academic International Relations* (London: Routledge, 2014).

[36]Ashworth, *A History of International Thought*, p. 194.

[37]See also Duncan Bell, 'Writing the world: Disciplinary history and beyond', *International Affairs*, 85:1 (2009), pp. 3–22; Benjamin De Carvalho, Halvard Leira, and John M. Hobson, 'The Big Bangs of IR: the myths that your teachers still tell you about 1648 and 1919', *Millennium*, 39:3 (2011), pp. 735–58.

[38]Ibid., p. 194, emphasis added.

[39]Ibid., p. 195.

Naturally, we welcome his focus on agency as a key factor shaping the drive to deploy causal narratives. Even so, we believe that the restating and reinforcement of narratives can happen through the interplay of agency and structure.

The limitations outlined above alert us to the fact that Steele's accounts still offer the best place to begin considering how to create 'a cottage field of critical studies on security *history*'.[40] Nevertheless, as noted in the introduction, his accounts also need to be developed. First, it is helpful to extend his analysis by illustrating how a CSH perspective can enrich and converse with different CSS approaches. This is the purpose of the next two sections. Understanding this pursuit also makes it necessary for scholars to analyse 'the various places and spaces where historical interpretations are reinforced and/or disrupted'.[41] The final section of the article is thus dedicated to pinpointing one illustrative case study – the 2012 Sarajevo Red Line project – where security and history are mutually reinforcing yet highly contested.

Looking for Critical Security History in securitisation studies

According to the Copenhagen School, security pivots around the social construction of threats. Adopting a speech act approach, they analyse how agents speak security to convince audiences that extraordinary measures may need to be used to ensure the survival of a valued referent object.[42] While advancing this agenda, however, the Copenhagen School openly cautions against security being 'idealized'.[43] Desecuritisation is therefore presented as an 'optimal long-range' strategy for returning issues back into the political realm.[44] The inclusion of this exit strategy in their original framework implies that they never intended for securitisation to last forever. Jumping to this conclusion, however, does not help us to consider the legacies of securitisation, let alone how they are selectively remembered and forgotten. What happens if securitised processes of the past seep into desecuritisation strategies? What if securitisation creates toxic memories that cannot be erased? What happens when older securitisation processes are ritualistically commemorated? As demonstrated below, CSH offers an excellent opportunity to explore these questions.

In parallel, it is well placed to contributes to 'second generations' claims that (de)securitisation does not unfold in a linear way.[45] Subsequent literature has framed securitisation as an ongoing

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[40]Steele, 'Critical Security History and Hiroshima', p. 304.

[41]Ibid., p. 305.

[42]Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).

[43]Ibid., p. 29.

[44]It is important to note that other scholars are advancing alternative ways for us to move out of security. These do not neatly coincide with the Copenhagen School's discussion of desecuritisation. See, among others, Claudia Aradau, 'Security and the democratic scene: Desecuritization and the emancipation', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 7:4 (2004), pp. 388–413; Andreas Behnke, 'No way out: Desecuritization, emancipation and the eternal return of the political – a reply to Aradau', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 9:1 (2006), pp. 62–9; Faye Donnelly, 'The Queen's Speech: Desecuritizing the past, present and future of Anglo-Irish relations', *European Journal of International Relations*, 21:4 (2015), pp. 911–34; Lene Hansen, 'Reconstructing desecuritization: the normative-political in the Copenhagen School and directions for how to apply it', *Review of International Studies*, 38:3 (2012), pp. 525–46; Jef Huysmans, 'The question of the limit: Desecuritization and the aesthetics of horror in political realism', *Journal of International Studies*, 27:3 (1998), pp. 569–89; Xymena Kurowska and Anatoly Reshetnikov, 'Neutrollization: Industrialized trolling as a pro-Kremlin strategy of desecuritization', *Security Dialogue*, Online First (2018), pp. 1–19; Megan MacKenzie, 'Securitization and desecuritization: Female soldiers and the reconstruction of women in post-conflict Sierra Leone', *Security Studies*, 18:2 (2009), pp. 241–61.

[45]From a CSH perspective, this claim could easily be connected to ongoing debates about the role of time and temporality in IR. See, for example, Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier and Bradford S. Jones, 'Time is of the essence: Event history models in political science', *American Journal of Political Science*, 41:4 (1997), pp. 1414–61; William A. Callahan, 'War, shame and time: Pastoral governance and national identity in England and America', *International Studies Quarterly*, 50:2 (2006), pp. 395–419; Andrew R. Hom, 'Timing is everything: Toward a better understanding of time and international politics',

process with no clear beginning or ending.[46] In this vein, Philippe Bourbeau and Juha A. Vuori have suggested that very little attention has been paid to instances in which 'desecuritization arise *before* security – when securitization is brewing'.[47] At the same time, Jonathan Luke Austin and Philippe Beaulieu-Brossard have suggested that securitisation and desecuritisation can occur simultaneously.[48] For them, simultaneity can occur through 'splitting speech acts'.[49]

We believe that CSH complements Bourbeu and Vuori's attempt to excavate the 'formative powers' that precede and condition (de)securitisation processes from the start.[50] Nevertheless, one could still clarify how we go about accumulating clues of what counts as 'prior' and 'where exactly to temporarily locate a [causal] mechanism'.[51] From a CSH perspective it is essential that we do not romanticise vocabularies that draw clear lines between (de)securitising moves because we all speak with 'an inherited set of voices'.[52] We also propose that CSH pushes us to acknowledge that neat splits are almost impossible to accomplish. From this perspective, every synergy and/or rupture that emerges during a (de)securitisation processes is shaped by an unacknowledged yet omnipresent historicity.

In many ways these discussions merge into earlier concerns around the Copenhagen School's approach to context.[53] However, while context has become a buzzword in 'second generation' debates, far less calls have been made for (de)securitisation processes to be historicised. The point being made here is emphatically not that that history has been completely written out of securitisation studies. Certainly Matti Jutila has already explored the relationships between history, securitisation, and identity.[54] His work has also identified that 'political actors use various historical narratives to justify their present position and to build their desired futures'.[55] Going further still Jutila has asked if history can be securitised.[56]

In a similar vein, Bezen Balamir Coskun states that 'historians, as well as the power elite, play a significant role in construction and reconstruction of the security discourse'.[57] Another trend is for historical events and empirical references points to form the backdrop for theorising how

International Studies Quarterly, 62:1 (2018), pp. 69–79; Ty Solomon, 'Time and subjectivity in world politics', *International Studies Quarterly*, 58:4 (2014), pp. 671–81.

[46]Donnelly, 'The Queen's Speech', pp. 911–34; Holger Stritzel and Sean C. Chang, 'Securitization and counter-securitization in Afghanistan', *Security Dialogue*, 46:6 (2015), pp. 548–67; Juha A. Vuori, 'Let's just say we'd like to avoid any Great Power entanglements: Desecuritization in post-Mao Chinese foreign policy towards major powers', *Global Discourse*, 8:1 (2018), pp. 118–36.

[47]Philippe Bourbeau and Juha A. Vuori, 'Security, resilience and desecuritization: Multidirectional moves and dynamics', *Critical Studies on Security*, 3:3 (2015), pp. 253–68.

[48]Jonathan Luke Austin, '(De)securitization dilemmas: Theorising the simultaneous enaction of securitization and desecuritization', *Review of International Studies*, 44:2 (2017), pp. 301–23.

[49]Ibid., pp. 314–19.

[50]Judith Butler, *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative* (London: Psychology Press, 1997), p. 2.

[51]Stefano Guzzini, 'Securitization as a causal mechanism', *Security Dialogue*, 42:4–5 (2011), p. 337.

[52]Ibid., p. 25.

[53]See, among others, Thierry Balzacq, Sarah Léonard, and Jan Ruzicka, 'Securitization revisited: Theory and cases', *International Relations*, 30:4 (2015), pp. 494–531; Felix Ciută, 'Security and the problem of context: a hermeneutical critique of securitisation theory', *Review of International Studies*, 35:2 (2009), pp. 301–26; Filip Ejdus and Mina Božović, 'Grammar, context and power: Securitization of the 2010 Belgrade Pride parade', *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 17:1 (2017), pp. 17–34; Holger Stritzel, 'Towards a theory of securitization: Copenhagen and beyond', *European Journal of International Relations*, 13:3 (2007), pp. 357–83.

[54]Matti Jutila, 'Securitization, history and identity: Some conceptual clarifications and examples from politics of Finnish war history', *Nationalities Papers*, 43:6 (2015), pp. 927–43; Also Jarrod Hayes, *Constructing National Security: US Relations with India and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Jarrod Hayes, 'Securitization, social identity, and democratic security: Nixon, India and the ties that bind', *International Organization*, 66:1 (2012), pp. 63–93.

[55]Jutila, 'Securitization, history, and identity', p. 928.

[56]Ibid.

[57]Bezen Balamir, 'History writing and securitization of the Other: the construction and reconstruction of Palestinian and Israeli security discourses', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 23:2 (2010), p. 285.

securitisation works in practice. Take for example, Vuori's analysis of the Doomsday Clock as a 'longstanding process of securitization in which speech acts have been interwoven with a powerful symbol'.[58] Elsewhere Maria Mälksoo has begun to, 'critically engage the securitization of memory as a means of making certain historical remembrances secure by delegitimizing or outright criminalizing others'.[59] Her conceptualisation of mnemonical security allows for the possibility that securitisation lingers in antagonistic ways that can 'produce circular security dilemmas'.[60]

It is also misplaced to claim that history cannot be brought into securitisation studies under the rubric of context. 'Second generation' debates are not looking for *the* context in which securitisation occurs. Instead they are looking for *any* and *every context* in which (de)securitisation is contested, negotiated, imagined, visualised, and resisted.[61] Yet, as important as these developments are, they can be further developed by centralising history even more. A cursory glance at the exiting debates, for example, illustrates that very few scholars have examined The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars from a securitisation perspective.[62] What has also not been fully acknowledged is that all contexts must be viewed as a 'ritual chain of resignification whose origins and end remain unfixed and unfixable'.[63]

One explanation for why history is not always adequately captured is our preoccupation with 'securing catastrophic futures'.[64] Our hunch, however, is that this line of argument starts to unravel very quickly when it is put into a broader context. In the end, futuristic gazes do not make history redundant. This is because discussions and visions of the future always interact and coexist with past experiences, memories, disputes, and struggles. To mention just one example, Martin Shaw has noted, 'the Second World War remains the main historical reference point for understanding contemporary warfare and, relatedly, the international system in the twenty-first century'.[65] This observation reminds us that war does not simply reside on the battlefield or end. Their legacies can linger and be experienced by different people in elusive ways.[66] As Duncan Bell notes, 'the fugitive traces of memory long outlast the sound of the guns'.[67] If this point holds, then the links between (de)securitisation and commemoration warrant much greater attention than they are currently afforded.

Taking these ideas in a slightly different direction brings us in contact with what we term mutual (de)securitisation processes. While the concept of countermoves and contestation has

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[58]Juha A. Vuori, 'A timely prophet? The Doomsday Clock as a visualization of securitization moves with a global referent object', *Security Dialogue*, 41:3 (2010), p. 255.

[59]Maria Mälksoo, '"Memory must be defended": Beyond the politics of mnemonical security', *Security Dialogue*, 46:3 (2015), pp. 221–37 (p. 221).

[60]Ibid., p. 227.

[61]In turn, many scholars have incorporated unexpected and everyday settings into securitisation studies. See Balzacq (ed.), *Securitization Theory*; Balzacq (ed.), *Contesting Security*; Jef Huysmans, 'What's in an act? On Security speech acts and little security nothings', *Security Dialogue*, 42:4–5 (2011), pp. 371–83; Jef Huysmans, 'Democratic surveillance in times of curiosity', *European Journal of International Security*, 1:1 (2016), pp. 73–93.

[62]For an exception, see Camil Fransc Roman, 'The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in the Prussian political imaginary: a political anthropological genealogy of the "special" German-French relations', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 21:2 (2018), pp. 322–45.

[63]Judith Butler, *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative* (London: Psychology Press, 1997), p. 14.

[64]Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster, *Politics of Catastrophe: Genealogies of the Unknown* (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 17.

[65]Martin Shaw, 'Still the key reference point: the Second World War, the international system and contemporary warfare', *Critical Studies on Security*, 3:3 (2015), p. 285.

[66]Christine Sylvester, *War as Experience: Contributions from International Relations and Feminist Analysis* (London: Routledge, 2013); Kevin McSorely, 'Doing military fitness: Physical culture, civilian leisure and militarism', *Critical Military Studies*, 2:1 (2016), pp. 103–99; Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014); Enloe, *Nimo's War, Emma's War*.

[67]Duncan Bell, 'Introduction: Violence and memory', *Millennium*, 38:2 (2009), p. 348.

gained a lot of traction in securitisation studies, far less attention has been given to the layers of mutual (re)enactment, (re)telling, and (re)calling that are often in play in every securitisation game.[68] Even when securitisation is 'declared' to be over, we still find highly institutionalised, choreographed, and ritualised process of recalling and reliving what happened during securitisation. As Maria Mälksoo has already noted, '"our memory must be defended" emerges as a variation of the omnipresent security discourse, as another ringtone of the familiar "society" must be defended "logic"'.[69] Paying attention to how older securitisations are relived and retold opens up the possibility for intergenerational (de)securitisation processes through which images, beliefs, experiences, objects, lessons, traumas, and much more get passed down from one generation to the next. These encounters do not have to be explicit. Instead, they may become 'mundane matters'[70] or 'little security nothings'[71] that become woven into the fabric of our lives in ways that are rarely articulated. For example, by participating in commemorative practices, like wearing a red poppy, actors and actant become somewhat complicit in the reproduction of ritualised stories, mythologies, and ceremonies.

These observations raise anew the question of whether or not desecuritisation is possible. For Andreas Behnke, the goal is to break the ritualistic chain in order to allow securitisation to fade away.[72] For if we continue to participate in the same securitised game (whether they are historical or contemporary) there is a real danger that we never exit securitisation. This echoes Catherine Charrett's claim that 'securitisation is maintained through its own ritualised mechanisms of measuring and judging the performance of the marked threat'.[73] Taking these repetitive aspects a step further she argues that securitising actors find it difficult to step outside their prior 'discursive order' or provide dissenting views.[74] Understanding securitisation in this way, however, downplays and precludes the constant possibility for contestation and even fissures in the ritual. As Ido Oren and Ty Solomon note, 'the audience is not akin to students in an academic lecture hall or to theatergoers who are mostly performed *to*'.[75] As such, their discussion of ritual allows for multivocality and, in turn, contestation since 'the complexity and uncertainty of securitising phrases thus make it possible for them to be adopted and chanted by people who do not share political values and who do not see eye to eye on the securitisation of the issue at stake'.[76]

Two implications follow from this section. First, CSH calls attention to how certain securitised stories become ritualised and collectively remembered. Second, it establishes that there is no straightforward way to understand how history is securitised or desecuritised at a particular point in time or in a particular place. Looking at such dynamics is likely to make CSH a valuable area of future research for ontological security studies, to which we now turn.

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[68]For perhaps the best attempt to conceptualise collective speech act, see James Sperling and Mark Webber, 'NATO and the Ukraine Crisis: Collective securitization', *European Journal of International Security*, 2:1 (2016), pp. 19–46.

[69]Mälksoo, '"Memory must be defended"', p. 222.

[70]Cynthia Enloe, 'The mundane matters', *International Political Sociology*, 5:4 (2011), pp. 447–50.

[71]Huysmans, 'What's in an act?', pp. 371–83.

[72]Andreas Behnke, 'No way out: Desecuritization, emancipation and the eternal return of the political – a reply to Aradau', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 9:1 (2006), pp. 62–9.

[73]Catherine Charrett, 'Ritualised securitization: the European Union's failed response to Hamas's success', *European Journal of International Relations*, Online First (2018), pp. 1–23.

[74]Ibid., p. 10.

[75]Ido Oren and Ty Solomon, 'WMD, WMD, WMD: Securitization through ritualised incantation of ambiguous phrases', *Review of International Studies*, 41:2 (2015), p. 324.

[76]Ibid., p. 326.

Recollecting historicity and Critical Security History in ontological security studies

Ontological security studies (OSS) is another evolving field in critical security studies.[77] As Stuart Croft notes, 'it has become as multidisciplinary work space'.[78] Overall, these debates focus on the practices through which agents order their environments and their Selves. As Steele suggests, 'the mere act of recognizing ourselves is the first of many in a process meant to extract who we are from what surrounds us'.[79] Of course, narration is an act of representation – not only of the Self (as fleeting as that may be), but of others and all within the social environment. It allows actors to acquire and maintain a consistent biographical narrative and identity, even if they are harmful or self-defeating.[80]

Yet the striving for ontological security does not guarantee its attainment. The chaos and speed of late modernity, and bewildering variety of methods and avenues for representation and counter-representation, place any narrative ordering under constant attack. Within OSS these critical situations are theorised as moments of 'radical disjunctions of an unpredictable kind affecting substantial numbers of individuals', disturbing the routines so vital to ordering the Self and (with) its environment.[81] Such critical situations – likened to the crises theorised in IR – disrupt narratives and conceptualisations of the Self.[82] In these moments, new models or analogies can take hold for agents seeking to reorder the Self in the face of a critical situation, lest identity be upended altogether.

Two key concepts within Giddensian-inspired uses of OSS relate to CSH, namely (auto)biographical narratives and 'historicity' (the use of history to make history). The biographical narrative is what Giddens also terms the 'narrative of the self': the story or stories through which self-identity is reflexively understood, both by the individual concerned and by others.[83] In general, OSS has centralised this aspect from both conventional (taking the narrative as an analytical given) and critical (treating it as a politically problematic device) angles.[84] Less acknowledged but still found in OSS work is the concept of historicity.[85] For Giddens, two conditions of modernity are responsible for the 'use of history to make history'.[86] The first is literacy and the development

[77]For excellent overviews of the pluralistic debates taking place, see Catarina Kinnvall and Jennifer Mitzen, 'An introduction to the Special Issue: Ontological securities in world politics', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 52:1 (2017), pp. 3–11; Catarina Kinnvall, Ian Manners, and Jennifer Mitzen, 'Introduction to the 2018 Special Issue on European security: "Ontological (in)security in the European Union"', *European Security*, 27:3 (2018), pp. 249–65.

[78]Stuart Croft, 'Constructing ontological insecurity: the insecuritization of Britain's Muslims', *Contemporary Security Policy*, 33:2 (2012), p. 223.

[79]Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations* (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 20.

[80]Jennifer Mitzen, 'Ontological security in world politics: State identity and the security dilemma', *European Journal of International Relations*, 12:3 (2006), pp. 342–70.

[81]Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 61. The referent of critical situations has received special treatment in recent ontological security studies. See, in particular, Filip Ejdus, 'Critical situations, fundamental questions and ontological insecurity in world politics', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 21:4 (2018), pp. 883–908.

[82]Jutta Weldes, 'The cultural production of crises: U.S. identity and missiles in Cuba', in Jutta Weldes *et al.* (eds), *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

[83]Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 243.

[84]See Felix Berenskoetter, 'Parameters of a national biography', *European Journal of International Relations*, 20:1 (2014), pp. 262–88; Jelena Subotić, 'Narrative, ontological security, and foreign policy change', *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 12:4 (2016), pp. 610–27; Catarina Kinnvall, 'Globalization and religious nationalism: Self, identity, and the search for ontological security', *Political Psychology*, 25:5 (2004), pp. 741–67; Ayşe Zarakol, 'Ontological (in)security and state denial of historical crimes: Turkey and Japan', *International Relations*, 24:1 (2010), pp. 3–23.

[85]Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations*, p. 18; Alanna Krolikowski, 'State personhood in ontological security theories of international relations and Chinese nationalism: a sceptical view', *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 2:1 (2008), pp. 109–33.

[86]Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*, pp. 199–203.

of the printing press.[87] The second is the importance of electronic communication that made the retrieval of information and, in turn, everyday meanings possible. According to Giddens, these two trends spur agents to use history to create and maintain ontological security. In short, historical ties reduce the anxiety and fears produced by critical situations.[88]

Championing a complex understanding of CSH, however, opens up four new lines of inquiry for OSS scholars interested in historicity. First, it reminds us that the process of narrating history is *an expression of agency* that transcends a singular level of analysis or socialisation. As Friedrich Kratochwil notes, 'while history cannot be the "teacher" of all things practical, the critical reflection on our historicity is an indispensable precondition for grasping our predicament as agents'.[89] Second, adopting a CSH lens allows us to appreciate that 'history' itself is an actant, a collective force exerting pressure upon individuals and groups. This assertion requires some clarification since 'agency' is typically assumed to be both the property and outcome of *human action*. At the broadest level, 'we need to start theorizing … assemblages of non-human and human actants'.[90] Agency thus needs to be considered 'not just in terms of human or intersubjective intentionality … but as a kind of *emergent swarm effect*'.[91] This effect is similar to what we speak of when referring to how the 'weight' of the 'past' influences the present. The core point is not to occlude the role of humans. What it does mean is that the long-lasting consequences of our actions in any moment can be judged by history. This is the background against which the trail of former Bosnian Serb commander Ratko Mladić should be seen, although some years on the ground has shifted fundamentally.[92]

Third, OSS focuses on the ways in which insecurity is generated by a whole host of factors not all connected to 'conventional' security stories. Just like its ability to order a social world that seems chaotic and beyond our control, narratives (including master narratives) help to order a past that seems endless and infinite in its details and trajectories. Ontological insecurity about the present can thus be attended to through a connection to the past. Fourth, and related, OSS calls our attention to the *politics of identity* involved in the making of history, and why the dynamics of causal narratives regarding *specific historical events* is about more than 'just' those events. To begin, they are about narrating a past Self as an aspirational one. As Steele noted, 'historical narratives function to order and routinize the Self of individuals and collectives'.[93] In doing so, they can, 'paper over particular urges. These urges can be ever-so-slightly revealed when narratives are disturbed, including emotional drives connected to notions of revenge and lost honor.'[94]

Taking all of these points into consideration, a CSH approach drawn from OSS has to not only be aware of the importance of narratives for all agents who engage them for organising the past in the context of a security-seeking present. It also has to acknowledge recent critiques that have emerged within ontological security studies over problems of narration.[95] First, narratives are

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[87]Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1983).

[88]Brent J. Steele, 'Ontological security and the power of self-identity: British neutrality and the American Civil War', *Review of International Studies*, 31:3 (2005), p. 526.

[89]Friedrich Kratochwil, 'History, action and identity: Revisiting the "second" great debate and assessing its importance for social theory', *European Journal of International Relations*, 12:1 (2006), pp. 20–1.

[90]Alexander D. Barder, 'Neo-materialist ecologies and global systemic crises', *Globalizations*, 13:4 (2016), p. 399.

[91]Ibid., p. 407, emphasis added.

[92]Ratko Mladić was found guilty at the United Nations-backed international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague of ten offences involving extermination, murder, and persecution of civilian populations. See The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 'ICTY Convicts Ratko Mladić for Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity' (2017), available at: {http://www.icty.org/en/press/icty-convicts-ratko-mladi%C4%87-for-geno-cide-war-crimes-and-crimes-against-humanity} accessed 21 September 2018.

[93]Steele, 'Critical Security History and Hiroshima', p. 306.

[94]Ibid., p. 305.

[95]See Chris Rossdale, 'Enclosing critique: the limits of ontological security', *International Political Sociology*, 9:4 (2015), pp. 369–86; Christopher Browning and Pertti Joenniemi, 'Ontological security, self-articulation and the securitization of identity', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 52:1 (2017), pp. 31–47.

exclusive not only of the events that they select against others, but also of the others against which the narrative finds its political power. Will K. Delehanty and Brent J. Steele have pointed out the importance of gender in the constitution of biographical narratives of political communities. Chris Rossdale goes further, suggesting that the 'contiguous and stable narratives of selfhood, can (violently) obscure the ways in which such narratives are themselves implicated in power relations'.[96] Elsewhere Nick Vaughan-Williams has called for a 'hauntological security' approach, 'that pays keen interest in what is left out, unsaid, excluded, and/or undermined in service of claims made to secure a biographical narrative of the self'.[97] This requires looking into how 'fixing a certain understanding of the past and defending it may take the form of active forgetting and/or remembering'.[98]

CSH opens up a striking way for these recent critiques within or against OSS to gain continual momentum, especially the recent attempts to problematise the notion of a coherent 'Self' being possible in the first place.[99] While OSS scholars simplify the link between ontological security and history to biographic narratives and routines, CSH calls attention to some of the broader 'stakes' of those links. Building on the previous sections, it seeks to highlight the importance of reinstating the fine line between who speaks and who is silenced. Some of the work on vernacular security is already making progress in this direction,[100] demonstrating the ways in which 'political discourses' can 'disrupt dominant understandings of threat and insecurity'.[101] Building on these conversations, the next section provides some ways to 'do' Critical Security History.

How to 'do' Critical Security History: an illustration of 'engaged historical amateurism'

So far this article has highlighted that securitisation and ontological security scholars could benefit from engaging with a CSH approach. But what about the actual 'doing' of CSH? How can scholars, students, and everyday people 'do' this type of work? On the surface, CSH appears to leave us with several dilemmas. The first pertains to the near impossibility of studying historical narratives 'critically' when they are always incomplete and in the process of becoming. The second hinges on methodological challenges pertaining to where and how this kind of work should be done. Of course, as scholars, we would focus on the practicing CSH in our studies. However, in reality, it can be 'done' almost *anywhere*.

Although this article does not attempt to overcome these dilemmas, we believe that CSH is still a useful approach in thinking about how to address them. As previous sections have already shown, the role of history forces us to pay closer attention to the ambiguities, inconsistencies, and uncertainties that constantly reside in and shape an array of narratives. This awareness is already critical. In another way, it nudges those interested in 'doing' CSH to unapologetically embrace pluralistic methodologies and multidisciplinary outlooks.[102] Following Claudia

[96]Rossdale, 'Enclosing critique', p. 369.

[97]Nick Vaughan-Williams, 'Border (In)Securities, "Regular" Populations, and the Mediterranean Crisis: The Vernacular, the Everyday, and the Ontological', paper presented at the ISA Convention, Atlanta, Georgia, US (16–19 March 2016), p. 26.

[98]Bahar Rumelili, 'Breaking with Europe's pasts: Memory, reconciliation and ontological insecurity', *European Security*, 27:3 (2018), p. 289.

[99]Charlotte Epstein, 'Who speaks? Discourse, the subject and the study of identity in international politics', *European Journal of International Relations*, 17:2 (2011), pp. 327–50.

[100]See, for example, Nils Bubandt, 'Vernacular security: the politics of feeling safe in global, national and local worlds', *Security Dialogue*, 36:3 (2005), pp. 275–96; Nick Vaughan-Williams and Daniel Stevens, 'Vernacular theories of everyday (in)security: the disruptive potential of non-elite knowledge', *Security Dialogue*, 47:1 (2016), pp. 40–58; Georg Löfflmann and Nick Vaughan-Williams, 'Vernacular imaginaries of European border security among citizens: From walls to information management', *European Journal of International Security*, Online First (2018), pp. 1–19.

[101]Ibid., p. 40.

[102]See, for example, Roland Bleiker, 'Multidisciplinarity', in Xavier Guillaume and Pinar Bilgin (eds), *Routledge Handbook of International Political Sociology* (New York: Routledge, 2017), pp. 319–27; Roland Bleiker, 'Pluralist methods for visual global politics', *Millennium*, 43:3 (2015), pp. 872–90.

Aradau, Jef Huysmans, Andrew Neal, and Nadine Voelkner we would advise people not to rush to define what a method is before they use it.[103] Ultimately each actor who uses a CSH approach will have to be reflexive enough to acknowledge that 'all methods are in a sense historical'.[104] In this respect, we find that Halvard Leira's advice to embrace a 'spirit of engaged amateurism in dealing with history'[105] provides a vitally important sensibility for pursuing CSH. Applied here, amateurism is recognition that we are more equipped than we realise to engage history as a social, and even collegial, activity.

In no particular order, we would suggest three entangled steps for 'doing' CSH. These steps would include, first, finding the master narrative being invoked/evoked. This is perhaps the most straightforward step. Nevertheless, it still requires careful documentation and/or citation and reflexive analysis on the part of the actor. On a constant basis they must ask, is this the 'only story' that could be told about the event in question?[106] In the first instance, discourse analysis, oral histories, and ethnography may provide useful methods for identifying and unpacking the master narratives and the dominant themes that emerge wherever they reside.

A related step is to try establish the particular causal factors 'at play' in the master narrative.[107] Interpretivist 'process-tracing' appears to be a suitable beginning point to investigate the powerful role of causal claims in securitised realms.[108] Care must be taken here. Let us recall, the goal of CSH is not to establish causality or determination per se. The goal is to examine how causal narratives persuade people that certain historical events happened in a certain way. What follows is the daunting task of discovering how this happened. This step is difficult. Master narratives maintain a seemingly concrete authority. By extension, it is likely that doing CSH will involve travelling 'through a winding path that touches on core issues related to memories, with many side trails and detours'.[109] However, the third step is to remain alert to fissures that are always possible in these master narratives once we travel down these winding paths.[110] Importantly, routinised and ritualised security-seeking actions and relationships can be disturbed precisely *because* they have gone unquestioned for so long, lacking a type of flexibility and adaptability in the face of questioning.

The 2012 Sarajevo Red Line is a good illustration of the complexity of trying to 'do' CSH. To commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the start of the Bosnian War, 11,541 empty red chairs were carefully placed in 825 rows on Titova Street in Sarajevo to create a 'red river'[111] seen in the Figures 1 and 2 below.[112] The installation, designed by Haris Pašoviü, was dedicated to the

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[103]This mistake is one of the reasons why this article does not pretend to provide a ready-made CSH method. We feel very strongly about defending the reflexive ethos CSH seeks to embody. For further insights, see Claudia Aradau, Jef Huysmans, Andrew Neal, and Nadine Voelkner, *Critical Security Methods: New Frameworks for Analysis* (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 1–23; Claudia Aradau and Jef Huysmans, 'Critical methods in International Relations: the politics of techniques, devices and acts', *European Journal of International Relations*, 20:3 (2014), pp. 596–619.

[104]Halvard Leira and Benjamin de Carvalho, 'History', in Guillaume and Bilgin (eds), *Routledge Handbook of International Political Sociology*, p. 290.

[105]Leira, *International Relations Pluralism and History*, pp. 23–31.

[106]Ibid., p. 54.

[107]Albert S. Yee, 'The causal effects of ideas on policies', *International Organization*, 50:1 (1996), pp. 69–108.

[108]Guzzini, 'Securitization as a causal mechanism', p. 338. For a more conventional approach to causal tracing, see Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'Tracing causal mechanisms', *International Studies Review*, 8:2 (2006), pp. 362–70. On context-specific methods, see Amir Lupovici, 'Constructivist methods: a plea and manifesto for pluralism', *Review of International Studies*, 35:1 (2009), pp. 98–215.

[109]Elizabeth Jelin, 'State repression and the struggle for memory', *Open Democracy* (2006), available at: {https://www.open-democracy.net/arts/jelin_3891.jsp} accessed 24 September 2018.

[110]Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*, p. 54.

[111]See Michela Bassanelli, Viviana Gravano, Giulia Grechi, and Gennaro Postiglione, *Beyond Memorialization: Design for Conflict Heritage* (Politecnico di Milano, Department of Architecture and Urban Studies; REcall Book, 2014), p. 14, available at: {https://re.public.polimi.it/retrieve/handle/11311/961621/40484/6_Recall_Book_Bassanelli.pdf} accessed 30 September 2018.

[112]Alan Taylor, '20 years since the Bosnian War', *The Atlantic* (2012), available at: {https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2012/04/20-years-since-the-bosnian-war/100278/} accessed 10 February 2017.

Figure 1. Titova Street, Sarajevo, 2012. Photo by Dado Ruvic, Reuters.

Sarajevo citizens killed during the 1992–6 siege of their city.[113] Each red chair was there to symbolise a life lost during the siege. Poignantly, 'a teddy bear, toys, and schoolbooks were placed on the smaller ones that symbolize the hundreds of children killed during the four-year siege by Serbian forces'.[114]

This temporary installation illustrates the inherent difficulties of leaving what happened 'then' in the past. As Katelyn E. Giovannucci writes, 'Red plastic chairs seem so simple, but 11,541 of them can be overwhelming. A stage full of performers also seems ordinary, but the fact that they are playing to a dead audience is anything but that.'[115] What is equally apparent in this particular case is how older securitisation stories and biographic narratives are passed down from one generation to the next. These active processes of collective (re)telling reaffirm that desecuritisation is difficult to achieve. For example, although the installation presented an opportunity to commemorate those who had died, the effects made it difficult to ignore the issues of trauma, loss, and victimhood it raised.

Trying to remember what happened in the streets of Sarajevo complicates any attempts to split securitising and desecuritising plotlines or determine what counts as a 'prior' experience. In reality, we cannot rule out the possibility this space may always contain securitised stories even if they change over time. Put differently, peace and war may have to coexist awkwardly. This may make us uncomfortable. It is not the typical way we have been socialised into thinking about peace, (de)securitisation, or ontological (in)security. However, this article has already shown that memory, securitisation, and historicity intersect in ways that does not guarantee stability. Their interrelationship is ambiguous precisely because no guidelines exist a priori.

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[113]Katelyn E. Giovannucci, 'Remembering the victims: the Sarajevo Red Line memorial and the trauma art paradox', *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, 4:9 (2013), p. 449.

[114]Andrew Cooke-Welling, 'Genocide is a neglected area of criminological inquiry', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 23:4 (2012), p. 69.

[115]Giovannucci, 'Remembering the victims', p. 449.

Figure 2. Titova Street, Sarajevo, 2012. Photo by Dado Ruvic, Reuters.

Adopting a CSH perspective, it is important to acknowledge what we do not see or hear in these images. To be sure, 'the photograph provides a quick way of apprehending something and a compact form for memorizing it'.[116] In contexts like Bosnia, however, they also have the potential to perpetuate threat perceptions and ontological insecurity. Rather than trying to run away from this reality, CSH allows for the possibility that these images will affect certain groups and individuals in different ways and at different times. Other questions also arise. What do these images tell us about the conflict? Whose stories do they tell? Whose chair is missing?[117] What remains invisible in these snapshots? Do they allow us to access the soundscape of the choir, classical music, and 750 school children singing during this commemoration? Did this commemoration create reconciliation and desecuritisation? Time should be dedicated to answering these questions in the classroom, conference, and everyday sites. More broadly, we need to be realistic enough in these conversations to realise that these images can only ever attempt to convey a snapshot of a much larger picture that we may never fully know, see, feel, or touch.

On some level, CSH provides security scholars with a way to address this reality. It opens a pathway for histories, identities, and memories to remain insecure. From a linguistic perspective, this approach acknowledges that speech acts and (de)securitisation can empower certain speaker while diluting the voice of others.[118] Equally, it confronts the question of silence from another angle. As notes Jay Winter, imagery can (and frequently does) escape the confines of written language. The Sarajevo Red Line is a strong example of how visuals demand attention.[119] Perhaps,

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[116]Susan Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others* (London: Penguin, 2004), p. 19.

[117]Adopting a CSH perspective, it is plain that missing people are not seen or represented in this installation. See Janine Natalya Clark, 'Missing persons, reconciliation and the view from below: a case study of Bosnia-Hercegovina', *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 10:4 (2010), pp. 425–42. See also Jenny Edkins, *Missing: Persons and Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011).

[118]This topic has started to inform a recent conversation taking place in securitisation studies. See Claudia Aradau, 'From securitization theory to critical approaches to (in)security', *European Journal of International Security*, 3:3 (2018), pp. 300–05; Sarah Bertrand, 'Can the subaltern securitize? Postcolonial perspectives on securitization and its critics', *European Journal of International Security*, 3:3 (2018), pp. 281–99; Lene Hansen, 'The Little Mermaid's silent security dilemma and the absence of gender in the Copenhagen School', *Millennium*, 29:2 (2000), pp. 285–306; Xavier Guillaume, 'How to do things with silence: Rethinking the centrality of speech to the securitization framework', *Security Dialogue*, Online First (2018), pp. 1–17.

[119]Giovannucci, 'Remembering the vcctims', p. 450.

however, we need to take this idea further. On a deeper level, this memorial reflects that history has a mysterious ability to stir up emotions that transcend any singular medium, time, or place. Viewed in this way, the Sarajevo Red Line offers us a glimpse into a different kind of storytelling, one that is open to contestation as much as causation. As the ReCall project has already stated, 'this points to the need for every individual to take critical responsibility … for envisioning new ways of handling painful places and stories'.[120] For us, adopting a CSH approach may provide one stepping stone in that direction.

Continued and continual CSH conversations

Security and history are topics that people will perennially encounter. Despite our best efforts, we cannot leave either of them behind. Evidently, the end of the Cold War continues to shape disciplinary debates in security studies and public perceptions of fear in ways that are hard to measure. As John Gerard Ruggie argues, 'the year 1989 has already become a convenient historical marker … to indicate the end of the postwar era'.[121] Reflecting on how the 'war on terrorism' was constructed, Richard Jackson also suggests that this phrase has become 'accepted as part of the way things naturally are and should be'.[122] Throughout this article, we have shown that such master narratives help to ensure ontological security, routines, and identities. As such, they often 'become a powerful tool for authorities as well as other social groups to preserve certain memories and conceal others'.[123]

Our aim in this article has been to develop a CSH approach that can question master narratives. We can see from the example of the Bosnian conflict that there is no automaticity in how security stories are told or remembered. This gives us room to unsettle and potentially transform the engrained assumptions about well-known historical events. At the same time, we have been careful not to leapfrog over the question of causality altogether. CSH openly acknowledges that reified, routinised, and ritualised narratives have 'fostered certainty about how one could define, prosecute and win future conflicts'.[124] Given that causal narratives play an important role in developing that certainty, it is not enough to simply try to substitute one cause with another cause or foreground agency.

This focus has broader implications for security studies. In the first instance, this article adds substantially to our understanding of securitisation and ontological security studies. By foregrounding the powerful role that history continues to play in the social construction of threats fear, we contributed to recent efforts to frame (de)securitisation as an ongoing process with no clear beginning or ending. Rather than assuming that actors can successfully close one securitisation story or split simultaneous (de)securitising moves, we need to be vigilant and open-minded when it comes to placing ambiguity rather than causality at the centre of discussions about ritualised histories, commemorations, and contexts.

An additional promise we have identified in this article is the ability of CSH to unsettle biographic narratives and identities that hold special significance because they offer a 'useable past'.[125] In this respect, it can contribute to recent trends in OSS to investigate the history,

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[120]Bassanelli *et al.*, *Beyond Memorialization*, p. 16.

[121]John Gerard Ruggie, 'Territoriality and beyond: Problematizing modernity in International Relations', *International Organization*, 47:1 (1993), pp. 139–74.

[122]Richard Jackson, *Writing the War on Terror: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), p. 2.

[123]Sarah H. Awad, 'Document a contested memory: Symbols in the changing city space of Cairo', *Culture & Psychology*, 23:2 (2017), pp. 234–54.

[124]Barbara J. Falk and Paul T. Mitchell, 'The last good war?: the lingering impact of World War II epistemology and ontology in conflict and popular culture', *Critical Studies on Security*, 3:3 (2015), p. 291.

[125]Dmitry Chernobrov, 'Ontological security and public (mis)recognition of international crises: Uncertainty, political imagining and the Self', *Political Psychology*, 37:5 (2016), p. 385.

memory, and emotions via the concept of nostalgia.[126] Our analysis has also shown that CSH opens up a way for more research to be done on the concept of historicity. This connects to recent attempts in OSS to problematise the notion of a coherent 'Self' being possible in the first place.

It also seems quite clear that a fuller understanding of CSH necessitates cultivating 'a spirit of engaged amateurism'[127] that can be practiced in a wide variety of micropolitical settings. In this light, events that unfold in our research conversations with fellow scholars, students, and even strangers hold implications for exploring how master narratives are learnt, told, remembered, and challenged. Moreover, we believe that the critical security studies approaches beyond the scope this article offer versatile entry points to study and 'do' CSH in a number of relational spaces and interconnected sites. Taking this invitation seriously creates another avenue of future research; the silences that all stories produce and the (in)visibility of who is left out. To illustrate why these issues matter to CSH, it is worthwhile to return briefly to what happened and is happening in Bosnia.

Using the two photographs of the 2012 Sarajevo Red Line project, we demonstrated that history and security are interconnected in complex ways. In this context, their interplay pushes us to reconsider how justice and reconciliation can be achieved in this region. As Jasna Dragovic-Soso notes, 'the history of the failed TRC project in Bosnia holds important lessons for ongoing truth-seeking attempts'.[128] Further research needs to be carried out to uncover how past atrocities will be collectively remembered, narrated, and contested in Bosnia. Looking ahead, it is not clear whether overt practices of memorialisation will upset and discredit official attempts to narrate this conflict as something that happened in the past. Our analysis definitely speaks to a more complex story of desecuritisation and biographical continuity, one that pays tribute to the unassailable struggles over the senses of wrong and injustices produced to establish an 'official history/memory'.[129]

All of this brings us back to where we began. Quite unexpectedly, Valentin Inzko's premonitions may have come at precisely the right time. If we listen, they testify to the unmistakably difficulties of burying 'traumatic fragments that still defy narrative reconstruction and exceed comprehension'.[130] Instead of implying that a harmonious community can be restored in Bosnia, CSH endorses multivocal and multiperspectivst approaches that elide any '"policing" mentality that denotes the limitations of what is sayable or thinkable and the boundaries beyond which the unsayable lies'.[131] In this effort, we invite readers to constantly question who is narrating security stories and history in this context and elsewhere. Is it a speaker? Or an image? Or a chair? Or history itself?

[126]See Amir Lupovici, *The Power of Deterrence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 69; Mira Sucharov, 'Imagining ourselves then and now: Nostalgia and Canadian multiculturalism', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 16:4 (2013), p. 544.

[127]Leira, *International Relations Pluralism and History*, pp. 23–31.

[128]Jasna Dragovic-Soso, 'History of failure: Attempts to create a national truth and reconciliation commission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1997–2006', *International Journal of Transitional Justice*, 10:2 (2016), pp. 292–310.

[129]Elizabeth Jelin, *State Repression and the Labours of Memory* (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2003), p. 27.

[130]Marianne Hirsch, 'Postmemory', available at: {www.postmemory.net} accessed 29 September 2018.

[131]Cillian McGrattan and Stephen Hopkins, 'Memory in post-conflict societies: From contention to integration', *Ethnopolitics*, 15:5 (2017), p. 491.

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