The Impact of Economic and Cultural Cues on Support for Immigration in Canada and the United States

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In the comparative literature on immigration attitudes, Canadian public opinion tends to be viewed as an anomaly. Hostility has characterized debates about immigration in the US and many European countries (Fetzer, 2000; Lahav, 2004; Rustenbach, 2010), while attitudes toward immigration in Canada tend to be rather more positive (Adams 2007; Harell 2009; Hiebert 2006; IPSOS 2004). Debates in the US (and elsewhere) tend to focus on the threat that illegal and low-skilled workers pose to the economy, as well as the cultural threat posed (see Fetzer, 2000). Concern about cultural change is evident in Canada as well, but to a lesser degree. Credit for Canadians' more open attitudes toward immigration is typically given to Canada's official policy of multiculturalism, alongside a comparatively selective immigration system (Bloemraad, 2006; Harell, 2009; Kymlicka, 2003). Canadians' open attitudes

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are, in part, a consequence of the types of immigrants accepted as well as the context in which these immigrants integrate.

This question has become all the more salient since September 11, 2001, when issues around security and terrorism became much more prominent in discussions about immigration across Western democracies. Immigrant communities from Arab and Muslim source countries have become the target of both government surveillance and public concern. In the US, the vitriolic debate concerning the building of a mosque near ground zero reflected the ways in which security concerns have taken on a "culture wars" component, where Muslim Americans are viewed as a threat to the American way of life. In Canada, similar concerns about the cultural otherness of Muslim immigrants have emerged during the "reasonable accommodation" debates in Quebec, and the public debate over *sharia* family law in Ontario. Yet, again, we know little about how citizens distinguish between immigrants from different ethnic and religious backgrounds.

Drawing on a unique online survey experiment, this paper explores how both economic and cultural characteristics of immigrants affect public support for immigration in Canada and the US. Economically speaking, for instance, we expect that when faced directly with lower status immigrants, citizens in both Canada and the US will view them as more threatening to the economy. Canada's overall high levels of support for immigration could then be explained in part because immigrants themselves tend to be higher status. Culturally speaking, however, we expect ethnic and racial attitudes to play a relatively smaller role in Canadian citizens' evaluations of immigrants. Canada's official policy of multiculturalism and the larger policy debate about diversity in Canada may well frame immigration in a way that downplays racial threat, and hence make racial cues less salient when Canadians evaluate individual immigrants.

Results suggest that while Canadians express somewhat higher support for immigration overall, they, like Americans (and citizens in other countries as well), express a distinct preference for higher status immigrants. That said, Canadians (at least outside Quebec) seem relatively unaffected by the ethnic manipulations examined here (South Asian versus Middle Eastern), while in the US there is a clear preference for Hispanic rather than Middle Eastern immigrants. In neither context do we find a meaningful effect for the complexion (light skin versus dark skin) of individual immigrants. Before exploring these results, however, we review the related literatures below.

Support for Immigration Cross-nationally

Comparative research provides a rich array of findings related to how citizens react to immigration (which is to say that there is a good deal

Abstract. Past research suggests that citizens' attitudes toward immigration are driven by perceptions of immigrants' (a) economic status and (b) ethnicity. In this study, we use an online survey conducted with a representative sample of Canadians to test to what extent economic and cultural cues influence support for individual immigrants. In particular, by drawing on a parallel US survey, we explore whether Canadians' relatively unique (positive) attitudes toward immigration make them more immune to economic and cultural threat manipulations than their American counterparts. The analysis is based on an experimental design embedded in a series of immigrant vignettes that vary the ethnoracial background and social status of an individual applying for immigration. We examine overall support for immigration, as well as the extent to which both ethnic and economic status cues affect support for individual immigrants. We also explore variance within Canada, specifically, in Quebec versus the rest of the country. Results offer new and unique information on the structure of attitudes on diversity and immigration in Canada. Most importantly, they suggest the relative importance of economic cues in support for immigration in both countries.

Résumé. Divers travaux de recherche ont suggéré que les attitudes des citoyens au sujet de l'immigration sont influencées par leur perception (a) du statut économique et (b) de l'ethnie des immigrants. Afin de tenter de savoir jusqu'à quel point les informations socioéconomiques et culturelles ont effectivement un impact sur le soutien des citoyens envers les immigrants, la présente étude fait usage d'un sondage mené en ligne avec un échantillon représentatif de la population canadienne. En nous appuyant sur un sondage américain similaire, nous cherchons plus précisément à savoir si l'attitude (positive) relativement unique des Canadiens vis-à-vis de l'immigration les rend moins susceptibles d'être manipulés par l'évocation de menaces économiques et culturelles que leurs voisins américains. Notre analyse se fonde sur une expérience utilisant une série de vignettes qui modifient les caractéristiques ethnoraciales ainsi que le statut social d'un individu procédant à une demande d'immigration. Nous examinons non seulement le soutien pour l'immigration en général, mais aussi la mesure dans laquelle les informations relatives à l'ethnie et au statut économique d'un immigrant affectent le soutien que les citoyens lui offrent. Nous étudions aussi la variance à l'intérieur du Canada, plus spécifiquement entre le Québec et le reste du pays. Les résultats ainsi obtenus fournissent de l'information nouvelle et unique ayant trait à la structure des attitudes par rapport à la diversité et l'immigration au Canada. De surcroît, ces résultats suggèrent le rôle relativement important que jouent les informations d'ordre socioéconomique dans le soutien de l'immigration tant aux États-Unis qu'au Canada.

of variation in both approaches and findings). There are, however, several points of convergence. One is that publics across the Western world tend to express a desire for less immigration; relatedly, anti-immigrant sentiment has generally been on the rise (Citrin and Sides, 2008; Esses et al., 1998; Fetzer, 2000; Kinder and Kam, 2009; Rustenbach, 2010; Segovia and Defever, 2010; Simon and Lynch, 1999). Another is that the underlying predictors of individual attitudes toward immigration are similar across developed countries (see Citrin and Sides, 2008). The main explanatory factors are related to the threat that new immigrants pose to the host society. The threat can be (a) economic, that is, taking away jobs from natives or being an economic drain on the welfare system, or (b) cultural, that is, culturally, religiously or ethnically distinct groups that threaten the identity of the dominant group (Valentino et al., forthcoming).[1]

Immigration and Economic Threat

Economic threat arguments draw mainly on group conflict theory (Blumer, 1958; Key, 1949; LeVine and Campbell, 1972), the basic idea of which is that negative outgroup attitudes—in this case, of natives toward newcomers—are typically the result of fear of increased competition for scarce resources like jobs and government benefits (Esses et al., 1998).

Economic threat hypotheses have been investigated at both the macro and individual level. At the macro level, the state of the economy appears to have an effect on immigration attitudes. When the economy is doing poorly, citizens are more hostile toward immigrants because competition for scarce resources is greater. This seems particularly true as the size of the immigrant community increases.[2] Quillian (1995) finds support for this argument in the European context, for instance. Other research finds similarly negative relationships between the state of the economy, levels of immigration and anti-immigrant attitudes in Europe (Aksoy, 2011; Coenders et al., 2008; Meuleman et al., 2009), in the United States (Lapinsky et al., 1997; Citrin et al., 1997; Lee and Ottati, 2002), and in Canada (Palmer, 1996; Wilkes et al., 2008).[3]

Individual-level evidence is more mixed. One expectation is that citizens who are in direct competition for jobs with immigrants will express greater hostility toward immigrants. Existing research suggests that those with less education do tend to be more hostile toward immigration (Chandler and Tsai, 2001; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001), and voting for anti-immigrant parties also tends to be concentrated among the lower income classes (see Lubbers et al., 2002).[4] Yet, substantial research suggests that an individual's personal economic situation is unrelated to immigration attitudes (see, for example, Citrin and Sides, 2008; Citrin et al., 1997; Fetzer, 2000; McLaren and Johnson, 2007). Direct tests of labour market competition (that is, between economically similar citizens and immigrants) find little support for this argument (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007).

Perceived competition for jobs may be less important than assessments of immigrants' socio-economic status, especially as it relates to their successful involvement in the labour market and their potential reliance on social welfare programs. Economic factors appear to affect all citizens (Citrin et al., 1997; Wilkes et al., 2008) and *all* citizens tend to prefer higher-skilled immigrants, regardless of their personal situation (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; O'Connell, 2011). Furthermore, when the institutional context makes social welfare services easier to obtain, hostility is greater (Hanson et al., 2007; see also Dustmann and Preston, 2007; Facchini and Mayda, 2009). In short, this version of the economic threat argument focuses on the threat low-income immigrants pose to

the health of the larger economy, rather than to individual workers. That is, it may not be direct *economic threat* that matters, but perceived *fiscal burden*.

Neither the direct labour market competition nor the fiscal burden argument is entirely consistent with the evidence. What is clear is that low-skilled citizens tend to be particularly hostile towards immigration, especially low-skilled immigration (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). This may be because they are more prone to view immigrants as more likely to take away their jobs (Palmer, 1996) or because they view immigration as a greater threat to the welfare state on which they rely more heavily. In either case, both the economic situation of the individual and of the immigrant appear important in understanding immigration attitudes.

Immigration and Cultural Threat

Drawing on both the symbolic politics literature (Kinder and Sears, 1981) and social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1986), cultural threat arguments focus on cultural, ethnic and religious differences between the host society and immigrant communities. Immigration, from this perspective, is viewed as a policy domain that fosters citizens' thinking in terms of "us" versus "them." How the "us" and "them" is defined is then vastly important for the support that immigrants receive because it activates psychological processes that lead one to valorize one's community and negatively stereotype the outgroup (Sniderman et al., 2000). When differences are seen to be greater, so is outgroup hostility. When immigrant communities are viewed as more culturally similar, they are more likely to be accepted by the host society.

When it comes to immigration, new communities are often seen as culturally, ethnically and racially distinct, and so it should be no surprise that measures of ethnocentrism and racism are important predictors of immigration attitudes (Berry et al., 1977; Burns and Gimpel, 2000; Jackson et al., 2001; Kinder and Kam, 2009; Pettigrew, 1998). The extent to which ethnocentrism applies across immigrant groups, however, is debated. For example, Sniderman and colleagues (2000) find little difference in Italians' attitudes toward African versus Eastern Europeans, suggesting that "other" status is more important than the differences among outgroups. Dustmann and Preston (2007), on the other hand, find that racial prejudice only matters for immigrant populations that are ethnically different from the host population. Brader and colleagues (2008) find that ethnic cues matter a great deal because when stigmatized groups are cued in relation to immigration, they illicit negative emotional responses.

Religion is another factor that influences popular conceptions of national identity as well as evaluations of the cultural proximity of immigrant communities, both of which are related to support for immigration

(Citrin et al., 1990; Green, 2007; Green, 2009). Indeed, there is some evidence that religious differences are becoming more salient in defining immigrant communities, specifically as it relates to the place of Islamic immigrants within historically Christian host societies (Oswald, 2006; Poynting and Mason, 2007).

In general, the more that immigrants are viewed as "symbolic threats" to the host society, the more hostile citizens are expected to be toward immigration (Breton, 1999; McLaren and Johnson, 2007). Additionally, there is evidence that priming racial, ethnic and religious differences between immigrants and host societies can make racial and ethnic considerations more important predictors of immigrant attitudes (Ayers et al., 2009; Brader et al., 2008;). Thus, when citizens think of immigrants as culturally, ethnically or racially different (and when citizens themselves espouse more ethnocentric attitudes), the literature suggests that we should find greater hostility toward immigration.

The Canadian and US contexts

Immigration attitudes generally, and the salience of economic and cultural cues in particular, are very likely structured by the context in which immigration takes place, both institutionally and discursively (see, for example, Coebanu and Escandell, 2010; Hopkins, 2010; Schlueter and Davidov, forthcoming). The similarities, as well as differences, between Canada and the US make them particularly interesting contexts in which to explore attitudes toward immigration. Most comparative research examines differences in levels of support across countries and, as noted, Canada tends to score fairly well in contrast to the US and other countries on this measure. Our starting point is the difference in levels, but our main focus is whether the cultural and economic cues work equally well in explaining attitudes toward immigrants in these two countries. Are Canadians less susceptible to economic and cultural threat than others or is aggregate support for immigration simply a reflection that immigrants to Canada *are* less threatening?

Canada and the US are both immigrant-receiving countries, and both accept substantial numbers of immigrants each year. The Canadian foreign-born population makes up almost 20 per cent of the population (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2010), while in the US, the foreign-born population is 13 percent (US Census Bureau, 2011). There are a substantial number of new immigrants coming to each country yearly as well. In 2009, Canada accepted just over 250,000 immigrants, making up approximately .7 per cent of the population (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2010). In 2010, the US granted permanent legal status (or green cards) to just over a million individuals, roughly .3 per cent of the population (Office of Immigration Statistics, 2011).

Despite similarly large immigrant inflows, however, immigrants to the US and Canada differ considerably in terms of source countries. In Canada, 58 per cent of immigrants arriving between 2001 and 2006 were from Asian countries, including the Middle East. While China is the most common source country (14% of recent immigrants), South Asian countries also make up the second, third and fourth most common source countries (Statistics Canada, 2007: 10). In contrast, over half of the US foreign born population is from Latin America and the Caribbean, largely from Mexico, with another quarter of the foreign-born population from Asia (US Census Bureau, 2011).

Canada and the US also have quite distinctive immigration systems. Six out of 10 immigrants to Canada arrive as "economic class" citizens, with "family class" citizens making up the second largest group at around 25 per cent (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2010: 7). Economic class citizens are evaluated using a point system that values education and job experience, as well as ties to the country. The result has been a highly educated and highly skilled immigrant population. In the period from 2001 to 2006, over half of new immigrants to Canada had a university degree, a proportion roughly two and a half times greater than among the Canadian-born population (Statistics Canada, 2008: 6).[5] In the US, the situation is reversed. Two-thirds of those granted permanent status in the US are either immediate relatives or sponsored by a family member, and only about 15 per cent entered on an economic stream (Office of Immigration Statistics, 2011: 18). About half of all family class immigrants in 2010 have no occupation or do not work outside the home, and only about 10 per cent worked in management or professional occupations (2011: 26). In short, the socio-economic status of immigrant streams in Canada and the US are drastically different.

Despite these aggregate-level differences, our expectations where economic threat hypotheses are concerned do not vary across the two countries. We expect citizens in both countries to prefer higher status immigrants. In Canada and the US, and indeed across the developed world, we expect the economic position of immigrants to matter to public support. If economic threat functions similarly, as we suspect, then this provides one possible explanation for higher overall support for immigration in Canada, given the relatively economic skills of its immigrants.

Cultural threat hypotheses may play out differently in the two countries, however. In the current US context, we expect immigrants of Middle Eastern descent to be seen as particularly culturally threatening in comparison to Mexicans. Many Mexicans share a Christian (and, in part, European) heritage while people of Middle Eastern descent face an increasingly hostile environment after the events of 9/11. "Race" more generally has been and continues to be a highly politicized issue in the US. In Canada, we might also expect Middle Eastern immigrants to be

seen as more culturally threatening than South Asians because they are more strongly associated with Islam. Yet, the common view of Canada as a more tolerant society suggests that cultural differences may make less difference in how citizens react to individual immigrants. Only by examining distinctions across non-white immigrants groups, which has rarely been done in the Canadian context, can we truly test this.

We might also expect interesting differences in the salience of cultural threat within Canada. Past work contrasting French and English Canadians has tended to find less favourable attitudes towards immigrants among francophones (Berry et al., 1976; Berry and Kalin, 1995; Lambert and Curtis, 1982, 1983, 2008; although see Gidengil et al., 2003). There are several possible explanations for this finding; one is that because francophones are a minority within Canada, they may feel that their identity/culture requires more protection (see, for example, Banting and Soroka, 2012).[6] Relatedly, there may be a critical tension between cultural diversity and at least some forms of ethnic Quebec nationalism.[7] Since the creation of the Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Difference (known also at the Bouchard-Taylor Commission after the commission co-chairs) in 2006 by the Quebec government, issues around immigration have been particularly salient within the province. Most notably, the commission notes that hostilities toward Muslim immigrants seem to be heightened compared to the rest of Canada (Bouchard and Taylor, 2008). We might accordingly expect some Quebecois francophones to be more sensitive to cultural (and possibly economic) threats posed by immigrants generally, and to exhibit a particular bias against the Middle Eastern immigrants.

The Experiment

We examine cultural and economic threat hypotheses using a pair of jointly fielded online survey experiments. The surveys include a representative sample of 1250 Americans and 1000 Canadians, conducted by YouGov Polimetrix in 2010. (Details of the surveys are provided in the appendix.) To make the analysis of results somewhat simpler, we look here at the impact on white respondents only (n=909 in the US, n=893 in Canada).[8]

The experimental design is based on factorial analysis (Rossi and Nock, 1982). Participants are exposed to two vignettes (short stories) that describe an individual immigrant's circumstances. (These vignettes are included in the appendix.) With each vignette, the participant sees a colour photo of the individual described in the vignette. They are then asked a series of questions about their support for that immigrant's work permit and citizenship, including:

(1) Given what you know about [candidate], do you think his application for a work permit should be approved or rejected? Approve/Reject/Can't Say

(2) Assume that [candidate] comes to Canada on a work permit and then he decides to apply for Canadian citizenship. Do you think his citizenship application should be approved or rejected? Approve/Reject/Can't Say

Preliminary tests suggest that results based on these two questions are roughly similar, though effects tend to be weaker for work permits than for citizenship, as we might expect. We focus below on citizenship exclusively, with approval coded as 1, reject as 0, and can't say as .5.

For the photos, we take advantage of morphed images to create our ethnic and complexion manipulations. Images of the fictional immigrants are created from a picture of a person of each ethnic background (South Asian, Middle Eastern and Mexican) that has been rated as "average" in terms of attractiveness. We then morph onto these faces one white and one African-American male to create the complexion manipulations. Using morphs based on pre-rated faces allows us to isolate, in large part at least, the effect that racialized appearance has on support for immigration (see, for example, Eberhardt, 2005; Goff et al., 2008).[9]

There are four treatments in total, two within-respondent treatments (that is, which vary across the two vignettes each respondent saw) and two respondent treatments (that is, which did not vary in the two vignettes the respondent saw, but did vary across respondents). Within-respondent treatments are as follows: (1) the ethnicity of the immigrant and (2) the family status of the immigrant. For ethnicity, we examine distinctions between an immigrant from Kuwait and then, in the US, a Mexican immigrant and, in Canada, a Sri Lankan immigrant. For family status, the manipulation focuses on the presence of a wife and children and the other without. Respondent treatments are: (3) the complexion of immigrants, where some respondents see lighter-skinned versions of the immigrants, and others see darker-skinned versions, and (4) the job status of immigrants, where some respondents see two skilled immigrants and others see two unskilled immigrants.

The job status of immigrants clearly speaks to the economic threat hypothesis. Family status likely does as well, though in this case the impact may go in either direction—having a family may suggest an increased financial burden, or may be a sign of stability. The other manipulations require a little more discussion. First, the ethnic manipulation relies on just two of many possible ethnic groups. The objective in using these two groups was to select an immigrant group from a region where a large number of immigrants are received (South Asia and Latin America) and one from a Middle Eastern country, in order to contrast support for an

Arab/Muslim immigrant with support for another common immigrant group in each country. The Middle Eastern focus was motivated, in part, by the contemporary salience of issues around Muslim integration in Canada and the US, and the larger "threat" that Arab countries are (at least portrayed as) posing Western societies.

The Middle Eastern country used in the study is Kuwait. It was selected because it is clearly an Arab country, but not one directly involved in current military conflicts. Sri Lanka is a rough South Asian equivalent in the Canadian context—another small country but also a significant source of immigration for Canada. Sri Lanka also bears some similarities to Mexico in the American context, insofar as Sri Lankans have been associated in the media with illegal and refugee immigration streams in Canada. Mexico is clearly the largest source country for the United States, making it an appropriate comparison group against an Arab immigrant.[10]

The complexion manipulation was used to test the possibility that either (a) darker immigrants may elicit lower levels of support or (b) the impact of ethnicity may matter more when immigrants' complexions are darker. There is a body of work suggesting that racial prejudice does not function only on the level that ingroups and outgroups matter (that is, white versus non-white) but also that complexion matters to a wide range of social, political and policy attitudes, particularly in the US context. Past research suggests that darker skinned individuals are more likely to trigger stereotypical and prejudicial attitudes associated with racial bias (see, for example, Dixon and Maddox, 2005; Gilliam et al., 1996; Gyimah-Brempong and Price, 2006; Hunter, 2005; Iyengar and Morin, 2006; Iyengar et al., 2010; Maddox and Gray, 2002; Seltzer and Smith, 1991; Terkildsen, 1993; Weaver 2009). While we do not directly compare attitudes toward ingroups and outgroups (whites versus non-whites), the complexion manipulation allows us to test a preference for lighter-skinned immigrants.

Respondents were randomly assigned to a pair of vignettes, and those vignettes were randomly ordered. Alongside the vignettes, the survey included a series of more direct questions on immigration. While not the main focus of this paper, we present results from some of these more general items in the following section. We then shift to explore attitudes toward our specific immigrants.

Attitudes toward Immigration and Immigrants

Table 1 shows mean responses to a series of general questions about immigration in each country. Question wording is included in the table, and responses were captured on a four-point scale (agree strongly, agree, dis-

TABLE 1

General Attitudes among Whites, US and Canada

	US	Canada	Prob > F
Laws make it too difficult to acquire [US/Canadian] citizenship.	0.313	0.353	***
Increasing cultural diversity in [US/Canada] due to immigration is good.	0.471	0.550	***
Immigrants have a favorable effect on the country.	0.465	0.550	***
[US/Canada] is taking in too many immigrants.[a]	0.690	0.610	***
Immigrants come to [US/Canada] to take advantage of welfare benefits.[a]	0.616	0.616	
Compared to other problems, how important is illegal immigration?[a]	0.697	0.571	***

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$. Weighted results presented for white respondents only.
[a]indicates negative items. Mean differences tested with an adjusted Wald test.

agree, disagree strongly). All variables in Table 1 are rescaled from 0 to 1, where 0 is disagree strongly and 1 is agree strongly. The first column shows means for US respondents, the second shows means for Canadian respondents, and the last column shows results from F-tests of the statistical significance of the difference between the US and Canadian results.

As suggested by previous research, Canadians tend to provide slightly more positive (and less negative) responses toward immigration than their US counterparts. This is not to say by any means that Canadians are universal in their support of immigration. For the three negative items, answers among both Canadians and Americans lean toward thinking that the countries are taking in too many immigrants, that these immigrants are taking advantage of welfare benefits and that illegal immigration is a more important problem than others. Yet, for five of the six items, mean responses are more pro-immigrant in Canada than in the US. These findings are consistent with past research which has shown that Canadians tend to be among the most pro-immigrant countries in terms of public opinion (see, for example, IPSOS, 2004).

The experiments embedded within the online survey, described in some detail above, allow us to test whether cultural and economic threat manipulations affect respondents' evaluations of individual immigrants in Canada and the US. In so doing, they provide some insight into whether Canadians are in fact more pro-immigrant than their American counterparts. We can explore differences in the impact of ethnicity across countries; we can also examine the possibility that Canadians' positive attitudes reflect the (comparatively wealthy) nature of Canada's immigrant population. Table 2 presents the mean levels of support for citizenship in each country within each of three of the treatment conditions: complexion,

TABLE 2

Mean Levels of Support for Citizenship

	US			
	High Job Status		Low Job Status	
	Hispanic	Middle Eastern	Hispanic	Middle Eastern
Dark	0.646	0.592	0.584	0.521
Light	0.675	0.610	0.555	0.508
combined	*0.631*		*0.541*	

	Canada			
	High Job Status		Low Job Status	
	South Asian	Middle Eastern	South Asian	Middle Eastern
Dark	0.708	0.667	0.574	0.572
Light	0.649	0.679	0.554	0.583
combined	*0.676*		*0.571*	

ethnicity and job status. (To simplify the table, we do not present results for the family status manipulation here, but it discussed further below.) Support is scaled from 0 to 1, where 0 is "reject" citizenship and 1 is "approve."

Higher economic status immigrants clearly receive higher scores overall than lower status immigrants in both countries. Put differently, when faced with lower skilled immigrants, both Canadians and Americans are less supportive. Consider the mean levels of support across economic status groups: combining results across the four high job-status groups, mean support for citizenship is .676 among Canadians, and .631 among Americans; across the four lower-status groups, the means are .571 and .541 respectively. The difference between Canada and the US is statistically significant across the high-income groups, and falls just below significance across low-income groups. But the differences within countries, from high- to low-status groups, are clearly significant in both cases.

In terms of complexion and ethnicity, the patterns are less consistent. In the US, we see that Hispanics are consistently preferred to the Middle Eastern candidate, regardless of job status or complexion. Differences for complexion are smaller and not statistically significant. In Canada, neither the ethnic or complexion manipulation has consistent or significant effects within status categories.

Overall, then, these results suggest that job status is an important predictor of support for citizenship in both countries and ethnicity less so. The preference for Hispanics in the US, for instance, is of a smaller magnitude than the job status effect. No clear pattern emerges in terms

of ethnicity in Canada. In both countries, the complexion manipulation is small and inconsistent.

Table 2 presents just the basic results, of course; we can examine the drivers of support for immigration in a more detailed way using relatively simple multilevel mixed-effects linear regressions. These are appropriate for this situation in which we capture the same measures for each respondent more than once, that is, twice, after each of two randomly ordered immigrant vignettes, where the vignettes are the cases clustered within individuals. The models are equivalent to repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVAs), also called a mixed-design or split-plot ANOVAs, with both between-subjects variables and within-subjects variables. The mixed-effects regression approach is somewhat more generalizable, however.[11] It also has the advantage of producing coefficients that are readily interpretable. Below, we present both (a) standard multilevel mixed-effects results, which give us a sense for the magnitude and significance of each individual variable, and (b) estimated probabilities of support for citizenship, which give us a clearer sense of the combined impact of the direct and interactive effects.

Table 3 shows results from a mixed-effects linear regression capturing all four treatment effects for the entire sample, as well as each country separately. Recall that complexion and job status are between-respondent treatments only (that is, respondents only saw either dark or light complexion and only high- or low-status job treatments), while eth-

TABLE 3

Mixed-Effects Regression Results, All Treatment Effects

	DV: Support for Citizenship					
	Combined		US		Canada	
Fixed Effects						
Complexion	−.020	(.017)	−.002	(.025)	−.039	(.025)
Ethnicity	−.041***	(.009)	−.058***	(.012)	−.023*	(.013)
Complexion * Ethnicity	.028**	(.013)	.005	(.017)	.053**	(.017)
Job Status	−.083***	(.017)	−.076**	(.025)	−.092***	(.025)
Family Status	.020**	(.009)	.008	(.012)	.033**	(.013)
Job Status * Family Status	−.027**	(.013)	−.028*	(.017)	−.024	(.018)
Country	.037**	(.017)	—		—	
Order	−.038***	(.006)	−.033***	(.008)	−.043***	(.009)
Constant	.667***	(.018)	.672***	(.022)	.698***	(.023)
Random Effects						
Respondent (StDev)	.328	(.006)	.331	(.009)	.326	(.009)
N	3598/	1802	1815/	909	1783/	893

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. Cells show coefficients from a mixed-effects regression, with standard errors in parentheses.

nicity and family status are within-respondent treatments. *Ethnicity* is coded 0 for South Asian/Hispanic and 1 for Middle Eastern, so the coefficient captures the difference moving from the former to the latter; *Complexion* is 0 for dark and 1 for light; *Job Status* is 0 for high status and 1 for low status; *Family Status* is 0 for single and 1 for family. Note that we allow here for interactions between the two economic threat variables, *Job Status* and *Family Status*, and the two cultural threat variables, *Ethnicity* and *Complexion*. (Preliminary tests suggested that there were not significant interactions between economic and cultural variables.) We also include a variable capturing the order in which vignettes were shown (*Order)*, scored 1 for the first candidate and 2 for the second, to capture the tendency for support to decrease for the second candidate.

The significant direct effect of job status is readily evident in Table 3. The coefficient for job status in the US suggests that support for citizenship is, *ceteris paribus*, 7.6 percentage points lower for manual labourers; in Canada, support is 9.2 percentage points lower. These results are made clearer still in Figure 1, which shows predicted mean levels of support across the two economic threat manipulations. What we find, in short, is confirmation that both Americans and Canadians have a strong preference for engineers and programmers over construction workers and landscapers. Moving from skilled to unskilled, support shifts downward in both the US and Canada. The impact in Canada is slightly greater, though the difference in the impact of job status across the two countries is not statistically significant.[12]

Having a family slightly increases rather than decreases support in Canada. This is evident in the significant coefficient for family status in Table 3, as well as the consistent (but small) upward shift moving from "single" to "kids" for both skilled and unskilled immigrants in the bottom panel of Figure 1. We originally thought that the presence of a family would be seen as an additional economic threat, particularly for unskilled immigrants. Results in the US, for unskilled immigrants at least, are in line with this expectation: the interaction between job status and family status suggests that the impact of family is both significant and negative for unskilled immigrants. The interaction points in this direction in Canada as well; the gain for immigrants with families is marginally less for unskilled immigrants, though the difference is not significant. Overall, the direct effect of having a family may be to suggest a degree of stability or responsibility for skilled immigrants but increased cost for unskilled immigrants. Our results are not clear on these points, however. This is an avenue for further research.

Unlike job status, measures of cultural threat do not appear to matter greatly to support for citizenship in either country. This is especially true for the direct effect of complexion, insignificant in all models. Eth-

FIGURE 1
The Impact of Job and Family Status

US

Canada

nicity does have a small negative effect in both countries, suggesting that Middle Eastern candidates receive less support for citizenship than do South Asians or Hispanics.[13] The impact of ethnicity in the US is greater than in Canada (and the difference is statistically significant at p < .05).[14] The results in the two countries, however, are not completely comparable; we are comparing Middle Eastern immigrants with South Asians in Canada and Hispanics in the US, after all, and Hispanics are arguably a more stigmatized group in the US context than South Asians are in the Canadian context. Yet, this makes our findings even more interesting. If cultural threat has the same effect in both countries, then we would expect *greater* differences in Canada if South Asians are truly a less stigmatized immigrant group than Hispanics. This is not what we find. Being from a Middle Eastern background matters more in the US, despite the fact that the comparison group is also relatively stigmatized.

The interaction between ethnicity and complexion is significant in the Canadian case, but that significance captures the fact that in the light manipulation there is somewhat greater support for the South Asian while in the dark manipulation there is somewhat greater support for the Arab. We have no particular explanation for this minor difference. And in the US, complexion does not matter at all, directly or in interaction with any other treatment.

Figure 2 makes more readily interpretable the combined effects of ethnicity and complexion. The figure shows predicted mean levels of support for citizenship across the two manipulations, in both the US and Canada. The preference for Hispanics over Middle Eastern immigrants in the US is clear in Figure 2; there are no clear effects of ethnicity or complexion in Canada.

Sources of Heterogeneity

Experimental manipulations point to the importance of job status (and to a lesser extent the presence of children), but we find less evidence for substantive differences across ethnic groups or complexion when evaluating individual immigrants. In a final test, we examine whether respondents who are more likely to be economically or culturally threatened by immigrants are more susceptible to our experimental treatments.

Recall that the fiscal burden argument suggests that citizens may view lower-status immigrants as more costly due to increased demands on government services, while the economic threat hypothesis suggests that individuals who are in direct competition with immigrants should be more hostile to them. Both hypotheses imply that threat should have a greater affect on certain citizens. For the fiscal burden argument, we might expect that those likely to bear the costs of poor immigrants, namely

FIGURE 2
The Impact of Complexion and Ethnicity

US

Canada

those in higher tax brackets, to be more affected by the job status manipulation. The second hypothesis focuses not so much on respondents' own income, but rather on a certain degree of matching between the immigrants' and participants' job statuses. We test both possibilities here.[15]

First, we test for the potential impact of fiscal burden by including a measure of participant's income in the mixed-effects model of immigrant support. The income variable is a ten-point scale for monthly household income from $1000 or less to $12,001 or more. We use this variable to divide our sample in each country into terciles. We then test for the possibility of direct and moderating effects: (1) we include binary variables equal to one for the second and third income terciles (where the first tercile is the residual category), and (2) we interact the two tercile variables with the job status treatment.

Results are shown in the top panels of Table 4. The table shows just the coefficients directly relevant to each of five hypotheses. Each is

TABLE 4

Mixed-Effects Regression Results, Sources of Heterogeneity

	DV: Support for Citizenship			
	US		Canada	
1. Fiscal Burden				
Income, 2nd tercile	−.005	(.028)	.037	(.032)
Income, 3rd tercile	.068**	(.029)	.042	(.032)
2. Fiscal Burden (interactive)				
Income, 2nd tercile	.002	(.041)	.020	(.046)
Income, 3rd tercile	.052	(.042)	.055	(.045)
Job Status	−.084*	(.041)	−.103**	(.042)
2nd tercile * Job Status	−.013	(.057)	.034	(.064)
3rd tercile *Job Status	.030	(.057)	−.026	(.063)
3. Labour Market Competition				
SES Match, Low Status	−.002	(.046)	.001	(.040)
SES Match, High Status	−.159**	(.060)	−.010	(.045)
*4. Cultural Threat (*Ethnicity)*				
Language (1=French)	.007	(.032)		
Ethnicity	−.008	(.014)		
Language * Ethnicity	−.079***	(.024)		
*5. Cultural Threat (*Job Status)*				
Language (1=French)	.038	(.043)		
Job Status	−.067**	(.028)		
Language * Job Status	−.136**	(.061)		

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. Cells show coefficients from mixed-effects regressions, with standard errors in parentheses. Full models are included in appendix, Tables 1–3.

derived from a fully specified model, that is, a model with all the variables shown in Table 3 but with the income variables added. For the sake of simplicity, however, we show just these most relevant variables in Table 4. The full models are included in the appendix, Table 2.

The first panel shows results from a model that includes just the direct impact of income terciles. Results for income suggest that participants' own income affects support for immigration. This is true in the US, at least, where the highest income tercile is about 7 per cent more likely to support citizenship, *ceteris paribus*, than the low-income tercile. There is no difference in support between the low and middle terciles. The coefficients for income terciles in the Canadian model point in the same direction, but are not statistically significant.

The second model in Table 4 (*Fiscal Burden, interactive*) shows the effect of allowing for an interaction between income terciles and job status. There are no significant effects of income in this case. Collinearity (due to interactions) reduces the stability of the income tercile coefficients; and no interactions seem to matter. Overall, then, the evidence here suggests that participants' own income matters to support for individual immigrants, but it does not condition the impact of immigrants' job status.

We test the labour market competition hypothesis by focusing on a combination of the job status treatment, and respondents' own occupation. Occupation is captured in both surveys using a nine-category variable. We derive two binary variables: first, *SES Match, High Status*, a variable equal to one for participants with (a) occupations coded as "professional or higher technical work," or "work that requires at least degree-level qualifications," and who (b) were exposed to high job-status immigrants (engineer, programmer); and second, *SES Match, Low Status*, a variable equal to one for participants with (a) occupations coded as "skilled manual work," or "semi-skilled or unskilled manual labour," and who (b) were exposed to low job-status immigrants (construction worker, landscaper). Using the two separate *SES Match* variables allows for the possibility that high-status workers react differently to economic threat than low-status workers.

Results for the SES Match variables are shown in the third panel of Table 4. (Full results are in appendix, Table 3.) The labour market competition argument suggests that all respondents should react negatively to a status-matching immigrant; that is, that both coefficients should be negative. There is, however, just one significant coefficient in the two models: compared to respondents who read a vignette of a non-status matching immigrant, high status respondents in the US appear significantly less supportive of similarly high-status immigrants. Indeed, support drops almost 16 percentage points when high-status US respondents are matched with high-status immigrants. The failure to find similarly

negative effects for low-status matching respondents, or for either group in Canada, suggests the limits of the economic threat argument. That said, this one (strikingly) significant finding requires some further analysis. It may be that high job status US citizens, less used to being faced with high job status immigrants than Canadians (due to very different immigrant flows, discussed above), react more strongly to the prospect of competition for high status jobs. This is just conjecture at this stage, however.

We do not expect the cultural threat hypotheses to vary with the income or socioeconomic status of participants. There is nevertheless one interesting possibility where the cultural treatments are concerned. Recall that the cultural threat hypothesis suggests that those of the cultural majority will feel threatened by ethnically and culturally different immigrants. We find rather weak evidence for the impact of ethnicity on white respondents, particularly in the Canadian case. But we have thus far combined anglophone and francophone Canadians; in spite of evidence (discussed above) that attitudes towards immigrants vary across the two linguistic groups. Past work suggests that as a linguistic minority, already under a certain degree of cultural threat, francophones may view immigrants as more culturally threatening than do anglophones. This may lead to reduced support for immigration overall (as has been shown in past work, for example, Berry et al.,1976; Berry and Kalin 1995; Lambert and Curtis, 1982, 1983, 2008; although see Gidengil et al., 2003); it might also mean that francophone participants are more susceptible to the cultural (and perhaps also economic) experimental treatments.

Models in the fourth and fifth panels of Table 4 explore the direct and moderating effects of language (1 = French). (Full results are in appendix, Table 4.) The fourth panel shows results for the direct effect of language, and the moderating effect of language on the ethnic manipulation. There is no significant direct effect of language; francophones are not, *ceteris paribus*, less supportive of the individual immigrants in our sample. But the ethnic manipulation does matter more for French-speaking respondents. French-speakers distinguish between South Asian and Middle Eastern immigrants and the difference is in the expected direction: namely, there is less support (about 8 percentage points less) for Middle Eastern immigrants. Indeed, introducing the language interaction reduces the main effect of *Ethnicity* to essentially zero, suggesting not just that francophone respondents distinguish more between the two ethnic groups, but that English-speaking respondents seem to make no such distinction at all.

In the fifth panel of Table 4, we also find an interaction between language and job status. In this case, everyone (English- and French-speaking) expresses a preference for higher-status applicants, consistent with our initial results. (This is evidenced by the negative coefficient for Job Status.) But the preference is much stronger among francophones.

Indeed, the coefficients suggest a 6.7 percentage-point drop in support for low job status immigrants among anglophones, and a 20.3 percentage-point drop for francophones. This is consistent with the argument that culturally threatening groups may be more sensitive to threatening cues about immigrants, both culturally (in terms of the Middle Eastern immigrant) and economically (in terms of the low-status immigrant).

Discussion and Conclusions

What do these results tell us about the role of economic and cultural threat on Canadians' and Americans' attitudes towards individual immigrants? What the experiment makes most clear is that economic factors make a significant difference in citizens' evaluation of potential immigrants in both countries. In this experiment, support for individual candidates' citizenship drops in both countries when we move from a relatively high to a relatively low job status. While income level has a direct effect on attitudes toward immigrants, however, we find no evidence that the status effect is dependent on a respondent's personal economic situation (see also Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; O'Connell, 2011). These results are in line with larger macro-economic studies suggesting that what worries citizens are the economic costs of unemployment and dependence on the welfare state more than direct competition from immigrants for jobs.

Our results also make clear that if ethnicity and skin complexion matter for citizens' evaluations of individual immigrants, they appear to do so only to a small degree. In the United States, we find a consistent but small preference for Hispanics over those from the Middle East, as we might expect given the current political climate; in the Canadian context, there are not clear differences in support across either ethnicity or complexion, except in the case of francophones.

The relative absence of any such effects in the (anglophone) Canadian context reflects what the larger comparative literature seems to suggest: Canadians tend to be, comparatively speaking, tolerant of both immigration and ethnic diversity. This is not to say that prejudicial out-group attitudes do not exist in Canada, for they certainly do (Henry and Tator, 2009). But our experiment provides little evidence that Canadians are making large distinctions across "more" or "less" desirable immigrant communities based on ethnicity or skin complexion.

This is true, at least, when we are comparing different visible minority immigrant groups. This experiment explores the extent to which Americans and Canadians distinguish between different *minority* immigrants; it does not compare attitudes on these immigrant groups to attitudes about other in-group (given our sample here, white) immigrants. Future work

will focus on these differences, and there we may see greater differences in support, and bigger differences, or perhaps bigger similarities, between Americans and Canadians.

For the time being, we know that the socio-economic status of immigrants matters. The Canadian immigration system has been both praised and criticized for its emphasis on the economic potential of immigrants; this research points to the possibility that high levels of support for immigration in Canada is bolstered by a comparatively selective Canadian system. Our study is not able to capture how this system affects the larger discourse about immigration in Canada. It is possible that the differences that we have observed between Canada and the US partly stem from the ways in which immigration has been framed in the two countries. A system that fosters high-skilled immigrants may well minimize the salience of racial cues in immigration attitudes by changing the way in which elites and the media frame the issue. This is an avenue for future research.

What is clear, though, is that individual immigrants who come to Canada with degrees in hand and contribute to the economy are the norm, not the exception. When faced with such immigrants, our research confirms that Canadians are quite positive, in fact, more positive than Americans faced with similarly described immigrants. It follows that selective immigration policy may be a critical component of high levels of support for immigration in Canada, and elsewhere as well.

Notes

1   It should be noted that beyond individual and cross-national differences in economic conditions, there is an important literature that points to the role of cross national institutional differences in public opinion toward immigration (for example, Bloemraad, 2006; Koopmans et al., 2005; Schain, 2008). The debates on this front largely point to the role that the immigration system, policies toward multiculturalism and the citizenship regime more generally play. The immigration regime is important because it determines the types of immigrants accepted into a country. While explicit entry requirements based on racial or ethnic background are a thing of the past, the emphasis that a regime puts on symbolic factors (especially language) and economic factors (education and work experience) can have a direct impact on not only the immigrants that are accepted, but also on how the media and institutions frame discourses about immigrants more generally. Citizenship regimes, as well as specific policies related to integration, are also viewed as important. In countries where citizenship is tied more closely to ethnicity, immigrants are likely to be viewed with greater hostility. For example, symbolic factors have been shown to play a greater role in explaining immigrant attitudes in Europe than in the United States (Citrin and Sides, 2008). At the same time, there is substantial debate about the role that multicultural policies play in explaining attitudes toward immigrants (see, for example, Banting et al., 2006; Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007).

2   It should be noted that some research suggests that the negative effect that the size of the immigrant community has can be moderated through actual contact between natives

and newcomers (McLaren, 2003), although contrary evidence exists, in line with the group conflict approach, that contact can promote greater competition (Ha, 2010, Oliver and Wong, 2003)

3   Two multivariate cross-national studies, however, find inconsistent effects of the macro-economic context on immigrant attitudes. See, for example, Kessler and Freeman (2005) and Rustenbach (2010).

4   Other psychological research shows that when competition for jobs is primed, respondents are more likely to attribute negative attributes to immigrant groups (Esses et al., 1998).

5   Although note that while immigrants come in with high levels of education and job skills, these economic advantages do no always translate into economic success in Canada. See, for example, a recent report by Statistics Canada (2007) that suggests that recent immigrants are more likely to work in jobs that require lower levels of education than they possess than other Canadians.

6   Note that this is reflected in the structure of language and education laws, as they pertain to immigrants in Quebec, as well as the differences between Quebec interculturalism versus Canadian multiculturalism. These themes are complex, of course, and not dealt with in detail here. See, for example, Carens, 1995; Gagnon and Iacovino, 2007; Labelle and Rocher, 2004; McAndrew et al., 2000.

7   Consider, for instance, work on immigrants' attitudes towards Quebec identity and intercultaturalism (especially Bilodeau et al., 2010, but also see, for example, Helly, 2002; Helly and van Schendel, 1995; Salée and Labelle 2001).

8   Using non-white respondents likely requires a number of additional interaction terms, since non-whites are likely to react differently to non-white immigrants than whites do.

9   For the photos used here, faces were drawn from Jennifer Eberhardt's face database (Stanford University, Psychology Dept), which includes 100 Afro and Euro faces that were rated by student judges for stereotypicality, attractiveness and age.

10 Both Kuwait and Sri Lanka have the added advantage of being important source countries for other countries taking part in the larger cross-national survey project as well.

11 In STATA, *xtmixed* also converges much more quickly then *anova* when using large sample sizes and interactions.

12 The significance of differences in coefficients across the US and Canada models is based on a separate model which interacts country with all other variables. The overall story does not change, of course, but we are able to test directly the significance of cross-country differences. Results are available upon request.

13 Note (based on the ANOVA equivalent of this regression) that the direct and indirect effects of ethnicity and complexion combined account for less than .5 per cent of the total variance in support for citizenship.

14 See note 11.

15 Note that we have also tested for university education as a moderating variable, as it may be related to both the socio-economic status of the respondent and to more cultural tolerance. In no case was there a significant interaction between having completed a university degree and any of the four manipulations (not shown).

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Appendix

Survey Information

Surveys in both the US and Canada were conducted by YouGov-PMX. YouGov uses a matching methodology for delivering online samples that mirror target populations on key demographics. The approach is described in some detail by Vavreck and Iyengar (2011). The sample for the US is in this case based directly on an existing YouGov panel. In Canada, YouGov applied their sampling techniques to panels maintained by Research Now. In both cases, the resulting demographic composition of the online sample was only slightly different from the national population based on age, gender, ethnicity, education and language. Compari-

sons of the sample with the national population are provided in appendix, Table 1.

Note that the effectiveness of the randomization of treatments was confirmed by looking at mean values for gender, age and education across treatment groups for the two across-respondent treatments (complexion and job status). In no case where there statistically significant differences between treatment and non-treatment groups.

APPENDIX TABLE 1

Survey Descriptives

		US	
		2010 Census	YouGov
Age	18–34	30.71%	24.60%
	35–54	37.01%	39.60%
	55+	32.28%	35.80%
Gender	Male	49.20%	48.20%
	Female	50.80%	51.80%
Race	White/Other	72.40%	76.80%
	Black	12.60%	11.90%
	Hispanic	16.30%	11.30%
Education	HS or less	44.76%	40.88%
	Some College	27.96%	32.88%
	College Graduate	18.01%	17.12%
	Post-graduate	9.27%	9.12%
		Canada	
		2006 Census	YouGov
Age	18–24	16.21%	9.50%
	25–34	15.39%	17.02%
	35–44	18.51%	16.40%
	45–54	19.12%	19.10%
	55–65	14.11%	17.50%
	65–74	8.80%	15.80%
	75+	7.70%	4.50%
Gender	Male	49.00%	48.90%
	Female	51.00%	51.10%
Ethnicity	White	84.71%	89.30%
	Visible Minority	15.28%	10.70%
Education	HS or less	44.76%	52.40%
	Tech School/Some College	27.69%	39.60%
	College Graduate	18.01%	12.00%
	Post-graduate	9.27%	7.80%
Language	French	21.80%	17.30%
	English/Other	78.20%	82.70%

Categories for each country are based on those readily available in the survey and in the corresponding census.

Vignettes

The four vignettes are listed below, using the immigrant from the Middle East as the example. Others are Rajan Sivamurthy from Sri Lanka and Roberto Sanchez from Mexico.

HIGH STATUS—COMPUTER PROGRAMMER
Rashid Siddiqui is a native of Kuwait. He wants to come to Canada and find a job as a computer programmer. Eventually, he would like to settle in Canada and become a Canadian citizen. He is 30 years old and lives in Kuwait City. His father is in poor health and is no longer able to work. Rajan helps pay for his parents' living expenses and for the education of his two younger brothers and one sister.

　　Rashid completed his undergraduate degree in computer science at the Kuwait University. After graduating, he worked at Polywell Computers as a quality assurance technician. He recently enrolled in an online language institute to learn English [in Canada: English/French].

HIGH STATUS—ENGINEER
Rashid Siddiqui comes from Kuwait. He would like to come to Canada to be an engineer. He would like to bring his young family to live with him and for them to become Canadian citizens. He is 28 years old and currently lives in Kuwait City. Rashid and his wife have two sons and one daughter. His parents are elderly and depend on him for financial support.

APPENDIX TABLE 2

Mixed-Effects Regression Results, Income as a Moderating Variable

	DV: Support for Citizenship							
	US				Canada			
Fixed Effects								
Income, 2nd tercile	−.005	(.028)	.002	(.041)	.037	(.032)	.020	(.046)
Income, 3rd tercile	.068**	(.029)	.052	(.042)	.042	(.032)	.055	(.045)
2nd tercile * Job Status			−.013	(.057)			.034	(.064)
3rd tercile *Job Status			.030	(.057)			−.026	(.063)
Complexion	−.003	(.025)	−.003	(.024)	−.058**	(.028)	−.058**	(.028)
Ethnicity	−.059***	(.012)	−.059***	(.012)	−.013	(.015)	−.013	(.015)
Complexion * Ethnicity	.005	(.017)	.005	(.017)	.048**	(.021)	.048**	(.021)
Job Status	−.078***	(.025)	−.084*	(.041)	−.101***	(.028)	−.103**	(.042)
Family Status	.008	(.012)	.008	(.012)	.033**	(.015)	.003*	(.015)
Job Status * Family Status	−.028*	(.017)	−.028*	(.017)	−.019	(.021)	−.019	(.021)
Order	−.033***	(.008)	−.033***	(.008)	−.038***	(.011)	−.038***	(.011)
Constant	.653***	(.028)	.656***	(.032)	.687***	(.034)	.689***	(.034)
Random Effects								
Respondent (StDev)	.330	(.009)	.330	(.009)	.330	(.010)	.330	(.010)
N	1815/	909	1815/	909	1502/	752	1502/	752

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. Cells show coefficients from a mixed-effects regression, with standard errors in parentheses.

Rashid received his undergraduate degree in structural engineering at Kuwait University. After graduating, he was hired by Gulf Contractors. Following an apprenticeship, he has been working in their design department on large scale infrastructure projects. He is taking classes to learn English [in Canada: English/French].

LOW STATUS—CONSTRUCTION WORKER
Rashid Siddiqui is a native of Kuwait. He wants to come to Canada and find a job as a construction worker. Eventually, he would like to settle in Canada and become a Canadian citizen. He is 30 years old and lives in Kuwait City. His father is in poor health and is no longer able to work. Rashid helps pay for his parents' living expenses and for the education of his two younger brothers and one sister.

Rashid is a graduate of Khalifa School, a vocational high school in Kuwait City. After graduating, he held various part-time jobs including construction worker, taxi driver and house painter. He is learning English [in Canada: English/French].

LOW STATUS—LANDSCAPING
Rashid Siddiqui comes from Kuwait. He would like to come to Canada to find work in landscaping. He would like to bring his young family to live with him and for them to become Canadian citizens. He is 28 years

APPENDIX TABLE 3

Mixed-Effects Regression Results, Same Job Status as a Moderating Variable

	DV: Support for Citizenship			
	US		Canada	
Fixed Effects				
SES Match, Low Status	−.002	(.046)	.001	(.040)
SES Match, High Status	−.159**	(.060)	−.010	(.045)
Complexion	−.003	(.025)	−.039	(.026)
Ethnicity	−.059***	(.012)	−.023	(.013)
Complexion * Ethnicity	.005	(.017)	.053**	(.019)
Job Status	−.063*	(.026)	−.090**	(.028)
Family Status	.008	(.012)	.033*	(.014)
Job Status * Family Status	−.028*	(.017)	−.024	(.019)
Order	−.033***	(.008)	−.043***	(.009)
Constant	.673***	(.023)	.698***	(.025)
Random Effects				
Respondent (StDev)	.330	(.009)	.326	(.010)
N	1815/	909	1983/	893

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$. Cells show coefficients from a mixed-effects regression, with standard errors in parentheses.

old and currently lives in Kuwait City. Rashid and his wife have two sons and one daughter. His parents are elderly and depend on him for financial support.

Rashid graduated from Khalifa School, a vocational high school in Kuwait City. He has worked as a street cleaner, a farm worker and in various construction jobs. He is learning English [in Canada: English/ French] by talking regularly with his friends who speak the language.

Full results for the data shown in Table 4 are as follows.

APPENDIX TABLE 4

Mixed-Effects Regression Results, Language as a Moderating Variable

	DV: Support for Citizenship			
	US		Canada	
Fixed Effects				
Language (1=French)	.007	(.032)	.038	(.043)
Language * Ethnicity	−.079***	(.024)		
Language * Job Status			−.136**	(.061)
Complexion	−.039	(.026)	−.041	(.026)
Ethnicity	−.008	(.014)	−.023*	(.013)
Complexion * Ethnicity	.052***	(.019)	.053***	(.019)
Job Status	−.092***	(.026)	−.067**	(.028)
Family Status	.033*	(.013)	.033*	(.014)
Job Status * Family Status	−.025	(.019)	−.024	(.019)
Order	−.043***	(.009)	−.043***	(.009)
Constant	.696***	(.024)	.692***	(.024)
Random Effects				
Respondent (StDev)	.326	(.009)	.325	(.010)
N	1783/	893	1783/	893

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. Cells show coefficients from a mixed-effects regression, with standard errors in parentheses.