

steady and historically unprecedented fall in GDP and living standards. Social indicators declined in parallel; most notably, the population began to fall in 1992 and has been falling ever since. Industrial output was concentrated in even fewer factories than before; traditional industries held up better than electronics; and exports depended even more heavily than before on oil and gas. The collapse of the currency in August 1998, and of the Kirienko government, appeared to represent a final and devastating verdict on everything that had happened under the label of reform since the start of the decade.

Shliefer and Treisman are optimists, and ones who through their direct involvement in Russian events are well placed to present a plausible account from this progovernment perspective. But this is a second-edition optimism, more cautious: No longer are reforms simply bound to succeed, the question is whether they exceeded reasonable expectations and whether they were politically feasible at the time. In this reading, the reformers enjoyed some remarkable early successes, particularly the privatization of most of state industry in 1992–94. Then they outmaneuvered a coalition of speculative banks and subsidized enterprises to get inflation down to more reasonable levels in 1995. They managed to achieve these successes by winning over key opponents and marginalizing others. But after Yeltsin's reelection in 1996 the reformers encountered stiffer resistance among the industrial barons that privatization had created and among regional governors. So tax reforms slowed down, and public finances weakened.

Perhaps the leading merit of the carefully crafted analysis in *Without a Map* is the emphasis placed upon political constraints of this kind and upon the stakeholders who together constituted the proreform and antireform coalitions. There were four in particular: industrial ministries, industrial directors, workers, and regional and local governments. To run an enterprise in 1990s Russia, it was necessary to bring together most of these stakeholders, and certainly the last three (the role of industrial ministries weakened as enterprises gained the right to elect their own management). Somewhat confusingly, there were five stakeholders in the "system of federal tax collection and economic control that existed in Russia in the 1990s" (pp. 137–8): the federal government, regional governors and legislatures, local governments, enterprises, and state tax officials. Still more confusingly, "four sets of actors dominated Russia's politics in the 1990s" (p. 178): regional governments, the central political leadership, the central bank, and the powerful firms that dominated natural resource extraction.

The value of *Without a Map* lies more in the detailed exploration of the role of these stakeholders than in the larger discussion of reform. It exaggerates the extent of the changes that have occurred. Private enterprises, certainly, accounted for 88% of the total by 1998, but they were responsible for no more than one-quarter of industrial output and one-third of the workforce (mixed forms of ownership were rather more important). Privatization was in any case largely a paper transaction, given that the second and most favored option in the legislation was an employee-management buyout. Vouchers were distributed, but they brought few benefits to ordinary people, and the general view (84% in a representative U.S. Information Agency survey) was that the whole exercise had mainly benefited the mafia and members of the CPSU nomenklatura. Agriculture was little affected, and by the late 1990s no more than 2% of output came from private commercial farms.

Shliefer and Treisman were "unable to find a single study that does not show positive effects of privatization on restruc-

turing in Russia" (p. 36). Joseph Blasi and his colleagues, in a study frequently cited in *Without a Map*, conclude that managers were just as keen as their Soviet predecessors to retain state subsidies, cheap credits, and protection from foreign competition (*Kremlin Capitalism*, 1997). More recent findings suggest that privatization "failed to bring any significant change in the way Russian companies were managed" and "had very little (if any) effect on gross output and average output per employee" (Vladimir Tikhomirov, "The Second Collapse, of the Russian Economy," *Europe-Asia Studies* 52 [March 2000]: 222). There is certainly little evidence in macroeconomic performance of the dynamic effects that privatization was supposed to have had: National income plunged to half its previous level under the guidance of the reformers, investment fell even more sharply, and growing numbers of workers lost their employment.

For a political scientist, one surprise of *Without a Map* is that so little attention is given to the electoral legitimation of the policies of the Yeltsin government. The parliament, for instance, was "hostile to market reforms from the start" (p. viii), but at least it had been popularly elected, whereas Gaidar owed his position to a presidential decree. Yeltsin himself was elected in summer 1991, but with a Communist running-mate, and there was no indication that he would shortly embark upon a fundamental change in the economic and social system. There was some indication in the spring 1993 referendum that Russian voters broadly supported the new leadership and its policies, but this was after the event. Promarket reformers received little support in the elections of December 1993 and even less in December 1995. Is it surprising that there were "constraints" in implementing policies that were not approved by the Russian people at a general election and that clearly reduced many of them to destitution?

Shliefer and Treisman are impatient with the idea that there may be special countries or that Russian cultural or historical circumstances may have made a difference to economic strategy. The only conclusion is that opposition to the reformers was misconceived and often politically motivated. But the objections to the Yeltsin-Gaidar strategy—from a group of critics that included Nobel laureates—were not necessarily in terms of the Russian soul but in terms of Russian objective conditions. As James Tobin and others argued at the time, there should have been more attention to competition than privatization and a more gradual approach toward the process of change rather than a continuation of the radical measures that had led to a "deep crisis" (*Nezavisimaya gazeta*, July 1, 1996). Indeed, one wonders why the whole process is labeled reform at all; it would beg fewer questions to speak of it as the (attempted) construction of capitalism, even if the outcome was neither reform nor a functioning market economy.

Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces. By Marybeth Peterson Ulrich. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999. 292p. \$57.50.

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This relatively slim volume (187 pages of text) provides a useful and valuable guide to an often overlooked aspect of the post-Cold War international transitions: that of the vital transition of militaries from communism to democracy. Ulrich makes a good case that militaries, with their control of the instruments of violence, also need to be studied, if only because they can block or hinder the democratization pro-

cess. The literature on democratization and on civil-military relations pays little attention to the democratization of communist military. Ulrich shows that Samuel Huntington's thesis (*The Soldier and the State*, 1957) needs to be modified in that military professionalism and civilian control differ significantly between communist and democratic militaries.

Ulrich highlights well the deficiencies of traditional approaches (such as those of Huntington) that assume the military can stand aside from and be unaffected by great societal changes. She shows the critical differences between civil-military relations in democratic and communist systems as well as the importance of democratic political control and democratizing postcommunist states. In a very good table (pp. 24–5) Ulrich shows the marked differences between military professionalism in a democratic and communist state in such areas as recruitment and attention, promotion and advancement, officership and leadership, education and training, norms of political influence, prestige and public relations, and compatibility of military and societal values. Thus, democratic political control and democratic military professionalism are critical to democratic militaries that can overcome the legacies of the past.

Yet, there are difficulties with this volume. The first, and a major one from the viewpoint of comparative historical analysis, is whether the fundamental comparison of Russian and Czech cases makes sense. Both countries are on the periphery of Western Europe and underwent democratic overthrow of the communist regime, but Russia has been a great and vast power, even a superpower, whereas the Czech Republic (itself only a recent creation) has been for the most part either a smallish part of a larger empire (Hapsburg) or a relatively dependent smaller state in Central Europe. Russia made history, whereas the Czechs had history made on them. Culturally, the Czechs were an integral part of European culture, and the Russians were peripheral outsiders. Ideologically, the Russians embraced communism in the October Revolution, but the revolution in Czechoslovakia, although much more popular than elsewhere, still in 1948 relied on Russian power. On the eve of communism, Czechoslovakia in 1948 was historically one of the more advanced industrial powers in Europe (renowned for its Skoda works), whereas Russia in 1913 was an industrial laggard with high rates of illiteracy and semiliteracy.

Furthermore, there is an exaggerated emphasis on the power of exogenous factors—especially American power and influence—to transform the nature of militaries, communist or not. Ulrich argues that “the United States’ inability to overcome its own Cold War legacy as evidenced in the persistence of Cold War bureaucratic inertia accounts for much of the lack of success” of Russian and Czech military reform. She is even more explicit in laying the blame on American policy by adding: “The United States was unable to release adequate resources from its defense arsenal . . . to fund and staff sufficiently efforts to help post-Communist militaries make the ideological and organizational shifts necessary to consolidate democracy in the region” (pp. 180–1). But, by her own later statements (p. 184), “the prevalence of democratic values and expectations as evidenced in the oversight capabilities of the developing democratic institutions, the media and the society at large determined the extent of democratic political control of the armed forces.”

The United States has some influence, but institutional change, unless directed by an occupying power (as in postwar Germany and Japan, but not in the post-Cold War cases), must largely come from within a society and an institution, especially a total institution such as the Russian military. The

Soviet military was a powerful and successful institution proud of its great victories in World War II and its role in elevating the Soviet Union to global parity with the United States, space exploits, and superpower status. Democracy, as the author does mention at one point, is seen as destroying the power status, glory, and budgets of the military, whereas Marxism-Leninism brought it military glory, high budgets, and great status. Thus, even much greater American funding would have had little effect and perhaps even, coming from the triumphant enemy, a negative role in changing the Russian military.

Ulrich argues at the beginning that “the military institutions of the former Soviet bloc must overcome patterns of interaction between civilian authorities and military leaders that contrasted sharply with the norms of interaction that their Western democratic counterparts experienced” (p. 1). The problem is whether there is only one possible model for modern countries, that of the United States, or whether countries with very different levels of economic and political development and different cultures, geography, and histories can evolve in a somewhat different direction. If Japan can develop models for democracy (dominant one-party system) and capitalism (strong government role and *zaibatsu* driven), why cannot Russia create its own models that incorporate some Western notions and others compatible with deep Russian traditions and history?

Furthermore, has enough time elapsed to make a serious judgment about the two militaries? Although political scientists do not adhere to historians’ 30-year rule, Ulrich is making judgments based on less than seven years’ experience in postcommunist Russia (and even more a pre-Putin Russia) and merely ten years for the postcommunist Czech Republic (only five years in its post-Slovakia phase). At a similar point after the American Revolution, the United States (1788) still had not consolidated and was wrapping up the Articles of Confederation. Seven years after the French Revolution (1796) Napoleon had not yet appeared on the scene, and seven years after the English Revolution (1656) Oliver Cromwell was still lord protector and the restoration of Charles II was four years away. It may be too soon—and the material too fresh—to understand fully what from the viewpoint of a decade or two may be much clearer.

We do walk away with a heightened appreciation of the difficulties of the transition regimes, of the resistant power of institutions to change even in the face of failure and disaster, and especially the parlous state of the Russian military. Corruption, low morale, terrible living conditions, public disapproval, and poor battlefield competence hinder the largely untransformed army at every turn. Overall, then, this is a valuable book in achieving its goals, but other issues need to be addressed.

Confessions of an Interest Group: The Catholic Church and Political Parties in Europe. By Carolyn M. Warner. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000. 249p. \$55.00 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

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The empirical puzzle at the heart of this book is the diverging postwar behavior of the Catholic Church in France and Italy (1944–58). Why did the French church, which needed far more political help to recover lost ground after World War II, link only superficially with a political party before abandoning it altogether, whereas the Italian church, which exited