

to unreasonable standards and fail to provide effective guidance” (p. 45). Effective rules must be clear and easily understandable, but must also be practicable. Rules that are overly constraining or that require access to information that soldiers simply cannot reliably acquire in combat are likely to be ignored.

Another implication of Schulzke’s study of particular interest to just war thinkers is his finding that the fear of feeling guilty in the future leads soldiers to exercise more restraint, whether by holding fire or by choosing to expose themselves to more danger, rather than risking civilian lives. Thus, moral emotions appear to play a significant role as motivators of ethical action in the real world and, hence, are worthy of further study.

Finally, Schulzke also finds cross-national agreement that self-defense is of primary importance. Civilian protection, in practice, is often ranked as more important than combating insurgents but not as important as self-defense. This suggests that, regardless of the ethical training soldiers receive, many rank these three disparate goods in the same way: self-preservation as primary, protection of civilians as secondary, and the killing of the enemy as tertiary. Future research into the origins and robustness of this moral hierarchy could be fruitful.

In an ideal world, Schulzke might have conducted even more interviews, particularly because drawing on a random sample is not possible. However, this small methodological shortcoming should not discourage those interested in the interplay between theory and practice in the world of military ethics from reading this fascinating book. As a work probing the adequacy of military ethics training in preparing soldiers to face the intense challenges of counterinsurgency warfare, Schulzke’s book provides rich food for thought for those interested in both ethical and practical questions.

On the Brink: Trump, Kim, and the Threat of Nuclear War. By Van Jackson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. 248p. \$24.95 cloth.

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Three years of the Trump presidency have revealed a dramatic turn in the United States’ relations with North Korea from a possible nuclear collision course to the historic summit meetings with Kim Jong Un. In 2017 the United States and North Korea were dragged deep into a crash course heading for a possible nuclear exchange. In September of that year, North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear weapons test, which was allegedly a hydrogen bomb; two months later, it test-fired a Hwasong-15, an ICBM that could reach North America. Meanwhile, a war of words between Trump and Kim further heightened a sense of imminent crisis, as the two leaders provoked

each other with extreme rhetoric: “Rocket Man is on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime,” “a mentally deranged dotard,” “a lunatic old man,” and so on. North Korea’s provocation and the confrontation between the two idiosyncratic leaders took the world close to the danger of a nuclear war, a perilous moment that was comparable with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

In his book *On the Brink*, Van Jackson, previously a policy strategist in the Office of the Secretary of Defense under the Obama administration and a current academic at Victoria University of Wellington, details the danger of the US–North Korean nuclear confrontation and examines its political and historical origins. In the past decade alone, numerous books on North Korea have been published, and *On the Brink* is the most recent and up-to-date version that focuses on Trump-era US policies toward North Korea. The first two chapters explain the historical origins and evolution of North Korea’s nuclear strategy and articulate how nuclear weapons fit into Pyongyang’s long-term strategic thinking. Ensuing chapters keep track of the United States’ North Korea policies since the early Obama administration, Trump’s strategy of maximum pressure, the escalating threat of a nuclear war, and how the crisis became quickly subdued in 2018. In this midst of this narrative chapter 4 offers a counterfactual analysis to argue that Hillary Clinton’s presidency would not have been much different from Trump’s with respect to North Korea policy. The concluding chapter critically evaluates Washington’s policy approach to denuclearizing North Korea and presents policy recommendations.

Van Jackson’s book is a first-rate research product that comprehensively analyzes both North Korea’s survival strategies and Washington’s responses and how the relationship almost resulted in a nuclear war. The author suggests that, although Pyongyang’s primary goal has always been self-preservation—both state and regime security—through nuclear weapons, Kim Jong Un’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program quickly became much more dangerous than those of most other nuclear weapon states when it was combined with North Korea’s long-lasting “reputational theory of victory,” a view built on coercion and the threat of force. North Korea believes that “showing strength and resolve prevents war, while showing weakness invites war” (p. 39). Jackson suggests that a nuclear North Korea would embolden its leader to go beyond mere regime survival and to pursue more aggressive policy goals on its own terms. Moreover, the nuclear crisis quickly escalated to the point of imminent nuclear war when Donald Trump put maximum pressure on North Korea and openly threatened military operations to dismantle nuclear and missile facilities—and when Kim Jong Un flatly defied the threat with more belligerent provocations; indeed, the Trump administration put all possible options on the table from total war to a “bloody nose.” A nuclear war could have

been a possibility with a preemptive attack by the United States and North Korea's response of meeting "pressure with pressure." The highly elevated nuclear crisis suddenly cooled down after Kim Jong Un began to show restraint at the end of 2017 and expressed his desire for economic development and peace on the Korean peninsula. North Korean nuclear diplomacy quickly changed after Moon Jae-in, a progressive leader who pursued rapprochement with the North, became president of South Korea. President Moon's initiatives made possible four inter-Korean summits, three summit meetings between Kim and Xi Jinping, and the historic Trump-Kim summit in Singapore, all of which happened in 2018.

Jackson's analysis convincingly rejects the widely held belief among many scholars and policy makers that ever-tightening economic sanctions, nuclear deterrence, and the policy of maximum pressure will bring North Korea to the negotiating table and lead to ultimate denuclearization. On the contrary, he suggests that maximum pressure did not end the crisis, but indeed was the catalyst for the crisis. The author offers a realistic but politically indigestible policy recommendation that the United States abandon the unattainable short-term goal of comprehensive denuclearization and instead pursue a nuclear freeze, "arms control negotiations, diplomatic normalization, and the gradual repeal of sanctions" (p. 205). But this approach may be a politically unacceptable option for the United States, because it is unwilling to accept anything short of complete denuclearization of North Korea.

This is a rare research monograph that conducts in-depth analysis about the source of North Korea's strategic thinking, the origins and development of its nuclear weapons programs, and resulting US–North Korean confrontations. Although the main audience of the book will be intellectuals and scholars of the Korean peninsula and international security, it should be accessible to broader audiences with limited knowledge about—in but interest—in North Korea and its nuclear program.

At the same time, however, the book has one significant shortfall that requires stronger justification and additional empirical evidence: *On the Brink* does not endeavor to examine changes in Pyongyang's domestic political settings, leadership figures, and policy priorities that occurred since the end of the Cold War; instead, it makes informed guesses about "what North Korea really wants" in vague terms. One prominent point of interest is whether the possession of nuclear weapons has made North Korea's decision makers more confident and aggressive. The author argues that it has, that the bombs "embolden it to pursue revisionist foreign policy goals, including unification of the Korean peninsula" (p. 49). He even claims that there is a widely held belief among scholars and policy makers that Pyongyang will use the bombs for reunification of the peninsula and the withdrawal of US forces from the South. However, nothing in

the book presents convincing evidence for such a claim; the author only provides three citations for this assertion, two of which are from media coverage.

North Korea has possessed nuclear weapons since 2005, and its self-proclaimed policy priorities have changed over this time—from Kim Jong Il's *Songun* (military-first) policy, Kim Jong Un's *Byongjin* (dual) policy in 2013, and the economy-first policy since 2018. Moreover, the book does not explain why the nuclear crash course between Washington and Pyongyang suddenly changed; the author lists multiple possible reasons, such as Kim Jong Un's 2018 New Year's speech, Moon Jae-in's rapprochement, and the Winter Olympics in Pyongchang, South Korea. Yet, he misses the most important factor: the domestic political changes that transpired in Pyongyang since 2011. Despite this weakness of the book, however, readers will gain a substantive understanding of the nature and future of North Korea's nuclear strategy and sound policy alternatives for the United States in the face of it.

Social Practices of Rule-Making in World Politics. By Mark Raymond. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. 280p. \$74.00 cloth.
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Constructivist international relations (IR) scholars have produced a robust literature focusing on the mechanisms and processes that generate norms and rules in world politics. Yet this research agenda has yet to specify *how* agents understand the means by which they can change rules. Mark Raymond's new book investigates the origins and dynamics of rule formation and change. He argues that implicit rules establish a social practice of "rule-making, interpretation, and application" (p. 4) that suggests which actors can participate in deliberation about rules and the procedures by which they can do so.

Raymond demonstrates how the practice turn in IR can help us address questions about the emergence of norms and rules. He builds on H. L. A. Hart's research regarding secondary rules, the socially accepted guidelines that structure how actors negotiate changes to the primary rules that regulate their behavior. Agents' background knowledge about secondary rules tells them who can engage in rule change and how to do so competently. Intersubjective understandings thereby shape how actors propose rules based on their identities and preexisting procedures for making proposals about how to govern their relations.

In this way, the book extends practice theory's application beyond specific aspects of world politics (like diplomacy) to the more general phenomenon of argumentation. Agents who master tacit rulemaking procedures are thus more likely to succeed in changing how they relate to