

What is unique to Quinlan's book is his detailing of how MI5 perceived and responded to various security threats. The historical cases noted are used to examine the application tradecraft in "official cover," "recruitment and handling," "penetration agents," and "defection and debriefing." Fittingly, the overwhelming source base for the book is the declassified MI5 files held in the National Archives at Kew. Quinlan supports this archive with a broad array of secondary sources, including, naturally, Andrew's. More problematically to some, perhaps, Quinlan also incorporates information obtained under Chatham House Rules, that is, anonymously, from "current and former government officials" (xi). However, this information is used very sparingly and is not critical to any of the book's arguments or conclusions.

In most of the cases examined in *Secret War*, the "other side" is represented by the Soviets, and, in Quinlan's analysis, success or failure often comes down to how well one side or the other practiced its tradecraft. Quinlan acknowledges Soviet intelligence as a formidable, though not infallible, opponent, but a basic limitation, not to say flaw, in his work is that he is really only looking at one side of what is a two-sided equation.

Overall, Quinlan presents the interwar MI5 as a highly professional organization that achieved important successes despite, as he frequently mentions, severe shortages of money and personnel. If there is a "hero" in the story, it is Maxwell Knight, the eccentric ex-Fascist who used female operatives to penetrate pro-Fascist and pro-Nazi cabals. His efforts culminated in the so-called Tyler Kent Affair, which involved a member of the American diplomatic community. However, Quinlan's characterization of Kent as a "bitter isolationist" is an oversimplification at best (128).

On the other hand, Quinlan is quite correct to argue that those who accuse MI5 and SIS of "gross incompetence" in their handling of defector Krivitsky by failing to heed his clues regarding MacLean, Philby, et al., are operating from 20–20 hindsight (175). As Quinlan demonstrates, Krivitsky's clues were really not that clear, and as an angry anti-Stalinist but still fiercely loyal Communist, he was a difficult source to handle and evaluate. Quinlan also correctly notes that the MI5 and Secret Intelligence Service files on the Cambridge Five remain, for whatever reason, classified, and the whole story can never known (if ever) until they are open to the public.

The Secret War between the Wars is a useful contribution to the study of interwar British intelligence, and interwar intelligence broadly, but it definitely will be most useful to readers who already have grounding in the period and the cases discussed. It offers an insightful look into the operational "mind" of MI5 during a critical and complex historical period.

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DAVID A. JOHNSON. *New Delhi: The Last Imperial City*. Britain and the World. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. Pp. 261. \$99.00 (cloth).
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Half a century ago, one of the courses in Delhi University's MA program was "Constitutional History and the Indian National Movement." It was boring beyond belief, moving from reform to reform and movement to movement. Our only concern as students was to not confuse the "Morley-Minto" and "Montagu-Chelmsford" reforms, or the Non-Cooperation and Civil Disobedience movements.

What a delight then to read David Johnson's *New Delhi: The Last Imperial City*, in which the narrative moves briskly through a range of themes—the staccato play of international politics, the frenzy of the agitation against the partition of Bengal province, the protest against the transfer of the capital, the verbal duels in the House of Lords, arguments over the positioning

of the new government buildings at Delhi, the shadowy figures of speculators, the nervous deference of officials to the vestiges of older Delhis, the swift transformation of rugged slopes and highly cultivated stretches to a geometrically harmonious design of roads and rond-points.

The two decades from 1911 to 1931 are not easy to write about. There are too many players on the Indian stage, too many rabbits pulled out of hats, too many utopian dreams. For Delhi, there is a sort of hole through which the years from 1917 to 1927 slide away. The new capital should have been completed by the beginning of 1916—which became 1929, and the inauguration took place two years later. Between 1916 and 1931, the political map of Europe had changed, as had the constitutional situation in India. While Viceroy Hardinge's maps and dreams had been translated into a city of brick and stone, the "common man" had been swept into the nationalist movement, and the liberals of 1912 had given place to the charismatic Gandhi.

Johnson conveys the sense of urgency very vividly—through the debates on the partition of Bengal, where a decision had to be taken, keeping in mind that the government must not seem to have caved in before pressure, and then the speed with which Hardinge set in motion the work on the choice of site, the acquisition of the villages, the appointment of architects, and the preliminary design. His term would end in 1916, and he was determined to see the capital in place by then. However, delays were caused by the energy and eloquence of Lord Curzon, convinced he knew best; of Fleetwood Wilson, whose wisdom in imperial economics was unparalleled; and of Bradford Leslie, who wanted the capital to create a totally new landscape, one where the river Yamuna would be impounded in a lake, with British Delhi sitting to its right (west) and Indian Delhi to its left (east). The outbreak of war caused further postponements.

Underlying all the discussions was the anxiety to ensure the loyalty of middle-class Indians by conceding some of their political demands while using up India's revenues on building the city. Johnson attributes to the rulers not only the plan to create an iconic capital, but also, in so doing, to promote an empire *based on consent*. This would account for such an expensive project being pushed through at a time when austerity measures were badly needed. The officials looked forward to a well-adjusted British-Indian middle class bureaucracy governing from Herbert Baker's secretariats, implementing laws passed by the Legislative Council housed in the Viceroy's House. The constitutional reforms of 1919 overtook the completion of that building, and the Legislative Assembly was housed in a building designed by Baker, while over it all presided the benign despot, the viceroy. The participation of the Indians would increase gradually over time, as the country moved towards self-government (which was *not* a synonym for independence). India would become another dominion, as firmly tied to Britain as were Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. There was the hope that, secure in the empire, Britain's economy would retain its buoyancy despite the increasing competition from Germany and the United States.

It was as well that so much of the work was done by 1914: otherwise the project may well have been shelved.

Roughly half the book deals with the discussion on the location of the new city. This account goes over familiar ground, but two themes are new. First, Johnson contributes the story of a problem area—Paharganj, a densely inhabited neighborhood between the Mughal city and the area marked out for the capital. This neighborhood had grown organically in the previous half century, and it was becoming home to the unacknowledged but vitally necessary domestic staff needed by the sahibs in the new city (157). Second, Johnson offers a very thorough discussion of the acquisition of village land, webbed in a complicated range of tenures, and the relocation of the villagers.

The chief recommendation for Delhi was its historicity. Calcutta was largely a British city; Delhi, by contrast, was scattered with ruined buildings and citadels dating from the twelfth century, and had memories of older ones. A side benefit was that because the government was understandably wary of inadvertently destroying a sacred site, the building activity was

paralleled by a remarkably exhaustive listing of all old structures, which has become an invaluable base map. To say the new city made the older monuments just a backdrop and was based on “a gross vulgarisation of the area’s history” (7) seems somewhat unfair. This argument could have applied to the northern site, had that been chosen, where the Ridge was a sacred site for the British, a constant reminder of 1857, but not to the southern plain which was selected.

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DAVID W. GUTZKE. *Women Drinking Out in Britain since the Early Twentieth Century*. Studies in Popular Culture. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2014. Pp. 304. \$100.00 (cloth).
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Women have had a hard time of it so far as alcohol is concerned. At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, mothers drinking in pubs were blamed for racial deterioration and hereditary degeneration, the production of enfeebled children, and the decline of Britain as an imperial power. As alcohol came back on the policy agenda in recent years, it was the “ladettes,” young women out for a good time, out drinking at weekends, who were blamed for the rise in binge drinking, even though the statistics showed that men were the great majority of drinkers.

David Gutzke’s *Women Drinking Out in Britain since the Early Twentieth Century* sets out to survey the recent history of women out drinking. The focus of his book is the actual physical presence of women on licensed premises and what facilitated that. Later, he examines some of the responses over time to women in pubs, considered through the prism of the concept of “moral panic.”

From the 1850s, the respectable classes withdrew from licensed premises. But when did they start to come back? Gutzke takes issue with recent research on this question by historians such as Stella Moss and Claire Langhamer. While Moss argues that respectable women used pubs before 1914 and Langhamer taps the Mass Observation Archive to show that women entered pubs during World War II, Gutzke argues that women went into pubs during World War I and stayed there in the interwar years because of the development of the “improved public house.” He agrees that figures also went up during the next war, but he estimates the rise as lower than Langhamer’s account suggests. But the big difference was that women returned into the home after 1945 and did not maintain the pub habit.

The book draws on market research and surveys commissioned in the 1940s and after, which Gutzke prefers to data from Mass Observation. It also uses the advertising by which brewers hoped to make pubs appear woman friendly. A telling table (281) summarizes the revolution in women’s drinking habits between the mid-1970s and 2000. But the changes itemized—food, the rise of soft drinks—are not female specific. And here we see one limitation of the study.

Much of the book deals with changes in women’s drinking habits and their return to the pub, which began from the 1960s and gathered pace in the 1980s. However, many of the issues discussed here are not female specific but rather illustrative of changes that have led to a rise in alcohol consumption across British society, among them the doubling of wine consumption between 1975 and 1985; the rapid expansion of wine bars which provided a more woman-friendly environment (with toilets) in which to drink; changes in the tied house system from the late 1980s, which required the conservative brewing establishment to divest itself of