perhaps more significant than what has actually been said and done. So here is a robust domestic–international linkage: domestic bargains between leaders and constituents based on economic performance and regime legitimacy, and financial and economic relations that serve as a credible commitment to amicable international relations. The "interlocking nature of international domestic bargains . . . buttress[es] and sustain[s] regional stability and cooperation" (p. 220).

While Chan articulates a two-level game logic that contributes to economic welfare gains and regional cooperation, Ganguly and Thompson examine a domestic–international interaction that leads to international competition and conflict. With the case studies having disconfirmed their initial hypotheses drawn from Putnam's two-level game framework, they conclude by offering alternative hypotheses with better potential. A rivalry is usually nested in larger games that involve more actors than the rivals themselves. The inter-Korean rivalry, for example, is nested within interstate games between the United States and China, as well as two sets of patron–client relationships. Given that there are at least six different games taking place at three different levels, domestic politics within North Korea may not be the most significant factor influencing the country's foreign policy decisions vis-à-vis South Korea. The case studies point to the potential usefulness of "a triangular structure" in explaining the variation in rivalries' propensity for violence. The United States is an indispensable player in the rivalries between Taiwan and China, the two Koreas, and India and Pakistan; and the Soviet Union/Russia plays the same role in the United States–China, China–Vietnam, and India–China rivalries. Hence, the presence and propensity of a third party emerges as a critical variable in the case studies, although this variable is not given a central treatment in them.

Another important theoretical contribution made by Ganguly and Thompson is that they venture an explanation for the insignificance of domestic politics in shaping the course of the rivalries studied. They note that the polities studied in their volume are characterized by "governmental autonomy," whereby the government is insulated from public demands and factional infighting. These polities are therefore less likely to see their foreign policy-making complicated by domestic politics than are other countries that are vulnerable to pressures from various domestic actors.

Here is room for important dialogue and future collaboration between Chan and Ganguly and Thompson. The enduring rivalries arguably are the most difficult cases for Chan. Rivals would find it difficult to develop enduring financial or economic relations because they would worry about negative political and security consequences that could result from such relations. Even if they manage to develop such economic ties, they are more likely to sever them at the first sign of political trouble. Hence it would be quite useful to test Chan's thesis against some of the enduring rivals that have developed significant economic relations: Taiwan and China, China and India, and, to a lesser degree, South and North Korea. Governmental autonomy can be treated as an intermediary variable that changes in response to economic interdependence and that, in turn, affects the government's policy choices toward its international rival. If Chan's finding is robust, one would expect to find a decrease in governmental autonomy as commercial and financial ties increase between rivals, and as such ties engender domestic interest groups with a stake in maintaining those economic ties. A decrease, in turn, is likely to be correlated with policy choices that accentuate "associational" relations. Treating government autonomy as a variable in such a manner may also give Ganguly and Thompson a more refined way to explain the variation they observe in the Asian rivalries.

While some of the rivalry relationships may confirm the hypotheses drawn from Chan's argument, more recent events have the potential to complicate them. The author cites as evidence for the absence of balancing in Asia "a general trend of declining defense burden and a reduction in U.S. military personnel deployed in the Asia Pacific" (p. 92), but recent developments raise questions about the degree to which his findings are robust and stable. The recent escalation of tensions between China and Japan challenges Chan's liberal thesis that growing economic interdependence reduces the likelihood of conflict between countries whose well-being is tied together. Despite many economic linkages built before 2008, President Lee Myung-bak easily reversed the "sunshine policy" to turn the inter-Korean relationship frosty and to strengthen both alliance and armament options.

The two books under review are exemplary works that analyze international relations in Asia in a theoretically sophisticated manner. They both challenge important IR theories and suggest alternatives in their respective ways. Their dialogues concerning whether and to what degree rivals can create economic ties and be bound by their interdependence to moderate their rivalry comprise a promising research agenda. I look forward to a follow-up study, and hopefully a collaborative one by Chan, Ganguly, and Thompson.

Women and Wars: Contested Histories, Uncertain Futures. Edited by Carol Cohn. Malden, MA: Polity, 2012. 256p. $64.95 cloth, $26.95 paper.

International Security and Gender. By Nicole Detraz. Malden, MA: Polity, 2012. 224p. $64.95 cloth, $22.95 paper.
doi:10.1017/S153759271300193X

— Katherine E. Brown, *King's College London*

Reviewing these two books alongside each other emphasizes the advances and contributions of gender scholars to the fields of security and war studies: No aspect, no

assumption, no phenomenon is left unexamined by "curious feminists" (cf. Cynthia Enloe, cited in *International Security and Gender,* p. 15). These books successfully demonstrate how "adding women" and using "gender lenses" unpick and contribute to an understanding of war, terrorism, peacekeeping, peacemaking, war fighting, and civilian–military relations—among other things. Combined, they offer an excellent and accessible introduction to gender and feminist scholarship in the fields of war and security studies.

A key understanding gained from both texts is the relationship between war and security, and "what" they are (as phenomena and as subdisciplines). For Nicole Detraz, studying security requires taking a broader perspective than studying war; in contrast, the volume edited by Carol Cohn is concerned more narrowly with war making, war fighting, and war ending. To understand the processes of global security, Detraz demands that analysis stem from listening to all actors, from soldiers and terrorists to "bush wives" and HIV patients (p. 130), and in particular from a foregrounding of the gendered lives of the marginalized and disempowered (p. 11). With this human emphasis, *International Security and Gender* is similar to Christina Sylvester's *Experiencing War* project, but Detraz also expands her focus as a result. She argues that "we should think of security as a broad umbrella, and military security/conflict should be subsumed under the umbrella along with things like insecurity in the face of natural disaster, insecurity due to loss of livelihood etc." (p. 209). *International Security and Gender,* therefore, includes discussions of militarization, health crises, and climate change (Chapters 2, 5, and 6, respectively), as well as terrorism and peacekeeping (Chapters 3 and 4).

Cohn argues in the first chapter of *Women and Wars* that there is a need to understand the specificities of wars (p. 2) and therefore prioritizes analysis of such specificities for their own sake. But she also brings together a range of chapters to push the boundaries of traditional understandings of war, in terms of time, geography, and agency (pp. 21, 22). Consequently, the authors of this edited volume problematize the assumptions, images, binaries, and discourses built into labels of "war," "postconflict," and "peace" (in particular, in Chapters 7, 9, and 10). Broader security concerns emerge in this volume but, importantly, as *by-products* of war. However, Cohn's emphasis on gendered human agency and human concerns, like Detraz's, distinguishes the feminist approach from traditional war studies and reveals "a more complex reality" (p. 22).

These are not arbitrary editorial/authorial decisions for focus or ordering of chapter material, but go to foundational debates about what is to be understood, what is excluded from our analysis, where priorities are, how phenomena are connected, and what truths and power relations are revealed in our explanations (cf. Tarak Barkawi, "From War to Security: Security Studies, the Wider Agenda and the Fate of the Study of War," *Millennium—Journal of International Studies* 39:3 [2011]: 701–16). Therefore, it is incumbent upon all politics and international relations scholars to think through what war is and concurrently whether it is simply one end of a security spectrum or the central umbrella under which other elements of security can be found (to borrow Detraz's metaphor). Reading these works does not resolve these arguments directly, but it does highlight the interconnectedness of war to human security. This makes me doubt that war can be studied without an awareness of how it is embedded in wider global security processes—historical, economic, political, and social (*Women and Wars,* p. 27). But also given how war is productive and implicated in so many insecurities, it seems that a study of security without due consideration of war is incomplete.

Both books are concerned not just with adopting a human-centric approach but also with convincingly demonstrating that a gendered understanding of war and security is necessary. However, a second insight of both goes to the heart of deeper debates about whether or not gender analysis is sufficient or whether it needs to be accompanied by feminist agendas of equality, emancipation, and empowerment (see also Laura Sjoberg, "Gendered Realities of the Immunity Principle: Why Gender Analysis Needs Feminism," *International Studies Quarterly* 50 [December 2006]: 889–910). Primarily adding gender as a variable to existing analysis is considered incomplete by feminists (albeit welcomed as a first step) because it does not address why or how gendered inequalities emerge but accepts the world *as is*. Feminist analysis usually begins by identifying (diverse) women in the world and their subordinate position, followed by appreciating how gender constitutes and is constituted by world politics, but it also includes a clear commitment to overcoming gender inequalities. This explicit normative element of much feminist work goes to the heart of debates about the validity of social sciences research.

Detraz is refreshingly upfront about her feminist normative agenda—and the arguments are stronger for it. Her position is that a commitment and understanding of emancipation—as freedom from insecurity—is essential for understanding security and global politics and, therefore, the basis from which change is possible. Emancipation requires strategies of development and empowerment, which she then advocates (p. 201). Yet she also recognizes a tension in these strategies, and as a result, she demands in scholarship a reflexive approach to the understanding of security, such that security and emancipation are conceived of as processes, not end points (pp. 19–20, 203). As a result, she shows that approaches that are not reflective, that fall into the trap of gender (and other) essentialism, are incomplete and contribute to existing inequalities.

The edited volume, however, makes no clear claim to a specific feminist agenda. Throughout the volume it directly

https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759271300193X Published online by Cambridge University Press

refers to what feminists write, argue, and do, but always in the third person, without saying that "we/I," the author(s), are feminists (those who are familiar with the various authors' other work will know them as such). It becomes clear, however, in reading the multifaceted chapters that feminism does so many things and is so diverse that it cannot be easily simplified under a central concept, such as emancipation. The various authors, and editor, perhaps resist self-identifying as feminists and avoid any explicit normative agenda in order to make their arguments more acceptable to those who hold onto an idealized objectivity in research. Yet the chapters reveal that gender is a "social relation which structures hierarchical power relations" (p. 5) and that war differentially and unequally impacts men and women. So seeking to flatten those structures could be an essential aim of the authors too?

This points to a related question of whether feminist scholars—or any academic group—need also to be activists and engaged with the communities they study (please see: http://genderingglobalgovernancenet-work.net/comment/the-silent-feminism/ and http://genderingglobalgovernancenet-work.net/comment/perfect-feminism-a-response-to-swati-parashar/.)

Given the lack of exposure of feminism in mainstream war/security studies, informing and generating an understanding of the gendered nature of global politics are nevertheless useful functions of these books. Both focus on women in order to highlight the different gendered experiences of war, insecurity, and violence and to further knowledge of these phenomena. The two books do not just talk about women because others do not, or because women are only "newly present"—to paraphrase Enloe, women have always been present in international relations *if* we chose to see them (*Bananas, Beaches and Bases,* 2001)—they focus on women because to do so gives knowledge of war and security. For example, looking at war practices, in Chapter 3 of *Women and Wars,* Pamela DeLargy discusses sexual violence and women's health in war. Not only does she, like Detraz, explain that women face additional risks during war for biological and sociological reasons, but she also discusses how sexual violence is a strategy, weapon, and endemic part of war. However, she also shows how this is a varied phenomenon in its use and meaning, and that societal pressure is forcing change in war so that rape is no longer accepted practice—although, as Detraz notes, prostitution is (pp. 40–51). Less positively however, DeLargy explains that after war, well-meaning interventions by the "international community" can have negative, unintended consequences, such as continued stigma, resentment from other "victim groups," and retaliation (pp. 67–78). This is an important point for international politics generally, that the desire to "do good" and "do something," such as in Responsibility to Protect actions, can be counterproductive. Detraz demonstrates, though, that good practice in postconflict health-security programs does exist, and the more successful ones combine protection and empowerment strategies, such as in Sierra Leone (p. 157).

Examining the ending of wars, Detraz, in her chapter on peace-support operations, breaks from talking about women and discusses peacekeeping masculinities. Here, the processes of "Othering" required in the construction of soldier identities and, therefore, their capacity to kill and to keep peace, and the consequences this has for security, are highlighted (pp. 69–70). This is an important reminder that gender analysis is not just "about women" but also shows how "men become men" in global politics, as well as how gender inequalities are intersected with race and imperial politics. Ruth Jacobson (Chapter 10 in *Women and Wars*) adds detail to Detraz's argument and further shows how the gendered nature of peace support operations impacts final peace settlements. As Chapters 8 and 9 also attest, in order to understand the shape of peace, understanding the operation of war and "postconflict" becomes essential. Feminist analysis therefore has intrinsic and instrumental insights for understanding war and security.

Both books are written in such a manner as to facilitate the teaching of both gender/women's and security/war studies courses at the advanced undergraduate level. While *Women and Wars* is not marketed as a textbook, it includes questions at the end of each chapter and "fact boxes" to illuminate key points, as well as further reading suggestions. I would also particularly recommend them to security and war studies scholars who are not familiar with this literature, as they serve as insightful introductions.

The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory.
Edited by Nicolas Guilhot. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011. 312p. $95.00 cloth, $29.50 paper.

The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010. By John M. Hobson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 406p. $99.00 cloth, $32.99 paper.

A Whole New World: Reinventing International Studies for a Post-Western World. By Pierre P. Lizée. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 288p. $90.00.
doi:10.1017/S1537592713001941

— Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, American University

In recent years we have heard a lot about the sins of academic international relations: how the field's early days were wrapped up in projects of hegemonic dominance, colonial management, and xenophobic racism; how subsequent scholarly generations failed to acknowledge that past and were consequently unable to overcome it; and how those legacies keep the field from genuinely acknowledging the diversity of international theory. Many of these