

## SOUTHERNERS WHO REFUSED TO SIGN THE SOUTHERN MANIFESTO\*

TONY BADGER

*University of Cambridge*

**ABSTRACT.** *The aim of those drafting the Southern Manifesto of 1956 was to coerce wavering Southern politicians into supporting a united regional campaign of defiance of the Supreme Court's school desegregation ruling. The Manifesto largely succeeded. Most Southern congressmen, including leading moderates, felt they had no alternative but to succumb to what they perceived to be mass popular segregationist sentiment and sign the Manifesto. This paper examines the cases of those who refused to sign: what were the sources of their racial moderation, did they face electoral retribution, or did their careers suggest there was a political alternative to massive resistance? The evidence from Texas, Tennessee, Florida, and North Carolina highlights the diversity of political opinion among the non-signers – from New Deal liberal to right-wing Republican ideologue – and the disparate sources for their racial moderation – national political ambitions, party loyalty, experience in the Second World War, Cold War fears, religious belief, and an urban political base. Their fate suggests, at the very least, that outside the Deep South there was room for political manoeuvre, especially if state political leaders took a united moderate stance. Nevertheless, the cautious and gradualist stance of the moderates did not offer a convincing alternative to the massive resistance strategy so passionately advocated by the conservatives.*

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On Monday, 12 March 1956, Georgia's senior senator, Walter F. George, rose in the Senate to read a manifesto blasting the Supreme Court for its decision in the *Brown* school desegregation case. The Manifesto condemned the Court's 'unwarranted decision' as a 'clear abuse of judicial power' and commended the motives of 'those States which have declared the intention to resist forced integration by any lawful means'. The signers of the Manifesto pledged 'to use all lawful means to bring about a reversal of this decision which is contrary to the Constitution'. By this time white Southerners could not avoid confronting the issue of school desegregation. Black plaintiffs were in court demanding that local school boards comply with the *Brown* decision: Southern states were passing a barrage of anti-desegregation statutes to prevent compliance. One of the aims of those initiating and drafting the Manifesto – principally Richard Russell of Georgia, Strom Thurmond, and Harry Byrd of Virginia – was to ensure that all white Southerners united behind moves to defy the Supreme

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Court. Richard Russell, the most influential Southern senator, lamented that there were five or six Southerners in the Senate who were prepared to agree with the *Brown* decision. Russell and his colleagues aimed to make those waverers publicly proclaim their determination to resist the Supreme Court. If the South could 'obtain a unity of action' then that evidence of united resistance would force Northern politicians and the Court itself to reconsider imposing desegregation on the South.<sup>1</sup>

For the most part the sponsors of the Manifesto succeeded. Southern moderate or liberal congressmen felt that they had no alternative but to sign, given their perception of the overwhelming popular commitment to segregation. Alabama's Lister Hill, facing a primary challenge from a right-wing, states-rights fanatic, apparently signed the Manifesto without even reading it. The most liberal of the Alabama house delegation, Carl Elliott, for whom Franklin Roosevelt was and remains his political god, recalled:

When that Manifesto came along, neither those [Deep South] colleagues nor my constituents back in Alabama cared about moderation. You were either with them or against them. And if you were against them, you were gone. Voted out. Politically excommunicated ... I knew there was no way I could survive and I hadn't yet achieved what I came to Congress to do. It was that knowledge ... that grabbed me as I decided to add my signature to the others ... I'd probably make the same decision again.<sup>2</sup>

Others moved reluctantly. In Arkansas, Fulbright's staff even prepared a statement explaining why he was not going to sign, but then he decided that he had secured enough changes toning down the document to allow him to sign. Kerr Scott of North Carolina rang his aide Bill Cochrane on the morning the Manifesto was issued asking him to take his name off the document, but it was too late. Little Rock congressman Brooks Hays had refused to sign, but Governor Orval Faubus came to Washington and spent two or three hours at James Trimble's hospital bedside persuading Hays and Trimble, the two most moderate members of the Arkansas delegation, to sign. Hays recalled

Faubus ... confronted the two of us ... with the idea that if we did not do something ... to quiet the people down, that we would find what he called the Ku Klux Klan and the extreme Citizens' Council groups taking over the political life of the state, and that the racists and the radicals would displace the moderates. Faubus was known as a moderate.<sup>3</sup>

Despite this perception of overwhelming segregationist constituency pressure, three Southern senators did not sign, as well as twenty-two Southern

<sup>1</sup> I developed these arguments in 'The Southern Manifesto', a paper given at the Southern Historical Association meeting in Orlando, November 1993 (copy in the author's possession).

<sup>2</sup> Fulbright referred to 'one of the most-respected and liberal-minded Southerners in the Senate' who signed the Manifesto without reading it in an interview with Stewart Alsop, clipping, *Washington Post*, 8 Apr. 1956, box 71, J. William Fulbright papers, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville. Carl Elliott Sr and Michael D'Orso, *The cost of courage: the journey of an American congressman* (New York, 1992), pp. 178–82.

<sup>3</sup> Draft statement, n.d., box 48, Fulbright papers. Transcript, Columbia University oral history Program interview, 1970, pp. 28–9, copy in Brooks Hays papers, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville.

members of the House (one each from Tennessee and Florida, three from North Carolina and seventeen from Texas). In this paper, I want to try and identify the sources of the non-signers' racial moderation and to examine their political fate. Did they face electoral retribution or did their careers suggest that there was a political alternative to massive resistance, a road not taken by most Southern moderates in the 1950s?

## I

In Texas, presidential aspirations, the demands of national party leadership, and a local factional battle for control of the Texas party combined to put Lyndon Johnson and the majority of the state's congressional delegation in the moderate camp.

The drafters of the Manifesto asked neither Johnson nor House speaker Sam Rayburn to sign. They argued that they did not want to compromise LBJ's position as majority leader. As John Stennis, a member with Richard Russell of the sub-committee that originally drafted the document, recalled:

Well on a personal basis and just Senator to Senator, of course we wanted him [LBJ] to sign it, but at the same time we recognized that he wasn't just a Senator from Texas, he was a leader and he had a different responsibility in that degree. It wasn't held against him, I'll put it that way, by the Southerners that he didn't sign it.

Johnson was following a delicate balancing act, keeping his power base in Texas, retaining the support of the Southern senators, yet trying to establish a record on civil rights that might win him Northern support for a presidential bid. Whatever personal sympathy Johnson had for poor African-Americans, shown in his efforts as Texas National Youth Administration director, he had largely employed conventional, even extreme, segregationist rhetoric in order to win and retain his Senate seat. But he managed to convey to Northern liberals that he would not have signed the Manifesto even if it had been presented to him. The act of not signing impressed some Northern liberals as an act of great political courage: Hubert Humphrey remembered the 'many times' LBJ mentioned his refusal to sign.<sup>4</sup>

But Johnson, like his mentor Sam Rayburn, also feared for the unity of the national Democratic party in election year. To his mind, the Manifesto unnecessarily brought to the surface a divisive sectional issue which would gratuitously antagonize Northern Democrats. The oratory surrounding the Manifesto was reported 'distasteful' to Johnson who 'didn't want national party unity disturbed by fights over highly controversial issues'. Johnson worked to convince Northerners that the Manifesto was largely designed for home consumption, an effort to re-elect Walter George who was facing a tough

<sup>4</sup> John Stennis, oral history interview, 17 June 1972, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin. Sanford P. Dyer, 'Lyndon Johnson and the politics of civil rights, 1935-1960: the art of moderate leadership' (Ph.D. thesis, Texas A and M, 1978), pp. 102-7. Robert Dallek, *Lone star rising: Lyndon Johnson and his times, 1908-1960* (New York, 1991), pp. 138-43, 496-7. Robert Mann, *The walls of Jericho: Lyndon Johnson, Hubert Humphrey and Richard Russell* (New York, 1996), pp. 159-66.

re-election battle against segregationist Herman Talmadge. As George Reedy explained, ‘George had become somewhat a hero to many Northerners and they were willing to go pretty far to do anything that would strengthen his prospects over Herman Talmadge.’ So Johnson defused the issue in the North, yet at the same time, kept the confidence of the Southerners. When a correspondent quoted an alleged Johnson comment dismissing the Manifesto as a piece for home consumption, Richard Russell angrily retorted in capital letters, ‘I DO NOT THINK LYNDON JOHNSON MADE ANY SUCH STATEMENT’. Harry Byrd and Russell both endorsed Johnson as a presidential candidate.<sup>5</sup>

Why were so many Texas congressmen prepared to join Johnson and Rayburn in refusing to sign the Manifesto? A convenient answer, of course, was that race simply was not as much of an issue in Texas as in other Southern states with larger African-American populations. The Beaumont *Enterprise*, whose editor in fact supported the Manifesto, argued:

There has been less interest on the part of Texas national lawmakers in such vehicles of protest as congressional manifestoes than has been the case in other areas of the South. This situation is undoubtedly due to the fact that many sections of the state have very few Negroes ... it is hard to get excited about a problem that does not exist on the local level.<sup>6</sup>

But race *was* a major issue in Texas politics in March 1956, at least as much as in Florida, Arkansas, and North Carolina. States-rights was a powerful doctrine reflecting concern about federal control of the Tidelands oil, and Supreme Court decisions on both segregation and anti-Communist state legislation. Governor Shivers intended to ‘‘paramount’’ the re-declaration of states-rights as the top political issue in Texas’. He regarded interposition as a ‘basic fundamental right’ and secured a referendum on maintaining school segregation that passed comfortably that summer. Senator Price Daniel was deciding whether or not to run for governor to succeed Shivers at the very time he signed the Manifesto. He decided to run and defeated Ralph Yarborough whom he denounced as the candidate of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and of labour leader, Walter Reuther. Rabid segregationist and anti-Communist Martin Dies signed the Manifesto, ran for re-election for the statewide at-large congressional seat and won overwhelmingly.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Memo, George Reedy to Lyndon Johnson, 12 July 1956, box 423, office files of George Reedy, 1956–7, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin. There is no evidence that Russell was anxious to protect Walter George, even though politicians like Ross Bass, Albert Gore, and Paul Douglas appeared to accept that argument. The success of the campaign to paint the Manifesto as designed purely for home consumption and therefore to restrain Northern criticism was noted by columnist Peter Edson, *Birmingham Post-Herald*, 26 Mar. 1956. For Johnson’s distaste at the divisive oratory, *Dallas Morning News*, 13 Mar. 1956. For Russell’s reaction, Charles J. Bloch to Richard B. Russell, 21 Mar. 1956, Russell to Arch Rowan, 27 Mar. 1956, Richard B. Russell papers, University of Georgia, Athens. Harry Byrd to E. H. Ramsey, 1 May 1956, Harry F. Byrd papers, University of Virginia, Charlottesville.

<sup>6</sup> Beaumont *Enterprise*, 30 July 1956.

<sup>7</sup> *Austin-American*, 1, 6, 13 Mar., 1, 3 Aug. 1956.

In the East Texas first district, Wright Patman, populist scourge of bankers and financiers, was opposed from the start in 1956 by a candidate who aimed to 'beat him on the segregation question', capitalizing on the fact that allegedly Patman was supported by '99 per cent of the Negro vote ... and had refused to take any stand on the segregation issue'. Despite his resolute support of all segregation measures, Patman had consistently faced such opposition. Patman signed the Manifesto, released it in advance to newspaper editors in his district, and made a central plank in his speeches, press releases, and campaign literature the fact that he had signed the Manifesto, which had been, he noted, 'so severely criticized by communists and fellow-travellers'. His opponent nevertheless did not surrender the issue: segregation-related issues constituted the overwhelming bulk of his TV speeches and newsletters. Patman bolstered his staunch defence of segregation and his record on public works, water projects, and industrial development by securing information on his opponent's wild drinking, insurance scams, and faked heart attacks. Patman won comfortably.<sup>8</sup>

The majority of Texan congressmen, however, refused to sign the Manifesto. They were a very disparate group in terms of age, personality, political ideology, and constituency. Some, like Jack Brooks in the second district and Jim Wright from Fort Worth, represented a new breed of younger liberal politicians who constituted the 'new generation' of Southerners Franklin Roosevelt had expectantly awaited. The Depression and the Second World War shaped their philosophy. Wright, like many returning veterans, was anxious to challenge the old guard on his return from service overseas. At the University of Texas Law School, he reorganized the Young Democrats who in December 1945 called for anti-lynching legislation, an end to the poll tax, and the admission of black students to the Law School. In the state legislature, he was in a group of eighty or ninety veterans who were determined to change the shape of Texas politics. As mayor of Mansfield he worked to improve black schools. In 1954 he ran for Congress challenging the powerful Amon Carter and the Fort Worth *Star Telegram*. In 1956 his father warned him about the 'damn NAACP getting out of hand'. Such activities would lead to a revival of the Klan and he reminded his son of the damage done in the 1920s by such appeal to prejudices. Nevertheless, when the Manifesto was issued, Wright believed that both prudential considerations and Christian principles de-

<sup>8</sup> Franklin Jones to Wright Patman, 2 Feb. 1956, box 80A, Wright Patman to newspaper editors, n.d., speech notes, TV Speech, box 79C, *Wright Patman's Congressional Record* box 73A, Kenneth Simmons TV speech, n.d., *Simmons for Congress News*, box 73C; Simmons speeches, 29 June 1956, 19 July, 1956, box 80B; Wright Patman to R. B. Morrison, 23 Feb. 1956, Morrison to Patman, 7 Mar. 1956, box 80A; Patman press release, 23 Mar. 1956, box 79C, Wright Patman papers, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin. Two of the other Texas signers had views more like Martin Dies's. Right-wing views on states-rights, the economy, and subversion went alongside traditional views on race for John Dowdy and Clark Fisher. Even someone as conservative as W. R. 'Bob' Poage viewed Dowdy as a 'perfectly honest and sincere reactionary' and Fisher as an 'extreme reactionary'. W. R. Poage, oral history interview, vol. 5, pp. 20-1, 23, W. R. Poage papers, Baylor Collection of Political Materials, Baylor University, Waco.

mandated that he not sign: not only was the Supreme Court decision the law of the land but ‘hatred is evil in the sight of God. The Negro is a child of God, as am I and as are my kinsmen. He possesses an immortal soul, as do we.’ He applauded resolutions of the Texas Council of Churches and the Canterbury Association in Austin in favour of desegregation.<sup>9</sup>

There were older liberals, like Albert Thomas, who also refused to sign. Thomas prided himself on the projects and developments he brought to Houston, but he was also still proud of his role in the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. But there were a number of less liberal voices. Joe Kilgore had voted for Eisenhower in 1952 but was a new congressman with significant numbers of Hispanic voters in his border constituency. Hispanic voters were also a factor for anti-radical San Antonio machine politician, Paul Kilday. But there were also a number of stalwart conservative senior figures with powerful committee assignments – George Mahon, Omar Burleson, Olin Teague, and Bob Poage – who refused to sign the Manifesto, together with wealthy socialite Clark Thompson. At the far right was Dallas Republican Bruce Alger. Alger was a forerunner of Goldwater Republicanism. A property developer who had exploited Dallas’s post-war boom, Alger was a fervent apostle of individualism: he opposed the income tax and social security, and was proud of his claim to be the only congressman to vote against free school milk. Yet Alger was the only Southern Republican not to sign the Manifesto. He detested Southern Democrats, who were masterminding the Manifesto, as much as he detested socialists. Indeed, he lamented that it was a Democratic Supreme Court in *Brown* which overturned the correct doctrines enunciated by a Republican Supreme Court sixty years earlier. He had also spent much of his early life outside the South, had been educated at Princeton, and claimed to be friendly with Albert Einstein. Despite their ideological differences, it is possible to suggest some common threads amongst the Texan non-signers. Unlike those who signed, most of the non-signers had served overseas in the Second World War and, between them, they represented all the major urban centres in Texas – Austin, Beaumont, Corpus Christi, Dallas, Fort Worth, Houston, Lubbock, and San Antonio.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Jim Wright, *Balance of power: presidents and Congress from the era of McCarthy to the age of Gingrich* (Atlanta, 1996), pp. 19–30, 48. Interview with Jim Wright, 18 Nov. 1996. James Wright to Jim Wright, 26 Feb. 1956, Jim Wright to —, letter and statement 14 Mar. 1956, statement, 22 Mar. 1956, Wright to —, 20 Apr. 1956, Wright to —, 20 Apr. 1956, Jim Wright Collection, Texas Christian University, Fort Worth. (The anonymity of Wright’s correspondents is a condition of citing material from these papers.) Stuart Long interview, Texas oral history Collection, Woodson Research Center, Rice University, Houston. The voluminous papers of Jack Brooks have been deposited at Lamar University, Beaumont, where they lie uncatalogued in their original boxes. I was kindly allowed to examine these but could turn up no material for 1956. Brooks was four days older than Wright, entered Law School at the same time, and was elected to Congress in 1954, backed by organized labour and the oil workers.

<sup>10</sup> Albert Thomas to M. E. Walter, 12 Aug. 1937, box 15, Thomas biography, box 18, Albert Thomas papers, Woodson Research Center, Rice University. Joe Kilgore interview, Sam Rayburn papers, Barker Center for American History, University of Texas, Austin. Interview with Jim

But the one indisputable common thread amongst the non-signers was Sam Rayburn. Of the Texans who signed, Rayburn was friendly only with Patman. Of the others, Walter Rogers was simply not part of his circle, Fisher had long since parted company with the Speaker on most policy issues, and Rayburn despised Dies and Dowdy. The rest of the Texas delegation (with the exception of Republican Bruce Alger) was the most cohesive and powerful in the South; they were numerous enough to ensure that Texas had one representative on every major committee in which the state had a vital interest, and each member deferred to their representative in those specialist areas. They met for lunch every Wednesday to raise matters of common concern and they looked to Rayburn both for leadership and protection. In turn, Rayburn looked after their interests. Even the most senior Texas congressional figures like Poage, Mahon, Thomas, and Kilday deferred to a man who had been in the House almost a quarter of a century longer than they had. As for the younger representatives, Rayburn took a particular paternal interest in the fortunes of some of them, notably Frank Ikard, Homer Thornberry, and Joe Kilgore. On the issue of the Manifesto, these men would follow Rayburn's lead, whatever their private feelings.<sup>11</sup>

Rayburn, himself, regretted the *Brown* decision and hoped that Texas could 'delay it coming into operation for as long a time as possible', but it was the law of the land. Like Johnson, he did not like divisive sectional issues when raised in such away that they could not be brokered into compromise within the Democratic party. The Manifesto made such compromise difficult. In any case, he believed that 'any congressman worth his salt can lead his district' and he thus encouraged his fellow Texans to avoid signing the Manifesto.<sup>12</sup>

Rayburn's stand was also intimately wrapped up in the fight for control of the Texas party in 1956, which was in turn inextricably linked to the race issue. Rayburn claimed not to 'have hated anybody', but he grudgingly admitted that 'there are a couple of shitasses I loathe'. Richard Nixon was one, Bruce Alger another, but he reserved special venom for Governor Allan Shivers. The hatred was mutual. On Shivers's side it dated back to his disappointment that Rayburn had not delivered more from Congress or president on the issue of Tidelands oil. On Rayburn's part, it dated back to what he believed was his betrayal by Shivers over the 1952 presidential campaign. Rayburn was determined that in 1956 the Texas party would not be led by those who supported Eisenhower in 1952 and who clearly intended to back the general

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Wright, 18 Nov. 1996. Bruce Alger speech, 24 Sept. 1956, Bruce Alger papers, Dallas Public Library. Bruce Alger oral history interview, East Texas State University and Dallas Public Library.

<sup>11</sup> Interview with Jim Wright 18 Nov. 1996. Oral history interviews: O. C. Fisher, Frank Ikard, Joe Kilgore, George Mahon, J. R. Parten, Homer Thornberry, Rayburn papers.

<sup>12</sup> Sam Rayburn to Miss M. R. Bruton, 3 July 1954, Rayburn papers. Wright, *Balance of power*, p. 54.

again. He forced Lyndon Johnson to mobilize the ‘loyalist’ forces to fight at the precinct and district conventions to take control of the State Democratic Executive Committee and to control the delegation to the National Convention. Rayburn was making the first steps in this campaign as the Manifesto was drafted. The fight between the ‘loyalists’ and the Shivers forces was firmly drawn on the race issue. The non-signers were the forces of moderation: the Shivers faction was the faction of interposition and massive resistance. George Reedy complained that Shivers ‘played on the emotions of race hatred, anti-Northern hatred and any other hatred that were available’. No attack got under Rayburn’s skin more than Shivers’s jibe that LBJ’s speech on great Texans ‘From Sam Houston to Sam Rayburn’ should be reworded ‘From Santa Anna to Sam Rayburn’. The Texas congressmen loyal to Rayburn were drafted in to campaign in their districts. The Johnson–Rayburn forces, consciously claiming the moderate ground against the extremists, routed the opposition.<sup>13</sup>

Some of the non-signers, nevertheless, heard from their constituents. Mississippi segregationist John Bell Williams made a favourable reference to the ‘splendid’ local Fort Worth congressman at a meeting of the Tarrant County Citizens’ Council on 16 March. The audience greeted this reference to Jim Wright with ‘thunderous boos’. Disappointed by Wright’s failure to sign, a Cleburne couple expected him to tell them where he also stood on ‘the infamous United Nations, the States of the Forces treaty, the Bricker amendment and the so-called Alaska Mental Health bill’. A Fort Worth evangelist was certain that Wright did not want ‘your daughter to attend school where every ninth child had syphilis or gonorrhoea’. A write-in candidate materialized against Wright in the primary. Bob Poage faced no opposition but had to defend himself against those who expected him to sign. He argued that segregated schools could best be kept by keeping quiet about the issue: the confrontations in Alabama over the admission of black student, Autherine Lucy, to the university in Tuscaloosa showed the wisdom of not ‘hollering and shouting’ on the issue. Jack Brooks wrote in August that he had just endured a ‘rough campaign ... about the manifesto. In fact, it was the meanest, most vicious that I was ever in.’ Bruce Alger in the general election campaign found that his Democratic opponent, Dallas district attorney, Henry Wade, hammered away at Alger’s failure to sign.<sup>14</sup>

Nevertheless, all these incumbents survived. Wright told me that he had forgotten about his write-in opponent; Brooks defeated the son of his congressional predecessor by a two to one margin; and Alger saw the

<sup>13</sup> J. T. Rutherford, Allan Shivers oral history interviews, Rayburn papers. Jim Wright, *You and your congressman* (New York, 1976), pp. 107–9. *Austin-American*, 8 Mar. 1956. Memorandum on campaign for control of Texas delegation, box 419.2, Reedy Office Files.

<sup>14</sup> — to Jim Wright, 20 Mar. 1956, — to Wright, n.d., Larry King to Craig Raupe, 6 Aug. 1956, Wright papers. Jack Brooks to Charles B. Deane, 7 Aug. 1956, Charles B. Deane papers, Southern Baptist Historical Collection, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem. Henry Wade v Bruce Alger debate, Wade speech, 17 Sept. 1956, Alger papers.



Democratic challenge off comfortably. Poage in retrospect noted ‘I don’t recall hearing as much complaint as some other people say we heard at that time. I doubt that the district approved of it [the *Brown* decision], but neither did I think that our district was getting up in arms about it.’<sup>15</sup>

Race was a vital issue in Texas politics in 1956 and Texans as a whole endorsed segregation and elected segregationist state officials. Yet they also re-elected those who did not sign the Southern Manifesto. National and local imperatives drove the majority of Texas congressmen safely to ignore segregationist constituency sentiment.

## II

In Tennessee a similar mix of national presidential ambitions and state leadership shaped the parameters within which leading politicians could afford not to sign the Southern Manifesto. The Manifesto was issued in the midst of Estes Kefauver’s battle in the Democratic primaries for the 1956 presidential nomination. As a Southerner chasing national office, he had little choice but to denounce the Manifesto. The drafters did not even bother to ask him to sign it. He reiterated his 1954 stand that the *Brown* decision was the law of the land and had to be obeyed. He regarded as pure deceit ‘any attempt to lead the people into believing Congress could change the court’s ruling’. ‘People of goodwill’ should be left to seek solutions at the local level. The federal government had an obligation to help much more vigorously to facilitate such solutions. He also saw the issue in an international dimension in the Cold War: ‘people all over the world with skin that is not white are restive’.<sup>16</sup>

Albert Gore had a different power base in Tennessee to Kefauver: he was widely regarded as a more down-to-earth politician and he was well regarded by his fellow Southern senators. But he shared Kefauver’s economic liberalism: his hostility to big business, his championing of public power, and his support of progressive taxation. Gore also had national ambitions. He was hankering after the vice-presidential nomination in 1956, as, indeed, was the governor of Tennessee, Frank Clement. It was said in Tennessee that year, ‘in America it is possible for any man to run for president. In Tennessee they all are.’ Gore had been rather less emphatic than Kefauver in his endorsement of the *Brown* decision: it was the law of the land, but he stressed that the decision was fortunately not for immediate implementation and that it had been taken out of the hands of Congress. He was at pains to point out to constituents that these views did not mean that he agreed with the decision. Gore now recalls that he was always ‘upfront’ on the race issue. He dates his awareness of the moral dimension of civil rights to his first trip from his constituency to Washington in

<sup>15</sup> Interview with Jim Wright, 18 Nov. 1996. Beaumont *Enterprise*, 29 July 1956. Poage oral history interview, vol. 3 p. 815, Poage papers.

<sup>16</sup> New York *Times* 12 Mar., 3 Apr. 1956. Speech draft 1956, Estes Kefauver to P. L. Prattis, 19 May 1956, Kefauver to B. L. Fonville, 10 May 1956, Estes Kefauver papers, University of Tennessee, Knoxville.

1939. On the long drive he could find no restrooms that the black nanny, who was looking after their baby, could use. That first trip he had to make a long detour to his cousin's house in the mountains to stay the night. Subsequently, he made an arrangement with a motel in eastern Tennessee. The family and the nanny could stay, provided they arrived after dark and left before the other guests in the morning.<sup>17</sup>

Gore regarded the Manifesto as 'the most spurious, inane, insulting document of a political nature claiming to be legally founded I had ever seen'. It represented an act of secession. It was 'utterly incomprehensible and unsupportable'. Thurmond invited Gore to sign it on the floor of the Senate, waving the sheet with all the Southern signatures in front of him and jabbing him in the chest. After Gore replied 'Hell, no', he looked up to see that all the Southern pressmen, obviously primed in advance, were in the gallery. In Tennessee he soon heard from chapters of the Federation for Constitutional Government. As his wife's old classmate, Sims Crownover, threatened him, Gore faced 'almost certain defeat in 1958'. Crownover repeated a familiar theme: voters expected Kefauver not to sign. One correspondent claimed, Kefauver 'has made it quite clear from the outset that he would sell the entire South to the NAACP in return for a few votes' but, Crownover said, they felt Gore had 'actually betrayed the South because people felt that you were on their side'.<sup>18</sup>

Gore received plenty of mail to weigh against the segregationist protests. A month after the Manifesto was issued, he claimed that mail on the subject had almost stopped. The race issue had been used against Kefauver in the 1954 Tennessee primary and would be again in 1960. Gore's opponent in 1958, Prentiss Cooper, specifically campaigned on the issue of the Manifesto and waved a copy of the Declaration at every opportunity on the stump. Both Gore and Kefauver successfully fought off such well-financed challengers and Gore later claimed that in Tennessee the race issue was not as divisive as the Vietnam War when people would cross the street rather than shake hands with him. Veteran Nashville congressman and staunch Baptist Percy Priest also had little trouble gaining re-election after not signing the Manifesto. Two Tennessee congressmen who did sign, Ross Bass and Joe Evins, went out of their way to claim that the Manifesto was meaningless.<sup>19</sup>

The path of racial moderation was easier in Tennessee than in some

<sup>17</sup> Albert Gore to Mrs Talley, 12 Oct. 1954, Albert Gore papers, Middle Tennessee State University, Murfreesboro. James B. Gardner, 'Political leadership in a period of transition: Frank G. Clement, Albert Gore, Estes Kefauver and Tennessee politics, 1948-1956' (Ph.D. thesis, Vanderbilt, 1978), pp. 500-670. Interview with Albert Gore Sr, 1 Dec. 1990.

<sup>18</sup> Albert Gore interview, 13 Mar. 1978, Southern Oral History Program, Southern Historical Collection, Chapel Hill. Interview with Albert Gore Sr, 1 Dec. 1990. Donald Davidson to Albert Gore, 12 Mar. 1956, Fred Childress to Gore, 12 Mar. 1956, Sims Crownover to Gore, 19 Apr. 1956, Gore papers.

<sup>19</sup> Interview with Albert Gore Sr, 1 Dec. 1990. Albert Gore to Pat Hughes, 12 Apr. 1956, Gore papers. Nashville *Tennessean*, 13 Mar., 18 Mar. 1956.

Southern states: a greater percentage of voting age blacks were registered; organized labour was a force to be counted; the Tennessee Valley Authority had a liberalizing impact; there were newspapers who supported compliance with the Supreme Court. But in these respects Tennessee was not so very different from North Carolina and Arkansas at least. What distinguished Tennessee was that both senators and the governor chose to seek public support for compliance with the law of the land. In such circumstances when the three leading politicians ('you and coon-skin and pretty-boy' in the words of one of Gore's less friendly constituents), despite their rivalry, set the terms of the political debate in a particular way, racial moderation had a chance of success.<sup>20</sup>

### III

In Florida, Spessard Holland had sufficient doubts about the Manifesto to work with Fulbright and Price Daniel to tone it down, but he eventually signed and George Smathers as a matter of reflex followed suit. Several Florida congressmen were reported to be reluctant to sign, but rabid segregationist Bob Sikes removed their doubts.<sup>21</sup>

Dante Fascell from Miami was unmoved by this pressure. Like Jim Wright and Frank Smith, Fascell's political world was shaped by the New Deal and the Second World War. As a Northern migrant when he was a small boy, he had fought Klan-type gangs in his Coconut Grove school. After the war he returned home determined to take a full part in political life. In Miami's version of a GI revolt his first political campaign – 'the damnedest political fight I have ever seen' – was to recall the corrupt and conservative Miami City Commission. By 1947 he was president of the Miami Junior Chamber of Commerce, the Italian-American Club and the Young Democrats. He then worked to get his commanding officer elected to the state legislature.<sup>22</sup>

Fascell always reacted to Klan-style bullying. Anticipating the Brown decision, he addressed public meetings in Dade County with the principal of the black high school urging the community to take steps to prepare for change. As a candidate for Congress he sought black support through traditional means – surreptitiously through local black ministers and with the help of a former sheriff and current state senator who had originally thought Fascell could not win because he was too short, the wrong race and voters could not pronounce his name. But he also became the first candidate in Miami to seek black support 'in daylight', taking his three-piece band into black neighbourhoods and actively canvassing the black community. He announced that he considered

<sup>20</sup> Hugh Davis Graham, *Crisis in print: desegregation and the press in Tennessee* (Nashville, 1967), pp. 29–90. Miss Jean Scraggs to Albert Gore, 28 Jan. 1956, Gore papers.

<sup>21</sup> Spessard L. Holland to Mrs A. L. Anderson, 27 Mar. 1956, Spessard Holland papers, University of Florida, Gainesville. Miami *Herald*, 8, 11 Mar. 1956. Interview with Dante Fascell, 27 Feb. 1997.

<sup>22</sup> Interview with Dante Fascell, 27 Feb. 1997. Claudia Townsend, *Dante Fascell: Democratic representative from Florida* (Ralph Nader Congress papers, Citizens Look at Congress, 1972), p. 1.

the Manifesto a ‘piece of chest-thumping’ – he was one of the few non-signers immediately to issue a statement explaining his decision, a feisty unapologetic document remorselessly demonstrating the futility of the Manifesto. The reaction was strong from his constituents: ‘Man’, he recalled ‘that was like jumping off the Brooklyn Bridge at high noon. I took my life in my hands’. But he survived: he already knew that filing date had passed and that he would face no opposition in the Democratic primary.<sup>23</sup>

#### IV

The evidence from Texas, Tennessee, and Florida suggests that there might have been more room for manoeuvre than Southern moderates were prepared to credit. The evidence from North Carolina is more ambiguous. First, it highlights what an idiosyncratic and personal matter taking a moderate stand on racial matters was. Second, the fate of the congressmen who did not sign suggests that the political perils were not imaginary.

There was considerable unease in the North Carolina congressional delegation about signing the Manifesto. At first, only Hubert Bonner and Graham Barden from the rural east signed. In the end, however, only three congressmen refused to sign. All faced immediate primary battles for re-election in which their failure to sign was a salient issue. Two of the three were defeated.<sup>24</sup> It is difficult to imagine three more disparate congressmen than Charles Deane, Harold Cooley, and Thurmond Chatham and three more diverse routes to racial moderation.

Harold Cooley had not entirely lost the vestiges of the liberalism which saw him elected to the House as a New Dealer in 1934. As chairman of the House Agriculture Committee, he saw himself as part of the national Democratic leadership; he had to work with Northern and Western representatives of other farm commodities to ensure favourable treatment for tobacco; and he may have had thoughts of his own of the vice-presidential nomination in 1956. Not lacking in the sense of his own importance, Cooley resented being presented with the Manifesto by the senators as a sort of *fait accompli*, when House members had been kept out of the discussions which led to its drafting.<sup>25</sup>

Thurmond Chatham was the millionaire chairman of the board of directors of the family Chatham mills. In the 1930s he was a Roosevelt-hating member of the Liberty League. In 1940 he supported Republican Wendell Willkie. Elected to Congress on an anti-union platform in 1948, he remained firmly

<sup>23</sup> Interview with Dante Fascell, 27 Feb. 1997. *Miami Herald*, 11, 12 Mar. 1956. Taylor, *Fascell*, p. 9.

<sup>24</sup> *Raleigh News and Observer*, 13 Mar. 1956. Howard W. Smith was the congressional leader responsible for securing signatures from the North Carolina delegation. The successive lists in his papers show the order in which the North Carolina delegation signed up, Howard W. Smith papers, University of Virginia, Charlottesville.

<sup>25</sup> Clipping, Henderson *Times-News* 14 Mar. 1956, Harold D. Cooley to H. Q. Dorsett, 13 Mar. 1956, Harold Dunbar Cooley papers, Southern Historical Collection, Chapel Hill.

opposed to unionization, particularly of his own mill, and he opposed raising the minimum wage. As a student at Yale, however, in 1916 he had sat next to a black student in two of his classes and become friendly with him; in the Navy in the Second World War he had seen desegregation in operation; on the House Foreign Affairs Committee he had become friendly with younger liberals, Abraham Ribicoff and Lloyd Bentsen. His support for national Democrats on foreign policy began to spill over into the domestic field. He favoured recognition of Red China. When the Supreme Court decision came in 1954 he said he had been expecting it; he was confident that the South would take it in its stride; and he was pleased that the decision was out of the way. America would be able to turn its attention to ‘the greater problems which face us in the international sphere’.<sup>26</sup>

By contrast, Charles B. Deane was an unequivocal liberal on domestic economic and social affairs. He had been elected in 1946 with the backing of the textile and railroad unions in his eighth district. He could be relied on by both the national Democratic leadership and by national union leaders. He was also a staunch Baptist, a former secretary of the state Baptist Convention.<sup>27</sup>

Both Deane’s religion and his economic liberalism led him to a liberal stand on civil rights. But there was another compelling impetus. Deane had become a member of Moral ReArmament (MRA), the movement for moral uplift known earlier as the Oxford Movement and led by Frank Buchman. In 1951 Deane had been to one of MRA’s plays in Washington. As he told a former congressman, the consequences were startling: ‘revolutionary things have taken place in our family... I saw myself as I really was, wrapped up in a cloud of self-righteousness going round with a mask and there were a good many iron curtains within the family circle’. His daughter sacrificed a legacy that was to pay her way through college, gave it to MRA, went to work for MRA full time, and went round the world as part of the integrated cast of ‘The Vanishing Island’, a musical in rhyming verse written by Peter Howard. Deane himself accompanied the play part of the time.<sup>28</sup>

The message MRA put across was one of absolute personal standards: absolute honesty, absolute purity, absolute unselfishness, absolute love. People imbued with these standards could resolve all the conflicts in society either in the international sphere, in labour relations, or in racial matters.<sup>29</sup>

MRA was wholeheartedly anti-Communist, but it was convinced that military spending could not contain Communism, especially in the Third

<sup>26</sup> Ralph J. Christian, ‘The Folger-Chatham congressional primary of 1946’, *North Carolina Historical Review*, 53 (1976), pp. 25–53. Raleigh *News and Observer*, 18 May 1954. Winston-Salem *Journal*, 18 May 1954.

<sup>27</sup> Greensboro *Daily News*, 2 Sept. 1955. Winston-Salem *Journal*, 12 Sept. 1955. Comment, James L. Sundquist, 8 Apr. 1987. John A. Long to Charles B. Deane, 23 Apr. 1956, John A. Lang papers, East Carolina Manuscript Collection, East Carolina University, Greenville.

<sup>28</sup> Charles B. Deane to Walter Lambeth, 22 Oct. 1952, Deane papers. Interview with Charles B. Deane Jr, 12 Sept. 1989.

<sup>29</sup> Charles B. Deane to Fay Allen, 21 Nov. 1951, Deane papers.

World. Rather, as Deane himself passionately believed, Americans needed to win the battle for the hearts and minds. The battle could not be won by the picture of American capitalism as ‘half-dressed women, debased youth, effeminate heroes, gangsters and cowboys’. It could not be won by ‘Big talk coupled with low living’. Victory needed young people ‘as thoroughly trained and disciplined in living the ideology of freedom’ as the Communists and ‘honest about the places where change will come if the faith of our fathers is to be fulfilled’.<sup>30</sup>

Race relations was one of the areas where change would have to come. Deane’s religious and political concern for the dispossessed re-enforced his conviction that racial change at home was essential if America was to have success overseas. This conviction was strengthened by an MRA visit to Kenya where he visited the prison camps for the Mau Mau fighting the British. He was acutely conscious of the potential black hatred for the white race.<sup>31</sup>

In the primaries that followed it is difficult to disentangle the race issue from other local issues. But the issue was unambiguously joined in Charles Deane’s case. Deane had not faced serious opposition in 1952 and 1954. No opponent filed against him in 1956 until he failed to sign the Manifesto. Two days later a local school superintendent told him ‘it is clear to a number of people that if any average candidate ran against you that you would not be able to secure 30 per cent of the votes in your district at the present time’. Then a retired FBI agent and law partner of a former lieutenant-governor announced against Deane. The first two items in all Paul Kitchen’s literature were that the candidate would have signed the Manifesto and that he opposed race-mixing. Deane’s daughter was smeared by the distribution of a cropped photograph showing her at a MRA camp next to two blacks. Blacks were paid to ring up white voters and ask them to support Deane. A textile union leader sadly reported that his members would no longer support the congressman. As a result a congressman who had had powerful support in his district and had assiduously catered to his constituents’ patronage and pork barrel needs found himself comfortably beaten. He lost all the counties bordering on the South Carolina black belt with the highest percentage of blacks in their population. He even lost his home county of Richmond by a three to one vote, with the opposition forces, including black votes, marshalled by the local sheriff.<sup>32</sup>

In the case of Chatham and Cooley the evidence is more mixed. The first letter Chatham received after not signing the Manifesto told the congressman ‘you express yourself like a Damn Yankee. If you like the Negro you can have him but I think you are a dead duck’. Two days after not signing the Manifesto, Chatham was told ‘your not signing along with the rest of the

<sup>30</sup> Notes for schools and colleges [n.d.], notes, 22 Nov. 1956, Deane papers.

<sup>31</sup> Charles B. Deane to Herman Hardison, 27 Mar. 1956, Deane papers.

<sup>32</sup> Interview with Charles B. Deane Jr, 12 Sept. 1989. Charles B. Deane to Mrs P. A. Wood, 28 July 1956, Lang papers. Lewis Cannon to Charles B. Deane, 15 Mar. 1956, leaflet [n.d.], Deane to James E. Griffin, 7 May 1956, J. B. Hood to Deane, 24 Apr. 1956, Nina Duke Wood to Deane, 26 July 1956, Deane papers.

Southern congressmen in opposition of [sic] desegregation (mongrelizing) will I'm sure place you in favour with senator [sic] Hubert Humphrey and his Negro worshippers'. The North Carolina Patriots targeted Chatham for special opposition with particular success in two counties in his district.<sup>33</sup>

Cooley had no opposition until he refused to sign the Declaration. Then he was opposed by local broadcaster Waldemar Eros Debnam, who had written the popular racist tract, *Then My Old Kentucky Home, Good Night*. Debnam labelled Cooley the NAACP candidate. Debnam claims he resisted attempts to buy his candidacy off. 'I regarded the Manifesto as a recall issue and it was my intention to play the fact that Cooley had attacked the document to the hilt, letting the people draw their own conclusions ... I made it plain that I regard this segregation business as of tremendous importance to our people and the duty of every man to stand up and fight by every legal means forced racial integration.'<sup>34</sup>

But there were local and personal factors in the elections as well. Chatham had faced surprisingly stiff opposition in 1952 and 1954 from political unknowns who had capitalized on his absentee record in Congress. In 1956, irrespective of the Manifesto, he was going to face opposition from a substantial local politician, a county solicitor who represented part of the constituency that felt that it had been overlooked historically in terms of congressional representation. Chatham's opponent stressed his absenteeism, his foreign trips, and his earlier support of Republican candidates. There was also a whispering campaign about Chatham's alcoholism (and indeed Chatham died of cirrhosis of the liver in 1957).<sup>35</sup>

Cooley had long since ceased to keep his political fences mended and he too enjoyed foreign junkets. He was attacked as the 'globe-trotting gadfly'. Voters were told 'the district needs a full time congressman'. There were even deeper personal factors. The first person to denounce Cooley for not signing the Manifesto, and to consider running himself, was Pou Bailey, the man who later persuaded Jesse Helms to run for the Senate. Bailey's cousin was the man Cooley defeated to get into Congress twenty-two years earlier: Bailey's uncle had defeated Cooley's father for the same congressional seat in 1916.<sup>36</sup>

Chatham remained unapologetic for his refusal to sign the Manifesto. He ran best in high-income wards and in black wards in Winston-Salem, an early forerunner of the cross-class, bi-racial alliance that would play an important

<sup>33</sup> Anon. to Thurmond Chatham [n.d.], Dallas Gwynn to Chatham, 24 Mar. 1956; I. F. Young to Chatham, 13 May 1956, Thurmond Chatham papers, North Carolina Division of Archives and History, Raleigh.

<sup>34</sup> Debnam adverts, Cooley papers. Raleigh *News and Observer*, 17 Mar. 1956. Memorandum, 19 Mar. 1956, Waldemar Eros Debnam papers, East Carolina Manuscript Collection, East Carolina University, Greenville.

<sup>35</sup> L. van Noppen to Thurmond Chatham, 8 Mar. 1956, Ralph Scott adverts, Chatham papers. Greensboro *Daily News*, 10, 13 Apr. 1956. Winston-Salem *Journal*, 19 Apr. 1956.

<sup>36</sup> Ermine B. Hampton to Barbara Dearing [n.d.], Debnam adverts, Cooley papers. Raleigh *News and Observer*, 14 Mar, 6 Apr. 1956. Anthony J. Badger, *North Carolina and the New Deal* (Raleigh, 1981), p. 89.

part in Southern politics in the 1960s. Cooley won – but he race-baited the race-baiter to do so. He started off the campaign by stressing the false hopes that the Manifesto aroused and the fact that as a lawyer he could not attack the Supreme Court in the language of the Manifesto. While he still asserted that he was proud of his decision not to sign, by the end of the campaign he was proclaiming that he hated and despised the *Brown* decision. Then he counter-attacked by accusing Debnam of advocating desegregation of public transport and for having eaten a meal with the NAACP's Roy Wilkins in Wilkins's home in New York City. His opponent, said Cooley, had said 'let the Negro eat where he pleases, sit where he pleases and sleep where he pleases. This is exactly what Debnam's friend Roy Wilkins has been advocating for years'. Flanked by Senator Sam Ervin, Cooley flooded the district with his segregationist propaganda and overwhelmed Debnam by a two to one margin.<sup>37</sup>

## V

The wide diversity of political opinion amongst the non-signers – from New Deal liberal to Democratic party stalwart to right-wing ideologue – highlights the personal and fragmented nature of the forces of Southern racial moderation in the 1950s. A variety of factors led to their decision not to bow to segregationist pressure in 1956: experience in World War, national political ambitions, concerns for party unity, Cold War fears, religious belief, an urban political base. But all these factors were also compatible with the defence of white supremacy.

Did their experience suggest there was an alternative to defiance, a road not taken by most of their moderate and liberal colleagues in the South in the mid-1950s? None of these politicians came from the Deep South, black majority districts. A historian second-guesses a Frank Smith, a Hale Boggs, or a Carl Elliott at his peril. In the absence of detailed public opinion polls, a historian needs to be careful of confident assertions about what their constituents might have tolerated in the 1950s. To argue that the politician on the ground knew less about constituency sentiment in their own districts than someone from the comfortable vantage point of Britain in the 1990s is clearly fraught with dangers. The fate, outside the Deep South, of Chatham and Deane in their primary elections is, in any case, enough to give the presumptuous historian pause. It is important, however, to note that conservatives at the time were much less confident than their moderate protagonists that public opinion was overwhelmingly in the massive resistance camp. The irony was that conservatives and liberals both believed that public opinion was on the other side. Most moderates believed that whites were so stirred up on the race issues that they had no alternative but to retreat and become 'closet moderates'.

<sup>37</sup> Harold Cooley to E. L. Cannon, 3 Apr. 1956, Nashville (NC) speech, 7 Apr. 1956, Henderson speech, 17 May 1956; WTVD speech, Cooley papers. Thurmond Chatham to Hiden Ramsay, 31 May 1956, Chatham to Ralph Howland, 5 June 1956, Chatham papers.



Conservatives such as the drafters of the Southern Manifesto, by contrast, believed that public opinion was insufficiently aroused on the race issue, that white Southerners were entirely too likely to accept the inevitability of compliance with the Supreme Court decision. The difference was that the conservatives were prepared to use instruments like the Manifesto as part of a righteous crusade to change public opinion, to convince white Southerners that desegregation was not inevitable, that white supremacy could be protected. Most Southern moderates were not prepared to take their case to the people.

Did congressional moderates have to be so supine? The case of the non-signers does suggest that there might have been some room for manoeuvre. In Texas and Tennessee significant elements of the state political leadership defined the parameters for debate in such a way that racial moderates enjoyed a measure of protection from electoral retribution. It is difficult to believe that that alternative was not available in Arkansas, Florida, and Virginia. Mississippi, South Carolina, and Louisiana may not have offered such scope. (Even there, Frank Smith has suggested that he always hoped that an agreement amongst political and business leaders for a united stand in favour of compliance with the Supreme Court could have carried the day against segregationist demagogues.)<sup>38</sup> But surely Alabama offered the possibility of a compliance alternative: a state where the governor and both senators were economic liberals and racial moderates and which boasted the most liberal House delegation in the South. Instead, personal incompetence on the part of the governor and personal caution on the part of the congressional politicians paved the way for a segregationist triumph.

But if there was a road not taken in the South in the mid-1950s, what direction was the road going in? If most of the non-signers recognized that the Brown decision was inevitable, that it was the law of the land, and outright defiance was futile, few of them were in any hurry to give up the privileges of segregation and, like other moderates, feared the power of white public segregationist opinion. They were therefore gradualists, like the moderates who signed the Manifesto, like the Eisenhower administration, like the Supreme Court, and, indeed, as Walter Jackson has shown, like most Northern white liberals.<sup>39</sup> They all feared an aroused white citizenry. What Lyndon Johnson, Estes Kefauver, Albert Gore, Jim Wright, and Charles Deane objected to in the Manifesto was the fact that it stirred up that white sentiment and created the false hope that the court could be defied. What they wanted instead was token compliance, to leave the matter to local men and women of goodwill of both races.

Their strategy begged the question of what would happen if these local men and women of goodwill would not agree to compliance, since these moderates

<sup>38</sup> Interview with Frank Smith, 4 Nov. 1995.

<sup>39</sup> Walter Jackson, 'White Liberal intellectuals, civil rights, and gradualism, 1954-1960', in Brian Ward and Tony Badger, eds, *The making of Martin Luther King and the civil rights movement* (London, 1996), pp. 96-114.

also set their face firmly against what they called 'forced integration'. They seemed to believe that, if no one stirred up the issue, desegregation would slip in without arousing mass white outrage. Indeed, for someone like Bob Poage, the reasoning seemed to be that if no one stirred up the issue, segregated schools could continue indefinitely. This stealth-like approach, and the repeated calls for a 'cooling off period', was one reason why they denounced the NAACP as extremists, because NAACP action inevitably brought the issue to centre stage. The Southern moderate politicians had a vivid sense of the opinions of their white constituents; they had no equal sense of the opinions of Southern African-Americans. Even those moderates who courted black support mostly did so at a distance, relying on black leaders and intermediaries to deliver the black vote, rather than coming face to face with black voters. Those black leaders were often, as Numan Bartley has described them, 'racial diplomats' who told the white politicians what they wanted to hear.<sup>40</sup> It was not surprising that Albert Gore, Jim Wright, and Dante Fascell could refuse to sign the Southern Manifesto, vote for the 1957 Civil Rights Act, but vote against the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

The gradualist strategy espoused by the non-signers of the Manifesto might have spared the South some of the bitter racial turmoil of the late 1950s and early 1960s. But the strategy they advocated contained a considerable amount of wishful thinking. It was almost a strategy based on *not* campaigning to persuade ordinary white Southerners of the merits of gradualism. It was not a strategy likely to succeed in the face of conservative segregationists who were determined to take their case to the people, to mount a righteous crusade to convince white Southerners that the Supreme Court could be defied.

<sup>40</sup> Numan Bartley, *The New South, 1945–1980* (Baton Rouge, 1995), pp. 175–6.