

it above all others, and through this reductionism excludes other vectors of analysis.

In the end, the deep structures elucidated in this book are not cultural or historical but historiographical. During the postwar rise of Soviet studies, the “totalitarianism school” was split between those emphasizing totalitarian uniqueness and others depicting a totalitarian variant on modern industrial society. In its day, revisionism, while delving into historical particularity, often emphasized phenomena identified by social science as modern—most famously, Sheila Fitzpatrick’s “social mobility”—to counter the totalitarian notion of Stalinism as *sui generis*. But in the 1990s members of a “modernity school” emphasized state projects of transformation and ideology, sometimes with an explicit rehabilitation of their totalitarian “grandfathers,” while Fitzpatrick and others began to stress the personalistic, hierarchical nature of Stalinist politics and society, pointing to such phenomena as *blat* and patronage. The theory of neotraditionalism was advanced as a rival to the notion of modernity, emphasizing the combination of traditional and modern features. Getty, while inconsistent in his rhetoric, takes this one step further in substance, moving from neotraditionalism to patrimonialism *tout court*.

By the cunning of historiography, then, Getty, the former archrevisionist, has now aligned himself with an interpretation of Russian history that most closely resembles Richard Pipes’s. But even for Pipes the rise of the modern police state in the late imperial period was a crucial innovation. Insofar as he depicts Russian politics as fundamentally the same whatever the historical period, and reduces all politics to clan politics, Getty reinforces the essentialism of popular prejudice.

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***Myth, Memory, Trauma: Rethinking the Stalinist Past in the Soviet Union, 1953–1970.*** By Polly Jones. Eurasia Past and Present. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013. xii, 360 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. \$65.00, hard bound.

In 1954, one year after Iosif Stalin’s death, Il’ia Erenburg’s novella *The Thaw* provided a profoundly influential metaphor of post-Stalin transition. Indeed, literary works constituted an early means of tracking changes in the Soviet Union; George Gibian’s study of thaw literature dubbed the period after Stalin’s death the “interval of freedom.” More recently, historians have vigorously contested the metaphor and charted studies in many fields—family life, criminal justice, architecture—in the wake of Stalin’s death. Nonetheless, both the thaw metaphor and the tendency to understand the thaw as a literary phenomenon persist.

Polly Jones’s study of Soviet literary and, to a lesser extent, historical writing in the decade and a half after Stalin’s death can thus be understood as a return to well-trod ground. However, she arrives armed with an impressive range of archival sources that allow her to construct a detailed picture of the

production and popular reception of post-Stalin representations of Soviet life. In examining these new sources, Jones brings new questions to bear. Approaching de-Stalinization as “an exercise in coming to terms with the past” (3), Jones asks how the state authorized Soviet citizens to rethink Soviet history and their own life stories in light of partial, but nonetheless shocking, revelations of Stalin’s crimes and how writers and readers responded.

Given the importance of official authorization for public efforts to come to terms with the Stalinist past, Jones begins her study in 1956 with an examination of the production and reception of Nikita Khrushchev’s so-called secret speech at the Twentieth Party Congress. Written hastily by committee, the speech, Jones argues, emerged as a confusing and ambiguous hybrid. It stitched together a factual report on the Central Committee’s investigation into the purges and a collection of Khrushchev’s vignettes of Stalin’s incompetence and cruelty. Downplaying the role that intraparty political battles played in Khrushchev’s decision to make the speech and to support, albeit sporadically, the process of de-Stalinization, Jones emphasizes his interest in mastering the past: Stalin weighed like a nightmare on his heirs’ minds. At the same time, she recognizes some role for more immediate political considerations, explaining, for example, Khrushchev’s 1963 “pendulum swings”—when, within the space of a few months, he both praised and condemned Stalin—as responses to “broader political and ideological imperatives,” including the “serious threat of anti-Soviet tendencies in the Soviet intelligentsia” and “growing tensions with China and Albania” (125).

In her treatment of the secret speech and subsequent party statements on the cult of personality, the purges, and Stalin’s reputation, Jones emphasizes ambiguity, uncertainty, unpredictability, and instability. Failing to present a “uniform line on the memory of Stalinism” (23), the “secret” speech—disseminated to local party organizations soon after the congress—generated unanticipated and uncomfortable questions. In December 1956 the Central Committee issued a directive that aimed to rein in the discussion. But it, too, failed to provide a coherent, stable party line; rather, it struck a “tense balance” between the “drive to eliminate potential dissent” and “nagging anxieties” that a “clampdown” on de-Stalinization would facilitate a revival of Stalinism (60). The more radical de-Stalinization authorized by the Twenty-Second Party Congress, in 1961, which resulted in the eviction of Stalin’s embalmed body from the mausoleum on Red Square, was itself followed by the aforementioned bewildering “pendulum swings.” Even after Khrushchev’s ouster, in 1964, the new leadership struggled to “fix” Stalin’s reputation, a task accomplished, Jones argues, only in December 1969, on the occasion of his ninetieth birthday. *Pravda*’s jubilee article balanced “mild praise” with “mild blame,” a formula that satisfied no one but provided a stable, “easily reproducible” image of Stalin that would turn up again in commemorations of his hundredth birthday (248). However useful, this stabilization of Stalin’s image “left Stalinism an unresolved episode in Soviet collective memory” (213)—a problem, Jones notes in the conclusion, that has carried over into the post-Soviet period.

Jones’s account of popular responses to de-Stalinization, drawing on substantial caches of letters to editors and authors, especially those to the

popular wartime journalist and novelist Konstantin Simonov, as well as surveillance reports, charts the “unpredictable, sometimes uncontrollable, discussion about memories of Stalinism and about Soviet memory itself” (4). To some extent her account transposes the conventional representation of the thaw as a clash of reformers and conservatives into the new key of memory politics. Her description of the mounting criticism of Vladimir Dudintsev’s novel *Not by Bread Alone* in late 1956 and early 1957—the period of refreezing that followed the thaw initiated by the secret speech—pits “liberals” (73) in the Moscow Writers’ Union, who “emphasized the purifying and ‘healthy’ effects of literary glasnost” against “conservative opponents,” who “deemed such retrospection compulsive and painful” (83). However, even as she details the “uncontrolled” nature of some discussions, Jones disputes the hallowed story of the courageous writer confronting the state in the name of individual rights. Instead, she emphasizes that many writers and historians participated in the “taming of the thaws in their respective professions” because they embraced their “role in celebrating the Soviet past” (60). Similarly, many readers who knew, as they recounted in their letters, the terrors of war demanded that writers tell the bitter truth while acknowledging that they craved stories of triumph and redemption.

By the late 1960s Khrushchev’s successors had withdrawn official sanction from efforts to publicly rethink the Stalinist past. Jones emphasizes that this was a contested and drawn-out process, epitomized by the tortuous path to nonpublication of Aleksandr Bek’s novel *The New Appointment* and Simonov’s annotated war diaries—works “haunted by the figure of Stalin and by the memory of 1937” (226). While explaining the origins of dissent falls beyond the scope of her study, Jones suggests that the need to work through “the crimes of Stalin and the Stalin era” (257) led many writers to samizdat.

In the background of these textured assessments of writers’ and readers’ responses to the process of de-Stalinization stand the three big concepts headlined in the book’s title: *myth*, *memory*, and *trauma*. Each of these contested terms has generated a vast scholarly literature. However, Jones rarely intervenes directly in the debates around these central concepts—which, somewhat surprisingly, do not appear in the index—a situation that may puzzle those unfamiliar with memory studies and disappoint those immersed in it.

For Jones, these concepts provide a useful means of normalizing Soviet memory. As she makes clear at the outset, she is keen to show that “contestation over the Stalinist past . . . resembles the ‘contested pasts’ of other political systems and countries” (4). This emphasis on normal contestation leads her to reject the “tenacious belief that Soviet public memory consistently falsified and silenced popular memories” and to posit instead a “dynamic interplay within and between official and popular memory” (10). This theme emerges clearly in the chapter on Simonov and his readers, “Between Myth and Memory: War, Terror, and Stalin in Popular Memory,” which traces the resonances of the official “myth” of the war among veterans, if not always among those “haunted by memories of imprisonment,” who emphasized the “gulf between public and private memories of terror and war” (198). The analysis suggests that there was perhaps more dynamic interplay between individual memories of the war and the myth of the great victory than between private (pre-

viously hidden) memories of the terror and the official narrative, which emphasized that the limited “damage wrought by the terror . . . lay firmly in the past” (198).

Jones places the question of coming to terms with “the traumatic impact of Stalinism” at the heart of “debates about Soviet public memory itself”: “was it supposed to celebrate the Soviet past or . . . confront the traumatic aspects of that past” (2)? Here she seems to employ the vernacular definition of “trauma” as inherent in violent events (such as those encapsulated by “1937” and “1941”) and to understand people who experience traumatic events as likely to possess an “instinctive awareness of the curative powers of remembrance and narrativization” (191). Hence the popular support for the truth telling authorized by de-Stalinization. But elsewhere Jones suggests that she understands trauma not as inherent in events but rather as socially constructed. Although the Twenty-Second Party Congress granted writers permission to “confront the tragedy or horror” of the terror (139), the pervasive and powerful “heroic narrative of party devotion and martyrdom” (140) worked against the construction of the terror as trauma. For some writers and readers, Soviet myths of progress and redemption had more “curative power” than truth telling and remembrance, which promised only to “reopen old wounds” (157). This debate, too, Jones asserts, “echoed debates in very different political systems” (157).

Providing richly detailed and engaging accounts of the prolonged and complicated debates over memory that engaged Soviet writers of fiction and history as well as readers after 1953, this book will appeal to a broad interdisciplinary audience. Jones’s approach to the literary history of the post-Stalin period, with its emphasis on questions of reception, makes the book attractive for use with advanced undergraduates and graduate students.

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