Nationalities Papers (2020), 48: 3, 569–584
doi:10.1017/nps.2019.120

SPECIAL ISSUE ARTICLE

The Don and Kuban Regions During Famine: The Authorities, the Cossacks, and the Church in 1921–1922 and 1932–1933

Evgeny Krinko,[1*] Alexander Skorik,[2] and Alla Shadrina[3]

[1]Department of Humanities of the Federal Research Centre the Southern Scientific Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Rostov-on-Don, Russia; [2]Department of Jurisprudence, Philosophy and History and the Research Institute of the History of the Cossacks and the Development of Cossack Regions of the South Russian State Polytechnic University named after Platova, Novocherkassk, Russia; and [3]Cossacks Laboratory of the Federal Research Centre the Southern Scientific Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Rostov-on-Don, Russia
*Corresponding author. Email: krinko@ssc-ras.ru

Abstract
This article studies the famine of 1921–1922 and 1932–1933 in the Southern Russian regions. Famine as a socio-historical phenomenon is considered in the context of the relationship of state power, the Cossacks, and the Church. The authors reveal the general and special features of the famine emergence and analyze the differences in the state policies of 1921–1922 and 1932–1933. Considerable attention is paid to the survival strategies of the Don, Kuban and Terek populations. Slaughtering and eating draft animals, transfer from the state places of work to the private campaigns and cooperatives, moving to shores and banks, and eating river and sea food became widespread methods of overcoming famine. Asocial survival strategies included cannibalism, abuse of powers, bribery, and more. In 1921–1922, the Russian Orthodox Church fought actively against the famine. In 1932–1933, the Church was weakened and could not provide significant assistance to the starving population. The article was written based on declassified documents from the state and departmental archives, including criminal investigations and analytical materials of the Obedinjonnoe gosudarstvennoe politicheskoe upravlenie [Joint State Political Directorate] (OGPU) recording the attitudes of minds. Also used are personal stories—namely, interviews with eyewitnesses of the famine of 1932–1933, recorded by the Kuban folklorists in the territory of the Krasnodar and Stavropol Krai.

Keywords: Famine; Don; Kuban; Cossacks; survival strategies; Russian Orthodox Church

The famines of 1921–1922 and 1932–1933 are among the most tragic events in the history of Soviet Russia. Memories of past miseries, such as the mass death of relatives and friends, passed on to the next generation despite the official veil of silence. The trauma of memory had a destructive effect on the social and personal identity of millions of Soviet citizens.

Analysis of the events of 1921–1922 and 1932–1933 in the Cossack regions of Southern Russia provides clarity about the scale of the tragedy and reveals the specific acts of state violence against population groups.

Prior to the 1917 revolution, these lands belonged to the Don and Kuban Cossack hosts, respectively. In contrast to Russia's central regions, the Cossack lands were hardly ever affected by hunger. The tsars rewarded the Cossacks' military service with land, autonomy, and other privileges. By 1917, though, the Cossacks constituted less than half of the population in all three regions. Their ranks were torn apart by stratification and conflicts, even though social and political tensions among them were far less pronounced than in the country overall. Most Cossacks fought

© Association for the Study of Nationalities 2020.

against the Bolsheviks during the Russian Civil War and were subsequently oppressed: their former privileges were revoked, and their independence as an estate in its own right was taken away. Upon the Bolsheviks' victory, the Cossack hosts were disbanded, their lands taken over by other territorial jurisdictions.[1]

Despite the Russian Civil War's grave consequences, partial emigration, and the state's policy of decossackization, the Cossack presence was still tangible in the country's southern regions in the 1920s and 30s. As noted in the Stalingrad Governorate Committee's 1925 report, in the former districts of the Don Host's Oblast taken over by the Stalingrad Governorate Cossacks constituted up to 80% of the populace, whereas in the Governorate on the whole Cossacks exceeded 50% of the population (634,000).[2] According to the All-Russian census of 1926, 8,363,491 people resided in the North Caucasus Krai, including 1,655,124 town dwellers and 6,708,367 rural residents. The number of Cossacks amounted to 2,301,945 (27.5%), of whom 153,646 lived in towns (9.3%), and 2,148,299 (32%) lived in Cossack villages (*stanitsa*) and on homesteads (Vorobiev 1928, 3). This information did not, however, make it into official census records, wherein most Cossacks were marked as Russians (the Don and some Kuban Cossacks) or Ukrainians (most of the Kuban Cossacks) (See Table 1). No subsequent surveys recognized Cossacks as a separate ethnicity.

The Cossack lands in the south of Russia have traditionally been Russian Orthodox, with a large Old-Believer constituent. By the early twentieth century, various sects—mostly Protestant—gained a foothold in the region. This was largely due to the 1905 legislation, which granted Russian citizens a degree of freedom of faith. The Soviet rule persecuted religion, and the Russian Orthodox Church became one of its principal targets. In an atheist state, the mere existence of the Church as an established institution with a substantial influence on the population and a very negative view of the Soviet regime's actions was seen as a serious problem.

This article examines the genesis and consequences of the two famines in the Don and Kuban regions in the context of the Soviet state's attitude to Cossacks. The analysis of differences in state policies in 1921–22 versus 1932–33 will be followed by an assessment of the population's survival strategies. The final section will be devoted to the Church's activities and predicament. In the conclusions, we shall sum up our main findings. By focusing on the situation in the former Cossack regions, we can fill considerable gaps in the general picture of hunger and clarify how the Cossacks coped with it. Additionally, an analysis of demographic, social, and cultural consequences of hunger is essential for understanding of the Cossacks' further evolution.

Political and ideological circumstances have taken their toll on the study of famines in the USSR. Multiple works on the famine of 1921–22 were published by contemporaries and eyewitnesses in Russia and abroad (Yaroslavsky 1922; Sorokin 1922; Fisher 1927). Later, this interest waned amidst the consequences of new social disasters. Events of the 1932–33 famine were hushed up from the very beginning, concealed behind the euphemistic expression "food shortages" (Skorik 2009, 93). It was not until the late 1980s that studies dedicated specifically to this topic saw the light of day (Conquest 1986; Graziosi 1998; Kondrashin and Penner 2002; Zelenin 2006; Kondrashin 2008; Ivnitsky 2009; Viola 2010). This was greatly facilitated by declassification of archival documents and the socio-political changes in the post-Soviet realm, even though this subject matter remains highly politicized.

Table 1. Population of the North Caucasus Krai in 1926 (All-Union Population Census of 1926).

Ethnicity	All population	Town dwellers	Country dwellers
Russian	3,841,063	1,009,342	2,831,721
Ukrainian	3,106,852	353,791	2,753,061
All	8,363,491	1,655,924	6,708,367

https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2019.120 Published online by Cambridge University Press

By now, researchers have compared the two famines and investigated their common causes, the impact of weather, the state of communal food production in a *kolkhoz* (collective farm), the nature of grain production, conditions in the famished rural area, and the peasants' sentiments. Historians of the North Caucasus pay close attention to famines and their consequences for this region during the 1920s and 1930s. (Bondarev 2006; Tarkhova 2010; Skorik 2008; Skorik 2009). Nevertheless, only a handful of works dedicated specifically to this topic exist (Krugov 1995; Oskolkov 1991). Publication of essential documents (The tragedy of the Soviet village, 1999–2006), including those from regional archives (Shadrina and Tabunshchikova 2013), stimulated further research both at the national and regional levels. Overall, research into famine in the Southern Russian region in the context of relations between the state, Cossacks, and the Church is a lacuna of scholarship.

This article examines this problem based on declassified documents from a number of archives, both national (GAKK; GARO; CDNIKK; CDNIRO; CDNIVO) and institutional (Archive UFSB po RO; Archive MVD KK). Particularly important are criminal investigations and analytical materials of the Joint State Political Administration (OGPU) that recorded citizens' sentiments. Also, personal records are used, such as field materials of the Kuban Folklore and Ethnography Expedition of the Research Centre for Traditional Culture of The Kuban Cossack Choir. These are interviews with eyewitnesses of the 1932–1933 famine, recorded by the Kuban folklorists in Krasnodar Krai and Stavropol Krai as early as 1975. The interviews are currently preserved in the archive of the Research Centre for Traditional Culture of The Kuban Cossack Choir and were first published in the proceedings of the thematic academic conference (Golod na Kubani 2009).

Hunger, State Policy, and Its Perception in 1921–22 and 1932–33

The peak of the first social disaster occurred during the winter of 1921 and spring of 1922. This famine was due to a draught and the related crop failure in 1921, as well as to the consequences of the Russian Civil War and the war communism policy. As a consequence of the Civil War, Russia lost 9.5% of its population. In the South, losses amounted to 17.4% of the population (Chernopitsky 1987, 5). A significant demographic attrition such as this led to a decrease in agricultural labour force and impaired the economy of agrarian regions. A declared transition to the New Economic Policy notwithstanding, practice of food requisitions continued into 1923.

It is not known precisely how many people were affected by famine in 1921–1922: we have only the minimum and the maximum thresholds at our disposal, with the inevitable for the period statistical margins taken into account. The Don regionhad the greatest number, 638,000 people starving—almost 50% of the population (Chernopitsky 1987, 54). In the Kuban region, 500,000 people were starving (Krivoded 2002, 43). The data from the three oblasts amounts to a total of over 1.7 million people starving. According to P.G. Tchernopitsky's summary findings, at least 1.5 million people were starving in the Southeastern Russia in the early 1920s (Chernopitsky 1987, 54).

Migrants from other regions started coming to Kuban, historically considered to be a rich, prosperous land (Skorik and Fedina 2013). As noted at the Second Convention of Councils of Temriukskii District of the Kuban-Black Sea Oblast on December 3, 1921, "The situation with food in the Kuban region [was] disastrous due to other governorates feeding at Kuban's expense."[3] According to the 1922 data of the Kuban-Black Sea Oblast land administration, among those starving were *stanitsas* Alexandrovskaia, Beisugskaia, Bratskaia, Voronezhskaia, Vostochnaia, Vyselki, Zhuravskaia, Korenovskaia, Ladozhskaia, Nekrasovskaia, Novolabinskaia, Platnirovskaia, Razdolnaia, Ust-Labinskaia, and the Bolgov homestead.[4] The documents noted that, "even though Kuban was relatively devastated and economically poor, it was incomparably better off than the centre of Russia. The famished central Russia was waiting for bread, and that was why, as part of the food surplus appropriation program [*prodrazvyorstka*], they began requisitioning grain here."[5] Despite requisitions, the situation in the Kuban region was considerably better than in the Don and Terek.

https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2019.120 Published online by Cambridge University Press

During the 1921–22 famine, the policy of the Soviet regime, intended to stabilize the country's socioeconomic situation after the Civil War, had no anti-Cossack agenda. The authorities tried to help the hungry (Graziosi 2016, 64), but their financial and material resources were extremely limited. Consequently, emphasis was placed on measures of administrative and fiscal nature.

Attempts were undertaken to create a system of peasant mutual aid in rural areas, similar to pre-revolutionary mutual aid societies. Committees for peasant mutual aid were seen as "a means for working peasants and the Cossacks to avoid… distresses."[6] Sowing committees regulated sowing and land use planning on location. For instance, 22 people were elected to sit on the *stanitsa* Nekrasovskaia's sowing committee: four representatives from every quarter of the *stanitsa* and two from each of the three yurt homesteads. Addtionally, households sowing no fewer than then *dessiatinas* of winter crops became members of the sowing committee by default. Consequently, the sowing committee consisted almost exclusively of the Cossacks (Kharitonov 2009, 426).

The state offered grain farmers concessions and loans. The sowing loan advanced to grain growers in the Southeastern areas most affected by crop failure amounted to four million gold roubles.[7]

In July 1921, the Central Committee for Famine Relief (TsK Pomgol) was formed, primarily to raise funds in aid of the starving population. Campaigns in support of farmers afflicted by crop failure were being launched. Under the auspices of the All-Russian Executive Committee, an All-Russian week of famine relief was held between September 15 and October 15, 1921.[8] On September 24, 1921, a Saturday voluntary workday took place in Donetsk district under the slogan "Let everyone fight hunger."[9] In order to overcome the consequences of famine on the Don, a commission for overcoming the consequences of hunger was formed under the leadership of Bolshevik G.V. Tcherepakhin. Tcherepakhin's memoirs report that he was granted emergency powers and a right to levy "a heavy tribute from places of recreation where new economic policy beneficiaries (*nepmani*) enjoyed themselves. Betting pools and lotteries were organized" (Cherepakhin 1955, 70). In the fall of 1923, the funds went toward purchasing 101 Fordson tractors.

In this difficult situation, the Bolsheviks acknowledged famine and petitioned foreign countries and the wider public for help (Ivanova 2007; Polyakov 1975; Polyakov 2009; Uryadova 2010). In Southern Russia, the American Relief Administration (ARA) was the most well-known foreign organization to provide genuine assistance. ARA had a branch in Novorossiisk. It was through this port that food shipments arrived. Local party organizations and Soviet government structures also tried taking measures to remedy the situation by means of redistributing the few food resources they had at their disposal. As noted at the same Second Convention of the Councils of Temriukskii District, "all governmental bodies have been removed from ration lists, and the rations reserved for the army."[10]

The measures undertaken by the authorities and the public to fight hunger saved many lives. However, some Soviet officials admitted that "not enough was done as compared to what could have been done."[11] Insufficient governmental help to those starving led to agricultural stagnation and a rise in anti-Soviet sentiments. In March 1922, local population was documented as being "ill-disposed" toward the authorities.[12]

Present-day scholars surmise that in 1932–1933, "a subjective, political factor played the decisive, dominant role over all others… Among the various factors to contribute to this famine, environmental calamities were not as important as anything else, which set this famine apart from those of 1891−1892, 1921−1922, and 1946−1947. In 1932–1933, there were no natural disasters similar to the great droughts of 1891, 1921, 1946." Therefore, this is believed to be the first "man-made famine" (Kondrashin 2008, 331). Hunger was provoked by the state policy of forcible collectivization and unreasonable demands placed on grain producers. The plan for grain production in 1932 was based on preliminary data forecasting a much higher—two or three times higher—yield than was ultimately harvested. But the party authorities demanded that the plan be implemented unfailingly, and so on location, almost all the harvested crops started to be taken away from the growers.

https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2019.120 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Incomplete data shows that at the peak of the 1932–1933 famine in the North Caucasus, the mortality rate was three times higher than the birth rate (416,700 deaths versus 138,900 births). Excess mortality reached around 350,000 deaths (Skorik 2009, 424). During the first half of 1932, the number of deaths per month was 8,270 on average, whereas in the second half of the same year deaths per month increased to 12,247 on average. Mortality grew especially after January 1933, reaching its peak in April, May, and June with 59,242, 60,038, and 56,062 deaths, respectively (Kondrashin 2008, 173). After that, it started to decrease, but February 1934 still saw continued reports from diverse areas about "cases of intumescence and individual deaths of starvation due to lack of food among the *kolkhoz* members and self-employed farmers" (Kondrashin 2011).

As a rule, excess mortality caused by hunger affected mostly rural areas because self-employed farmers and *kolkhoz* workers surrendered their last grain supplies to the state and—unlike town residents—received no food rations. According to V.V. Kondrashin's findings, 21 out of 34 districts were starving in Kuban, 14 out of 23 in the Don region, and 12 out of 18 in Stavropol Krai. Thus, 47 (63%) out of 75 grain-producing districts of North Caucasus were starving. Among the 20 "most disadvantaged" districts were six in Kuban, seven on the River Don, and seven in Stavropol Krai; 15 more districts, including four in Kuban, seven in the Don region, and four in Stavropol Krai, were listed as "also affected" (Kondrashin 2008, 172–173).

Famine reached such a scale that hushing it up entirely was impossible. Even though in January 1933 I.V. Stalin argued that only "sworn enemies of the Soviet rule" might doubt the improvement in the material well-being of the USSR's working class (Stalin 1951, 200), even regional officials started speaking up about the hunger. In his speech at the first North-Caucasian regional convention of superproductive *kolkhoz* workers (February 24–27, 1933), head of the North-Caucasian Regional Executive Committee V.F. Larin admitted that «…"it would have been unfair, dishonest, and incorrect to deny that many kolkhoz workers [were] experiencing difficulties [that] year, incomparable to anything they lived through last year or the year before."[13]

In contrast to the previous famine, in 1932–1933 the Soviet authorities' actions had an explicit anti-Cossack agenda, which is clear from the contemporaries' memoirs. In the words of a *stanitsa* Starovelichkovskaia resident, I.F. Gordienko said, "I would say that in the year [19]33 it was done on purpose, in order to stamp out the Cossacks. They created committees here to keep looking for [grain] pits, in case anyone had fashioned one" (Matveyev 2009, 22). This statement emphasizes that it was not a natural crop failure that caused famine, but rather the actions of officials from Central Russia.

The Cossacks who resisted were variously prosecuted and persecuted. Fifteen Cossack *stanitsas* (13 on the River Kuban and two in the Don region) were "put on the blacklist" of shame.[14] In the words of P.G. Butnik, a Cossack from *stanitsa* Nezamaievskaia, which was among those blacklisted:

> There's no difference between being "a son of the people's enemy" or being "blacklisted." One is tantamount to the other. They mean that everyone there was an enemy of the people. This category included even the red partisans who had fought on the Bolsheviks' side during the Civil war. They too were deported (Golod na Kubani 2009, 388).

The blacklisted *stanitsas* were to be severely punished by restrictions placed on supplying them with staple commodities, a ban on advancing local residents any loans, removal of supplies and goods from warehouses of the local consumers' association, a ban on any contacts with other locations, forced confiscation of personal and household property, administrative arrest, and deportation of families of the most active "saboteurs." Local party, Soviet, and Komsomol organizations were disbanded and military administration took over, complete with a curfew, a ban on cultural events for the masses, restrictions on individual business activities, prohibited access and egress, a ban on any kind of local trade—in fact, an establishment of martial law. In 1933, a number of blacklisted *stanitsas* had their residents deported into remote regions of the USSR. Houses and farmsteads vacated by "saboteurs" were turned over to families of demobilized Red Army soldiers.

https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2019.120 Published online by Cambridge University Press

At harvest time in 1933, the norms of grain production for the ex-Red Army *kolkhozes* were two times lower than those expected from the other *kolkhozes* in the region (Kondrashin 2011).

In order to erase even the memory of resisting the Soviet regime, some *stanitsas* were renamed: the former Urupskaia was to be known as Sovetskaia, Poltavskaia became Krasnoarmeiskaia, and Umanskaia was now Leningradskaia. These punitive measures against the Cossacks during famine were a direct continuation of the earlier policy of dekulakization and decossackization.

To justify these actions against the Cossacks, well-known party functionary B.P. Sheboldaiev[15] wrote about "the defeat of the kulaks' sabotage" in late 1932–early 1933: "The enemy's hostility reached such a pitch that, by hiding from grain procurers thousands of pounds of grain in pits, some mature kulaks from among the Cossacks brought themselves and their own children to the point of dying of hunger" (Sheboldayev 1936, 4). An immediate organizer of punitive measures, L.M. Kaganovich[16] stressed a similar sentmiment: "all Kuban Cossacks ought to know how in [19] 21 the Terek Cossacks were deported for resisting the Soviet rule. The same applies now: we cannot allow the Kuban lands—the golden lands—to remain unsowed, but be defiled, be spat on, not be taken into account… we will rather move you" (Oskolkov 1993, 9–10).

Only after this did the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union resolve to give the North Caucasus seed relief in 1933, whereas no such aid was given in 1932 (Danilov, Roberta, and Lynne 2001, 288–289, 362–363, 367–368, 374–375). On May 26, 1933, the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union adopted a special resolution: *On Food Relief for the North Caucasus* (Kondrashin 2011).

The Cossacks' historical memory often associates forced seizures of grain and other foodstuffs with actions of other ethnic and social groups, as well as persons from other regions: those from out of town,[17] Red Army soldiers released from active duty, and others. Eyewitnesses noted that a "special committee went around: people from Leningrad, Muscovites, the majority were Jewish" (Matveyev 2009, 22). These words bespoke not only the committee members' ethnic belonging, but also Kuban stanitsa residents' traditional ethnic biases.

According to a resident of *stanitsa* Grigoripolisskaia (presently of Novoalexandrovskii district of Stavropol Krai), V.I. Dronov, the relief committee (*komsod*) included "both our people and those from out town" (Golod na Kubani 2009, 438). As *stanitsa* Mingrelskaia (presently of Abinskii district of Krasnodar Krai) resident S.Ye. Damnitskii asserted:

> At the time, Cossacks were never appointed brigade leaders, only town residents. Some of those brigade leaders had never even seen or touched the land before […]. Krasnoarmeiskaia stanitsa […], what happened there was this: the Cossacks raised a revolt […]. So, then they were surrounded […]. Kaganovich demanded an army down there—a Russian army, soldiers, and gave the command to shoot. So, they shot, those soldiers. They were then disengaged, and "national minority" (*natsmeny*)—a division from Kazakhstan—[brought in]. So, they then made the feathers fly, and hereafter the stanitsa became Krasnoarmeiskaia (Matveyev 2009, 22).

This account contradicts documentary evidence and studies based on this evidence, according to which it was the demobilized Red Army soldiers from the military districts of Moscow, Belorussia, and Volga to settle in this *stanitsa*. No one from North Caucasus or even from the Ukraine was involved in resettlement (Tarkhova 1997, 38–42). But N.G. Butnik also recalled that "the elders told me later that there had been no trials here with a court and the jury. There was a *troika*.[18] Most of them weren't Russian, but primarily "black," Caucasian. For even I have heard them speak. This nation seemed to have been very antagonistic toward the Kubans" (Golod na Kubani 2009, 388). Many memoirs feature stories of family members finding respite from famine in the Adyghe villages, the Black Sea coast, or South Caucasus. They imply that famine did no harm to other, non-Cossack lands, including national autonomies of the North Caucasus (Matveyev 2009, 23–25).

https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2019.120 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Survival Strategies: Similarities and Differences

While the authorities' policies in 1921–1922 and 1932–1933 were radically different, the Cossacks' actions in response to either famine had a lot in common. Hunger compelled people to modify their everyday eating habits: the Cossacks had to resort to eating nettle, sorrel, other plants, wild fruit, and berries. As M.V. Sementsov states based on folkloric evidence, "during lean years," people in Kuban "consumed purslane, spurges, salsify, mallow, the henbanes, crambe, barbarea, lattuce, sickleweed, salvia, shepherd's purse, crocus and tulip bulbs, cattail, chokeberry, burdock roots. To substitute for flour, beech nuts were ground alongside mais, acorns were also used" (Sementsov 2007, 147). Tree bark was also widely used, as testified to by archival documents.[19] To assuage hunger, tree bark was first pounded in the mortar, then used to bake unleavened cakes. Long-term residents of the Don *stanitsa* Melikhovskaia recalled how, during the famine of 1921–1922, in order to survive they used to grind tree bark, pound chaff (the husks left over after threshing grains), and dry weeds, mostly tumbleweed. They washed, dried, and ate roots of reeds and cattail, and baked surrogate cakes (Shevchenko 2005, 31).

Those living near rivers or lakes were relatively lucky. In the spring of 1921, the despairing population of the Lower Don took to fishing out in the open, and even though this violated not just the law, but also a traditionally established moratorium on fishing during spawning season. The authorities were unable to do anything about it (Berelovich 2000, 412). When the catch was good, local residents felt almost no impact of the famine and could even sell some products of their customary trade on the side. Apart from fish, local bodies of water supplied hungry people with snails, shellfish, crawfish, and other aquatic animal life. This occurred even more often than fishing, for many simply had no strength left for fishing (Golod na Kubani 2009, 356). As one of the Don Cossacks recorded in 1930, "we will have to recall the tricks of the foodless 1920s and dive into the Don the Sustainer for shellfish" (Sidorov 1994, 176). In August 1933, up to 30 Cossack households among the *kolkhoz* workers and individual farmers left *stanitsa* Starotitarovskaia of Temriukskii district of North Caucasus Krai for the floodplains on the Kuban River. They declared that the authorities "had been extorting from them their last bits of grain, whereas here the Kuban river would keep them fed, however poorly."[20]

One more salient survival strategy was the slaughtering of domestic livestock. A conscious decimation of the beasts of burden necessary for agricultural work would inevitably lead to reduced yields and food shortages in the future. Hence, the cattle were to be saved at all costs. The animals were switched to emergency fodder made of hay and reeds from the rooftops of outbuildings and even residential housing. Consequently, villages acquired a rather exotic appearance by spring, with their roofless houses and uncovered beams sticking out for all to see. The composition of the livestock changed, too: individual farmers would hold first and foremost onto dairy cows whose milk became a strategic means of survival in the time of famine.

Everday diet included small rodents and other wildlife, as well as one's own pets or those stolen from the neighbours. Growing up in the country children would, from an early age, learn to catch and eat critters, but in the face of famine traditional childhood sports, such as pouring water down ground squirrels' holes in order to catch them when they tried to escape, acquired vital importance as a means to stave off hunger. In 1922, contemporaries remarked on the "total extermination of dogs and cats," when neighbours everywhere were "stealing and eating each other's pets," when starving people would catch rats, and "cats, dogs, and carrion [were] considered to be the tastiest treat" (Shadrina and Tabunshchikova 2013, 185). The spring 1922 report by the Donetsk Circuit Committee of the Communist Party contains a shocking descrption of the situation: "A fallen horse and other dead animals attract [the starving people's] attention from several miles away. The starvelings who gather at the scene share the carrion among themselves."[21]

One other traditional way to survive was by obtaining food in exchange for clothes, shoes, and other valuables preserved since pre-Revolutionary times: "antique mother's and father's belongings, good quality, valuable blankets, shawls, skirts, and tablecloths—all of those we took for trading to

https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2019.120 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Panteleimonovka. They had good crops. We would gather up kerchiefs and shawls. We traded a shawl for a pail of potatoes—a knitted woollen shawl. We peeled it, planted the skins, and then there were crops" (Golod na Kubani 2009, 435). Potatoes were immediately eaten, and potato peelings were planted to grow new crops.

But there were differences between survival strategies used in the first famine, in 1921–1922, and in the second famine, in 1932–1933. This applies particularly to economic self-regulation in the Cossack *stanitsas* and homesteads. After the Civil War, the authorities encouraged people to form mutual aid societies, whereas in the early 1930s any initiative of this sort would bring about grave consequences. As an example, the tragic story of the secretary of the Communist party branch of *stanitsa* Otradnaia in Tikhoretskii distict of North Caucasus Krai, N.V. Kotov, comes to mind. In adherence to the agricultural co-op's regulations, he gave the malnourished *kolkhoz* workers around 1 kg of grain per day instead of the 491 g, as the Krai authorities insisted he should have (Oskolkov 1991, 47–51). This saved many lives, but the party secretary and his supporters were executed by firing squad.

In 1921–1922, the Cossack population of the Don and Kuban regions attempted to survive famine by refusing to surrender grain to the state and taking up arms to resist the authorities in direct continuation of the recent civil war. "The Cossaks were reluctant to surrender grain, [the Soviet rule] had to resort to arms, frequent skirmishes between food requisition detachments[22] and Cossacks took place. These skirmishes necessitated sending military divisions to quash the resistance, but upon their approach the Cossacks fled into the woods and floodplains."[23] Local party and Soviet authorities stood on the positions of "war communism" and prevented the New Economic Policy from being introduced on the Cossack homesteads and in *stanitsas*.

In the early 1920s, anti-Soviet miltants continued to be active in Cossack areas. Red Army divisions proved to be unable, at these early stages of the insurgency, to suppress individual insurrections on homesteads and in *stanitsas*. Detachments of 120–350 rebels started coming together, forming sizeable armies willing to seize and control substantial territories. Between the armed resistance to the Soviet regime trying to take their food and their own internal food requisitions, some of the Cossack farmers managed to live through the 1921–1922 famine, coming out relatively unscathed.

By the early 1930, the Cossacks' morale had been broken and they could no longer stand for themselves. This was further exacerbated by dekulakization and decossackization, which stripped the Don and Kuban stanitsas of a considerable number of their most active inhabitants or made them resort to passive resistance.

Suicide was a type of asocial behavioural strategy during famine. However, voluntarily taking of one's own life was rarely able to ensure the survival of remaining family members. Nevertheless, some *stanitsa* residents would hang themselves, drown themselves, or set themselves on fire in a locked-up building. Another asocial survival strategy reflecting the highest degree of hunger was necrophagy. Such cases were recorded in *stanitsa* Yermakovskaia and other communities.[24]

Open cannibalism, meaning the killing and eating of fellow humans, was the most exceptional strategy. In February 1922, the town-wide meeting of the women of Novocherkassk made note of "a series of horrifying occurrences of cannibalism" (Shadrina and Tabunshchikova 2013, 150). Such cases took place in the famished Kuban *stanitsas* in 1932–1933 as well. They were reflected not only in eyewitnesses' memoirs but also in the documents produced by the party and governmental organizations (Golod na Kubani 2009, 23, 132).

A peculiar survival strategy was adopted by the local Soviet functionaries after having lost their entitlement to food rations during the 1920s famine. They started quitting their governmental positions in favour of employment in a co-op or in the private sector. A massive resignation of Soviet officials was observed, for example, in Morozovskii district in 1922 (Skorik 2015, 474). This worked during the transition to the New Economic Policy, but it was no longer feasible in the early 1930s, especially after restrictions were placed on migration.

https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2019.120 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The Role of the Church in the Context of Hunger

In keeping with the tradition of giving charitable succor to those affected by natural disasters, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church—His Holiness Patriarch Tikhon (Bellavin)—volunteered to help the Soviet state raise funds in support of the hungry in July 1921. Later, he offered up eccelesiastical valuables that were not used for liturgical purposes. In August 1921, the Patriarch addressed the patriarchs of the Eastern orthodox churches, the archbishop of Canterbury, and the bishop of New York with a request to help the hunger victims of the Volga relion. This was also when he petitioned the authorities in writing to let him organize an All-Russian Ecclesiastical Relief Committee (Gubonin 1994). In his address to state officials on August 22, 1921, Patriarch Tikhon once again emphasized the Church's willingness to help the hungry and collect donations of money, clothing, and food (Russkaja Pravoslavnaja Cerkov' 1995, 146–147). The Patriarch's initiative caused an ambivalent and mostly negative reaction of the Communist Party leadership (Krivova 1999). However, in view of the country's difficult economic situation, permission was granted for the Church to raise funds for the hungry (Krivova 1999).

After the Patriarch's written request to organize an All-Russian Ecclesiastical Committee for famine relief in the Volga region, a meeting of the clergy and laymen took place in Novocherkassk on August 16, 1921, to discuss establishing a local branch of the committee.[25] In contrast to the central All-Russian Ecclesiastical Committee, the Novocherkassk initiative received not only permission from the local Extraordinary Committee for volunteering to help but also praise.[26] Staring from August 1921, collection began also in churches of Rostov-on-Don (Shadrina and Tabunshchikova 2013, 111). In the summer of 1921, clergy of the Don region collected and distributed 100,000 rubles among the hungry.[27]

But the Soviet state decided to turn Patriarch Tikhon's initiative against the Church. On December 27, 1921, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee published the decree *On Valuables in Churches and Monasteries.* On January 2, 1922, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted the resolution *On Liquidation of Ecclesiastical Property*, entailing a partial confiscation of valuables. A decree from February 23, 1922, stipulated a total expropriation of ecclesiastical valuables and placed a ban on substituting liturgical objects. The Church was basically excluded from choosing what to surrender. Already on February 19, 1922, Patriarch Tikhon addressed the Orthodox believers with a request to intensify their efforts to help the hungry, thereby giving the public permission to donate ecclesiastical objects not used in liturgical services to famine relief (Gubonin 1994, 187). However, on February 28, in his epistle regarding aid to the hungry and the expropriation of ecclesiastical valuables, the patriarch condemned the Executive Committee's decree of February 23, calling it "an act of blasphemy" and expressing his displeasure at the confiscation of holy objects (Acts of the Holy Patriarch Tikhon 1994, 190). However, in many cases, the hierarchs chose to compromise with the authorities. For instance, Metropolitan Mitrofan (Simashkevich), head of the Don and Novocherkassk bishopric, authorized his vicar to state that, from the canonical viewpoint, expropriation of ecclesiastical valuables was possible and necessary.[28] He addressed the clergy and the laymen with a pastoral intended to soften Patriarch Tikhon's position as much as possible, suggesting turning liturgical vessels into scrap before surrendering to avoid their desecration.[29] Arsenii Smolenets, the bishop of Rostov and Taganrog, was a vocal opponent of expropriations. This resulted in public unrest in Rostov-on-Don and in *stanitsa* Morozovskaia. In the latter, demonstrations against expropriations of ecclesiastical valuables were simultaneous with an alleged execution by firing squad of 24 cannibals.[30] Whereas at first the Cossacks had protested "looting" the churches, by this time, with expropriation of valuables purposely timed to coincide with the sowing season, they had lost any interest in this action.

According to incomplete preliminary data, by May 1922 the authorities had removed from the churches of the Don Oblast over 25 lbs (or approximately 12 kg) of gold, over 505 *pud* (over 8 tonnes) of silver ecclesiastical utensils, and many other valuables.[31] But these valuables were not used to help the hungry in the Don Oblast or in the Volga region. The Soviet regime kept them

https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2019.120 Published online by Cambridge University Press

exclusively for its own needs, such as, for instance, financing "a worldwide revolution" in Europe. The money was invested in western banks, with proceeds benefitting the Bolshevik government (Mitrofanov 2002). Any protests provided grounds for a campaign against clergy.

Just like in the 1920s, the famine of 1932–1933 brought about no religious cults. Moreover, this was not even possible in the context of an aggressive antireligious propaganda campaign run by the Soviet government since the early 1920s. (Tabunshchikova and Shadrina 2016, 114–136). Famine vividly demonstrated how different the position of the Russian Orthodox Church now was. Since the Church, "beheaded" and decentralized by dissensions instigated by the State Political Administration, could no longer express an opinion and call on the believers for help, like it did in 1921, parish clergy's privately shared negative views of "wholesale collectivization" gained extra traction.

This did not go unnoticed by the populace, nor was it ignored the Soviet authorities, who used it as a weapon against the priests. Analysis of archived investigative documents show that repressions of the Orthodox clergy in 1932–1933 were related to clergymen's protests against the "*kolkhoz*-building." Standard accusations levied against the ecclesiastics were often based on eyewitness accounts of what a priest said in a private conversation. For instance, priest A.M. Alekseyev was charged with "agitating against the *kolkhoz* movement of the sowing campaign and a number of other campaigns." During grain requisitioning, Alekseyev, "having undertaken to foil these afforts, carried out systematic anti-Soviet propaganda, urged the population not give the state their surplus grain, threatened the needy with an imminent arrival of the Whites from abroad and their merciless execution of those helping the authorities to build a socialist state."[32] Alekseyev was exiled to the North for 5 years. Archival documents abound with similar cases.

Clearly, clergymen shared their fears that the *kolkhoz* policy would lead the population to ruin in private conversations. Since a priest cotinued to enjoy respect especially in Cossack communities, the Soviet regime took steps to curtail the clergy's influence by means of repressions. The priests' personal views notwithstanding, the Russian Orthodox Church had no influence on the changes in state policies, nor was it able to help the hungry. Repressions of the early 1930s served as the first step on the way to repressions of 1937–1938, many of which were based on false accusations.

Besides, religious rituals could hardly be carried out properly, if at all in the time of famine. Eyewitness accounts make a point of the desire to celebrate major holy days, mainly Easter, even if symbolically, with an "extra" cake of pig weed and dust or, if possible, an egg purchased with the last of the money.

> In the hungry 1933, on the occasion of Easter the parents bought 10 eggs for 10 rubles. Threw them into the samovar. Cooked them. Each one of us had one. A brother came in saying: "Christ is risen!" He, too, was given an egg. In those times, people were subsisting on sorrel. Mowers, rakes, and ploughs had all been taken away. Whatever anyone had [was taken] (Bondar 2014, 186).

But often, religious holy days were no different from regular days, filled with tragic losses. "On the first day of Easter … father is dying on the bed. And the little brother, dying on the bench, is begging, 'Give me but a half an egg to eat. I am dying.' But there's nothing. Only water, that's it. And a willow twig is in the cabin." Consequently, no calendar or lifecycle events were celebrated either: "There were no childbirth celebrations, no baptisms, weddings, nor even proper funerals." *Stanitsa* Staronishesteblievskaia resident P.A. Kostiglot noted that "rituals were observed and kept up to 1932, when people lived a life. Then came [those who] put everyone here in jail, tried them in courts, and starved them. All games were over then: all anyone could think of was how to survive" (Bondar 2014, 187).

The sources at our disposal do not give us complete information on the reaction of dissident communities to famine in 1921–1922 and 1932–1933. Nevertheless, documents offer some insight into their activities, which in the contexts of struggle with hunger turned against the government. In March 1934, officers of the Joint State Political Directorate of the Azov-Black Sea Krai succeeded

https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2019.120 Published online by Cambridge University Press

at wiping out a "c[ounter]-[revolutionary] monarchist organization of the Joannites"[33] operating in several communities in Don and Kuban, with headquarters on a homestead called Zapadnii Sosyk. When interrogated upon their arrest, members of the organization stated that "by focusing their c[ounter]-r[evolutionary] activities on wealthy Cossacks, our organization simultaneously worked on Cossack youth, from whom rebel units were formed, mostly from among the military reserve."[34] Based on the Joannites' statements, the Joint State Political Directorate's officers arrested six reservists in *stanitsa* Starominskaia. Members of the organization were alleged to have been preparing an armed insurrection of the Don and Kuban Cossacks, but postponed it till the beginning of intervention: «"we were betting on a well-heeled Cossack as the primary force capable of standing up againt the Soviet rule when the time is right."[35] Remarkably, to stimulate anti-Soviet sentiments among the Cossacks, the Joannites tried to revive the monarchist ideals by resorting to the typical Russian impersonation. As reported by the criminal investigation materials, "at one of the safe houses in Samsonenko's domicile in *stanitsa* Starominskaia, the c[ounter]-r[evolutionary] organization had concealed the so-called "royal heir Alexei," brought there by some Kalmychek Yemelian from *stanitsa* Pavlovskaia for the purpose of greater promotion of the monarchy among the Don Cossacks." Members of the organization even paraded this "heir" around the Cossack *stanitsas* in the company of Ye. Kalmychek.[36] Nevertheless, judging by the fact that the Joint State Political Directorate's officers only mentioned the "royal heir" in passing, this action of the Joannites garnered no success among the Don and Kuban Cossacks.

Conclusion

The roots of famine as a phenomenon of Russian history go back to a centuries old archetype of "moral economy," wherein the goal of economic activity was to achieve a certain quality of life based on natural self-sufficiency and fairness of the farmer's honest labour. Hence, net profit was of secondary importance by default. Unfavourable weather conditions were a necessary objective prerequisite for a famine, but subjective causes played just as big a role. In the early 1920s, one of these causes was a terrible economic devastation of the South of Russia as a result of the Civil War. Additionally, the ruling Bolshevik party's economic policy was to a great extent determined by political considerations. Not only did they requisition food by methods of war communism, but they also were reluctant to give up an earlier practice of forceful food seizures after the declared transition to food tax. The same model of social governance led to the famine of 1932–1933. This time—as opposed to the early 1920s—it was the authorities' actions that caused the famine, and these had acquired a distinctly anti-Cossack bias. A clampdown on food procurement campaigns went hand in hand with an accelerated country-wide collectivization. When the *kolkhozes* proved unable to provide minimal food supplies, a new administrative crackdown followed, disguised as "the war on the kulaks' sabotage." Only afterward did the Soviet government bother to boost the *kolkhozes* structurally and economically, slowing down the *kolkhoz* building.

The Cossacks tried to adapt to the hardships of famine and looked for their own social and existential practices. Survival strategies of the population of Don and Kuban during widespread famine may be classified as the social and the asocial ones. Among the socially acceptable ways of overcoming hunger are the slaughtering and consumption of livestock, the mass employment changeover from the Soviet jobs to private companies and co-ops, a move closer to a body of water, and consumption of fish and seafood. Asocial survival strategies include cannobalism and necrophagy, abuse of power by officials, and bribery. In 1921–1922, social strategies dominated; in the 1932–1933, asocial survival strategies gained the upper hand due to the much more limited material resources—as compared to a decade earlier—and the narrower range of opportunities available within the *kolkhoz* system. These strategies arose within the context of a common culture of peasant resistance (Viola 2010, 13). Their specifics were determined by the particular conditions of hunger in the region, as well as by peculiarities of Cossack mentality. Having become accustomed to unexpected political twists and turns, the population of the Cossack regions started to prepare for

https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2019.120 Published online by Cambridge University Press

survival in advance, at the very first signs of the situation changing for the worse. When in May 1934 rumours started circulating in *kolkhoz Sotsialisticheskoe zemledelie* of Kushchovskii district of the Azov-Black Sea Krai about the Cossacks' deportation to the North, the populace reacted right away. The Joint State Political Directorate made an emergency report that, prompted by those rumours, "some *kolkhoz* workers" prepared for "leaving the *stanitsa* by selling out their property, stocking up on rusks and other food for the road, and even digging up the barely planted potatoes."[37]

The experience of hunger became an integral part of Cossacks' self-identification: remembering the famine was an important component of their historical memory. A song of the Cossacks fighting for the German Wermacht says:

For the desecrated Church,
And the executed fathers.
For those perished in the thirty-third
All those from Kuban and Don.
For the scorched motherland,
For *stanitsas* and homesteads,
For the kids' and women's tears
It is time to take revenge (Donskov 1994, 583).

An amateur Cossack poet who composed these verses clearly knew the situation well and was successful in using familiar sorrowful imagery to sustain the listeners' resentment of the Soviet regime and the Bolsheviks.

The Church, back in the 1921–1922 still influential politically and ideologically, actively participated in fighting the hunger and encouraged both laymen and clergy to make charitable donations. This was the means for the Church to promote social survival strategies. However, the hungry did not always heed those injunctions, which brought about cases of cannibalism and necrophagy recorded in the Don region. The policy of the State, intended to exclude the Russian Orthodox Church from every sphere of social life, used Patriarch Tikhon's initiative against the Church by turning his voluntary action into an anti-ecclesiastical campaign. As a result, ecclesiastical valuables were seized, the hungry received no aid, and the proceeds were used for purposes other than intended.

Ten years later, in 1932–1933, the weakened Russian Orthodox Church had no clout left and could no longer offer the hungry any assistance. In private conversations, clergymen expressed concerns over the *kolkhoz* policy, leading the population of the Don oblast to ruin. The rank-and-file parish priests found themselves on the peak of "counter-revolutionary agitation," and they had enough courage to touch upon pressing issues of vital significance to their flock. In view of the respect clergymen enjoyed among the Cossacks, the Soviet regime took measures to stop this negative influence by means of repressive crackdowns. These laid the foundations for the repressions of 1937–1938.

Financial Support. The research was supported by Russian Science Foundation "Wars and Population of the South of Russia in the XVIII–early XXI century: History, Demography, Anthropology" (project No. 17-18-01411).

Disclosure. Authors have nothing to disclose.

Notes

1 In the early 1920s, the larger chunk of the Don Cossack Host's lands became the Don Oblast. Some lands were given to the Tsaritsyn Governorate of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, and some to the Donetsk Governorate of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The Kuban Oblast, along with the Black Sea Governorate, became the Kuban-Black Sea Oblast upon having lost part of their lands to the Mountain ASSR. In 1922, the Karachay-Cherkessia Autonomous Oblast and the Cherkessia (Adyghe) Autonomous Oblast seceded from the Kuban

Black Sea Oblast. In 1924, the South-Eastern Oblast was formed, later known as North Caucasus Krai, which included parts of the former Don and Kuban oblasts, except for the lands remaining within the Ukrainian SSR and the Tsaritsyn Governorate. In 1934, North Caucasus Krai was divided into two: Azov-Black Sea Krai and the proper North Caucasus Krai. The latter was renamed as Ordzhonikidze Krai in 1937 (and in 1943, as Stavropol Krai).

2 CDNIVO, f. 1, op. 1, d. 119, l. 27.
3 CDNIKK, f. 4386, op. 1, d. 58, l. 4.
4 GAKK, f. P-59, op. 1, d. 46, l. 23.
5 Archive MVD KK, f. 18, op. 1, d. 16, l. 25.
6 CDNIRO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 99, l. 113.
7 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 86, d. 23, l. 13.
8 CDNIRO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 99, l. 120.
9 CDNIRO, f. 75, op. 1, d. 20, l. 5–5a.
10 CDNIKK, f. 4386, op. 1, d. 58, l. 10.
11 CDNIRO, t., f. 4, op. 1, d. 67, l. 26.
12 CDNIRO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 146, l. 64.
13 CDNIRO, f. 7, op. 1, d. 1372, l. 49.
14 Among the Kuban *stanitsas*, the following were blacklisted: Ladozhskaia (presently in Ust-Labinskii district of Krasnodar Krai), Medvedovskaia (Timashovskii district), Nezamaevskaia (Pavlovskii district), Novoderevianskovskaia (Kanevskoi district), Novorozhdestvenskaia (Tikhoretskii district), Platnirovskaia (Korenovskii district), Poltavskaia (Krasnoarmeiskii district), Staroderevianskovskaia (Kanevskoi district), Starokorsunskaia (Krasnodar city district), Staroshcherbinovskaia (Shcherbinovskii district), Temirgoevskaia (Kurganinskii district), Umanskaia (Leningradskii district), and Urupskaia (Novokubanskii district). On the Don, blacklisted were Bokovskaia stanitsa (Bokovskii district) and Meshkovskaia (Verkhnedonskii district) of the present-day Rostov Oblast.
15 Well-known party functionary B.P. Sheboldaiev, part of the Committee of the Communist Party, was first secretary of the Azov-Black Sea Krai Committee of the Communist Party in 1934–1937.
16 L.M. Kaganovich was secretary of the Central Committee and chair of the Agricultural Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1929–1934.
17 To Cossacks, the expression “those from out of town” meant migrants from other parts of the country, that is, those “of non-Cossack origin,” persons unfamiliar with local customs and traditions.
18 The *troikas* were out-of-court penal organizations in the USSR. An oblast’s *troika* would include the head of the oblast’s Joint State Political Directorate (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs), the head of the oblast’s party committee, and the oblast’s prosecutor.
19 CDNIRO, f. 118, op. 1, d. 9, l. 12об.
20 CDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1, d. 22, l. 76.
21 CDNIRO, f. 75, op. 1, d. 29, l. 7a, 8.
22 Food requisition detachments were armed groups of activists, workers, soldiers, and sailors. During food shortages, they were dispatched to rural areas to forcibly seize grain and other foodstuffs needed to supply the cities, the army, and Soviet nomenclature during the Civil War and transition to the New Economic Policy. Food requisition detachments ceased to exist once the New Economic Policy was introduced in 1921–1922.
23 Archive MVD KK, f. 18, op. 1, d. 16, l. 25.
24 CDNIRO, f. R-4, op. 1, d. 146, l. 64–65.
25 Archive UFSB po RO, d. P-53110, l. 327–327turn.
26 Archive UFSB po RO, d. P-53110, l. 327об.
27 Archive UFSB po RO, d. P-53110, l. 327–327turn.
28 Archive UFSB po RO, d. P-53110, l. 347–349.

https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2019.120 Published online by Cambridge University Press

29 Archive UFSB po RO, d. P-53110, l. 347–349.
30 CDNIRO, f. 71, op. 1, d. 4, l. 10turn.
31 CDNIRO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 122, l. 36a. The results of ecclesiastical valuables exproppriations in the Don Oblast (excluding Shakhtinskii and Taganrogskii districts, turned over to the Ukrainian SSR) were impressive: 502 *pood* 8 lbs 26 *zolotniks* 41 part of silver; 13 *poods* 10 *zolotniks* 8 lbs of gold; 15 lbs 17 *zolotniks* 32 parts of gold in items with precious stones; 1 lb 64 *zolotniks* 59 parts of pearls; 5,990 diamonds, 1,957 polished diamonds, 4,338 rubies, 631 saphires, 2,545 emeralds, 112 amethysts, 1,121 pearls, 1,253 pieces of turqoise, other precious articles, and 11 golden topazes (GARO, f. R-3758, op. 3, d. 32, l. 12).
32 Archive UFSB po RO, d. P-26479, l. 15.
33 This is sect worshipping St. John of Kronstadt. Prior to 1917, they were persecuted. An indication that they created "rebel units" of monarchists is dubious, as this kind of activity is atypical of the Joannites, who were more likely to set up unofficial monasteries (as in Taganrog) in which to devote themselves to prayers.
34 CDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1, d. 111, l. 9.
35 CDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1, d. 111, l. 15. In the early 1930s, Soviet authorities used to create made-up "counter-revolutionary" organizations, which never failed to include prosperous Cossacks, as well as vocal opponents of the *kolkhoz* movement, clergymen, and former White movement supporters. As a rule, the fabricated group of "counter-revolutionaries" was arrested. Some of them were then executed by firing squad, exiled to the North, orsome let go, provided they kept away from big cities. A significant portion of criminal cases in the Don region followed this pattern.
36 CDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1, d. 111, l. 12–13.
37 CDNIRO, f. 166, op. 1, d. 111, l. 204–205.

References

Berelovich, Alexis, and Viktor Danilov, eds. 2000. *Sovetskaja derevnja glazami VChK – OGPU – NKVD* [The Soviet Village through the Eyes of the VChK – OGPU – NKVD]: *Documents and Materials in 4 Vols. 1918–1939*. Vol. 1. Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopedia (ROSSPEN).

Bondar, Nicholaus. 2014. "Kod smerti: antropologiya goloda 1932–1933 gg." [Death Code: The Anthropology of Famine 1932–1933.] In *Kubanskij Sbornik: Collection of Scientific Articles and Materials on the History of the Region*, edited by Oleg Matveev and George Kokun'ko, 184–210. Krasnodar: Kniga.

Bondarev, Vitaliy. 2006. *Krest'yanstvo i kollektivizaciya: mnogoukladnost' social'no-ehkonomicheskih otnoshenij derevni v rajonah Dona, Kubani i Stavropol'ya v konce 20-h – 30-h godah XX veka*. [Peasantry and Collectivization: The Multistructure of the Socio-Economic Relations of the Village in the Areas of the Don, Kuban and Stavropol in the Late 20s and 30s of the Twentieth Century.] Rostov-on-Don: North-Caucasian Scientific Center of Higher School Publishers.

Cherepakhin, George. 1955. *Gody bor'by*. [Years of Struggle.] Rostov-on-Don: Knizhnoe izdatel'stvo.

Chernopitsky, Paul. 1987. *Derevnya Severo-Kavkazskogo kraya v 1920–1929 gg*. [Village of the North Caucasus Region in 1920–1929.] Rostov-on-Don: Rostov University Publishers.

Conquest, Robert. 1986. *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Danilov, Viktor, Roberta Manning, and Lynne Viola, eds. 2001. Konets 1930–1933 [The End of 1930–1933]. Vol. 3, *Tragediya sovetskoy derevni: Kollektivizatsiya i raskulachivanie 1927–1939* [The Tragedy of the Soviet Village: Collectivization and Dispossession, 1927–1939], edited by Viktor Danilov, Roberta Manning, and Lynne Viola. Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopedia (ROSSPEN).

Donskov, Piter. 1994. "Don, Kuban' i Terek vo Vtoroj mirovoj vojne." ["Don, Kuban and Terek in the World War II."] In *Tragediya kazachestva* [The Tragedy of the Cossacks], edited by L. Barykina, 465–604. Moscow: Molodaja gvardija, AO "Delovoj centr."

Fisher, Harald. 1927. *The Famine in Soviet Russia, 1919–1923: The Operations of the American Relief Administration*. New York: The Macmillan Company.

"Golod na Kubani: 1932–1933 gg. Polevye materialy Kubanskoy fol'klorno-etnograficheskoy ekspeditsii Nauchno-issledovatel'skogo tsentra traditsionnoy kul'tury GNTU "Kubanskiy kazachiy khor" [Famine in the Kuban: 1932–1933: Field materials of the Kuban Folklore-Ethnographic Expedition of the Scientific and Research Center for Traditional Culture of SSTU "Kuban Cossack Choir."] 2009. In *Istoricheskaya pamyat' naseleniya Yuga Rossii o golode 1932–1933 gg*. [Historical

https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2019.120 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Memory of the Population of the South of Russia about the Famine of 1932–1933], compiled and edited by Nicholaus Bondar and Oleg Matveev, 336–449. Krasnodar: Tradicija.

Graziosi, Andrea. 1998. *La grande guerra contadina in URSS: Bolscevichi e contadini. 1918–1933*. Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane.

Gubonin, Mikhail, ed. 1994. *Akty svyatejshego patriarha Tihona i pozdnejshie dokumenty o preemstve vysshej cerkovnoj vlasti. 1917–1943*. [Acts of His Holiness Patriarch Tikhon and Later Documents on the Succession of the Supreme Church Authority. 1917–1943.] Moscow: Orthodox St. Tikhon Theological Institute.

Ivanova, E. 2007. "Svjatejshij Patriarh Tihon i golod 1921–1922 gg. v Rossii." [His Holiness Patriarch Tikhon and the Famine of 1921–1922 in Russia.] *Bogoslovskie trudy* 41: 500–514.

Ivnitsky, Nikolaus. 2009. *Golod 1932–1933 godov v SSSR: Ukraina, Kazahstan, Severnyj Kavkaz, Povolzh'e, Central'no-Chernozemnaja oblast', Zapadnaja Sibir', Ural* [The Famine of 1932–1933 in the USSR: Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the North Caucasus, the Volga region, the Central Black Earth region, Western Siberia, the Urals.] Moscow: Sobranie.

Kharitonov, Igor. 2009. "Stanica Nekrasovskaja posle Grazhdanskoj vojny glazami kazaka-kolhoznika" [The Nekrasovskaya Stanica after the Civil War through the Eyes of a Cossack Collective Farmer.] In *Fjodor Andreevich Shherbina, kazachestvo i narody Severnogo Kavkaza. Istorija i sovremennost'* [Fedor Andreevich Shcherbina, Cossacks, and the Peoples of the North Caucasus: History and Modernity], edited by Sultan Jakaev, 425–452. Krasnodar: Academy of Marketing and Social Technologies (IMSIT).

Kondrashin, Viktor and Diana Penner. 2002. *Golod: 1932–1933 gody v sovetskoj derevne (na materialah Povolzh'ja, Dona i Kubani)* [Hunger: 1932–1933 in the Soviet Village (Based on Materials from the Volga Region, Don, and Kuban).] Samara: Samara State University.

Kondrashin, Viktor, ed. 2011. *Golod v SSSR 1929–1934* [Famine in the USSR, 1929–1934]. Vol. 3. *Leto 1933–1934 gg.* [Summer 1933–1934]. Moscow: International Foundation for Democracy (MFD).

Kondrashin, Viktor. 2008. *Golod 1932–1933 godov. Tragedija rossijskoj derevni* [Famine of 1932–1933: The Tragedy of the Russian Village]. Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopedia (ROSSPEN).

Krivoded, Viktor. 2002. *Istorija sela L'vovskogo na Kubani* [The History of the Village of Lvovsky in the Kuban Krasnodar.] Krasnodar: Krasnodar State University of Culture and Arts.

Krivova, Natalia. 1999. "Vlast' i Cerkov' v 1922–1925 gg. Politbjuro i GPU v bor'be za cerkovnye cennosti i politicheskoe podchinenie duhovenstva." http://krotov.info/history/20/krivova/kriv01.html. (Accessed March 14, 2017.)

Krugov, Alexis. 1995. "Golod 1921–1922 gg. v Stavropol'skoj gubernii." PhD diss., Moscow Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Matveyev, Oleg. 2009. "Metodologicheskie aspekty ustnoj istorii goloda 1932–1933 gg. na Kubani" [Methodological Aspects of the Oral History of the Famine of 1932–1933 in the Kuban]. In *Istoricheskaja pamjat' naselenija Juga Rossii o golode 1932–1933 gg.*, [Historical Memory of the Population of the South of Russia about the Famine of 1932–1933], edited by Nicholaus Bondar and Oleg Matveev, 19–32. Krasnodar: Tradicija.

Mitrofanov, George. 2002. "Istorija Russkoj Pravoslavnoj Cerkvi 1900–1927" [History of the Russian Orthodox Church 1900–1927]. http://yakov.works/history/20/1900/mitrofanov.htm. (Accessed February 6, 2020.)

Oskolkov, Evgeny. 1991. *Golod 1932 / 1933. Hlebozagotovki i golod 1932/1933 goda v Severo-Kavkazskom krae* [Famine of 1932/1933: Bread Procurement and Famine of 1932/1933 in the North Caucasus Region.] Rostov-on-Don: Rostov State University.

Oskolkov, Evgeny. 1993. "Tragedija "chernodosochnyh" stanic: dokumenty i fakty." [The Tragedy of the "Blacklisted" Villages: Documents and Facts.] *North-Caucasian Region Social Sciences Series* 1–2: 3–23.

Polyakov, Vyacheslav. 2009. "Rossijskaja obshhestvennost' i inostrannaja pomoshh' golodajushhim v 1921 g." [Russian Public and Foreign Aid to the Starving in 1921.] *Voprosy istorii* 12: 14–24.

Polyakov, Yury. 1975. *1921 g.: pobeda nad golodom*. [1921: Victory over the Famine.] Moscow: Politizdat.

Russkaja Pravoslavnaja Cerkov' v sovetskoe vremja (1917–1991) [The Russian Orthodox Church in Soviet Times (1917–1991)]. 1995. *Materials and Documents on the History of Relations between the State and the Church*. Vol. 1. Moscow: Propilei.

Sementsov, Michael. 2007. "Istoriko-jekologicheskie aspekty hozjajstvennogo osvoenija Kubani kazachestvom v XIX–nachale XX vv." [Historical and Environmental Aspects of the Economic Development of the Kuban Cossacks in the XIX–early XX Centuries]. In *Itogi fol'klorno-jetnograficheskih issledovanij jetnicheskih kul'tur Severnogo Kavkaza za 2006 god. Dikarevskie chtenija (13)* [Results of Folklore-Ethnographic Studies of Ethnic Cultures of the North Caucasus for 2006: Savage Readings (13)], edited by Michael Sementsov, 76–164. Krasnodar: Mir Kubani.

Shadrina, Alla and Lydmila Tabunshchikova. 2013. *Iz"yatie tserkovnykh tsennostey v Donskoy oblasti. 1922 god* [The Seizure of Church Property in the Don Region: Year 1922]. Rostov-on-Don: SSC RAS Publishers.

Sheboldayev, Boris. 1936. "Kazachestvo v kolkhozakh." Rostov-on-Don: Azcherizdat.

Shevchenko, Vladimir. 2005. *Stanitsa serdtsu dorogaya. Istoriko-kraevedcheskoe povestvovanie* [The Village Is Dear to the Heart: Historical and Local Lore Narration]. Part 2. Rostov-on-Don: Priazovskij kraj.

Sidorov, Vladimir, ed. 1994. *Krestnaya nosha. Tragediya kazachestva* [Godfather Burden: The Tragedy of the Cossacks]. Rostov-on-Don: Gefest.

Skorik, Alexander, and Irina Fedina. 2013. "Genezis kazach'ego hutora i generacii hutorjan na Kubani s konca XVIII veka i do konca 1920-h godov." [The Genesis of the Cossack Farm and the Generation of Farmers in the Kuban from the End of the 18th Century to the End of the 1920s.] *History and Historians in the Context of the Time* 10 (1): 4–14.

https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2019.120 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Skorik, Alexander. 2008. *Mnogolikost' kazachestva Juga Rossii v 1930-e gody: ocherki istorii* [The Many Faces of the Cossacks of the South of Russia in the 1930s: Essays on History]. Rostov-on-Don: North-Caucasian Scientific Center of Higher School Publishers.
Skorik, Alexander. 2009. *Kazachij Jug Rossii v 1930-e gody: grani istoricheskih sudeb social'noj obshhnosti* [Cossack South of Russia in the 1930s: The Verge of Historical Destinies of a Social Community]. Rostov-on-Don: North-Caucasian Scientific Center of Higher School Publishers.
Skorik, Alexander. 2009. "Kazachestvo Juga Rossii v 30-e gody XX veka: istoricheskie kollizii i opyt preobrazovanij" [Cossacks of the South of Russia in the 30s of the Twentieth Century: Historical Collisions and the Experience of Transformation]. PhD diss., Stavropol State University.
Skorik, Alexander. 2015. *Miljutinskij kazachij jurt: opyt istoricheskoj rekonstrukcii*. [Milyutinsky Cossack Yurt: The Experience of Historical Reconstruction]. Novocherkassk: Lik.
Sorokin, Pititrim. 1922. *Sovremennoe sostoyanie Rossii*. [The Current State of Russia.] Prague: Hutor.
Stalin, Joseph. 1951. "Itogi pervoy pyatiletki. Doklad na ob'edinennom plenume TsK i TsKK VKP(b). 7 yanvarya 1933 g." [The Results of the First Five-Year Plan: Report at the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the CPSU(b). January 7, 1933]. In *Sochineniya*, vol. 13., 161–215. Moscow: State Publishing House of Political Literature.
Tabunshchikova, Ludmila, and Alla Shadrina. 2016. ""We Have Already Separated the Church from the State, but We Still Have Not the Religion from the People:" The State and the Russian Orthodox Church in the Don in 1923." *Russkaya starina* 18 (2): 114–136.
Tarkhova, Nona. 1997. "Uchastie Krasnoy Armii v zaselenii stanitsy Poltavskoy zimoy 1932/1933 g. (po materialam RGVA)" [The Participation of the Red Army in the Settlement of the Village of Poltava in the Winter of 1932/1933 (Based on Materials from the Russian State Armed Forces)]. *Golos minuvshego* 1: 38–42.
Tarkhova, Nona. 2010. *Krasnaya armiya i stalinskaya kollektivizatsiya. 1928–1933 gg.* [The Red Army and Stalin's collectivization. 1928–1933]. Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopedia (ROSSPEN).
Uryadova, Ann. 2010. *Golod 1920-h gg. v Rossii i Russkoe zarubezh'e* [Famine of the 1920s in Russia and Russian Abroad]. St. Petersburg: Aletejja.
Viola, Linn. 2010. *Krest'yanskiy bunt v epokhu Stalina: Kollektivizatsiya i kul'tura krest'yanskogo soprotivleniya* [Peasant Riot in the Era of Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance]. Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopedia (ROSSPEN).
Vorobiev, Nikolaus, ed. 1928. *Kazachestvo Severo-Kavkazskogo kraja: Itogi perepisi naselenija 1926 g*. [Cossacks of the North Caucasus Region: The Results of the Census of 1926]. Rostov-on-Don: North-Caucasian Regional Statistical Office.
Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya 1926 goda: Nacional'nyj sostav naseleniya po regionam RSFSR [All-Union Census of 1926: The National Composition of the Population by Region of the RSFSR]. http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_nac_26.php?reg=807. (Accessed June 1, 2017.)
Yaroslavsky, Yemelyan. 1922. *Pochemu u nas v Rossii golod i kak s nim borot'sya? (Prostaya beseda s krest'yanami)*. [Why Do We Have Hunger in Russia and How To Deal with It? (Simple Conversation with Peasants).] Moscow: State Publishing House, Samara Branch.
Zelenin, Ilya. 2006. "*Stalinskaya "revolyutsiya sverkhu" posle "velikogo pereloma," 1930–1939: Politika, osushchestvlenie, rezul'taty* [The Stalinist "Revolution from Above" after the "Great Turning Point," 1930–1939: Politics, Implementation, Results]. Moscow: Nauka.

Archival Sources

Archive MVD KK. Arhiv pri Glavnom upravlenii MVD Rossii po Krasnodarskomu krayu (Archive of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for the Krasnodar Territory).
Archive UFSB po RO. Arhiv Upravlenija Federal'noj sluzhby bezopasnosti Rossijskoj Federacii po Rostovskoj oblasti (Archive of the Department of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation for the Rostov Regiont).
Centr dokumentacii novejshej istorii Krasnodarskogo kraja (CDNIKK).
Centr dokumentacii novejshej istorii Rostovskoj oblasti (CDNIRO).
Centr dokumentacii novejshej istorii Volgogradskoj oblasti (CDNIVO).
Gosudarstvennyj arhiv Krasnodarskogo kraja (GAKK).
Gosudarstvennyj arhiv Rostovskoj oblasti (GARO).
Rossijskij gosudarstvennyj arhiv social'no-politicheskoj istorii (RGASPI).

Cite this article: Krinko, E. Skorik, A. and Shadrina, A. 2020. The Don and Kuban Regions During Famine: The Authorities, the Cossacks, and the Church in 1921–1922 and 1932–1933. *Nationalities Papers* 48: 569–584, doi:10.1017/nps.2019.120

https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2019.120 Published online by Cambridge University Press