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SPECIAL ISSUE ARTICLE

Revolutionary Origins of Political Regimes and Trajectories of Popular Mobilization in the Late Communist Period

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Abstract
Popular protest, which repeatedly occurred in Communist regimes, turned into massive mobilizational waves in the late Communist period. Why did some protests result in state cooptation and particularist nationalism (Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union), and others in state-society polarization (Poland) and protest containment (China), when these states shared important historical, political, and institutional legacies? Political regimes with origins in indigenous popularly-based revolutionary movements are more resilient to popular protests and other major crises than other authoritarian regimes. Protracted ideological armed struggle largely overlaps with broader patriotic causes, such as liberation wars or struggles against foreign intervention. The revolutionary regimes thus acquire patriotic credentials, while boundaries between partisan and patriotic identities become blurred, which strengthens their elite unity and popular base. Popular protests thus facilitate a complex political game of old and new actors that may result in regime survival or transformation. In other regimes, popular unrest tends to produce state-society polarization and, ultimately, regime delegitimation and breakdown. Popular contention in complex multinational institutional settings, if there is no major external threat, highlights old and triggers new conflicts along these structural and institutional divides and, where dual political identities prevail, facilitates identity shifts in particularist direction.

Keywords: political regimes; revolutionary legacies; popular protest; authoritarianism; Yugoslavia; the Soviet Union; Poland; China

Introduction

Popular protests in repressive political contexts, though considered unlikely, occur often. Communist regimes, which were widely seen as among the most repressive modern regimes, experienced repeated popular mobilization after Joseph Stalin, including Poland in 1956, 1968, 1970, and 1976, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in 1968, the Soviet Union in 1965 and China in 1957, 1978–1979, and 1989. In the late Communist period, large popular protests turned into massive waves of popular mobilization in several states, such as Solidarity in Poland (1980–1981), the "antibureaucratic revolution" and its antecedents in Yugoslavia (1986–1989), the *glasnost* mobilizational wave in the Soviet Union (1986–1991), and popular protests in China since the early 1990s. Interpretations of these events explored parallel issues. Some highlighted that the agency of cultural and/or political elites mattered most, while ordinary people followed their lead (Ash 1999; Cohen 2001, 62–78; Hough 1997, 11–13). Others provided evidence of major grassroots involvement in the origins and expansion of mobilization and of complex interplay between elites and ordinary people (Laba 1991; Beissinger 2002; Vladisavljević 2008; Chen 2012).

The parallel arguments in debates on the sources and dynamics of these cases of popular mobilization originated from the historical, political, and institutional context of late Communism.

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Trajectories of popular mobilization differed considerably across these countries. Solidarity triggered a long-lasting polarization between the state and society and, ultimately, led to authoritarian breakdown and democratization in Poland. Popular mobilizations in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union produced an increasingly pluralistic political process, spiraled into particularist nationalism, largely coopted by political elites, and facilitated state breakdown and the rise of hybrid regimes in most successor states. Despite their considerable levels, popular protests in China have been contained by a strong and flexible authoritarian regime but remain an important element of popular participation. Having in mind that the late Communist regimes shared important legacies, the question is why massive popular mobilizations in some states resulted in protest cooptation and particularist nationalism, while others produced very different outcomes: enduring polarization between the party-state and society, and, ultimately, democracy or non-binding consultation within a flexible authoritarian regime.

Building upon comparative regime analysis, this article argues that political regimes with origins in indigenous popularly-based revolutionary movements are more resilient to popular protests and other major crises than other authoritarian regimes. Protracted ideological armed struggle does not only produce strong partisan identities, militarized party structures, higher repression capacity, and legitimate and authoritative leadership, which sustain revolutionary regimes in times of major crises (Levitsky and Way 2012, 2013). It also largely overlaps with broader patriotic causes, such as liberation wars or civil wars with major external involvement, and thus blurs the boundaries between the partisan and patriotic identities and produces patriotic credentials for regimes that emerge from such struggle. As a result, elite unity and popular base of the regimes are strengthened considerably. Thus, massive popular protests tend to facilitate a complex political game of old and new actors that may produce various political outcomes, including regime survival and transformation. In other regimes, popular unrest is more likely to produce state-society polarization and, ultimately, regime delegitimation and breakdown. A byproduct of massive popular protest in states with complex multinational institutions, if there is no major external threat, is particularist nationalism. Popular contention on the public stage highlights old and triggers new conflicts along these structural and institutional divides and, where dual political identities prevail, facilitates identity shifts in a particularist direction.

Revolutionary Origins of Political Regimes and Trajectories of Popular Mobilization

A recent debate in comparative regime analysis on the influence of political institutions on stability of authoritarian regimes provides a foundation for understanding different trajectories of popular mobilization under late Communism. The debate emerged in response to an overwhelming scholarly focus on various aspects of democratic consolidation at a time when democratic institutions in many new democracies eroded considerably and various authoritarian regimes survived and prospered. It explores the sources of durable authoritarianism and suggests that political institutions, especially ruling parties, strongly contribute to regime survival. The emerging literature builds upon earlier scholarly arguments and evidence that party-based non-democratic regimes are more resilient than either personalist or military regimes (Huntington 1968; Geddes 1999). Strong ruling parties provide the foundation for elite cohesion and for the exclusion and marginalization of opposition. They do so by providing institutional arenas and incentives that unite self-interested leaders and maintain their loyalty even during major crises (Brownlee 2007; Svolik 2012).

However, some party-based authoritarian regimes are more durable than others. Regimes with origins in lengthy ideological armed struggle were among the most durable authoritarian regimes in the 20th century, apart from several oil-based monarchies in the Persian Gulf, and were also among regimes most resistant to democratization since the beginning of the “third wave.” Non-material sources of elite cohesion in party-based authoritarian regimes seem to be more effective in maintaining regime stability than patronage at times of major crises (Levitsky and Way 2012; Levitsky and Way 2013, 6). Revolutions produce strong ruling parties (Huntington 1968). They do

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so by building durable partisan identities and rigid partisan boundaries, militarized party structures, legitimate and authoritative leadership, and by enhancing the ruling party's capacity for repression. Ruling parties are most stable when mixing the non-material sources of cohesion with patronage. In addition, revolutions destroy independent power centers. Revolutionary legacies, and their impact on regime durability, fade in "post-revolutionary" regimes, that is, once the revolutionary generation has retired and younger leaders and activists have taken their place (Levitsky and Way 2012, 870–872; Levitsky and Way 2013, 7–14).

There is some evidence about the link between the revolutionary legacies and regime durability from Communist states. Some Communist regimes originated from homegrown ideologically-driven and popularly-based insurrections, which were then followed up by consolidation in power and extensive political and social transformation (for example Russia, Yugoslavia, Albania, Vietnam, China, and Cuba). Using concepts from the relevant literature, these were examples of revolutions, i.e., revolutionary movements that managed to overthrow a state or political regime in an "irregular, extraconstitutional, and/or violent fashion" (Goodwin 2001, 9). Or to be more precise, these were social (or great) revolutions, that is, rapid transformations not only of political institutions, but also of society's class structures, which had occurred at least partly through class-based popular rebellions (Skocpol 1979, 4). Other Communist regimes originated from external imposition, and not from indigenous popularly-based revolutionary movements (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria). The Communists took over all levers of power and initiated political and social change principally because of support from the Soviet Union. After 1989, Communist regimes outside Europe—all with a revolutionary background—survived major external and internal shocks. In Europe, Communist regimes ended, with or without revolutionary origins.

While cases outside Europe are in line with this theory's prediction, Communist regimes in Europe are a difficult testing ground for the theory. Firstly, most consequences of revolutionary legacies for regime durability emerged in Communist regimes without origins in an indigenous popularly-based armed struggle via ruthless top-down imposition backed up by an external hegemonic power—a sort of "revolution from above." These regimes used Soviet military and political support, and individual experience of leading Communist cadres in armed struggle outside their countries, to harden partisan identities and build strong parties, with military-style discipline, and to enhance their repression capacity. They transformed their countries' social, economic, and political landscape, aiming to eradicate independent power centers on the Soviet example. Secondly, the theory claims that revolutionary legacies fade in the post-revolutionary period as elite cohesion erodes, leadership loses legitimacy and authority, and repressive capacity declines. Revolutionary legacies could not prop up the Communists in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia because their revolutionary generations had retired in the 1960s and by the early 1980s respectively, well before the end of Communism.

This theory considers popular unrest as a potential source of crises that test the resilience of authoritarian regimes but does not discuss how revolutionary legacies shape popular mobilization. Revolutionary regimes are hardly pluralistic and tolerant places that facilitate the emergence and expansion of popular protest, if we think of them exclusively in terms of hardened partisan identities and rigid partisan boundaries, militarized party structures and strong repressive capacity, and legitimate and authoritative leadership. In this kind of setting, popular mobilization might take the form of mobilization "from above," aimed at various regime purposes, or of (violent or non-violent) confrontation with the regime. In the post-revolutionary period, one would expect that regime opponents exploit the decline of elite cohesion, leadership's legitimacy, and coercive capacity to mobilize against the regime and, if successful, produce sharp boundaries between the regime and society. And yet, this outcome occurred in (non-revolutionary) Poland, but not in post-revolutionary Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and China.

This article suggests a different take on how revolutionary legacies influence trajectories of popular mobilization, and possibly also long-term regime outcomes, both while the revolutionary

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generation is in power and after. Revolutionary struggle facilitates the construction of broader public and patriotic identities that sustain authoritarian regimes at both elite and mass levels. This is because ideological revolutionary struggles largely overlap with broader patriotic causes, such as liberation wars or civil wars with major external involvement. Huntington suggested that while a liberation war might occur without a social revolution, a social revolution always went together with a patriotic ("nationalist") revolution because the masses were mobilized into politics via appeals to nationalist sentiments. His focus was different though, principally on how nationalist appeals brought together specific social groups seen as essential for a social revolution, such as urban intelligentsia and peasants (Huntington 1968, 304).

A violent struggle against internal political competitors, amplified with a credible external threat, is likely to get an aura of patriotic struggle, if reasonably effective. The creation and transformation of political identities is therefore not limited to the building and hardening of partisan identities of elites, activists, and supporters of revolutionary movements. It also involves the formation of new or refashioning of dormant patriotic identities in the face of a major external threat. These revolutionary regimes therefore benefit from both the "standard" package of consequences of revolutions for elite cohesion and from patriotic legitimacy that emerges in liberation struggle, which boosts both elite unity and popular support. In these cases, it becomes difficult to disentangle elite and popular support for emerging regimes from their support for the states they preside over. Boundaries between partisan and patriotic identities become blurred, lending patriotic legitimacy to revolutionary regimes (and their political and associated social organizations), which further entrenches their elite unity and popular base. This kind of "genetic legitimacy" does not expire with the change of political generations. Older generations find it hard to distinguish between partisan and patriotic aspects of revolutionary struggle because both form a part of their personal experience, while younger generations are socialized into this state of mind at home, in schools, and through media.

There are various arguments in the literature on how wars shape patriotic/national identities. Wars unite disparate groups in the face of external threat; provide raw material for myths that in turn provide a sense of meaning and identity to populations; create we/they stereotypes that facilitate collective self-differentiation; produce social rituals that create a sense of commonality; and outcomes of war may produce public policies and behaviors that entrench national symbols and practices into everyday life (Hutchinson 2017, 52–65). These and related arguments are important but are beyond the scope of this article, which explores one particular outcome of protracted armed struggle—the (partial) merger of partisan and patriotic identities, the blurring of boundaries between regimes and states they run (including regime and state organizations) and its impact on trajectories of popular mobilization and potentially also on regime outcomes. A cultural content of patriotic appeals, their historical antecedents, and the very process by which the influence of war on patriotic/national identities unfold deserve a separate discussion.

Two caveats are important here. Firstly, nearly all non-democratic rulers tend to equate the regime with the state in order to exploit citizens' patriotic sentiments so it is easy to confuse rhetoric for the real thing. However, many citizens accept these claims as largely credible in regimes with revolutionary origins, while most see them as authoritarian manipulation in non-revolutionary regimes. Secondly, there may be a wide variation across individuals and groups in terms of how they perceive these claims in revolutionary regimes. In any case, it is difficult to assess popular support for non-democratic regimes ("their legitimacy") because competitive, free, and fair elections do not exist. Some clues exist though. Socio-economic, political, and/or international crises drain resources of regime incumbents and thus put major strains on non-democratic regimes. If elite unity and popular support (or the lack of widespread popular discontent) depends only on patronage, elite conflict and/or massive popular unrest is likely to undermine the regimes, unless there is major external support for regime survival. More importantly from the perspective of this article, the influence of revolutionary origins on popular protest is revealed in mobilizing structures, or formal and informal sites within which people mobilize and participate in protest; frames, or interpretive

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themes, that encourage people to participate in protest and to interpret grievances in ways that dignifies them and is meaningful for allies and opponents; and in forms or strategies of protest (Tarrow 2011, 28–33).

It is logical to assume that the blurring of boundaries between a regime and state, i.e., a broad "genetic" legitimacy in regimes with revolutionary origins, leads popular challengers to use official institutions and organizations, in addition to relying on existing social networks. Most of them are likely to accept the institutions and organizations as essentially legitimate, despite failures with respect to specific policies and cadres, and mobilize within or on the margins of these institutions and deploy protest strategies that are at least partly compatible with authorized channels. They are likely to use the regime's frames and rhetoric to demonstrate their continuing relevance, despite specific failures, and also to show how official policies and practices have come to differ from their programmatic statements. Within these limits, popular challengers may innovate on the margins of official institutions, frames, and repertoires of action, thus linking old with new popular struggles.

As a result, one should expect little ideological and organizational coherence in popular challenges in revolutionary (and post-revolutionary) regimes even at a time of high levels of mobilization. One potential outcome is demobilization amidst the mix of concessions and repression from the regime, which ensures regime survival. The other is major political change via the state cooptation of main demands and protest leaders, which ultimately results in regime transformation. In contrast, popular protests in non-revolutionary regimes are likely to produce new formal organizations because the official ones are widely perceived as illegitimate. Frames and symbolism surrounding massive popular protests are likely to be different from the official ones and based on the opposition to the regime. Therefore, ideological, symbolic, and organizational currents that crystallize behind massive popular protest in non-revolutionary regimes are likely to facilitate state-society polarization, regime delegitimation, and ultimately regime breakdown.

The Emergence and Unraveling of Patriotic Identities in Plural Societies

The blurring of boundaries between partisan and patriotic identities requires the refashioning of pre-existing identities. In plural societies, the process is more complex because it involves more than one ethnic/national identity. Broadly speaking, political actors—including revolutionaries—may pursue two broad strategies for managing ethnic and national diversity within existing states while avoiding discrimination of minorities. Integration promotes a single public identity that overlaps with a state territory. The aim is to safeguard political equality of citizens, regardless of their ethnic, religious, racial, or other cultural background, and to ensure stability and public unity. Ethnic minority identities remain important in the private sphere or get some, largely token official recognition. In contrast, accommodation promotes both separate identities and overarching public identities. Separate groups are granted official recognition and institutional protection, often via complex multinational federal and/or consociational institutions (O'Leary and McGarry 2012). The choice of integration or accommodation depends on the "national question" strategy of revolutionaries, but also on the country's structural and historical legacies.

Once institutional arrangements in support of the selected strategy are in place, they strongly shape political behavior by providing resources to some actors and denying them to others, and by encouraging specific claims and discouraging others. Integration strengthens state elites and starves elites of separate ethnic groups of resources to challenge the center and its policies; it also discourages all actors from making claims that bring into question the official public/patriotic identity. Accommodation promotes dual identities and often introduces complex multinational institutions that provide substantial resources to both state and national/regional elites; it also legitimizes nationalist claims so long as they do not undermine the common patriotic identity and institutions. These strategies may periodically come under strain. Major socio-economic, political, and/or international crises may open space for various challenges to the strategies and political regimes that sustain them, which in the course of widespread conflict across society may reshape cultural loyalties in unexpected directions.

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Lengthy popularly-based armed struggles in the face of external threat strongly promote broad overarching public and patriotic identities, above and in addition to pre-existing separate ethnic, national, and partisan identities. Examples include revolutionary struggles of the Yugoslav, Russian/Soviet, and Chinese Communists. However, massive protracted popular contention in plural societies with complex multinational institutions may produce opposite effects, if there is no major external threat, such as in the late Communist Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Dual or multiple identities may in the course of conflict shift in a more particularistic direction, which in turn is likely to undermine common political institutions and organizations, even if most influential actors had not previously pushed for such outcomes. By triggering conflict on the public stage, popular protests invite others to take part in the struggles, including potential supporters, opponents, and bystanders. They tend to produce unrealistic expectations among participants and their supporters and to multiply fears among their opponents. If sustained over time, the protests may trigger polarization that will reinforce structural and institutional divisions in plural societies (McAdam et al. 2001; Beissinger 2002). Polarization is boosted by considerable resources that complex multinational institutions provide to national/regional elites at a time when the federal center is undermined by external and internal strains (Bunce 1999; Vladisavljević 2008).

Revolutionary Regimes, Protest Cooptation, and Particularist Nationalism in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union

The Communist regimes in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union shared important features. They originated from indigenous ideological revolutionary movements that gained patriotic credentials when facing major external threats. Both emerged in highly ethnically and nationally diverse societies and built elaborate multinational institutions to deal with this diversity. A blend of partisan and patriotic identities, built in armed struggle and sustained via complex multinational federalism, sheltered the regimes against external and internal crises and strongly influenced popular mobilization under late Communism. The outcomes were the state cooptation of popular mobilization and particularist nationalism, which ultimately produced state breakup and the transformation of Communist into hybrid regimes in most successor states.

Yugoslavia

The origins of revolutionary struggle in Yugoslavia lay in a small, officially banned, and faction-ridden Communist party in the interwar period. The party was strengthened with the Popular Front policy and takeover by Josip Broz Tito in 1937, but became politically important only after its armed rebellion against foreign occupying forces which partitioned the country in 1941. The Communists built upon their interwar experience of an illegal political group and of the only genuinely multinational political force in a highly diverse society in which political parties, interest groups, and cultural associations developed principally along ethnic and national lines. Their patriotic and multinational appeal only grew at the time of extreme violence as foreign occupation and internal nationalist conflict unfolded in parallel (Đilas 1991). The Communists also waged an ideological struggle pursuing the socialist revolution but relying on support from peasants, the main social force in an agricultural society, calling for land reform (Bokovoy 1998).

The communists built a powerful, popularly-based army, defeated their local rivals and liberated the country from foreign occupation, aided by the Red Army. They took over all levers of power before the war's end and then created a highly centralized party-state and command economy, well before other East Europeans. The small, multinational group of Communist leaders, led by Tito, firmly controlled the party, state apparatus, and coercive institutions, which were staffed principally by war veterans. The Yugoslav identity had emerged in previous decades, but its appeal had remained limited to a small section of the population as official attempts at integration, initially via liberal democracy and later royal dictatorship, failed well before the war. Patriotic themes

however resonated well among large sections of the population during and after the liberation war and extreme internal nationalist violence. The Communists now promoted both the common patriotic (Yugoslav) identity and separate national identities: the constituent (titular) nations gained territorial autonomy via multinational federalism and national minorities acquired broad collective rights. A push toward greater territorial decentralization since the early 1960s turned the façade federalism into a radically decentralized multinational federalism with major consociational features (Đilas 1991; Burg 1983).

The strength of the party-state and its popular legitimacy, boosted by relentless official references to its origins in the "people's liberation struggle," immunized the regime against major external and internal crises. It survived a split with Joseph Stalin in 1948, which brought the country to the verge of war with the emerging Soviet bloc and into international isolation (Banac 1988). The Communists also weathered out major internal crises, such as elite conflict in 1966 and 1971–1972, which resulted in leadership purges, and popular protests by students and Kosovo Albanians in 1968 and 1981. By the time the economic crisis took a severe turn in the early 1980s, revolutionary leaders had already left the political stage and post-revolutionary generations had taken over. Radically decentralized authoritarianism at a time of major economic crisis and generational change produced a political stalemate, elite conflict, and liberalization by default, which in turn facilitated popular protest (Vladisavljević 2008, 31–50).

The antibureaucratic revolution originated from the grassroots action of unconnected groups. Industrial workers in large cities and other industrial centers pursued socio-economic causes amidst severe economic crisis and rapidly rising inequality, demanding policy change and resignations of specific high officials and regional and federal government (Musić 2016; Vladisavljević 2008, 110–119). The Serb minority in Kosovo, supported by allies in other parts of Serbia and Montenegro, demanded protection of their rights and greater control of Serbia's government over this autonomous province. As grassroots protests expanded spatially and participation grew, the unrelated demands blended under the "antibureaucratic" master frame, which blamed high officials for severe economic and political crises, building upon the official campaigns against corruption and bureaucracy from previous decades (Vladisavljević 2008; Grdešić 2016). The protesters partly mobilized within official channels, exploiting highly decentralized political institutions. Industrial workers organized largely outside external control within their factories' branches of the official trade union while Kosovo Serbs and their allies mobilized partly within local branches of the party's associated organizations. These and other groups and individuals, who joined the "antibureaucratic" mobilization at its peak in the autumn and winter of 1988–1989, repeatedly displayed loyalty to the regime and state by carrying their flags and chanting official slogans. The mobilization remained loose and informal, without new formal organizations that would confront the Communist regime, but instead demanded policy change, greater popular participation, and targeted specific high officials (Vladisavljević 2008, 88–108, 119–124, 134–142, 151–176).

As protests spread out and gained political weight, high officials and dissident intellectuals worked hard to co-opt their causes, gain the support of the groups and citizens sympathetic to their goals, and to exploit it against their elite rivals. Elite support, organizational resources, and logistics of the party-state boosted participation in large rallies and demonstrations, principally in central Serbia, but ordinary people remained key agents in the other regions even in later stages of the mobilization wave. Despite contrasting demands, the counter-mobilization of Kosovo Albanians in 1988–1989 fully reflected the dual agency of the antibureaucratic revolution, shifting over time from the grassroots to more organized and elite-led participation. The events facilitated regime transformation by weakening some parts of the political class and strengthening others who early on jumped on the bandwagon of political change by backing popular demands. In the process, state-society relations altered as well as the organization of the center of political power, clearing the way for the transformation of Yugoslavia's Communist regime into hybrid regimes in republics and, ultimately, successor states (Vladisavljević 2008, 125–134, 146–150, 179–194, 202–207).

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Nationalist claims evolved considerably from the protection of rights to constitutional change—both in the direction of recentralization and further decentralization. The expansion of socio-economic, nationalist, and other conflicts, which involved elites and ordinary people at the federal, regional, and local levels, altered power relations within the political class and between republics and autonomous provinces at a sensitive time of constitutional debates, which made some constitutional outcomes more likely than others. This in turn radicalized party-state officials and emerging political actors (cultural elites and non-elite actors) amidst highly institutionalized national divisions. High officials—Milošević and his rivals in other republics—began to press rival nationalist claims in public, which undermined the practice of party consultations and give-and-take politics behind closed doors, typical of consociational contexts, and weakened the regime's unified front toward popular challenges. High levels of conflict in the context of dual cultural loyalties—Serb, Croat, Slovene, and Yugoslav—and the radicalization of political actors now pressed individuals to choose between previously compatible but now competing loyalties. The escalation of conflict on the public stage, and the prospect of major redistribution of power among republics and autonomous provinces via constitutional change, produced attitudinal shifts of a particularistic kind, which made concessions over rival nationalist demands less likely. In the milieu of a loose and increasingly dysfunctional multinational federation and of a rapidly transforming Communist power structure, the attitudinal shift opened space for particularist and (later) exclusionary nationalism and, ultimately, the break-up of Yugoslavia (Vladisavljević 2008, 198–201, 207–209).

The Soviet Union

The Communist regime originated from the Bolsheviks' takeover in Russia amidst the revolutionary chaos of 1917. A series of defeats in World War I had undermined the credibility of the tsarist regime and triggered rural and urban unrest. The provisional government, which emerged after the collapse of autocracy amidst spontaneous strikes and bread protests of February 1917, failed to establish control over growing mobilization by rebellious workers and soldiers, and their soviets. The continuing war and disintegration of the army boosted agrarian revolts, with the seizure of estate land and its redistribution among peasants. In October, Vladimir Lenin's Bolsheviks took over, supported by the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, and officially approved land distribution. As the national constituent assembly became dominated by their opponents, the Bolsheviks dissolved it and relied on support from the pyramidal structure of soviets that were increasingly controlled by party loyalists (Service 1998).

The government rushed to end the war as parts of the former empire declared independence, counterrevolutionary forces established control in parts of its territory, and foreign troops (including British, French, Turkish, Japanese, and American) landed on the periphery. While previously promoting urban and rural revolts, the Bolsheviks now turned to the construction of highly centralized and bureaucratic structures, such as the Red Army and the party-state, to fight their counterrevolutionary and foreign rivals as well as internal opposition. The Communist revolution thus overlapped with the civil and patriotic war (1917–1921). Increasingly hardened partisan identities forged in armed struggle against domestic competitors mixed with patriotic sentiments that arose during foreign intervention. Simultaneously, the White forces' co-operation with foreign troops hardly boosted their popularity. Having in mind that the Bolsheviks had instrumentally promoted peripheral nationalism in the struggle against their opponents after the revolutionary takeover, institutional arrangements designed to support overlapping partisan, ethnic/national, and patriotic identities became very complex.

The highly centralized party-state now existed in parallel with the newly created Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which simultaneously promoted the common overarching patriotic (Soviet) identity and identities and territorial autonomy of non-Russian groups, in sharp contrast to the tsarist empire that was based on a shifting mix of imperial and Russian identities (Suny 1993). Still, the Russians effectively remained the dominant nation due to the size of the Russian "residual"

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federal unit and its party organization and the routine use of Russian language for official purposes and higher education at the center, while many approved of the regime that restored borders of the former imperial state (Vujačić 2015, 160–185). The generous nationality policy within a complex asymmetric multinational federation faded under Stalin's "revolution from above," as the focus shifted toward rapid coercive industrialization and collectivization and resulting political instability (Tucker 1992). The patriotic sentiments, now increasingly associated with Russian national identity, were revived in the monumental military efforts and popular suffering of World War II (the "Great Patriotic War"). Later, the regime drew patriotic legitimacy from the country's superpower status and leadership in the Soviet bloc and from being a preferred developmental model for many new states after decolonization.

The revolutionary regime survived major internal and external crises—including the civil war, coercive socio-economic transformation, the famine and mass terror of the 1930s, and World War II—but at a great human and material cost. By the 1960s, it entered its post-revolutionary stage, as the few remaining prominent revolutionaries who survived Stalin's purges left leadership, though leaders who participated in the "Great Patriotic War" remained in power through the mid-1980s. By the 1960s, the regime entered its post-revolutionary stage, as the few remaining prominent revolutionaries who survived Stalin's purges left leadership. Still, leaders who participated in the "Great Patriotic War" remained in power through the mid-1980s. Then, international, economic, and political crises intersected to trigger major political change, which revived an old imperial dilemma. The superpower status, arms race, and the control over Eastern Europe exhausted the country's resources in competition with considerably wealthier and developed Western countries, which a weakened economy could not sustain any longer (Lieven 2003). Then, international, economic, and political crises intersected to trigger major political change, reviving an old imperial dilemma: the superpower status, arms race, and the control over Eastern Europe exhausted the country's resources in competition with considerably wealthier and developed Western countries, which a weakened economy could not sustain any longer (Lieven 2003). The party-state turned sclerotic with a rapid succession of gerontocratic leaders. In response, Mikhail Gorbachev, a new leader from the younger generation, initiated economic and liberalizing reforms (Brown 1996; Hough 1997).

Perestroika and g*lasnost*, together with economic problems and the decline of the Communist regime, opened up space for pluralism and popular protest. Between 1986 and 1991, popular protests over environmental protection, democratization, socio-economic and nationalist issues swept across the country. Most protests originated from institutional sources and unfolded on the boundaries of institutions (Beissinger 2002; Fish 1995; Urban et al. 1997). In December 1986, several thousand people protested in Alma Ata against the replacement of Kazakhstan's Communist party leader Dinmukhamed Kunaev with a Russian official. In 1987, there were small, unconnected protests of various groups but also more sustained popular mobilizations. Crimean Tatars drafted petitions and sent delegations to meet party-state officials, and organized street protests in Moscow and in other locations. Most groups pursued their separate causes while supporting Gorbachev's reforms. In early 1988, environmental protests in Yerevan turned into large irredentist demonstrations. While triggered by violence against Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian enclave within Azerbaijan, the protests reflected prior official demands for its transfer to Armenia.

Struggles over the selection of delegates for the June 1988 party conference triggered the rise of officially sanctioned "popular fronts" across the country in explicit support of *perestroika*: small protests in various large cities went in parallel with large protests by "popular fronts" in the Baltics, which spiraled into particularist nationalism, and their imitation in nearly all union republics and their cooperation. Likewise, the March 1989 election campaign for the Congress of People's Deputies, and its subsequent sessions, spawned new groups and their protests (Beissinger 2002, 81–87; Fish 1995, 33–38). Socio-economic protests were small and much less frequent than other protests. The exception is the massive campaign of strikes and demonstrations of coal miners of the Kuzbass region in Western Siberia and the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine in mid-1989. The protests, which emerged over shortages of various goods, low living standards, and working

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conditions but reflected the miners' anger over bureaucracy, pressed the government into major concessions (Crowley 1997, 26–45).

Much of the popular mobilization in 1987–1989 openly supported Gorbachev's reforms, and were not against the Communist regime: the popular fronts involved a disproportionate number of party members and worked largely in parallel with party-state officials in the union republics. Alternative groups in Russia emerged largely from the Communist party in the form of "platforms" that later turned into loosely organized and often internally divided movements within the "movement society" (Fish 1995). The Communists also provided the leadership of the emerging opposition in Russia and most other republics in 1989–1991. The bulk of protest symbolism initially related to *perestroika* and *glasnost*, although national symbolism grew rapidly, via commemoration of the annexation in the Baltic republics or ethnic conflict in some parts of the country and later turning into secessionist claims. Popular protests strongly influenced institutional struggles by triggering elite conflict within the union republics and between them and the center. Having made an important impact on political developments, the protests gradually dissipated and were coopted by regional political elites.

Nationalism turned out to be the most potent source of popular mobilization. As popular protests and economic and political crises expanded, nationalist issues became more prevalent, reflecting structural and institutional legacies of a highly diverse, multinational federation. These events and Gorbachev's new foreign policy then triggered a nationalist wave and the fall of Communism across Eastern Europe in 1989, which in turn facilitated nationalist mobilization within the Soviet Union, beginning in the Baltics and the Caucasus, and gradually turning demands for rights and autonomy into calls for secession. It took several years of intensive popular contention and nationalist waves to transform various social, economic, and political conflicts into secessionist claims that ultimately undermined the state (Beissinger 2002, 47–48).

Differences Between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The focus of comparison on the presence or absence of revolutionary origins and of complex multinational institutions contrasts the cases of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union with those of Poland and China respectively and thus inevitably underplays important differences between them. Competing nationalisms turned more exclusionary in Yugoslavia than in the Soviet Union, which triggered protracted large-scale violence among the main groups. By contrast, the break-up of the Soviet Union was largely peaceful, except for the Caucasus, though violent nationalist conflicts between the largest nations caught up more recently. One explanation directs attention to considerably more decentralized federal institutions in Yugoslavia, especially to a decisively weakened federal center, powerful republics, and a more independent military, which encouraged key actors to pursue radical goals at a time of state disintegration (Bunce 1999, 110–125). Another shows how historically embedded collective representations of the state shaped identities of dominant nations—Serbs and Russians—in different directions, which produced contrasting reactions of their elites to the prospect of state dissolution (Vujačić 2015). Both explanations are largely compatible with the argument presented here as they all explore the same, complex problem from different angles.

Externally-Imposed Regime, Popular Mobilization, and State-Society Polarization in Poland

In contrast to Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the Communist regime in Poland originated largely from the imposition by an external hegemonic power after World War II, which had devastated the country and destroyed the upper classes. In the interwar period, the Communist party had been weak, without strong leaders and popular support. Some Communists took part in fighting the German occupation, but the partisan resistance was dominated by the Home Army, closely connected to the London government. Simultaneously, Communists and leftists resident in the Soviet Union were organized to take over power after the war. Installed at the helm of a provisional coalition government by the Soviet Union, the Communists gradually took over all levers of power

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by suppressing their more popular political opponents and by distributing patronage (Prazmowska 2004), without a brief democratic period that other Central European states experienced after the war. The lack of a powerful revolutionary movement was partly compensated by the Stalinist "revolution from above," which strengthened the party and hardened partisan identities but left coercive institutions in partial control by the Soviet Union. The creation of a centralized party-state and command economy did not proceed so far as in other parts of the Soviet bloc, leaving behind limited social pluralism, including some autonomy of the Catholic Church, private ownership of most arable land, and some private sector in retail trade and services.

The lack of patriotic legitimacy did not originate only from the regime's non-revolutionary origins, but also from its imposition by a hegemonic power that had been Poland's historical adversary. The territorial shift westward, the annihilation of Jews, and expulsions of Germans transformed Poland from an ethnically highly diverse country into a largely homogeneous one. While the loss of territory to the Soviet Union to the east was generously compensated by gains from Germany in the west and on the coast, the regime's dependence on a historical foe was hardly popular, just like its suppression of a powerful popularly-based patriotic resistance movement and its political successors. Attempts by Władysław Gomulka and other "national" Communists from the partisan resistance to "domesticate" Communism in their struggle against the "Muscovites" failed to produce patriotic legitimacy, while the coercive industrialization drive proved only partly successful (Rothschild 1993). As a result, repeated political crises that involved large popular mobilization—by workers in Poznan in 1956, students and intellectuals in 1968, and workers on the Baltic coast in 1970 and 1976—that were triggered by socio-economic and political causes undermined the regime and reinforced its reliance on its external sponsors.

De-Stalinization and its institutional, economic, and cultural fallouts opened more space for elite and popular dissidence in the context of limited social pluralism and of the regime's weak popular legitimacy. The repression loosened up and universities, professional organizations, and media gained more autonomy, while generational change freshened up the regime organizations that operated in an institutional framework considerably more complex than in other parts of the Soviet bloc (Ekiert 1996, 216–230). In August 1980, economic grievances triggered industrial workers' protests on the Baltic coast, amplifying patriotic passions raised by a visit by Karol Wojtyla, a recently elected Pope John Paul II, a year before (Ash 1999, 31–33). The protests expanded quickly across the country and turned into a broad social movement of industrial workers, intellectuals, students, and other groups. The cross-group cooperation originated from the experience of earlier failed protests by separate groups. Solidarity, the workers' new organization, swiftly gained nearly 10 million members and was thus by far the largest and most influential popular mobilization in Eastern Europe under Communism. It confronted a weakened party-state through non-violence until the army, led by General Wojciech Jaruzelski, introduced martial law in December 1981.

The workers' demands were economic and social, such as those related to the sharp increase of basic goods' prices, but also political. They demanded the right to organize independent trade unions and used the sit-in strike and the interfactory strike committee as protest strategies that had emerged in the 1970–1971 protests (Laba 1991, 82). Solidarity aimed at regime delegitimation via self-organization of society and did not question the Communist party's rule and Poland's place in the Soviet bloc, which reflected its "self-limiting revolution." The choice of non-violence also reflected tragic consequences of violence during World War II and the pragmatic position of the Catholic Church (Staniszkis 1984; Smolar 2009, 128–130). Once Solidarity's independence had been officially sanctioned, other groups created their own independent organizations, including students, artisans, and farmers, while existing organizations affiliated with the Catholic Church grew rapidly. In turn, these developments triggered reforms of the official organizations, including the Communist party, youth organizations, and professional associations. Overall, Poland became the only Communist state that formally (though temporarily) recognized independent political organizations, with extraordinary levels of popular support for the opposition, with experienced grassroots leaders and was supported by the intellectuals and the Church (Ekiert and Kubik 1999, 38–40).

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Solidarity focused on individual and socio-economic rights, but also built upon national and patriotic values and traditions, which underlined the lack of the regime's patriotic legitimacy. Its counter-hegemonic frames and symbolism reflected a widening gap between the party-state and society. One view is that they originated from the discourse of the intellectual opposition in the previous decade and some features of the Catholic Church's social and ethical doctrine (Kubik 1994); another is that they were rooted in the demands of industrial workers on the Baltic coast in 1970 and in the commemoration of their comrades-victims of the regime's ruthless repression via "sacred politics" (Laba 1991). Ultimately, the main outcome of the rise of Solidarity was polarization between the party-state and society. The December 1981 crackdown pushed Solidarity underground for several years but did not facilitate the regime's legitimacy and left it reliant on the Soviet Union. Once Gorbachev's reforms lifted the barriers to political change across the Soviet bloc, it returned triumphantly to the political stage and gently pushed the Communists away from power, via roundtable negotiations and partially democratic elections, which signaled the end of Communism in Eastern Europe.

Revolutionary Regime, Integration, and Protest Containment in Contemporary China

The Communist regime emerged from protracted armed struggle of the revolutionary movement that mixed ideological and patriotic themes. The imperial regime, an autocratic, centralized and semi-bureaucratic administration in an agrarian society that had been under the strain of foreign intervention and regional centrifugal forces for decades, collapsed in 1911. The events resulted in the declaration of a republic but also in an enduring dissolution of a unified national administration (Skocpol 1979, 67–80, 237–242). Regional military-based regimes competed with each other and with creeping foreign advances, which culminated in the Japanese invasion in the 1930s. The Kuomintang and the Communist party, nationalist and Communist revolutionary movements, respectively, that originated from attempts to overcome the internal disunity and fend off foreign intervention, occasionally cooperated to further these goals (1924–1927, 1937–1940), but for the most part fought each other in a civil war (Wilbur 1985; Snow 1968). Failing to mobilize the urban population and driven out to the countryside by their former larger partners in 1927, the Communists concentrated on guerrilla war and rural mobilization, promoting policies that benefited peasants, including land reform, and getting directly involved in the organization of village life. After major successes in fighting Japanese occupation and the building of a strong base in the peasantry in the north in the first half of the 1940s, the party effectively waged armed struggle against the Kuomintang and took over central power in 1949 (Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 301–337).

Since the early 1930s, the Communist party had endorsed self-determination to attract minorities, whose national homelands occupied vast peripheral (including strategic border) areas despite their small relative numbers (less than 10%). In practice, however, it insisted on China's territorial integrity, which appealed to the Han majority. Taking into account the Kuomintang's assimilationist program, ethnic minorities supported (or at least did not oppose) the Communist party during the civil war (Connor 1984, 72–92). The Communists could credibly claim that the Kuomintang's failed to preserve the country's unity against both competing warlords and foreign invasion. Their nationalist appeals—and their nationalist rivals' failure to effectively fight Japanese occupation and their reliance on US forces after Japan's defeat—attracted the educated, while the support of peasants originated from the mix of socio-economic and nationalist appeals (for their relative importance see Johnson 1962; Selden 1995; Bianco 1971).

The party built a centralized party-state down to the villages but, after abortive attempts to construct a Soviet-style command economy in an overwhelmingly agrarian society, switched to decentralization and agriculture via relentless mobilization from above and collectivization. Revolutionary struggle produced strong partisan identities, hardened in large scale violence, strengthened and militarized the party organization, produced strong party control over the army,

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and was led by charismatic leadership under Mao Zedong. Regarding ethnic minorities, the Communists settled for integration, following forceful reunification of seceding minority areas, and strongly promoted a single common public (Chinese) identity in a unitary state. The gradual extension of collective rights and regional autonomy to minorities was downplayed by highly limited powers of the autonomous units and major dilution of their titular groups by gerrymandering and Han migration (Connor 1984, 233–235, 322–329).

The strong popular base enabled the regime to weather out several major crises, including conflict with the United States over Korea (1950–1953) and split with the Soviet Union, its main external sponsor (1960). It recovered successfully after major self-inflicted socio-economic and political disasters of the Great Leap Forward (1958–1959) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1969). The two episodes of radicalism from above—which aimed at the acceleration of economic development and transition to Communism via massive mobilization of popular efforts and contempt for institutions, intellectuals, and technical knowledge—resulted in economic collapse, famine and malnutrition, political chaos, and the sharp decline in the quality of leadership.

Since the late 1970s, reforms under Deng Xiaoping pushed the country in a different direction via a retreat from collectivization; growing private initiative in agriculture, commerce, and manufacturing; opening to the world; and collective leadership. A transition to a market economy, based on exports, accelerated at a time when Communism disappeared from Europe, produced fast and sustained economic growth. Communist ideology was downplayed and supplemented by patriotism/nationalism. A decentralized capitalist economy produced greater institutional complexity and change in state-society relations, namely a shift from the cellular political and economic organization, based on a unit system model, to broadly-based government-citizen relations, in the context of a still centralized party-state (Chen 2012, 59–65). After Deng's death in 1997, China completed a long transition to post-revolutionary leadership.

These developments set the stage for an unprecedented rise of popular protests. According to official statistics, there were about 8,700 protest events (protests, demonstrations, group complaints, marches, and sit-ins) in 1993, but over 87,000 annually by 2005 (O'Brien and Stern 2008, 12). Popular protests surged in both rural and urban areas, ranging from small events to large protest marches and demonstrations. Rural protests originated from farmers' discontent over illegal taxes and fees, the corruption of local officials, land disputes and irregularities in village elections. Urban protests involved workers' strikes and other protests over higher pay, industrial relations, and the loss of jobs. Citizens protested over the supply of utilities, environmental issues, house demolition, and official corruption, while pensioners protested over welfare and students over various causes. Important precedents under and after Mao had included some spontaneous protests of industrial workers in response to nationalization of industrial firms in 1956–1957 and during a "wind of economism" in 1966–1967; Democracy Wall protests in 1978–1979; labor protests in 1980; student protests in the winter of 1986–1987; and the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 (Perry 2010).

Since the early 1990s, protesters have largely relied on communal networks, such as the workplace, neighborhood or dormitory, and informal organization limited to the local context and loosely organized (pensioner and peasant associations). They have deliberately avoided creating formal organizations (Chen 2012, 9). The popular protests reveal the logic of "playing by the rules." They are permeated with the official rhetoric and symbols, often wrapped up in the official legalistic speak, to protect their groups' interests while demonstrating loyalty to the party-state. The vast majority of protesters use official channels for collective petitions, appeals, and delegations (collective visits). While the protests remained a challenge to authorities, since demands might go up the hierarchy quickly, goals and targets remained limited to greater inclusion and recognition by the party-state (Perry 2008; Perry 2010). Such "rightful resistance" operates on the boundaries of the formal channels, strictly adheres to established values, exploits divisions within the party-state, and is contingent on broader public support (O'Brien and Li 2006, 2–3). The focus on the official channels does not exclude deliberate disruptive tactics, such as marches, street

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demonstrations, sit-ins in public places and at government offices, traffic blockades, even violence, with the aim to attract the attention of authorities and the media (Chen 2012).

The "protest opportunism" aims not only at achieving short-term goals but also at long-term bargaining with the authorities. Protest groups ultimately become pressure groups in local politics and their interests and opinions are taken into account in policy-making and implementation (Chen 2012, 5). The official response to popular challenges was historically and ideologically sensitive to workers, students, and grassroots claimants, while discouraging ideological dissidence and unofficial demands toward "special autonomous regions," such as Tibet or Xinjiang. Attempts to link protests of workers, students, and other groups also faced repression (Cunningham and Wasserstrom 2011). Within these limits, local popular protests of various rural and urban groups flourished. Some authors saw in contemporary popular protests in China a "rising rights consciousness" and incipient civil society that signaled future struggles with the party-state (O'Brien and Li 2006, 116–129); others pointed to the blurring of lines between the party-state and society, as well as to contentious participation that compensated for the lack of institutional participation in a flexible authoritarian regime. The parallel high levels of popular protest and effective protest containment, with highly selective repression, ensured not only authoritarian survival but also continuing popular legitimacy of such "contentious authoritarianism" (Perry 2008, 206–207; 2010; Chen 2012, 5–6).

Conclusion

Revolutionary legacies do not only bolster regime durability by strengthening partisan identities, militarizing ruling parties, boosting their repression capabilities, creating legitimate and strong leadership and by destroying rival power centers (Levitsky and Way 2012; Levitsky and Way 2013). Having in mind that most revolutionary movements unfold amidst patriotic struggles against external threat, they also facilitate the blurring of boundaries between partisan and patriotic identities. The patriotic aspect of "genetic" legitimacy of revolutionary regimes strengthens their elite unity and popular base and—unlike the effects mentioned above—does not expire in the post-revolutionary period. The comparison of Communist regimes with and without revolutionary origins reveals that revolutionary legacies dampened effects of major external and internal crises and strongly influenced trajectories of popular mobilization in the post-revolutionary period. The revolutionary regimes in Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and China repeatedly endured major internal and external predicaments drawing on internal resources, and retained patriotic credentials along the way. Popular challengers, who questioned specific policies and high officials but not the regimes' legitimacy, mobilized within or near official channels and existing social networks, largely adopted official frames and symbolism, and deployed a mix of conventional and disruptive strategies. The popular protests turned the political process wide open for new actors and resulted in a complex political game in which old and new actors—in various combinations—competed for public support. New formal oppositional organizations emerged only when regime transformation had already been in full swing (i.e., in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union).

The end of the Cold War and political opening it provided for democratization worldwide, found these (post-revolutionary) regimes in a very different position. In Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, growing economic and political crises, and centrifugal forces that mobilization waves produced in complex multinational institutional contexts, undermined central government and pushed emerging regimes in their republics-successor states beyond the boundaries of Communism. Attempts to gain a new popular base within the international context highly favorable to democratization, however, produced only hybrid regimes, and not democracy. In China, high and sustained economic growth ensured protest containment by adding ample patronage to non-material sources of regime durability. Simultaneously, the regime tolerated ample popular mobilization as a non-binding form of public consultation. By contrast, the lack of patriotic credentials of Poland's non-revolutionary regime undermined its stability via repeated internal crises, which required external support, and pushed popular protest toward (non-violent) confrontation with the

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party-state via the creation of new formal organizations and frames and symbolism that aimed at regime delegitimation. The rise of Solidarity thus contributed to major confrontation between the increasingly militarized party-state and self-organized society, which resulted in regime breakdown and democratization.

Levitsky and Way's argument explores how revolutionary legacies boost regime durability (2012; 2013) but is silent on what happens after the regimes end. It does not discuss regime change in Communist Europe because regimes with revolutionary origins were already in their post-revolutionary stage. And yet, a clear pattern emerged with regard to regime outcomes. All non-revolutionary regimes broke down and gradually shifted toward democracy, including Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. Romania was a late riser in this group because it experienced its own small revolutionary struggle in 1989. In contrast, all regimes with revolutionary origins transformed into hybrid regimes. In 1991, the Communist regime ended in Albania and multinational states collapsed in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Due to complex Yugoslav and Soviet multinational institutions, the transformation of Communist rule into hybrid regimes had already been under way at the level of republics. The Baltic states, which gradually shifted toward democracy, are not an exception because their Communist governments had no revolutionary origins; they had become part of the Soviet Union well after the October revolution and resemble other non-revolutionary states in Eastern Europe. Slovenia's early and stable democracy remains the only outlier.

The lack of strong patriotic credentials that emerge in revolutionary struggle, it seems, renders authoritarian regimes more vulnerable to external pressure and influence, including during major political openings—such as that after the Cold War. That is why domestic political actors, old and new, tend to adopt frames and strategies promoted by external hegemonic actors that in turn strongly shape regime outcomes—democracy in this particular case. In contrast, regimes with revolutionary origins are normally more resilient to external pressures because they enjoy "genetic" legitimacy: much of the elite and population see them as essentially legitimate, despite specific policy and personality failures. The focus therefore is on domestic reform—including policy, personnel, and institutional change—and possibly also regime transformation, but not regime delegitimation and breakdown. Sheltered from excessive external constraints, political actors are reasonably free to explore "third way" possibilities, which in the post-communist context largely resulted in hybrid regimes. This angle seems to deserve further investigation.

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