especially when otherwise "normatively effective constitutional regimes" lose their way (p. 74).

Brunkhorst's lively and richly sourced historical narrative, and his frequently blunt observations regarding the present weaknesses of the embryonic global public sphere—with citizens essentially reduced to the "politics of appeal" and mere contestation and opinion formation, rather than deliberation and decision making—complement Bohman's more abstract theorizing. While much of his text is meticulously structured and conveyed, Bohman goes too far in narrowly framing his perspective as "republican cosmopolitanism." At the outset of his book, Bohman makes it clear that he wishes to highlight a republican ideal of nondomination, rather than a liberal ideal of noninterference (pp. 8, 17–18). However, a great deal of what he advocates throughout the book—and especially his overarching concern for implementing human rights standards—can be situated just as squarely within cosmopolitan liberalism. Classifying human rights within any political community as universal; upholding the rule of law and unequivocal commitments to liberty, justice, and equality; safeguarding minority rights; championing the rights of all human beings, especially immigrants and noncitizens, to make legal and political claims within any given polity, on their own behalf as well as on behalf of others; warding off any slippery slope toward tyranny—all of these are core liberal tenets, which Bohman repeatedly labels exclusively as "republican." And a key thesis of the book—that the standard of a democratic minimum must be enlarged to include all humanity—certainly flows from liberalism as well as republicanism.

While Bohman seems to leave cosmopolitan liberalism out in the cold, Brunkhorst seems more willing, refreshingly, to treat republicanism and liberalism as compatible theories in the global project of strengthening democratic legitimacy and public deliberation. Bohman seems to recognize as much; as he notes toward the end of his book, democracy carries both the legal capacity to "protect the rights of those who are juridical subjects under its laws" and the political capacity to "empower its citizens to actively change their circumstances" (p. 180).

All in all, Brunkhorst and Bohman each offer many worthwhile insights into how ideals related to democratic empowerment and universal inclusion have proceeded throughout history, and how models of transnational (or cosmopolitan) democracy have the promise to reconfigure political relationships among citizens and governing institutions, especially when it comes to bolstering parliamentary representation and opportunities for unmediated influence and communication among and between everyday citizens and government officials. While neither book contains much specific commentary on the current state of affairs with respect to global governance, both authors seek to harness political theory in hastening the advance of democracy, at all levels—and in turning weaker public spheres, especially within civil society, into stronger deliberative public spheres. The nascent global public sphere, then, serves as a corrective to largely unfettered global capitalism. It also heightens the profile, across all government arenas, of everyday people alongside administrative elites and "experts" in the face of perceived erosion in democratic responsiveness within even the more established constitutional democracies. Both books make clear, in short, that a meaningful expansion in the scale of democracy can emerge only with a more fundamental transformation in the content of democracy.

Liberalism in the Shadow of Totalitarianism.
By David Ciepley. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006. 379p. $52.50 cloth.
doi:10.1017/S1537592709091038

— Terence Ball, *Arizona State University*

This is a timely book—much more timely than its author knew or even could have known as he wrote it. It is in large part a revisionist history of modern American liberalism, and of the New Deal in particular. David Ciepley's central thesis is (as his title suggests) that through the 1930s, World War II, and the Cold War, American liberalism stood increasingly in the long and very dark shadow of totalitarianism. Ciepley contends that "the encounter with totalitarianism closed the Progressive era and opened the Liberal era" (p. 29). The tar-brush of totalitarianism led liberals to distance themselves from accusations that liberal reformism and governmental activism bore an uncomfortably close resemblance to totalitarianism. And in so doing, liberals lost their nerve—and their way. In the early twentieth century, progressivism was a fighting creed; by mid-century, it had transmuted into a cautious liberalism; and by century's end, it was the "L-word," enervated and in full retreat. Ciepley narrates this tale of decline through the lens of earlier progressive and later liberal intellectuals and their conservative critics, concluding that "[i]ntellectual discourse has [in recent years] swung in a libertarian direction" (p. 3). He aims to explain that swing.

Ciepley could neither have known nor predicted that there would in 2008–09 be a wild and even violent swing in the other direction, and a revival of something like New Deal activism and interventionism. The false god of the un- or deregulated market has been dethroned. The great value of Ciepley's book resides in his detailed and painstaking recreation of earlier arguments against and in favor of such activism—arguments that are once again echoing through the halls of Congress, across the Internet, and in countless columns of newsprint. As Yogi Berra said (in another context), "It's *déjà vu* all over again!"

Or maybe not. This time around, American liberals don't have a totalitarian "other" to contend with. There is now no Nazi Germany, no Fascist Italy, no Soviet Union to overshadow and stall the liberal (or progressive) project. To be sure, this doesn't stop conservatives from labeling

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anything or anyone they don't like as "socialist" or "communist"; it's just that the accusations fail to resonate and simply don't seem to stick anymore.

Late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century progressivism placed a premium on active government, not only in the economy, but in morality as well. It promoted fair dealing in markets (which required a degree of market regulation) and unflinchingly advocated the cultivation of virtue in citizens. Prominent progressives such as Herbert Croly and Walter Lippmann argued that in an increasingly complex world, technical expertise must replace bumbling amateurism, and technical "mastery" must surpass planless "drift." Little heed was paid to such Cassandras during the boom times of the Roaring Twenties, but (as in the *Iliad*) Cassandra proved prophetic. As financial markets crashed and the Great Depression ensued, free-market ideology was discredited and progressivism came into its own. By the time of Franklin Roosevelt's election in 1932, the country was receptive to new and nontraditional approaches to governance—to increased regulation of banks, of financial markets, of production for use (instead of profit); to planning and large-scale government programs.

But, as Ciepley notes, the coming of the New Deal coincided with the rise of totalitarian regimes in Russia, Germany, and Italy. These regimes engaged in extensive planning and exerted considerable control over production and other economic matters. Under the guise of educating citizens, they indoctrinated them and made them march in lockstep. Conservative critics of the New Deal were quick to draw unflattering comparisons between these regimes and the Roosevelt administration, claiming that Roosevelt would soon be a dictator, if he wasn't one already. The Hearst and Gannett newspapers beat this drum at every turn, and with some success (pp. 139–40). The coming of the Second World War provided something of a respite from such attacks, as it made such appeals less appealing, and a world war on two fronts could hardly be fought without extensive federal funding and central planning. One result of the war was a shift away from "social Keynesianism" (welfare and workfare programs) to "military Keynesianism," i.e., government spending on weapons of war (p. 97). Spending of the latter sort soon dwarfed social-welfare expenditures, and finally ended the Great Depression.

As the Soviet Union swallowed up Eastern Europe and threatened Western Europe as well, the "totalitarian" stigma returned with a vengeance. Liberals inside and outside the American academy were cowed by red-baiting politicians—Richard Nixon and Joseph McCarthy were only two of the most vocal among them—who often equated liberalism with communism, or at least with being "soft" on communism. Eager to establish their patriotic *bona fides,* liberals beat a hasty retreat from their own cherished beliefs and principles, leaving liberalism so watered down as to be almost unrecognizable. In economics, liberalism went from being a vigorous defender of planning for the public interest to defending a new kind of liberalism—a pluralistic liberalism of contending interest groups (Part 3)—and in law and morality, from a politics of virtue to a political philosophy of state neutrality (Part 4), which, in turn, created the conditions for the "culture wars" of recent years (Chapter 16).

Ciepley's is a plausible and interesting story, and he tells it well. But an equally plausible alternative explanation might invoke the idea of "reform fatigue." As Arthur Schlesinger Sr. noted in "Tides of American Politics" (*Yale Review,* Dec. 1939), the United States has historically oscillated every sixteen years or so between reform and retrenchment, between governmental activism and quiescence. He predicted (correctly) that the era of liberal activism would end in 1947–48. Never once invoking the threat of totalitarianism, Schlesinger held that political moments and movements run their course. So it was with the progressive politics of the New Deal. So now it seems to be with free-market conservatism's long run. The tide, it appears, has turned.

Provisional Politics: Kantian Arguments in Policy Context. By Elisabeth Ellis. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008. 208p. $50.00 cloth.
doi:10.1017/S153759270909104X

— Chad Lavin, *Virginia Tech*

A companion rather than a sequel to Elisabeth Ellis's rightly celebrated *Kant's Politics: Provisional Theory for an Uncertain World* (2005), this slimmer volume is an initial payment on the promise of that earlier book. *Kant's Politics* argued that Kantian political theorists should not strive to establish conclusive political principles, but rather to establish the conditions under which "actually existing publics" might determine and apply their own principles. The point was to refute the familiar claim that Kantianism promotes abstract principles divorced from the messy realities of political life or, more broadly, to deny that Kant's politics can be derived from his ethics.

Provisional Politics, however, "is not a book about Kant" (p. 4). Instead, this book responds to the common complaint that liberal theory writ large begins with lofty ideals and conclusive principles (like property rights) instead of the concrete realities and specific dilemmas of particular political contexts. Ellis situates her work between an abstract moralism that derives political judgment from such principles and a cynical *realpolitik* that refuses moral arguments outright. Provisional theory, she explains, admits the inconclusiveness *and* the unavoidability of moral claims in politics (p. 20); it does not ask whether any policy tends toward justice or any other abstract political ideal, but whether it might "multiply rather than foreclose political possibilities" (p. 20). Ellis proposes three basic structural arrangements that can multiply these possibilities:

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