

emphasis on productivity and more on creativity. Here as in many other sections, the book has an important point to make and makes it very well.

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**Hypnosis and Behaviour Modification: Imagery Conditioning.** By WILLIAM S. KROGER. Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications. 1977. Pp 406. £16.80.

This book introduces the topic in a clear and readable way, by a series of concise definitions and clear expositions of major theoretical views. These are followed by helpful sections on the preparation of the subject for hypnosis and on the variety of hypnotic techniques. The discussion broadens into related procedures such as autogenic training and biofeedback and there is a useful discussion of autohypnosis.

Unfortunately the work loses much of its pristine clarity as it continues and the extensive sections on clinical applications become muddled and repetitive. The author would have been better advised to exclude this entire section from the work since he has covered the matter in a second book which appeared since the first edition of the present work.

Most of the sections are well referenced which is of advantage to the serious student and researcher.

**Hypnosis in Practice: Its Application in Stress and Disease.** By H. LAWRENCE SHAW. London: Baillière Tindall. 1977. Pp 138. £2.75 (limp-back).

This small book, produced in limp cover, is intended to be an introductory work on the topic for interested practitioners. It has the merit of brevity, there are some useful references and on the whole the topic is dealt with clearly.

However, I would not be able to recommend it to my own students, for the emphasis given to induction techniques is too heavily weighted with active instructions instead of passive suggestions. To inform a subject attempting to enter a hypnotic trance that he must raise his right index finger when he has a clear mental image of some scene clearly militates against the easy passage into the hypnotic state. The better alternative is a suggestion that a hand or finger will twitch or move when such a scene is visualized.

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**Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man.** By MARGARET BODEN. Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester Press. 1977. Pp 537. £13.50 (cloth), £4.95 (paper).

Enthusiastic testimonials on the dust-cover of a book may tend to make a reviewer feel *de trop*. However, it should be said that in this case at least the enthusiasm is fully warranted, and that this is indeed a book which merits very wide circulation.

Dr Boden defines artificial intelligence as the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. Thus the book's central concern is with questions usually considered in the context of psychology and cognate disciplines, concerning for instance language, creativity and personality. The coverage and discussion of current and previous work is thorough and illuminating. It is also readily assimilable, partly because of the author's limpid, jargon-free prose, partly because of the book's organization. No previous knowledge of computing is assumed. Instead, after a short introduction, two chapters are devoted to outlining a particular computer program, Colby's simulation of a neurotic process, and to discussion of the program's strengths and weaknesses. The following chapters adopt the same strategy of introducing general and abstract discussion via the description of particular programs. The consequence is that the book is stimulating and informative for the specialist and non-specialist alike.

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**Meaning and Void: Inner Experience and the Incentives in People's Lives.** By ERIC KLINGER. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1977. Pp 364. \$16.50.

It can be daunting to review a 400-page book at the end of which no less than 600 references are given: the more so if the topics they refer to take one from learning theory to clinical psychiatry passing through social psychology, drug addiction, suicide and psychotherapy.

Professor Klinger's avowed intention is to write a 'book about people's sense that their lives are meaningful, about the conditions under which people feel that way and about the conditions that erode that feeling' (p 3). This is plain enough. Indeed in this quotation the general structure of the book is laid out.

The author starts by discussing the notion of meaning. Soon, however, it becomes clear that meaning is considered by him as tantamount to 'incentive'. This term, central to his whole argument,

is defined in general terms. 'An incentive is any object or event that tends to attract a person' (p 6). Incentives thus constitute a kind of *primum mobile*. The presence, erosion or absence of incentives will determine whether you are with it or whether you become depressed or, if the worst comes to the worst, you do yourself in.

Some, with an iconoclastic mood, may well challenge this pedestrian truth and ask what is the evidence for it or, what is more important, what can in principle count as evidence. For Klinger 138 American students talking about the importance of meaning in their lives may not be very relevant to understanding what makes the rest of mankind tick, principally those people not yet imbued by the Western ethos. Nor indeed the claim that 'psychiatrically disturbed individuals report a lower sense that their lives are meaningful' (p 9) is of any relevance to the problem of whether indeed people need to see some meaning in their lives in order not to be depressed.

The fact of the matter is of course that this kind of hypothesis cannot be disproven. Not that I need to lean here on the Popperian canon to see that once you define incentive and meaning as Klinger does then you cannot really demonstrate that it is possible to live happily without incentives. Nor, *per contra*, demonstrate that someone who is suicidal still has incentives left, but wants to kill himself for some other positive reason. And you cannot do that because ex-hypothesis, to be suicidal is to have no incentives.

Chapter 3 on 'incentives and emotions' is a standard reviews of ideas on emotions and the usual names from McDougall and Marañon to Olds, Gray and Schachter are paraded.

The next three chapters deal with the vicissitudes of value and its association with incentives. 'Downs in the value of incentives' can play havoc with individual lives, and aggression, anger, frustration and depression follow this central loss.

In the section on depression, the expected references to Beck, Seligman and Lewinsohn are found. A view of depression based on learning is accepted and a therapy of depression 'concerned with identifying losses that may be responsible' and 'helping patients to accept their depression as a natural, adaptive process' is put forward.

But depression is not the only consequence of 'losing' incentives. In chapter 6 we find that 'alienation, futility and discontent' are also the result of this process. Cumming and Henry's 'disengagement theory' also appears in this chapter. Klinger concludes that 'much of what have seemed to be natural psychological deficits of ageing are in fact the consequences of the incentive systems with which our

modern aged are surrounded' (p 233). The evidence he presents to prove this point is extremely jejune.

The next chapter, under the baffling title 'tampering with the message system', soon is found to refer to less dramatic matters. In fact it deals with the various ways in which people try to improve the quality of their emotions: by drugs, spiritual exercises, and manipulation of all kinds.

Chapter 8, entitled 'Self-Annihilation', touches upon yet another consequence of the failure in the system of incentives: suicide. The accustomed references, names, statistics and explanatory models are forwarded. Then we are told that what Durkheim really meant (How could it be otherwise?) by his notion of anomie was the failure of the incentive system in society.

After a general summary the book comes to an end. The question as to whether psychiatrists should, profitably, read this book cannot be answered unequivocally. To those psychiatrists who already hold a motivational view of most psychiatric ailments the book says nothing new. To those who weary of the excessively cognitivist aspects of this kind of hypothesis and believe that there is no need of constructs such as incentive systems, operating either at a conscious or unconscious level, this book will sound waffly and irrelevant. After all, we do not even know whether the phrase 'zest for life' represents the outcome of some kind of psychological process or is only a poetic licence, inspired by the Western Value System, to describe the behaviour of those who get on with their lives.

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**Psychoanalysis and Behaviour Therapy: Toward an Integration.** By PAUL L. WACHTEL.  
London: Harper & Row. 1977. Pp 292. £11.25.

This book is written by a psychodynamically orientated psychologist who has spent considerable time working with behaviour therapists and examining their practice from the viewpoint of his own training. He first reviews the history of psychoanalysis and examines the way in which the original insights of Freud have been modified by his successors. He welcomes the open-mindedness demonstrated by some theoreticians and comments that 'excessive certainty is the most serious difficulty that has plagued psychoanalysis'. He sees that a narrow Freudian view of the role of the past as the only relevant consideration in present functioning is a major obstacle to integration of analytic and behavioural psychotherapy. His view is that over and above acquiring insight into early