Thus, in the midst of an expansive period, those who fear or suffer under the process of expansion rally in protest. The effectiveness of their reaction may vary significantly. Indeed, historically, those actors were not able to thwart the globalizing thrust, although they were capable of interrupting, postponing, or transforming it. Above all, such reactions have increased the need for an international power with the necessary military resources to reimpose or recreate order in the international system—that is, an imperial power that substitutes rules with strength and multilateral regulation with unilateral control. As Harold James convincingly argues, globalization and imperialism feed each other. Each, and any, rule-based world order is going to generate the reasons and the actors for its overturning, thus creating the conditions for the ascendancy of an imperial power. Even the most powerful of imperial powers had, and will have, to face their own decline, if not fall. Each of them met, and will meet, the *limes* of their disintegration.

This is the Roman predicament discussed in the book. On the basis of the interpretative models elaborated more than two centuries ago in Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* and Edward Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (it is peculiar that both books were published in 1776), James advances a pessimistic (but also stimulating) view of the process of globalization. On the basis of Smith's model, James argues that the liberal hopes of promoting peace through the formation of an open economic international order have to reckon with the contradictory nature of that system. On the basis of Gibbon's model, he argues that the conservative hopes of guaranteeing peace through the formation of an imperial order have to reckon with the negative implications of the exercise of that power. In other words, Smith and Gibbon show that there are no easy ways out of the "Roman dilemma." Indeed, the empire's supporters of the modern era had to learn that military power is a necessary but not sufficient resource for guaranteeing international order; whereas the empire's critics had to recognize that economic trade is a necessary but not sufficient condition for promoting peace and prosperity. In sum, domestic as well as international systems require rules to function, but those rules are rarely neutral, or better, rarely express universally shared views. Not all (countries, groups, individuals) comply with those rules, as the rules do not always reflect their interests. Such circumstances thus drive the creation and imposition of enforcement mechanisms that make explicit the biased nature of those rules; that is, their existence is the expression of some configuration of dominant powers.

Is there an alternative to what the author defines as the "challenge and response model" that has as its inevitable outcome the clash of civilizations? After presenting in Chapters 2 through 6 a disheartening scenario on the contradictory forms taken by globalization, James discusses what might represent the most innovative attempt to find a way out of the Roman predicament—the European Union. The EU has tried to introduce a new concept of power based on its negation. The EU is a power that has renounced power. In the EU, power is diffused, segmented, disaggregated, shared, and pooled. The EU is a postmodern state, or rather, a premodern one. Indeed, it is the contemporary heir of the long-lived Holy Roman Empire, which organized a highly fragmented continental Europe for roughly a millennium. However, even the EU does not represent a convincing answer to the Roman dilemma. Its "obsession" with processes constitutes an insurmountable constraint on its capacity to solve conflicts. Just as rules and power cannot keep the Roman dilemma under control, the same holds also true for processes. The solution of the Roman dilemma, James finally argues, resides in getting back those values that are the expression of a natural law recognized as such by different countries, groups, individuals, and civilizations.

Whereas the argument of the book is clear and stimulating, the prose is not always clear and persuasive. The book is an exercise in intellectual history and not a text on the history of international political economy supported by empirical evidence. Erudition sometimes overtakes argumentation. The chapter on the EU, for instance, is evocative rather than innovative; whereas the discussion of values in the conclusion is evocative rather than substantial. Moreover, the chapters are not well connected, as if each of them represented an autonomous contribution to the book. In sum, the book is a brilliant endeavor of intellectual history, although its persuasive power is somewhat limited by a too vague and disconnected narrative.

The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment. By Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 302p. $80.00 cloth, $29.99 paper.
DOI: 10.1017/S153759270707137X

— Richard Little *University of Bristol*

The English School, although still not mainstream, is now increasingly recognized as one of the significant approaches to the study of international relations. In their attempts to map the parameters of the field, for example, both Steven D. Krasner in *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (1999) and Alexander Wendt in *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999) position the English School alongside more familiar schools of thought. There is also now a section of the International Studies Association devoted to the English School and it sponsored more than a dozen panels at the 2007 convention in Chicago. As the prominence of the English School has risen, so has the need for a comprehensive and authoritative assessment of its development and defining ideas.

Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami have both displayed a long-standing interest in the English School,

although neither are card-carrying members. As a consequence, they are exceptionally well-equipped to provide a broad-ranging and far-reaching account of the English School. However, they also have a very clear agenda, which is to ensure that as the defining ideas associated with the English School are absorbed into mainstream thinking, so the distinctive orientation of the English School is not lost. Their account, therefore, complements and provides a useful antidote to Barry Buzan's important attempt to hijack the English School in *From International to World Society: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalization* (2004).

Buzan's starting point is that there has been a persistent failure by English School thinkers to establish a clear distinction between normative theory and theory about norms. Although he wishes to focus on theory about norms, he is very insistent, however, that his structural rewriting of English School theory should not replace or override the normative version. However, Buzan's powerful and persuasive text is proving to be very influential. Linklater and Suganami, therefore, seek to redress the balance and, without doubt, are deeply skeptical about the possibility of drawing a neat and tidy distinction between normative theory and theory about norms. Certainly their aim is to present a historically based and normatively oriented perspective on international relations, which they extrapolate from the major English School texts.

There is a clear division of labor in this book, which reflects and takes advantage of the predilections of the two authors. The first part of the book, written by Suganami, provides a historiography and critique of English School thinking. Suganami demonstrates, very effectively, that the English School is the product of two largely independent sources. The first was a very influential group of teachers at the London School of Economics who from the 1950s propagated the importance of getting students to think about international relations in terms of an international society. Charles Manning's *The Nature of International Society* (1962) is seen to be a particularly important and underrated text. Second, the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, established in the early 1960s and funded initially from the United States, brought together a select group of theorists and practitioners to develop a theoretically informed and historically oriented approach to international relations. Martin Wight and Hedley Bull were two of the key theorists and Bull went on to write *The Anarchical Society: A Study of World Order* (1977), which persists as the school's iconic text.

Critics of the English School are prone to focus on the British Committee and to argue that the clublike origins of the school mirror its assessment of international society, which, they argue, is treated as an exclusive club of great powers. Suganami, by contrast, stresses that the school is better represented as a cluster of like-minded scholars who form a historically evolving intellectual movement.

He then does an excellent job of identifying the basic building blocks employed by the English School, focusing in particular, on how the international systems, international societies, and world societies are structurally differentiated and the significance of the distinction drawn between pluralist and solidarist approaches to international relations. Suganami, also demonstrates that underpinning the English School approach is a historical mode of analysis and, drawing on the important work that he has done on the nature of historical narrative, he provides a very valuable critique of the failure by the school to explore the methodological implications of this mode of analysis.

He starts by asserting that the English School rejects the familiar and widely accepted formula

International Relations: *International History*
$$= nomothetic: ideographic,$$

but he insists that there has then been a failure to clarify the nature of the relationship between international relations and international history and that, as a consequence, there is a degree of ambiguity and uncertainty about the status of the historical analysis carried out within the English School. By drawing on scattered comments from English School theorists about the nature of historical analysis, Suganami demonstrates that it is possible to show that there is a complex but nevertheless coherent view of how history can be used to develop a theoretical understanding of international relations.

The second part of the book, written by Linklater, is primarily concerned with extracting what is useful in English School writing for developing an account of the potential for progress in international relations. In the first instance, Linklater explores the idea of a progression from an international system, through to an international society, and on to a world community or society. He then examines the potential for progress in both a pluralist world dominated by the norm of nonintervention and a solidarist world that adopts a permissive attitude toward humanitarian intervention. Linklater concludes, therefore, that the English School demonstrates that states have a clear capacity for moral learning and this encourages him to focus more specifically on what he calls the harm principle, which is premised on the belief that the liberty of agents should only be restricted when their actions harm others. The harm principle is seen to be a central feature of international relations and is associated with both international and cosmopolitan harm conventions. The former are designed to prevent harm in relations between states and the latter to protect individuals in and of themselves.

Linklater then focuses on the English School's interest in a comparative sociology of states systems and shows how this approach can be used as a springboard for developing a historical sociology of harm. Although this is largely

uncharted territory, it identifies the need for a research program to see whether all states systems have made some attempt to put the harm principle into practice and whether the progress made in the contemporary states system is unique. This is a project that Linklater is currently undertaking and this trailer suggests that the results will be potentially very significant.

The English School is shown by Linklater and Suganami to be a vibrant intellectual tradition that has been evolving for more than 50 years. As a consequence, they are certainly willing to accept that Buzan has made a significant contribution to this tradition and they engage directly with his arguments at various points in the text, but it is also clear that they consider that their own explicitly normative approach is more in tune with the orientation of the founding fathers of the school. As Buzan notes, however, this is another area of ambiguity within English School thinking. However, it can only be good for the ongoing intellectual debate that Linklater and Suganami have produced a book that also makes such a powerful and persuasive case for normatively driven social science.

The Global Dynamics of Racial and Ethnic Mobilization.

— Elizabeth Crighton, *Pomona College*

Susan Olzak's new monograph is a milestone in comparative research on ethnic mobilization and conflict. Not only does it chart new theoretical and methodological territory. It also offers the most rigorous proof yet that globalization promotes collective action by ethnic groups. The book's main claim is that transnational networks diffuse "ideologies, strategies, tactics and leaders" rapidly across national borders, enabling ethnic mobilization and "leaving political regimes more vulnerable to internal challenges" (pp. 32, 152). Global processes, in other words, interact with forces at the group and state level to promote violent and nonviolent activism by communal groups.

This "world integration argument" (p. 152) draws on three theoretical perspectives that, together, advance what the author intends as a "unified explanation of ethnic conflict" (p. 100). Her goals are to make sense of the fragmentary findings of a field dominated by case studies; to account for different magnitudes of mobilization (nonviolent as well as violent) across countries and regions; and to capture the diffusion of ethnic mobilization across national boundaries. In a creative synthesis of world system theory, world polity theory, and social movement research (Chapter 1), she constructs a three-level model of ethnic mobilization that includes group- and country-level factors typically found in comparative studies of ethnic conflict: for example, ethnic fractionalization, competition for land,

discrimination, poverty, inequality, and formal civil rights. To measure levels of state integration into the global system, she adds variables usually studied only by world systems/world polity scholars: dependency (core/peripheral status) and membership in international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs).

Characteristically, the author puts her argument to a careful empirical test using multiple indicators (group data and event counts) from the Minorities at Risk and Protocol for the Assessment of Nonviolent Direct Action (PANDA) data sets. To tease out causal relationships, she adopts a longitudinal design based on panel analyses across three time periods. This strategy is a major advance over previous large-n studies using cross-sectional data because it permits direct tests of causality. Sensitive to the effects of two-way (simultaneous) causation, the author includes an interesting chapter exploring endogenous models of ethnic violence and protest (Chapter 9).

The combination of robust data and innovative design yields a rich, complex, and sometimes unexpected set of findings. In line with earlier research, Olzak finds that ethnic protest and violence have declined since the early 1990s, particularly in wealthier countries, but that "poverty and embeddedness in a world system of organizations has led to a concentration of violent ethnic activity in a few vulnerable regions" (p. 232). Her results confirm previous studies showing that poverty and economic decline promote ethnic violence; that discriminatory state policies increase both violent and nonviolent action; and that religious pluralism (fractionalization) greatly reduces the magnitude of both. Several unexpected findings challenge emerging "laws" in research on ethnic conflict: for example, the conventional view that democracy encourages ethnic protest but reduces ethnic violence. Olzak finds that democracies in the post–Cold War era have experienced more, not less, ethnic violence than autocracies and semi-authoritarian regimes.

The author's central concern here is to demonstrate the impact of global forces on ethnic mobilization. She uses dynamic modeling to show that countries with the highest number of memberships in INGOs have the highest magnitude of ethnic mobilization and violence, even after controlling for wealth and core/peripheral status; that the impact of INGOs on ethnic mobilization has increased over time (see Tables 6.3 and 7.3); and that peripheral states experienced higher levels of ethnic violence and lower levels of protest than core states did for most of the Cold War era. This cumulative evidence more than sustains the author's claim that global integration promotes and internationalizes ethnic social movements. Less conclusive—because it is inferred, not tested directly—is her constructivist story of the dynamic at work in this process. The story emphasizes the role of INGOs in diffusing "claims for expansion of civil liberties and human rights" around the globe (p. 213), while