Introduction

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Twenty years ago in an interview, the then up and coming philosopher Jonathan Wolff told me, 'Political philosophers shouldn't, I think, be trying to create policy. They don't know how to' (Baggini and Stangroom, 2002, p. 48). At the time, this was an unremarkable remark. Philosophy as a discipline had moved on from its peak years of proudly impractical uselessness in the mid twentieth century. But in the English-speaking world there was still a suspicion of the kind of continental style *philosophe engagé*, pontificating on politics from a position of theoretical naiveté.

   Wolff's contribution to this philosophers' manifesto does not show he has recanted his younger commitment. He and his collaborator Simon Duffy 'resist the temptation to make a simple policy recommendation', setting out broad 'policy goals' instead. Many others have explicitly left the filling out of the details of their proposals to others with more expertise in framing laws and policies. But most have been bold enough to make fairly specific proposals.

   Times have changed. Philosophers have been increasingly unwilling to stick to the safety of their academic seminar rooms, indifferent to whether or not their arguments carry any weight beyond them. The drivers of this have been internal and external. From without, there is increasing pressure from the funders of higher education on academics to demonstrate 'impact', which in the UK is now a formal element of the quality assessment exercise all university departments have to undertake. But the desire to engage with those outside the classroom is in good part an endogenous phenomenon and not just a reaction to outside pressure. For all the worries that measuring impact would instrumentalise academic study, particularly for economic ends, many philosophers have found that they actually want to have some impact. A Philosophers' Manifesto is still an unusual kind of document, but its time has come.

   The title of this manifesto was very careful chosen. First it is *a* manifesto. The absence of the definite article is essential: the contributors do not speak for any other philosophers, let alone all of them. The positioning of the inverted comma is also critical: this is a manifesto of plural, diverse philosophers. However, despite this very deliberate distancing from any kind of suggestion that this

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volume speaks for the philosophical profession, it is interesting to consider whether these essays collectively give us some kind of rough sketch about what a government – or at least a political party – of contemporary philosophers would stand for.

Some might object that the views of philosophers are too diverse to profitably imagine any kind of single party that could represent them. That would be premature. First, it begs the question, since it assumes an incoherence that has not yet been demonstrated. Second, political parties are always coalitions in which members have a lot of disagreements. The coherence of a political project depends on having enough of what matters in common, not everything. Third, many parties represent sectors of society even when large minorities within those groups dissent. Not all workers support the policies of workers' parties, Christians those of Christian Democrats, environmentalists Green Parties. An imagined Philosophers' Party requires neither universal membership of philosophers nor unanimous support for every policy from its ranks.

Looking at the contributions to this manifesto, there does appear to be some striking convergence. I can see six general themes which each recur in two or more proposals: extending the role of state-funded education, expanding state ownership, increasing equity, making society less punitive, extending membership rights and countering excessive individualism. What's more, these themes are not only compatible, they form a more or less natural set

Regarding the first theme. Rajeev Bhargava argues for state-funded inter-religious education. In his own country, India, this is more controversial than it is in many other parts of the world, especially Europe. India has a secular constitution, albeit one which is being sorely tested by the rise of *Hindutva*, Hindu nationalism. As in the United States, it is widely believed that the state has to stay out of religion altogether to protect religious freedom.

But Bhargava is not arguing for formal religious *instruction* nor the teaching of the dominant religion. Rather, he argues that 'states must assume responsibility for teaching the ethical traditions of all religions'. If it does not, religions education is 'left to the family where learning is largely unsystematic and informal' or 'confined to schools funded and run by religious communities themselves, and where biases might go unchecked'. He argues that 'unbiased inter-religious education alone enables citizens to learn about and responsibly criticise each other's ethical values. It also helps place one's own ethical tradition in critical perspective'. This is 'necessary for social harmony'.

Myisha Cherry makes the case for state-funded anti-racist training, not just (or even primarily) in schools, but in public bodies, their

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contractors and nonprofit organisations funded by the United States government. Cherry carefully takes down the most common arguments against such training, which are mostly based on misconceptions – or perhaps deliberate misrepresentations – of what such training involves. (Anyone confused about what 'critical race theory' really means should read her lucidly clarifying account.) Cherry cleverly argues that the very fact critics don't understand what they are attacking is evidence that such training is needed. 'When a president says that "critical race theory is a Marxist ideology," and says it with confidence as if it is true, then it shows our leaders can benefit from the training they are tempting to halt […] they will learn that there is more to learn about race and that there is a lot they do not know'.

Like Bhargava, Cherry argues that non-partisan state-funded education is important for creating a polis capable of promoting the liberal values governments claim to be committed to. 'If Americans really wanted to live up to their egalitarian principles,' she writes, 'the promise of equality for all, it was critical race theory that would help them move in that direction.'

These two very different proposals for state-funded education share a belief in the necessity of an educationally active state, not in order to impose a substantive, restrictive ideology, but to make the conditions of a diverse and fair society possible. To put it simply, in any culture in which people have diverse beliefs and backgrounds, we need to understand one another if our differences are not to lead to divisions. Those of one faith need to understand those of others or none, and those who receive the rewards of privilege need to understand how and why others do not, so that historic injustices are not perpetuated. Only the state has the resources to do this.

Two other contributions grant the state an arguably even more powerful role. In the latter part of the twentieth century nationalised industries went somewhat out of fashion. In Europe, many states still owned coal mines, steel works, railways and utility companies. Until 1976, the Italian government even had a monopoly on salt and tobacco, and the distinctive black and white *sali e tabacchi* signs can still be seen outside many stores. A growing confidence in the efficiency of markets led to many of these state assets being privatised. Today, however, the wisdom of many of those sales is increasingly questioned. Market competition seems impossible for natural monopolies such as water and energy supply. The case for private ownership is also somewhat undermined when some of the companies running railways and airports in the UK, for example, are owned by other European states.

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So it is perhaps not surprising that we're seeing a revival of arguments that some public goods are too important to be left to the vagaries of the market, and that state ownership is a more direct and efficient means of keeping the private sector on the straight and narrow than complex regulation. This is the basis of Diane Coyle's argument that we need to establish a publicly funded social media platform. (Coyle is an economist, but one guiding principle of this manifesto is that philosophy's borders are porous and we find people who can be considered philosophers in adjacent disciplines.)

Coyle acknowledges her proposal might sound like 'wishful thinking', although some may fear it sounds more like a nightmare. But the basis of her argument is powerful. Until recently, we did not know how powerful social media would be. There is increasing evidence that it directly impacts not only on 'political discourse and choices' but on our mental wellbeing. As Coyle writes, 'The ascendancy of a small number of digital companies in the online world where most of us now spend a growing amount of our time means that their platforms can no longer be considered a private domain'. The online world has become a shared civic space yet it is owned and run by a small number of multinational giants. Imagine for example, that our city centres were all owned run by profit-making organisations, lightly regulated, with no obligation to serve the communities that surround them. The online world is like this. 'The features of digital markets mean they tend toward monopoly, so great economic and political power lie in the hands of a small number of giant companies.'

Coyle's public option is modelled on the BBC, the UK's state-owned broadcaster. Over its hundred-year history the BBC has managed to maintain its editorial independence and despite bullying has only rarely allowed itself to become an unwitting tool of the government. Its public service remit means that citizens have access to a more reliable news source than private alternatives, not just in Britain but around the world, thanks to the World Service. Coyle believes a similar body for social media would free users from 'the hunt for people's attention' which 'drives algorithmic promotion of viral content to get ever-more clicks'. This matters because 'Ideas build societies' and 'nothing is more important than the information and beliefs people acquire in determining the kind of society we have'.

Fergus Green and Ingrid Robeyns also reject the idea that 'the market is better at maximising aggregate welfare than the government' and argue for another radical form of nationalisation: states taking over the Fossil Fuel Industry. They argue that the urgency of the climate emergency provides strong reasons for a policy which

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would allow governments to take 'ten actions that are in the public interest, which will enhance social justice, enable a fair division of burdens and benefits, and strengthen democracy'. These include the end of all exploration for and development of new fossil fuel deposits; accounting for all emissions from the fossil fuels it produces; using its market power to raise the price of fossil fuels; expending research, development and demonstration resources on developing emissions reduction technologies; and ceasing all governmental and public affairs operations aimed at promoting fossil fuels.

Green and Robeyns acknowledge that the benefits they expect require making certain assumptions about government intentions and capacities, namely that 'the government is suitably motivated, has effective control over the companies it acquires, and is able to sustain this motivation and control for long-enough to wind-down acquired companies in the public interest'. But they argue these are reasonable and reject concerns that 'public ownership is the first step on the Road to serfdom'.

The presence of these four proposals for a strong state role may lead some to suspect that the Philosophers' Party would basically be a socialist one. However, none of these proposals is argued for on the grounds that the workers should own the means of production, that private ownership is illegitimate, or that capitalism exploits the surplus value of labour. Rather, in each case there is a more pragmatic set of arguments that, given the importance of certain public goods and the need for a fair society, the state is the body best placed to take control of certain keys aspects of the economy and social infrastructure. These arguments do not require anyone to buy into a thick political ideology. To have the chance of being persuaded, all you need to accept are some rather thin ideas of justice and equity.

These ideals are somewhat thickened by the contributions that explicitly aim to increase equity. Catherine Rowett – a former Green Party MEP as well as a philosopher – argues for a universal basic income (UBI). A UBI is 'an unconditional allowance, sufficient to live on, paid in cash to every citizen regardless of income'. This idea, for a long time dismissed as utopian, has attracted serious interest in many parts of the world, with some large-scale trials in progress.

Again, Rowett does not base her argument on socialist principles about the wrongness of private wealth or commerce. Rather, she presents what she thinks are some widely-accepted desiderata of a good society and argues that a UBI is the best way to achieve them. For example, almost every society accepts that we need to provide economic support for those in need. Yet our means of doing this

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creates 'a vast army of bureaucrats', fraud, 'the misery of a shame-based system' and enormous costs. A UBI would do away with all of these. It also eliminates the so-called benefits trap by which people receiving state money are disincentivized to find work. With a UBI 'there would be no penalty or deduction for earning a little, or a lot, of extra money on top of it'. Those who aspired to be rich would not be thwarted by a policy which prevents anyone from being poor.

Rowett also argues that a UBI would free many from 'the daily grind of going to a hateful job, and returning with not enough to live on, only to be obliged to apply for in-work benefits just in order to keep the family going is the source of enormous misery and distress'.

She accepts that a UBI would not entirely fulfil the criteria of the two most widely endorsed concepts of fairness, by which people get what they deserve and not something for nothing, or that 'disadvantages are remedied and reparations are made, to make good the unfairness of life-chances'. But current systems are even less fair, and the UBI, argues Rowett, does uphold the 'kind of fairness that says that being human is the same for all, and no one is worth more or less than anyone else'.

Arguments over UBI tend to focus on whether it is really affordable, with many arguing that it is not. Rowett cites studies that suggest otherwise. But her contribution to the debate fills out the moral and philosophical case for UBI which is too often lacking or assumed.

As has been mentioned, Simon Duffy and Jonathan Wolff do not offer a policy as such but a clear policy goal that dovetails neatly with Rowett. At the heart of their argument is the need for equity, expressed in their chosen epigram from Confucius: 'I have heard that [true] leaders of states or clans […] do not worry about poverty, but inequity. […] For if there is equity, there will be no poverty'.

For the kind of equity Duffy and Wolff seek, 'It is critically important to be able to offer a life of dignity for all'. That is something most benefit systems cannot do. In fact, they are often assaults on dignity. This is especially true of the ways in which benefits systems come accompanied by systems of punishment for anyone who breaks the rules. Stated as such, this might seem reasonable. But in practice, sticking by the rules can be extremely burdensome. If you do an odd-job for £50 pounds, for example, you face a choice of going through all the hassle of declaring it and perhaps losing the same amount in benefits as a result, or keeping it quiet and becoming a 'benefits cheat'. For Duffy and Wolff this is

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unacceptable: 'Compounding vulnerability with threats is the opposite of humanity'.

Hence their policy goal is to devise a system in which the threat of being charged as a benefit cheat is removed. This is not only faster, it is more humane. It would bring about 'a reduction of stress for claimants' and 'possibly a reduction in stress-related illness'. They accept that 'part of the social contract is to expect people to act responsibly in return for humane treatment' but argue that the current system absurdly makes 'following a set of arbitrary hurdles a test of responsibility'.

Rowett, Duffy and Wolff challenge us to rethink the ways in which we protect the most vulnerable by asking us to think harder about what equity and respect really mean and require. To stress once again, these are not highly ideological arguments but ones which, like all good philosophical arguments, are designed to appeal to any reasonable person, irrespective of their prior convictions.

Duffy and Wolff in particular seek to make our society less punitive, which is the key goal of two more of our manifesto proposals. Thaddeus Metz advocates state punishment for offenders which has reconciliation as its primary goal, rather than protection of the public or retribution against the offender. His argument draws on political and social values more dominant in the Global South, and especially sub-Saharan Africa, than in the West. In these societies, there is typically a greater emphasis on the relational nature of human beings, in which much of the value of human life is found in 'our capacity to relate positively or cohesively'. From this point of view, the main impact of crime is to undermine that value and 'the aims of punishment should be both to express disapproval when that value is degraded and to mend broken relationships'. Interestingly, something similar is found in Jesus's teachings about forgiveness, in which the goal is the healing of divisions. (Baggini, 2020, pp. 114–119)

Metz's argument, however, does not require us to fully take on board the relational model of human society. He also argues that the reconciliatory approach to sentencing 'avoids widely recognized problems with the rival protection and retribution models'. For example, in order for punishments to deter, they can sometimes be disproportionately harsh or lenient, which seems unjust. Retribution approaches promote the brutal logic of 'an eye for an eye' and take no account of the offender's character.

Brian Wong and Joseph Chan advocate for a different kind of reduction in the punitiveness of punishment. Democratic societies have long accepted that peaceful civil disobedience is sometimes morally warranted. In Rawls' famous account, civil disobedience

may be permissible when it is public, non-violent, principled, a political act and has the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government.

Wong and Chan argue that there are forms of 'conscientious disobedience' which are morally justified but which do not meet all these criteria. Such 'uncivil disobedience' may be public, principled, and politically grounded but may involve some violence with no realistic chance of transforming society. Hong Kong, where Chan lives and works, may have provided recent examples of this. Wong and Chan argue that such conscientious disobedience is importantly distinct from other criminal acts and that this distinction is 'worthy of acknowledgment by public apparatus and actors'.

Their proposal is that when 'uncivil disobedients are wielding force that is *roughly proportionate* as a response to the egregious structural violence that they endure' they ought to be treated more leniently than ordinary criminals. Their paper proposes a 'comprehensive legislative scheme for governments to deal with prosecution, sentencing, and imprisonment of the conscientious disobedients' which is discussed in some detail.

The connections with Metz's reconciliatory approach are obvious. In both cases, retribution is judged inappropriate because it does not address the needs of the justice system to maintain and foster good relations between members of society. Punitive approaches increase divisions and exaggerate conflict. The existence of crime and uncivil disobedience highlights the fact that society always has its fractures and conflicts. Surely the goal of politics is to lessen these, to bring us closer together, not to drive us further apart.

This ideal of cohesion is developed more radically by three proposals to extend society's membership rights. Lea Ypi tackles the question of how far states are morally required to grant such rights to people who have crossed their borders illegally. Her starting point is the historical fact that many states were founded by the unjust appropriation of land by conquerors. This is not generally regarded as a reason to deny the legitimacy of these states today, thanks to something called supersession theory, which maintains that 'with the passage of time […] a change in circumstances progressively mitigates the initial injustice, if certain conditions about supersession hold. A claim that was established through wrongdoing in the past could then be considered justified going forward'. To take a common example, a state founded illegitimately could in time be considered legitimate if it became properly democratic.

Ypi identifies a similarity between the position of illegal immigrants who have settled in a new land and initially illegal states that

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have settled in to government. In both cases, it can be argued that if the immigrant or state behaves properly, their initial crime can be overlooked. Opponents of regularising illegal immigrants argue that the differences are more important than the similarities. Most obviously, the passage of time is typically much longer with states than with immigrants. However, Ypi argues that supersession *both* justifies the rights of irregular migrants to stay *and* the states' right to exclude them. The way out of this, she argues, is to 'apply to states, the same criteria for supersession of injustice that they apply to individual immigrants'. These are that they fully recognise their previous wrongdoing and that they show their current good character. States that fulfil these criteria, she argues, have a weak right to exclude but also a responsibility to grant amnesty to illegal immigrants who also pass the tests.

Martin O'Neill proposes extending membership rights in a very different way: by reducing the voting age to twelve. This may sound recklessly radical but not so long ago many thought it dangerous to give the vote to ordinary working people, women, or those under thirty. As O'Neill argues, 'The franchise has expanded continually over the history of democratic societies, and this is a clear and obvious next step in this process of broadening the basis of democratic politics.'

O'Neill believes that this latest extension is required because 'Britain – like many other economically developed democratic societies – is now a society that does not serve its young people at all well'. These 'age-based injustices' need to be addressed and giving young people the vote is one important way of doing this. He argues that the twelve and overs 'are participating citizens whose lives are lived as part of our shared social and institutional environment' whose 'fundamental interests' are affected by 'the social, political and economic institutions of our society' and that they 'do not in general lack any specific capacity that would allow them to exercise their democratic rights as voters or as citizens more generally'.

O'Neill's is a good example of a philosophical argument that generates counter-intuitive conclusions that are nonetheless hard to fault rationally. He tackles the main objections head on and finds them very much wanting. I am sure that many will read his paper and find themselves convinced that he must be wrong but unable to explain convincingly why. In such cases, we may just have to accept that he is right.

Will Kymlicka's extension of membership rights is the most radical of all. He argues that domestic animals – which include livestock and companion animals – should be legally recognised as members of

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society. If that sounds preposterous, then just consider that already 'the vast majority of North Americans with companion animals consider them as "one of the family", to be treated according to an ethic of membership, and they increasingly expect the legal system to respect and honour this membership relationship'.

With the seemingly relentless march of animal rights, it might be wondered why membership rights should be necessary. Kymlicka argues that the status quo, described by Robert Nozick as 'Kantianism for humans, utilitarianism for animals' is a moral failure. On this view, human beings are treated as ends in themselves and animals as means to ends. Under this system, many farm animals in particular are subjected to cruel treatment in the name of the good that produces. However, Kymlicka argues that it is a non-starter to try to adopt utilitarianism for both humans and animals. It would cause outrage if we proposed that, for example, we should experiment on a few human beings in order to produce benefits for the rest of us. Kantianism for both humans and animals is similarly unrealistic. With in average of around 3% of most Western populations vegan, there is simply no prospect of gaining widespread support to give the likes of chickens and pigs the legal status of personhood. Membership rights 'to flourish within a shared society' can be more limited and take account of species differences. Such rights are 'group-differentiated' or 'relational' since 'they vary with an animal's relationship to human society'.

An interesting detail of Kymlicka's proposal is his claim that 'philosophers have largely been 'caught napping' on this issue. Part of the explanation is that their focus has been too much on moral philosophy and not enough on the political. When it comes to 'the animal question' he argues 'we desperately need to get political philosophy on board.'

As in so many contributions, Kymlicka picks up on the importance of the relational aspect of society to ground his arguments, extending these relations to other animals. This connects neatly with the sixth and final theme: countering excessive individualism. The West has not lost any of its enthusiasm for individual liberty and freedom. Over recent decades, however, there has been increasing concern that this may have gone too far, resulting in an unhealthy atomisation of society in which the social bonds that tie have become loose and sometimes severed.

The global coronavirus pandemic has put aspects of this issue into sharp focus as societies debate the need to balance personal freedom and collective security. Korean philosopher Heisook Kim challenges dominant Western assumptions about individuality, but begins her

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attack from within. John Stuart Mill, so often wheeled out when a philosophical defence of liberty is needed, famously wrote that 'the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant'.

Kim points out that mask wearing mandates, far from being contrary to this principle, actually follow from it. 'It is difficult to view the mask use mandate as a violation of individual freedom, because even those who are not confirmed to have been infected may pass on the virus through asymptomatic spread'. This is a stark reminder that for many freedom is not longer a matter of principle but a kind of fetish, in which any restrictions on the rights of individuals to do what they like is an affront, even when those actions harm others.

Kim also questions the centrality of the individual to Western conceptions of liberty from without. As she explains, 'In the Confucian tradition, an individual never exists as an absolute unit. Individuals always exist in the network of relations carrying out their roles'.

We are asked to rethink what it means to be free because it is simply a fantasy to believe that in the age of the all-pervasive world wide web, individual freedom has an 'absolute value'. Our preferences are being modified and manipulated by global corporations like Amazon, to whom we willingly give information so that they can reconfigure the 'choice architecture' of our environment. Naive beliefs in autonomy simply don't hold water in this new world. Kim argues that a Confucian ethic based on community values is more suited to modern times than a notion of individual freedom which in the contemporary West is becoming 'more obscure than ever'. She warns, 'If we take individual freedom as an absolute value, we have to face a gloomy future'.

Debra Satz also asks us to think more of our duties as citizens and less of our rights as sovereign individuals when she argues for a mandatory public service requirement. 'Democratic citizenship is an achievement,' she says, not a basic right that can be conferred at will. A flourishing society cannot exist if it is not in the first place a *society*: a community of people living together, not as discrete islands. Her argument for compulsory national service rests on us accepting that what we owe to one another is more than just non-interference. She argues that 'democracy itself requires certain shared experiences and conditions and a commitment to democracy entails a commitment to the conditions needed to sustain it over time'.

She accepts that her proposal will not appeal to those 'who see society simply as an instrument for the optimal pursuit of individual

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interests'. But, she concludes, 'for those who see society as a framework for individuals – considered as free and equal but differing in many interests and values – to come together and rule themselves, a year of compulsory national service will count as a small price of admission'.

The conservative member of parliament and philosopher Jesse Norman also sees the need for society to be united by something more than just trade and legal obligations. It also requires *philia*, or civic friendship. For Aristotle, he writes, '*philia* is what holds states together, and he says that lawgivers almost care more for it than for justice. It is the social amity that they aim at most of all, and it expels faction, which is their worst enemy'.

How does a society create *philoi*, civic friends? It cannot do so by fiat. Rather, it must create the conditions for *philia* to flourish, and that in turn requires cherishing 'freedom of thought and speech and association, and the institutions, practices and habits that sustain them'.

Norman argues that mentoring is an effective means of promoting this. Mentoring binds generations and, if done well, different social classes. 'It is the stuff of meetings and conversation and personal contact, of shared projects and new friendships'. Echoing Satz, he suggests that the existing National Citizen Service could be extended and put to use facilitating more mentoring, which rewards both mentor and mentored.

The fact that it has been possible to seamlessly move from discussions of each of these six themes to the next suggests that there is some kind of natural connection between them. So what is it that links extending the role of state-funded education, expanding state ownership, increasing equity, making society less punitive, extending membership rights and countering excessive individualism?

First, there is a common thread of seeing society as a network of relations rather than simply a collection of atomic individuals. Criminals and dissidents are not just members of society, they are formed by it. To disown them is to deny the dark side of your own culture. Better to bring them back into the fold. Also, people believe different things and it is better to find ways to allow them to coexist harmoniously than it is to push them into their own ghettos. A too-mighty state can of course crush liberty, reducing citizens to vassals. But a too-weak state leaves its citizens to the mercy of fate, accidents of birth and the whims of rich, powerful, unaccountable organisations. Perhaps it is time to move away from tired debates about the small versus the big state and focus less on its size and more on what it should and should not do.

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Second, there is a common theme of equity. State-funded religious and racial education programmes are essential for all groups of society to be given equal respect and recognition. State ownership of fossil fuels and a major social media provider ensures intergenerational justice, that the burdens of the energy transition are shared fairly, and that users of social media are not reduced to tools of the big tech companies. Less punitive criminal justice is fairer to those for whom life circumstances have made them more likely to become criminals as well as those whose 'criminality' is a principled and necessary resistance to injustice. Extending membership rights makes society more inclusive and horizontal, while countering excessive individualism reduces the inequalities that atomised capitalism has encouraged.

What unites the Philosopher's Party is therefore a politics of *equity* and *relationality*. This neatly brings together the conservative value of the organic society and the more left-wing values of greater equality of opportunity and access to resources. The vision being offered here is not a trade-off between solidarity and individuality, but the realisation that individuals can only really be fully free in an enabling society that allows each to fulfil their own potential.

Could such a programme be enough to unite a political party in the real world? It already is. The old parties have fractured and declined across the democratic world. It is no longer easy to distinguish neatly between right and left. Politicians can respond to this with one of two strategies for victory. One is divide and rule. Appeal to an angry faction of society, demonise the rest, and gain a parliamentary majority to impose your vision of the good society on others. The other is to try to unite the increasingly fractured electorate around the basic values that most people still share. Of these, surely equity and relationality are key.

Ever since Plato advocated the philosopher kings, people have worried that this would empower an out of touch elite to impose its values on an unwilling population. Our Philosophers' Manifesto suggests that if that were ever a worry, it no longer is. The values at its heart chime with ordinary people across the world. Wolff may be right that political philosophers shouldn't be trying to create policy. But this manifesto shows they could be invaluable in guiding it.

References

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