

by the traditional school, though whether or not it is syllogistic I cannot say. Arguing from hypotheses, which I call deduction, he calls induction, and then he says the distinction between them is *exactly the reverse* of what I say it is. Why, of course it is, if you reverse the names.

Although, however, the distinction between deduction and induction is exactly the reverse (that is, exactly the same if you change the names back again) of what I say it is, yet ultimately both induction and deduction are the same; and my distinctions, with which it appears that Mr. Baillie thoroughly agrees (after the names are changed), "leave us in chaos." This seems to me to be the familiar doctrine that nothing is new, and nothing is true, and it doesn't matter.

For one criticism of Mr. Baillie's, however, I am heartily grateful, and none the less so that he does not seem to appreciate that it gives his whole show away. My book is often, he says, a fair enough account of how ordinary men think. That is precisely what it purports to be. That is what it was written for. That is the whole and sole purpose of the book. I never intended—I should not presume—to give an account of the way in which logicians and other extraordinary men think. Their method is so amazing, and the results to which it leads are so astounding, that it is far beyond my powers of description; and no doubt it was his realisation of my limited powers in this direction that led Mr. Baillie to admit, sorrowfully, as it seems to me, that "Dr. Mercier's distinctions leave us in chaos." By "us" Mr. Baillie means, of course, himself and his fellow logicians. It is but too true. I found them in chaos, and I leave them in chaos. They are the children of darkness and eternal night. They refuse to hear the voice of the charmer, charm he never so wisely. I find them groping with their syllogistic muck-rake at Socrates and his mortality, and I bid them lift up their eyes and view the glorious crown of the New Logic; but like their prototype, they stick to their muck-rake, and prefer to go on groping in the muck.

*Note in Answer to the Foregoing Reply.*

The Editors have very kindly allowed me to read the MS. of Dr. Mercier's reply to my review, and have placed at my disposal as much space as I might wish to occupy in answering its charges. But I have no inclination to enter into a discussion with Dr. Mercier, my purpose having been simply to express my opinion on the value of his work. Dr. Mercier's tirade, clever as its invective undoubtedly is, is hardly of the sort that could be taken seriously in the scientific world. I am afraid he thinks more of brilliance of style than of consequence of thought. Moreover, he does not appear to have yet benefited by the rebuke administered, with such generous mildness, by Sir Thomas Clouston in a recent number of this Journal; and as no reasonable person combats incivility with argument, I should in any case have been limited in my reply to certain parts only of what Dr. Mercier has written. Dr. Mercier may call this "a conspiracy of silence"; in reality it is merely a recognition of the fact that certain things need no condemnation because they condemn themselves.

I am reproached for not having made my review longer and gone into greater detail in my criticisms. To that I can only say that I shall be very much surprised if any other student of logic thinks Dr. Mercier's book worthy of even so long a review. I may add that I am of opinion that Dr. Mercier's reply is characterised by at least as much misunderstanding and vagueness and inconsequence as was his book, and I shall perhaps give one example of each of these faults below. I do not see that I can be called upon to do more. My business as a reviewer was not to convince Dr. Mercier of his errors so much as to give the readers of this Journal some idea of the nature and value of his work.

Dr. Mercier, however, supplies my omission by choosing certain instances of his own, and he wonders whether these were among the instances which I had in my mind. I do not remember now whether they were or not, but they will serve my turn as well as any others. The only fault I have to find with them is that the explaining away of them is rather ridiculously simple. Let us select the second—Dr. Mercier's example of a valid argument from two negative premisses :

No logician agrees with my doctrines,  
No logician is infallible ;

∴ Some fallible persons disagree with my doctrines.

It is surely simple enough to see that we are only able to get a conclusion from these premisses, because we are able to read the second premiss as positive, *viz.*, "all logicians are fallible." We do this by removing the two negative signs "no" and "in—" which counteract one another. It is only after we do this, and because we can do it, that we can get the term "fallible" (which occurs in the conclusion) into the premisses at all. I speak from experience when I say that any student of average ability would be able to detect this after one month's study of elementary logic. And to-day I showed Dr. Mercier's argument to a medical student who has never seen a logic-book, and, without any help or prompting, he detected and correctly stated the fallacy it contains within two and a half minutes by my watch.

Dr. Mercier thinks I reproach him for saying that a proposition expresses a *relation*. But I think I made it sufficiently clear that what I objected to was not that very obvious statement, but rather the idea that logic dealt with *verbal* relations instead of with thought-relations. If Dr. Mercier holds to this definition it would be interesting to know how he distinguishes logic from grammar or syntax. The natural distinction surely is that syntax deals with the relation of words to one another, logic with the relation of thoughts to one another. And this is usually expressed by saying that syntax deals with sentences or propositions, logic with judgments. The terminology is, of course, a mere convention, but it is adopted by most modern logicians.

One point more, and I have done. In my review I said that the true distinction between deduction and induction is the reverse of Dr. Mercier's ; that it is in deduction we are arguing from known truths, and in induction from hypotheses. Dr. Mercier now says that what I have done is merely to reverse the names. But he has been too hasty in his judgment. I took good care to determine what I meant by deduction in some other way than by reference to the characteristic which was under dispute. I said I meant a specific thing by deduction, *viz.*, the sort of argument

that is used in geometry. It is *that* sort of argument that I assert to proceed from known truths,<sup>1</sup> and it is *that* sort of argument that is always called deduction. Consequently, when Dr. Mercier says that deduction proceeds from hypotheses, I suppose it is of that sort of argument he is thinking. If it is not, then it is he who has departed from the usual nomenclature. If it is, then my disagreement with him amounts to far more than a mere change of names. And it should not have taxed Dr. Mercier's powers of penetration to have noticed this. But Dr. Mercier cannot hope to understand even so simple a thing as this until he has learned a more excellent way of scientific discussion. I do not know whether invective and repartee and easy sarcasm are useful instruments either in the study or in the practice of the alienist, but I am very sure that they are alike futile weapons and dangerous playthings for the serious student of logic. JOHN BAILLIE.

---

*Psychological Medicine: A Manual of Mental Diseases for Practitioners and Students.* Second edition. By MAURICE CRAIG, M.A., M.D. Cantab., F.R.C.P.Lond. London: J. & A. Churchill, 1912. Pp. xii + 474.

We congratulate Dr. Craig on the appearance of the second edition of his *Psychological Medicine*. The first edition, which was published in 1905, has proved to be a valuable text-book for the use of students and practitioners, and has fulfilled the hopes of its author. In the present volume reference is made to the most important modern investigations and methods of treatment. The chapters on General Symptomatology, Epochal Insanities, General Paralysis of the Insane, Insanity and Physical Diseases and the Relationship of Insanity with Law are especially good; the Pathology of General Paralysis is admirably illustrated. The work exhibits evidences of careful revision throughout, and the author has aimed at meeting the requirements of examination boards in psychiatry.

---

### Part III.—Epitome.

---

#### Progress of Psychiatry in 1911.

SPAIN.

By DR. W. COROLEU.

The Commission appointed by the County Board of Barcelona to inquire into the administration of S. Bandilius Lunatic Asylum has issued its report. The sad condition of matters therein revealed is an ample justification of the demand which the public had made for an

<sup>1</sup> It is a good exercise, both in elementary geometry and elementary logic, to show that "indirect proofs" do not really form an exception.