On the Method of the Study of Mind. By J. H. Balfour Browne, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

Many people buy things merely because they are cheap. No actual necessity dictated the purchase of the commodity, but "only 3s. 9d." was irresistible! "If it is not useful now, it may be by-and-bye, besides Mrs. B—— has one," is a sufficient argument to set off against that of economy, which would have us, as far as possible, gratify the demands of choice, but not create wants by the existence of supply. Now there is a somewhat similar tendency in mental economy. Subjects "made easy" are the snare of our nineteenth century enlightenment. Table-talk is a sign of our times! These are the days of wide spread but thin spread education. We must all know a little of everything. We must be able to converse rationally upon any subject, land tenure or ladies' gloves! and it consequently becomes a matter of some importance to have subjects "made easy." We wish to get into the bowels of a science as we do into the bowels of a country, by train! Well, just as three and nine, and the fact that Mrs. B—— has one, tempted the purchase of the useless article, so the "made easy" and the small talk of a neighbour at dinner tempt to the acquisition of some very useless knowledge. And as it is true that purchases which are dictated by vanity and not by need do harm in trade, so do acquisitions of useless table-talk facts do harm in science. If a science is to have fair play, it is well for it if it does not become popular. Goethe somewhere says that when a man does a great thing the world seems to enter into a conspiracy to prevent him doing it again. It dines him and cheers him till he dies. He has only time to bow! So a science that is thought to have done some great thing becomes popular, and it is likely enough to die while the cheering lasts. A popular science, one that is "made easy," is not likely to have much vitality in it. The intension of a science is in the inverse ratio to the extension.

Now materialism is a popular science of sciences. It is so easy to believe! You have infinite time and conditions to produce a season of scarcity; nay, many seasons of scarcity; and your short necked Herbivora die in all those seasons, because they can't reach the leaves on the trees; and there you have the Giraffe, with its long neck, waiting for other seasons

of scarcity to have its neck lengthened still more. This is all easy thinking. It is really as easy as "look at it." Indeed it comes to little more than looking at a series of pictures of animals with long and short necks, and trees with high branches, hung up on the walls of your mind. If one asks as to the beginning of all this, the materialist will probably say he does not know nor care any thing about the beginning, or if he does care about the beginning he thinks of it as a primitive atom. And if you choose to think about this primitive atom and are desirous of believing in God still—habit clings to one so,—you may imagine it in time and space, and surrounded by conditions, and with the potentiality of the universe in it. It is not necessary to be logical in this science made easy. You find it somehow necessary to think a beginning, and you do it in your primitive atom, or God who made it; and your whole material system is the baseless fabric of a vision, no better founded than the Buddhist world, which was on an elephant, which was on a tortoise. You are not a good architect, but still your dinner-table materialism will do! It was easy come by, "only 3s. 9d."

Now the believers in this popular science of materialism have endeavoured to advance its standards. The province of mind, which in their eyes is very much like a lake in the eyes of a lawyer—in the latter case so much land covered by water, or in the former case so much matter covered by mind, must be brought under its sway. The laws which govern it must be shown to be the same that govern matter, and the method of the study of the one must be shown to be the same as the method of the study of the other. Are they the same? The arguments against the psychological or metaphysical method are these:—

1. Plato was a great man, and so was Descartes; in my opinion they accomplished nothing by this method. You are, in my opinion, a small man; do you think that you will accomplish what they could not?

2. Mind is a sanctuary; you require to be a priest to enter it. It requires a special cultivation to be able to attend to a succession of mental phenomena, and it is not a mind in a state of cultivation, that, according to the Baconian inductive method, should in the first instance be the subject of scientific investigation, and even those who have sufficient education to appreciate significants give us no guarantee of agreement amongst themselves as to their observations.

3. The very looking destroys the thing looked at in consciousness.

4. A lunatic has delusions. The veracity of consciousness can only be relied upon when in conformity with rules—but the rules are subjective. The lunatic is a rule to himself!

5. Because consciousness is not mind! This method only explicates states of consciousness, not states of mind.

(*a*) There is unconscious mental perception.
(*b*) There is unconscious cerebration and elaboration.
(*c*) There is memory.

6. This method does not take into consideration essential material conditions which accompany mental manifestations.

7. The association of ideas is not under the power of will. It does not come into consciousness in its process, but in its result.

8. The brain is influenced not only by the without of the external world through the senses, but by the without of other organs of the body through internal stimuli, which only enter into consciousness in these modified results.

These seem to be the arguments of the medico-psychologists of the present day against the metaphysical method of studying mind. It may be worth while examining these objections.

1. Did Plato accomplish nothing? Most of our materialists of to-day look with reverence upon that thorough-headed Scotchman, David Hume, and it may be worthy a materialist's notice that David Hume said, "We cannot reasonably expect that a piece of woollen cloth will be wrought to perfection in a nation which is ignorant of astronomy, or *where ethics are neglected.*" This is an external view, which indicates that the energies of such men as Socrates and Plato and Aristotle were not wasted, and we shall have opportunities of pointing out that even looked at from the ground of the science of sciences, philosophy, their energies have accomplished great things! Those who say that metaphysics have fallen into disrepute err. The revival of philosophy in Germany, in Kant, and Fichte, and Schelling, and Hegel, shows that to some men there is still some profit in the science of thought, and in the why? whence? and whither? of purblind humanity; and the labour of such men as Ferrier and Stirling indicates that there is still a silver thread

of thought running through the pack-sheet texture which is being produced in the loom of our national mind. Is Comte's third stage of existence come? Have we passed through the caterpillar stage, when we fed, and believed in a God?—have we left behind us the chrysalis state, when men lived in metaphysical dreams?—have we reached the third state, that happy realm of positivism, when we spread our wings, lay eggs, and die? Thank Heaven, there are still signs enough of a belief in something above and beyond matter to convince us that our wings are not ready for that flight. May we never be full fledged! If the metaphysical method has done little—and this we deny—what has the Baconian method done? It has not proved thought a secretion of the brain, as bile is of the liver! It has not shown one bodily organ in which the function was other than physical! It has not shown how mind is a symptom of body. It has done nothing.

2. The second objection is, that it requires a special cultivation to enable an individual to attend to a succession of mental phenomena; that when an individual is able to observe mental phenomena, those which it is most important he should take cognizance of have ceased, in consequence of the cultivation of his powers; and that those who do observe give us no guarantee of agreement amongst themselves as to the facts of their observation.

Mr. Herbert Spencer, who is in earnest to ground science upon a true metaphysics, says—"If psychology is ever to become anything more than a mere aggregation of opinions, it can only be by the establishment of some datum universally agreed to," and proceeds to prove that it is the province of metaphysics to show what this universally agreed-to datum is.

It is materialism and the kindred modern science of political economy that we have to thank for what our ablest metaphysician has called the "accentuation of the Private" in that one outcome of eighteenth Century Illumination, which is termed "Private Judgment." It is evident that the tendency of our times has laid the burden of thought on the wrong word. We all "think for *ourselves*," instead of "*thinking* for ourselves." It is true that the subjective feelings of men have no quality which could give any guarantee of agreement; but there is such a guarantee in the word judgment. Thinking is not subjectively A's or B's or C's;—it is capable of comparison, and therefore objective, and in this differs from feeling or sensation—which is mine, or yours, or his—and only subjective! So far, then, as the metaphysical method is

thought,—so far is it capable of being brought to a definite condition, as regards those persons who employ it with reference to thought,—so far, also, as it is *thought*, it must be, to a certain extent, common to the cultivated and to the uncultivated. And, although the observation of the operations of thought does imply a certain amount of cultivation, that is really no argument against the validity of the metaphysical method—any more than it would be a criticism upon the novum organum of Bacon to say, that unless a man learned Latin he would be unable to read it. Is it not true that we must know thought better than matter? What is life to us but the thread that sensations, perceptions, emotions, thoughts, are strung upon? And because we cannot make a *sectio* of consciousness, or get it under the microscope, are we to say we know nothing of it?

3. The amount of slip-shod shuffling that passes for upright progress in questions of mental philosophy is likely to strike even a tyro. Like the answers received by the clergyman who was questioning an eccentric gardener as to the eloquence and orthodoxy of several neighbour-priests, and enjoyed the criticism on a friend, concerning whom the gardener had, with much head-shaking, said, "He's not sound;" and who, when he mentioned his own name with the query, "What do you think of him?" got for answer, "Oh! he's all sound;"—like to these two verdicts might be the decision in reference to the use of most words which pass current in philosophical discussions. In most cases the idea connected with the words—as value with a coin—is very far from definite; and in other cases—as there is no value represented by a false coin—there is no meaning attached to the words at all. Energy is one of those loose words. People don't know anything about it, and therefore they use it, and reason concerning it. Words! what a history might be written about words. Men have cut one another's throats for the sake of words, and because there was no absolute dictionary. Words have ruled nations! They have life and being—words! "A name," says Victor Hugo, "is self." In reference to this objection, one hears that the light of consciousness is a constant quantity, and when you withdraw it, say from sense, to place it where you can look at consciousness, you have withdrawn consciousness too; that, in order to view its own activity, mind must cease to be active; that reversing Lord Castlereagh's feat, who said he had turned his back on himself, the mind would require to turn its face on itself, or have the same

quality that Sir Boyle Roche ascribed to birds—that of being in two places at once. If a man made a bad statue of an intimate friend of ours in wax, stuck all manner of pins in its waxy vitals, and then let it melt before a slow fire, we should not believe him if he told us that by this means he had destroyed our friend, that *he* lay dying, and that we might sit down and write our letter of condolence to his wife-widow. No! we would be rather pleased that the filthy image which pretended to be like our friend had lost those superficial relations which had a tendency to recall him to mind after so wretched an idea. We like pleasant thoughts to be ushered by thoughts in themselves pleasant. The relative association of ideas has an almost omnipotent influence over certain mental states. And now no more do we grieve because the medical psychologist, who made a very waxy image of mind and its conditionedness, has melted it in his thought crucible. The absurdity is in the supposition. To figure thought as winter frosts windows, and then blame the thought for not letting you see through it, seems unfair! To look upon mind as an eye behind the eye of sense is a gratuitous assumption. To take for granted place and time as external to thought, is as if Macduff had requested Macbeth to lay down his arms before he fought him. To regard thought or consciousness as conscious only of its object, and not at the same time conscious of itself, is to suppose that there is no such thing as consciousness or thought, and is to eliminate the only question which it is really of any importance to solve, i.e., the question of the connection between sensuous affection and intellectual function. Is it not the fact that when we remember we know that we remember, and when one idea leads directly to another, as cause to effect, we are aware both of the antecedent and of the consequent. The next objection might have been answered along with the one we have just considered, as much of the material of answer is common property. We hope that each question will appropriate what it requires for answer.

4. The fourth objection is that a lunatic has delusions, and these delusions must make worthless any testimony of the individual as to his mental conditions. The rules which are supposed to test the validity of subjective impressions are themselves no better founded, have no higher guarantee of validity, than the impressions which appear at their bar. We should have thought that the madman's delusion was a sword safer in its sheath for the materialist philosopher. However,

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as we imagine the hilt is toward us (his politeness held by the point), we must not complain, but use it. The whole argument of the supporter of the so-called inductive method is in the validity of the senses. The materialist finds a pearl in this shell of a body; he tramples on the pearl but hugs the shell! He finds a soul in this house with its sense windows, and he drives it out, or because he only saw it when it came to the windows and the light from without fell upon it, he thinks that it *is* the windows. But what does he do now? He confesses that all advance must be made through the observation of external phenomena, by means of those sense windows, and yet he admits that there is a large class of persons who looking through those windows see not what is outside, but what is in, and that to those persons their delusions, what they think they see, have as much validity to them as our observations of what we think we see have to us. We have shown that a purely subjective standard of validity in the case of feelings and sensations is little better than no criterion at all, and that thought alone which is not subjectively anybody's, but is everybody's, and therefore objective, is the only guarantee of agreement as to all matters of thought, and consequently of every matter whatever. But what rules does the materialist lay down with regard to the validity of sensuous evidence? It is evident, even from the expression used above in stating the position of the medical psychologists, that their observations are not what they see, but what they think they see. It is evident that their test of the validity of their observations must be a mental one. To say that they make experiment and number of observations the test of the accuracy of one, is to say nothing. Experiment and the corroborative effect of numbers of experiments must look for the test of their validity to mind and thought. The fact that the coming upon the same result at different times, when the quantity self appears in the equation of thought as averaged, and therefore less likely to negative any results by its occasional variation, is a discovery of thought, and it is a fact, simply because "fact" is a mint-image that is stamped by thought. It is the queen's head upon a coin! To say that it is entirely a matter of experience is to say that experience can experience itself; and to assert with Locke that all that we know is known *a posteriori*, is to assert something that nobody believes, and that Hume showed to be untrue of relations of ideas, and which has been shown by Kant and Hegel, continuing the work so well begun by Hume, to be untrue of what he called matters

of fact, and what we call affections of the senses. Even Hume, when accounting only for the expectation of an effect from the observation of a cause, admitted a mental element into his explanation, by using the word "association;" for association, to give any validity to our invariable expectation, must have of itself some validity from thought. Where then the philosophic medicists look for the rules which convince them of the veracity of consciousness with regard to sensual impressions, while they are sceptical with regard to the veracity of that same consciousness with regard to its impressions concerning itself, it would be difficult to say.

That objective standards are necessary we have admitted, but that the objective is impossible without the subjective; indeed, that it is in one sense the subjective, or that nature is the *other* of thought, is as capable of proof as any of those "ideas of relation" which are admitted to be *a priori*. Where is the point of the sword? or the handle of the "rod?" for a rod had been better in this simile, if taken in connection with the Biblical triad.

5. The fifth objection seems to be raised partly upon the authority of Sir William Hamilton. That the gold of glory should tarnish is a sad thing, but that gilding should rub off is what was to be expected. It is all that a man can desire if the light that is *behind* his head throws an aureole round it to those who see his face. It is not necessary that the deception should continue when the pseudo-saint is dead. The fame of Sir William Hamilton has almost burned to its socket. People begin to see him in the rays of the sun. His authority for "the fact that such latent modifications exist, and that the doctrine is established beyond all rational doubt," need not go unquestioned. The argument is capable of division into three parts. It asserts that at best the self-questioning of consciousness can only throw light upon states of consciousness; but that as consciousness is not mind, it cannot explicate states of mind which lie outside consciousness. That mind is like the world—while one half is in light the other half is in shadow—and that it cannot be scientific to look at only the sun-ripened side of this peach, and to neglect that which lies under the "blanket of the dark." It admits that the applicability of such a comparison must be proved, and it tries to prove it by these assertions:—

(*a*) That there is unconscious perception.
(*b*) That there is memory, or conservation.
(*c*) That there is unconscious cerebration or elaboration.

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It is said that the eye sees many things which either do not at all enter into consciousness, or enter into it when it is out of focus as regards them; and that such impressions, while they do not directly influence life through consciousness, indirectly modify character, and may come into consciousness in dreams or under abnormal circumstances. And then that poor servant-girl is introduced who talked gibberish in the ravings of fever, and who was found to be repeating long passages from Hebrew authors, without understanding them, which she had been committing to memory without any effort of memory, merely from living with a clergyman in a house with thin walls, and the Hebrew had come through from the parlour to the kitchen! And the story of a postman who did not get enough of sleep during the night, and who regularly fell asleep on his country rounds as he was crossing a meadow, but who woke invariably as he came to the bridge which continued the road after the meadow, because the meadow was safe, and there was danger in crossing the bridge! It strikes an outsider that this is an unsatisfactory latent mental modification, and that, if it was sufficient to waken him when he was coming near danger, it ought to have been sufficiently exalted—in independence of sense—to have taken him over the bridge, too, and let him get his nap out! Coleridge's case, or the case he quotes, of the servant girl and her delirious Hebrew, seems somewhat doubtful. The facts are not in such a condition of preservation as to allow one to speak with any confidence as to its probable truth or falsehood; but conviction leans to the latter alternative. The fact that certain weak-minded persons have excellent memories, although it is supposed to bear witness on the side of unconscious cerebral action, proves nothing! If the deficiency of idiots is dependent on their inability to externalise their own ideas in certain relations, it is perfectly conceivable that extraordinary circumstances—as the death pangs, for instance—should produce manifestations of mind which have not been observable up to that time; and it is impossible to see how a theory of unconscious perception, coupled with unconscious cerebration, could account for these circumstances except under the gratuitous supposition that insanity is observable only in the manifestations of consciousness, and that it does not affect those states of mind which the medical psychologist is for the sake of his argument taking for granted. But without dwelling longer on these side-winds of the doctrine, let us see what it is in itself. It asserts that consciousness

is not co-extensive with mind. If you ask those who support this theory how they know that there is perception without consciousness, they will tell you to examine your dreams, and you will find that the things which appear unfamiliar are impressions received during the day. Many men float on the bladders of assertion! But how long do impressions take to go from the senses to the brain? These things which it is said I perceived during the day, and which have only now come upon the carpet of consciousness, how do you know that any time has intervened between the perception and the consciousness? You suppose time a clock it seems, or measure it by events, which are just the things to be measured by it! How if time were itself an idea? To prove unconscious vision—for to use perception in that sense is erroneous—you say here it comes into consciousness when the eye is shut, and when the event in time is past, which seems logically only to disprove the existence of vision, or at most your supposititiary relation in time, and not to disprove the consciousness, for you set about it by admitting the fact of consciousness of the vision. It is very evident that the events are not separated in time, except in so far as to consciousness they have the relation of near or distant succession, and therefore the time as an element in the proof is, as it were, a weapon out of consciousness' armoury. How, further, if it is sight that we deny, and hold that as the world of nature is only the idea made external, nothing can be in the external, for example in brain, but what is in thought? But even upon their own theory this unconscious vision seems absurd. Sir William Hamilton holds that as consciousness or attention—which, figuratively, is letting consciousness shine through a bull's eye—is intense, so is memory persistent; and as the light of consciousness is diffused, so memory is fugitive; that where consciousness is not in the attentive attitude memory is impossible. But this pre-conscious perception takes for granted a memory which has not been made by consciousness, an edition of a book without the setting-up of the types.

If it is unlikely that the mind receives impressions unconsciously, the improbability is much greater that it can unconsciously work up these materials into thought. The theory of unconscious perception has been seen to be untenable, and the assertion that some boys read over their lessons before going to bed, and find them within the reach of the reproductive faculty in the morning, will not "establish beyond rational doubt"

this twin theory of unconscious cerebration. The fact that certain individuals can waken almost exactly at any hour they determine upon before going to bed, and that when they have wakened they cannot recall any memory of a continuous attention to the passage of time during sleep, will not prove this theory. The almost entire independence of thought of its environment of ideas, with regard to time and with regard to the objectivising of impressions, would seem to be in favour of the other theory. And surely such a confession as that made by Professor Huxley in his "Physiology" (p. 193), that "What consciousness is we know not; and how it is that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness comes about as the result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable as the appearance of Djin, when Aladdin rubbed his lamp, in the story," is sufficient to show how absurd it is for men, who confess that their science cannot teach them anything as to consciousness, still to maintain that consciousness can teach us nothing about itself, and that the method whose failure they confess is still *the* method after all. This is miserliness! A man doesn't use his money, but he is satisfied if others don't!

That there is memory, that the mind has somewhere a store-house for impressions, and that these impressions, though not in consciousness, are capable of coming into consciousness, is another argument used to establish the fact of unthought thought.

As we have seen, we are much too apt to reason from our own conceptions as if they were facts. It is the idealistic tendency carried out with materials which have not become objective, and which are consequently unsuited to the absolute uses to which they are put. This idea of a store-house deceives many. If you think of memory as of two persons, one who keeps thought-stuff and the other who *réchauffés* it for the table of consciousness, then to reason that the cook is not constantly appearing at table seems irresistible. But this conception is entirely erroneous. It is a fact which most persons will admit, that impressions of sense obey certain mental functions. Under what laws and subject to what conditions the former are subject to the latter, it is the object of philosophy to determine. German philosophy has determined that not only do sensuous affections obey intellectual functions, but that there is nothing but intellectual function, and has proceeded towards the demonstration of this proposition with a thoroughness which has never characterised any one of the self-named exact sciences, and has ended with the

assertion of the existence of thought. If then, as we have hinted throughout, time and space are only externalizations of thought, any such reasoning as the duality of the faculty of memory would be absurd. Ideas in consciousness are ideas in consciousness, whether they have or have not associated with them conceptions of past externalization or not. If thought as thought is all, need we argue that unless memory is in thought, without reference to the externalised categories of space and time, it is not. And that to thought as thought the "now" is the only! The name of Rothschild might not be good for £10 at a country bank, and so some may say, "Who's Hegel?" Although the country banker won't cash your cheque some other body will, and he will learn in time that he made an ass of himself and lost 9d., and so with Hegel's name. A great man is the summing up of a universe of facts.

We turn then to the next objection.

6. It is said that consciousness gives no indication of most significant material conditions which accompany mental manifestations. A man's feelings are blunted by fatigue, and consciousness only tells him that he does not feel inclined to weep, not the "why" of the dry eyes. But who told the medical psychologist the why of the dry eyes—the *why* of anything, or the "why" itself? Not observation; you might look for ever at cause and effect, and you would never see any other connection between them than "happens." It is the first principle of all experiment and observation to know something of the instruments used. Men had wisdom enough not to put new wine into old bottles, men have sense enough to carry on the early operations of the photographic process in a dark room, and to set up rods with their lightning-rails on houses of a conducting and not of a non-conducting material; and still men go on in every science using all the marvellous instruments of thought, without ever thinking what they are, how they come to have absolute validity. Now they use such terms as being and nothing, identity, difference, cause, effect, all abstractly and in self-independence, as if they were pokers, instead of in their true concreteness, as if they were scissors or tongs! If you must first go for the universal "Why?" to thought or consciousness, it is not for you to come with one little particular "why," and say you can't answer that. It is as if the men of his time had troubled Newton by asking him to work out little accounts in simple addition.

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7. It is inevitable. One must answer other questions when answering one; and the objection that the association of ideas does not come into consciousness in its process, but in its result, has been already answered. "The association of ideas," the very name would indicate that it is the ideas that are associated, and if it is asserted that the ideas are in consciousness in succession, but their relation (looking upon relation as something in itself) is not, it is evident that the objection arises only from a series of somewhat crude conceptions. To say that if we wish to remember something the best way is not to try, but to leave memory alone, and probably the remembrance will return; to say that thoughts arrange themselves in sequence, and that it is the effect-idea which calls our attention for the first time to the cause-idea;—is only to give concrete examples of the laws of thought; and to expect to be able to fathom them by the inductive method is as hopeless a task as that of the gentleman who required his spectacles in order to be enabled to seek them! "Happy they," says Goethe, "who soon detect the chasm that lies between their wishes and their powers."

8. The eighth objection shows some confusion of thought with regard to the meaning of the word "subjective," and a failure to perceive that the body is objective to thought, and that the influence of the bodily organs is to be regarded in no other light than the impressions of sense already considered. It must not be imagined that a man lives in the objective side of himself, so to speak—that he is, according to Feuerbach, "What he eats." There is much more truth in the assertion that he lives by every word which cometh out of God's mouth. It is words, as the externalization of the idea, that constitute his true and only life. The relation of the mind to the organs of the body is of precisely a similar nature to its relation to the world without, although in the one case the connection is ascribed to the nervous system as a net of feeling in which we live, and in the other to those architectural senses which build up a world "more lasting than brass."

And yet there are those brook-minds which bubble down the sides of the world, with every stone-rib seen through their shallowness; that will spring into rapids of laughter if you say that there can be no other method, in the first instance, than the metaphysical. A summer's day would leave nothing but the pebbles, the empty scabbard of the stream-sword which ran up between the hills. No wonder that they cannot under-

stand the progress of great minds,—no wonder that this fallacy should impose upon them; "a fallacy respecting which," as Mr. Mill remarks, "the only wonder is that it should impose on any one." That a metaphysics must precede any scientific psychology seems certain, from the very arguments used in opposition to this method. The question, however, becomes not what it has been stated above, but breaks into fragments, and you have the question as to how many impressions can be consciously in the mind at one time,—whether, as Sir William Hamilton, following M. Cardaillac, asserts, there can be six, —or whether it is true, as Müller holds, that one only can have place in consciousness, and that such ideas are a chain, each link making room for that it produces. Or again, you have the question whether the co-existence of mental states is at all necessary to the argument, and whether a rapid succession of mental states—as the sides of a thaumatrope are brought before the eye, and the man on the one side seems to be seated on the donkey on the other—would not serve to explain the validity of all the phenomena discovered by the psychological method. In other words, mental phenomena are not best studied through, or by means of, memory. These are the forms this question takes, and it is upon grounds similar to these that the question is generally argued; and upon grounds such as these that it generally has for conclusion some such expression as "I think by far the wisest thing we can do is to accept the inexplicable fact that if we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind or ego is different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which *ex hypothesi* is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series." A very dreary sigh that, and but a windy philosophy that which ends with an "Amen" after it. Mr. Mill ashore! But was he ever afloat? There he lies at the mercy of every little self-willed wave, and many will have a slap at him. But how can ships sail if they trust to chance, without knowing what chance is?—and how can they come on the rocks if they but discover the soundings not so much of the sea we sail, but of the chance and change we sail by, and that the sea lies in. We must be true to ourselves, and before we can be true we must "know ourselves;" not as the mere outsides that your medical psychologists would have us

think we are, but with a something in us of which the external is but a shadow that passes away,—a something which is in truth *the all*, the universe!

Then will we be like that friend in the Life Drama, described by Arthur, when he says—

> "An opulent soul
> Dropped in my path like a great cup of gold,
> All rich and rough with stories of the gods."

That a science of psychology which has for its basis a true metaphysics, and which shall still have regard to the phenomena of mind, as influenced by its *other*, the objective idea—nature—is the only possible science of psychology to us it seems legitimate to deduce. While these constitute the matter of this science, it is only following out a principle which has been present to our mind throughout, to assert that it shall be regulated in its method, as all science must be, by a rational reference to thought in itself. That any science of psychology can have any validity apart from the ground-science of thought, it is consistent to deny.

OCCASIONAL NOTES OF THE QUARTER.

The Scotch Lunacy Commission; the Resignation of Dr. W. A. F. Browne.

It will be a matter of grave regret to all interested in the success of the Scotch Lunacy system, and a source of grief to a large circle of warmly attached friends, to learn that Dr. W. A. F. Browne has been compelled—while still in the full vigour of his mental powers—from grave failure of sight, to resign his office of Commissioner in Lunacy.

Dr. Browne for many years acted as secretary for Scotland to the Medico-Psychological Association, and the success of that flourishing branch is mainly due to his work in the early days of its existence. This, though of interest to ourselves, is but a small item in the long list of services which Dr. Browne has rendered to this department of medicine in Scotland, and which date from 1834, when he was elected Medical Superintendent of the old Montrose Asylum. While there