

not obviously problematic when diachronic processes are involved,” given that it is plausible a cause that originated with a whole system can at a later time affect a component of the system (127). Indeed, Humphreys is insistent that transformational and fusion emergence is, if not an outright attractive position, compatible with narrow views on emergence, regardless of the approach one takes with respect to the relational dimension of emergence.

A central theme in this book is the interdisciplinary nature of the study of emergence. Humphreys makes liberal use of ideas and examples of emergence in the scientific literature just as much as he draws on discussions of emergence in the philosophical literature. His reasons for doing so are twofold: first to demonstrate that emergent phenomena are not as mysterious or rare as might be supposed, and second to draw attention to both the successes and failures of GAP, the methodology primarily motivating scientific investigation. Emergence, and hence the failure in some way of GAP, can be found in the preservation and formation of bird flocks over time (inferential and conceptual) and first-order phase transitions (inferential and ontological), to name two examples. By informing his philosophical investigation of emergence with scientific examples of emergence, Humphreys is able to make a powerful argument for diachronic ontological emergence grounded in empirical research, however, he is under no illusions that such phenomena may exhibit actual, i.e., ontological, emergence. In short, despite Humphreys’ attempt to demonstrate the plausibility of maintaining the ontic status of emergent phenomena, it is still of utmost importance to maintain the distinction between ontologically possible, nomologically possible, and logically possible phenomena.

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Critique of Practical Reason. Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. Revised edition.

IMMANUEL KANT, Trans., MARY GREGOR

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015; 141 pp.; \$26.95 (paper)

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The new, revised edition of the Mary Gregor’s translation of Immanuel Kant’s *Critique of Practical Reason* corrects some of the errors that unfortunately tarnished Gregor’s generally fine first translation. But, in the opinion of this reviewer, the revisions do not go far enough to warrant a clear recommendation, especially in light of the stiff competition.

Kant’s *Critique of Practical Reason*, published in 1788, is both Kant’s second *Critique* (falling between the *Critique of Pure Reason* [1781/1787] and the *Critique of Judgment* [1790]) and the second of Kant’s three major works on moral theory, next to *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) and *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797), both of which Mary Gregor has translated for Cambridge University Press. According to Andrews Reath, author of the “Introduction” and editor of the revised edition, “This revised edition corrects a number of misprints in the translation. Several small emendations have also been made to the translation” (xli). All in all, this is a very

readable and mostly faithful translation with a valuable introduction and a helpful annotated list of secondary literature on the *Critique of Practical Reason* and Kant's moral theory in general. The main changes between the two editions are the revised introduction by Reath, the updated "Further reading" section, and the correction of a number of errors that plagued the first edition.

Most importantly, for this reviewer, although the revised edition does indeed correct some of the errors of the first edition, it still contains a non-negligible number of typographical errors. In at least one case, the revised edition even manages to add an error that the original edition did not contain. Mind you, all the typographical errors that this reviewer has found were in the German text contained in the translator's notes. Nonetheless, it is surprising that Cambridge University Press did not catch these typographical errors ahead of printing the first edition. But it is outright puzzling that even in the revised edition these errors still persist, and, even more so, that *new* errors could make their way into the book.

At the time of its first publication, Gregor's translation could only be compared to two earlier English translations of Kant's second *Critique*: that of Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (1873) and that of Lewis White Beck (1949). Both translations are still in print; the former in its 1909 edition in the Dover Philosophical Classics series, the latter in its third edition (1993) by Liberal Arts Press. Compared to these translations, Gregor's original translation had the advantage that it came with a fine scholarly introduction and that it contained at least some annotations concerning controversial translations along with some references. From what the reviewer can tell, no major changes have been made to the translation itself, which is both surprising and unfortunate given that a few years after the first publication of Gregor's translation Hackett Publishing published Werner S. Pluhar's translation of the *Critique of Practical Reason* (2002), which instantaneously set a new standard for any future English translations. Not only did it contain an overabundance of annotations, it also managed the remarkable feat of being *at the same time* more readable and more faithful to the letter of the original text than Gregor's translation. That Pluhar's translation is so compelling of course also has to do with the fact that he could build on existing translations, including the fine translation by Gregor, which is more rigorous than earlier translations. (To wit, Pluhar's translation is much closer to Gregor's than to that of either Abbott or Beck.) However, since Pluhar's translation remains widely available, one has to wonder whether there are reasons to prefer the revised edition of Gregor's translation to the Pluhar translation, especially since the advantages of Pluhar's translation over the first edition of that by Gregor are largely unaffected by the changes made to the new, revised edition.

With fewer than 200 pages in length, the revised Cambridge edition is significantly shorter than the Hackett edition, which is over 300 pages long. The difference in length is primarily due to the extensive annotations in Pluhar's edition, which add up to over 1,000 notes (including Kant's own notes). While Pluhar's meticulousness is for the most part admirable, in some cases his annotations border on the excessive. To give just two examples: it is hard to see what is gained by the explanation on page 182 that the word "mind" in "a very fine and bright mind" translates "*Kopf*" (literally, "head"). Likewise, this reviewer wonders if the English reader really needs to know that, on page 186 "*nun*," usually "now," means "however." Neither of these are controversial translations. (To be fair, Gregor's own translation is not entirely free of such annotations of questionable value to the reader, but the number of these is of course significantly smaller than in Pluhar's translation.) This is not to depreciate the enormous value of

many of Pluhar's insightful historical references and cross-references to other portions of Kant's *oeuvre* and the thoughtful remarks on more controversial translation choices. All of these are comparatively sparse in Gregor's translation. However, the overabundance of annotations not only makes working with this translation at times unnecessarily cumbersome, it also seems a bit self-indulgent because it constantly reminds the reader of the work of translation that is everywhere present in the Hackett edition. It is here that Gregor's much neater-looking text is pleasantly 'humble.' Here the translator disappears behind her work and allows the translated text to take centre stage (as s/he should).

As far as the accuracy and fluency of the translation are concerned, Pluhar's translation remains the gold standard for English translations of the *Critique of Practical Reason*, perhaps even for all three of Kant's *Critiques*. There is no doubt that Pluhar's edition contains a lot of very valuable information for the scholar of Kant's ethics. However, for those who are easily distracted by Pluhar's overabundance of annotations, Gregor's more economical translation may prove a worthwhile alternative, especially because of its fine 27-page introduction by Reath and the updated list of suggestions for further reading. It is unfortunate that even the new, revised edition still contains typographical errors that a more thorough editing process should have easily detected.

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The Realistic Empiricism of Mach, James, and Russell: Neutral Monism Reconceived

ERIC C. BANKS

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014; 217 pp.; \$95.00 (hardback)

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In *The Realistic Empiricism of Mach, James, and Russell*, Eric Banks attempts to revitalize the theory of 'neutral monism' (or 'realistic empiricism'), a philosophical position developed through the works of Ernst Mach, William James, and Bertrand Russell. This theory, which basically states that the fundamental constituents of the world are neither mental nor physical but 'neutral,' is both an underappreciated position in the history of philosophy and one which has value in contemporary philosophy of mind. By reviving and further developing this thesis, Banks attempts to contribute both to the history of the 'scientific philosophy' of the early 20th century and modern debates on supervenience and physicalist explanations.

Chapters 1 and 2 contribute to the recent resurgence of interest in Mach's work by reconstructing his theory of the elements and philosophy of mind. Mach's motivation to provide empirical explanations of psychological phenomena, in contrast to Brentano's 'intentionality' view, led him to formulate a monist theory on which both psychological and physical phenomena can be metaphysically united. For Mach, the most fundamental constituents of the world are elements understood as individual events which come in and out of existence. The fact that they are fleeting makes them too difficult to be known directly, but we still come to recognize certain patterns in nature (i.e., laws) which provide knowledge of the elements. These elements are manifestations of