Anti-communism at Home, Europeanism Abroad: Italian Cultural Policy at the Venice Biennale, 1948–1958

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The year 1958 is generally acknowledged as a watershed in the history of the fine arts exhibition of the Venice Biennale in the post-war period. While it had, since 1948, emphasised Modernism in the international pavilions, the Biennale had always shown both abstract and Neorealist tendencies in its domestic shows.[1] The 1958 exhibition, in contrast, saw the near exclusive domination of abstract tendencies in both sections. What is less widely recognised, however, is that the exhibition was organised by an administrative board, or *ente*, which had been constituted through the most open intervention of the Italian national government in the affairs of the Biennale since Mussolini's era. In November 1957 the Christian Democrat (DC) government in Rome seized control of the exhibition's *Ente autonomo*. Dismissing its briefly tenured president, Massimo Alesi, a local businessman with commitments to no particular artistic tendencies, it replaced him with Giovanni Ponti, a DC senator, long-standing proponent of European unification and advocate of Modernist art, as *commissario straordinario*.[2] It was a post with which Ponti was familiar. Recently described as the 'doge' of the Biennale, he had been its special commissioner between 1947 and 1954, and his second tenure would last from 1957 to 1960.[3] His reinstatement led to five years of the Biennale's dedication to Informalism, a predominantly, if not wholly abstract, gestural style of painting that flourished internationally, and particularly

[1] See Pascale Budillon Puma, *La Biennale di Venezia: della guerra alla crisi 1948–1968*, (Bari: Palomar, 1995), 83–5; Maurizio Calvesi, 'The Avant-Garde Biennales', in Palazzo Ducale, ed., *Venice and the Biennale: Itineraries of Taste* (Milan: Fabbri Editori, 1995), 97–99 (hereafter *Venice and the Biennale*); Enzo Di Martino, *La Biennale di Venezia 1895–1995: Cento anni di arte e cultura* (Milan: Editoriale Giorgio Mondadori, 1995), 56–7; Paolo Rizzi and Enzo Di Martino, *Storia della Biennale 1895–1982* (Milan: Electa, 1982), 55.

[2] Memo, 'Il Capo di Gabinetto, Presidente, Consiglio dei Ministri al MPI Gabinetto: Interpellanza dei deputati Bernieri ed altri sulla B di V #239', 8 April 1955; De Angelis, Oral Response, 'Interrogazioni 20.1.1955'. Dir.Gen. AA.BB.AA. divisione III, 1949–54, box 285, Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome (hereafter ACS).

[3] Silvio Tramontin, *Giovanni Ponti (1896–1961): Una vita per la Democrazia e per Venezia* (Venice: Comune di Venezia, 1983), 59. (hereafter Tramontin, *Ponti*)

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

Figure 1. *Wolfgang Wols (1913–51),* Yellow Composition, *1947 (oil on canvas), 73 × 92 cm. Staatliche Museen zu Berlin-Preussischer Kulturbesitz Nationalgalerie. Photo: Bildarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin. Photo: Jörg P. Anders, Berlin, 1972.* © *DACS 2005*

Figure 2. *Renato Guttuso (1912–87),* Death of a Hero, *1953 (oil on canvas), 88 × 103 cm. Estorick Collection, London.* © *DACS 2005*

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in the West, between 1947 and the early 1960s (see Figure 1). By 1958 it would be read as shorthand for the commitment to the freedom of individual expression that had survived, and more importantly, resisted occupation across Western Europe during the Second World War.[4] The government also dismantled the Ente's advisory committees, including the *sottocommissione* which had been in charge of the domestic exhibits and was rife with communist union representatives. The latter tended to advocate Neorealism, a representational style that favoured images of the urban proletariat and peasantry (see Figure 2). Because of its accessible style and subject matter, it had been embraced by the Italian Communist Party (PCI) as a formally acceptable variant of Socialist Realism, which had been imposed by the Soviet Union across the Eastern bloc since 1947.[5] Thus, the purging of its advocates from the Ente would inevitably have strong political repercussions.

In spite of these important changes at the 1958 Biennale, the relationship between government policy and the exhibition's promotion of Informalism have not been fully investigated. The most in-depth considerations have been those by Pascale Budillon Puma and Maria Cristina Bandera.[6] The emphasis of Budillon Puma's book, however, is on the exhibition's encounter with communist critics and the complaints they raised with the government over its continued involvement with the Biennale, rather than on the nature of those activities. Bandera's study, on the other hand, focuses on the debate within the Ente between the Christian Democrats and the Communists through a case study of the relationship between the Biennale's general secretary, Rodolfo Pallucchini, and Ente member Roberto Longhi, and how it affected the selections for the exhibitions between 1948 and 1956. As both resigned after the 1956 exhibition, however, her study stops short of an analysis of the managerial crisis of 1957.

The ramifications of the government's decision to promote Informalism at the 1958 Biennale were, however, considerable. Not only did it determine the exhibition's aesthetic preferences until 1962, when Informalism began to be supplanted by other practices. Arguably more importantly, its underlying policy motives provide substantial insight into Italy's role in constructing and implementing domestic and international cold-war cultural policy, an activity that is usually approached from a

[4] The history of Abstract Expressionism has tended to credit this American movement with propagating gesture painting in Western Europe in the 1950s. There is, however, a growing body of scholarship that is interrogating the relationship between American and European practices. See, e.g., Germano Celant, *Roma–New York, 1948–1964*, trans. Joachim Neugroschel (Milan: Charta, 1993); Fiona Gaskin, 'British Tachisme in the post-war period, 1946–1957', in Margaret Garlake, ed., *Artists and Patrons in Post-War Britain* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), 17–55; Nancy Jachec, 'Transatlantic Cultural Politics in the late 1950s: the Leaders and Specialists Grant Program', *Art History*, 26, 4 (2003), 533–56; and Sigrid Ruby 'The Give and Take of American Painting in Postwar Western Europe', *The American Impact on Western Europe: Americanization and Westernization in Transatlantic Perspective* in (German Historical Institute, Washington, DC, 1999), available at www.ghidc.org/conpotweb/westernpapters/ruby.pdf.

[5] Michael Ledeen, *West European Communism and American Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Transaction Books, 1987), 11; Spencer Di Scala, *Renewing Italian Socialism: Nenni to Craxi* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 26, 29.

[6] Budillon Puma, *Biennale*; Maria Cristina Bandera, *Le prime Biennali del dopoguerra: II careggio Longhi-Pallucchini 1948–1956* (Milan: Charta, 1999).

US – Soviet rather than a European perspective. Based on archival sources, this article will argue that modern – meaning here abstract as opposed to representational – painting was promoted at the Biennale's fine arts exhibition between 1948 and 1958 by the DC government in the service of its most pressing, and inseparable, domestic and international policy concerns. These were, respectively, its need to defeat the PCI and to secure Italian participation in the European effort towards unification. As Leopoldo Nuti has recently argued, domestic and international policy were nearly inextricable in Italian politics at this time, the DC's problem with communism at home necessarily affecting its international ambitions.[7] Not only was communist agitation seen to jeopardise Italy's Western-style parliamentary democracy, it also threatened that country's participation in the nascent European union, which the PCI and its fellow-travellers within the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) staunchly opposed from the time of their expulsion from the national government in 1947 until the early 1960s.[8] Moreover, the PCI was the largest communist party outside the Eastern bloc, and the PSI was also gaining electorally in the early and mid-1950s. This was a period of comparative weakness for the DC centre, which found itself depending on support from the far right to retain its majority.[9] Thus the DC's centrists' effort to ensure Italy's place in Europe was paramount to its future in international politics and to its domestic struggle against communism on the one hand and right-wing elements on the other, as both threatened a return to political isolationism. Consolidating the centre, winning increased support from persuadable leftists, and strengthening its links with Europe were some of the ways in which that government responded to these combined threats, using culture and, specifically, painting as a particularly persuasive medium on behalf of these goals.

Painting may not at first seem the most effective way to further European integration. Film, for example, was acknowledged as a far more powerful propagandistic tool because of its ease of mass distribution, and there is clear archival evidence that the Biennale's film festival, which ran in alternate years to the fine arts exhibition, was involved in this integrationist initiative by 1957.[10] Although Italian realist cinema had been internationally applauded since the film market began to revive in 1946, the overall percentage of Neorealist films produced was small in relation to the output of the industry as a whole. Moreover, the Italian film industry was under firm American control, and collaboration between the US film industry and Christian Democratic

[7] Leopoldo Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra: Importanza e limiti della presenza americana in Italia* (Bari: Editori Laterza, 1999) (hereafter Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti*). See the Introduction for Nuti's account of the historigraphy of this subject.

[8] Donald Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism: the West European Left in the Twentieth Century* (London: IB Tauris, 1996), 209–240 (Hereafter Sassoon, *One Hundred Years*). Also, David Forgacs, *Italian Culture in the Industrial Era* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 101–128. (Hereafter Forgacs, *Italian Culture*).

[9] Di Scala, *Renewing Italian Socialism*, 116–17.

[10] Ruth Ben-Ghiat, *Fascist Modernities: Italy, 1922–1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 71, 141. 'Floris Luigi Ammannati to Massimo Alesi, 24.5.1956', Arte Visive (hereafter AV) 168, Archivio Storico dell'Arte Contemporanea, Venice (hereafter ASAC).

elements in the Italian film industry was frequent throughout this period.[11] The Milan Triennale, predominantly an architecture, design and applied arts exhibition but with a small fine arts component, was also used to promote Italy's place in Western Europe after the war. Anty Pansera has shown that the exhibition was used by the DC government throughout the 1950s to assert Italian participation in, and to promote, the European market for such goods. She has also demonstrated that, unlike the fine arts, which had clear political orientations invested in particular styles, the prevalence of the Bauhaus style in the applied arts was accepted by both the centre and the left across Europe. Moreover, both camps agreed on the importance of the need for urban regeneration and the raising of living standards through industrial production and consumption.[12] Consequently, aesthetics at the Triennale, which was, from its inception, a socialist manifestation, were not as contentious an issue.[13]

The fine arts were therefore unique in the field of Italian cold war culture in that they formally embodied the specific ideological debates at the heart of the national government's chief policy concerns.[14] Thus the Venice Biennale's status as Italy's sole and highly prestigious international fine arts exhibition meant that it was particularly suited to address them. If the Triennale's fine arts exhibition was a minority component, the Rome Quadriennale, established in 1931, in spite of the government's lavish expenditure, never transcended its status as a domestic event.[15] In contrast, the Biennale, founded in 1895 as a salon for the promotion of primarily Italian painting, soon became one of the premier international fine arts exhibitions in Europe. Its international prestige was not lost on Mussolini, who from 1928 used the exhibition to suit the changing propagandistic needs of his regime.[16] Although the Fascist period is often perceived as one of isolationism for Italy from the rest of the European community, nationalism and conservatism in the visual arts was really a feature of only the last phase of Mussolini's dictatorship, when imperialist and militaristic imagery was emphasised. As Ruth Ben-Ghiat has persuasively argued, European concerns were never absent from Fascist cultural policy. If, in the immediate aftermath of the First World War, European modernist culture was feared by some in the regime as decadent, this was offset by a lingering concern with Italy's inferiority

[11] Christopher Wagstaff, 'Italy in the Post-War International Cinema Market', in Christopher Duggan and Christopher Wagstaff, eds., *Italy in the Cold War: Politics, Culture and Society 1948–1958* (Oxford: Berg, 1995), 92, 96, 102–6.

[12] Anty Pansera, *Storia e cronaca della Triennale* (Milan: Longanesi, 1978), 76–7, 79.

[13] Ibid., 16–18.

[14] It is interesting to note that the US State Department, although it took responsibility for American participation at the Biennale's film festival since its re-launch in 1947, avoided the fine arts exhibition, because of the 'communist problem'. See, e.g., the correspondence between the State Department and the US Embassy, Rome, preserved in RG59, General Records of the Department of State, Central Decimal File 1945–1949 865.607; and 'Streibert to Dulles, Jan. 24, 1956', RG59, General Records of the Department of State, Central Decimal File 1955–1959 865.191–VE/11–145, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park.

[15] Sileno Salvagnini, 'Roma padrona Venezia in declino', *Arte*, 22, 233, 1992 69–71.

[16] Marla Stone, 'The State as Patron: Making Official Culture in Fascist Italy', in Matthew Affron and Mark Antliff, eds., *Fascist Visions: Art and Ideology in France and Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 205, 209.

as an insufficiently modernised society. It was also tempered by an awareness of the importance of events like the Biennale as a way of maintaining Italy's cultural profile in Europe.[17]

Its reputation became tarnished in 1938, however, when the Biennale was used to construct what, after the fall of Mussolini, came to be seen as the wrong kind of internationalism through the promotion of cultural exchange networks between the Axis powers.[18] This initiative, a response to Italy's expulsion from the League of Nations for its invasion of Ethiopia, marked the end of Mussolini's preoccupation with Italy's cultural profile in western Europe.[19] Consequently, Italy's commitment to post-war Europeanism – the unification of liberal, democratic Western European states and participation in its attendant institutions – was the paramount concern of the Biennale's post-war Ente and the recently reinstated democratic government, when the exhibition reopened its doors in 1948 after a six-year hiatus.

While a considerable amount of work has been done on Italy's role within larger European efforts towards economic, political and military unification during the 1950s,[20] comparatively little attention has been paid to initiatives involving the fine arts. This lack of scholarly interest possibly reflects the lassitude within pan-European institutions such as the Council of Europe itself regarding cultural questions. Although cultural integration was one of the Council's named areas of competence on its formation at the Hague Congress of 1948, it was slow to get involved in cultural initiatives, save those involving the mass media. It did immediately establish a Committee of Cultural Experts, which by 1950 had coined its European cultural integration project as the 'Idea of Europe' or, interchangeably, the 'European Idea'.[21] Yet the committee offered no defined aesthetic for post-war Europe. It merely recommended that 'where cultural institutions of an international character already exist in the same country, they should work together, where they are encouraged to do so by the Government, in an effort to stimulate the European idea'.[22] Furthermore, the Council of Europe generally devolved cultural matters to the Western European Union (WEU), which did not run a tight, centrally organised campaign for the promotion of European integration either, but relied instead on activities conducted through cultural conventions.[23] A phenomenon of the early post-war years, these were signed initially as bilateral agreements between Allied countries, vowing to

[17] Ben-Ghiat, *Fascist Modernities*, 5, 11–12, 35–6.

[18] *Ibid*., 125.

[19] Ibid., 140.

[20] See Antonio Varsori, 'Italy's Policy towards European Integration (1947–58)', in Duggan and Wagstaff, *Italy in the Cold War*, 47–66.

[21] Council of Europe, 'Meeting of Cultural Experts, Part II of the Agenda: Item 3: Setting up of a European Cultural Centre, Strasbourg, 28 June 1950', 1. FO924/878, Foreign Office Records, Public Record Office, London (hereafter PRO).

[22] Ibid. This document originally listed a number of institutions targeted to address the cultivation of the 'European idea', but the list has not been preserved.

[23] The WEU's first assembly was composed of the same representatives who had launched the Council of Europe. See Pierre Duclos, *La Réforme du Conseil de l'Europe* (Paris: R. Pichon & R. Durand-Auzias, 1958), 72.

promote the understanding of each other's language and culture through the exchange of persons, cultural exhibitions and performances, and the establishment of cultural institutes. A European Cultural Convention was only suggested in 1953,[24] and when finally signed in July 1955, it was designed to

> strengthen cultural relations with a view to developing European culture, to make Europe a single cultural entity without thereby sacrificing its remarkable variety, to disseminate the idea of European unity and to foster the European spirit in this and future generations.[25]

The year 1955 has been marked by Antonio Varsori as the 're-launching of Europe' through a 'supra-national approach to European co-operation'. It was intended to reduce tension between member states in advance of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, and to prevent communism from spreading into Western Europe. Varsori has argued that the failure of the European Defence Community (EDC) in late 1954 prompted this initiative,[26] and while he has focused on economic relations as its vehicle, in the words of WEU spokesperson Léopold Senghor, 'as was stressed when the EDC was overthrown, cultural defence is quite as important as military defence'.[27]

Both the Council of Europe and the WEU were closed to any form of communist representation, and given Italy's recent experience of fascism, and its current struggle against communism at home, the DC government was from the outset devoted to promoting an integrated Europe and Italy's place within it. Of all Western European countries, Italy was frequently remarked upon by foreign commentators for its high regard for art as a diplomatic tool.[28] That the Biennale was an important site for the promotion of a Europeanist culture is more than probable when one considers the links between the Ente and Italian representation at the Council of Europe and the WEU. Representation at the latter two usually came from the ministries of foreign affairs of member nations and, since the early 1950s, Gennaro De Novellis, deputy director of the Cultural Relations Division of Italy's Ministero degli Affari Esteri (Ministry of Foreign Affairs – MAE), had been a member of the Committee of Cultural Experts. He became directly responsible for the Biennale after March

[24] See 'Second Proof of the European Cultural Convention, December 1954'. FO924/1043B, Foreign Office Records, PRO.

[25] Council of Europe, Directorate of Information, *European Culture and the Council of Europe*, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1955), 14–15.

[26] Varsori, 'European Integration', 64–5.

[27] 'Document 41: Report from Senghor on the Future Role of the WEU in Political, Economic, Cultural and Legal Fields', 5 April 1957, 72. DG1/127, WEU Archive, PRO.

[28] E.g., the British Council's Italian representative noted in 1954 that Italy spent more on arts at home and abroad during the financial year 1953/54 than British Council's budget that year for whole world. See 'British Council Annual Report: Italy', 1953/54, 2. BW40/39, British Council Records, PRO. See also 'Cover Letter, BC Rome Representative's Annual Report for 1958/59, from Sir Ashley Clarke, to Cultural Relations Department, Foreign Office, August 1959'. FO924/1268 Foreign Office Records, PRO. For a similar, US perspective, see 'Foreign Service Despatch, from the American Embassy Rome to the Department of State, April 13, 1956' and 'Semi-Annual Report on International Educational Exchange Program for Italy July 1 to December 31 1955', 1. RG59 lot file 66D499 CU Planning and Development Staff Country Files 1955–64 box 217, State Department Records, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park.

1957.[29] Ponti, too, had embraced the arguments for a federal European Union and a European parliament as soon as they were mooted in 1947. In 1950 he also became the founding president of the Società Europa di Cultura (SEC). The idea for the SEC sparked at the Rencontres Internationales de Genève of September 1946, which was dedicated to 'affirming the existence of Europe' after the catastrophes of the war.[30] Under the aegis of the Biennale, the SEC sought to define a 'politics of culture' that, unlike the more familiar *kulturpolitik*, renounced political engagement in favour of establishing an international cultural language through which international political relations could be more successfully conducted. His opening address to the SEC's first general assembly in November 1951 gives some idea why Ponti was enthusiastic about having the SEC within the Biennale. Describing their function as parallel, he noted that the Biennale was equally seeking to revive European culture through painting.[31] That he saw this renewal as coming from Modernist as opposed to realist painting was, given his anti-communism, never really subject to question. The final confirmation of Ponti's Europeanism was his admission to the WEU assembly by November 1959.[32] Yet Ponti also had influential allies in the Ente and the national government: general secretary Rodolfo Pallucchini and DC minister Guglielmo De Angelis d'Ossat, director general of the Antiquities and Fine Arts Division of the Ministero della Pubblica Istruzione (Ministry of Public Instruction – MPI) from 1947 to 1960, and a representative on the Council of Europe's Assembly. Both were ardent anti-communists and advocates of modern art.

Given that so many key senior officials attached to the Biennale were long-standing proponents of European integration, the question presents itself as to why the exhibition only became officially allied to the Europeanist cause in 1957. To answer this, we have to consider the history of the Biennale's legislation, which both hindered and facilitated the interests of the DC party there, depending on its changeable electoral stability. Ironically, the legislative changes made by Mussolini to bring the previously autonomous Biennale under national governmental control were used by the post-war DC government to reassert a Europeanist agenda at the exhibition. Its reluctance to repeal that legislation had varied consequences. On the one hand, Mussolini's creation of the Ente autonomo in January 1930, described by Chiara Rabitti as 'autonomous in name alone', gave the DC government full

[29] Council of Europe, *European Culture*, 15–16, 31–2, 50. See also 'Alesi to Stanislao Ceschi, 28.3.1957', AV 167, ASAC.

[30] Norberto Bobbio, *Bobbio Autobiografia*, ed. Alberto Papuzzi (Rome: Laterza, 1999), 96; Umberto Campagnolo, 'Origines de la Société Européenne de culture', *Comprendre*, vol. 1 (Venice: Carlo Ferrari, 1950), 9–15.

[31] Giovanni Ponti, 'Debates of the First General Assembly of the SEC', *Comprendre*, vol. 1, 11.

[32] For Ponti's early involvement with European federalism see 'Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, President of the Committee for a European Congress, to Carlo Sforza, National Assembly, Rome, 15.3.1947', Gabinetto 1943–1958 b. 97, posizione v-1, 1948–1952, fasc. V-2.2; 'Memorandum on the Organisation of a Parliament for Europe, 12.2.1947'. Gabinetto 1943–1958, b. 97, Posizione-V-1, Unione Europea 1948–1952, Archivio Storico Diplomatico, Rome. See also Tramontin, *Ponti*, 59.

power to appoint the exhibition's directors.[33] His royal decree of July 1938, on the other hand, introduced a strong element of labour representation within the Ente. This was not a problem under a one-party state, when all representation came from the Fascist National Confederation of Professionals and Artists.[34] After the Fascist period, however, the unions reasserted themselves, and the translation of the lone Confederation into its multiple democratic successors greatly increased the union representation legally required within the Ente. This had important implications for the visual arts, since many artists were communists or socialists. They were also heavily unionised, with many of the unions being adherents of the CGIL and the CISL, communist and ostensibly independent national federations respectively. Their strident opposition to government control of the exhibition – particularly to the appointments of Ponti and Pallucchini – and the Biennale's general privileging of Modernism not only hampered preparation of the post-war exhibitions until the government's seizure in 1957. It also undermined DC efforts to use the exhibition fully as a site for Europeanist cultural initiatives until that date.

The unions' attacks on the exhibition's administrative structure and procedures began before the first post-war exhibition even opened its doors. When it was announced in 1946 that the exhibition would resume, the DC's manipulation of the Ente was immediately the focus of the debate. Many of the unions were hoping that the Biennale would return to its pre-Fascist tradition of management by the mayor of Venice and autonomous as opposed to national governmental authorities. Ponti's leadership of the first post-war Biennale, therefore, immediately raised their ire. Although he had been installed by the regional Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale (CLN) as the first mayor of Venice after the Liberation, his post at the Biennale should have passed to the newly elected communist mayor, Giobatta Gianquinto, in 1946. Yet the CLN decided to keep him on as *commissario straordinario*, given his extraordinary contribution to the renewal of cultural life of Venice immediately after the Liberation.[35] His appointment was nonetheless denounced as undemocratic, and a number of local artists' unions wrote to the President of the Council of Ministers and the mayor of Venice, calling for the 'organic development' of the Ente, and the replacement of Ponti's Commissione with one elected by artists.[36]

What rankled as much was Ponti's choice of Pallucchini as secretary general. Pallucchini had been responsible for the historical exhibitions of European

[33] Chiara Rabitti, 'The Events and the People: The Brief History of the Institution', Palazzo Ducale, *Venice and the Biennale*, 34–5.

[34] Marla Stone, *Patron State: Culture and Politics in Fascist Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 124.

[35] Tramontin, *Ponti*, 51–2. See also Rizzi and Di Martino, *Storia*, 46–53.

[36] See 'Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri dall'Associazione Pittori e Scultori Veneziani, 12.6.1946'; 'Ministero dell'Istruzione Pubblica al Direttore Generale delle Antichitá e Belle Arti, 5.7.1947'; 'Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri al Ministero dell'Istruzione Pubblica, 31.1.1947'; 'Sindacato Regionale Pittori e Scultori a Consiglio dei Ministri, 12.5.1947'; 'Ordine del giorno, Assemblea del 12.6.1947'; and 'Ordine del Giorno Votato alla'Unamità dagli Artisti del Sindacato Regionale Pittori e Scultori di Veneto nell'Assemblea Generale Straordinaria, 21.9.1947', Dir. Gen. AA.BB.AA. Divisione III, 1929–60, b. 281, ACS.

Modernism that dominated the international shows at the Biennale between 1948 and 1956,[37] and he was the unions' fiercest opponent in the government's struggle to flush communist representation from the Ente. Personal correspondence between Pallucchini and De Angelis reveals the extent to which the Biennale was a site of the DC's struggle against communism. It also reveals the steps taken by Pallucchini, De Angelis and Ponti to protect the Biennale's orientation toward the West European avant-gardes at the first post-war exhibitions against unabating criticism from the unions. The most common complaints came from CGIL-affiliated unions regarding fuller union participation in the organisation of the Biennale, and the failure of the domestic shows to represent equally all tendencies in contemporary Italian art.[38] These complaints, usually made to leftist senators or ministers, were passed to De Angelis in the form of an 'interrogation' to which he would have to reply. His usual response was that the government was not able to intervene with the workings of the *Commissione* once it had been appointed.[39] Yet in the case of one persistent critic, Ponti and De Angelis conspired to change the rules governing the participation of his union. Ilario Neri, general secretary of the Sindacato Nazionale degli Artisti, Pittori e Scultori, had been complaining directly and at length to government officials about irregular practices within the Ente since 1946. In September 1947 he even demanded, on behalf of his union and its parent organisation, the CGIL, an annulment of the acts of Ponti's administration and a return to democratic, pre-Fascist procedures.[40] His criticisms culminated in a letter to Guido Gonella of the MPI in February 1949, and his denunciation of the DC leadership of the exhibition as 'pornographic' led to the standard ministerial enquiries.[41] Yet later that year, when he accused Ponti of inviting the unions too late to participate in the organisation of that summer's exhibition, Ponti blithely responded that a democratic system for the representation of artists was in place, but simply not well applied.[42] By autumn 1949 Ponti could afford this attitude, as in April he and De Angelis had agreed to enforce the changed status of Neri's union. The heir of the fascist Ministero delle Corporazioni, it had been the post-war union with claims to the 'exclusive representation of all artists'. But once deprived of that status, Neri's union had to compete with other organisations for a

[37] Gabriella Belli, 'Nineteen Forty-Eight and the Surrounding Years', Palazzo Ducale, *Venice and the Biennale*, 91–2; and Philip Rylands and Enzo Di Martino, *Flying the Flag for Art: The United States and the Venice Biennale, 1895–1991*, (Richmond, VA: Wyldbore and Wolferstan, 1993), 108.

[38] For exclusion of union representation, see letters from 'CGIL Bologna Chapter, 29.11.1949'; 'CGIL Sindacato Nazionale Artisti Pittori e Scultori, Roma, 6.1.1950; and '12–13.6.1950'. On the privileging of abstract and modernist works, see 'CGIL Lombardy Chapter, 2.12.1949', 'Prof. Ernesto Mattiuzzi a Guido Gonella, MPI, 6.2.1950'; 'De Angelis a Mattiuzzi, 19.5.1950'; 'Accademia di Belle Arti Venezia a De Angelis, 14.12.1949'; 'Accademia di Belle Arti e Liceo Artistico Bologna a Di Angelis, 27.1.1950'; 'Accademia S. Luca a Cerbone, Feb. 1950'. Dir. Gen. AA.BB.AA, divisione III, 1929–60, b. 282, ACS.

[39] See 'De Angelis a Prof. Erminio Forni, 28.12.1950'; 'De Angelis al Capo di Gabinetto SE il Ministro, 24.2.1950'. Dir. Gen. AA.BB.AA. divisione III, 1929–60, b. 282, ACS.

[40] 'Sindacato Regionale Pittori e Scultori a Consiglio dei Ministri, 12.5.1947'; 'Neri a Gianquinto, 21.9.1947'. Ibid.

[41] 'Neri a Gonella, 26.2.1949'. Ibid.

[42] 'Neri a De Angelis, 20.9.1949'; 'Ponti a De Angelis, 20.12.1949'. Ibid.

place in the Commissione.[43] As Ponti clarified at the September 1949 meeting of the *Commissione per le Arti Figurative*, since De Angelis and his ministry had the power to resolve issues over union representation, Neri's prospects for direct participation in the future were indeed limited.[44]

Working together in this way, Ponti, Pallucchini and De Angelis managed to limit the impact of the unions on the Biennale between 1948 and 1952. Above all, they preserved the emphasis on European avant-gardism in the international shows, in spite of the ferocity of the abstraction–realism debate that had been polarising the Italian art world since November 1948. This had been precipitated by the Wroclaw Conference in August that year, which ushered in the period of high Stalinism in the visual arts (1948–52). The conference was the Soviet response to a number of recent anti-communist events in the West. Described by Donald Sassoon as the '*annus horrendus*' of West European communism, 1947 saw the communists excluded from the national governments of Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and Norway (they had already been ousted in Denmark in 1945 and would be in Finland in 1948).[45] Yet it was the establishment of NATO and the Marshall Plan that prompted the Soviet Union to create the Cominform, along with a package of cultural policies, which it unveiled at the conference.

Since France and Italy had the largest communist parties in Western Europe, they were under the most pressure from the Soviet Union to support international communist policy, and the PCI's leader, Palmiro Togliatti, toed the party line, embracing realism as the official idiom of the communist international.[46] Thus he was responsible for igniting the abstraction–realism debate in Italy, which divided hardline communists supporting an accessible, realist aesthetic for political and ideological reasons from the liberal left, which supported less overtly politicised forms of Modernism. In Rome in November 1948 Togliatti denounced abstract art as 'formalist and impotent intellectualism', and followed this with another attack on the abstract works on display at the *Mostra Internazionale d'Arte Contemporanea* (Bologna, 17 October–5 November 1948), dismissing the works on display as pretentious and technically deficient.[47]

Togliatti's remarks were powerful enough to put an end to the strong spirit of co-operation that had developed during the Resistance and early post-war years between artists of different stylistic and ideological persuasions, exemplified in groups such as the *Fronte Nuovo delle Arti*. Founded in October 1946, the Fronte Nuovo included nascent Informalist painters Renato Birolli, Ennio Morlotti, Giuseppe Santomaso and Emilio Vedova, and budding Neorealists Renato Guttuso and Armando Pizzinato.

[43] 'Ponti a De Angelis, 10.1.1948' and '1.4.1949', 'De Angelis, #1590,1.4.1949'. Ibid.

[44] 'Verbale: Reunioni della Commissione per le Arti Figurative 16–17 settembre 1949', 2–4, 5. AV 28, ASAC. See 'Sindacato Nazionale Artisti Pittori e Scultori, Roma al MPI, 12–13 gennaio 1950', for its response to these events. Ibid.

[45] Sassoon, *One Hundred Years*, 97.

[46] James Hyman, *The Battle for Realism: Figurative Art in Britain During the Cold War 1945–1960* (London: Yale University Press, 2001), 4–5.

[47] Angela Zanotti, *Impegno e critica. Gli intellettuali di sinistra nel dopoguerra* (Naples: Liguori, 1979), 97–8. See also Belli, 'Nineteen Forty-eight', 94.

United in their resistance to Fascism and the German occupation, they had been consciously developing a 'progressive' art.[48] Picasso's *Guernica* was central to the their investigations since it was held to have resolved successfully the tension between the potentially inaccessible appearance of much avant-garde art and the need for an engaged, legible subject matter.[49] Their fascination with *Guernica* and late Cubism meant that they were all working in a more or less Modernist vein; thus when they showed as a group at the first post-war Biennale of 1948, the Fronte Nuovo embodied the theme of the exhibition as a whole. When its spokesperson, the leftist art critic Giuseppe Marchiori, described the group as motivated by the shared need to establish 'human solidarity' and 'new relations between men' through whatever artistic means necessary,[50] he echoed in part the ideals of Ponti and Pallucchini. Also veterans of the Resistance, they saw the task of the fine arts exhibition as uniting participating countries 'in a humanistic understanding and universal family against every division and discord'.[51] The crucial difference between the Fronte Nuovo and the Biennale's directors, however, was the latter's insistence on European Modernism as the only artistic language that could transcend 'national borders' and 'ideological barriers' toward this pacifist end. In Pallucchini's words, the avant-garde was an indicator of the 'new climate of liberty, hard won of the European spirit' which had defended the 'liberty of Western European culture' and which the Ente was now promoting.[52]

The national debates that followed the Wroclaw Conference, however, immediately affected subsequent Biennali. By March 1950 it had split the Fronte Nuovo, only three months before a number of its artists were to appear in a large group show at the 1950 exhibition.[53] Ponti and Pallucchini capitalised on this: like its predecesssor, the 1950 Biennale was committed to Modernism at the international level, with the historical retrospectives once again celebrating the early Modernist avant-gardes. For the international pavilions, there is evidence that Pallucchini regularly requested foreign participation at this time through diplomatic channels, nominating specific commissioners for proposed shows. This would ensure that the exhibition as a whole pursued a 'common directive', as envisaged by him.[54] Minutes of Commissione meetings do, however, indicate that this emphasis on Modernism was by no means uncontested. While everyone agreed on the Cubist and Futurist shows, Roberto Longhi and Carlo Ludovico Ragghianti, advocates of representational art, had wanted more stress on the historical precursors of contemporary realism, such as Ingres, Courbet or Delacroix.[55] Retrospectives for the latter two would only

[48] Nello Ajello, *Intelletuali e PCI 1944–1958* (Rome: Laterza, 1979), 246, 249; Enrico Crispolti, 'Frammenti d'una ricerca sul Fronte Nuovo', in Basilica Palladiana, *Il Fronte Nuovo delle Arti: Nascita di una avanguardia* (Vicenza: Neri Pozza Editore, 1997), 12, 21.

[49] Ajello, *Intellettuali*, 242–3, 247.

[50] Giuseppe Marchiori, 'Il Fronte nuovo delle Arti', *Catalogo della XXIV Biennale di Venezia* (Venice: Stamperia di Venezia, 1948), 167 (hereafter *Catalogo XXIV*).

[51] Giovanni Ponti, 'Prefazione', ibid., ix.

[52] Rodolfo Pallucchini, 'Introduzione', ibid. xiii, xv.

[53] Crispolti, 'Frammenti', 27.

[54] 'Verbale: Riunioni della Commissione per le Arti Figurative, 16–17 settembre 1949', 18.

[55] Ibid., 6–7, 16–17.

occur in 1954 and 1956 respectively, when Ponti left the Biennale for a ministerial appointment in Rome.

The debate within the Ente contradicts the argument that Italian participation achieved a 'certain, meaningful equilibrium' between realists and abstractionists in the immediate post-war period.[56] If this is how the exhibition looked, Pallucchini's introduction to the exhibition catalogue indicates the promotion of the future informalist artists, namely Mario Mafai, Renato Birolli and Giuseppe Santomaso, over the Neorealists. He described the informalists as combative, lively and adventurous, while the latter, and their politics, were dealt with dismissively: 'Some of the artists are under the impulse of a political or social stimulus. We register this fact as simple reporters.'[57]

There were other discriminatory tactics used against the Realists, one of the most controversial being the reduction in the number of Italian artists and works shown. Down from 664 in 1948 to 574 in 1950, Pallucchini defended this on the grounds that the great national exhibitions such as the Quadriennale in Rome and the Triennale in Milan provided the public with panoramic accounts of contemporary artistic practices in Italy.[58] He also argued that the Ente had used the same admissions procedures for the foreign exhibits. Nonetheless, he lamented, 'We found ourselves under constant pressure from the great mass of those who . . . haven't yet yielded themselves to the international task of the Biennale'.[59]

In 1948, Pallucchini and Ponti had already been pushing for the Biennale to take sole responsibility for representing the nation's contemporary art abroad. As Pallucchini wrote to Ponti, if the artistic centres of Zurich, Brussels, Amsterdam and, above all, Paris were currently using contemporary art as propaganda for their nation's cultural vitality, then 'the Biennale, in sum, ought to become the centre of initiatives of this kind, initiatives that, spreading our artistic culture abroad, which is still little known but certainly of the first order, constitutes very good propaganda to which our men of state ought to give great credit'.[60]

According to Pallucchini, De Angelis was coming around to this way of thinking,[61] and Ponti later sought to consolidate his support by forwarding him the press reviews for the 1950 Biennale attesting to the international importance of the exhibition.[62] They seem to have had the desired effect on De Angelis, who responded that they provided 'without doubt a clear idea of the full international resonance aroused by

[56] Calvesi, 'Avant-Garde Biennales', 96.

[57] Pallucchini, 'Introduzione', *Catalogo della XXV Biennale di Venezia* (Venice: Stamperia di Venezia, 1950), xiv.

[58] Ibid., x.

[59] Ibid., xi.

[60] 'Pallucchini a Ponti', ca.1948. AV 161, ASAC.

[61] Ibid.

[62] It is interesting to note that, in spite of being a functionary of the DC government, Ponti pressed throughout the 1950s for the exhibition's release from national, and its return to regional, control. This exchange indicates uncertainty about the government's ability to deliver an exhibition committed to the ideals of internationalism and avant-gardism, which Ponti appears to have put before domestic concerns.

the recent Biennale'.[63] The Director General of Foreign Affairs had also sent him French press reviews, which made clear the sense of French cultural superiority in the field of painting.[64] It is therefore likely that De Angelis's awareness of this rivalry helped convince him to support the Biennale's commitment to abstract art at an early date. When asked by the government to comment on the complaints about the 1950 Biennale he defended the Ente, remarking that it was 'completely absurd that in a country with a high level of artistic culture, famous scholars, university professors in the history of art, have come to be seen as incompetent at judging modern art'. He concluded that the Commissione had acted in the interests of artists of all tendencies, and that it was, in fact, responsible for the increased degree of awareness that modern Italian art had attained over the past two years in Europe and the United States.[65]

The 1952 Biennale has been characterised as the exhibition at which the debate between the abstractionists and the realists 'died down'.[66] This was not due, however, to an abatement of hostilities between the two camps, but more to administrative changes that furthered the interests of Ponti and Pallucchini. A presidential decree devolved the Biennale's administration for the 1952 exhibition to two new boards, the Comitato Internazionale di Esperti and the Commissione Esecutiva per le Arti Figurative. The Esperti were to be responsible for the 'general cultural plan of the exhibition, and for proposing the historical and retrospective shows', while the Commissione Esecutiva was to choose the artists to be invited.[67] Both panels were to be appointed by the Biennale's newly formed Consiglio d'Amministrazione, a panel headed by Ponti and composed of predominantly local and national government representatives.[68] It is still unclear why the national government decided to structure the Ente in this way. Yet there is evidence of a growing awareness both in the MAE as well as the Council of Ministers of the international importance of the Biennale, and of the need for Italy to be both competitive and in step with other European nations.[69] Unsurprisingly, most of the Esperti, composed of the Italians Carlo Giulio Argan, Costantino Baroni, Pericle Fazzini, Longhi, Pallucchini, Carlo Alberto Petrucci and Gino Severini, as well as Otto Benesch (Austria), Raymond Cogniat (France), Paul Fierens (Belgium), Eberhard Hanfstaengl (Germany), Max Huggler (Switzerland), John Rothenstein (Britain), Willem Sandberg (Holland) and James Thrall Soby (United States), were clear supporters of Modernism. Many of them would be also involved in the promotion of gesture painting as an international cultural language by the end of the decade, and a number of them, including Argan,

[63] 'Ponti a De Angelis, 30.1.1951', 'De Angelis a Ponti, 17.3.1951'. Dir. Gen. AA.BB.AA. divisione III, 1929–1960, b.282, ACS.

[64] 'Direttore Generale degli Affari Stranieri al Ministero dell'Istruzione Pubblica e De Angelis, 20.10.1950'. Ibid.

[65] 'De Angelis al Capo di Gabinetto SE il Ministro, 24.2.1950'. Ibid.

[66] Belli, 'Nineteen Forty-eight', 94.

[67] 'Ponti a Ricci, 21.9.1951'. AV 38, ASAC. Ricci was the representative of CGIL on the Commissione Esecutiva.

[68] 'Pallucchini a Semeghini', 8 Nov. 1951; 'Ponti a Ricci', 21 Sept. 1951. AV 38, ASAC.

[69] 'Direttore Generale degli Affari Stranieri al Ministero dell'Istruzione Pubblica e De Angelis, 20.10.1950'. Dir. Gen. AA.BB.AA. divisione III, 1929–1960, b. 282, ACS.

Fierens, Hanfstaengl and Sandberg, were attached to the Council of Europe and the SEC.[70]

The promotion of Modernism at the 1952 Biennale was therefore even more effective than at the previous two exhibitions. Although Pallucchini maintained that the selection represented a snapshot of the current situation in Italian art, containing members from both camps of the Fronte Nuovo,[71] the new policy of admission by invitation rather than jury further reduced the number of works in the domestic shows. In 1952, only 235 Italian works were shown, fuelling the mounting level of criticism from the unions, and generating heated discussion in the press.[72] Sparked by the art critic Leonardo Borgese's article for the *Domenica del Corriere*, which was accompanied by 'photographs of extreme abstract works' purchased from the Biennale by the government,[73] the latter's privileging of abstraction prompted an inquest from more than fifty-five senators. De Angelis, however, was firm in his defence of artistic Modernism. When the Minister of Foreign Affairs Luigi Gasparotto, who had initiated the interrogation, described the exhibition as 'repugnant to beauty and truth', De Angelis responded that only someone with 'scarcely interested in contemporary art' could fail to recognise that 'for at least fifty years art has been free from figuration, exploring liberation and independence'.[74] De Angelis himself was clearly satisfied with the international quality of the Italian shows. Noting to Palluchini that they were a 'step up' from the 1950 exhibition, he explained that while they managed to highlight artists who were 'most representative of the various valid tendencies', they held up 'very well in comparison with the foreign sections'. Of the latter, he remarked, equally approvingly, that they 'have reached a truly imposing level this year, represent[ing] another of your, and the Biennale's, victories'.[75]

Union representation within the Ente meant, however, that the Biennale at this time was still a two-tiered event, in spite of continued efforts by Pallucchini and De Angelis to control the appointment of union representatives.[76] When asked by the government in January 1953 to appoint three new union representatives, De Angelis requested 'all the information in its possession concerning the extent and efficiency of the various unions in the field of figurative art'.[77] This was ostensibly to enable a broader range of unions to have the chance at representation. The request, however, actually came from Pallucchini, who had drafted the text of his letter with the

[70] Conseil de l'Europe, *L'Europe Humaniste* (Editions de la Connaissance, 1955), 9–10.

[71] Pallucchini, 'Introduzione', *Catalogo della XXVI Biennale di Venezia* (Venice: Stamperia di Venezia, 1952), xxii.

[72] Rizzi and Di Martino, *Storia*, 82–3.

[73] 'Capo del MPI a De Angelis, 31.1.1953'. Dir. Gen. AA.BB.AA. divisione III, 1929–1960, b. 283, ACS.

[74] 'De Angelis a Gabinetto SE il Ministro, 29.11.1952'. Ibid.

[75] 'De Angelis a Pallucchini', 25 Oct. 1952. Dir. Gen. AA.BB.AA. divisione III, 1929–1960, b. 285, ACS.

[76] See, for example, 'Ponti a De Angelis', 2 July 1953. ACS. 'Ponti a Ceschi, 2.7.1953'; 'Ponti a Spanio, 2.7.1953'. AV 167, ASAC.

[77] 'De Angelis al Ministero del Lavoro e Previdenza Sociale, 16.1.1953'. Dir. Gen. AA.BB.AA. divisione III, 1929–1960, b. 285, ACS.

intention of diluting the presence of the CGIL with more moderate representation.[78] Pallucchini also urged De Angelis to appoint three artists 'of clear fame' as opposed to union representatives, based on a singular interpretation of current statutes.[79] These efforts failed, however, and in January 1953 De Angelis announced that he had appointed three new representatives from the CGIL, the CISL, and the Federazione Sindacati Autonomi, which the Commissione Esecutiva had already called upon for representation.[80] Moreover, the progress that had been made in promoting international Modernism at Biennale, particularly in the international historical shows, was also stalled by dramatic changes within the national government during preparations for the 1954 exhibition. These resulted in procedural and staff changes. In the general election of June 1953 the DC lost its majority in the quadripartite coalition government that had been in place since 1948, and what followed was a period of even greater instability for the party. After a brief interregnum under Giuseppe Pella, Mario Scelba assumed office as Prime Minister in February 1954. A DC centrist, he initially tried to reinstate the quadripartite government, but failed to secure the participation of either the Social Democrats or the Republicans, who were sceptical about reconstituting a partnership that had so recently failed.[81] While he did work closely with Saragat's Democratic Socialists (PSDI), who also lost votes to the PSI, he was forced to seek support from the monarchists in order to increase his electoral strength in parliament.[82] Scelba has also been described as the scourge of the far left, noted for his efforts to purge communists from government bodies.[83] Yet the Biennale was also under the jurisdiction of the Venetian government, which saw the formation of one of the earliest centre-left coalitions in the country, in April 1954.[84]

Given the perilous position of DC leadership in Venice as well as Rome, concessions had to be made to the left, and its aesthetic preferences, at the Biennale. This was facilitated by Ponti's appointment in the national government as Minister for Tourism, Sport and Spectacle in February 1954.[85] Since he was unable to fulfil his obligations to the Biennale, a new head was needed, and the government reverted to the pre-Fascist tradition of mayoral leadership. This was well received by the unions, as Venice's mayor, Angelo Spanio, whilst a Christian Democrat, was at the head of a heavily left-leaning local government, which at that time was already renewing contact with the PSI.[86] The *Sottocommissione per le Arti Figurative* was also partially reinstated as an advisory committee for the domestic exhibits, arguably as a gesture of appeasement. Originally a creation of Mussolini, it was composed

[78] 'Pallucchini a De Angelis, 3.1.1953'. Ibid.
[79] 'Pallucchini a De Angelis, 27.10.1953'. Ibid.
[80] 'De Angelis a Pallucchini, 8.4.1953'. Ibid.
[81] Giuseppe Mammarella, *L'Italia Contemporanea* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1999), 193–4.
[82] Di Scala, *Renewing Italian Socialism*, 93–4; Mammarella, *L'Italia*, 201.
[83] Mammarella, *L'Italia*, 201.
[84] Cesco Chinello, *Storia di uno sviluppo capitalistico: Porto Marghera e Venezia, 1951–1973* (Rome: Editori Rinuniti, 1975), 30.
[85] Tramontin, *Ponti*, 71.
[86] Ibid., 26–7.

of advisors from various government ministries, the educational sector and the professional artists' union. It was therefore a stronghold of labour representation in its post-war incarnation. As it was brought in to advise the Commissione per le Arti Figurative, which had replaced the Commissione Esecutiva, the choices for the domestic shows were heavily influenced by CGIL- and CISL-affiliated unions.[87] When the Sottocommissione first met, it was made clear that, in principle, 'the two currents of abstraction and neorealism ought always to be well represented, and artists ought to be chosen, above all, from these two currents'.[88]

Pallucchini and De Angelis did have some success, however, in manipulating the domestic shows against the wishes of the Sottocommissione. They failed to preserve the policy of admission exclusively by invitation used for the previous exhibition. Yet they did successfully block its suggestion that Italian exhibits be rotated, thereby keeping the number of works down.[89] Although admission by competition was reinstated, this was only a partial success in the view of the Sottocommissione: just over a third of the 213 Italian exhibitors were admitted that way. Thus, as Rizzi and Di Martino have noted, a policy of restricted selection prevailed.[90] Yet Pallucchini and De Angelis's grip on the international shows was also slipping. While they managed to preserve the Comitato di Esperti,[91] the overall complexion of the 1954 exhibition was not a tribute to Surrealism, as the Esperti had intended.[92] Instead, the main retrospective was of Courbet's work, and Pallucchini's catalogue introduction makes it clear that the show was politically contentious. Pallucchini tried to focus on Courbet's formal achievements, maintaining that the current show celebrated the purity of that artist's 'pictorial instinct' rather than any 'underlying political philosophy'.[93] Yet, in the current political climate, it would have been hard not to see the Courbet show as a substantial concession to the communists. That year, the former surrealist writer Louis Aragon, by that time a member of the central committee of the French Communist Party, and the man who had coined the term 'new realism', had published *L'Example de Courbet*, described by Gertje Utley as 'a plea for Socialist Realism'.[94] That summer, *Realismo*, the main forum for communist artists in Italy, began tracing contemporary Italian realist practices back to Courbet.[95]

[87] The unions represented on the Commissione Esecutiva were the Federazione Nazionale Sindacati Autonomi Arti Figurative, the Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori, and the Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro. The ones for the Commissione per le Arti Figurative were Federazione Italiana dei Sindacati Artisti Profesionisti, CISL, Federazione Nazionale di Sindacati Autonomi Arti Figurative, and the Federazione Nazionale degli Artisti pittori, scultori, grafici e scenografi, CGIL.

[88] 'Seconda Riunione, Sottocommissione per l'Arte Figurativa, XXVII Biennale, 21.9.1953'. AV 59, ASAC.

[89] 'De Angelis a Pallucchini, 20.1.1953', AV 168, ASAC; 'Pallucchini a De Angelis, 27.10.1953' AV 161, ASAC.

[90] Rizzi, *Storia*, 53.

[91] 'De Angelis a Pallucchini, 20.1.1953'.

[92] L'Ente della Biennale di Venezia, 'Il Movimento Surrealista in Europa sarà presentato alla XXVIII Biennale di Venezia', 25 Feb. 1954. Dir. Gen. AA.BB.AA. divisione III, 1929–1960, b. 285, ACS.

[93] Pallucchini, 'Introduzione', *Catalogo della XVII Biennale di Venezia* (Venice: Stamperia di Venezia, 1954), 19, 20.

[94] Gertje Utley, *Picasso: The Communist Years* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 121, 138.

[95] Budillon Puma, *Biennale*, 61.

Pallucchini was clearly dissatisfied with the resulting exhibition. His catalogue essay was openly critical of the Sottocommissione's commitment to the panoramic approach, the tone of the piece revealing the extent of his displeasure. Noting that although the Sottocommissione had examined 3,000 works in search of a truly representative show, many of the submissions showed signs of dilettantism. Recommending the retention of stricter admissions by jury and a reduced number of exhibitors, he also advised the institution of 'a vast cycle of national shows' for the unions, separate from the Biennale, in order to 'permit a clearer qualification of values'. While he did concede that the Sottocommissione had managed to sift out works of insufficient quality, the exhibits held 'no surprises'.[96] Nor was Pallucchini the only one to have reservations. Although Spanio publicly embraced the panoramic approach,[97] privately he felt that the exhibition was a failure. In a letter to the MPI, he expressed his frustration at having failed to reconcile the tasks of eradicating communism from the Biennale and satisfying the government's growing demand for full and fair union representation on the Sottocommissione. Describing the Biennale's ideal president as an administrator capable of eliminating 'all the infiltrations that the communists have made, particularly in the artistic sector', by September 1954, before the exhibition had even closed its doors, Spanio was actively seeking his successor.[98]

The impending vacancy at the head of the Ente was not only a cause for governmental concern. Several of the artists who were participants in the abstraction–realism debate were temporarily re-united in summer 1954 in their apprehension over the exhibition's leadership. In spite of the political division between the former Fronte Nuovo artists, many of them petitioned De Angelis to appoint the Venetian poet Diego Valeri as president.[99] They chose him as a true 'man of culture' who, uninvolved with party politics, met the Biennale's original criterion that a Venetian of 'clear fame' in the cultural sphere should preside. De Angelis, however, refused to get involved, replying that the nomination was solely in the hands of the President.[100] By the turn of the year, Alesi had been appointed. The government was immediately flooded with inquiries, and on 20 January 1955, De Angelis issued a statement defending the choice. He maintained that Alesi was chosen because, as a businessman, he was detached from the 'aesthetic tendencies and political ideologies' currently polarising Italian artists. Thus he could 'guarantee impartiality'.[101]

Letters to Alesi from the Ministry of Labour and Social Providence and the MPI show that both ministries were taking care to ensure the legally required union representation on the Ente.[102] It was also clear at the first meeting of the

[96] Ibid., 17.
[97] Spanio, 'Prefazione', *Catalogo XVII*, 13.
[98] 'Spanio a Ermini, 30.9.1954'. Dir. Gen. AA.BB.AA. divisione III, 1929–1960, b. 285, ACS.
[99] Telegram to MPI forwarded to Direttore Generale delle Antichità e Belle Arti, 'Nomina Presidente della Biennale di Venezia, 25.6.1954'. Ibid.
[100] De Angelis' response, sent to 'Gabinetto SE il Ministro, 25.6.1954'. Ibid.
[101] Internal Memo, 'Il Capo di Gabinetto, Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri al MPI Gabinetto, Interpellanza #239'; De Angelis, 'Risposta orale alle interrogazioni 20.1.1955'. Ibid.
[102] 'Ministero del Lavoro e della Providenza Sociale al'Ente, 24.5.1955'; 'MPI a Alesi, 28.4.1956'; AV 161, ASAC.

Sottocommissione for the 1956 Biennale that Alesi himself, while mindful of the exhibition's international character, and of the need to display only Italy's finest work, favoured a panoramic approach.[103] In order to establish more democratic ways of deciding the domestic shows, in late summer 1955 he circulated a questionnaire among the union representatives, polling their opinions on the key issues that had been pitting the Sottocommissione against the rest of the Biennale's committees. These included the desirability of the panoramic approach, participation by invitation or jury, and the international jury for prize awards. The panoramic approach was overwhelmingly supported, and admission by jury was unanimously endorsed, with only CISL adherents opting for an element of invitations to be retained. Only one union, the Federazione Italiana Sindcati Artisti e Professionisti (affiliated to the CISL), was in favour of scrapping the international jury, preferring to involve the views of the public and the critics in the awarding of prizes.[104]

Given the pressure Alesi was working under, he took a diplomatic approach.[105] The year 1956 marked the return of the Soviet Union to the Biennale after an absence of twenty years, and Socialist Realism could not be side-stepped as a minority practice. Moreover, the inclusion of a main historical retrospective of Delacroix added a strong realist component to an exhibition that was struggling to preserve its commitment to Modernism. While the primary historical retrospectives in the central pavilion were given to Gris and Mondrian, the rest of the exhibition was torn between realist and abstract practices. Pallucchini tried to amplify the importance of the latter in both the international and domestic shows, praising West Germany and Spain for highlighting the 'new orientations' in national taste, exemplified by the selection of gestural painters Ernst Wilhelm Nay and Fritz Winter for the pavilion of the former, and the inclusion of José Caballero and Antonio Tapiés in the latter.[106] Pallucchini was, however, less complimentary about the domestic shows. Noting that Italian culture, 'with few exceptions, has remained backward regarding the evolution of international taste', he roundly criticised the panoramic approach for duplicating the recent Quadriennale in Rome, concluding that admission by jury meant that once again much of the work presented for selection was amateurish.[107]

Pallucchini was clearly losing his patience with the Sottocommissione that, in unpublished comments, he accused of failing to maintain an international level of quality at the Biennale. His report on the 1956 exhibition to the Consiglio d'Amministrazione shortly after his resignation that November criticised the fine arts exhibition for being out of step with the rest of the Biennale's events, which were markedly Modernist. He advised that the Sottocommissione's representatives be appointed for their reputation as artists, not for their union affiliation. As it stood,

[103] 'Verbale della Prima Riunione della Sottocommissione per l'Arte Figurativa alla XXVIII Biennale, 22.9.1955', 5–6. AV 73, ASAC.
[104] Ibid., appendix 2, 15.
[105] Alesi, 'Prefazione', La Biennale di Venezia, *Catalogo della XXVIII Biennale di Venezia* (Venezia: Stamperia di Venezia, 1956), xiv, xv.
[106] Pallucchini, 'Introduzione', *Catalogo XXVIII*, xxix.
[107] Ibid., xxi, xxii–xxiii, xvii, xx.

the lowered level of 'quality and prestige' of the Sottocommissione itself was directly reflected in the domestic shows, undermining the quality of the exhibition as a whole.[108]

Although the Consiglio d'Amministrazione unanimously accepted Pallucchini's resignation, it was nearly eight months before a successor was found.[109] In the meantime Pietro Zampetti, another proponent of Modernism,[110] was put in his post. Yet Pallucchini continued to offer advice to Alesi and De Angelis on how to limit the damage that he perceived was being done to the Biennale's national and international prestige, advising Alesi to hand-pick a new Sottocommissione for the 1958 exhibition.[111] He made the following recommendations: Argan for president, with Marco Valsecchi or, as second choice, Francesco Arcangeli, representing art critics. Artists would be represented by Afro, Bruno Cassinari, Bruno Saetti, Marcello Mascherini and Luciano Minguzzi. Giuseppe Marchiori should be in charge of the press.[112]

Pallucchini's recommendations showed clear support for the Informalist movement and its attendant politics, that would soon be promoted at the Biennale at the expense of all other styles. Of the recommended artists, Afro was a pioneer of Italian Informalism, and while Cassinari and Saetti were somewhat older Modernists, working in styles informed by Picasso's late Cubism and Matisse, they offered reliable support for the current avant-garde. Yet the critics, while they were strong advocates of gesture painting, also reflected more directly the interests of the government in consolidating the centre by co-opting persuadable leftists. Argan, whilst he had been a student of the socialist art critic and historian Lionello Venturi and was a strong advocate of artistic Modernism, had maintained a lasting relationship with the PCI. This culminated in his election as mayor of Rome on a communist ticket in 1976.[113] Yet as an anti-Stalinist communist, his commitment to the social ideals of communism did not conflict with his support for the avant-garde.[114] Valsecchi, on the other hand, was at the time the critic for *Il Giorno* and *Tempo*, both of which were liberal-leftist papers. Likewise, Arcangeli was working for *L'Europeo*, of a similar political complexion.[115]

It is possible that Alesi was influenced by Pallucchini's advice, since he was now coming under increasing pressure from the national government to expand the international exhibits and Italy's place within them. Although Alesi had arrived

[108] Pallucchini, 'Relazione al Consiglio d'Amministrazione sull'Attività della Biennale nel 1956', Dec. 1956, 2, 7, 8–9. Dir.Gen. AA.BB.AA. DIV-III 1949–54 b. 284, ACS. This had been a longstanding concern for Pallucchini. See 'Pallucchini a De Angelis, 27.10.1953'.

[109] 'Ordine del segretario generale della Biennale di Venezia, 31.12.1957'. Dir.Gen. AA.BB.AA. divisione III 1949–54 b. 284, ACS.

[110] See Budillon Puma, *Biennale*, 99, on Zampetti's support for Informalism.

[111] 'Pallucchini a Alesi, 15.6.1957', b. 284, ACS.

[112] Ibid.

[113] Calvesi, 'Avant-Garde Biennales', 99; Zanotti, *Impegno e critica*, 106. 'Carlo Giulio Argan', *Indice Biografico Italiano*, series III, fiche 19, frame 124.

[114] Budillon Puma has described him as preoccupied with European internationalism. See *Biennale*, 37.

[115] Forgacs, *Italian Culture*, 132–3.

at the Biennale when the beleaguered DC had to share power, in 1957 this situation was changing. While that year was fraught with internal political crises for the DC, it did mark a clear turning point in the government's involvement in Europe, and arguably a more important role for Italy in promoting Europeanist initiatives, in which cultural relations would figure prominently. In 1957 Italy ratified the Council of Europe convention already passed by nine WEU member states the previous year, which tied their cultural activities to disseminating the European idea.[116] De Novellis had been active in drawing up the plans for the new convention, and in April 1956 it was Gaetano Martino, Italy's representative at the Council of Europe, who had introduced the proposal before the Council's Assembly.[117]

Italy's impending commitment to this Europe-wide initiative had an immediate impact on the Biennale. In May 1956 the MAE informed Alesi that a meeting was being planned by the ministers of foreign affairs of Council of Europe countries regarding their involvement at the Biennale.[118] Thus, De Novellis would be overseeing the 1958 exhibition much more closely than had the MAE in the past. Ten months later, it was decided that the Esperti, in agreement with De Angelis, would be in charge of Italy's contribution the 1958 exhibition, to ensure its international competitiveness.[119]

At the same time, the Camera dei Deputati, the lower house of the Italian parliament, had begun to intervene in the composition of the Sottocommissione. A memorandum to Alesi informed him that while under current Biennale law, representation was required from the CGIL as well as the CISL, Alesi should invite the USAIBA-UIL union to nominate a representative, as it represented the Liberals, Republicans and Social Democrats. This would avoid putting the Christian Democrats under pressure, in the worst-case scenario through an elected representative from a clerical union, such as the Sindacato Autonomo Arti Figurative, 'notoriously linked' with the Catholic Association.[120] Thus, in a meeting with the Sottocommisione in October 1957, Alesi noted that procedures for the nomination of union representatives had become problematic. For the 1956 exhibition, the appropriate procedures had not been honoured, with the result that the CGIL was over-represented. The President had chosen three representatives – Birolli, Manzù and Saetti - from a 'fuller list' to ensure a more balanced representation. Moreover, Argan, Corpora and Capogrossi – all proponents of Informalism – had been lined

[116] Council of Europe Consultative Assembly, 8th Ordinary Session, *Draft Opinion on the Cultural and Social Parts of the 1st Annual Report of the Council of WEU*, 19 April 1956, 4. DG1/83; WEU Restricted CCL (57) 91 Annex B *Points Contained in the Brussels "Appeal" Already Dealt With*, 7. DG1/24. WEU Archive, PRO.

[117] See Baron M. F. de Selys Longchamps, Secretary General, BTO, 'Note: Relations with the Council of Europe, Annex I, 5.3.1954', 2. DG1/19; Dunstan Curtis, 'Acting Clerk of the Assembly, Council of Europe, Secretariat General, 5.4.1956', 5. DG1/83. WEU Archive, PRO.

[118] 'Floris Luigi Ammannati a Alesi, 24.5.1956', AV 168, ASAC.

[119] 'Alesi a Ceschi, 28.3.1957'.

[120] *Pro-memoria a Alesi dalla Camera dei Deputati*, AV 83, ASAC. Whilst this document is undated, it is likely to have been written in autumn 1957 given its content and its position in the record file.

up for the Sottocommissione for the 1958 Biennale.[121] The union representatives present denounced this move as one which excessively favoured abstract tendencies, maintaining that the unions were far more in touch with contemporary Italian art than the Consiglio. They even called for the reformation of the *Consiglio*, as it had 'entrenched political tendencies' that clashed with the interests of the unions.[122]

This meeting appears to have been Alesi's last stand, and it was also the last manifestation of the Sottocommissione as a vehicle for union representation. Dismissing Alesi, the following month the government installed the Comitato di Consulenza, a hastily assembled all-Italian advisory board. Given that there was no time to consult with international advisors for the exhibition, the Consulenza replaced the Esperti, and was thus responsible for the shape of the 1958 Biennale as a whole. Pascale Budillon Puma has recounted that after the appointment of Gian Alberto Dell'Acqua – another Council of Europe representative – as Secretary General in August, the mayor of Venice, who had been vice-president of the Biennale, resigned. He was followed by the representatives of the *comune* and the provincial administration, and the representatives from the Accademia delle Belle Arti, Venice.[123] The appointment, in their view, was just another example of the national government's abuse of its power, and Dell'Acqua was perceived as no more than an instrument of the state.[124] Budillon Puma has stressed Dell'Acqua's appointment as the event prompting the conference convened on 13 October to address the crises at the Biennale, which resulted in important administrative changes. As the conference was only six days after Alesi had announced his unpopular appointments to the Sottocommissione, however, it is also likely that those appointments influenced the decisions taken at the conference. Declaring solidarity with the Venetian administration that resigned, the designation of a *commissario straordinario* was called for, who would appoint a consultative committee for the 1958 exhibition, and draw up new statutes for the 1960 Biennale. Moreover, a return to the practice of having the mayor of Venice as president in time for the 1960 Biennale, and a consultative committee appointed equally by parliament and the council of the commune of Venice, were also requested.[125]

Ponti was reinstated in November 1957 by the Consulenza,[126] and under his leadership the Biennale focused on establishing a European-led international Modernism at home and abroad. Unsurprisingly, the Consulenza, composed of Apollonio, Argan, Bettini, Casorati, Dell'Acqua, Dorigo, Mascherini, Morandi, Pallucchini, Petrassi, Radice and Valsecchi, was heavily weighted towards proponents of Modernism if not Informalism. Ponti's return also brought any preoccupation with domestic politics to an end. In November 1957, the Sottocommissione's

[121] 'Verbale, Comitato di Consulenza, 7.10.1957', 3. AV 83, ASAC.
[122] Ibid., 9.
[123] Budillon Puma, *Biennale*, 124.
[124] Ibid., 123.
[125] Ibid., 124.
[126] 'Pubblicazione ufficiale: La Biennale di Venezia, 25.11.1957', 1. AV 83, ASAC; Di Martino, *Cento anni*, 56–7.

union activists were replaced with figures whose views complemented those of the Consulenza.[127] The new representatives were all confirmed supporters of Modernism, paving the way for the dominance of abstraction at the forthcoming Biennale: Casorati, Bettini, Birolli, Fazzini, Saetti, Zampetti, and Dell'Acqua.[128]

In spite of these appointments, the Sottocommissione's activities were still curtailed by those of the Consulenza, as well as by Ponti's. At a meeting spanning eight days in late December 1957 and early January 1958, Ponti explained to the Sottocommissione the distribution of duties amongst administrative bodies in the light of the changes to the Biennale's administration, handed down from the MPI. While the international function of the Biennale was the concern of all of them, the Consulenza had responsibility for both ensuring the international level of the exhibition, and making sure that Italy kept pace.[129] Thus it was to provide Ponti with advice, in a relationship that he likened to that between the parliament and the president of the republic.[130] Regarding the domestic shows, he also stressed that the representation of Italian artists would be 'in rapport' with foreign ones; thus the panoramic approach which had informed the exhibition for the past ten years and the high numbers of artists shown, were to be scrapped.[131] Yet if the Sottocommissione was answerable to the Consulenza, both were ultimately only advisers for the 1958 Biennale. In his meeting with the Consulenza in November, Ponti made it clear that its function was only to make 'suggestions', precipitating the departure of its last members who had defended Realism at the Biennale on moral, if not aesthetic grounds: Longhi and Ragghianti.[132] Although Longhi had recently noted that Neorealism had become stale while abstraction had caught its second breath, he nonetheless resigned from the Consulenza the following month over the proposed composition of the Italian section for its weighting towards abstraction.[133] Similarly, Ragghianti complained to Ponti that his views were not being respected in the Consulenza. Ragghianti was against a retrospective for Wolfgang Wols, the recently deceased Swiss Informel artist, preferring Daumier, Rodin or Millet.[134] Whilst he had denounced the Soviet art shown at the 1956 Biennale as fascist, his preferences still clearly echoed his earlier support for French realists with leftist pedigrees.[135]

Although it was not the only abstract style on display, Informalism was a persistent theme in 1958, particularly in the pavilions of countries fervently committed to assuring their profile in Europe, namely Italy, West Germany and the United States. As Informalism would dominate the next two exhibitions, a case can be made for seeing the 1958 Biennale as the point at which the exhibition's commitment to

[127] 'Verbale Riassuntivo della prima Riunione del Comitato di Consulenza 24.11.1957', 2, 10. AV 83, ASAC.
[128] Rizzi and Di Martino, *Storia*,53.
[129] 'Resoconto delle Sedute della Sottocommissione, 29–30.12.1957 and 4–5.1.1958', 14. AV 83, ASAC.
[130] Ibid., 7.
[131] Ibid., 2.
[132] 'Verbale Riassuntivo, 24.11.1957', 2–3.
[133] Budillon Puma, *Biennale*, 65–6; 'Bettini a Ponti 18.2.1958', AV 160, ASAC.
[134] 'Ragghianti a Ponti 27.4.1958'; 'Verbale, Consulenza, 12.1.1958', 13; AV 160, ASAC.
[135] Budillon Puma, *Biennale*, 39, 70.

gesture painting as the cultural emblem of the idea of Europe, and of the West, germinated. It is therefore useful to consider at this point why Informalism was the style chosen as representative of post-war European experience, especially when it is still today popularly associated with Jackson Pollock and American Abstract Expressionist painting, the movement which allegedly triumphed over the School of Paris during the cultural cold war. It has recently been argued elsewhere that this American movement was actually grafted onto kindred European practices, in keeping with US foreign policy that sought to promote European unification during those years.[136] From a European perspective, it is also important to note the relationship perceived by the Council of Europe between European and Western – in other words, inclusive of American – culture. Throughout the 1950s, the Council of Europe not only accepted US participation, but viewed its efforts to consolidate the Atlantic Community to be in tandem with the European integrationist movement. Maintaining that US involvement was necessary both for material support after the devastation of the war and for keeping communism within its current borders, the Council described Western Europe in 1958 as 'no more than a bridgehead buttressed by the power of America on the fringe of a hostile continent'.[137] Conceding that Western Europe's position of political supremacy in the world had declined, it stated that its initiative of 1956 was instead designed to enable it 'to give meaning to contemporary life and thus to acquire a leading moral position'.[138] Yet its attitude to the relationship of American and European culture also needs to be qualified. As Caroline Brosat has shown, the Council considered American culture as essentially an offshoot of Europe's. Thus it used the terms 'European culture' and 'Western culture' interchangeably.[139]

This moral role that the Council of Europe identified for itself in the mid-1950s can be seen to inform Ponti's reading of the dominant tendencies on display in the pavilions of many of the Council of Europe's countries. In his preface to the 1958 exhibition catalogue, he noted that the European community's shared responses to 'the most acute aspects of modern artistic experience in Italy and other countries' was defined by the shared 'ideological, ethical and moral motives' of artists who matured in the post-war period.[140] Crucially, this was discernible in their preoccupation with either 'expressivity' of gesture or material.[141] Thus the Wols retrospective was a central reference point in consolidating the themes of the entire exhibition. As Dell'Acqua noted in his introduction, it aimed 'to permit an exhaustive examination of a crucial experience, not less than that of Pollock, of the language of Informel that, pleasing or

[136] See Jachec, 'Transatlantic Cultural Politics', 533–56; Richard J. Aldrich, 'OSS, CIA and European Unity: The American Committee on United Europe', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 8, 1 (1997), 184–227.

[137] Council of Europe, Secretariat General, *Ten Years of European Co-operation, Part II: European Unity: Achievement and Prospects* (Strasbourg, 25th April 1958), 3, 80.

[138] Council of Europe, Directorate of Information, *European Culture and the Council of Europe* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1956), 47.

[139] Caroline Brosat, 'Vers une Europe de la culture?', *European Review of History*, 1, 2 (1994), 182.

[140] Ponti, 'Prefazione', *Catalogo della XXIX Biennale di Venezia* (Venice: Stamperia di Venezia, 1958), lxiii.

[141] Ibid., lxiii.

not, characterises in large part contemporary taste'.[142] Not only did it confirm gesture painting as the emerging dominant style at the Biennale, it also united contemporary practitioners with their precursors, for cultural and historical reasons. Presenting Wols as more a social historian than a painter, the curator Umbro Apollonio noted that as the artist was undervalued in his lifetime, it was now the Biennale's duty to present his insight into Europe's current 'historical condition', gained through direct experience of the war and its aftermath.[143] Whilst Wols's seeming spontaneous calligraphy had been classified by other critics as a form of surrealist automatism, Apollonio was keen to point out its stronger links with Informalism, giving his work greater relevance for current painters. The legacy, in Apollonio's view, was the 'existential insistence' at the heart of Wols's work that could not be resolved in an absoluteness of form. Insofar as it 'recorded' live experience, it pinned down the feelings of suffering and uncertainty of the post-war period.[144]

Budillon Puma has argued that Informalism flourished under the DC and its right-wing supporters.[145] We have seen, however, that the government was anxious to keep right-wing representation out of the Biennale in the directives it issued to Alesi in 1957 about staffing the Sottocommissione. Moreover, as the right was not an active proponent of European and Atlantic institutions,[146] it is difficult to see the rise of gesture painting, which was so strongly linked to the idea of Europe, as fundamentally indebted to the government's right-wing tendencies. The six-month period between November 1957 and April 1958 was a complex period in Italian politics which directly affected the way in which the Biennale of 1958 was organised. While it was fraught with internal political crises for the DC, the most acute being its dependence on electoral support from the right, it nonetheless marked a clear turning point in the government's involvement in Europe. This has been described by Nuti as sustained by an 'alternative vision' within the DC government of the role of a more expansive portion of the Italian left in achieving both a stable, Western-style democracy in Italy and Italy's full participation in European and Atlantic institutions.[147] Given the impact of the idea of Europe on the organisation of the 1958 Biennale, it is arguable that Europeanism, and its roots in the centre-left, is the context through which the rise of Informalism is best approached.

[142] Dell'Acqua, 'Introduzione', *Catalogo XXIX Biennale*, lxxiii.
[143] Umbro Apollonio, 'Wols', Ibid., 150, 151–2.
[144] Ibid., 150.
[145] Budillon Puma, *Biennale*, 83.
[146] The three main parties represented at the Council of Europe, for example, were the Christian Democrats, Socialists and Liberals. Duclos, *La Réforme*, 127.
[147] Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti*, 127, 131.