

Norris's authority rests not only on his ability to mine Chinese sources and interpret Chinese thinking, but his equal ease with theories of international political economy and international relations. He spent at least two years doing fieldwork in China and in Taiwan, and it shows. Original interviews and copious Chinese sources strengthen the Taiwan analysis, the three chapters on Chinese investment funds and the Chinalco–Rio Tinto case. On the other hand, Norris's analysis of China's search for energy security in Africa does not come up to the standard established by the other chapters.

Norris argues that Beijing was “initially unable to control” China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in Sudan, but was later able to “reassert its control over CNPC” (p. 69). Yet CNPC only appears in this chapter as a key actor in the “early” case (in Sudan). In outlining Beijing's response to the criticism of China's role in Sudan, Norris recounts the significant shifts in Beijing's non-interference policy, but this is normal (not economic) statecraft. He then highlights the critically important role of China's policy banks, especially China Eximbank, in greasing the wheels of deals, including oil-secured infrastructure loans. As a policy bank, China Eximbank is clearly a tool of China's economic statecraft, but that is not the argument we started with. Nowhere does Norris provide any evidence that the Chinese state in fact reasserted control over CNPC (or any Chinese oil company). Furthermore, this chapter relies mainly on secondary sources, some of which are quite dated and subject to error. For example, Norris cites a 2006 source to describe China Eximbank's US\$2 billion loan to Angola as an “aid package” with an interest rate of 1.5 per cent (pp. 79, 259), but later scholars realized that this was in fact an oil-secured commercial loan at *LIBOR plus* 1.5 per cent, with terms quite similar to loans offered to Angola by European banks. This has very different implications for economic statecraft.

Nonetheless, one unconvincing chapter is a minor flaw in a gem of a book that does such an excellent job of marrying theory and practice in ways that make it a profitable read for academics and policy makers. It should be the starting point for anyone seeking to understand when, how and why Beijing might employ its economic policy toolkit for strategic gain.

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Managing Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment

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Houndmills, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016

xiv + 180 pp. \$110.00

ISBN 978-1-137-39458-3 doi:10.1017/S0305741016001193

The first wave of China's outward direct investment (ODI) went hand-in-hand with its urbanization and industrialization, which called for enormous quantities of raw materials for steel and energy. These are industries which are still dominated by China's state-owned enterprises, and so initial Chinese outward investment was state led. Since the decline of commodity prices, a new wave of Chinese foreign investment has extended beyond hard commodities, largely geared to meet the consumer demands of China's burgeoning middle class.

This book studies the first wave of investment into resource-rich economies, the largest recipient of which was Australia. The reception of large-scale Chinese investment has become a major political issue in Australia, as in other countries, making the question of how to manage Chinese ODI highly pertinent. This book draws on interviews, case studies and detailed market information to provide detailed sketches of Chinese companies in Australia that have already made the decision to invest. The book will also be useful as a historical record, given the access that researchers gained to key figures in the relevant companies while events were still fresh.

The detailed case studies paint a diverse picture of Chinese investment strategies and corporate behaviour, which can help dispel the caricature of Chinese investors, particularly state-owned ones, being simple instruments of the Chinese state. Chapter three's detailed account of CITIC Pacific's disastrous Sino Iron Project – with its four-year project delay, 300 per cent cost blow out and ongoing management mishandling – contrasts well with the glowing assessment of fellow SOE Minmetal's 2009 acquisition of OZ Minerals and its successful management integration within Australia and skills transfer back to Beijing (chapter four). The detailed lessons in stakeholder and community management within a Chinese–Australian joint venture provide some substance to oft-platitudinous rhetoric of corporate social responsibility.

These case studies are very useful for their detail and content, but their theoretical contribution is limited by the absence of a common theoretical thread or conceptual framework. Setbacks of the Sino Iron Project are explained in terms of the “liability of foreignness,” but the concept is not followed through in the next chapter to explain how this liability was overcome in the OZ Minerals acquisition, nor is it related to the goals of community engagement within the joint venture.

The book does provide some useful generalizations for the mining sector. Reviewing corporate governance arrangements in ten publicly-listed Chinese investments (chapter five), the authors find a preponderance of Chinese involvement at the board level, but with predominantly Australian management teams. However, the authors also reveal the formalistic nature of corporate governance structures in some cases; one company complied with the letter of investment conditions imposed by the Australian treasurer requiring its key management to be Australian residents, but subverted it in spirit by making the Chinese-resident deputy chairman effectively responsible for major operational decisions.

Despite the title's emphasis on “managing” Chinese investment, the perspective of Huang and Zhu's book is almost entirely that of Chinese companies that have established direct investments in Australia. There is no substantive discussion about how a host country might consider adjusting its own foreign-investment policies in response to new Chinese investment. The historic 1987 joint venture between Rio Tinto and the Metallurgical Import and Export Company is mentioned, but the collapse of the \$19.5 billion takeover bid for Rio Tinto by Chinalco in 2009 is not.

The book's quantitative analysis of share-market performance of resource investments is less persuasive than its detailed case studies. The number of listed Chinese-invested companies that the authors track until the end of 2011 is simply too small (16) to support robust econometric analysis, particularly in an industry as risky as mining. Moreover the benchmarking of company performance against the general Australian sharemarket index makes it difficult to interpret the finding that the majority “underperformed” (p. 34). Given that a Chinese resource SOE would be unlikely (and unwise) to diversify into retail, a more informative comparison would be with other mining investments.

A more fundamental question is how to interpret “underperformance.” All investment involves risks, and cross-border investments (whether the investor is Chinese,

American or Swiss) entail higher risks than those faced by domestic competitors. That many should fail, and that high profile cases might fail spectacularly, is to be expected. Provided the failure is not the direct result of capricious administration, it should be interpreted as a sign that the market is working. The best way to manage Chinese outward investment may be for market participants and governments on both sides to watch and learn.

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China's G20 Leadership

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London and New York: Routledge, 2016

xiv + 191 pp. £95.00

ISBN 978-0-472-47948-8 doi:10.1017/S0305741016001181

For observers of both global summitry and China's rising influence in the world, the Chinese Presidency of the Group of 20 (G20) and the centrepiece Hangzhou Summit of September 2016 have garnered considerable attention. This is understandable as two different but parallel phenomena intersect. On the one hand, in the immediate aftermath of the global economic and financial crisis, attention shifted from the exclusive and seemingly ineffective G7 as the world's steering committee to the more inclusive G20. At the same time, China's participation as a founding member was a given, reflecting not only its concomitant rise in importance within the global economy but also the fact that it had been a key participant in the G20 finance ministers' meetings that began in 1999 after the East Asian economic crisis and were upgraded to the leaders' level in 2008.

However, since both 1999 and 2008, China's leadership within the G20 has been the subject of debate both within and outside China. Initially wary of an informal forum like the G20, China tended to keep it at arm's length, resisted any attempt at institutionalization and privileged the more legitimate position of the United Nations (UN). However, more recently this stance began to change, especially since China's presidency of the G20 was announced at the 2014 Brisbane Summit. In this context, and especially in this momentous year, Kirton's contribution to our understanding of how China's role in the G20 has evolved over a relatively short period of time is indeed welcome.

The book provides an empirically rich coverage of these incremental developments in five chronological chapters that detail the development of "G" summitry as well as China's engagement from the East Asian economic crisis through to the 2016 Hangzhou Summit. In addition, an analytical chapter evaluates China's participation in the G20 and explores its motivations. It will come as no surprise to students of China's role in the world to learn that the extant literature has highlighted multiple, overlapping and often contradictory identities that shape China's participation in the G20. China is motivated by the status that the G20 accords, its leadership of emerging countries generally as well as the BRICS countries and Asia specifically, the role of a bridge builder between different constituencies, or a reformer whose efforts range from reluctant to proactive, to name but a few of the labels Kirton employs in his literature review.