

consequences of legislative development is one of the most promising directions for future research. In chapter 7, Opalo takes a first step in this direction by looking at how political liberalization affected incumbents' reelection rates and legislatures' abilities to secure pork in his two core cases. But we are left wondering about the book's implications for larger questions of governance and accountability. Are more autonomous legislatures able to deliver better policies, or do they more consistently guard against executive overreach? Or is it possible that more powerful legislatures might impede electoral turnover and democratic deepening, because their greater capacity to capture rents could magnify electoral advantages for incumbents?

These suggestions should not detract, however, from the strengths of this excellent book. Opalo has written a groundbreaking work that should reinvigorate interest in postcolonial legislatures, which have not received the same attention as political parties and bureaucracies.

Furthermore, the book's core insight about the institution-strengthening effects of strong authoritarian executives should provoke new thinking on the causes of authoritarian durability and demise.

**Where the Party Rules: The Rank and File of China's Communist State.** By Daniel Koss. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. 408p. \$99.99 cloth, \$34.99 paper.  
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The Chinese Communist Party celebrated the seventieth year of its rule in October 2019. The 90-million strong party has thus far defied many Western observers' expectations that it would implode. Led by Xi Jinping at the helm, the party appears to be stronger and more penetrating than ever. Why? Daniel Koss's book tackles such fundamental puzzles about the organizational infrastructure of the Chinese Communist Party from a historic and comparative lens. At a macro level, Koss's empirical study of grassroots party-building in China asks the question of how parties contribute to authoritarian rule. It also seeks to explain the unevenness of party infrastructure across different regions of the country. Comparing "red areas" where there is high party penetration with "pink areas" where the party has failed to fully penetrate, the book explains variations in governance outcomes as a function of party penetration.

The book's overarching point is that grassroots party politics is a key variable in explaining the durability of authoritarian rule. An authoritarian regime party can effectively penetrate society at a grassroots level through its local party branches that serve as "capillaries that enable

the microcirculation of information" (p. 5). Every party-state depends on its foot soldiers to collect taxes and to implement unfavorable policies. China is no exception. Koss provides compelling evidence that, in achieving both governance goals, the state succeeded in those places that had a strong party presence at the local level.

This makes intuitive sense. After all, if rank-and-file members are the eyes and ears of the party, they are more likely to fulfill their missions in places where there are more members and better-developed party infrastructures. Similarly, the extractive capacity of the state is higher in places with more party members who can provide valuable information to the government about local taxpayers. In other words, the degree of party penetration is directly linked to certain governance outcomes at the local level.

The second part of the book traces the historical origins of a strong grassroots party in China. This is where Koss's argument connects most directly with a broader comparative literature on revolutionary struggle and the birth of authoritarian parties. Why is it that some regions in China are more "red" than others? Why did the party not penetrate each region evenly? Koss finds the answer in an important historical event: the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–45. Confirming findings by comparativists Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, he finds that violent revolutionary struggle heralded the birth of a strong party in China.

Yet, he goes a step further to analyze subnational variations in China according to their exposure to the violent anti-Japanese struggle. This is a worthwhile inquiry, because it disaggregates the impact of revolutionary struggle across regions, an analytical task that scholars of China have long emphasized. Koss finds that the party is much stronger in regions that underwent violent struggle against the Japanese than in those that did not. Treating individuals as rational beings, Koss argues that people living in regions that the Japanese occupied were more likely to support the Communist Party because doing so was a viable survival strategy. As a result, occupied regions saw much deeper party penetration that persisted long after the war, constituting a path-dependent outcome. Thus, the origins of the Chinese Communist Party can be traced to the revolutionary struggle, one that created an uneven party infrastructure across the country.

Yet, it is one thing to have a strong party and quite another to have one that can rectify itself. One of the most intriguing analyses comes at the end of the book when Koss interrogates the ability of the party to auto-correct. Here, the book addresses a central debate in Chinese politics on whether the authoritarian regime is truly adaptive. Koss does not simply opine: he digs into historical archives to present evidence that the Communist Party not only survived the crises of the Cultural Revolution (1967–69) but that it also emerged even stronger and more capable of dealing with crises writ large.

This poses an intriguing question: Does the Chinese Communist Party today have the same adaptive capabilities that it did in decades past? Analysts have long speculated that the party-state may not survive an economic shock, because the regime's legitimacy has been tied to its economic performance. Koss does not answer this question. Instead, he raises a provocative proposition that the survival of the party may not be tied directly to that of the state. He suggests that it is possible for the party to outlast the state. That is, even if the top echelons of the party collapse, the grassroots tentacles of the party may persist. Moreover, these party foot soldiers may have much to offer in terms of information and practical experience to rulers.

These propositions leave readers wanting to know more about party politics in contemporary China and beyond. To what extent has the party infrastructure at the lowest levels transformed or expanded in the past decade? One of the party-state's hallmark projects under the current leader Xi Jinping is its poverty alleviation campaign, which seeks to eradicate extreme poverty by the end of 2020. The party has sent more than 770,000 officials to far-flung, poor villages to implement programs to meet these development targets. If party penetration is uneven, as Koss suggests, how can the government ensure equality in poverty alleviation across the country? The party has also increased its presence inside universities and enterprises. This ensures even deeper and broader control of all sectors of society, aided by high-tech surveillance. Meanwhile, internal party struggles are refracted through political campaigns such as Xi's anticorruption drive, which targeted two million officials.

The manner and extent to which the Chinese Communist Party has changed have implications beyond Chinese politics, which points, as Koss suggests, to the importance of studying the evolution of parties in a comparative light. Whether authoritarian or democratic, Koss reminds us that political parties and their grassroots members play a crucial role in everyday governance.

**Offshore Citizens: Permanent Temporary Status in the Gulf.**

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State-generated documents provide evidentiary proofs of citizenship, but their role is not always so clear. The very documents that are used to acquire and cement citizenship can also be distributed by states to strategically deny citizenship claims. It is the latter that is the subject of this timely and much-needed contribution.

Noora Lori's *Offshore Citizens* investigates the unique case of the United Arab Emirates' (UAE) purchase of foreign passports from the poor African island nation of the Union of Comoros in 2008 to distribute as an identity document to its subnational minorities without their consent. Because these passports do not afford rights or protections by either the Union of Comoros or the UAE, this arrangement was seen as a "novel and puzzling" (p. 5) state strategy of denaturalization. The passports allowed federal authorities in Abu Dhabi to effectively convert "domestic minorities" into "foreign residents" without the individuals ever leaving the country. The new passports came with the "specter of deportation" (p. 212), because the recipient was now legally subject to the discretionary power of the state through contingent and revocable residency rights. Moreover, because these 80,000–120,000 long-term minorities did not possess an important citizenship document, the *khulāṣat al-qayd* or family book, the UAE reclassified them as *bidūn* (stateless). They were disqualified from Emirati citizenship because their lineage was outside the officially recognized Arab tribes listed in the 1925 British census. This created a "de facto" statelessness (p. 40)—an exclusion that was "short of expulsion" (p. 5).

Based on an extensive archival study of more than 3,200 documents and data from 180 semi-structured in-depth interviews, Lori lays out a richly detailed history and analysis of *how* this exclusion came to be. She suggests two possible explanations. The first is a larger "national dilemma" that wrestles with the question of who can be a citizen in the UAE. Before 1971, regional immigration flows and intra-emirate elite rivalry led to divergent visions of which Arab tribes constitute authentic nativity to the new federal monarchy. She explains, "The official primordial nationalism seen today with its procedural emphasis on bloodline and allegiance can be traced to this period of intense struggles over categorization" (p. 51). But as the federation developed, these historic rivalries did not dissipate and elite competition over citizenship criteria continued, with Abu Dhabi at the apex of a seven-member Emirati federation. Over time each Emirate subunit was limited in its ability to define the citizenry within its jurisdiction, as naturalization cases approved at the local level were delayed or denied at the federal level where Abu Dhabi called the shots.

A second explanation emphasizes the UAE's "security dilemma," its immediate need to upgrade state capacity through a comprehensive surveillance and identification of immigrant and local populations. In the mid-2000s, an internal shift in elite power in Abu Dhabi led to a biometric identity registration campaign to sort "everyone in a category" (p. 218) and to secure the distribution of welfare benefits. Abu Dhabi issued foreign passports to those without family books, thereby formally denying them robust welfare benefits, such as subsidized housing,