Back Into The Fold: The Influence of Offender Amends and Victim Forgiveness on Peer Reintegration

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ABSTRACT: After a transgression has occurred within an organization, a primary concern is the reintegration of the affected parties (namely offenders and victims) back into the organizational community. However, beyond offenders and victims, reintegration depends on the views of organizational peers and their desire to interact with these parties. In two studies, we demonstrated that offender amends and victim forgiveness interact to predict peer reintegrative outcomes. We found evidence of backlash against unforgiving victims: Peers wanted to work the least with victims who rejected appropriate amends, thus penalizing them for their failure to contribute to the restoration process. This backlash effect was due to decreased liking of the victim and the perceived failure to repair the offender-victim relationship. These findings demonstrate that peers expect both offenders and victims to do their part to achieve reconciliation following transgression, and both may suffer the consequences of failing to meet peer expectations. Implications for reintegration within organizations are discussed.

KEY WORDS: reintegration, third parties, amends, forgiveness, restorative justice

WHEN A TRANSGRESSION OCCURS within an organization, one of the primary concerns is whether reintegration can be achieved. Reintegration involves the repair of relationships touched by the transgression so that the affected parties can be restored back into the organizational community (Goodstein & Aquino, 2010; Goodstein & Butterfield, 2010). Unlike other common justice outcomes such as offender punishment or offender-victim reconciliation, reintegration depends on the views and actions of third-party stakeholders from the broader organizational community. The support and acceptance from one's peers is a necessary component of successful reintegration (Bazemore, 1988; Braithwaite, 2002). Others must want to work and interact with the offender and the victim for them to once again be truly included as members of the organization. These reintegrative outcomes have important implications beyond the parties affected by the transgression, as the relations amongst co-workers contribute to overall organizational effectiveness (Goodstein & Butterfield, 2010; Kidder, 2007).

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However, little is known about what affects individual desires to bring offenders and victims back into the organizational fold. Although the victim's peers are likely to react to the victim's experience of injustice (as observers have strong negative emotional reactions to others' victimization and desire justice to be done on their behalf; Brockner, 1990; Gromet & Darley, 2009; Kray & Lind, 2002), it is currently unknown whether people place expectations on the victim to contribute to the restoration process. It has been suggested that victims may be seen as having a moral obligation to do their part to allow for restoration to occur (see Goodstein & Butterfield, 2010; Walker, 2006). Such an obligation may be particularly strong in contexts in which the offender-victim relationship has a direct effect on others in the community (such as in organizational settings). Thus, if victims refuse to do their part, particularly after offenders have made efforts to right their wrongs, victims may be viewed poorly in the eyes of their peers for failing to meet these expectations.

This research addresses, for the first time, how the victim's (and offender's) failure to adhere to peer expectations can result in reintegrative failures. This perspective is often overlooked in much of the research on justice in organizations and other contexts, which focus primarily on the reaction of victims (and to a lesser extent offenders) to transgressions that directly affect them (for an extensive review of the existing third-party literature, see Skarlicki, O'Reilly, & Kulik, in press). Recognizing the role of peer reactions is essential to understanding the potential pitfalls that may undermine the effective organizational reintegration of victims and offenders.

In two experimental studies, we investigated how peers react to the restorative actions (or lack thereof) of offenders and victims following workplace transgressions, and the consequences that those reactions have for achieving victim and offender reintegration within organizations. We focus on how offender amends and victim forgiveness influence peers' relational views of victims and offenders (how they perceive and feel toward them), and how these reparative factors influence their desire to work and interact with victims and offenders (either separately or together as a team). We examine three key variables in this research: the reparative actions taken after a transgression has occurred (offender amends and victim forgiveness), the appraisals observers make based on these actions (liking of offender/victim, perceived offender-victim relationship repair), and observers' reintegrative responses (offender, victim, and team reintegration). Figure 1 depicts the predicted patterns of association between these variables, which will be discussed in detail below.

Previous research has tended to focus on offender amends and victim forgiveness in isolation, for example by manipulating whether the offender has apologized and examining its effect on victim forgiveness (Fehr & Gelfand, 2010), or by examining the effect of victim forgiveness on victims' justice perceptions and behaviors (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2001, 2006; Wenzel & Okimoto, 2010). Our research builds on these previous findings, and provides two innovations: (1) we examine how offender amends and victim forgiveness *interact* to affect reintegration outcomes, and (2) we investigate how offender and victim actions affect their standing in the eyes of their peers (rather than how others' actions affect victims). As reintegration is an interactive process that involves offenders, victims, and members of the organi-

zational community, investigating these areas provides important insights into how to best foster reintegration within organizations.

OFFENDER AMENDS AND VICTIM FORGIVENESS

Both amends-making and forgiveness-granting are essential components of harm repair, which is one of the primary goals of restorative justice (e.g., Strang & Sherman, 2003). Amends-making includes the offender admitting that his actions were wrong, apologizing for those actions, and taking steps to make things right with the victim (Walker, 2006). It is important to note that the making of amends extends beyond offenders simply apologizing for what they have done. It also includes offenders taking active steps to repair the harm that they have caused (Walker, 2006; Zechmeister, Garcia, Romero, & Vas, 2004). Indeed, particularly when transgressions are viewed as serious, victims typically require more than an apology to feel better about the wrongdoing and to start the process of forgiving the offender (Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murnighan, 2002; Exline, Worthington, Hill, & McCullough, 2003; Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989).

Victim forgiveness has also been shown to be instrumental for justice restoration in many settings, including organizations (e.g., Aquino et al., 2001, 2006). Forgiveness is viewed as the victim deciding to replace negative thoughts and feelings toward the offender and the offense with more neutral or positive ones (Exline et al., 2003), providing an alternative to retribution or revenge in dealing with injustice (Tripp, Bies, & Aquino, 2007; Wade & Worthington, 2002). Beyond the interpersonal component of justice restoration, forgiveness also has many intrapersonal benefits for victims: victims who have forgiven their offender are less angry (Wenzel & Okimoto, 2010;



Figure 1: Hypothesized patterns of mediation linking amends/forgiveness to reintegration

Hypothesis 1: Peers will desire greater offender reintegration when offenders make strong amends (rather than weak amends), and when victims forgive them (rather than withhold forgiveness); the effects of amends and forgiveness on offender reintegration will be mediated by liking of the offender and perceived relationship repair.

Hypothesis 2: Peers will desire less victim reintegration when victims do not forgive their offenders than when they do forgive, but only in the presence of strong offender amends; this interaction will be mediated by liking of the victim and perceived relationship repair.

Hypothesis 3: Peers will desire greater team reintegration when the victim forgives, particularly when accompanied by strong offender amends; this interaction will be mediated by liking of the victim and perceived relationship repair.

Witvliet, Worthington, Root, Sato, Ludwing, & Exline, 2008), have greater feelings of empathy and benevolence toward the offender (McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997; Wenzel, Turner, & Okimoto, 2010), and have improved psychological and physiological outcomes related to life satisfaction and stress (Bono, McCullough, & Root, 2008; Cox, Bennett, Tripp, & Aquino, 2012; Witvliet, Ludwig, & Vander Laan, 2001). Our focus is on the interpersonal aspect of forgiveness with regard to how it is perceived to affect the offender-victim relationship.

Offender amends and victim forgiveness set the stage for relationship repair (Braithwaite, 2002; Palanski, 2012), one of the important steps to the achievement of reintegration. In the present research, we examine peers' perceptions that the offender-victim relationship has been repaired. We conceptualize this perception as a judgment about the status of the relationship between the offender and victim, assessing whether or not the dyadic-level justice concerns raised by the transgression have been addressed. With regard to third-party perceptions of victim-offender relationship restoration, both amends and forgiveness should be seen as necessary because they each illustrate satisfaction of different justice concerns that people care about.

In particular, suitable offender amends communicates that the offender now respects the values that his actions violated (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2008, 2009), and victim forgiveness communicates that victims have experienced closure, as well as providing additional evidence about the offender's repentance for the transgression (Gromet, Okimoto, Wenzel, & Darley, 2012). The absence of either offender amends or victim forgiveness suggests to people that some justice concerns have not been addressed. Thus, without both suitable offender amends and victim forgiveness, people are unlikely to view relationship restoration as being achieved. Notably, victim forgiveness is particularly important for third-party perceptions of relationship repair, as the presence of forgiveness is indicative of victim closure, which is a critical justice concern (Gromet & Darley, 2009). Indeed, a third-party's own justice satisfaction is tied to the perception that victims have experienced closure (Gromet et al., 2012). Therefore, even if an offender has offered appropriate amends, observers will view the offender-victim relationship as unrepaired if the victim does not offer forgiveness in return.

Independent of perceptions about the victim-offender relationship, amends and forgiveness are also likely to affect observers' attitudes toward the offender and victim individually. Previous research has demonstrated that likability affects how people respond to offenders and victims: liked offenders are more likely to be forgiven and punished less severely (Bradfield & Aquino, 1999) and liked victims are the recipients of better justice outcomes, such as compensation (van Prooijen, 2010). Therefore, how much observers like the offender and victim should affect their reintegrative desires toward them. We argue that both offenders and victims should be liked less when they hinder the justice process by refusing to offer reparative actions following the transgression. Peers are apt to dislike offenders who are unwilling to offer sufficient amends to the victim. For victims, their refusal to convey forgiveness should also lead to decreased liking by peers, but only after the offender has offered appropriate amends. In this instance, when offenders have done their part to right the wrong they committed, there is likely to be an expectation that victims should contribute to the harm repair process.

PEER REINTEGRATION OF OFFENDER AND VICTIM

One's peers in an organization are an important source of influence (Becerra & Gupta, 2003; Cobb, 1980) and their judgments of the offender and the victim are indicative of their psychological inclusion in the organization. By definition, reintegration necessarily involves the willingness of other organizational members to accept the offender and victim and bring them back into the organizational fold (which we refer to as *peer reintegration*). In the present research, we examine three aspects of peer reintegration: peers' reintegration of the offender (*offender reintegration*), the victim (*victim reintegration*), and the offender and victim together within a group context (*team reintegration*). Equal consideration to the victim's inclusion in the organization is critical as the transgression (and the reactions one has to victimization) can affect both offenders' and victims' standings in the eyes of their peers (Tripp, Bies, & Aquino, 2002; Okimoto & Wenzel, 2014).

Third-party willingness to work with the offender after his/her transgression is likely to be dependent on both the adequacy of offender amends and whether the victim has forgiven the offender. Consistent with previous research, offenders who make appropriate amends should be evaluated more positively than those who fail to do so (e.g., Darby & Schlenker, 1982, 1989), as apologies improve judgments of an offender's moral character (Gold & Weiner, 2000). We also investigated whether victim forgiveness increases peers' liking of the offender (and thus increasing the desire to work with offender), as the forgiveness of the victim may raise the moral status of the offender. Although previous research has not addressed how victim forgiveness affects peers' views of offenders, there is suggestive evidence for this hypothesis, as victims are more forgiving of liked offenders (Bradfield & Aquino, 1999). In addition to liking of the offender, the presence of offender amends and (particularly) victim forgiveness may also increase individuals' desire to work with offender because it leads to heightened perceptions of offender-victim relationship repair (indicating that the justice concerns raised by the transgression have been satisfied). Indeed, observers support less punitive action against offenders based on victim satisfaction because it communicates that the harm caused has been repaired (Gromet et al., 2012). Thus, peer reintegration of offenders should be positively influenced by both offender amends and victim forgiveness, based on increased liking of the offender when either of these factors is present, and greater perceptions of relationship repair when offenders are forgiven by their victims.

> *Hypothesis 1: Peers will desire greater offender reintegration when offenders make strong amends (rather than weak amends), and when victims forgive them (rather than withhold forgiveness); the effects of amends and forgiveness on offender reintegration will be mediated by liking of the offender and perceived relationship repair.*

Although victims are the aggrieved party, in some circumstances peers may be unwilling to fully accept the victim as a non-stigmatized member of the organization. Like evaluations of offenders, observers' evaluation of victims is likely to depend on whether the victim fulfills repair expectations. However, we predict that

victims are only expected to engage in the repair process when offenders have made appropriate amends to right the wrongs they have committed. Once offenders have offered sufficient amends, the victims' peers may view them as having an obligation to respond in kind with forgiveness (see Goodstein & Butterfield, 2010; Walker, 2006), and react negatively to the victim's refusal to forgive, as it prevents relationship repair from occurring. Moreover, such refusal also suggests that the victim is unreasonable, uncooperative, and unlikable. As a consequence, although peers are likely to reintegrate forgiving victims regardless of offender amends, victims who choose to *not* forgive their offenders may face reintegrative backlash from their peers, but only when offenders have offered sufficient amends.

Hypothesis 2: Peers will desire less victim reintegration when victims do not forgive their offenders than when they do forgive, but only in the presence of strong offender amends; this interaction will be mediated by liking of the victim and perceived relationship repair.

With regard to the dyadic peer reintegration outcome (team reintegration), participants' desire to work with the offender and victim together should be a direct function of the perceived state of the offender-victim relationship, which should be greatest when both the offender and the victim act in a reparative fashion (the offender offers strong amends and the victim forgives the offender). As discussed previously, the victims' choice to forgive their offenders is likely to be particularly influential to perceived relationship repair: The withholding of forgiveness signals that the offender's amends have failed to accomplish justice in the victims' eyes, and observers are sensitive to this signal (Gromet & Darley, 2009; Gromet et al., 2012). Therefore, participants' desire to engage with both the offender and victim in a team setting should be based on whether they felt that the offender-victim relationship had been repaired and their liking of the victim.

Hypothesis 3: Peers will desire greater team reintegration when the victim forgives, particularly when accompanied by strong offender amends; this interaction will be mediated by liking of the victim and perceived relationship repair.

STUDY 1

The aim of Study 1 was to examine how both offender amends-making and victim forgiveness-granting affect reintegrative intentions amongst their organizational peers. Participants were presented with a transgression scenario that occurred between two of their co-workers in their organization. The transgression was an instance of political deviance that involved harmful interpersonal behavior (Robinson & Bennett, 1995). Participants then learned about the subsequent amends made on the part of the offender (weak versus strong) and whether the victim granted forgiveness (no versus yes).

Method

Participants

Five hundred and one participants were recruited online from Mechanical Turk (68% male, $M_{Age} = 28.91$, $SD = 9.17$) and received monetary compensation for their participation. Overall, 72% of participants were currently employed; the remaining participants were retired (1%), unemployed (6%), stay-at-home parents (2%), or students (18%).[1]

Procedure

Participants were first asked to imagine that an event had occurred at the organization where they worked. In the scenario, one of their co-workers (George, the offender) committed a transgression against another co-worker (Jason, the victim) by talking badly about the victim to their other co-workers (see Appendix A for full scenario text, including the offender amends and victim forgiveness manipulations).

Offender amends. In all conditions, George offered amends, telling Jason that he should not have spoken badly about him to others, that it was wrong of him to do so, and that he was sorry. In the *Weak Amends* condition, George did not take any further action beyond this apology. In the *Strong Amends* condition, George took additional steps to remedy the situation by telling the other team members that Jason is a valuable asset to the team and by drawing attention to Jason's contributions.

Victim forgiveness. Participants learned that Jason either forgave George (*Forgives Condition*) or did not forgive him (*Does Not Forgive Condition*) for talking badly about him behind his back.

Negative consequences. On an exploratory basis, we also examined a possible moderator of these reintegration intentions: whether the offender's amends can repair all of the harm caused to the victim by the transgression. There are likely to be many instances in which transgressions occur and the offender, try as he might, is unable to completely undo the damage caused by the transgression. To examine this issue, we varied whether there were additional (unanticipated) negative consequences for the victim stemming from the offender's transgression. In the *Negative Consequences* condition (after participants learned that George had talked badly about Jason behind his back, but before they learned about offender amends or victim forgiveness), participants were informed that the offender's actions affected the victim's peer evaluations, which management uses to help determine bonuses, raises and promotions. Participants learned that other workgroup members rated Jason lower than they would have otherwise based on George's remarks. In the *No Consequences* condition, participants received no such additional information.

Dependent measures. Unless noted otherwise, all ratings were done on 7-point scales from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). Participants indicated their agreement with manipulation check items assessing *offender amends*. They were asked to agree/disagree with items stating that: George's apology was sincere, George tried to make amends, and George tried to make things right between him and Jason ($\alpha = .85$). The manipulation check on *forgiveness* asked participants whether George forgave Jason. The manipulation check for *negative consequences*

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asked to what extent the offender's actions put the victim at a disadvantage at work on a scale that ranged from 1 (*Not At All*) to 7 (*A Great Deal*).

For the potential mediating measures, participants indicated their feelings about the *offender's likability* and the *victim's likability*. We used Wojciszke, Abele, and Baryla's (2009) three-item composite scales for both offender and victim liking. Participants were asked how much they agreed that they liked the offender (or victim), had warm feelings about the offender (or victim), and feel close to the offender (or victim) (offender: $\alpha = .92$; victim: $\alpha = .90$). Participants also provided their views on the extent to which George and Jason's relationship had been repaired (*perceived relationship repair*) by indicating whether they thought that the relationship had been repaired, that their relationship could now have a fresh start (adapted from Aquino et al., 2006), and that they could successfully work together again ($\alpha = .91$).

For *offender* and *victim reintegration*, participants separately indicated how much they desired to work with George and with Jason on 7-point scales from 1 (*Not at All*) to 7 (*A Great Deal*). Participants were specifically asked how much they wanted to work with the offender (or victim), how much they thought that offender (or victim) was a good colleague, and how much they would like to collaborate with the offender (or victim) on a work project (offender reintegration: $\alpha = .96$; victim reintegration: $\alpha = .96$). For *team reintegration* (i.e., the desire to work with the offender and victim together), participants were asked how much they would want to work with in a group that both the offender and victim were a part of, how much they would like collaborating with both the offender and victim at the same time on a group work project, and how comfortable they would be interacting with both the offender and the victim ($\alpha = .92$). Participants provided demographic information at the end of the study. In both studies, we report all measured and manipulated variables.[2]

Results

For all of the analyses reported below, participants' judgments were submitted to linear regressions with offender amends (Weak = -1 vs. Strong = 1), victim forgiveness (Does Not Forgive = -1 vs. Forgives = 1), negative consequences (Absent = -1 vs. Present = 1), and all two-way and three-way interactions as predictors. Table 1 (Appendix C) provides the means and standard deviations for all measures, and Table 2 (Appendix C) provides the standardized regression coefficients for these analyses. Importantly, the negative consequences manipulation did not moderate any of our hypothesized effects, and will not be discussed further in the text.

Manipulation Checks

As expected, the offender was seen as making greater amends in the Strong Amends condition ($M = 5.77$, $SD = 0.80$) compared to the Weak Amends condition ($M = 4.58$, $SD = 1.31$; $t(499) = 12.34$, $p < .001$), and the victim was seen as more forgiving in the Forgives condition ($M = 5.79$, $SD = 0.95$) than in the Does Not Forgive condition ($M = 1.35$, $SD = 0.72$; $t(499) = 59.07$, $p < .001$).

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Peer and Team Reintegration

The offender making strong amends ($\beta = .18$, $p < .001$), and the victim granting forgiveness ($\beta = .14$, $p = .002$), both positively contributed to participants' desire to work with the offender (and did not interact with one another; Figure 2). Consistent with Hypothesis 1, participants expressed a greater desire to reintegrate offenders who made amends for their wrongs and whose victims forgave them.

In contrast, the desire to work with victims (victim reintegration) depended on the interaction between amends and forgiveness, $\beta = .13$, $p = .002$ (Figure 2). As expected, observers did not want to work with victims who did not forgive after receiving strong amends, as compared to those who rejected weak amends ($M_{Strong} = 3.67$ vs. $M_{Weak} = 4.21$; $t(249) = 3.67$, $p < .001$). No such difference emerged when victims forgave their offenders ($M_{Strong} = 4.78$ vs. $M_{Weak} = 4.63$; $t < 1$). Overall, participants had the least desire to work with victims who did not forgive strong amends ($ps < .001$), consistent with Hypothesis 2. This pattern of results illustrates that victims are penalized for not forgiving appropriate amends, and their reintegration into the organization may suffer when they do not contribute to the harm repair process.

Participants desire to work with the offender and victim together (team reintegration) was also dependent on the interaction between amends and forgiveness ($\beta = .14$, $p = .001$; Figure 2). Victim forgiveness was key to participants' interest in working with the offender and victim together. When victim forgiveness was absent, participants' had little desire to work with the offender and victim as a team, regardless of the amends the offender made ($M_{Weak} = 3.10$ vs. $M_{Strong} = 2.71$; $t(249) = 1.38$, $p = .17$). When victims forgave their offenders, participants had a greater desire to work with offender and victim as a team, but particularly when the offender offered strong amends ($M_{Weak} = 5.06$ vs. $M_{Strong} = 6.30$; $t(248) = 3.25$, $p = .001$). Therefore, participants expressed the greatest desire to work with the offender and victim together when both strong offender amends and victim forgiveness were present, and were particularly hesitant to work with the offender and victim together if the victim had not forgiven the offender.



Figure 2: Participants' desire for offender, victim, and team reintegration (+SE) based on offender amends and victim forgiveness (Study 1).

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Perceived Relationship Repair and Liking as Mediators

We expected that participants' desire to reintegrate the offender and the victim after amends and forgiveness would be based on their subsequent liking of the offender/victim and perceived offender-victim relationship repair (Hypotheses 1–3). Indeed, participants' liking of the offender and the victim showed the same pattern as their respective reintegration judgments, and perceived relationship repair mirrored the results for team reintegration (see Tables 1 and 2). To test for the indirect effects of amends and forgiveness on the three peer reintegration measures (offender, victim, and team), through both liking (offender and victim) and perceived relationship repair, we conducted mediational analysis using bootstrapping procedures that test for the significance of multiple simultaneous indirect effects with small samples (see Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The results are presented in Table 3 (Appendix C).

Consistent with Hypotheses 1–3, for all three reintegration measures, observers' desire to work with the offender and victim was partially determined by both how much they liked them and the perceived state of the offender-victim relationship. Notably, victim forgiveness enhanced reintegration because it increased both how much peers liked the victim *and* how much they viewed the offender-victim relationship as repaired (although note that all mediators showed significant indirect effects for these predictors due to high statistical power; see Table 3). Therefore, peers had the least desire to reintegrate victims who rejected appropriate amends not only because they liked them less, but also because they viewed their actions as detrimental to relationship repair. The role of perceived relationship repair is especially apparent for team reintegration, in which the state of the offender-victim relationship is likely to have the largest direct influence on peer observers. If peers do not think that the relationship is repaired, they are unlikely to want to work with the offender and victim together.

Discussion

These results demonstrate that both appropriate offender amends and victim forgiveness are needed for people within the organization to feel accepting of and willing to reintegrate the victim and offender. Although participants had generally more positive views of an offender who made strong amends and a victim who forgave, victim and team reintegration were sensitive to the presence of both factors (and particularly whether victims were forgiving of their offenders). These findings suggest that reintegration is most likely to be successful when both amends and forgiveness are present, and that the absence of victim forgiveness is particularly detrimental to achieving reintegration because it negatively affects liking of both offenders and victims, and the perceived state of the offender-victim relationship.

In addition, the study provides evidence that victims who reject appropriate amends experience backlash from their peers; participants reported the least desire to reintegrate the unforgiving victim due to the perceived unlikable character of the victim and their negative contribution to relationship repair, but only when the offender offered strong amends. These findings indicate that when an offender has sincerely tried to right his wrongs, the victim is expected to respond in kind, and

failure to offer forgiveness both prevents perceived relationship repair and diminishes the likelihood that their organizational peers will reintegrate them. These results emphasize the importance of victim forgiveness for reintegration within organizations, and that the offender making amends on its own only goes so far in restoring interpersonal relations in the aftermath of a transgression.

STUDY 2

Study 2 has two primary aims. The first aim was to replicate the findings from Study 1 with a different transgression. By identifying similar patterns in a different context, we can provide better evidence for the generalizability of our findings. We examined reactions to a situation where the victim was blamed for a negative outcome that was in fact entirely the offender's fault.

The second aim was to examine whether victim forgiveness contributes positively and/or negatively to offender, victim, and team reintegration (Hypotheses 1–3). In Study 1, we only compared the victim's granting versus denying forgiveness to the offender. In order to demonstrate the clear role of victim forgiveness in shaping reintegration, forgiveness (and the lack thereof) needs to be compared to a baseline condition in which participants are unaware of the victim's reaction. For this reason, we included a no information condition to the victim forgiveness variable, such that participants in this condition only learned about the offender's amends-making but received no details about the victim's response. The inclusion of this no information condition allows for an examination of what participants infer about victim forgiveness from offender amends. Consistent with the idea that reconciliation expectations drive the negative assessment of unforgiving victims, we expected that people are more likely to assume that the victim forgives the offender when the offender makes strong, as compared to weak, amends. Therefore, in this instance, participants should perceive the offender-victim relationship as more repaired because of the assumption that victims will forgive strong amends, which will result in better reintegratiave outcomes than when the victim actively refuses to forgive appropriate amends.

Method

Participants

Seven hundred and twenty five participants were recruited online. Four hundred and eighty one participants were recruited from Mechanical Turk (35% female, M_{Age} = 29.49, SD = 10.01) and received monetary compensation for their participation; two hundred and forty four additional participants were recruited an online panel and received a lottery draw as compensation (67% female, M_{Age} = 33.54, SD = 13.74). Overall, 65% of participants were currently employed; the remaining participants were retired (2%), unemployed (6%), stay-at-home parents (3%), or students (24%).

Procedure

The procedure was similar to Study 1, with the few exceptions detailed below. Participants read a new scenario (see full scenario text in the Appendix B) in which

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the offender (Joe) allowed the victim (Nick) to be blamed for failing to meet the deadline for their joint project, despite the fact that it was entirely the offender's fault that they missed the deadline. We included a *No Forgiveness Information* condition where participants only learned about the strength of offender amends.

Manipulation checks of *offender amends* ($\alpha = .87$) and victim forgiveness, as well as measures of *relationship repair* ($\alpha = .91$), *peer reintegration* (offender: $\alpha = .96$; victim: $\alpha = .96$; team: $\alpha = .95$), were all identical to the measures of Study 1. In the present study, we used a one-item measure of both *offender* and *victim likability* (1 = *extremely dislike*; 7 = *extremely like*).

Lastly, as stated previously, it is likely that people expect victims to forgive when offenders make strong amends, which suggests that when victims reject appropriate amends, they are violating others' expectations. To directly assess whether participants' *expectations of the victim* were in fact violated by the victim's refusal to accept strong amends, we included two items: How much they were surprised by the victim's reaction to the offender's apology (reverse-coded), and how much this reaction matched how they thought the victim would react ($r = .68$). These questions were only asked of participants who received information about victim forgiveness.[3]

Results

For all analyses reported below, participants' judgments were submitted to linear regressions with offender amends (Weak = -1 vs. Strong = 1), victim forgiveness (Does Not Forgive vs. No Information vs. Forgives), and their interactions as predictors. The victim forgiveness variable was dummy-coded with the No Information condition as the reference group. Table 4 (Appendix C) provides the means and standard deviations for all measures, and Table 5 (Appendix C) provides the standardized regression coefficients for these analyses.

Manipulation Checks

As in Study 1, the offender was seen as making greater amends in the Strong Amends condition ($M = 6.18$, $SD = 0.91$) compared to the Weak Amends condition ($M = 3.72$, $SD = 1.40$; $t(724) = 28.16$, $p < .001$). For victim forgiveness, as compared to the No Information condition ($M = 4.10$, $SD = 1.45$), the victim was seen as more forgiving in the Forgives condition ($M = 5.99$, $SD = 1.18$; $t(498) = 16.03$, $p < .001$), and less forgiving in the Does Not Forgive condition ($M = 1.35$, $SD = 0.92$; $t(471) = 24.37$, $p < .001$).

In addition, we examined our assumption that victims who rejected appropriate amends violated peers expectations about how they thought the victims would react. Indeed, the rejection of strong amends was seen as the most unexpected ($M = 2.86$, $SD = 1.42$) relative to all other amends/forgiveness combinations (ps $< .001$), including when victims forgave weak amends ($M = 3.80$, $SD = 1.38$).

Peer and Team Reintegration

Providing more support for Hypothesis 1, participants desired greater offender reintegration when he made strong ($M = 3.59$, $SD = 1.47$), rather than weak ($M = 2.09$, $SD = 1.31$) amends, $\beta = .55$, $p < .001$. In addition, victim forgiveness resulted

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in greater desire for offender reintegration, but only when the offender made weak amends (amends x forgives: β = -.15, p = .001). Participants wanted to reintegrate the offender who offered weak amends more when they learned the victim forgave the offender (M = 2.53) than when no information about victim forgiveness was offered (M = 1.98; $t(255)$ = 3.13, p = .002). Victim forgiveness did not moderate how much participants wanted to work with the offender who made strong amends (ps < .1). Thus, forgiveness information only affected offender reintegration when the offender's amends did not clarify the sincerity of his remorse, consistent with the idea that victim forgiveness provides disambiguating information about the offender (Gromet et al., 2012).

The results for victim reintegration further supported Hypothesis 2 by demonstrating the perils of victims' refusal to accept appropriate amends (see Figure 3). Overall, as compared to when participants learned no information about victim forgiveness, participants were more willing to reintegrate victims when they forgave their offenders (β = .18, $t(720)$ = 4.70, p < .001) but less willing when they withheld forgiveness (β = -.25, $t(720)$ = -6.40, p < .001). However, as expected, participants only penalized victims for non-forgiveness when victims rejected appropriate amends (amends x non-forgiveness: β = -.21, $t(720)$ = -4.46, p < .001). As shown in Figure 3, participants' wanted to reintegrate the unforgiving victim less when they rejected strong, rather than weak, amends (M_{Weak} = 4.73 vs. M_{Strong} = 3.68; $t(255)$ = 4.00, p < .001). Overall, participants had the least desire to reintegrate victims who did not forgive strong amends (ps < .001). Participants' desire to work with the victim was not affected by offender amends when they learned that the victim forgave the offender or when no information was provided (ts < 1). These results also demonstrate that victim backlash is not simply a result of the victim refusing to forgive, as victims who refused to forgive weak amends were not seen as any less desirable as colleagues than when no information was provided about victim forgiveness (M_{Weak} = 4.73 vs. $M_{NoInformation}$ = 4.95; $t(233)$ = 1.32, p = .19).



Figure 3: Participants' desire to reintegrate the victim (+SE) based on offender amends and victim forgiveness (Study 2).

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As with victim reintegration, the victim's refusal to forgive had a negative effect on peers' desire to work with the offender and victim together (β = -.35, $p < .001$), whereas a victim forgiving had a positive effect (β = .10, $p < .001$). Furthermore, as compared to when no information was provided, victims' refusal to forgive decreased participants' desire for team reintegration after both weak and strong amends (weak: $M_{\text{DoesNotForgive}} = 2.36$ vs. $M_{\text{NoInformation}} = 3.10$; $t(233) = 4.16$, $p < .001$; strong: $M_{\text{DoesNotForgive}} = 2.74$ vs. $M_{\text{NoInformation}} = 4.34$; $t(236) = 9.19$, $p < .001$); this difference was larger for strong amends (amends x does not forgive: β = -.15, $p = .001$). In addition, when victims forgave their offenders, team reintegration only received a boost as compared to the no information condition when offenders made weak amends (amends x forgives: β = -.13, $p = .006$). When offenders made strong amends, the additional information about forgiveness did not affect how much participants wanted to work jointly with the offender and victim ($M_{\text{Forgives}} = 4.31$; $t < 1$), again supporting the idea that individuals assume that victims have forgiven offenders who offered them strong amends.

Perceived Relationship Repair and Liking as Mediators

As in Study 1, participants' liking of the offender and victim mirrored the results for offender and victim reintegration, and the results for perceived relationship repair was akin to team reintegration (see Table 4). To examine whether participants' relational appraisals explained the effect of amends and forgiveness on offender, victim, and team reintegration (Hypotheses 1–3), we conducted bootstrap analyses that simultaneously tested the three possible indirect pathways (offender liking, victim liking, perceived offender-victim relationship repair). Table 6 (Appendix C) presents indirect bootstrap coefficients and confidence intervals for each significant effect. For offender reintegration, consistent with Hypothesis 1, the positive effect of strong offender amends on offender reintegration was partly due to increased offender liking, as well as enhanced relationship repair. Offenders who made weak amends were helped by their victims offering forgiveness: their peers were more likely to reintegrate them because the victim's decision to forgive increased how much they liked the offender and their belief that the victim-offender relationship was repaired. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, both dislike of the victim and a perceived lack of relationship repair impaired victim reintegration when the victim rejected strong amends; their peers liked them less, and thought the offender-victim relationship was in a worse state, when victims decided to withhold forgiveness when it was due.

For team reintegration, consistent with Hypothesis 3, the mediational pattern demonstrated that participants' desire to work with the offender and victim together was primarily based on their perceptions of relationship repair. When the victim refused to forgive strong amends, team reintegration was diminished because peers viewed the offender-victim relationship as less repaired (and they disliked the victim more). Correspondingly, when the victim forgave weak amends, team reintegration was enhanced because of greater perceived relationship repair (and increased liking of the offender). Decreased liking for the victim also partly mediated this interaction, although to a lesser degree. Therefore, when either appropriate amends or victim forgiveness is absent, team reintegration will suffer due to the lack of

perceived relationship repair between the offender and the victim and decreased liking of the victim.

Discussion

These results provide further support for the importance of victim forgiveness for reconciliation in organizations following transgressions. When compared to baseline conditions in which participants had no information about the victim's response to offender amends-making, offender, victim, and team reintegration were hampered when victims did not forgive and boosted when they did. Again these results appear to be driven by both individual-level liking of the offender and victim, and dyadic-level perceptions of the offender-victim relationship. These findings further highlight the perils facing victims who reject appropriate amends with regard to their own interpersonal consequences and the negative consequences at the team level. It is specifically the refusal to forgive (rather than the absence of forgiveness information) that leads to backlash against victims who do not forgive suitable amends.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The present findings demonstrate that in the aftermath of a transgression, the reparative actions taken by the offender and victim, and the interaction between the two, influence their peers' desire to bring them back into the organizational fold. Consistent with our model depicted in Figure 1, the offender's and victim's reparative actions affect their peers' intentions to reintergrate them based on appraisals of liking and relationship restoration following these actions. The results of two experimental studies demonstrated that, in the eyes of one's peers, victims' refusal to forgive appropriate amends undermined the victim's status as a desirable colleague and diminished perceptions of offender-victim relationship repair, both of which led to subpar reintegrative outcomes at both the individual and dyadic level. To our knowledge, this research is the first to consider the interactive effect of offender amends and victim forgiveness on third-party reintegrative judgments and intentions, and the first to demonstrate that victims put their own standing at risk by refusing to forgive after amends. These findings illustrate that peer reintegration is a dynamic and interactive process, and that peers will penalize both offenders and victims for failing to contribute to this process.

The interplay between offender amends and victim forgiveness was shown to be particularly influential to these assessments because of the importance observers placed on two appraisals, one at the individual level (i.e., liking of the offender and victim) and one at the dyadic level (i.e., perceptions of offender-victim relationship repair), both of which led the way for observers to work with the offender and victim together. When either appropriate amends or forgiveness was missing, the uncooperative target was liked less and the relationship between the parties was believed to suffer. In particular, victim forgiveness (or the lack thereof) was critical to these assessments, as both victims *and* offenders were liked more when victims forgave, and victim forgiveness was key to the perception that the offender-victim relationship had been repaired. These findings demonstrate that peers are concerned about whether

the justice concerns raised by the transgression have been addressed, consistent with previous research that has shown the emphasis that observers place on addressing victim justice concerns (e.g., Gromet & Darley, 2009; Gromet et al., 2012).

Importantly, victim backlash only occurred for unforgiving victims who rejected sufficient amends. Victims who received weak amends were not penalized for refusing to forgive, suggesting that their peers did not hold them as accountable for contributing to the restoration process when their offender did not do his/her part. This result again emphasizes the importance of considering the interactive process of reintegration. Unforgiving victims are not universally disliked; the strength of offender amends determines the reintegrative response they will receive from their peers. Victims who were unforgiving of appropriate amends were rebuked by their peers because they violated their expectations; people thought that appropriate amends from the offender would be greeted with forgiveness from the victim (as shown in Study 2), and they disliked victims (relative to other conditions) who failed to meet this expectation and inhibited relationship repair. This victim backlash effect occurred even in instances where the offender could not repair all of the harm his actions had caused the victim (Study 1).

The present research provides an important step in understanding the peer perspective in reintegration within organizations. However, much more research is needed to understand when and why reintegration will be successfully accomplished. In the present studies, we examined the strength of offender amends and the presence of victim forgiveness. These responses are only a small slice of the possible actions that offenders and victims may take in the wake of transgressions. For example, victims may choose to seek revenge against their offenders (Aquino et al., 2001, 2006) and offenders may make actively refuse to apologize for their actions (Okimoto, Wenzel, & Hedrick, 2013). In addition, we looked exclusively at peers (the offender and victim were peers, and participants were their peers as well). Hierarchical differences between the victim and offender, and the status of the observer relative to the offender/victim, are likely to influence justice perceptions and reparative actions (e.g., Aquino et al., 2006; Tripp et al., 2007), as well as constrain possible reintegrative actions (e.g., an employee may have little choice about whether to work and interact with his manager). Future research needs to consider these different factors, as well as employ additional methodologies beyond scenario-based studies to develop a full understanding of how reintegration can be accomplished within organizations.

Peers As A Key Part of Reintegration

The present results add to our understanding of intra-organizational justice dynamics by demonstrating that observers' perceptions and reactions to a transgression can have consequences for the achievement of reintegration. Previous research has established that individuals are affected by injustices that occur within their organizations as passive observers (e.g., Kray & Lind, 2002; Skarlicki & Kulik, 2005; Treviño, 1992). In the restorative model, however, observers are active participants in, and an essential part of, the justice process (Braithwaite, 2002; Goodstein & But-

terfield, 2010). Reintegration requires the involvement and cooperation of multiple stakeholders beyond the offender and victim. The present findings demonstrate that peers are sensitive to the reparative actions of both offender and victim (or lack thereof), and make assessments about their own reintegrative efforts based on the combination of these factors.

One key aspect to these assessments is likely to be whether observers view the affected parties as (morally) responsible for contributing to the harm repair process. Whereas previous research has established how justice perceptions (particularly with regard to procedural justice) affect assessments of supervisor responsibility for negative outcomes (e.g., Brockner, 2002; Brockner, Fishman, Reb, Goldman, Spiegel, & Garden, 2007), the present results demonstrate that individuals can hold their fellow peers responsible for contributing to harm repair in the wake of a transgression. Moreover, the current results suggest that peers not only hold the offender responsible for making appropriate amends, but they also hold the victim responsible for recognizing when appropriate amends have been made and responding in kind. This finding adds complexity to the discussion of forgiveness, which typically highlights both the intrapersonal and interpersonal benefits of forgiveness, such as how forgiving is empowering to victims (Bies & Tripp, 1996; Wenzel & Okimoto, 2010) and conducive to relationship repair (Aquino, Grover, Goldman, & Folger, 2003; McCullough et al., 1997). The current research indicates that there is an additional interpersonal consideration surrounding the victim's decision to forgive: the existence of an imperative for victims to forgive when their offenders have made amends that will affect their standing in the eyes of their peers.

More research is needed on how assessments of offender and victim responsibility affect reintegrative outcomes. We demonstrated that victims who rejected appropriate amends violated their peers' expectations, but it is not clear whether these expectations are morally based (i.e., reflecting normative standards about what victims should or ought to do to contribute to the restoration process; see Walker, 2006). It may also be that observers are particularly likely to hold victims responsible for doing their part when those observers are likely to be affected by the aftermath of the transgression (i.e., having to continue to work with both the offender and the victim together). Observers may also have different beliefs about responsibility depending on where the offender and victim sit in the organizational hierarchy. Future research should explore these issues to understand the role that responsibility assessments play in the reintegration process.

Implications for Reintegration in Organizations

Although restorative justice focuses on how transgressions affect all stakeholders (and provides ways in which all stakeholders can be involved in the justice process), it appears that the reactions and experiences of victims following a transgression carry much of the weight in influencing reintegration (at least in the eyes of their peers). Therefore, although it is important to recognize that victims are not the only relevant stakeholders (Goodstein & Aquino, 2010; Palanski, 2012), it is equally as important to appreciate the critical role that victims play in the restoration process.

However, the centrality of victims to reintegration does not mean that reintegration processes always serve to benefit victims. As the current research shows, victims can also suffer reintegrative consequences if they fail to play their role in the process of relationship repair. This victim centrality also does not mean that other stakeholders do not have an important role to play in the repair process. At the very least, members of the organizational community are likely to be instrumental in helping victims find the road to forgiving their offenders, such as by contributing to an organizational climate that facilitates and prioritizes forgiveness (Aquino et al., 2006; Tripp et al., 2007).

These findings suggest that organizations can facilitate reintegration following transgressions by providing avenues for victims to forgive their offenders and experience closure after the transgression. In the present research, we investigated one pathway to victim closure through the offender making appropriate amends. These results indicate that offenders need to do more than simply apologize for their actions. They must also take steps to right the wrongs that they have done (Walker, 2006; Zechmeister et al., 2004). However, there are additional means through which victims can forgive their offenders, such as choosing to forgive those who have wronged them even in the absence of the offender making amends. This act of forgiveness itself has been shown to have positive benefits for victims (e.g., Wenzel & Okimoto, 2010; Witvliet et al., 2008).

Although the offender making amends is likely to be important to many relevant organization stakeholders, victim forgiveness might not always follow. Even when the offender has made appropriate amends, granting forgiveness is not necessarily easy for a victim to do. Indeed, individuals can have difficulty forgiving someone who intentionally committed an offense against them (Exline, Baumeister, Zell, Kraft, & Witvliet, 2008; Struthers, Eaton, Santelli, Uchiyama, & Shirvani, 2008). The present findings suggest that this state of affairs is particularly hazardous for the reintegration of the victim. Even though victims might feel justified in withholding forgiveness (Zechmeister & Romero, 2002), they are likely to be faced with not only an unrepaired relationship with the offender, but a strained relationship with their organizational peers.

CONCLUSIONS

A restorative justice approach to resolving wrongdoing provides organizations with a blueprint for how to involve multiple stakeholders in the justice process following a transgression, and considers the multiple justice concerns that may arise following a transgression. Although such constructive approaches hold great promise for effectively managing transgressions that occur within an organization, it also brings additional perspectives (including that of peers) to the forefront, which adds complexity to the justice process. In particular, the importance of the peer perspective for reintegration presents a double-edged sword for victims: although their peers are likely to consider addressing their concerns as paramount, their refusal to accept appropriate amends has negative consequences for their own reintegration into the organizational fold.

APPENDIX A: STUDY 1 SCENARIO

Two of your coworkers, George and Jason, are part of a larger team at your organization. They are currently working together on a project.

One day, George is having lunch with some of your other co-workers who are also part of their team. Jason is not there.

At this lunch, George gossips about Jason to the other co-workers. George talks badly about Jason behind his back by saying, "I have to try not to laugh at the questions Jason asks about our project. It is like he is from another planet. Seriously, sometimes Jason can be a real idiot."

After this lunch, Jason finds out that George was speaking badly about him to other people at work.

Negative Consequences

The next day, there was a surprise organization-wide meeting in which all employees were asked to complete peer evaluations. Management uses these evaluations to help determine bonuses, raises, and promotions.

Based on what George said about Jason, your co-workers at that lunch rated Jason less positively than they would have otherwise.

Weak Amends

Later that week (after the peer evaluations were completed), George approaches Jason and says, "Jason, I shouldn't have said those things at that lunch. It was wrong of me. I am sorry."

George takes no further action to remedy the situation. He does not address the issue with the other team members who heard him talk badly about Jason.

Strong Amends

Later that week (after the peer evaluations were completed), George approaches Jason and says, "Jason, I shouldn't have said those things at that lunch. It was wrong of me. I am sorry."

George takes additional steps to remedy the situation. In a meeting with the other team members, he publicly states that Jason is a valuable asset to the team, and he goes out of his way to draw attention to Jason's contributions.

Does Not Forgive

After this, Jason says, "Thanks for apologizing, George. But I don't accept your apology. I do not forgive you for what you have done."

Forgives

After this, Jason says, "Thanks for apologizing, George. I accept your apology. I forgive you for what you have done."

APPENDIX B: STUDY 2 SCENARIO

Two of your coworkers, Joe and Nick, are working together on a project for a client.

In order to meet their client's deadline, Joe was responsible for submitting time-sensitive documents while Nick was out of the office working with another client. But Joe got distracted and did not submit the documents in time. Because Joe failed to submit the documents on time, they missed the deadline and submitted the project late.

Later, their boss called Joe and Nick into his office. The boss said to both of them, "I can't believe that you two missed the deadline! How could you let this happen? I am disappointed in both of you." Joe remained silent, and did not tell their boss that it was his fault, and not Nick's, that they missed the deadline.

Later that day, Joe approaches Nick and says, "Nick, I should have spoken up in the meeting with our boss and told him that it was completely my fault that we missed the deadline. That was wrong, and I should have said something. I am so sorry."

Weak Amends

Beyond apologizing to Nick, Joe does not take any additional steps to remedy the situation. Joe does not admit to their boss that it was completely his fault that they missed the deadline. Their boss does not know what has happened, and no further action is taken.

Strong Amends

Beyond apologizing to Nick, Joe takes additional steps to remedy the situation. Joe admits to their boss that it was completely his fault that they missed the deadline. Their boss knows what has happened, and no further action is taken.

Does Not Forgive

After hearing what Joe has to say, Nick says, "Thanks for apologizing Joe. But I don't accept your apology. I do not forgive you for what you have done."

Forgives

After hearing what Joe has to say, Nick says, "Thanks for apologizing Joe. I accept your apology. I forgive you for what you have done."

APPENDIX C: TABLES

Table 1: Participants' judgments based on the strength of offender amends, whether the victim forgave the offender, and the consequences of the transgression (Study 1).

	No Consequences				Negative Consequences			
	Weak Amends		Strong Amends		Weak Amends		Strong Amends	
	Does Not Forgive	Forgives	Does Not Forgive	Forgives	Does Not Forgive	Forgives	Does Not Forgive	Forgives
Offender Amends	4.53_{b} (1.28)	5.08_{c} (1.05)	5.78_{d} (0.76)	5.90_{d} (0.64)	4.00_{a} (1.43)	4.57_{b} (1.30)	5.66_{d} (0.94)	5.78_{d} (0.87)
Victim Forgiveness	1.45_{a} (0.89)	5.82_{b} (0.84)	1.25_{a} (1.63)	6.00_{b} (0.78)	1.31_{a} (0.50)	5.63_{b} (1.08)	1.40_{a} (0.83)	5.75_{b} (1.04)
Negative Consequences	4.85_{a} (1.43)	4.80_{a} (1.31)	4.80_{a} (1.25)	4.91_{a} (1.39)	5.76_{b} (0.99)	5.55_{b} (1.19)	5.99_{b} (1.02)	5.69_{b} (1.07)
Perceived Relationship Repair	2.50_{c} (0.99)	4.58_{e} (1.01)	$2.21_{b,c}$ (0.82)	5.11_{f} (0.97)	$2.10_{a,b}$ (0.82)	3.85_{d} (1.23)	1.92_{a} (0.71)	4.71_{e} (1.02)
Offender Liking	$2.59_{a,b}$ (1.30)	$2.92_{b,c}$ (1.22)	$3.06_{c,d}$ (1.11)	3.48_{d} (1.41)	2.19_{a} (0.88)	2.58_{b} (1.22)	$3.14_{c,d}$ (1.35)	$3.21_{c,d}$ (1.11)
Victim Liking	4.20_{b} (1.12)	4.99_{c} (1.09)	3.44_{a} (1.01)	4.83_{c} (1.06)	4.40_{b} (0.91)	4.95_{c} (1.15)	4.07_{b} (1.12)	4.76_{c} (0.99)
Offender Reintegration	2.37_{b} (1.32)	$2.64_{b,c}$ (1.35)	$2.81_{b,c}$ (1.38)	3.03_{c} (1.40)	1.89_{a} (0.84)	2.38_{b} (1.23)	2.43_{b} (1.33)	2.89_{c} (1.21)
Victim Reintegration	4.16_{b} (1.17)	4.67_{c} (1.27)	3.48_{a} (1.17)	4.92_{c} (1.15)	$4.26_{a,b}$ (1.12)	$4.58_{b,c}$ (1.38)	3.87_{a} (1.15)	$4.65_{b,c}$ (1.15)
Team Reintegration	3.23_{a} (2.65)	$5.18_{b,c}$ (3.11)	2.79_{a} (2.29)	$6.28_{c,d}$ (3.11)	2.98_{a} (2.26)	4.91_{b} (3.01)	2.61_{a} (1.98)	6.32_{d} (2.86)

Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Means within a row that do not share subscripts differ significantly from one another at $p < .05$, as indicated by planned Fisher's LSD comparisons.

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Table 2: Results of the regression analyses for each variable (Study 1).

	Offender Amends (Check)	Victim Forgiveness (Check)	Negative Consequences (Check)	Perceived Relationship Repair	Offender Liking	Victim Liking	Offender Re-integration	Victim Reinte-gration	Team Reinte-gration
Offender Amends	.50***	.01	.04	.07**	.26***	-.15***	.18***	-.07	.07
Victim For-giveness	.14***	.94***	-.04	.76***	.12**	.36***	.14**	.30***	.46***
Consequences	-.13**	-.02	.35***	-.15***	-.09*	.08	-.12**	.01	-.03
Amends x Forgive	-.09*	.02	.01	.15***	-.02	.08†	-.01	.13**	.14**
Amends x Consequences	.08*	.01	.03	.04	.05	.04	.02	.01	.02
Forgives x Consequences	.00	-.02	-.05	-.04	-.03	-.10*	.05	-.08†	.01
Amends x Forgives x Consequences	-.00	-.02	-.02	.02	-.04	-.05	.00	-.05	.01

Note: †$p = .05$, *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$. Values are standardized regression coefficients.

Table 3: Bootstrap coefficients and 95% confidence intervals of the indirect effects of amends and forgiveness on reintegration, through liking and relationship repair (Study 1).

Dependent Measure:		**Offender Reintegration**		
Mediator:		Offender Liking	Victim Liking	Relationship Repair
Offender Amends	B (SE) 95% CI	.24 (.04)* .15 to .32	.02 (.01)* .01 to .04	.02 (.01)* .01 to .05
Victim Forgiveness	B (SE) 95% CI	.11 (.04)* .04 to .19	-.05 (.02)* -.09 to -.02	.23 (.05)* .13 to .34
Dependent Measure:		**Victim Reintegration**		
Mediator:		**Offender Liking**	**Victim Liking**	**Relationship Repair**
Victim Forgiveness	B (SE) 95% CI	-.01 (.01) * -.04 to -.00	.31 (.04)* .23 to .39	.19 (.06)* .08 to .30
Amends x Forgive	B (SE) 95% CI	.00 (.01) -.01 to .02	.07 (.03)* .00 to .14	.04 (.01)* .01 to .07
Dependent Measure:		**Team Reintegration**		
Mediator:		**Offender Liking**	**Victim Liking**	**Relationship Repair**
Victim Forgiveness	B (SE) 95% CI	.09 (.04)* .03 to .17	.14 (.05)* .05 to .24	.95 (.15)* .65 to 1.23
Amends x Forgive	B (SE) 95% CI	-.02 (.03) -.09 to .04	.03 (.02)* .00 to .08	.18 (.04)* .11 to .29

Note: *$p < .05$, as indicated by 95% confidence intervals. B = unstandardized beta coefficients for the indirect effect. SE = standard error for the indirect effect. Tests of the indirect effects are only shown if there was a significant total effect of the predictor (see Table 2).

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Table 4: Participants' judgments based on the strength of offender amends and whether the victim forgave the offender (Study 2).

	Weak Amends			Strong Amends		
	Does Not Forgive	**No Information**	**Forgives**	**Does Not Forgive**	**No Information**	**Forgives**
Offender Amends	3.54_{a} (1.23)	3.39_{a} (1.41)	4.21_{b} (1.39)	6.16_{c} (0.90)	6.12_{c} (0.80)	6.27_{c} (1.02)
Victim Forgiveness	1.36_{a} (0.90)	3.69_{b} (1.52)	5.80_{d} (1.26)	1.35_{a} (0.94)	4.56_{c} (1.21)	6.08_{e} (1.07)
Perceived Relationship Repair	2.11_{a} (0.91)	3.36_{b} (1.36)	4.42_{c} (1.21)	2.22_{a} (1.03)	4.84_{d} (1.02)	5.29_{e} (1.17)
Offender Liking	2.77_{a} (1.08)	2.79_{a} (1.27)	3.31_{b} (1.39)	4.71_{c} (1.26)	4.78_{c} (1.19)	4.84_{c} (1.20)
Victim Liking	4.79_{b} (1.44)	4.92_{b} (0.99)	5.38_{c} (1.04)	3.36_{a} (1.27)	4.84_{b} (1.01)	5.54_{c} (1.17)
Offender Reintegration	1.69_{a} (0.86)	1.98_{a} (1.35)	2.53_{b} (1.26)	3.61_{c} (1.45)	3.71_{c} (1.54)	3.47_{c} (1.41)
Victim Reintegration	4.73_{b} (1.20)	4.95_{b} (1.31)	5.56_{c} (1.11)	3.68_{a} (1.33)	4.91_{b} (1.11)	5.33_{c} (1.25)
Team Reintegration	2.36_{a} (1.29)	3.10_{c} (1.40)	3.76_{d} (1.53)	2.74_{b} (1.40)	4.34_{e} (1.29)	4.31_{e} (1.38)
Victim Response Met Expectations	4.88_{c} (1.72)	--	3.80_{b} (1.38)	2.86_{a} (1.42)	--	4.85_{c} (1.36)

Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Means within a row that do not share subscripts differ significantly from one another at $p < .05$, as indicated by planned Fisher's LSD comparisons.

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Table 5: Results of the regression analyses for each variable (Study 2).

	Offender Amends (Check)	Victim Forgiveness (Check)	Perceived Relationship Repair	Offender Liking	Victim Liking	Offender Reintegration	Victim Reintegration	Team Reintegration
Offender Amends	.80***	.19***	.45***	.64***	-.03	.55***	-.01	.39***
Victim Does Not Forgive	.03	-.57***	-.54***	-.01	-.28***	-.06	-.25***	-.35***
Victim Forgives	.13***	.40***	.22***	.09**	.21***	.05	.18***	.10*
Amends x Does Not Forgive	-.02	-.11***	-.23***	-.01	-.29***	.04	-.21***	-.15**
Amends x Forgives	-.12**	-.06*	-.11**	-.09*	.05	-.15**	-.04	-.13**

Note: *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$. Values are standardized regression coefficients.

Table 6: Bootstrap coefficients and 95% confidence intervals of the indirect effects of amends and forgiveness on reintegration, through liking and relationship repair (Study 2).

Dependent Measure:		**Offender Reintegration**		
Mediator:		**Offender Liking**	**Victim Liking**	**Relationship Repair**
Offender Amends	B (SE) 95% CI	.52 (.05)* .44 to .62	.02 (.01)* .01 to .05	.13 (.02)* .09 to .17
Amends x Forgives	B (SE) 95% CI	-.13 (.07)* -.26 to -.00	-.01 (.01) -.04 to .00	-.09 (.03)* -.17 to -.03

Dependent Measure:		**Victim Reintegration**		
Mediator:		**Offender Liking**	**Victim Liking**	**Relationship Repair**
Victim Forgiveness	B (SE) 95% CI	-.03 (.02)* -.07 to -.01	.35 (.06)* .23 to .48	.13 (.04)* .07 to .22
Victim Non-Forgiveness	B (SE) 95% CI	.00 (.01) -.01 to .03	-.49 (.07)* -.63 to -.36	-.34 (.08)* -.52 to -.19
Amends x Non-Forgive	B (SE) 95% CI	.00 (.01) -.02 to .03	-.41 (.07)* -.54 to -.29	-.12 (.03)* -.20 to -.07

Dependent Measure:		**Team Reintegration**		
Mediator:		**Offender Liking**	**Victim Liking**	**Relationship Repair**
Offender Amends	B (SE) 95% CI	.25 (.04)* .17 to .33	-.04 (.01)* -.06 to -.02	.20 (.03)* .15 to .25
Victim Forgiveness	B (SE) 95% CI	.08 (.03)* .02 to .15	.10 (.03)* .04 to .16	.36 (.06)* .25 to .49
Victim Non-Forgiveness	B (SE) 95% CI	-.01 (.03) -.07 to .05	-.13 (.04)* -.21 to -.06	-.93 (.10)* -1.11 to -.74
Amends x Non-Forgive	B (SE) 95% CI	.00 (.03) -.06 to .05	-.11 (.03)* -.18 to -.05	-.33 (.06)* -.45 to -.23
Amends x Forgives	B (SE) 95% CI	-.06 (.03)* -.13 to -.00	.02 (.02) -.01 to .06	-.15 (.05)* -.25 to -.05

Note: *$p < .05$, as indicated by 95% confidence intervals. B = unstandardized beta coefficients for the indirect effect. SE = standard error for the indirect effect. The Forgives and Non-Forgive conditions are compared to the No Information condition. Tests of the indirect effects are only shown if there was a significant total effect of the predictor (see Table 5).

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NOTES

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1. We ran initial analyses of covariance on all of the dependent measures to determine whether our predicted results were dependent on whether participants were currently employed. All of the results discussed remain significant when controlling for employment status. This is true for both studies; employment status will thus not be discussed further.

2. We also asked participants to indicate how much they viewed the offender as exhibiting value reform ($\alpha = .90$) victim closure about the transgressions ($\alpha = .92$), and to what extent the harm was remedied by the offender's amends. Although patterns were consistent with theory, details of these variables are not reported for parsimony. Further details can be obtained by contacting the authors.

3. As with Study 1, we again measured offender value reform ($\alpha = .86$) and victim closure ($\alpha = .92$). We also assessed perceived goodness of the victim's and offender's character. These character measures yielded similar patterns to the measures of victim and offender likeability, and will not be discussed. Further details about these measures can be obtained by contacting the authors.

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