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ARTICLE

Keeping the “Recovered Territories”: Evolving Administrative Approaches Toward Indigenous Silesians

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Abstract

This article traces changes in Polish administrative approaches toward indigenous Upper Silesians in the 1960s and 1970s. By commissioning reports from voivodeship leaders in 1967, the Ministry of Internal Affairs recognized that native Silesians held reservations toward Poland and, moreover, that postwar “Polonization” efforts may have backfired. These officials further understood the need to act quickly against “disintegration” trends. Although administrators in Katowice and Opole noted that relatively few Silesians engaged in clearly anti-Polish activities, these leaders still believed that West German influence threatened their authority in Silesia. Increasing West German involvement in the area, particularly through care packages and tourism, seemed to support this conclusion. In response to fears of West German infiltration and the rise in emigration applications, local authorities sought to bolster a distinctly Silesian identity. Opole officials in particular argued that strengthening a regional identity, rather than a Polish one, could combat the “tendency toward disintegration” in Silesia. This policy shift underscored an even greater change in attitude toward the borderland population: instead of treating native Silesians as an innate threat to Polish sovereignty, as had been the case immediately after the war, the administration now viewed them as essential for maintaining authority in western Poland.

Keywords: Central Europe; ethnicity; minorities; national identity; Cold War

Introduction

“What percentage of teachers are of local [Silesian] origin? […] What are the locals’ main complaints in court? […] Are indigenous residents trying to change their names back to German spelling or pronunciation? […] Of the babies born in the area, how many of them are given German names?” These represent only a small sampling of questions that J. Rusiecki, head of the Social and Administrative Department in the Polish Ministry for Internal Affairs, (MSW) sent to regional officials in Upper Silesia in January 1967. The goal of the four-page questionnaire, to be completed by that March, was clear: to determine whether native Silesians had “[yielded] to revisionist propaganda” from West Germany and if they were likely to emigrate as a result. After gathering this data on regional trends, the Warsaw authorities would initiate a plan to “[deepen] the integration process” in the borderland and thereby keep the indigenous or autochthonous Upper Silesian population in place (Kulczycki 2016, 293–294).[1]

Rusiecki’s information request about Upper Silesian integration reflected a sense of uneasiness within the Ministry of Internal Affairs about the region’s loyalty. These concerns had a historical basis. Located in the so-called “Recovered Territories,” much of Silesia had belonged to Germany before the 1945 Potsdam Agreement “placed them under ‘Polish administration’ until a future peace conference took place” (Service 2013, 52). In Lower Silesia, a predominantly Protestant region, most prewar residents were expelled to Germany in the postwar years. In Upper Silesia,

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however, the population was overwhelmingly Catholic. Even more importantly, the Upper Silesians spoke or at least understood the Slavonic Polish dialect, which closely resembled the official Polish language (Karch 2018, 3). Consequently, most people were deemed "Polish" enough to stay.[2] Economic considerations also factored into the decision to let most Upper Silesians remain, for the native residents provided the skilled workforce needed to maintain this industrialized, mine-dotted region (Polak-Springer 2015, 189). Yet even with these religious and economic considerations, the Polish authorities were not fully convinced they could trust the Upper Silesians. Were the locals now loyal to the Polish state, or were they secretly hoping for the area's eventual reunification with Germany?

These fears underpinned the 1967 survey; however, the responses from Opole voivode leaders Maksymilian Zygiert, Stanisław Wdowiak, and Bonifacy Bryś initially suggested that most Upper Silesians had successfully adapted to the new Polish majority. Although their report was likely designed to present their work in the best possible light, they did include data to support their conclusions. For instance, in 1964 and 1965 only a handful of babies received German names. The highest instance was recorded in Krapkowice, where 32 of the 710 babies in 1964 and 39 of 791 babies in 1965 received German names.[3] Most children beginning school in Upper Silesia already spoke Polish fluently, indicating a decline in German usage within the home. Furthermore, the number of so-called "enemy actions," such as denouncing the Oder-Neisse Line, had also declined in recent years. In the eyes of the Opole leadership, these trends showed that Upper Silesia was well on its way to becoming a fully integrated Polish territory.

Yet despite these positive observations, the three leaders identified one potential rub: although the Upper Silesians appeared to be moving toward Polishness, their historical ties to Germany made them vulnerable to destabilizing influences from the West or, worse, to a reawakened German identity. In particular, the Opole administrators warned that the Upper Silesians' external adaptation might mask a deeper internal tendency toward German nationalism. West German expellee organizations or *Landsmannschaften* posed a real threat to the region's outward stability, especially as they doggedly promoted the so-called "Germanness of Silesia," both in the Federal Republic and among the indigenous population. Expellee propaganda supported "self-determination" and the "right of indigenous residents to 'their' fatherland," particularly through migration to West Germany or via the revocation of the Oder-Neisse Line.[4] In view of this threat, the Opole leaders proposed a series of "countermeasures" to keep the potential rise of Germanness at bay. They further urged Rusiecki to take immediate steps toward coordinating with Polish institutions "to fight the manifestations of West German revisionism" in Upper Silesia and elsewhere.[5] The recommendations thus boiled down to one core aim: bolstering a local Silesian identity to counteract a dangerous and unwanted German identity. By winning the Silesians' loyalty, the MSW and local leadership could protect the population from external influences and further "disintegration."

The question remains, however, as to why the MSW cared so much about the indigenous Silesian population. Why were they willing to invest critical energy and resources into crafting a policy designed to make these people feel at home? Moreover, why did they consider making such a sharp break with the notion of Upper Silesia's inherent Polishness—a concept that had, to date, underpinned the policies in the so-called "Recovered Territories"?

Finally, what prompted them to favor cultivating a regional identity in an area so long claimed by competing nationalist agendas?

This article unpacks this puzzle and, in the process, offers insights about administrative assumptions regarding nationality, identity, and West German influences in 1960s Poland. The argument is threefold. First, by commissioning the 1967 investigation, the Ministry of Internal Affairs recognized that postwar "Polonization" efforts in Upper Silesia may have backfired. Righting the situation and winning over the Silesians would require government agencies to work together, and quickly. Secondly, although few Upper Silesians were engaging in openly anti-Polish activities by the late 1960s, Katowice and Opole administrators nonetheless *believed* that (West)

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German influences, particularly through expellees, threatened Polish control over the area (Dziurok and Dziuba 2003, 278–280).[6] Lastly, the officials concluded that bolstering a *distinctly Silesian identity*, in contrast to the "re-Polonization" efforts of the postwar era, offered the best chance of counteracting the "tendency toward disintegration" in Upper Silesia. The importance of this shift cannot be overstated. Instead of interpreting ethnic ambiguity or "Silesianness" as an inherent threat to Polish authority, the administrators now viewed this indigenous heritage as an asset to be leveraged. If the people could be encouraged to embrace their Silesian identity, perhaps they would resist expellee influences and not "succumb to [the] revisionist propaganda" that threatened to infiltrate the region.[7]

Postwar Silesia and Its Discontents

Although the Polish officials may not have used the term "national indifference" in their questionnaire, their concerns about Upper Silesia stemmed at least partially from the region's history of ethnic ambiguity. As scholars have shown, Central European borderlands like Upper Silesia were more characterized by ambivalence, rather than strong nationalist feelings, from the mid-19th century to the mid-20th century (Judson 2006; Bjork 2008; King 2002; Zahra 2008; Zahra 2010). According to this framing, most Central Europeans aligned more strongly with regional, local, and religious identities than with abstract ideas of the nation. The presence of national indifference, which played out repeatedly in local resistance to or vacillating between clear national identifications, had long frustrated the nationalizing efforts of the German, Czech, Austrian, and Polish states in border areas like Upper Silesia. Lacking a strong sense of national identity but faced with pressure to pick a clear side, borderland residents made practical decisions about their national status. Despite these pragmatic choices, however, most prewar residents of Upper Silesia "regarded themselves as neither Germans nor Poles," and instead "exhibited a collective consciousness which was rooted in the region, town or village in which they lived" (Service 2013, 177).

Attempts to eradicate the region's national indifference became a recurring theme in Silesia's early 20th-century history. The 1921 Silesian plebiscite, Nazi-initiated *Volksliste* usage during World War II, and the Polish state's "re-Polonization" program in the postwar years all shared the common assumption that Silesians were either German or Polish and needed to identify clearly as such. National indifference or regional identities had no place in this postwar "exclusivist Polish nationalism" which "assumed a sharp dichotomy between a German and Polish national self-understanding" (Klusmeyer and Papademetriou 2009, 71; Linek 2000, 133). Moreover, the Polish state assumed that Upper Silesians were truly Polish at their core. The mandatory re-Polonization classes, with their language and cultural curriculum, were designed to confirm this reality and draw out the population's latent but genuine Polish identity.

Proving the Silesians' Polishness was not simply a matter of improving the region's cultural homogeneity; Polish authorities also believed the territory's future was at stake. Although Upper Silesia belonged to Poland after the Potsdam Agreement, the new border was technically still provisional, pending a final peace treaty. Thus, if the international community ever changed its mind about the legitimacy of the Oder-Neisse Line, Poland would likely lose Upper Silesia. However, if it could be shown that native Upper Silesians were inherently "Polish," the case for maintaining control of the region would become that much stronger. As Peter Polak-Springer (2015, 186) explains, "Fearing that the international community could still revise the [Oder-Neisse] border in Germany's favor," Polish activists "used these autochthons as diplomatic capital to defend Poland's 'right' to western Upper Silesia and the rest of the western territories." Accordingly, this diplomacy-based logic underpinned the decision to let most Upper Silesians remain in place. In the end, only 200,000 Upper Silesians were forced to leave, while more than 1.33 million prewar residents were permitted to remain (Polak-Springer 2015, 186, 189). In sum, the diplomatic and ideological significance of the Upper Silesians made it possible for them to stay; however, this

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privilege came at a price: these native residents *needed to become Polish*, for the sake of both the Recovered Territories and all of Poland (Strauchold 2017, 158).[8]

This need to prove the region's Polishness dictated many of the postwar policies in Upper Silesia. Starting in 1945, the regional government banned German language usage in public and in private; people who failed to comply faced fines or internment in labor camps (Polak-Springer 2015, 209). Polish names replaced the original German versions on street signs and storefronts. The names of German people were also "Polonized" (Kulczycki 2016, 233–236; Service 2013, 251–257; Linek 1997, 143–168). Richard became Ryszard; Peter, Piotr; Agnes, Agnieszka. For people with names that had no Polish equivalent, officials chose entirely different names at their own discretion.[9] For example, Wolfgang became Franciszek (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, September 15, 1976). The deceased were not even exempt, as German tombstone inscriptions were systematically removed (Linek 2000, 140–141). New labor regulations required adult Silesians to attend "re-Polonization" courses if they wanted to keep their jobs; these classes combined language lessons with cultural instruction to instill a sense of Polish national pride (Polak-Springer 2015, 209–216; Service 2013; Karch 2018; Kulczycki 2016). Re-Polonization policies even extended to land and property. In March 1946, lawmakers made it legal to seize indigenous property and redistribute it to newcomers from eastern Poland (Kamusella and Sullivan 1999, 169–182).[10] In all these ways, the People's Republic of Poland sought to claim the language, land, and people of Upper Silesia as its own (Karch 2018, 269–270). The need to bolster support for Poland's new Communist leadership further influenced this "ethno-national homogenization" policy. To achieve more acceptance by Polish society, the "Moscow-backed Communist government" in Warsaw opted "to embrace key aspects of [the] ethno-nationalist ideology," including the "verification" and re-Polonization processes (Service 2010, 655).

The challenge of handling the remnant of a population potentially slated for expulsion was not unique to Poland. After World War II, the Czechoslovak government needed to decide how to handle the country's remaining Hungarians (McDermott 2015, 45).[11] Like Poland, Romania also had a substantial number of Germans left in the Bukovina region (Ohlinger and Munz 2002, 53–54). Poland, however, dealt with the resettlement and integration of its eastern population after a substantial portion of formerly Polish territory was allotted to postwar Ukraine. Although most newcomers landed in Lower Silesia, where the mass expulsion of Germans had left a gaping demographic void, many still settled in Upper Silesia. In fact, by 1946, these immigrants comprised 40% of the population in the western part of the region (Polak-Springer 2015, 187). While in some towns newcomers and natives managed to get along (or, at the least, ignore one another), encounters between the two groups often went poorly (Karch 2018, 289). To the immigrants, the Silesians appeared to be "contaminated by German influences," while to Silesians, the "repatriates from beyond the Bug [River]" seemed to be "dirty and lazy, [and] inclined to steal." [12] Their long contact with the East made the newcomers seem "Russian." In the Silesians' eyes, they "[possessed] few features of Polishness."[13] Desperate postwar circumstances in the Recovered Territories exacerbated intergroup tensions and strengthened these stereotypes, particularly as residents competed for limited resources (Karch 2018, 288–289). Seeing newcomers placed in positions of regional authority rankled Silesian nerves even further and fueled the feeling that they were now strangers in their own homes (Polak-Springer 2015, 234). Significantly, these encounters "strengthened [the locals'] feelings of regional distinctiveness" (Service 2010, 677). Many began referring to themselves as Silesians and the newcomers as Poles, as they further "[emphasized] their separate identity."[14]

While the de-Germanization policies and the influx of people from eastern Poland indeed made the region look and sound more Polish, these developments did little to win the loyalty of the area's native population. Indeed, instead of bringing Upper Silesians into the Polish fold, these changes prompted many residents to retreat into what Brendan Karch (2018, 290) has called an "internal exile, with old familial and friend networks reestablished among an Upper Silesian diaspora." Although officials and researchers noticed the "natives' self-exclusion" in the early 1950s and

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worried about their failure to integrate them, they "were hamstrung by politicized mythmaking into assuming the essential Polishness of this population" (Karch 2018, 290–291). The very ideology that made it necessary to claim and integrate the Upper Silesians as Polish had rendered it impossible to respond effectively to the real challenges these individuals faced. In the words of Hugo Service (2010, 676), "far from culturally re-Polonizing the prewar population, these policies of de-Germanization and re-Polonization positively alienated the prewar residents of western Upper Silesia" (Service 2010, 676). Indeed, the efforts to bring the locals into the Polish community had actually precipitated their exclusion.

The situation for native Silesians improved slightly during the 1950s, as Stalin's death in 1953 and Władysław Gomułka's appointment as First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) in 1956 brought a temporary "thaw" across Poland. These developments directly affected the Upper Silesians. Notably, the "formerly taboo topic of German and autochthon discontent could now join a panoply of other issues to be publicly debated (within limits)" (Karch 2018, 291). While the January 1951 Law on Polish Citizenship had "eliminated the requirement of Polish nationality as a qualification for citizenship," thereby making it easier for indigenous residents to become citizens, the state took this a step further in 1956 by enacting the "Decree of the State Council" (*Uchwały Rady Państwa*) Number 37/56 (Kulczycki 2016, 4). This unpublished law shifted the process by which "German" populations received Polish citizenship and identity documents.[15] Among other things, Decree 37/56 had enabled people emigrating to West Germany to forfeit their Polish citizenship more easily, while also regulating travel documents and passports for people seeking permanent stays in West Germany, particularly through the Red Cross Family Reunification agreement (Góralski 2006, 339). In theory, this law also guaranteed and protected the emigrants' rights.[16] In November 1956, the Communist government in Opole even officially acknowledged the existence of a German minority in western Upper Silesia—a step that would have seemed impossible only a few years prior (Kulczycki 2016, 291). Between 1956 and 1957, 800 people had their original German names legally restored. In April 1957, Polish authorities even granted permission to establish a "German Social-Cultural Association" with headquarters in Wałbrzych/Waldenburg in Lower Silesia. However, because most Germans had been expelled from the region after the war, the group never reached more than 600 members.[17]

The thaw also opened the way toward emigration and emigration-related changes for self-described Germans in Poland. In November 1955, the German and Polish Red Crosses established a "Family Reunification" program.[18] As the name suggested, the program's goal was to reconnect families that had been separated across national boundaries because of World War II. After receiving permission from their respective country, people would relocate to join their relatives. Although the program was bidirectional in theory, most migration went from East to West; the few thousand who moved to Poland were men returning to their wives and children (Karch 2018, 291).[19] The response to the program was overwhelming. Between 1956 and 1959, more than 230,000 people left Poland for West Germany; approximately 49,000 of them hailed from Upper Silesia. While this figure may seem small—49,000 people equaled about 20% of the total emigrants from Poland during these years—the relatively high concentration of departures from Upper Silesia remains significant. About 6,100 of these émigrés came from the city Opole, while a further 7,100 left from the surrounding area. According to Karch (2018, 291), these numbers meant that departures from Opole fell "among the highest proportions [of emigration] of anywhere in Poland" (Karch 2018, 291; Madajczyk 2001, 230).

The Polish state thus treated the program as a "release valve" for discontented autochthons in what basically "amounted to an exit door westward for the native population" (Karch 2018, 291). Rather than fixing the problems in Silesia or working to integrate the population better, the Polish authorities opted to export the problematic people. In April 1957, the Communist Party started granting emigration permission to "advocates of revisionism, [who had been] consciously stirring up departure tendencies among the Polish autochthonous [indigenous] population" (Karch 2018, 291). Approximately 10,000 of the 70,000 indigenous persons attempting to emigrate repeatedly

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emphasized their Germanness despite being Polish citizens; 259 of them had been labeled as "advocates of revisionism" by the MSW (Kulczycki 2016, 297). According to John Kulczycki (2016, 297), Polish authorities saw family reunification as the perfect chance to remove these destabilizers and thereby consolidate the state's power. Having identified the troublemakers, Polish authorities took family reunification as "the occasion to get rid of them" (Kulczycki 2016, 297). Warsaw also used the program as an excuse to restructure the area's demographic makeup. As Dariusz Stola (2015, 102) explains, the family reunification program offered an opportunity to "rid the country of the elderly, sick, or otherwise unproductive Germans in the Western Territories." In these ways, the state leveraged the emigration agreement to make Upper Silesia even more profitable and "Polish."

Yet not all residents with ties to West Germany opted—or were encouraged—to leave Poland during these years. Isolated pockets of "Germanness" persisted across the region as a result. Especially in rural communities, which had largely remained intact after the war, people continued to speak German with one another and maintain their own German identity, despite laws to the contrary. Ryszard Donitza, a native from near Gogolin, recounted how as a boy he only conversed in German with the village priest, who "spoke Polish only weakly" because he had first learned it as an adult. Like many older Germans, this priest eventually emigrated to the Federal Republic. Even for those people who mastered Polish, German remained the mother tongue; German words and phrases often slipped out. In stores, for instance, clerks still counted (perhaps subconsciously) in German when tallying receipts. Thus, whether as a means of resistance or a matter of necessity, "German always remained alive" in Upper Silesian villages (Donitza 2017).

In sum, although the Polish state tried to use the family reunification program to encourage decidedly German individuals to leave, many German-leaning communities remained intact. As time went on, authorities began to wonder about the program's long-term effects on these areas. What had this wide-scale emigration meant for the Recovered Territories, both demographically and ideologically? Had the most clearly anti-Polish Silesians indeed left the country? If so, did this mean that the hoped-for "integration" of Silesia had finally taken place? Or did the 1950s emigration signal a greater problem, namely that Silesians felt displaced in their own region—and, even more significantly—that they still did not *feel* Polish? If this were the case, then what could the Polish state do about it? The growing number of West German tourists—many of whom were expellees returning to visit their lost *Heimat*—seemed to confirm their rising suspicions (Demshuk 2011, 79–99). Yet what exactly should be done about the potential "revisionism" remained to be seen. The 1967 inquiry stemmed from the desire to find a solution for Upper Silesia.

Stabilized or on the Brink of Collapse? Evaluating Upper Silesia in the 1960s

By initiating the 1967 report, Rusiecki and the MSW acknowledged that something had gone awry with the indigenous population in Upper Silesia. "Based on information from offices of internal affairs and our own data in the Social Administration of the Interior Ministry," Rusiecki's inquiry began, "it is claimed that in some regions there has been increased evidence of the disintegration of the population of local origin."[20] Attempting to emigrate to the Federal Republic, applying for pensions from West Germany, and trying to change legal names back to the original German were all causes for concern, for these trends suggested that "disintegration"—understood as the opposite of "integration"—was occurring among Upper Silesia's native residents. Hoping to identify the scope and breadth of these problems, Rusiecki requested the voivodeships' statistics and qualitative data from 1965 and 1966. These reports would provide material for a March 1967 strategy meeting aimed at counteracting "disintegration" trends and "deepening the integration process" in the region.[21]

Before an analysis of the regional responses, it would be helpful to examine the types of questions that the Ministry of Internal Affairs posed. The inquiry provides a valuable window into how the Polish government understood the concept of "integration." Much of the questionnaire boiled down to socioeconomics and demography, such as whether indigenous residents were clustered in

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specific geographical areas. The officials were also curious about if the local population owned real estate and whether the legal situation with this property was in order. They had questions about schooling and education, for example, how many teachers came from the native population and in which subject areas they taught. The final question in this section focused on interactions between indigenous Silesians and "immigrants" (*ludność napływowa*) from central and eastern Poland. Did the groups ever mix and, if so, what form did these social interactions take? With initial questions like these, Rusiecki aimed to establish some baseline facts about the local population.

Moving beyond demography, the next set of questions focused on the population's *subjective experiences* in Poland and their ongoing *connections to West Germany*. Rusiecki hoped to establish, for example, what kinds of complaints the native Silesians had formally raised at the County National Council (PRN) and to which officials they had directed these concerns. The Ministry also sought to verify whether there was evidence of discrimination against the local people and what actions, if any, local administrators had taken to address these problems. Lastly, and most importantly, Rusiecki homed in on Silesians' ties to West Germany and exposure to its "revisionist propaganda." Rusiecki asked how many care packages and letters native Silesians received each year and about Silesians' interactions with West German tourists. For example, when these visitors made anti-Polish statements or distributed pro-German brochures, how did Silesians respond?[22]

At their core, Rusiecki's questions boiled down to one main purpose: to ascertain whether native Silesians had "[succumbed] to revisionist propaganda" and, if so, to what extent. This "succumbing" could manifest itself in myriad overt ways, including returning to German pronunciation and spelling, giving newborns German-sounding names, or declaring German nationality on conscription forms. However, revisionism could also take more subtle forms. Continuing to keep church records in German, for example, could be interpreted as "revisionist," as could constructing tombstones with German-language epitaphs. Other revisionist behavior could be anonymous but equally insidious, such as when Silesians cared (often in secret) for Nazi-era graves, German-era monuments, and World War I memorials. Possibilities of "succumbing" were virtually limitless, and Rusiecki hoped to discover to what degree the so-called "revisionist propaganda" had infiltrated the Silesians' everyday attitudes and lives.[23]

Opole voivode leaders Zygiert, Wdowiak, and Bryś responded quickly with the requested information. While their conclusions cannot be taken at face value—after all, these officials undoubtedly wanted to present Warsaw with a flattering picture of their work—they did include some statistics to back up their claims of Silesian integration. They noted, for example, that only a handful of parents each year sought to give their newborns German names. Even though the authorities acknowledged that this trend had revisionist roots—by using such names, Silesian parents "want[ed] to emphasize their loyalty to German ideals" which were being "strengthened by pervasive revisionist slogans" [24]—incidents of this kind remained few. Tellingly, even though 1964 and 1965 showed the highest numbers of newborns given unambiguously German first names, the total still only amounted to 146 babies out of 2,760 births—slightly more than five percent.[25] The officials further pointed out that most children and youth were now fluent in Polish, which indicated that fewer parents were speaking German in the home. Moreover, preschool teachers had reported that their pupils started school already using Polish, thus suggesting that, within the younger generation, German was disappearing as the natural mother tongue.

Still, it is telling that in the midst of generally their positive report, the officials recognized that some indigenous Silesians were clearly not content in their postwar homeland. According to the authorities, the most common evidence of frustration came in the form of "insulting the Polish nation," with 65 incidents occurring in 1965 and 45 in 1966. The second most frequent was "preaching fascism," with 22 recorded incidents in 1965 and 31 in 1966. Overall, though, the number of "enemy actions" recorded each year remained quite small. In 1965, there had been 100 cases reported in the voivodeship; in 1966, the number dropped to 92. The document further noted that the "intensity of [enemy] activity" corresponded clearly with changes in diplomatic

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relations, as well as the "concrete political and economic situation in West Germany," rather than being connected to any missteps by the Polish authorities.[26]

Some actions were intentionally revisionist, even if they remained relatively rare. For example, the Katowice Security Service (SB) considered "organizing [illegal] hostile political groups" to be "one of the most dangerous […] anti-Polish activities."[27] Such groups had apparently popped up in Chorzów, Gliwice, and Bytom—all within the Katowice voivodeship—during the early 1960s. However, since the Security Service could not find any concrete proof of their existence, the agents concluded that such groups were "not a mass phenomenon."[28] A few more troubling "revisionist activities" had also occurred, some with potentially terrorist underpinnings. For example, a 51-year-old man in Gliwice attempted to use his West German and U.S. connections to procure explosives. He had allegedly planned to blow up the People's Tribune (*Trybuna Ludu*) newspaper headquarters in Warsaw and was sentenced to six years in prison as a result.[29] In 1965, a 32-year-old man received the same sentence, this time for conspiring with a pro-Nazi newspaper in West Germany to implement "wide anti-Polish activity."[30]

Alarming though these cases were, the Security Service agents in Katowice did not seem particularly worried. According to their logic, engaging in subversive, anti-Polish behavior remained too dangerous and risky to become a widespread issue. Specifically, the "fear of large personal losses," likely including significant prison time, prevented people from engaging in blatantly revisionist activities. As a result, while isolated individuals certainly made threats and conspired against the Polish state, this phenomenon never gained a "mass character." Voivodeship administrators in neighboring Opole drew similar conclusions. Although the region had a handful of anti-Polish/pro-German activists, they seemed to work independently and with very little impact.[31] While public displays of anti-Polishness were certainly not desirable, the officials were not particularly worried about them. Like the Katowice Security Service, they interpreted these actions as isolated incidents. By and large, Opole's administrators concluded that revisionist behaviors were declining and that integration in Silesia had proceeded smoothly.

Recommended "Countermeasures" for Upper Silesia

Yet the voivode leaders also included some recommendations for improvement. These cultural and structural "countermeasures" were designed to undermine any remaining German influences while reaffirming the area as Polish. Cultural programs, especially public lectures and regional tourism, formed the core of their first recommendations. According to the officials, the Silesian Institute's branches in Katowice and Opole had already proven the value of hosting educational events about "the Polishness of the Silesian territory." Most notably, the Institute had sponsored 80 public lectures in 1966 to commemorate the thousand-year anniversary of "Poland's baptism" or its conversion to Christianity (Ramet 2017).[32] Smaller regional associations had also found success in hosting similar events and collecting artifacts and documents that revealed "the historical truth about the land's Polishness."[33]

Travel and tourism comprised the second key cultural component. The Polish Tourist and Sightseeing Society (*Polskie Towarzystwo Turystyczno-Krajoznawcze* or PTTK) led excursions to historical sites in Silesia that revealed the region's "connections to the Polish past."[34] One trip featured the Piast tower in Opole's town square, while another visited Paczków, whose medieval walls had earned it the nickname "The Polish Carcassonne." Other destinations such as St. Anne's Mountain (*Annaberg/Góra Świętej Anny*), however, served the dual function of emphasizing Polish historical events while simultaneously overwriting the German past.[35] Already an established Catholic pilgrimage destination with its Franciscan monastery, basilica, and chapels, the town had attained Polish national significance with the Third Silesian Uprising in 1921. In the 1930s, the Poles commemorated this event with a colossal monument; Communist authorities rededicated the site in 1955. Yet the Germans also possessed their own nationalist ties to the space. During World War II, the Nazis built a separate monument to the 1921 Uprising's "Battle of Annaberg," where the

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German paramilitary Free Corps (*Freikorps*) troops defeated the Polish forces. The Nazis additionally constructed a massive outdoor amphitheater which could accommodate rallies of up to 120,000 people (Bjork and Gerwarth 2007, 372–400). By organizing trips to St. Anne's Mountain, the PTTK sent a clear message: the area and its history were indelibly Polish. Although the archival record does not specify how many native Silesians went on these trips, the lectures and excursions were both designed to highlight historical links between the Polish and Upper Silesian past. Indeed, that the Opole officials deliberately included these PTTK trips in their list of "countermeasures" shows that these excursions were planned with indigenous Silesians in mind.

The second set of recommendations aimed to improve indigenous connections to Poland through bureaucratic and structural changes. First, the Opole leaders suggested fixing the native population's relationship with the local government. Although each town had an administrator responsible for the needs and concerns of indigenous Silesians, the position was usually treated as a bureaucratic entry point. As a result, the individuals who held this position were usually young and inexperienced. They rarely possessed the background knowledge or expertise to handle autochthon needs effectively, and they seldom stayed in the post long enough to make any meaningful changes.[36] Secondly, Opole officials advocated for a more streamlined process for handling name-change requests. They pointed out that, in the absence of clear guidelines, local ID offices made haphazard, case-by-case decisions when Silesians applied to regain their original German names. Along these lines, the leaders requested greater cooperation between the Silesian Institute and the Communist Party. Specifically, they asked that research about the indigenous population be made available to voivodeship branches of the Ministry for Internal Affairs (WUSW), in order to direct their activities more effectively toward native Silesians in each town. Additionally, they recommended paying closer attention to challenges specific to the autochthonous population, so authorities could better address their needs.[37]

The last cultural suggestions involved a more thorough de-Germanization of the landscape. The authorities argued that, despite earlier purges of signs and inscriptions, "traces of Germanness" persisted in Upper Silesia, including almost 180 "German-era" World War I monuments in the Opole voivodeship alone.[38] Even though demolition would be expensive, the ideological gain from removing physical markers of German history would be worthwhile.[39] The officials' last structural recommendation was even more extreme. Leaders called for removing the remaining graves of German soldiers. Officials contended that, these Germans, though deceased, had created a physical and emotional connection to West Germany—a connection that continued to endure even two decades after the war's end. Moreover, these graves had tangible effects on locals' ties to West Germany; people from the Federal Republic frequently paid Silesian residents to care for the graves. Unless the headstones were removed and the soldiers exhumed, the spatial bond with West Germany would remain permanently strong. Eliminating the graves was the only solution.[40] In sum, by making structural changes, both in bureaucratic organization and in the physical landscape, authorities hoped to stop Upper Silesians from further "succumbing to revisionist propaganda" from West Germany.[41]

Warnings about Western Influences

Both the MSW investigation and the Opole response were predicated on the assumption that "revisionist propaganda" from West Germany had reached the Upper Silesians. Yet was there actually "revisionist propaganda" from West Germany, or were the officials' fears simply the product of Cold War-era paranoia? On one hand, evidence suggests that their concerns may have been a bit overblown.[42] After all, aside from the more extreme expellee circles, by 1967 few leading or mainstream German politicians still called for revoking the Oder-Neisse Line. Furthermore, administrators in Zabrze, a city in the Katowice voivodeship, did not believe that expellee-related "revisionist activities" were increasing. Even as late as 1972, the Zabrze leadership held that "no evidence was found that [expellee organizations] had given inspiration for the hostile activity" in the

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area.[43] While they recognized that their city had witnessed a "rapid increase in external manifestations of West German revisionism" after 1956, and that some instigators had allegedly participated in *Landsmannschaft* meetings in Essen, Zabrze's "Twin City" (*Patenstadt*), they did not think expellees were to blame.[44]

The Opole leaders had largely dismissed similar "revisionist activities" in their 1967 analysis. They pointed out that most people accused of "preaching fascism" or "writing propaganda" were students or youth; these young people presumably had minimal exposure to West Germany and no memory of living within German borders. As a result, the Opole officials dismissed the crimes as either being "inadvertent" (*nieświadome*) or the product of peer pressure; the youths "were not guided by their own political convictions."[45] In other words, while these young people might have struggled to resist negative social influences, they were not actively seeking to undermine the Polish nation.[46]

Yet even though Zabrze's leadership was not worried, the fact remained that expellees *did* have substantially more contact with Upper Silesians during the 1960s than previously. While these interactions most often came through care packages, a growing number of expellees had started coming as tourists, hoping not only to visit important sites but also to spend time with "Germans" still living there.[47] Along these lines, Opole officials considered care packages and material aid from West Germany as sources of legitimate revisionist threats, citing deliberate changes in the strategies of expellee organizations. They contended that expellee groups had started recruiting members to pose as relatives and send packages to vulnerable Upper Silesians. In their estimation, this material aid aimed to strengthen autochthonous ties with West Germany, and in some cases, the packages contained clearly anti-Polish propaganda.[48] Under the guise of material support, the West Germans thus sought to infiltrate the region with revisionist ideas.

The Security Service in Katowice shared the Opole officials' fears regarding the emergent German influence in the region. In 1963, agents had noticed that "pseudo-charitable organizations" from West Germany had started sending more mail to local-origin people in their area. Over the next few years, the number of care packages continued to multiply; by 1967, indigenous people in the Katowice region received 300,000 packages from West Germany annually.[49] Like the Opolans, the Katowice agents believed the aid had political or revisionist underpinnings. Specifically, they thought that the Silesian *Landsmannschaft* was "seeking to create a broad base of people who support West German politics [and uphold] the impermanence of the western Polish [postwar] border."[50] The agents further contended that expellees aimed to subvert the stability of Silesia by "sowing confusion and [a sense of] disbelief in the integration of the Silesian people into Poland."[51] The conclusion of their Security Service analysis connected the material help and revisionist goals even more explicitly, stating that "this aid is one form of influencing the local population, in order to maintain the spirit of revenge or retaliation among people who advocate for the German nationality."[52] In sum, the expellees' ostensibly charitable actions carried a potentially serious threat, both to Upper Silesian stability and to Polish territorial sovereignty as a whole.

West German visitors to Upper Silesia compounded the problem further. Even before the 1970 Warsaw Treaty had simplified the process of traveling to Poland, expellees had already found ways to visit and remain connected to their former homeland (Demshuk 2012, 185–231).[53] Although it is difficult to say how many expellees visited Silesia during the 1960s, the Security Service diligently tracked the growing "homesick tourists" (*Heimwehtouristen*) phenomenon and its effect on the indigenous population. For example, Dorota Bijas and Elżbieta Stanowska, a mother-daughter pair with German nationality and Polish citizenship, attracted significant attention in 1965 when they began receiving packages from non-relatives in West Germany. Bijas then began hosting non-family visitors from West Germany, thereby raising even greater suspicion. Around this time, the pair helped organize the Brzeg-Goslar "Twin City" (*Patenstadt*).[54] These activities, along with poems supposedly expressing loyalty to West Germany, earned Stanowska a year-long jail sentence.[55] From the perspective of the Katowice Security Service, the care packages from non-

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relatives, the visits from unknown West Germans, and the "Twin City" involvement all confirmed that Stanowska had "succumbed to revisionism."

While the Opole officials did not directly reference the Bijas/Stanowska case in their report, their conclusions aligned with those of the Katowice Security Service agents. In their view, expellee organizations from West Germany were responsible for the "disintegration" taking place in Upper Silesia.[56] In addition to the "pseudo-charitable" aid and the visits from individual West Germans, the expellee *Landsmannschaften* appeared to be spreading explicitly anti-Polish propaganda across Silesia. Specifically, these groups had been "using radio and press [to] deepen and disseminate knowledge about German Silesia," as well as taking steps to "preserve and develop the Silesia spirit, habits, and customs."[57] Occasionally, tourists from West Germany even used their visits to stir up resistance against Polish control. For example, a man named Norbert Gawlytta apparently stayed in Krapkowice for two weeks in August 1964.[58] During that time, the 28-year-old contacted approximately 30 Polish citizens and urged them to leave for West Germany. Based on stories like these, the Opolans concluded that cooperation among administrative bodies offered the only means for combatting these subversive external influences:

> Experience of working with the native population indicates the need to actively involve all bodies of the [government] to fight the manifestations of West German revisionism [for] this work requires proper coordination […] with other organs and institutions involved in combating expressions of German revisionism.[59]

Although the voivodeship leaders made a number of concrete suggestions about how to combat residual Germanness, it is difficult to determine whether Rusiecki and the MSW acted on the voivodeship leaders' recommendations; the archival record does not show conclusively if the measures were implemented or not. What is clear, however, is that concerns about Silesian integration continued to haunt Opole's administrators into the 1970s. Their fears about "disintegration" grew even stronger after 1970 when the Polish government declared its willingness to let people of "indisputable German ethnicity" emigrate. This announcement, which appeared alongside the Warsaw Treaty, caused the number of émigrés and emigration-hopefuls to skyrocket. In 1970, only 5,000 people left for West Germany; by 1971, the total exceeded 25,000. By late 1972, at least 1,700 families had registered to emigrate from Zabrze alone.[60] Efforts to instill a sense of Polish pride and identity in these émigrés seemed to have decisively failed.

The 1974 Strategy

With this mounting emigration problem in mind, Opole voivode executives altered their approach to the autochthonous population, devising their own integration plan in February 1974. Significantly, this program shifted the focus away from Polish pride and sought to foster *a distinctly Silesian identity* in its place. By supporting the regional identity of the "local-origin population," as it was called, the administration hoped to improve their "socio-political integration" and prevent further emigration.[61] Along with other strategic measures, such as having "preventative conversations" with "valuable" emigration applicants while quickly issuing exit visas to the region's "immoral or criminal elements," Opole's integration program was part of a broader government initiative to strengthen and demographically transform Upper Silesian society. These alterations were both important and urgent, for as of early 1974, more than 38,000 area residents were actively seeking to leave for West Germany. By enacting these changes, especially in districts with high concentrations of exit visa applicants, Opole's leaders hoped to counteract emigration's deleterious effects on their region.[62]

On the surface, the 17-part integration plan developed by Józef Gruszka, Secretary of the PZPR in the Opole voivodeship, looked like a reincarnation of the postwar "re-Polonization" program. However, unlike the re-Polonization initiatives, Gruszka's strategy clearly endeavored to instill a

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Silesian identity alongside a Polish one. The methods would be both cultural and educational. For instance, to promote "knowledge about the history of revolutionary fighting and the national liberation of the Silesian people," Gruszka recommended celebrating major regional anniversaries and significant historical dates at schools and universities. Hosting these festivities, along with increasing the number of Silesia-specific history texts at libraries and educational institutions, would give pupils and students the opportunity to learn about the Silesian past. Ideally, these informal scholastic encounters would strengthen the young peoples' emotional connections to the region. Gruszka also advocated for investing more resources into "dynamizing [Opole's] cultural politics." [63] In addition to supporting music, art, and cinema, he recommended awarding regional prizes to local artists; the prizes would be named after prominent Opolans. Lastly, to promote further Upper Silesian involvement in culture, Gruszka proposed appointing local-origin people to leadership positions in the educational, cultural, and propaganda divisions of voivodeship government, suggesting that "every open post should be utilized" for this purpose.[64]

Gruszka further called for improvements to the area's civic education and advised expanding the humanities higher-education opportunities for local-origin youth, starting in middle school. This proposition aligned nicely with his goal of placing more indigenous Upper Silesians in places of leadership and influence.[65] His last suggestion aimed at dissuading potential émigrés, namely by spreading information about Polish immigrants' struggles in West Germany. Gruszka asserted that regional newspapers, such as the *Opole Tribune* (*Trybuna Opolska*), should reprint West German stories about Poles' negative integration experiences and distribute this information across the voivodeship. Opole-based and national journalists should write their own stories on this subject as well. Similarly, Gruszka advocated for utilizing regional presses like the monthly *Opole* journal to teach residents about Polish press traditions in Silesia, especially during the era of partitions. Through cultivating a sort of "regional nationalism," Gruszka's program sought to prevent emigration to West Germany, in the apt words of Peter Polak-Springer (2015, 239), by "[winning] the hearts and minds of the locals for Poland."

Evidence suggests that Gruszka's 1974 integration program took effect in November that same year, but new international developments rendered its impact minimal at best.[66] The Helsinki agreement, in which Poland promised to allow 125,000 people of "indisputable German ethnicity" to emigrate between 1975 and 1979, effectively snuffed out Gruszka's integration strategy. As Opole First Secretary Andrzej Żabiński explained in 1979, once the Helsinki agreement began, the Opole voivodeship administrators lacked the resources needed to counteract the departures from Upper Silesia. Unlike West Germany, which offered the newcomers subsidies and compensation through the Equalization of Burdens Law (*Lastenausgleichgesetz*), Polish authorities could not coax people to stay through material incentives. In the absence of these means, Żabiński and others focused on improving the "ideological aspects of integration," starting with gathering more information about people seeking to emigrate.[67] This knowledge would become the basis of revised integration strategies in the future. Significantly, though, Żabiński did not mention a plan to cultivate a regional Silesian identity. In contrast to the Gruszka program, which focused on Silesians' "sociopolitical integration," Żabiński's strategy dealt with emigres' economic motivations—a wholly different type of problem to solve. The era of bolstering an explicitly Upper Silesian identity seemed to have ended.

Conclusion

Even though the Helsinki agreement essentially nullified Gruszka's 1974 program, its existence still reveals the continued evolution of both national and regional Polish strategies toward indigenous Silesians. Whereas after the war, Polish officials had viewed—and treated—the local population as "contaminated Germans," both the 1967 Rusiecki inquiry and Gruszka's 1974 plan exposed a concerned, even sympathetic interest in the autochthons. With these reports, government officials not only recognized that discrimination had occurred, but they also sought to ameliorate the enduring effects of this prejudice. Furthermore, instead of regarding native Silesians as innate

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threats to Polish sovereignty, the administration saw them as assets—and as essential for maintaining their authority in western Poland. In the 20 years since the war, Upper Silesians had taken on even greater value for Polish society, and their "disintegration" and emigration posed a serious hazard to the country as a whole.

Yet even this sympathetic view of the native residents had its limitations, and some of the measures designed to bolster local loyalty ultimately angered the indigenous population. The case of a "German-era" World War I memorial in Dobrosławice demonstrates this problem clearly. Built in 1920, this monument had fallen into disrepair. Residents apparently showed "no concern" for it and had long ceased placing flowers or candles at its base on holidays. The administration therefore decided in 1967 to tear down the memorial; however, since the demolition crew was slow to begin, there was time for word to spread in Dobrosławice. Led by a writer named Hubert Maj, residents quickly gathered in the village square to protest the demolition. Once the crew saw the "disapproval about their actions," they decided to stop; after all, they lived in the surrounding villages and did not want to anger their neighbors. Demolition did not happen that day because the residents, "most of whom were autochthons," gathered to protest. Although the county officials still planned to tear down the memorial, it is significant that the people of Dobrosławice banded together to voice their discontentment.[68]

It is further noteworthy that the MSW's 1967 inquiry and voivodeship reports both placed blame on West Germany and its "revisionist propaganda," while also recognizing the Polish authorities' contribution to the problem. According to this framing, the Silesians' "disintegration" stemmed not simply from the population's refusal to "become Polish," but from the "insufficient countermeasures [enacted by] state administrative organs."[69] In other words, the Polish administration faulted themselves and their voivodeship leaders for not doing enough to halt the "disintegration" process. The combination of counterproductive actions and the lack of effective countermeasures by the Polish authorities had, at least partially, left indigenous Silesians vulnerable to "revisionist propaganda." This conclusion represented a shift away from earlier Security Service analyses, which, according to Adam Dziurok and Adam Dziuba (2003, 280) had all but unilaterally blamed West German influences for the presence of "revisionism" in the region (Dziurok and Dziuba 2003, 275–280).

While the increased contact with West Germany after Helsinki made this "propaganda" virtually unstoppable, the earlier Polish attempts to counteract these outside influences showed at least a nominal, albeit utilitarian, appreciation for Silesian heritage and culture. When faced with rising West German and expellee pressures in their region, the Opole authorities responded in 1967 and 1974 with insightful, if not innovative, identity-based plans for local integration. This decision arguably revealed their awareness that identity is inherently malleable, especially in borderland areas. By bolstering Silesianness to increase residents' loyalty to Poland, Zygiert, Wdowiak, and Bryś and later Gruszka added another option to the "competing identity offers" available to the borderlanders.[70] While these officials did not necessarily care about Silesian identity in its own right, they realized that helping cultivate regionalism in this way could ultimately strengthen the population's connection to the nation.

In the end, however, the decision to kindle a "Silesian" identity through cultural engagement proved ineffective, in part because this strategy was based upon the wrong assumptions. The Polish authorities devised cultural and sociopolitical solutions for the "disintegration" problem, but economic factors bore the greatest blame for emigration. Although almost 75% of surveyed resettlers cited living "as Germans among Germans" as their primary motive for coming to the Federal Republic, many emigration-hopefuls barely masked their material aims (*Aussiedler im Spiegel polnischer Pressestimmen* 1981, 113). The Opole officials noted this problem in their 1967 report, stating that they had seen "many individual cases of [people] bragging that German [things] are better."[71] Most of these people had relatives in West Germany and regularly received packages from them. Visits to the Federal Republic strengthened the notion that life, at least from a material

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perspective, would be better in Germany. Thus, in order to be effective in the long run, any anti-emigration efforts from the Polish side would need to address the resettlers' economic complaints.

Yet because Poland was not in a position to bribe Upper Silesians to stay, more and more indigenous Silesians began self-identifying as Germans in order to obtain exit visas in the late 1970s. Many of those local-origin people who opted not to emigrate began more actively cultivating a German identity, and some became leaders of the minority movement in the 1980s. Their efforts were bolstered by continued, often clandestine expellee activity in the region.[72] In this sense, the West German "propaganda" and "revisionist influence" that the MSW's 1967 inquiry mentioned the Silesians might "succumb to" had ultimately surfaced. Notably, this group claimed a German identity, not a Silesian one, and they actively campaigned for their minority rights through the end of the 1980s. A distinctly Silesian identity only emerged in the mid-1990s after the fall of Communism—long after the 1967 and 1974 attempts to rekindle this regional awareness had ended.

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Notes

1 APO, PWRNwO 224/5123, fols. 2–3, January 18, 1967.

2 These people did not receive Polish citizenship until 1951. As John Kulczycki (2016) explains, the citizenship law of January 8, 1951, "severed the link between nationality and citizenship." Specifically, Article 3 stated that "the appropriate authority may recognize as Polish citizens individuals who do not fulfill the requirements of the previous article [i.e. verified as of Polish nationality] but nevertheless reside in Poland at least since 9 May 1945." Kulczycki concludes that, thanks to this provision, Polish authorities could force citizenship upon the more than 100,000 indigenous Silesians who had resisted national verification.

3 APO, PWRNwO 224/5122, fol. 48.

4 APO, PWRNwO 224/5123, fols. 30–51, April 13, 1967, pp. 3–4.

5 Ibid. p. 21.

6 Although Adam Dziurok and Adam Dziuba's study does not address the situation in Opole, his work on Katowice shows that fear of German revisionism continued within the voivodeship administration into the 1960s.

7 APO, PWRNwO 224/5123, fols. 30–51, April 13, 1967, pp. 3–4. The Polish phrase "ulegania propagandzie rewizjonistycznej" can be translated as "yielding" or "succumbing to revisionist propaganda."

8 Strauchold (2017, 158) comes to a similar conclusion about the ideological need for Polishness in his analysis of the Towarzystwo Rozwoju Ziem Zachodnich (Society for the Development of the Western Territories or TRZZ) and its development in the 1950s and 1960s.

9 APO, PWRNwO 224/5123, fols. 30–51, April 13, 1967, p. 9.

10 The March 1946 redistribution decree disproportionately affected indigenous Silesians, who faced unique discrimination as tainted Germans. AIPN BU 0825/9 t. 9, fol. 2, November 4, 1957. Some secondary literature lists the date as March 1945.

11 According to McDermott, the Slovaks had planned to expel the Hungarian minority from their territory, but this move was blocked by the Allies. Although 74,000 Hungarians were ultimately

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forced to leave, more than half a million ethnic Magyars remained in eastern and southern Slovakia.

12 APO, KW PZPRwO 2667, fols. 1–104, p. 51.
13 APO, KW PZPRwO 2667, fols. 1–104, p. 51.
14 APO, 178, sygn. 65, 63–65, "Current issues" report by Opole district administration's Social-Political Department, 5.11.48. Quoted in Service, "Sifting Germans from Poles," 677.
15 AIPN BU 1594/211, fol. 2; AIPN BU 07/5, fol. 11. These changes took place at the Third and Eighth Plena.
16 Decree 37/56 only applied to German emigres. A similar but distinct law regarding émigrés to Israel was instituted in January 1958. AIPN BU 1594/211, fol. 1, March 1970.
17 AIPN BU 1585/6781, fol. 10. Stanislaw Jankowiak (2017, 188-197) has written in detail about the German Social-Cultural Association.
18 Bundestagsdrucksache 6/2056, p. 1-4. According to the West German Bundestag, between December 1, 1955, and the end of 1970, 368,824 Germans left Poland in conjunction with Family Reunification aims. Polak-Springer (2015, 237) and Jankowiak (2017, 195) have analyzed how Gomułka's ascent to power affected Germans.
19 AIPN BU 1594/211, fols. 2–4. This file contains a detailed explanation of how Polish emigration policies functioned in the 1950s and the ways that changes to Polish citizenship law impacted them.
20 APO, PWRNwO 224/5123, fols. 2–3, January 18, 1967.
21 APO, PWRNwO 224/5123, fols. 2–3, January 18, 1967.
22 APO, PWRNwO 224/5123, fols. 4–8, February 8, 1967.
23 Ibid.
24 APO, PWRNwO 224/5122, fols. 1–6, June 24, 1966, p. 4.
25 APO, PWRNwO 224/5122, fol. 48. These statistics came from Krapkowice, Zdzieszowice, Gogolin, Zielina, Walce, and Dobra, which are all located within the Opole regional administration.
26 APO, PWRNwO 224/5123, April 13, 1967, p. 10.
27 AIPN Ka 030/188, t. 2, fol. 261, May 1966, p. 31.
28 AIPN Ka 030/188 t. 2, fol. 264, May 1966, p. 34.
29 The *Trybuna Ludu* was one of the largest, widely read newspapers in Communist Poland. It served as one of the primary propaganda outlets for the Polish Communist Party.
30 Specifically, this man had been in contact with the *Deutsche National- und Soldatenzeitung.* AIPN Ka 030/188 t. 2, fol. 264, May 1966, p. 34.
31 APO, PWRNwO 224/5123, April 13, 1967, p. 11-12. AIPN Ka 030/212, fol. 24, July 30, 1963.
32 Traditionally, 966 A.D. is regarded as the year of "Poland's baptism," the nation's conversion to Christianity. However, since the Communist authorities did not officially endorse Catholicism, the state-sanctioned celebrations focused on the millennium's national, rather than religious, elements. APO, PWRNwO 224/5123, April 13, 1967, p. 19.
33 APO, PWRNwO 224/5123, April 13, 1967, p. 20.
34 APO, PWRNwO 224/5123, April 13, 1967, p. 20.
35 Ibid.
36 APO, PWRNwO 224/5123, April 13, 1967, p. 20–21. The severity of this issue varied by location. In general, the administrators in Kluczbork, Racibórz, and the Opole region had a "good understanding of the local people." In contrast, the problem was particularly pronounced in Kośle and Krapkowice.
37 A later plan from 1973 also offered similar suggestions for addressing autochthons' needs. See APO, KW PZPRw 2579/2651, fols. 251–263.
38 To expediate the demolition process, the officials included detailed descriptions of the monuments' locations; the list took up more than three pages of the document. APO, PWRNwO 224/5123, April 13, 1967.

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39 APO, PWRNwO 224/5123, fol. 27, March 10, 1967.
40 According to Katherine Verdery (1999), corpses can play a critical symbolic role, especially in times of political rupture.
41 APO, PWRNwO 224/5123, fols. 30–51, April 13, 1967, p. 3–4.
42 Polak-Springer (2015) and Strauchold (2017) point out Polish statements showing their fear of "revisionism" and "propaganda" from West Germany in the 1960s. However, both scholars dismiss the Polish fears as deliberately overblown. Polak-Springer, for instance, contends that the Gomułka regime used a "conflict-ridden official history [of Upper Silesia] with servings of Germanophobia in the guise of the 'West German revanchist threat' in order to "legitimate the UB's (*Urząd Bezpieczeństwa*, Office of Public Security) continued surveillance, harassment, and even arrests of locals" (Polak-Springer 2015, 238).
43 AIPN Ka 030/212, January 10, 1972.
44 Ibid.
45 APO, PWRNwO 224/5123, April 13, 1967, p. 11.
46 Ibid.
47 AIPN Ka 030/188 vol. 1, fol. 50, February 25, 1963. AIPN Wr 011/387 t. 7, fols. 13–19, October 6, 1965.
48 APO, PWRNwO 224/5123, fols. 30–51, April 13, 1967, p. 5.
49 AIPN Ka 030/188 vol. 2, fol. 327, December 20, 1967.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid. The West German government actively encouraged citizens to send care packages, known as "*Westpakete*," to people living in East Germany (Soch 2018).
52 AIPN Ka 030/188 vol. 1, fol. 50, February 25, 1963. An inset in a 1965 issue of the *Kreuzburger Nachrichten* expellee periodical urged readers to "Always think about [Kreuzburg]! Send packages frequently, write often, and stick together!" The entire collection of the *Kreuzburg Nachrichten* is available at the Gerhard Hauptmann Haus in Düsseldorf.
53 For instance, in 1967, the *Kreuzburger Nachrichten* expellee periodical began publishing practical information about visiting Kreuzburg/Kluczbork.
54 Andrew Demshuk has written about the Brzeg-Goslar *Patenstadt* pairing (Demshuk 2012, 177–183). He has also analyzed *Patenstadt* pairings between West German and East European cities more broadly (Demshuk 2014, 224-255).
55 AIPN Wr 011/387 t. 7, fols. 13-19, October 6, 1965. The Security Service closely tracked connections between their population and West Germans. Agents made charts detailing individual people and their ties to West Germany through care packages, letters, and visitors. Dojas and Stanowska lived in Brzeg (Brieg), a town in the Opole voivodeship. AIPN Wr 011/387 t. 7, fol. 353 contains information from November 27, 1967, about Stanowska's jail sentence.
56 In one part of their assessment, the Opole administrators seemed to suggest that these organizations acted with the support of the West German government, meaning that the Federal Republic's leadership were also to blame. APO, PWRNwO 224/5123, fols. 30–51, April 13, 1967, p. 3.
57 Ibid.
58 Based on the report, it seems that Gawlytta was an émigré from Poland. The note suggests that he was a former member of the "Free German Youth" (*Wolna Niemiecka Młodzież*), an illegal association in Poland. APO, PWRNwO 224/5123 fol. 7–9, February 5, 1965, p. 2.
59 APO, PWRNwO 224/5123, fols. 30–51, April 13, 1967, p. 21.
60 AIPN Ka 0123/11, fol. 88, November 20, 1972.
61 APO KW PZPRwO 2579/2652, fols. 11–15, February 26, 1974.
62 APO KW PZPRwO 2579/2652, fols. 5–10, February 22, 1974.
63 APO KW PZPRwO 2579/2652, fol. 14, February 26, 1974.
64 APO KW PZPRwO 2579/2652, fol. 14, February 26, 1974.
65 APO KW PZPRwO 2579/2652, fols. 11–15, February 26, 1974.

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66 First Secretary Andrzej Żabiński refers to the integration program as being put into place in November 1974. Although he does not mention Gruszka's name, it is unlikely that another wide-scale integration program would have been developed that same year, especially since the two had worked together on an earlier plan. APO KW PZPRwO 2579/2653, fols. 5–17, July 7, 1979. For a specific reference to the 1974 integration program, see page 2.
67 Ibid. See especially pages 2 and 11.
68 APO, PWRNwO 224/5123, fols. 27–28, March 10, 1967.
69 APO, PWRNwO 224/5123, fols. 2–3, January 18, 1967.
70 Ther discusses the malleability of identity and "competing identity offers" at length (Ther 2000, 409).
71 APO, PWRNwO 224/5123, fol. 12.
72 In West Germany, expellee politicians and their affiliates advocated for these minority Germans and, in some instances, helped activists formulate their strategies. A 1985 surveillance proposal in Katowice interpreted the recent rise of unrest in Silesia as the product of "centers of political and ideological subversion from West Germany," particularly expellee organizations which had begun engaging in "intensified, aggressive and retaliatory activity." Additionally, these groups offered practical advice and material help to minority members. For example, when one self-described German sought to establish an illegal German-language school in his house, certain expellee representatives convinced a Munich-based publishing company to donate 30 textbooks. Similarly, when the same man sought to create a German-minority newspaper in Silesia, these West Germans offered to secure a photocopier and other supplies. See AIPN Ka 030/371, fols. 1–2, "Wniosek o wszczęcie sprawy obiektowej 'Odwetowcy,'" 1985; AIPN Wr 011/1813 t. 2, fols. 24–33, April 25, 1986, p. 17.

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