

pp. 270–71). First, there should be a change in the structure of political opportunities (e.g., a new set of potential allies). Second, the levels of repression should be lower than in previous times. Third, committed activists should be willing to risk their lives to promote protests and organizational efforts. Fourth, the authoritarian regime should be inconsistent in its willingness to apply massive, even criminal, repression to contain its contenders. Finally, and if there are survivors left in the popular camp, positive memories of what can be achieved by contending the regime, and a change in U.S. foreign policy toward the regime, there might be hope for popular movements to reemerge. This combination runs against high odds; human emotions make the difference.

Despite all the impressive empirical data and the detailed reconstruction of protest cycles in both Guatemala and El Salvador, *Political Movements and Violence in Central America* is a book that never loses sight of the basic human commitment to equality and liberty that lies at the heart of contentious politics. In doing so, Brockett not only pays tribute to those activists who sacrificed everything for what they believed. He also underscores the efforts of the progressive branch of the Catholic Church in fostering organizations, providing allies, and infusing substantive values into the popular struggles of both rural and urban Guatemalans and Salvadorians who during the better part of the twentieth century struggled for emancipation.

The main contribution of the book to the field of social movement theory is its clarification of the so-called “repression paradox” (i.e., the fact that state violence seems to both crush and provoke contention by popular movements). By examining violent (revolutionary) and nonviolent political movements and the responses of the Guatemalan and Salvadorian states in their historical and regional contexts, Brockett shows that organizational processes, accumulated memories, and changes in the structures of opportunity mediate the relationship between cycles of protest and state repression. In addition, he shows that two other variables, usually neglected by social movement studies, are important in explaining the conditions leading to rising contestation or successful contention: 1) the sequence of the interactions between nonviolent movements, violent challengers, and state responses, and 2) international influences, especially U.S. support for a given regime, and the presence of revolutionary waves in neighboring countries.

The prevailing wisdom in Latin America nowadays is that revolutionary challengers to the established order are outdated. Since the Clinton administration, U.S. policy toward the region has consistently supported governments that fulfill the standard minimal procedures of democracy. Social movements, such as those analyzed by Van Cott, are more numerous now than in the past. Indeed, as she has demonstrated, given the right condi-

tions, these movements, especially when ethnically based, have even been able to transform themselves into successful political parties. We should bear in mind, however, that ethnic politics have a greater chance of contributing positively to the development of democracy, in Latin American and in general, when democratic institutions have been in place for longer periods than is the case in Central America. We should also remember that ethnic politics—despite its persistent presence in Latin America—seems to present less of a challenge to undemocratic elites than does class politics.

The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World. By Partha Chatterjee. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004. 173p. \$33.00 cloth, \$20.00 paper.

Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey. By Esra Özyürek. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006. 227p. \$74.95 cloth, \$21.95 paper. DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707071174

— Howard Handelman, *University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee*
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Few leaders have been as lionized by their people decades after their deaths or have influenced their nation’s political development as much as Turkey’s Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In the wake of World War I and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Atatürk (an honorary title meaning “father of the Turks”) led a war of national independence, established the Turkish Republic, and introduced a series of modernizing/westernizing reforms that included secularization of the state, relative emancipation of women, and westernization of the alphabet, dress, and the legal code.

Esra Özyürek, an anthropologist, examines contemporary Turkish society—including the political and social debate between secular-Republicans and Islamists (including the moderate, currently governing Justice and Development Party)—through the lens of Republican nostalgia for Atatürk’s revolution and the modernity it still represents. Drawing upon her interviews of early Republicans, her analyses of museum exhibits, and other evidence, Özyürek discusses how Kemalist myths and symbols have long been used to buttress the norms and ideology of modernization, including, most recently, the introduction of neoliberal reforms that feature free trade and reduce state intervention in the national economy.

While this is a case study, its analysis of the maintenance and manipulation of founding myths and ideologies has applicability well beyond Turkey’s borders. Perhaps Özyürek’s most interesting contention is that Kemalist symbolism has been altered in recent decades to legitimize the reform and globalization of the nation’s economy. Whereas Atatürk’s original republicanism featured a powerful state as the agent of Turkish nationalism and economic development (etatism), more recently many of its

symbols have been transferred from the public to the private domain in order to support consumerism and anti-statist, neoliberal policies. At the same time, in recent years the leading Islamist political party, once adamantly opposed to Kemalist secular reforms, has highlighted some of Atatürk's early speeches defending Islam and the veiling of women, and has published photos of him in prayer or standing next to his then-veiled wife, all in an effort to legitimize their own values in the political arena.

Özyürek's symbolic interpretations generally seem reasonable and insightful. She points out, for example, that in her interviews of "the early Republican generation"—those who came of age in the 1920s and 1930s and were committed to Atatürk's reforms—respondents tended to describe their private lives (e.g., when and where they were married or began working) in the context of the public sphere (for example, where those events fit into the chronology of modernizing reforms). Contemporary Republicans, on the other hand, do not express similar devotion to the public arena.

At times, however, Özyürek's interpretations seem far-fetched, as when she notes that large public statues of Atatürk (which adorn every Turkish city and town) have been supplemented in recent years with miniaturized representations (on items such as T-shirts and coffee mugs) that citizens can purchase and "carry to their private domains." This, she argues, is emblematic of Turkey's new economic and political development models, representing a "conflation of consumerism and politics" and the "idea of the state . . . based on the free will and voluntary choice of the private citizen" (p. 124). No doubt Turkey has experienced these broad economic and political transformations. But it is less clear that they are symbolized by Atatürk coffee mugs. Here, as with some of Özyürek's other symbolic interpretation, this reviewer was reminded of Sigmund Freud's alleged comment when asked whether his cigar was a phallic symbol. "Sometimes," he responded, "a cigar is only a cigar."

Partha Chatterjee's *Politics of the Governed* also addresses Third World modernization, particularly how ethnic minorities and other subordinate groups have been only partially incorporated into postcolonial political systems. The book's subtitle refers to the political experiences of "three-fourths of contemporary humanity" now living in nations that "were not direct participants in the history . . . of modern capitalist democracy" (p. 3). But while this indicates that its analysis is broadly applicable to the developing world, Chatterjee's empirical evidence comes almost exclusively from India, particularly from his home state of West Bengal and its capital, Calcutta. Given India's unique political culture—influenced by Hinduism and the caste system—and West Bengal's atypical politics within India (since 1977 the state has been continuously governed by the Left Front coalition, led by the Communist Party-Marxist), it is questionable how widely we can generalize from his evidence.

In discussing the mobilization of disadvantaged groups (including the urban poor, peasants, and the lower castes), Chatterjee distinguishes between "citizens" and "populations." Citizens—consisting of the developing world's (or India's) middle and upper classes—are part of civil society, carrying "the moral connotation of sharing in the sovereignty of the state and hence of claiming rights in relation to the state" (p. 136). Drawing on Michel Foucault's notion of "the governmentalization of the state" (p. 34), he argues that members of subaltern (i.e., "popular") groups are not citizens but are, instead, "populations" whose periodically changing demographics and political role are defined by government policymakers. Since they lack the citizens' moral claims on the state, any benefits that they receive from it (such as housing for urban squatters or food programs for indigent mothers) are based on government calculations of their costs and benefits. Even when organized populations successfully pressure the state, he argues, they do not enter civil society because they must use illegitimate means (often "controlled violence," such as sit-ins and strikes) to achieve their goals.

Although Chatterjee admits that political demonstrations and patron–client relationships may bring real benefits to less privileged "populations," he still finds political society (the political world of those who are excluded from civil society) inadequate because it fails to give the underprivileged effective agency. Therefore, the welfare benefits that government policymakers extend at one point may subsequently be withdrawn if the cost–benefit calculations change. The author's distinction between civil and political society is conceptually interesting, but I am not sure how much it adds to our understanding of the politics of the poor. It suggests a fundamental dichotomy in which "bourgeois politics" follows a particular modality and the politics of the underprivileged follows another. Would it not be more illuminating to conceptualize a continuum in which, for example, corporate giants have more influence and "moral rights" (access) to state benefits than do middle-class professionals, while organized urban squatters have greater agency than landless peasants do?

While both books offer much food for thought, many political scientists will find it troubling that a number of their arguments and conclusions are merely the authors' assertions, which lack empirical support. At one point Chatterjee, a historian, insists "that we, as professional social scientists have a responsibility to continue the debates over secularism [and presumably other issues] within the accepted forms of scientific discourse" (p. 115). Yet elsewhere, when discussing an apparently successful protest by Calcutta squatters, he warns that their "story is not a simple story with a happy ending, *no story about political society ever is*" (p. 67, italics added). Few social scientists who have studied the political mobilization of the Third World's poor would agree that those stories never have a

happy ending, unless one's definition of "happy ending" is unreasonably demanding.

Elsewhere (p. 86), after noting that "researchers" differ on the distributive effects of economic globalization, Chatterjee states, "[M]y impression from all that I have heard and seen is that, on balance, inequalities between rich and poor countries have not come down in the last ten or fifteen years; if anything they have probably increased." Unfortunately, he cites none of the economic research on this subject and decides, instead, to trust his own impressions—drawn from what he has "heard and seen"—over the social science literature on the topic. In point of fact, that body of evidence on economic growth in recent decades indicates that the Third World's most globalized economies (those of India and East Asia) have considerably narrowed their income gaps vis-à-vis the First World, while the least globalized (most notably, in Africa) have fallen behind. It is true that neoliberal reforms and entry into the global economy often increase inequality within developing nations. But in countries such as China and Chile, even though domestic inequalities have widened, a rapidly growing economy has still raised the lower classes' living standards, albeit at a slower pace than middle- and upper-class incomes.

Both of these books are thought provoking and intellectually rich. Chatterjee's work is the more ambitious of the two, but would have benefited from a more nuanced, empirically grounded examination of the politics of subaltern groups.

Locked in Place: State Building and Late Industrialization in India. By Vivek Chibber. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. 334p. \$49.50 cloth, \$22.95 paper. DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707071186

— Aseema Sinha, *University of Wisconsin-Madison*

Despite the newfound optimism about the turnaround in the Indian economy, this book's arguments about the failure of the postcolonial state to build a developmental state in the 1950s and 1960s are original, important, and relevant. Vivek Chibber's *Locked in Place* sets out to dispel important misconceptions about India's early state-building effort. His arguments are both theoretically innovative and empirically novel. Theoretically, he aims to bring back class in our understanding of comparative political economy and to insert India into conversations about the developmental state that have focused only on East Asia. He also aims to give us some sense of the "mechanisms that generate contrasting reactions" (p. 226) in the two cases that he studies: India and South Korea. This is a welcome modification to the state-centric debates about India's past failure where the state is the only target of attack or of pious hope. Empirically, the author uncovers some new archival material to argue that Indian business "defeated" the state's efforts to build a developmental state in the

1940s. The new evidence shows powerfully that Indian business had much greater power to shape economic policy in the 1940s and 1950s than we knew.

Contrary to the conventional view that the capitalist class initiated and sponsored a discussion on capitalist planning through the Bombay Plan, Chibber argues that the Bombay Plan was a *defensive* strategy (p. 97) by the business class to legitimize itself in the face of the Quit India movement and play a role in shaping the planning in India and that it was opposed by most business actors. Chibber's uncovering of rarely used evidence is a valuable piece of historical scholarship. Yet, his own evidence of the pre-1940s shows that business was hostile to state *ownership* of capital (pp. 90–91, 105) and feared a socialist turn which are not the same as hostility to the state's extraction of performance standards from the private sector or to disciplining. The business class is reacting to expropriation, not a mechanism of give-and-take, as was the case in South Korea.

Chibber's larger theoretical argument is valid, however. For him, the answers lie not in the "goings-on *within* the state" (p. 9) but "*between* state and societal actors, particularly the capitalist class" (p. 9, Chibber's emphasis). It is important to note that he does not intend to displace a state-centered argument with a class-centered argument. In late developers, like Korea and India, states continue to play important roles. This leads the author to make a nuanced argument about the scope of class power in shaping developmental trajectories. Classes—business and labor, to some extent—are important but not determinative. For him, the state's actions and strategies are crucial both for disciplining strong classes (South Korea) or uplifting weak ones (Taiwan) and for enhancing the state's institutional capacities (Korea, Japan). He explains the actions of business in terms of the models their respective states adopt: import-substituting industrialization (ISI) versus export-led industrialization (ELI).

If so, Chibber must be able to explain why is it rational for state elites to choose the different models that they do. One plausible reason for the adoption of ISI may have to do with the size of their respective economies. Large states like India find it much easier to adopt ISI inasmuch as the domestic market is assured both for industrial classes and state actors. For smaller states, reliance on export markets becomes necessary as soon as supply oversteps domestic demand. Thus, the size of India's market becomes relevant both for state motivations and business defense of ISI or ELI.

In addition, were the business classes merely *reacting* to the adoption of ISI and ELI, as implied by Chibber? Did the business class in the two economies play any role in encouraging the adoption of ISI in India and ELI in Korea by insisting upon protection from external competition in the one case and requesting help with export markets in Korea? For an argument based on class, some exploration