The transformation of political community: E. H. Carr, critical theory and international relations*

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The obsolescence of war in the relations between the leading industrial powers, and the declining significance of national sovereignty in the context of globalization are frequently cited as key indicators of the steady decline of the Westphalian era.[1] The transformation of world politics has encouraged the formation of new linkages between the study of change in international relations and the normative consideration of alternative principles of world politics. Imagining new forms of political community has emerged as a major enterprise in the contemporary theory of the state and international relations.[2] In this context, E. H. Carr's writings on the crisis of world politics in the first part of the twentieth century acquire a relevance for contemporary debates which his reputation for Realism has served to distort. His writings contain a striking analysis of the changing nature of the modern state and the possibility of new forms of political association. Carr's observations about these subjects are as profound as they are inspiring, and they are rich in their significance for the contemporary theory and practice of international relations. They make significant contributions in three areas: the empirical analysis of the transformation of the modern state, especially but not only in Europe; the embryonic but increasingly sophisticated normative analysis of how the nation-state ought to evolve, and what it ought to become; and the evolving discussion of how the study of international relations might be reformed to tackle the dominant moral and political questions of the epoch. These questions are concerned above all else with the metamorphosis of political community.

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[1] For an insightful overview, see J. Richardson, 'The End of Geopolitics?', in R. Leaver and J. Richardson (eds.), *Charting the Post-Cold War* (Boulder, CO, 1993).

[2] W. Connolly, 'Democracy and Territoriality', in M. Ringrose and A. J. Lerner (eds.), *Reimagining the Nation* (Buckingham, 1993); D. Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Global Governance* (Cambridge, 1995); W. Kymlicka, *Liberalism, Community and Culture* (Oxford, 1989); A. Linklater, 'Community', in A. Danchev (ed.), *Fin de Siècle: The Meaning of the Twentieth Century* (London, 1995); and R. B. J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge, 1993).

In his short, magisterial essay, *Nationalism and After*, which was published in 1945, Carr cited the development of citizenship, and specifically the principle that all citizens have a right to health, education and welfare, as one of the great achievements of the modern state; he also emphasized the terrible effects of the modern state which dominated the interwar years: totalitarian government, violent nationalism which generated the most pernicious forms of racial and ethnic exclusion, and the eventual descent into total war. *Nationalism and After* is an exemplary attempt, unequalled within the field, to show how the achievements of modern political life can be secured while the propensity for violence and exclusion is overcome. Carr argued that it was essential to make significant inroads into state power and its command over national loyalty to ensure that Europe would never again be plunged into destructive war. The need for extending the boundaries of community so that citizens and aliens come together as political equals is a central theme of Carr's essay, but one that has to be seen in conjunction with other dimensions of his thought. Elsewhere, he argued for 'the largest measure of devolution' and for much greater regard for the multiple loyalties and allegiances which enrich social life.[3] Carr set out the case for post-exclusionary forms of political organization which would be more internationalist than their predecessors, more sensitive to cultural differences and more passionately committed to ending social and economic inequalities. These are still the main reasons for wishing to see the emergence of new forms of political association in the modern world.

Of course, the morally charged terms in which I have cast this discussion are more usually associated with the critical perspectives which have flourished over the past ten to fifteen years than with classical Realism. These perspectives have been especially concerned with the many respects in which national communities exclude minority nations,[4] women and indigenous peoples; with the ways in which the world economic and political system works against the interests of the vulnerable members of humanity; and with the ease with which nation-states are prepared to harm the interests of outsiders while depriving them of representation and voice. These approaches have criticized Realism and its offshoot, Neorealism, precisely because they ignore these moral matters; and they have been criticized by Realism for their naive assumptions about how the world might change.

An author who informed his readers that on 10 September 1931 Lord Cecil told the Assembly of the League of Nations that the world had seldom been a more peaceful place, and then promptly reminded the reader that on 18 September Japan invaded Manchuria, seems an unlikely ally of the more critical approaches to the subject which have emerged in recent years. Everyone will recall the apparent relish with which Carr despatched the utopians in *The Twenty Years' Crisis*.[5] But if Carr was a Realist, he was a remarkably complex, even an inconsistent one, as others have

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[3] *The Future of Nations: Independence or Interdependence* (London, 1941), p. 54.
[4] 'Minority nations' is a term used in the Ceredigion District Council guide to the Flags of Aberystwyth which can be consulted on the promenade at Aberystwyth. 'National minorities' is synonymous, but 'sub-national minorities' is problematical. I am grateful to Richard Wyn-Jones for this last point.
[5] *The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919–1939*, 2nd edn (London, 1946), p. 36.

argued.[6] Carr was obviously of the view that some things had to change, not least the basic unit of world politics, the nation-state, which could no longer be regarded as the most effective means of promoting welfare and security.[7] In *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, Carr maintained that the enlargement of political association was one of the dominant and possibly irreversible trends in Europe. But he was quick to remark that there was a point at which the expansion of the boundaries of political community could provoke what he called the 'recrudescence of disintegrating tendencies'.[8] He went on to argue that the struggle between the centripetal and centrifugal political forces would probably turn out to be 'more decisive' than any other issue for 'the course of world history in the next few generations'.[9] Subsequent events in Europe, including debates about the relationship between local, national and Community institutions in the European Union, vouch for the accuracy of his prediction.

Unfortunately, Carr failed to explain the nature of the approach which would avoid the naivety and exuberance of Idealism, on the one hand, and the sterility and barrenness of Realism, on the other.[10] But the outlines of the third way can be glimpsed in his remarks about the crises facing the modern state. Carr's writings remind us that the modern state has contributed enormous extensions of power over society and terrible levels of violence to the dark side of modernity. It has also been the site for the development of the progressive side of modernity which questions all forms of domination and exclusion. We are still in the midst of a profound debate about which aspect of modernity will prevail. Carr's work contains three observations about the promise of modernity which may encourage those who incline, however gently, towards the project of the Enlightenment: first, much of the moral capital which has been accumulated in the course of resistance to the growth of state power and the rise of capitalism is invested in modern conceptions of citizenship; second, the idea of citizenship is an important moral resource which can be used to imagine communities which overcome domination and exclusion; third, increasing transnational harm creates irresistible pressures to use these resources to create new post-national social and political arrangements.[11]

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[6] See K. Booth, 'Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice', *International Affairs*, 67:3 (1991), pp. 527–45. The following citations highlight the issue of Carr's inconsistency. On p. 93 of *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, Carr argued that '[p]olitics are made up of two elements: utopia and reality—belonging to different planes which can never meet', but he added (p. 209) that '[e]very solution of the problem—of political change, whether national or international, must be based on a compromise between morality and power'.

[7] In the preface to the second edition of *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (p. viii), Carr maintained that the main part of the first edition 'too readily and too complacently accepts the existing nation-state, large or small, as the unit of international society', although the concluding sections reflected on 'the size of the political and economic units of the future'. 'The conclusion', Carr proceeded to argue, 'now seems to impose itself on any unbiased observer that the small independent nation-state is obsolete or obsolescent and that no workable international organisation can be built on a membership of a multiplicity of nation-states'. Carr advises the reader to consult *Nationalism and After* for his 'present views on this point'. On p. 56 of *The Future of Nations*, published in 1941, he argued that: 'In Europe the present need is to build up larger military and economic units while retaining existing or smaller units for other purposes'.

[8] *Twenty Years' Crisis*, p. 230.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid., p. 12.

[11] Transnational harm refers to the harm which societies do to one another, and the harms to which all are exposed by global actors and processes.

In the context of social crisis and steering problems, Habermas has suggested, societies may draw upon elements of the utopian tradition for the purpose of redefining the principles of association.[12] In a parallel approach, Carr argued that modern societies could answer the challenge of rising levels of transnational harm by harnessing the utopian or progressive side of modernity which is evident in the achievements of modern citizenship. Carr is usually credited with introducing the stark contrast between utopianism and realism, and it is true that on occasions he argued that the two could never meet. But by showing that alternative forms of political community were already immanent in the existing order of things, he began to transcend this false antithesis.[13]

Community and exclusion

The points which have been made thus far indicate that one of my intentions is to release Carr from the grip of the Realists and to highlight certain affinities between his writings on the state and critical theories of international relations. My remaining intentions are these: to comment on a distinctive pattern of thought about community and exclusion with which Carr's ideas can usefully be linked; to show how he contributes distinctive sociological and moral insights to the analysis of these themes; and to take his moral and political insights further by enlarging upon his schematic and inevitably somewhat dated observations about post-nationalist forms of community and citizenship.

There are important links between Carr's analysis of political association and the tradition of thought which has wrestled with the moral problem of who (and whose interests) can fairly be excluded from our political arrangements. Rousseau is a convenient point of departure. Rousseau maintained that there is no point in belonging to a community if outsiders can lay claim to exactly the same rights. Enjoying the benefits of moral favouritism is the whole point of membership of a separate society.[14] This notion that the special ties between members must translate into exclusive benefits is also an important theme in Michael Walzer's thought. According to Walzer, no community can maintain its distinctive identity and determine its own affairs if outsiders can enter just as they please. A people that wishes to preserve its way of life must establish boundaries that cannot be crossed and rights that must not be violated. The survival of communities depends upon the right of closure and exclusion.[15]

Rousseau and Walzer note, however, that the matter can hardly be left there. As Rousseau observed, by departing from the original state of nature and becoming members of separate states, citizens became indifferent to the needs of other societies, and even enemies of the rest of humanity. Rousseau was troubled by the

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[12] See J. Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society* (Boston, MA, 1979).

[13] In *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (p. 10), Carr remarked 'that no political utopia will achieve even the most limited success unless it grows out of political reality'. The penultimate sentence of the book (p. 239) refers to his own utopia as 'stand[ing] more directly in the line of recent advance than visions of a world federation or blue-prints of a more perfect League of Nations'.

[14] J. J. Rousseau, *A Discourse on Political Economy*, in *The Social Contract and Discourses*, tr. with an introduction by G. D. H. Cole (London, 1968), pp. 246–7.

[15] The argument is set out in M. Walzer, *Spheres of Justice* (Oxford, 1983), ch. 2.

absence of any swift solution to the problem that obligations to fellow-citizens frequently clash with cosmopolitan duties to other human beings.[16] Walzer is very uneasy about one consequence of endorsing the principle that communities must have the right of closure, namely, the absence of a right of shelter for refugees. The right of closure has to be subject to moral encroachment, Walzer argues, if duties to desperate strangers are to mean anything at all—and to a great deal of encroachment, he adds, in the case of societies such as Australia which control vast empty spaces acquired by force or stealth from the first inhabitants.[17]

Walzer's remarks about the fate of the original inhabitants are an important reminder that aliens are not alone in living with the tyranny of exclusion. Since Marx we have known that class-based exclusion is a thread that runs through virtually the entire history of the human race; but, arguably, we have only become aware of the deeper issues here because of the alluring arguments of writers such as Foucault. There is an interesting contrast between their approaches. As we all know, Marx believed that nationalism was an ideology which unified societies which would otherwise shatter as the members of subordinate classes resisted the dominant modes of exclusion. Marx was interested in how capitalism defied the odds by uniting the members of different classes behind national symbols. Foucault and those who have been influenced by his writings invert the relationship by noting how communities obtain unity and coherence by excluding key sections of the population. Social consensus is produced through systems of exclusion directed against those who fail to satisfy the dominant criteria of rationality, normality and responsibility.[18]

Foucault cited the criminal and the insane as examples, and it is not hard to think of other groups who are enlisted for a similar cause. For his part, Carr knew that societies cement their national identity by wielding potent exclusionary symbols against some of their own members and against outsiders. In *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, he quoted Bertrand Russell's remark that when he was young, the French ate frogs and were called 'froggies'; Carr also observed that in racial theories 'sexual abnormality and sexual offences are commonly imputed to the discredited race or group. Sexual depravity is imputed by the white American to the negro; by the white South African to the Kaffir; by the Anglo-Indian to the Hindu; and by the Nazi German to the Jew'.[19] Parallels with more recent post-structuralist and post-colonial reflections on otherness will be evident.

Those forms of exclusion are far from new, but arguably their importance for modern political theory and practice is unprecedented. Much contemporary political practice strives to eradicate or at least to reduce unjust systems of exclusion. Much contemporary social and political theory has been concerned precisely with the ways in which subordinate classes, women, minority nations, migrants, gypsies, gays, lesbians and indigenous peoples amongst others are exposed to unjust forms of exclusion by the national societies to which they belong and by the world economic and political system.

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[16] See S. Hoffmann, *The State of War: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Politics* (London, 1965), ch. 3.
[17] Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*.
[18] See the interview, 'Rituals of Exclusion', in *Foucault Live: Interviews 1966–84* (New York, 1989), ch. 6.
[19] *Twenty Years' Crisis*, pp. 70–1.

Precisely why the politics of exclusion should loom so large in modern societies is an intriguing question whose answer would lead me too far away from my present concerns. Suffice it to say that certain cultural logics exist in modern societies and force their members to question not only the forms of exclusion which human beings practise against each other but, of growing importance, the forms of exclusion which humanity practises against the rest of the animal kingdom.[20] This is one dimension of the ambiguities of modernity. As noted earlier, modern states have been the setting for remarkable extensions of power over society, and the source of unparalleled violence in international affairs. But modern states have also been host to powerful democratizing imperatives which resist the forms of domination and exclusion associated with the state and capitalism. With these comments on the divided nature of modernity, let me turn to Carr's contribution to the pattern of thought which explores the linkages between community and exclusion.

Carr on community and exclusion

Carr made the point that the survival of any political community is likely to be in doubt if its members are unfairly excluded from enjoying the material and other resources of society.[21] If it is to survive, a society must convince the majority of its members—and certainly the most powerful or potentially disruptive groups—that they are treated equally or fairly. Of course, Carr was sufficiently Marxist to know that the political system which eradicates all unjust exclusion or unfair discrimination has yet to appear. Perhaps he was sufficiently anti-utopian or Realist to doubt that it would ever exist. In any event, to anticipate a theme which I shall explore later, he was firmly of the view that what he called the 'exclusive solution' to the problem of community would no longer suffice.

In many respects, Carr's analysis of exclusion wrestled with many of the problems which Marxists such as Bukharin and Lenin dealt with in their writings on imperialism and nationalism. The common theme was the contraction of the boundaries of moral and political association in the first part of the twentieth century as a new combination of state structures came into existence.[22] Marx, it will be recalled, but not Engels had little inkling of what lay ahead.[23] When Marx developed his powerful account of history and society, the leading states of Europe were at peace. Registering this point, various writers, including Gallie, Giddens and Waltz, have argued that Marx was duped into believing that production rather than geopolitics and war was the key to society and history; he was fooled by the peaceful

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[20] One of the most interesting arguments for sovereignty in recent times defends the possibility of a territory set apart for the exclusive use of the higher apes (human beings aside). See R. E. Goodin, C. Pateman and R. Pateman, 'Simian Sovereignty', unpublished paper, 1995. I am grateful to Chris Brown for the reference.

[21] *Twenty Years' Crisis*, p. 163.

[22] See A. Linklater, *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations* (London, 1990), ch. 4. The 'extension of the boundaries of the moral and political communities' is a term used by Benjamin Nelson in his paper 'Civilisational Complexes and Intercivilisational Encounters', *Sociological Analysis*, 3 (1973), p. 87.

[23] Carr points out in *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, p. 69, that 'Marx, who denied the existence of "national" interests, underestimated the potency of nationalism as a force conditioning the thought of the individual'.

interregnum into thinking that class-based exclusion was the key to all history and that class conflict would secure the transition to a universal socialist society.[24] Marx focused on how the international proletariat would lead humanity towards universal cooperation. He did so on the mistaken assumption that nationalism, the state and war would soon have little more than antiquarian interest.

Colonialism, increasing international rivalries culminating in the First World War and the collapse of the international socialist movement forced Marxists to reconsider the importance of nationalism, the state and war. They were made to realize that state power had increased over society, that cultures had become increasingly nationalized and militarized, and that the divisions between peoples had been sharpened. In *Nationalism and After*, Carr analyzed the same three phenomena in order to explain the contraction of the boundaries of moral and political association, while steering clear, it should be stressed, of the unhelpful argument that the rise of the monopoly state of capitalism explained the dramatic collapse of the European social and political order.

Carr's explanation of the crisis in Europe which is set out in part one of *Nationalism and After* analyzed the development of the modern nation, specifically its 'democratisation' as the middle classes won the suffrage and its later 'socialisation' as the industrial proletariat acquired the vote and enthusiastically embraced nationalism. The socialization of the nation transformed the principles of association and altered the nature of the ties that bound citizens together. Labour organizations used their industrial and political strength to press their respective governments to protect them against the tyranny of the market. Protectionism and economic nationalism destroyed the liberal era of the free movement of goods and brought the epoch of large-scale migration to an end.

Measures to include the hitherto excluded within national communities triggered the closure of community. Economic nationalism created pressures to end immigration, and all the major states began to close their frontiers after 1919.[25] After a lull of 125 years, Europe once again witnessed the practice of deporting peoples to tidy up the frontiers.[26] Nationalism from the First World War onward encouraged total war, and popular hatred of the enemy blurred the vital distinction between military and civilian targets. The First World War was the first international conflict to embroil whole nations, and the first to descend into total war.[27]

How far Carr's effort to trace the connections between declining economic exclusion within European states and rising exclusion in the relations between states is successful is undoubtedly a crucial question. In short—and here I rely heavily on a recent analysis of the causes of war by Hidemi Suganami—Carr analyzed developments within the international environment which made war more probable. What he did not analyze were the particular mechanisms such as recklessness, miscalculation or aggressive behaviour which brought either the First or the Second World War about.[28] In *Nationalism and After*, Carr was less interested in telling a

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[24] See W. B. Gallie, *Philosophers of Peace and War* (Cambridge, 1978); A. Giddens, *The Nation-state and Violence* (Cambridge, 1985); and K. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York, 1965).

[25] *Nationalism and After*, p. 22.

[26] Ibid., p. 33.

[27] Ibid., p. 26.

[28] H. Suganami, *On the Causes of War* (Oxford, 1996).

complete story about the origins of the two major wars than in showing that the transformation of political community made violence more acceptable in international relations. There is an important insight here. If the closure or contraction of the boundaries of moral and political association—rather than anarchy—was the permissive cause of the First World War, then it was surely essential to create new forms of community which would be less prone to repeat the events of the twenty years' crisis.[29] Students of Waltz will appreciate the contrast here with Neorealism, which advises resignation to the consequences of anarchy, namely, resignation to our political fate. Carr, it will be recalled, maintained that the belief that certain conditions are unalterable invariably reflects the lack of a desire for or interest in changing things.[30]

It is my view that Carr was dealing here with issues which should be central to the study of international relations but which have been strangely neglected within the field. To delve further into this subject it is helpful to use a term which Corrigan and Sayer introduce in their book, *The Great Arch*, which analyzes the development of the modern British state. They introduce the notion of the totalizing project to summarize some of the key features of state-building which have already been noted: the increased regulation of society, the creation of homogeneous national communities and the exaggeration of differences between citizens and aliens in order to foster national solidarity.[31] I use the term here because it conveniently summarizes many of the processes which Carr described in his overview of the meaning of the first part of the twentieth century; it also reveals what, for Carr, the reconfiguration of political community was essentially about.[32]

Judged in this light, the first part of the century was the climax of the totalizing project and the era in which its destructive potential was tragically revealed. This was the period in which the state's powers were at their height. Its monopoly control of the instruments of violence, its economic powers and its ability to make national identity the highest political identity were remarkably unchecked. And so were its status as the highest court of lawful appeal, its exclusive right of representation in international organizations and its sole right to bind the whole community in international law. These are the monopoly powers which Carr rightly hoped would decline.

The first part of the century was also the period in which states were most able to administer social and economic interaction within their boundaries and were strongly inclined, as Carr pointed out, to adopt protectionist strategies. Sociologists such as Wallerstein and Mann have argued that entirely self-contained societies do not exist, but in the interwar years societies such as the Soviet Union came closer

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[29] On anarchy as the permissive cause of interstate violence, see Waltz, *Man, the State and War*, p. 233.

[30] *Twenty Years' Crisis*, p. 89. One might also recall his remark that the 'intellectual superiority of the Left is seldom in doubt. The Left alone thinks out principles of political action and evolves ideals for statesmen to aim at' (ibid., p. 20).

[31] P. Corrigan and D. Sayer, *The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution* (Oxford, 1985), p. 4.

[32] See *Twenty Years' Crisis*, p. 228: 'In no previous period of modern history have frontiers been so rigidly demarcated, or their character as barriers so ruthlessly enforced, as to-day; and in no period, as we have already seen, has it been so apparently impossible to organise and maintain any international form of power. Modern technique, military and economic, seems to have indissolubly welded together power and territory'.

than most to achieving this result.[33] This was the epoch in which states contracted their moral boundaries and simultaneously expanded their security boundaries. They became more nationalistic while enlarging the areas in which they believed vital interests were at stake and which they desperately wanted to control. Carr described the first of these developments in some detail by drawing attention to the willingness of national communities to export costs to foreigners, to slam the door on aliens, to expel minorities and to reduce those moral constraints in war which had been designed to spare civilian populations unnecessary suffering. He was acutely aware that any international system in which the dominant powers define the moral community more narrowly while expanding the territorial domain which they desire to influence or control greatly increases the potential for violence.

Carr was not alone in analyzing these consequences of the totalizing project. As noted earlier, Lenin and Bukharin had commented more than twenty years earlier on the growth of state power, the nationalization of communities which ought to have fragmented along class lines, and deepening estrangement between national societies. They offered a different explanation of these events and assumed that the revival of class warfare would ensure that the totalizing project would be swept aside, along with the states which produced it. Horkheimer and Adorno maintained that the events of the interwar years had destroyed all possibility of transnational revolution. Conceding that Schopenhauer rather than Marx had glimpsed the dark images of the future, they concluded that the idea of historical progress was totally exhausted. In a summation of the meaning of history which many Realists would happily adopt, Adorno offered the chilling observation that the progress of history led simply from the stone catapult to the megabomb.[34]

Carr drew different conclusions. The first part of the century revealed that it was essential to reverse the totalizing project. It was necessary to make deep inroads into the state's monopoly powers, to recognize the diverse loyalties and allegiances which are the life-blood of any humane society and to ensure that societies did not establish their identities by invidious comparisons with outsiders or purchase their autonomy by exporting harm to others. So, unlike Lenin or Bukharin, Horkheimer or Adorno, Carr turned his attention to the possibility of new forms of political organization in which states would relinquish some of their power to determine affairs within their territories, withdraw from the assumption that national loyalties are always overriding, and acknowledge fundamental moral duties to outsiders. In Carr's vision of a humane political community, citizens and aliens would associate to pursue their common interest in security and welfare.

Earlier, I suggested that many of Carr's ideas are best seen in conjunction with a pattern of political thought which analyzes the relationship between community and exclusion. Rousseau was a point of departure, not least because he raised the issue of how human beings can be citizens of the state without turning into the enemies of the rest of humankind. Carr's variation on the theme asks how the members of the state could enjoy the benefits of social citizenship without coming into conflict

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[33] L. Wallerstein, *The Capitalist World-economy* (Cambridge, 1979), and M. Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1986). See also M. Waller, *The End of the Communist Power Monopoly* (Manchester, 1993), and the same author's 'Voice, Choice and Loyalty: Democratisation in Eastern Europe', in G. Parry and M. Moran (eds.), *Democracy and Democratisation* (London, 1994).

[34] See M. Horkheimer, *Critical Theory: Selected Essays* (New York, 1972), and P. Connerton, *The Tragedy of Enlightenment: An Essay on the Frankfurt School* (Cambridge, 1980), p. 114.

with human beings who happen to have been born elsewhere. And like Kant, who knew that the labour of creating the perfect state would amount to very little if international competition and conflict survived, Carr recognized the urgency of extending the boundaries of moral and political association but not, as noted earlier, at the cost of cultural variety and diverse loyalties.[35] This was his contribution to that strand of analysis which links Rousseau, Marx, Foucault and others in imagining communities which overcome the pernicious forms of exclusion.

Carr and the future of political community

The last few pages of *The Twenty Years' Crisis* introduce Carr's vision of new social and political arrangements. Further details are added in *Nationalism and After*, in which Carr refers to the need to break with what he called the 'the exclusive solution' to the problem of community in which 'white men, landowners, propertied classes and so forth' monopolize principal opportunities and resources.[36] Although the stress is on class inequalities, the reference to white men suggests that Carr was not entirely blind to systems of exclusion anchored in hierarchical conceptions of gender and race. The central point is nevertheless clear. Modern society had to be reconfigured to enable the excluded to become fully-fledged members of their political community.

Exactly the same point applied to international relations: an international order which revolved exclusively around the great powers could not be expected to command widespread popular support. Underlying this remark was Carr's specific concern with the problems which afflicted millions of people in their everyday lives: the scourge of unemployment, the absence of adequate material resources and the lack of meaningful opportunities. But as already noted, the efforts to solve these problems at the national level had catastrophic international consequences. Solutions to the social problem had to be found at the global level.[37] Carr was vigorous, as a result, in defending international planning which would promote, as he put it, the equality of individual men and women as opposed to the equality of nations.[38]

Clearly, international planning to promote welfare internationalism would encroach upon the powers of the nation-state and require the widening of the boundaries of moral and political communities. In a splendid passage towards the end of *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, Carr argued that British policy would have to grant the people of Dusseldorf, Lille and Lodz many of the same rights as the people of Jarrow or Oldham.[39] So much for Rousseau's belief that community grants insiders special status, and for Walzer's belief that community requires closure. Carr recognized the force of the argument which has been advanced by the so-called Euro-sceptics in recent times that there is a serious danger that various national and

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[35] Kant, *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmo-political Point of View*, in M. Forsyth, H. M. A. Keens-Soper and P. Savigear (eds.), *Theories of International Relations: Selected Texts from Gentili to Treitschke* (London, 1970), p. 183.
[36] See *Nationalism and After*, p. 42.
[37] For a discussion of welfare nationalism, see H. Suganami, *The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals* (Cambridge, 1989), p. 13, n.34.
[38] *Nationalism and After*, p. 43.
[39] *Twenty Years' Crisis*, p. 239.

cultural identities will be smothered by the vast and impersonal political system which results from bringing citizens and aliens together in larger associations. As noted earlier, he was aware of the risk that the widening of the boundaries of community would activate the recrudescence of disintegrating tendencies. If they were to survive, he added, international organizations would need to 'admit something of the same multiplicity of authorities and diversity of loyalties' as the more successful domestic societies.[40] Nations would be key elements of the new structures of international cooperation, but nations would no longer have an automatic entitlement to constitute themselves as sovereign states. Carr was hostile to the idea of national self-determination and anxious to see an end to the connection between nation and state.[41] The enlargement of political community would not destroy national loyalties, but it would mark 'the beginning of the end of the destructive phase of nationalism'.[42]

To realize this vision would involve a radical break with the parochialism of the modern sovereign state—but with the habits which are associated with the nation-state rather than with sovereignty itself. Along with Kant, Carr believed that the important question was not whether societies such as Britain should possess sovereignty, but how they should exercise their sovereign powers.[43] In *The Future of Nations*, Carr argued that nations and states did not have the right to take decisions without regard for the interests of outsiders.[44] Precisely this sentiment seems to underlie his comment about British policy to which I referred earlier. Britain would survive then as a sovereign state but not as a self-regarding sovereign state. For that reason, British policy could not automatically prefer the interests of the inhabitants of Oldham and Jarrow to those of the inhabitants of Dusseldorf, Lille and Lodz.

Further remarks on how the state's exercise of its powers might be restrained by new international norms are scattered throughout Carr's work. Like Roosevelt, Carr pinned his hopes on the continuation of the wartime alliance.[45] Military cooperation between the great powers would continue, he hoped, and each might enjoy military

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[40] *Nationalism and After*, p. 49.

[41] '. . . we must discard the nineteenth-century assumption that nation and state should normally coincide', *Future of Nations*, p. 48.

[42] *Nationalism and After*, p. 67. On Carr's belief that the problem of the first part of the century occurred because the balance between nationalism and internationalism had broken down, and on his assumption that striking a new balance between nationalism and internationalism was essential, see my 'Community', in Danchev (ed.), *Fin de Siècle*.

[43] 'What we are required to surrender is not a mythical attribute called sovereignty, but the habit of framing our military and economic policy without regard for the needs and interests of other countries' (*Future of Nations*, p. 61). In *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, p. 231, Carr argued that the 'concept of sovereignty is more likely to become in the future even more blurred and indistinct than it is at present'. 'It is unlikely', he went on, 'that the future units of power will take much account of formal sovereignty. There is no reason why each unit should not consist of groups of several formally sovereign states so long as the effective (but not necessarily the nominal) authority is exercised from a single centre. The effective group unit of the future will in all probability not be the unit formally recognised as such by international law'.

[44] See p. 23: 'A group of individuals living in the middle of Great Britain or Germany cannot claim, in virtue of the principle of self-determination, an inherent right to establish an independent self-regarding unit. In the same way, it would be difficult to claim for Wales, Catalonia and Uzbekistan, an absolute right to independence, even if a majority of their inhabitants should desire it; such a claim to self-determination would have to be weighed in the light of the interests, reasonably interpreted, of Great Britain, Spain and Soviet Russia. The same consideration of what is reasonable in the interests of others is also applicable to units which already enjoy an independent existence'.

[45] *Future of Nations*, p. 58.

bases on the others' soil[46] International cooperation in the economic sphere could be extended by developing a 'common economic policy'. States could break with the habit of using nationalist symbols to divide peoples from one another, so allowing a great diversity of loyalties to flourish. But some intrusions into the cherished sovereignty of the state should not be ruled out. Interestingly, Carr lamented the failure to establish fair war-crimes trials at the end of the First World War.[47] As this discussion reveals, Carr's principal aim was not the relinquishment of sovereignty, but the accumulation of international norms which would lead states to see the wider moral point of view.[48]

Of course the question whether his own ideas were utopian cannot be indefinitely postponed. Carr observed that state managers are unlikely to be at the forefront of radical change since most have a vested interest in ensuring that competing sites of power and authority do not erode their influence.[49] He coupled this remark with some confidence in the reformist role of the great powers. A central role in shaping the new world order is envisaged for them, and especially for the multiethnic great powers which already embodied some of the principles of an alternative to the classical sovereign state order.[50] Carr's general position on the role of great powers invites comparison with Bull's observation in the early 1980s that the leading powers must be guided by the principle that international order depends on justice.[51] Anticipating Bull's position, Carr argued that because the great powers benefit most

[46] In *The Future of Nations*, p. 58, Carr referred to international military cooperation through leasing bases to the forces of other powers as 'far more promising than any formal attempts to create an international army'.

[47] Carr discussed war crimes in *International Relations between the Two World Wars (1919–1939)* (London, 1965), pp. 47–8. Referring to the cases against twelve German military personnel heard before the German Supreme Court at Leipzig in 1921, with the Allied Governments acting as prosecutors, Carr maintained: 'Had the passions of the time permitted the Allied Governments to make the arrangement reciprocal, and had they themselves been willing to bring to trial any of their own nationals accused of similar offences by the German Government, the whole procedure might have been a valuable innovation and an earnest of the desire of mankind to make international law an effective reality'.

[48] 'For the Great Power, it involves the assumption of a responsibility both military and economic—such as Great Powers have rarely been prepared to undertake—for the welfare of other nations. For Great Britain—to take the concrete case—it means making the defence of, at any rate, some European countries a common unit with the defence of Britain, and accepting the principle of a common economic policy which will take into account the interest of, say, French, Belgian and German industry or of Danish and Dutch agriculture as well as of British industry or agriculture.' *Future of Nations*, p. 55.

[49] *Nationalism and After*, p. 53, refers to the fact that the great powers combine the promise of creating new structures of cooperation with the threat of introducing new forms of power.

[50] See *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, p. 236, for an intriguing comparison between the United States and Britain, and Germany and Japan: 'Belief in the desirability of seeking the consent of the governed by methods other than those of coercion has in fact played a larger part in the British and American than in the German or Japanese administration of subject territories'. Their apparent success as melting-pots seems to have appealed to Carr most strongly, and some of his remarks suggest that multiethnicity falls well short of the multicultural ideal which is expressed in modern notions of group-differentiated citizenship and the politics of recognition. Revealingly, to remain with this theme for one moment, Carr argued that while the older generations of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia opposed the absorption of their countries within the Soviet Union, the younger generation keenly anticipated the benefits which would result from amalgamating with the larger. There are echoes here of Lenin's approach to the national question, and a similar inclination to underestimate the extent to which nationalists will absorb a heavy economic and political price to realize their political claims. On group-differentiated citizenship, see Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, 1989); on the politics of recognition, see Charles Taylor, *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition* (Princeton, 1992).

[51] H. Bull, 'International Anarchy in the 1980s', *Australian Outlook*, 37 (1983), pp. 127–31.

from international order, it is fitting that they should pay a disproportionate part of the cost of ensuring that it has the approval of the majority of the world's peoples.[52] Some sacrifices would be incurred to bridge the gulf between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots'; but it was by no means certain, Carr went on to say in a formulation which brings the Grotian tradition immediately to mind, that the request for small sacrifices must necessarily fail.[53]

Carr's remark about 'the impossible task of creating an international community out of units so fantastically disparate . . . as China and Albania, Norway and Brazil' prompts one final observation about the question of utopianism.[54] That is that he believed that the best prospects for fundamental change existed at the regional level, and especially in Europe given its recent history.[55]

The core of the argument, then, was that the nation-state had failed but that practical solutions involving small sacrifices could be found. In Carr's work, a sober appeal to practical necessity was blended with a commitment to high moral ideals.[56] Whatever one may think of the details of the argument which Carr set out half a century ago, exactly the same need for combining elements of the utopian tradition with the quest for workable solutions to the problems of everyday existence exists today. In the final section therefore I want to offer some thoughts about how the higher moral ideas can be combined with issues of practical import. Let me look more closely at the nature of the moral capital which has been amassed in earlier struggles against exclusion; and let me consider its significance for the question of how political communities should evolve in response to the current challenge of transnational harm. Let me do this in order to show that it is the move from national to transnational citizenship which best captures the spirit of Carr's inquiry in the modern age.

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[52] 'Those who profit most by that order can in the long run only hope to maintain it by making sufficient concessions to make it tolerable to those who profit by it least; and the responsibility for seeing that these changes take place as far as possible in an orderly way rests as much on the defenders as the challengers'. *Twenty Years' Crisis*, p. 169. See also pp. 235–6 on the importance of the principle of consent in international relations.

[53] *Twenty Years' Crisis*, p. 239. Note also his agreement with Lauterpacht's observation that 'the circle of interests directly regulated by law expands with the growth of civilisation' (ibid., p. 212); and the following comment on Zimmern's claim that it is important for 'the ordinary man to enlarge his vision so as to bear in mind that the public affairs of the twentieth century are world affairs': 'the most common meaning which can be given to this injunction is that the recognition of the principle of self-sacrifice, which is commonly supposed to stop short at the national frontier, should be extended beyond it. It is not certain that the ordinary man will remain deaf to such an appeal' (ibid., p. 169). On 'haves and have-nots', see *Twenty Years' Crisis*, p. 212.

[54] *Nationalism and After*, p. 42.

[55] Ibid, p. 45.

[56] In *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, a combination of Realist hard-headedness and a quasi-Marxist belief that the dominant morality of each epoch reflected the interest of the dominant groups stood in the way of a bold normative defence of international political change. See esp. p. 79. But even there Carr expressed rather different sentiments. Note, for example, his claim (p. 145) that the 'fact that national propaganda everywhere so eagerly cloaks itself in ideologies of a professedly international character proves the existence of an international stock of ideas, however limited and however weakly held, to which appeal can be made, and of a belief that these common ideas stand somehow in the scale of values above national interests. This stock of common ideas is what we mean by international morality'. See Bull's critique, however, in ' "The Twenty Years' Crisis": Thirty Years On', *International Journal*, 24 (1969), pp. 625–38.

From national to transnational citizenship

As I have tried to show, *Nationalism and After* is an account of the dark side of modernity which includes the growth of state power, the increased regulation of society, the willingness to export harm to other peoples and the intensification of divisions between societies. It is an account of the dark side of modernity which in its worst moments produced the spectacle of violent nationalism, totalitarianism and war. But it is also an inquiry into the progressive side of modernity, in which subordinate groups sought inclusion within the nation: it is an exploration of the struggle of the middle classes to achieve the democratization of the nation and of the efforts of the working classes to overcome their exclusion from bourgeois society (albeit, Carr thought, with highly ambiguous results).

Increasing state power and exposure to the vagaries of the market generated two waves of demands for social and political inclusion. The German historian, Otto Hintze, reflected on the first part of this process.[57] Hintze argued that following the introduction of national conscription in Western Europe, citizens or subjects insisted on having legal and political rights in compensation for the enormous burdens which states now imposed upon them. Representative government which included larger numbers of citizens in the affairs of the nation developed in response to the effects of the totalizing project: it emerged in the context of state-building and war. Carr described the second phase, in which the working classes aimed to secure their inclusion in the life of the national community by carving out new social and economic rights. The most important point here as far as future modifications of political community are concerned is that the struggle against exclusion in the West has largely been a struggle to acquire and extend citizenship rights. Much of the moral capital which has been accumulated during the long history of resistance to unjust exclusion has been invested in the idea of citizenship.

Like the best investments, citizenship generates dividends: it creates additional reserves which excluded groups can draw on for the purpose of contesting unjust arrangements and imagining alternative forms of life. The idea of citizenship has been especially important in shaping critical political cultures which are sensitive to the varieties of exclusion and open to progressive development. It is one dimension of the cultural logic of modernity which forces members to question the forms of exclusion. Herein lies the key to developing Carr's image of new forms of political community.

The best-known account of the way in which the idea of citizenship injects progressive dynamics into modern society is to be found in T. H. Marshall's account of the development of the British state.[58] In that account Marshall argued that the acquisition of civil or legal rights such as freedom from arbitrary arrest, freedom of thought and free speech was an important achievement, but ultimately incomplete without the additional right of political participation. Demands for the right to be involved in making the law (albeit at a distance through elected representatives) therefore followed the establishment of rights of protection under the law. Additional pressures arose in the wake of these measures to democratize the nation. The

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[57] Otto Hintze, *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*, ed. with an introduction by Felix Gilbert (Oxford, 1975), p. 211.
[58] T. H. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship and Social Development* (Westport, CT, 1973).

idea that everyone is free to dine in the Ritz, but in reality not everyone can avail themselves of the opportunity, captures the essential point. Legal and political rights are hollow achievements unless citizens have the power to exercise them. A certain dialectic was set in motion, then, by the creation of basic civil rights. Its outcome was the recognition that citizens cannot be full-fledged members of a political community unless they possess an ensemble of legal, political and social rights.

Complex assessments of the moral significance of the differences between the members of society have been integral to the development of these citizenship rights. As Axel Honneth has recently argued, the belief that all members of society should possess exactly the same legal and political rights rests on the assumption that many of the differences between individuals lack moral relevance.[59] The principle that a person's class or ethnicity, gender or race, does not count as a good reason for withholding the rights which others already possess is therefore one of the achievements of the modern state, although its limitations have been convincingly exposed in the feminist literature.[60] Marshall exposed one clear limitation: societies which fail to take account of different levels of power, wealth and opportunity leave large numbers of citizens with little more than formal rights. Recognition of the need for 'sensitivity to difference', to use Honneth's phrase, prepared the way for the enlargement of citizenship to embrace social and economic rights.[61]

Citizenship is critically important because it inserts what Honneth calls developmental pressures and tendencies into the structure of modern society; these promote sensitivity to the ways in which some systems of exclusion deprive individuals of legal and political rights because of their ethnicity, race or gender; these pressures also create awareness of how exclusion operates through failures to take account of important differences between individuals, for example their inequalities of power and wealth.

Societies which have covered this much ground encounter two additional developmental pressures. Carr analyzed the first of them, which raises profound questions about the relationship between citizens and aliens, but barely considered the second pressure, which involves the deepening of sensitivity to cultural differences. He reconsidered the relationship between citizens and aliens in the light of one of the deepest lessons of globalization which is that the increased opportunities for, and instances of, transnational harm erode the value of national citizenship. Transnational harm confronts national communities with the question whether they can best secure, indeed only secure, social and other rights by bringing the inhabitants of, for example, Dusseldorf and Lille, and Jarrow and Oldham together in a wider political association. It poses the profoundly important question how the members of different societies can make progress in constituting themselves as a transnational

[59] A. Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts* (Cambridge, 1995).

[60] Carol Gilligan's *In a Different Voice* (New York, 1993) is the path-breaking work on this subject. See also S. Benhabib and D. Cornell (eds.), *Feminism as Critique: Essays on the Politics of Gender in Late-capitalist Societies* (Cambridge, 1987).

[61] Honneth, *Struggle for Recognition*, p. 118.

citizenry.[62] It invites the question whether the differences between citizens and aliens are morally relevant distinctions. It raises the question whether decisions to make too much of the differences between citizens and aliens smack of earlier practices of imputing far too much moral significance to differences of race, ethnicity and gender.

Of course it would be a mistake to assume that cultural and other differences between human beings do not matter at all. Carr acknowledged this point when he argued that international planning organizations should admit a diversity of loyalties and a multiplicity of authorities. But, to turn to the second developmental tendency, political sensibilities have moved on considerably in the period since Carr was writing. Pressures for increasing deep diversity were far less prominent in the 1940s than they are now. As a result, an observation which Frazer and Gordon have made in regard to Marshall's study of the development of citizenship also applies to Carr's argument for internationalizing social rights.[63] The key point is that mainstream analyses of citizenship were largely concerned with the problems of the male working classes and virtually ignored the plight of those who were excluded on the grounds of gender or race. The extension of citizenship rights has progressed unevenly; nevertheless the argument that the dominant conceptions of citizenship should be modified to take account of the particular needs and interests of subaltern groups is a hugely important development in contemporary political theory and practice. It is important for redefining the relationship between citizens and the state; and for widening the boundaries of community with a view to building a transnational citizenship.

The moral capital which is deposited in the idea of citizenship can be exploited in visions of how society can be changed to free human beings from the tyranny of unjust exclusion. It creates potentials for further progress, but whether these potentials are actualized is another matter. Carr believed that the fear of unemployment was the main form of personal insecurity which might force the European societies to use their moral capital to ensure the international protection of social rights. The recent G7 meeting in Lille indicated that this dimension of personal insecurity is still a matter of international concern, but the pressures to create new forms of com-

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[62] Carr argues in *The Future of Nations*, p. 49, that 'The divorce between nation and state, or between "cultural nation" and "state nation", would mean expressed in simpler language, that people should be allowed and encouraged to exercise self-determination for some purposes but not for others, or alternatively that they should "determine" themselves into different groups for different purposes'. See also the following remark (p. 50): 'There is every reason to suppose that considerable numbers of Welshmen, Catalans and Uzbeks have quite satisfactorily solved the problem of regarding themselves as good Welshmen, Catalans and Uzbeks for some purposes and good British, Spanish and Soviet citizens for others . . . An extension of this system of divided but not incompatible loyalties is the only tolerable solution to the problem of self-determination; for it is the only one which will satisfy at one and the same time the needs of modern military and economic organisation and the urge of human beings to form groups based on common tradition, language and usage'. Parallels with Bull's thought come to mind. For further discussion, see my 'Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State', *European Journal of International Relations*, 2:1 (1996), pp. 77–103. It is important to stress that in his essay, 'The Future of International Government', given at the conference on the theme of Peace Aims which was held in Oxford in 1941 under the auspices of the National Peace Council, Carr expressed a clear preference for welfare rights. To be 'effective' in the modern world, he argued, liberty must come to mean 'maximum social and economic opportunity'. Liberty would not appeal to people 'if it means liberty to starve'.

[63] N. Frazer and L. Gordon, 'Civil Citizenship against Social Citizenship? On the Ideology of Contract-versus-Charity', in B. van Steenbergen (ed.), *The Condition of Citizenship* (London, 1994), p. 93.

munity and citizenship now stem from a variety of sources.[64] Transnational harm comes in many different shapes and sizes: in the Chernobyl effect, for example, and the various instances of transnational pollution. In the context of globalization, citizens who live in the zone of peace are less troubled by the threat of war than by passing oil tankers and the consequences of purchasing meat from the local supermarket—and by all the other consequences of the global risk society, in Ulrich Beck's memorable phrase.[65] Societies and their citizens with major commitments to democracy must be increasingly alarmed too by the mounting evidence that national institutions are less able to protect local communities from the effects of global economic and social forces. With such phenomena in mind, David Held has argued that democratic citizens have an obligation to work together to transnationalize the democratic community.[66] To put the point differently, they have an obligation to form themselves into a transnational citizenry in which the members of different states assume political responsibility for the harm they cause one another.

Whereas Carr argued for new forms of political community to protect social rights, current approaches are inclined to argue that the enlargement of community should be a vehicle for safeguarding civil rights—allowing appeals beyond the state to international courts of law, for example—and for supporting cultural rights whether by devolving power to local communities or strengthening the international protection of minority nations. Current approaches are more likely to argue that one purpose of widening political community in Western Europe is to overcome the limitations of national democracy; and they are more inclined to stress the need to democratize extended communities. These approaches are more likely to offer a vision of a multiethnic, transnational democracy in which the members of different societies come together to secure their legal, political, social and cultural rights within local, national and supranational political communities.[67] In Europe we might yet see the realization of this vision by securing advances in democracy, individual and collective rights, social justice and common security, care for the environment and duties to other species. Despite the obstacles, the softer hues of modernity might yet prevail.

The realization of this vision would mark the end of the totalizing process in which governments could destroy alternative sites of power and authority and eliminate rivals in the competition for human loyalty. It would signify the end of the period in which national governments could use their monopoly powers to create national communities which were deeply exclusionary when dealing with subaltern groups and aliens; it would represent an important advance in the internationalization of national decision-making; and it would involve the passing of the era in which national governments could simultaneously contract the moral and extend the security boundaries of communities with inevitably disastrous results. Political association would no longer assume the fusion of sovereignty, territoriality, citizenship and nationalism. Post-nationalist communities and expressions of citizenship

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[64] On the recent G7 meeting see Diane Coyle, 'What about those Left outside our Brave New World?', *Independent*, 4 April 1996. The job summit, Coyle reports, was concerned with 'how to re-include' what the French call the *exclus*: those groups 'excluded from the mainstream of the economy and society by homelessness, unemployment or dead-end jobs'.

[65] U. Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity* (London, 1992).

[66] Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*.

[67] For further discussion, see my 'Citizenship and Sovereignty'.

would be more universalistic, more sensitive to cultural differences and more deeply committed to the eradication of social and economic inequality as a result.

Conclusion

For much of its short history the study of international relations has been at odds with the project of the Enlightenment which invites human beings to collaborate to expand the realm of freedom and understanding. For too long the subject has stressed immutability, necessity and inevitability in the world of states. Neorealism represents the high point of antagonism to the belief that the anarchic system can be modified and the nation-state transformed. This was not Carr's position. What is striking about Carr's analysis is his unusual recognition that the boundaries of moral and political community are not fixed and unalterable: these boundaries can expand just as they can contract. Realist themes in Carr's thought stressed the dark side of modernity such as totalitarianism and war, but he argued that modern societies had accumulated sufficient moral and cultural capital to advance to new forms of political community and new principles of international relations. The modern state's failure to ensure the security and welfare of its citizens made it necessary to draw on these resources in order to develop post-nationalist societies which are committed to developing a transnational citizenship.

By showing that new forms of political organization were already immanent in existing societies, Carr avoided the naivety of utopianism and the sterility of Realism. But somehow Carr's reputation for realism has obscured these aspects of his thought, and his writings have too frequently been used to legitimize a discipline with limited normative ambitions.[68] Had the stress been on how Carr's work contributed to the project of the Enlightenment the subject might have had a rather different history: a history of explaining the dark side of modernity with its logics of power and control, but also a history of exploring the other side of modernity with its capacity for generating resistance to domination and exclusion. The discipline might have arrived much earlier at the intellectual position which the critical approaches to international relations have reached today. From this vantage point, the moral reserves which have been accumulated in the struggles of recent centuries should now be used to meet the contemporary challenge of widening the moral boundaries of community and internationalizing the struggle against unjust exclusion.

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[68] Efforts to dislodge these assumptions can be found in Booth, 'Security in Anarchy', and P. Howe, 'The Utopian Realism of E. H. Carr', *Review of International Studies*, 20 (1994), pp. 277–97. See also my *Beyond Realism and Marxism*, p. 7, and 'What is a Good International Citizen?' in P. Keal (ed.), *Ethics and Foreign Policy* (Canberra, 1992).