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Songs sympathetic to Napoleon turn up in significant numbers only after the 1814 and 1815 falls from power. The plight of the captured leader diminished his towering figure to human dimensions; Cox Jensen speculates that Napoleon's "transportation" to St. Helena resonated with listeners whose loved ones had been sent to Botany Bay or grabbed by press gangs. What songs qualify as "pro-Napoleonic" remains a question. Humane sympathy did not necessarily amount to political endorsement. One provincial printer (Joseph Russell of Birmingham) who sold songs about the fallen emperor turns out to have also peddled ballads celebrating loyalist heroes like Nelson. Does this suggest that the fallen Napoleon's appeal was quasi-literary rather than political—that the story of a modern-day Icarus resonated for reasons having little to do with ideology? Cox Jensen observes that a patriotic song could sometimes appear on the same broadside as an anti-war ballad. Such combinations might indicate deliberate "satirical" intent, as he suggests (26), but we should also recall that listeners can be deaf to a song's seemingly obvious political content (see "Born in the U.S.A.").

Cultural historians will find invaluable the book's opening and closing chapters, which consider the composition, publication, marketing, and performance of songs. Cox Jensen clarifies much about early nineteenth-century "song culture." The final chapter focuses on Newcastle, a town of "no definite partisan character" (135). Because Newcastle's corporation harassed street singers, performance was largely restricted to public houses and other indoor venues. During the war, the chief target of sung political dissent was impressment; Napoleon played little role in local songs until his fall. Cox Jensen focuses on one radical publisher who later published a prose tribute to Napoleon, though, apparently, no pro-Napoleonic songs. (The tribute appeared in 1821, leaving one uncertain whether the printer had always been a Bonapartist.) That the publisher maintained a circulating library suggests to Cox Jensen that workers might have memorized songs without needing to purchase broadsides. But he cautions that we cannot be sure to what uses the library was put: this possibility may represent "merely so much potential" (146). As this careful observation suggests, the book manages to convey the fog that surrounds its subject, at the same time that its piercing light reveals a great deal.

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James Davey. *In Nelson's Wake: The Navy and the Napoleonic Wars*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015. Pp. 418. $40.00 (cloth).
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James Davey's major reexamination of the Royal Navy's strategic role in the Napoleonic conflicts, 1803–1814 and 1815, *In Nelson's Wake: The Navy and the Napoleonic Wars*, the first for many for decades, is based on a combination of original research and the latest published literature. In 1892, Alfred T. Mahan asserted the decisive impact of sea power on this conflict. Such ideas seemed passé after 1918, however, and for many years the prevailing trend in British historiography on the Napoleonic conflict and national strategy downplayed and even disputed the Royal Navy's contribution to victory. In the era of world wars, hot and cold, it was fashionable to dismiss the contribution of sea power, stressing the role of land forces. The key text of this argument, Sir Michael Howard's *The Continental Commitment* (1972), spoke to a particular period when the British Army on the Rhine was the center of Britain's NATO contribution. As those days are long past, the "Continental Commitment" can now be seen as a short-term anomaly. Since 1989, the emergence of a multipolar world and the critical role of the oceans on global economics have shifted the agenda back towards a maritime perspective. Consequently, there

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is a striking synergy between Davey's text and the strategic concepts advanced over a century ago by Julian Corbett in *England and the Seven Year's War* (1907), *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (1911), and other vital texts. Corbett emphasized the limited and maritime nature of British power, demonstrating how it succeeded without conscripting soldiers or seeking decisive land battles. The Royal Navy was the "Senior Service" because Britain's survival depended on imported food and raw materials, along with the proceeds of international trade. Between 1803 and 1814, Britain secured command of the sea in fleet battle and strategic blockade to impose a crushing economic restriction of France and her conquered satellites, steadily strangling an entire continent, denying Napoleon the opportunity to consolidate his Universal Monarchy or expand beyond the west and central European heartland.

Davey reinforces Mahan and Corbett's pioneering examinations of national strategy with detailed historical research that addresses the latest debates about supply, administration and logistics, economics and strategy. Alongside a wealth of telling detail, he sustains a compelling assessment of the naval role in victory. Where Mahan asserted the importance of economic warfare, Davey traces the interaction of Napoleon's Continental System and the British Orders in Council through to the decisive point. Exploiting his expertise on the Royal Navy's critical Baltic campaigns between 1807 and 1812, campaigns that enabled Britain to endure and wreck the Russian economy, Davey provides a clear line of causation. When Napoleon attempted to increase his control over the economies of Europe, Russia broke with the System, because the alternative was national bankruptcy and regime change. After his defeat in Russia, Napoleon's continental enemies, supported, funded, and equipped by Britain, defeated his armies as decisively as the Royal Navy had broken his economy. The economic war against France provided an occasion for the United States of America to attack Britain, declaring war just as Napoleon invaded Russia, anticipating his success would bring the British to their knees. Instead, Napoleon was defeated, and Britain was able to deploy a fleet of similar size to the one used in the Baltic between 1807 and 1812 to the American theater. Naval victories and the defeat of American commercial warfare secured the Atlantic, while the blockade broke the American economy, bankrupting the federal state and annihilating American commerce. Bankrupt and burned out of their capital city, the Americans were obliged to make peace in December 1814, despite the British refusing to discuss their core war aims of "Free Trade and Sailors' Rights." Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh also kept the legal basis of British economic warfare off the agenda at the Congress of Vienna, preserving British power for future conflicts. Finally, Napoleon's "Hundred Days" ended with his surrender on board HMS *Bellerophon,* an old 74-gun battleship that had fought with distinction at the Glorious First of June, the Nile, and Trafalgar. Confronted with the reality of British power, Napoleon admitted that the Royal Navy had broken his dreams of conquest.

The existential nature of the Anglo-French conflict—as well as its distinctly naval coloring—was reflected in the heightened rhetoric employed by both sides. Napoleon dismissed the British as mere "Carthaginians," doomed to be destroyed by a new Roman Empire; but J. M. W. Turner and many another British commentator took up the challenge. The British owned the label and celebrated their victory in suitably classical terms: Napoleon was no Scipio Africanus, and Turner created a series of "Carthaginian" masterpieces to drive the point home, images that hung alongside Trafalgar, British seascapes, and celebrations of industrial progress. When the wars ended, the Army was demobilized, the Navy was rebuilt, and Nelson given pride of place at the very heart of a newly imperial London.

The success of the book reflects Davey's ability to strike a fine balance between narrative, analysis, and context. His points, securely based in archival sources and modern scholarship, are frequently driven home with telling quotes from sailors, statesmen, and other makers of contemporary culture. Ultimately Davey explains how the British waged the first "Great War" and did so without copying the continental strategies, relying primarily on sea control and global trade to offset their exclusion from the markets of a burgeoning continental super-state. Britain could not win this war alone, but her limited aims, the restoration of a

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stable, balanced and peaceful European state system, were compatible with those of other powers, in stark contrast to Napoleon's dreams of world conquest. Maritime strategy and off-shore balancing have returned to the center of world affairs, making this a timely text as well as an impressive contribution to scholarship.

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Roberto del Valle Alcalá. *British Working-Class Fiction: Narratives of Refusal and the Struggle against Work*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016. Pp. 192. $195.26 (cloth).
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Many factors have contributed to the diminution of class critique. Some commentators have tried to give the decline's beginning an exact date, around Margaret Thatcher's quip in 1987 that "there is no such thing as society," but while it is true that Thatcherism (and Reaganism) heralded a neoliberalism of the individual and the weakening of state palliatives that addressed class divisions and hierarchies, it was an effect rather than a cause, and a symptom rather than a decisive moment. It coincided closely with another marker, the collapse of the Socialist Bloc, which suggested a broad contraction in the influence of Marxist thought with its theorization of class formation and antagonism. Such factors and others, emerging from long-term socioeconomic trends, are bound to have an impact on the importance of class discourse in understanding the current conjuncture. It is no small antinomy of history that when capitalism appears so global and triumphant, the class divisions on which it pivots appear so abstract and abstruse. Even the invocation of the infamous "one percent" underlines the confusion around how class determines and overdetermines social differentiation and how indeed one percenters can criticize their own and so claim to represent the rest against themselves. How might literary and cultural study speak to the banalization and obfuscation of class in the present?

British Working-Class Fiction comes as a welcome contribution to contemporary debates concerning fictions on class and fictions of class. Rather than simply trying to revivify or restate the class components of literary production, Roberto del Valle Alcalá attempts something more ambitious. In the face of class misrecognition or displacement, he pays attention to the problem of work itself in the production and reproduction of social relations within twentieth-century fiction. Following provocations in Autonomist thinking, the idea is to consider the contradictions of class in work as an ontological category. In this approach, being is not composed of a self-recognition around identity, but is conceived instead in specific relations to work and its processes. The reason behind this shift is not to dismiss either selfhood or self-recognition but to draw attention to class expressiveness that is not based on theories of transcendence. True, this means that del Valle Alcalá must distance his approach from the imprimatur of Hegelian dialectics (which for some is the true distinction between Marxism and post-Marxism—such a break is for Gilles Deleuze the only categorical imperative), but the challenge is to think the immanence of the work/worker relation without negating the very reason for its proposition or tension. Without recounting the complex dimensions of this political and philosophical debate (say, between Antonio Negri's penchant for Marx's fragment on machines and Deleuze's gambit on the desiring fragment itself), it should be clear that when del Valle Alcalá discusses British working-class fiction, his analysis will necessarily not comport with any reading based on a kind of New Left polemic (emanating from Richard Hoggart, Raymond Williams, Eric Hobsbawm or, for instance, E. P. Thompson, who warrants nary a mention in the text). The result can be both refreshing and frustrating.

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