

“words of thunder” (8). Although Jahr recognizes Bismarck’s central role in ending Austro-Prussian dualism in 1866 and achieving German unification in 1870–1871, he emphasizes that the Iron Chancellor viewed the idea of the nation as “nothing more than an instrument in his tool case with which he would restructure the European order” (178). That this rebuilding was successful was “not least” due to an “excess” of the fortunes of war (216).

In the end, Jahr wants us to understand that more reasons led to the founding of the Kaiserreich than just nationalism and the will of Bismarck. He seeks to address the modern and general antipathy for the founding of the German nation-state 150 years ago. His goal is to bring the complex series of events that led to the emergence of the empire closer to an audience that knows little about these events because “the memory of them has long been overlaid by the subsequent world wars and rests deeply sedimented at the bottom of the collective memory” (291). However, as is often the case when chronicling diplomacy and war, Jahr’s presentation follows the military events of 1864, 1866, and 1870 that made possible the imperial proclamation in 1871. Although Jahr shifts the focus of his narrative away from Bismarck, Moltke, and Roon, he sometimes gets bogged down in the details of the Wars of Unification without providing proper context, which raises the question of why he decided to include such details. Jahr discloses the wars’ causes, the diplomatic environment, the strategies and operations, and the experiences of both the military and civilian population. As much as possible, he allows the contemporaries to speak by utilizing a variety of published sources, in particular letters, diaries, and journals.

As for original contributions, the book’s final chapter examines the contrary images of the history of the Kaiserreich created both contemporaneously and subsequently. Its title, “The Spirit of Violence” summarizes the book’s main argument: that the creation of the empire established violence as a norm in German history that prevailed until 1945. In addition, Jahr examines the event of the founding of the empire over the longer term by looking at the very different cultures of commemoration and remembrance in the states involved in the Wars of Unification. Lastly, Jahr’s emphasis on Bismarck’s economic policy, the success of the Prussians in developing their economy faster than their rivals, and the views of the economy by Marx and Engels are presented in the short but important chapter “Armaments and Politics.” Jahr quotes Rudolf Löwenstein, who had prophesied in 1862 that German unity would be established “not through ‘iron and blood,’ but rather through iron and coal” (94).

*Blut und Eisen* is a multifaceted, thought-provoking book. Jahr connects the dramatic events of the 1860s with the great trends of the time and the perspective from above with experiences from below. The description of the military events remains tight and clear. Jahr covers much ground in a well-written, handsome book.

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## **“Blut und Eisen auch im Innern”. Soziale Konflikte, Massenpolitik und Gewalt in Deutschland vor 1914**

**By Amerigo Caruso. Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2021. Pp. 361. Cloth €29.95. ISBN 978-3593513287.**

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In “*Blut und Eisen auch im Innern*,” a phrase coined by Kaiser Wilhelm II in the midst of a construction workers’ strike in Potsdam in August 1898, Amerigo Caruso presents a

fascinating study of the exercise and control of violence during mass demonstrations and strikes in pre-World War I Saxony and Prussia. His aim is to investigate the interstices of an authoritarian, hierarchical regime that was “based unambiguously on democratic participation and the principles of a law-governed state (*Rechtsstaat*)” (9), in which a willingness to use violence was a “niche phenomenon” in a “precariously pacified society” (10), characterized by feelings of insecurity and images of violence in the press. The book also explores the penumbra of a “modern slave trade” (188) of migrant workers and yellow unions, which surrounded the world of strike breakers, the police, and industrial paternalism. In these respects, it extends the earlier work of Thomas Lindenberger on the violent politics of “the street” in *Straßenpolitik. Zur Sozialgeschichte der öffentlichen Ordnung in Berlin 1900 bis 1914* (1995).

The book is most successful in bringing to light half-hidden threats and acts of violence by privately employed factory guards, who worked closely with the police and organized gangs of strike breakers, who were given gun licences by local authorities and treated leniently by the courts, even in cases of homicide (which were usually reduced to manslaughter or self-defence). Officials and bosses in the *Kaiserreich* had become increasingly concerned about union organization, industrial unrest, and strikes, especially after the lapsing of the Anti-Socialist Laws in 1890. The police in Prussia (*gendarmerie*, *Schutzmannschaften*, and *Kommunalpolizei*) had increased in number from 3,000 to 40,000 in the course of the long nineteenth century, meaning that there was one officer per 700 inhabitants by 1913 compared to one for every 2,500 or so in the first half of the nineteenth century. Despite this, factory owners and officials seem to have become more anxious, seeking to quell unrest and protect property by allowing “mixed state-centric and private notions and practices of security” (236) to come into being through the use of the municipal police, who were deployed in factories and answerable to elite-controlled city administrations, and the arming of “loyal workers” (113) during disputes, amongst other things. Nationally, there were disagreements between the government in Berlin and local industrialists, with criticism of the lies and deceptions of business-friendly publications in the Crown Council itself during the Ruhr miners’ strike in 1905, for instance. Locally, though, officials, manufacturers, and mine owners usually collaborated with each other. In 1909, regular bribes and inducements given by businessmen to police officers were effectively complemented by the highest German court, which granted “a form of legal approval to the mixed private-public financing of police forces” (127).

Caruso rightly points out that strikes in Germany before 1914 “have been examined, for the most part, from the perspective of the workers’ movement” (28). This study investigates “strike terrorism” (31–39) from the standpoint of businessmen and officials as well as union activists and members of the SPD, providing a convincing interpretation of official records, the right- and left-wing press, and relevant treatises by economists, union leaders, and publicists. Arguably, such sources could have been supplemented by autobiographical material and correspondence. Nonetheless, the author’s alternation between detailed analysis of strikes, mass demonstrations (labour and electoral reform), and other events, from shootings by “revolver heroes” (120–128) to examples of “slave labour” (188–196), in both nationalist and socialist publications, helps him paint a revealing picture of the menace and actuality of violence that was inherent in turn-of-the-century labour relations.

How such violence was related to other violent acts, including domestic beatings, rape, assault, and murder, to imagined instances or depictions of violence in novels and newspapers, and to the military and paramilitary violence of wartime and the early Weimar era is more difficult to gauge. “The revolutions and civil-war-like conflicts after 1917 turned pre-war anxieties into open panic,” Caruso writes, before adding that “the states and societies of Europe were under acute stress after four years of total war, which was incomparably greater than it had been before the war” (233). This caveat leaves the question of wartime radicalization unanswered. What the study does very effectively, by contrast, is to examine, from varying points of view, “the discursive radicalization in the last years of the

*Kaiserreich*" (243), which served in part as a substitute for and in part as a constraint on actual violence. The book is a concise and authoritative addition to the wider literature on cultures of violence, economic discipline, and the exercise of political power in pre-Nazi Germany.

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## **A New Field in Mind: A History of Interdisciplinarity in the Early Brain Sciences**

**By Frank W. Stahnisch. Montreal and Kingston: McGill–Queen's University Press, 2020. Pp. xxviii + 570. Cloth CA\$65.00. ISBN 978-0773559325.**

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History of science is hard to write. Were its subject thoroughly antiquated—like alchemy, or salons, or dueling—it would have found more frequent analysis as an aspect of German culture. Unfortunately, historians of science have to straddle past and present, a position that frustrates efforts at placing their work in context. To avoid this hurdle, Frank Stahnisch presents the story of neuroscience as a set of disciplines that continually moved between institutions, countries, and eras.

*A New Field in Mind* opens in Imperial Germany, where Stahnisch shows how neuroscientists in Strasburg and Leipzig breached the confines of anatomy and physiology to join forces with physicians, psychologists, and philosophers interested in the study of the brain. This is an original finding. Traditional histories portray German neuroscience as stagnating during the *Kaiserreich*, with Britain taking over the lead in the twentieth century. The scientists in Stahnisch's book, by contrast, continually adapted to challenging conditions, treating brain injuries of soldiers wounded during the First World War and shifting their focus from physiological development to organic decline during the Weimar Republic. Both these moves aided the progress of neurology in the same way that studies of hereditary mental illness helped to establish the speciality of psychiatry.

The brain sciences turned abusive under National Socialism. Stahnisch recounts, for example, how Georges Schaltenbrand tested the transmission of multiple sclerosis by injecting monkey serum into human subjects and how Ernst Rüdin built a psychiatric empire on the basis of Adolf Hitler's racism. Other trimmers used the Third Reich's "oblique system of nepotism, obscurity, and arbitrariness" to force Jews out of their jobs and intimidate socialists, communists, and pacifists into fleeing the regime. The consequences of all this careerism are easy to imagine: the deaths of patients and prisoners, the ruin of the discipline in Germany, and the shift of the field overseas.

In 1934, Kurt Goldstein described soldiers suffering from brain damage as anxious, literal-minded, and insensible to their disability. The same might be said of neuroscience following the Second World War. Progress stagnated in Germany while psychiatrists like Richard Pfeifer denied their complicity in sterilization and murder. The situation was better in the United States, but American clinicians failed to appreciate the humanism that had fostered Goldstein's holistic neurology. "What was he really, they asked: a physician, a psychologist, or a philosopher?" Tragically, Goldstein never quite fit in at Columbia University,