Book Reviews

doi:10.1017/S095382080621197X

Andrew Mason, *Community, Solidarity and Belonging: Levels of Community and their Normative Significance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. viii + 246.

As Andrew Mason observes, the long-running and mainly misconceived debate between liberals and communitarians has been marked by the signal failure of the latter to make precise what they mean by 'community'. Writing as a liberal – in the broadest sense possible – Mason offers an account of community and of its value. Equipped with that understanding he then tackles three topics: the nature of the community that is valuable at the level of the polity, and the resolution of two conflicts – that between the political community and sub-state communities, and that between the political community and the global community.

Mason offers a thin definition of liberalism as a commitment to a set of individual rights that are prioritized in the construction of institutions and the choice of laws and policies. As he notes, such a commitment is one that a socialist, libertarian or conservative could consistently entertain. So it is not clear how much is gained by the continued use of the 'liberalism' tag. Better perhaps simply to take such a commitment as the minimum that any reasonable normative political theory of the modern democratic state should make, and then evaluate the merits of the different 'thicker' theories on offer. Mason's account of community makes usefully and clearly explicit what is implicit in the many and varied discussions of the subject. For Mason a community is a group of people who share some values and a way of life, identify with the group and recognize each other as members of the group. What Mason adds to this account is the distinction between an ordinary concept of community – one that meets the criteria just indicated – and a moralized concept of community. The latter is the concept of a community whose members display solidarity with, that is mutual concern for, one another and between whom there is no systematic exploitation or injustice. The two concepts play different roles, and the moralized concept will inevitably be the subject of contestation.

Mason has many interesting, judicious and well-argued things to say about multiculturalism, nationalism and the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other states. But the most interesting and original part of the book is his discussion of the role community – on either the ordinary or moralized understanding – should play in the construction of the polity. His central argument – and I think the animating ambition of the book as a whole – is that the ideal of inclusive political community rather than the dominant

conception should be the regulative ideal of liberal politics. Let me spell out what each conception is.

The dominant conception of liberal political community is of a polity whose citizens rationally endorse the principles of justice which regulate their polity's institutions. The ideal of inclusive political community is of a polity whose citizens feel that they belong to it, whose constitution is the product of an inclusive political dialogue, and whose constitution protects basic rights. One might simplify greatly by saying that whereas in the former there is agreement on substantive matters such as principles of justice, in the latter there is only agreement on procedures, that is constitutional essentials albeit including a bill of rights. Why should the second be the regulative ideal of liberal politics?

For Mason the dominant conception is simply too demanding; it is unrealistic to expect convergence on principles of justice. Of course, as he concedes, there is also deep disagreement about what should be included in a list of basic rights (and even whether rights should enjoy constitutional protection). But he can reply that the fact of rights being the outcome of an inclusive political dialogue would give the state some authority to entrench and enforce them, even if, as a non-proceduralist, he thinks that the justification of any set of rights is independent of their procedural approval. The sceptic might still press Mason to show why what is thought of as 'inclusive political dialogue' is not itself deeply contested and how it can be characterized independently of disputed substantive matters of justice and rights.

On the question why convergence on principles of justice is unrealistic Mason appeals to the fact of cultural diversity. This is noteworthy since Rawls – for whom agreement on a political conception of justice *is* attainable – sees the essential problem as one of *moral* pluralism. For Rawls moral disagreement is an inevitable result of the exercise of the deliberative freedoms guaranteed in a modern democracy. By contrast there is no similar assurance that cultural diversity – which is a complex product of social, economic, cultural and political factors – will endure in the problematic form Mason envisages. That is unless he thinks that there are independent reasons why such diversity *ought* to persist. But I do not see these being offered.

Also extremely interesting is Mason's idea of a political community as one whose members identify with its institutions even if they do not have a sense of identifying with one another. It is interesting because on the dominant liberal conception the stability of a polity is what Rawls would call of the right kind inasmuch as the state is legitimate, that is its members morally endorse, agree to, its regulative principles, which are themselves moral in content. To identify with something is to value it (or at least to value one's involvement with it), but such identification is not a moral endorsement. I identify with my family, my football team, my neighbourhood; I do not thereby view as warranted sets of principles regulating the activities of each of these groups. Mason's argument suggests a ground for political unity which need not have moral roots. But, given his rejection of nationality as such a ground, he will be pressed to show where exactly it comes from and how it may be fostered.

Much can be learnt from this book about what community means in political philosophy and about what role community should play in our political life.

It is a very welcome addition to the writing that has been prompted by the original liberalism–communitarian debates even while it rightly remains sceptical about the terms of these debates.

DAVID ARCHARD

Lancaster University

doi:10.1017/S0953820806221976

Thomas Hurka, *Virtue, Vice, and Value* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. ix + 272.

Thomas Hurka has written a splendid and highly original book on the nature of virtue. Treatments of virtue are becoming more common as virtue ethics generates more interest in the literature. Hurka's contribution in *Virtue, Vice, and Value* is one of the best of the new crop of books that seek to understand the nature of virtue and offer an alternative to the Aristotelian conception of virtue which has tended, thus far, to dominate. Hurka is not presenting a virtue ethics – that is, an ethical theory in which virtue has explanatory primacy. Indeed, he argues against such a view. Rather, he is offering an account of what the virtues are, and his account is compatible with other theories – in fact, it is quite compatible with consequentialism and it is an account of virtue that is non-instrumental. His account is therefore original, since it is widely assumed that on a consequentialist view virtues could only have instrumental (or, perhaps more precisely, extrinsic) value. Hurka's argument does not at all rest on denying the instrumental value of virtues – rather, it rests on providing a positive argument for intrinsic value, given certain relational features of virtue.

Hurka believes that virtue is not the only intrinsic value. He provides a base-clause (BG) which specifies 'pleasure, knowledge and achievement' as those things which are intrinsically good. Virtue consists in a relationship, one that is not a causal relationship, rather an 'intentional' or attitudinal relationship, to good and evil. This is a recursive account. First he needs to give a recursive account of good and evil, and then use this in the definition of virtue to get a recursive account of virtue.

The beauty of this account is that he does not simply *add* virtue to the list of intrinsic goods, and thus show how the consequentialist should be concerned with virtue in this way. Instead his ambition is the deeper one of explaining why virtue traits are intrinsic goods in virtue of their relationships with other goods. This gives the account far more structure and force and allows him to avoid the *ad hoc* charge brought against kitchen-sink consequentialism.

Virtue is having the right kind of attitude towards good and evil – attitudes include things like loving, hating, desiring, having an aversion for, etc. For example, loving the intrinsically good is itself intrinsically good; loving the intrinsically bad is itself intrinsically bad. This is the recursive account which makes his account of virtue compatible with consequentialism. It should also be noted, however, that his view can be made compatible with deontological approaches to virtue as well. To make this case he discusses the virtue of conscientiousness, which he describes as a non-consequentialist virtue. It is non-consequentialist, he believes, because it involves loving what is right as

distinct from the good. He admits his consequentialist recursive account cannot handle this, but argues that a modified or extended version can. So, if the account is modified to 'one saying that loving what is right and hating what is wrong as right and wrong are, like loving good and hating evil, themselves intrinsically good', then the account can handle virtues like conscientiousness. So it can be changed so as to accommodate the more deontological virtues.

My main criticism of Hurka's account is that it is too narrow. It fails to account for virtues that are not 'attitudes' – even though Hurka understands 'attitude' rather broadly (love, desire, pursue, take pleasure in, etc.). But some virtues may be simple dispositions to behave a certain way, and they may not be characterized by an attitude *towards the good*. For example, I believe that modesty is a virtue and that it involves underestimating self-worth, so it is characterized cognitively rather than attitudinally. Hurka disagrees with this (pp. 110–11), but his disagreement fails to note the difference between acting modest and being modest. A person can be modest even though acting immodestly. The 'being' modest consists in simply underestimating self-worth. But this criticism of his account does not rest on contentious examples like modesty, or the proper account of modesty. Think of something like honesty which can involve a whole host of motives, some involving attitudes towards the good, and others just neutral – e.g. that's how one was raised, or that's what God wants, etc. One is honest if one tells the truth reliably; or, more severely, one is honest if one tells the truth even if one knows one could get away with telling a lie (this would handle Kant's shopkeeper case). We need not appeal to loving the good at all. Hurka's response would be that in order to regard the honesty as a virtue we must believe it, at the bottom, to involve the right kind of attitude.

Hurka also discusses many specific virtues and vices, and moral emotions such as regret. He frequently makes interesting observations about, for example, how perceptions of a good's actuality affect our responses to it. For example, the value of concern for a remotely possible good is less than that for an actual or closely possible good. While I see the plausibility of this, there is also a 'romantic' intuition that cuts the other way – concern for the impossible or the highly unlikely, like universal love and harmony, may be better, in a kind of idealistic sense, than concern for what is an actual good. Also, I am not clear, on reading Hurka, if he is discussing love of what one knows or believes to be actual as opposed to unlikely, or love of what is actually actual as opposed to actually unlikely? For example, Jean may believe she is likely to win the lottery (though in fact she is not likely to win it) – should she care about this more than some good that is actually very likely?

Hurka also discusses internalist versus externalist accounts of virtue, and ends up favouring an account that is at least partly externalist. On his view, external circumstances can affect virtue – thus, it is not entirely self-sufficient. This echoes arguments one sees in Aristotle and G. E. Moore, and Hurka does an excellent job of incorporating their insights into his own account. He notes that the recursive account he offers 'already allows a person's virtue to be affected by factors outside his control, such as his innate capacities and past environment. If these factors can affect his virtue, why not also his present environment?' (p. 127). Here one might expect a more extended discussion of moral luck and why the internalists are so concerned at least to limit it.

Another issue that Hurka discusses is that of sadistic pleasure, and the value or disvalue that it has. Hurka believes that his recursive account has distinct advantages over the instrumental account since it can explain why this sort of pleasure is intrinsically bad – the sadist is one who gets pleasure from harming others, his attitude is one of loving or desiring what is evil. This is intrinsically bad. The instrumental account, on the other hand, seems to be committed to holding the view that sadistic pleasure is bad only if it leads to further bad things, and this seems rather counter-intuitive. However, Hurka's own account has other difficulties. His discussion of this comes up in his defence of a view that runs counter to Hastings Rashdall's thesis that virtue is a greater intrinsic good. Instead, Hurka defends the view:

(CP) The degree of intrinsic goodness or evil of an attitude to x is always less than the degree of goodness or evil of x. (p. 133)

Consider this in conjunction with (BG) – 'Pleasure, knowledge, and achievement are intrinsically good' (p. 12) – and the recursion account that holds that pleasure in others' pain is intrinsically bad. Given (BG), it is also intrinsically good *as pleasure*. Given (CP), this raises the possibility that sadistic pleasure could on balance be good – since the degree of intrinsic evil of the attitude is less than the evil of the event itself. Then we can combine that with the good of the pleasure and in principle get an 'on balance' good for the sadistic pleasure. This seems counter-intuitive as well – indeed, just as counter-intuitive as the instrumentalist claim that it could on balance be good. It is just that on Hurka's account the 'on balance' is spelled out differently than for the instrumentalist. However, Hurka attempts to meet this challenge, but this involves introducing cumbersome complexities to his view. Similar worries could be raised for the other elements of (BG), such as knowledge and achievement – each of these could involve something wicked, yet be intrinsically good on Hurka's account *qua* knowledge and achievement.

I have raised a few very minor quibbles. Hurka's account of virtue is brilliant because it presents an innovation in accounts of virtue. Even if the minor details require adjustment and even if one agrees with me that it cannot exhaustively account for virtue, it has certainly provided a novel framework for thinking about virtues and what is important about a significant number of them. Furthermore, he has given the consequentialist about virtue a way to have her cake and eat it too! I highly recommend this book.

JULIA DRIVER

Dartmouth College

doi:10.1017/S0953820806231972

Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwarz (eds.), *Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology* (New York: The Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), pp. xii + 593.

In their preface, the editors state their 'not at all modest aim' – to announce the existence of a new field of psychology. The new field is hedonic psychology.

It is described as 'the study of what makes experiences and life pleasant or unpleasant' (p. ix). The editors make it clear that they assume that governmental policy would naturally be concerned with the promotion of happiness. This gives their work dramatic immediate relevance. They go so far as to propose that 'nations should begin monitoring pleasure and pain through on-line experience recording among samples of respondents . . . to provide a more direct assessment of the final outcome about which people are most concerned' (p. xii).

The book is an extensive collection containing twenty-eight essays. A total of fifty-two authors participated in the production of the essays. Some essays have a single author; others were written by groups of two, three, or in some cases as many as five authors. The overwhelming majority of contributors are psychologists. A few are in economics, biology, physiology, neurology, management or other fields. It appears that there are no philosophers among the contributors. Although there are a few scattered brief references to Bentham, Aristotle, Descartes and even one to Wittgenstein, the works of philosophers are rarely mentioned and (as far as I could discern) never discussed in any detail.

The essays are organized into five Parts. The first Part consists of five essays on conceptual and methodological issues. They address foundational questions about the nature of happiness (or pleasure, or 'good feeling', or satisfaction, or fulfilment), its measurement, and the extent to which people are able to recognize, evaluate, recall and predict its presence in their lives. The second Part contains five essays. One is about the evolution of hedonic mechanisms. Another is about 'pleasures of the mind'. One is mostly about pain – what it is and how to manage it. Others focus on the connections between hedonic phenomena and mood and emotion. Essays 11–17 (Part III of the book) focus on the ways in which pleasure and pain are related to personality, emotion, gender, 'life task participation' and other personal factors. The five essays in Part IV consider various ways in which social context (jobs, nationality, etc.) might affect pleasure and pain. The final Part of the book contains six essays on the biology of pleasure and pain. One paper focuses on the neural computation of utility.

Space constraints make extended critical commentary impossible here. I will focus exclusively on conceptual matters that lie at the foundations of the proposed new branch of psychology. My comments concern Kahneman's essay – the first and most 'philosophical' in the volume.

Kahneman's intention is to construct a 'bottom-up' concept of objective happiness. He means to start with temporally small 'atoms of happiness' and then go on to describe mathematical operations on these atoms that will yield measures of a person's objective happiness over an extended period of time, in a domain of life, or even in a life as a whole. The fundamental units are 'instant utilities'. Kahneman says that a natural way to make use of the record of a person's instant utilities during a period of time is to 'define the total utility experienced during an interval of time by the temporal integral of instant utility' (p. 5). If we want to know how happy Helen was in March, we take the temporal integral of her instant utility for all instants in March. We have, in effect, an analysis of a proposed conception of happiness. Obviously, the interest

and success of such a project depends crucially on the clear identification and characterization of the atoms. What, then, is instant utility?

Kahneman introduces (p. 3) what he calls the 'Good/Bad Dimension' (or 'GB Dimension'). Although his remarks suggest a variety of possibilities, I am inclined to believe that Kahneman intends that the items to be ranked are *instantaneous slices of one person's purely subjective experience* – in other words, 'how Helen is feeling right now'. Kahneman suggests (p. 10) that Helen could be fitted with a watch-like device with a buzzer. When the buzzer goes off, Helen is to try to record the GB ranking of her current slice of experience.

But what evaluation is Helen supposed to be making? The choice of the name, as well as Kahneman's remarks about 'evaluation', suggest that when Helen's buzzer goes off, she is to reflect on her current experience and assign it a score representing how *good or bad* it is. But of course there are many sorts of goodness – moral, aesthetic, hedonic, intellectual, etc. In any case, this talk of evaluation is quickly rejected as 'overly intellectual' (p. 3).

Another set of remarks suggests that the GB score of Helen's momentary experience is determined by its *pleasurableness or painfulness*. Kahneman says: 'Being pleased or distressed is an attribute of experience at a particular moment. I will label this attribute *instant utility*, borrowing the term "utility" from Bentham' (p. 4.). He gives an example concerning the amount of pain a colonoscopy patient is suffering at each instant during the 25-minute-long procedure. Height on the up–down axis represents 'pain intensity'. On this interpretation, locations on the GB dimension would apparently indicate intensities of sensory pleasure or pain. This suggests a sensory hedonistic interpretation of the GB dimension.

While this idea might make sense, and is surely familiar to readers of *Utilitas*, Kahneman makes it clear that he does not accept it. He asks what a concept of instant utility should include and answers: 'The hedonic quality of current sensory experience is the first candidate, of course, but it is not sufficient' (p. 6.). The pleasures and pains of anticipation are also to be included, as are 'the pleasures of the mind'. It must also allow for states of 'flow' in which one is so involved in an experience or activity that hedonic value fades into the background of experience (p. 6). Other factors that bear on instant utility are mood, and the degree to which the current experience has 'a promotion focus or a prevention focus' (pp. 6–7). These remarks suggest a pluralistic interpretation of the GB dimension.

Kahneman acknowledges (p. 7) that all this makes instant utility 'intimidating' and 'formidable', so he proposes making use of a different factor – the extent to which the person undergoing the momentary experience wants that experience to continue. He says:

> it makes sense to call Helen 'objectively happy' [in March] if she spent most of her time in March engaged in activities that she would rather have continued than stopped, little time in situations she wished to escape, and – very important because life is short – not too much time in a neutral state in which she would not care either way. This is the essence of the approach proposed here. (p. 7.)

Elsewhere he says: 'Instant utility is best understood as the strength of the disposition to continue or to interrupt the current experience' (p. 4). All of this

strongly suggests that the GB dimension measures *strength of desire for the present experience to continue*. This may be seen as a form of preferentism.

It should be obvious that these remarks give us different ways of understanding instant utility. To see this, consider some cases:

1. Suppose Helen feels guilty about some previous sin and strongly prefers to undergo penance. Suppose she is undergoing some uncomfortable penance. Then at each moment her experience gets a negative rating on the GB dimension if we interpret it hedonically, but a positive rating on it if we give it the preferentist interpretation. She wants her experience to continue, but she is not feeling any pleasure.
2. Suppose Helen is smelling an unusual odour. She finds the smell slightly disgusting, but she is curious. She wants to reflect on this smell. If we let *strength of desire to continue* guide her, she will place it high on the GB dimension. If we let *pleasureableness* guide her, she will place it much lower. If we just ask her to tell us *how good it is* she might place it at some other point.
3. Suppose Helen has been told that she will get a substantial financial reward if she can keep her arm submerged in ice-cold water for five minutes. Suppose she has kept her arm submerged for more than four minutes when the buzzer sounds. If Helen thinks that GB rankings are determined by the extent to which she wants her experience to continue, she may be confused. On the one hand, she wants it to continue because she wants the money. On the other hand, she wants it to stop because it hurts. It seems to me that appeal to 'intensity of desire to continue' is ambiguous. We may want to invoke a distinction between *intrinsic* desires for an experience to continue and *extrinsic* desires for it to continue. Perhaps the score on the GB dimension should be understood to represent *strength of* intrinsic *desire for present experience to continue*.

But even with this added factor included, problems remain:

4. Suppose (to use an example Kahneman describes on p. 19) that Helen is watching a film showing a beautiful view of an African landscape from a low-flying plane. Suppose she is really enjoying it. Suppose her buzzer goes off and she is asked to record *how much she [intrinsically] wants the experience to continue*. She might record a relatively low GB score because she has seen enough. She might think that if she were to continue seeing the beautiful scenery, she would become bored (though she is not bored at the moment). This suggests that there is a difference between (a) how pleasurable Helen's experience is at that moment, and (b) how much she intrinsically wants it to continue.

A different problem concerns the question whether Kahneman has located the real 'foundations' of objective happiness. This example suggests that the foundations are somewhat deeper than instantaneous slices of experience:

5. Suppose that at some moment Helen is very pleased to be living in California, but very displeased to be stuck in a traffic jam. Suppose that at the same time she is enjoying the music playing on her car radio, but displeased about the honking of horns nearby. Suppose in addition that

she is tired and hungry after a long day of work, but satisfied with the quality of the work she performed during the day. Now suppose her online recording device buzzes, and she is required to indicate the location of 'the experience she is having at that instant' on the GB dimension. I would be inclined to say that there is no such thing as 'the experience she is having'. She is having hundreds of experiences. If Helen succeeds in finding some single number that represents her instantaneous level of happiness, she will have done this by combining information about a whole bunch of other numbers. Her GB score cannot be an 'atom' of happiness. If it exists at all, it is a complex 'molecule' of happiness. (Kahneman makes some remarks on pp. 8–9 that indicate that he is aware of this problem. He continues to treat 'instant utilities' as the foundational units for the purposes of his theory.)

If I were trying to construct a concept of objective happiness, I would (a) jettison the idea of characterizing GB scores by appeal to *strength of desire that the experience continue*; (b) introduce and try to explain the notion of a person's being *intrinsically (un)happy* to a degree about a state of affairs at a time; and (c) propose that someone's overall happiness level at an instant is some function (perhaps the sum) of his intrinsic (un)happiness levels with respect to all states of affairs he is aware of at that time. I might then want to consider the idea that (d) Helen's happiness in March is some function of these overall instantaneous (un)happiness levels.

The book contains a wealth of interesting empirical information concerning many aspects of happiness. Readers of *Utilitas* may wish that some of the authors had focused a bit more on conceptual questions that have been discussed in the philosophical literature at least since the times of Bentham and Mill.

FRED FELDMAN

University of Massachusetts at Amherst

doi:10.1017/S0953820806241979

Robert A. Hinde, *Why Good is Good: The Sources of Morality* (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. xiv + 241.

Naturalism in its various forms was the dominant force in twentieth-century American philosophy, though it is easy to lose sight of this, immersed as we are in the metaphysical jungle now in bloom. The moral philosophy that grew in the soil of American naturalism was distinctive in subtle and interesting ways. It sometimes seemed to express an impatience with the careful mapping of moral concepts, and an almost palpable desire to move on to the investigation of actual moral systems, real moral problems, and the apparent diversity of moral outlooks. On occasion this led to engagement with sources, materials and environments distant from the spaces conventionally occupied by philosophers. For example, the distinguished moral philosophers Richard Brandt and John Ladd each did fieldwork with the aboriginal peoples of the American Southwest, producing books on Hopi and Navaho ethics respectively. Brandt's book was

published in 1954, the same year as P. H. Nowell-Smith's *Ethics*, a book that became a standard text in the Cambridge philosophy curriculum. These two books could hardly be more different.

There are signs that philosophers are again becoming attracted to the idea of viewing morality in the context of psychology, biology and anthropology. A spirited debate is now underway on what social psychology tells us about character traits, and what this may imply for virtue theory. Philosophers are increasingly interested in how theories of well-being, judgement and decision can be empirically informed. And almost everyone now acknowledges that it is a constraint on philosophical theories of mind and language that they be at least biologically possible, if not plausible. In this changing environment the book under review takes on great significance.

Robert A. Hinde, the distinguished Cambridge ethologist, has done an excellent job of integrating material from the natural and social sciences with philosophy, and the resulting book will be enormously helpful in recasting some traditional questions in moral philosophy in a more biologically responsive way. Hinde himself focuses his discussion on a set of interrelated issues centring on the question of where moral codes come from. He explores this central question from the perspective both of individuals and of societies. His general answer is that the basic principles of morality are 'pan-cultural' but that they are given specific shape by history. This, he thinks, makes otiose the 'search for a transcendental source for morality'. Although his approach is broadly in the spirit of evolutionary psychology, he is careful to avoid crude reductionism, denying, for example, that it makes sense to discuss the relative importance of genes or experience in the development of a given characteristic, or that his view anyway amounts to a 'biological determinism'. On Hinde's account, people are more 'pro-social' than commonly thought, but they are also 'assertively selfish'. Particular moral systems negotiate these competing tendencies. It is important to Hinde that moral precepts are seen as internalized in a 'self-system', but this system is deeply affected both by the human tendency to conform and by an individual's picture of how he or she is seen by others. On Hinde's telling, the existentialist hero looks more like a vaguely disruptive village eccentric than the authentic voice of human freedom.

In addition to sketching a plausible, if provocative, view, and surveying and synthesizing large and important literatures largely unknown to most philosophers, Hinde also provides interesting arguments and argument-sketches relating to such topics as free will, the existence of God, and the nature of moral dilemmas. It is inevitable with such a synthetic work that specialists in any field surveyed will find something to howl about. The readers of this journal will not be pleased by Hinde's treatment of Bentham and Moore, and they will also yearn for more detail at various philosophically poignant moments. However, most of these lapses are inconsequential when viewed against the broader background of the book's accomplishments. Moreover, philosophers should be humbled to see one of their own set right by a biologist on the question of whether free will and determinism are compatible (pp. 172–6).

I agree with Hinde that it is important to the understanding of morality that we see it as an evolutionary product. I am also sympathetic to utilitarianism. However, the conjunction of these views appears to present a problem. Here is why.

For utilitarianism to prevail, morality must exist. For morality to exist in anything like a modern society, individuals must engage in pro-social behaviour towards those to whom they are not related (where pro-social behaviour is understood as behaviour that fosters the well-being of others). Individuals who engage in such behaviour will, it seems, be less fit than those who do not since they will be providing others with a comparative advantage, sometimes at direct cost to themselves. It thus appears that natural selection would lead to the extinction of pro-social traits. Yet it is obvious that such traits have not been extinguished. Why not?

One explanation appeals to the fact that the very possibility of group living implies the existence of pro-social behaviour. This may be true, but without further development this thought seems to redescribe the phenomenon rather than to explain it. A second explanation appeals to experiments which show that individuals who engage in pro-social behaviour, guided by 'tit for tat' strategies, survive and even thrive in competition with those who practise more selfish strategies. But there are many different results here, and they are not easy to interpret. It appears that 'tit for tat' is least likely to be successful in large groups in which individuals have little knowledge about each others' behavioural dispositions—in other words, the sorts of modern societies with which we are most concerned. The third approach argues that under various fairly robust conditions groups that have large populations of individuals who engage in pro-social behaviour will out-compete groups that do not. Such individuals may be at a disadvantage within their own group, but their group may be at an advantage with respect to other groups, so that such individuals will survive and perhaps thrive, especially if various cultural and social strategies for supporting pro-social behaviour within groups are in play (e.g. nationalism, conformity, etc.).

The problem comes into focus if we endorse this third strategy. If morality is to exist, then pro-social behaviour must survive. But in order to survive, pro-social behaviour must occur primarily within groups that are competing with other groups. A group dominated by individuals whose pro-social behaviour is universally directed, as utilitarians would recommend, rather than directed only towards members of their own group, would present two problems. The first and more limited problem is that such individuals and the groups they dominate might not survive. A second and more general problem is that if pro-social behaviour were expressed only in this way, then pro-social behaviour might not survive and morality itself would be extinguished. These results suggest that if utilitarianism were to prevail at some particular time it would soon disappear, perhaps taking the institution of morality with it.

Hinde does not draw this conclusion, and I do not think that he would be depressed by this result. His goal is only to explain morality. For those of us who seek to change how people behave in the direction of greater and more universal happiness, this result presents a serious challenge. It is a virtue of Hinde's book that it helps us to see such challenges clearly, and, I think, supplies some of the materials for overcoming them.

DALE JAMIESON

New York University