

Different Demands, Varying Responses: Local Government Responses to Workers' Collective Actions in South China

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Abstract

While Chinese local governments remain extremely wary of workers' collective actions, they do not always suppress them; sometimes, they tolerate such actions and even seek to placate workers. What accounts for these different government responses to workers' collective actions? Based on a sample of over 1,491 collective action cases that took place in Guangdong between 2011 and 2016, we find that the types of demands raised by workers during collective actions affect how local governments respond. Local governments are likely to forcefully intervene in collective actions in which workers make defensive claims concerning issues of payment. In contrast, local governments are likely to use non-forceful approaches in response to actions in which workers make defensive claims regarding social security.

Keywords: workers' collective actions; suppression; mediation; worker demands; strike; south China

How to handle collective actions by workers is an important political issue in China. The state's general antipathy towards organized protest,¹ coupled with its concern for slowing economic growth, has increasingly led it to respond more forcefully to workers' collective actions. However, it is a mistake to conclude that local governments in China attempt to suppress all collective actions by workers.² In fact, local governments do not intervene in a large number of such actions and even when they do intervene, suppression is not the only option available to them.³ Local governments at times placate workers by actively mediating conflicts between employees and employers in accordance with the labour law.

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1 King, Pan and Roberts 2013.

2 Cai 2008; Tong and Lei 2013; Li 2017.

3 Su and He 2010.

What explains Chinese local states' varying modes of response to workers' collective actions? Existing studies have extensively examined how the size, the degree of organization and the level of disturbance created by workers' collective actions affect how local governments respond.⁴ In this article, we argue that the types of demands raised by workers is another important factor that determines how governments respond to such incidents.⁵

Data

In this paper, the term workers' collective action (*gongren jiti xingdong* 工人集体行动) refers to strikes, workers' protests, labour activism and demonstrations. The Chinese government unfortunately does not provide official figures on workers' collective actions. To fill the void, the previous literature has relied on a self-constructed dataset derived from mass media reports about collective action cases.⁶ However, many of these studies do not adequately capture changing labour–state relations. This is because they are not confined to workers' collective actions but instead encompass various types of mass action.⁷

The frequency of workers' collective actions, the types of workers' demands and government responses to these actions vary greatly in relation to specific regional characteristics, including local demographic structure, industrial structure and economic conditions. To minimize biases that may arise from a regionally disproportionate frequency of labour events and other location-specific effects, the current study focuses only on workers' collective action cases in a single Chinese province, Guangdong.⁸ This area has received a large number of migrant workers and has experienced more collective actions by workers than any other province.⁹

In constructing the dataset, we derived data from the China “Strike map” developed by the China Labour Bulletin.¹⁰ Our dataset covers collective action cases reported between 2011 and 2016 in Guangdong.¹¹ The “Strike map” provides geo-referenced information on workers' collective actions which is sourced from multiple media reports as well as self-reports on social media. However, it is not a comprehensive or definitive record of all workers' collective actions in

4 Lorentzen 2013; Chen, Feng, and Kang 2016; Fu and Distelhorst 2017.

5 For debates about types of worker demands, see Chen, Feng, and Tang 2013; Elfstrom and Kuruvilla 2014.

6 Cai 2010; Becker 2012; Elfstrom and Kuruvilla 2014; Li 2017.

7 Even quantitative studies of workers' collective actions may not completely capture some important aspects of strike activity such as the role of informal leadership. See, e.g., Franzosi 1989.

8 Elfstrom 2017.

9 Many studies of Chinese workers' collective actions are based on case studies of Guangdong. See, e.g., Chan and Hui 2014; Chen, Feng, and Kang 2016; Chen, Patricia, and Gallagher 2018. Unlike previous studies that examine several representative cases that occurred in Guangdong, our focus is on finding general patterns between collective actions and government responses. Therefore, we have examined a large number of cases that took place in Guangdong, rather than a smaller, representative sample.

10 “Strike map,” China Labour Bulletin, no date, <https://maps.clb.org.hk/strikes/en>.

11 The frequency of reporting in the “Strike map” is also greatest in Guangdong.

China. Actions that receive little media attention, for example, are likely to be excluded from the dataset. Nevertheless, it is by far the most comprehensive publicly accessible database containing detailed information on workers' collective actions.

Another limitation of the dataset is that the level of detail available for each incident may differ depending on the information source. To address this issue, we classified the source of each entry in the dataset into one of three categories: thin reports, thick reports from state media and thick reports from non-state media.¹² Thin reports are self-reports posted on Weibo 微博 or the now-shuttered Wickedonna archives.¹³ Thick news reports provide more detail than thin reports, but how they report government responses may differ depending on the type of media platform used. State media sometimes underreport the level of police intervention or violence; the opposite can be true for reports filed by non-state media.¹⁴

How Do Local Governments React to Workers' Collective Actions?

We divided local states' responses to workers' collective actions into three categories: non-intervention, forceful intervention and non-forceful intervention. Non-intervention is when local states do not take any practical action towards addressing workers' collective actions.¹⁵ This form of response is widely adopted by many local states,¹⁶ as it helps them to collect information about the level and source of social grievances.¹⁷

Forceful intervention is aimed primarily at quelling collective actions by workers rather than seeking to resolve them. It does not necessarily imply the use of violence. For example, in many cases police are dispatched but do not take any practical action other than dispersing crowds.¹⁸ Despite the absence of violence, we still classify this response as a forceful intervention as its main goal is to quell the action.

Non-forceful intervention is a form of response which requires local states to play an active role in resolving conflicts either through mediation (*zhengfu tiaojie* 政府调解) or negotiation (*jiti tanpan* 集体谈判). This approach enables local

12 The China Labour Bulletin no longer provides the original link from which it retrieved the data. When identifying the source of the data, the authors used the dataset that was downloaded when the information about the original source was available. This dataset covers the period between 2011 and 2013.

13 Wickedonna was a blog founded by two citizen-journalists. It kept track of and reported on mass demonstrations in China via Twitter, YouTube and Weibo: <http://wickedonna.blogspot.com>.

14 The most frequently used non-state media from which the China Labour Bulletin retrieves information are *The Epoch Times* and *New Tang Dynasty Television*. Founded by Falun Gong practitioners, these media platforms have maintained a critical view of the Chinese government. See, e.g., Zhao 2003.

15 We coded the type of government response as "non-intervention" when reports did not indicate any police presence. When police presence was reported, we coded the response as "forceful intervention" even when the police only played a limited role. However, reports may omit to mention any police presence, especially if the police did not take any action. The number of "non-intervention" cases might therefore be overestimated.

16 Butollo and ten Brink 2012.

17 Lorentzen 2013.

18 Li 2017.

states to settle disputes without having to fully implement the labour laws.¹⁹ It has also paved the way for the development of party-state-led collective bargaining.²⁰ To facilitate this process, Chinese local authorities sometimes dispatch local officials and judges to collective action sites in order to encourage collaborative efforts between labour bureaus, trade unions and courts.²¹

Chinese local governments often employ a combination of different modes of intervention when responding to collective actions by workers. In [Figure 1](#), the dark circles connected by dark lines indicate the simultaneous deployment of multiple modes of intervention. Each of the corresponding vertical bars indicates the frequency of each set of co-occurrences.

As indicated by the vertical bars, the most frequent type of intervention is police intervention (*jingcha chudong* 警察出动) that does not also involve any other mode of response (302 cases), followed by police intervention accompanied by arrests (*beibu* 被捕) (128 cases). This indicates the predominance of forceful intervention in government responses to workers' collective actions. Interestingly, however, non-forceful intervention characterized a significant portion of government responses: government mediation was used in 103 cases, government-aided negotiation in 46 cases, and mediation accompanying negotiation was used in 38 cases.

Based on the definitions of non-intervention, forceful intervention and non-forceful intervention discussed above, we created a chart showing the chronological changes in the modes of government response to workers' collective actions (see [Figure 2](#)). As indicated by the dark grey bars, the proportion of cases in which the government did not intervene has grown significantly, especially since 2013, the year in which the Chinese central leadership shifted from the Hu–Wen administration to the Xi administration. This, however, is hardly a sign that the government is loosening its grip on workers' collective actions. Under the Xi administration, there has been a widespread crackdown on labour NGOs and the pre-emptive repression of worker activists.²² This may have reduced the occurrence of collective actions in which local states feel compelled to intervene. The proportion of workers' collective actions in which states forcefully intervened (indicated by the white bars in [Figure 2](#)) has not decreased. The rapid increase in workers' protests following the 2008 global financial crisis may have led to an increase in the government's reliance on forceful mechanisms.²³ Our analysis shows that this trend has intensified since Xi's rise to power in 2013. Although some studies argue that there is little evidence of institutional decay in Xi's era, the use of non-forceful intervention mechanisms has declined rapidly, from 44 per cent in 2008 to 7 per cent in 2016.²⁴

19 Zhuang and Chen 2015.

20 Chan and Hui 2016.

21 Su and He 2010; Zhuang and Chen 2015.

22 Fu and Distelhorst 2017.

23 Hernandez 2016.

24 Fu and Distelhorst 2017.

Figure 1: Local Governments' Varying Modes of Intervention in Workers' Collective Actions





Figure 2: **Government Responses to Workers' Collective Actions in Guangdong, 2008–2016**

Source:

For 2008 and 2010, we used the data from “China strikes.” For other years, we used data from the China Labor Bulletin.

Notes:

The China Labor Bulletin collection only covers the years after 2011, the last year of the Hu–Wen administration. In order to better capture the differences between the Hu–Wen and Xi Jinping administration, we added the data from <https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com> (Elfstrom 2017). The data only cover the years after 2008. We skipped the year 2009 because the source has thin coverage for that year. The finding from this chart resonates with those of other studies that have found that the Xi administration has adopted different approaches from the Hu–Wen administration in responding to workers’ collective actions. See, e.g., Fu and Distelhorst 2017; Elfstrom 2019.

What Do Workers Demand?

We argue that the type of demand raised by workers is an important yet under discussed factor in explaining how governments react to collective actions. Workers’ demands can be classified into three categories: defensive payment demands, defensive social security demands and offensive demands.

Defensive demands are those in which workers lay claim to the minimum benefits stipulated, either strictly or loosely, by the labour laws. Defensive demands can be either defensive payment demands (for example, for unpaid wages, minimum wages or severance compensation) or defensive social security demands (for example, for social insurance provisions). Offensive demands aggressively pursue benefits beyond those which states are legally required to provide – for example, pay increases, an improvement in working conditions²⁵ or worker representation.²⁶

25 Unlike demands that are confined to the legal minimum (i.e. defensive demands), demands for pay increases and improved working conditions (i.e. offensive demands) cannot be resolved through the judicial process. For this reason, workers making offensive claims often engage in spontaneous or “wildcat” strikes. See Chen, Feng, and Tang 2013.

26 Demands for worker representation have increased since the Honda strike in June 2010. This has worried many local and central policymakers and incentivized them to take a firmer stance

Chinese workers, and especially young migrant workers in the coastal areas, have tended to issue defensive demands that are often framed in legal terms.²⁷ Only recently have Chinese workers started to make offensive demands.²⁸ The continued preponderance of defensive demands in workers' collective actions reflects the way the Chinese government regulates labour relations through appeals to labour law. Since the early 2000s, the Chinese central government has actively encouraged workers to use the law to defend their rights.²⁹ Unlike the old 1994 Labour Law, the 2008 Labour Contract Law (*laodong hetongfa* 劳动合同法) has made it mandatory for employers to provide all employees with labour contracts. It has also further institutionalized the procedures through which workers may seek redress in disputes with employers over wages.³⁰ The promulgation of the labour law, however, has constrained the types of demands that workers can legitimately ask for. The state has attempted to prevent worker grievances from escalating into collective actions by steering aggrieved workers towards individualized court procedures.³¹

However, lax enforcement of the labour law, ineffective court procedures and the nominal worker representation system, which is monopolized by the Chinese official trade union, have often discouraged workers from relying solely on the legal route.³² Increasingly, workers have simultaneously sought both formal resolutions in the courts and informal resolutions on the streets.³³ This explains why many defensive demands are still being raised not just in courts but also in collective actions.

According to our dataset, defensive payment demands are the most frequently raised issue in workers' collective actions. More than half (55.47 per cent) of the collective actions in the sample contained a demand for payment of overdue wages. Slightly less than one-fifth of collective actions in our sample (18.11 per cent) were motivated by demands for economic compensation (Figure 3).

Defensive social security demands (for example, for social insurance payment) are the fifth most frequently occurring type of demand in our sample (see Figure 3). Defensive social security demands differ from defensive payment demands in that they more proactively assert the responsibility of local states to their citizens. This signals an important change in state–labour relations. Chinese workers (especially young migrant workers) have long refrained from

footnote continued

against grassroots activists and organizations. See Elfstrom and Kuruvilla 2014; Hui and Chan 2011.

27 Lee 2007; Chen, Feng, and Tang 2013.

28 Elfstrom and Kuruvilla 2014.


29 Gallagher 2005.

30 Gallagher et al. 2014; Remington and Cui 2016.

31 Chen, Patricia, and Gallagher 2018.

32 Gallagher 2006; Gallagher 2017. Chen, Patricia, and Gallagher 2018.

33 Su and He 2010.

Figure 3: **Top Seven Demands of Workers in Guangdong Strikes, 2011–2016***Notes:*

A collective action case can feature multiple demands. For simplicity, we have collapsed overtime regulation issues into the category of demands for improvement in working conditions. Collective actions featuring demands that do not fall into any of the major categories represent only 8.7 per cent of cases in the authors' sample.

asserting their social security rights as they proactively absorbed the market hegemony.³⁴

Offensive demands, such as those for pay increases and the improvement of working conditions, are the fourth and sixth most frequently raised demands in our sample. These demands are fundamentally different from defensive demands in that they pursue workers' interests more aggressively by making claims that go beyond the minimum that local states are legally required to provide.³⁵

Workers' Demands, Labour Laws and Local States' Responses

While all workers' collective actions are threatening to local states, some are more so than others. The degree of alarm caused by collective actions is largely determined by the kinds of demands made by workers. Some studies suggest that local states consider narrow economic demands less politically daunting and they are therefore more likely to tolerate them.³⁶ However, certain economic demands raised during collective actions can still be considered to be "political." The rise of defensive demands can be politically threatening to local states as they may signal to the central government that those local states lack the ability to regulate labour relations according to the labour laws.³⁷ Because they wish to

34 Blecher 2002; Pun 2016; Hui 2018.

35 Butollo and ten Brink 2012; Chen, Feng, and Tang 2013; Elfstrom and Kuruvilla 2014.

36 Lorentzen 2013; Li 2017.

37 Gallagher 2017.

prevent this, local states have a strong incentive to intervene in collective actions featuring defensive demands in either a forceful or non-forceful way. In contrast, there is not such a strong political incentive for local states to intervene in cases featuring offensive demands.

When intervening in workers' collective actions, local states are concerned with two things: first, they want to minimize the potential of social turbulence as a result of their intervention backfiring; and second, they prefer to settle disputes through the partial and discretionary implementation of the law. This is because the full implementation of the labour laws would discourage firms from investing in the locality.³⁸

Despite the effectiveness of forceful intervention in dispersing crowds, local states do not solely rely on it because doing so too frequently can backfire and damage the regime's legitimacy.³⁹ Settlement through non-forceful intervention (for example, mediation or negotiation) can reduce the level of social unrest. However, local states cannot easily settle conflicts through the partial and discretionary implementation of labour laws for issues around which there is a high level of legal sophistication. For example, Chinese laws and regulations concerning economic issues such as payment and compensation are highly sophisticated and well established. Moreover, workers themselves are very familiar with these laws and institutions. While local states want to redress issues quietly by directing aggrieved workers to the courts, relying on labour laws to resolve disputes is expensive. Also, after encountering disappointing and ineffective court procedures, many Chinese workers end up taking their demands to the streets.⁴⁰ This makes it difficult for local states to resolve disputes solely based on the court procedures. While they can still settle disputes through mediation or negotiation, the sophistication of the regulations concerning these issues allows little opportunity for local states to settle disputes using non-forceful means. As a result, local governments are more likely to adopt forceful mechanisms when intervening in collective actions featuring defensive payment issues.

Conversely, the nascent laws and regulations concerning social security are less sophisticated and less familiar: the Social Insurance Law, for example, was not passed until 2011. Local authorities have a high level of discretion when deciding the specifics of social insurance provisions, including the contribution rate for employers and workers' eligibility for social insurance programmes. Ironically, the incomplete development of institutions concerned with defensive social security issues creates room for non-forceful intervention.

Empirical Analysis

To examine the relationship between workers' demands and government responses, we conducted a multinomial logistic regression analysis. The dependent variables

38 Gallagher et al 2014.

39 Hu, Tu and Wu 2017; Wright 2018.

40 Gallagher 2006; Su and He 2010.

are the three different modes of government responses (non-intervention, non-forceful intervention and forceful intervention) and the independent variables are dummies of the top seven demands found in each of the collective actions in the sample. We also controlled covariates that might affect government responses to workers' collective actions, including the various sources of information about these actions (added in column 2 and column 5), the size of the strikes, the actions taken by workers during each incident, the type of industry affected, the ownership types of the firms impacted, and the dummies for city and year (added in column 3 and column 6).

Table 1 shows the results of our analysis. The relationship between collective actions featuring defensive social security and non-forceful intervention (as opposed to non-intervention) becomes statistically less significant when the sources of information are controlled (column 2); however, the relationship remains positive and significant in other models (columns 1 and 3). This provides limited yet important evidence supporting our hypothesis.

The relationship between defensive payment demands and forceful intervention is statistically significant and consistent in our analysis. Collective actions featuring defensive payment demands are more likely to be met with forceful intervention, rather than non-intervention, by local authorities (columns 4, 5 and 6).

To provide a more intuitive interpretation of the analysis, we created a marginal plot illustrating the marginal effect of the main independent variable (demand type) on the predicted probability of each mode of government intervention.⁴¹

As **Figure 4** shows, collective actions featuring defensive demands (compensation, overdue wages or social security) are more likely to experience intervention. The presence of defensive claims decreases the probability of non-intervention by 8, 7 and 12 percentage points, respectively. The state is also more likely to forcefully intervene when defensive payment demands (for example, for compensation and overdue wages) are present. The presence of the demand for compensation increases the probability of forceful intervention by 4 percentage points, as does the presence of the demand for overdue payment. However, defensive social security demands are more likely to face intervention using non-forceful mechanisms. When social security demands are present, the probability of non-forceful intervention increases by 10 percentage points. Local states are not more likely to intervene in response to offensive demands (such as for pay increases or better working conditions).

Our analysis, as reported in **Table 1**, also finds other interesting patterns. As can be seen in column 2, state media are more likely to report on non-forceful intervention than non-intervention. Column 6 shows how other factors, such as the size of the collective action and the behaviour of protesters, may affect

41 For this substantive plot, workers are assumed to take no other action other than to strike or stage a sit-in. Collective action size is held at size 1, industry type is held at secondary, ownership type is held as private, year is held as 2013, and city is held as Shenzhen.

Table 1: Multinomial Logistic Regression on Government Responses to Workers' Collective Actions

	Non-forceful intervention vs. non-intervention			Forceful intervention vs. non-intervention		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Type of Demands						
Compensation	0.498* (0.290)	0.786** (0.382)	0.406 (0.369)	0.675*** (0.201)	0.663* (0.380)	0.660*** (0.256)
Overdue wages	0.114 (0.244)	0.019 (0.362)	0.268 (0.327)	0.473*** (0.168)	0.577* (0.340)	0.715*** (0.233)
Social security	0.884*** (0.286)	0.612 (0.394)	0.941** (0.374)	0.492** (0.236)	-0.050 (0.473)	0.345 (0.294)
Pay increase	0.620** (0.250)	0.584 (0.327)	0.459 (0.340)	0.018 (0.221)	-0.135 (0.362)	-0.009 (0.295)
Employment security	-0.509 (0.575)	-0.671 (0.946)	-0.362 (0.638)	0.134 (0.277)	-15.940 (1.509)	0.075 (0.335)
Working conditions	0.304 (0.334)	0.283 (0.465)	0.230 (0.428)	0.197 (0.265)	0.419 (0.471)	0.080 (0.323)
Factory closure	0.042 (0.304)	0.118 (0.458)	0.199 (0.356)	0.010 (0.198)	0.007 (0.446)	-0.199 (0.250)
Data Source	Baseline: short reports					
State media reports		1.294*** (0.380)			0.007 (0.436)	
Non-state media reports		0.255 (0.384)			0.584 (0.367)	
Size of Strike	Baseline: size 1 (1–100)					
Size 2 (100–1,000)			0.231 (0.284)		1.114*** (0.164)	1.156*** (0.191)
Size 3 (1,000–10,000)			-0.281 (0.497)		1.730*** (0.272)	1.627*** (0.309)
Size 4 (10,000+)			-14.264 (2,929.963)		1.959 (1.267)	2.236* (1.286)

Continued


Table 1: **Continued**

	Non-forceful intervention vs. non-intervention			Forceful intervention vs. non-intervention		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Actions Involved						
Strike			-0.342 (0.388)		0.250 (0.216)	0.244 (0.248)
Sit-in			-0.425 (0.419)		0.175 (0.186)	0.136 (0.215)
Jump			-0.690 (1.145)		1.545*** (0.341)	1.443*** (0.461)
Road block			0.112 (0.418)		1.705*** (0.213)	1.741*** (0.240)
Demonstration			-0.482 (0.351)		0.451*** (0.169)	0.420** (0.193)
Industrial Sectors						
	Baseline: Secondary sector					
Tertiary			0.535* (0.302)			-0.522** (0.237)
Other			-14.181 (1,690.472)			0.173 (0.782)
Firm Ownership						
State-owned firms			0.523 (0.436)			0.028 (0.361)
Foreign firms			-0.451 (0.390)			-0.057 (0.252)
China circle firms			0.207 (0.336)			0.059 (0.228)
Joint ventures			0.036 (0.607)			-0.430 (0.544)
Constant	-15.680 (2,202.500)	-15.942 (3,713.66)	-1.277 (1.174)	-15.642 (2,550.535)	0.229 (1.555)	-1.541 (1.564)
Observations	1,465	432	1,465	1,395	432	1,060
City/year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes:

China circle firms indicate Hong Kong, Taiwan or Macau-invested firms. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Figure 4: Marginal Effects of Different Demands on Local States' Responses



government response. Specifically, the local state is more likely to forcefully intervene in large collective actions. It is also more likely to forcefully intervene in collective actions that involve roadblocks, demonstrations or workers threatening to jump off buildings. The state is more likely to use non-forceful mechanisms to intervene in collective actions from tertiary industries and less likely to intervene in actions effecting these industries using forceful mechanisms. The ownership type of firms, however, does not have a significant impact on government responses. Even when these important factors are considered, however, the correlation between workers' demands and government responses remains significant. Local states are more likely to forcefully intervene in worker collective actions involving defensive payment demands even when other factors, including the size and type of collective action, the industrial sectors involved and firm ownership, are controlled.

Conclusion

Drawing from a sample of collective actions staged by workers in Guangdong province between 2011 and 2016, this paper finds that the types of demands raised during these actions correlates with local states' responses. We suggest that the relationship between workers' demands and labour laws explains why local states respond differently to workers' collective actions featuring different demands. Local states are more likely to intervene in actions featuring defensive demands (as opposed to offensive demands) as the rise of defensive demands

signals the local state's inability to control labour relations through the application of labour laws. Furthermore, states are more likely to forcefully intervene in collective actions featuring defensive payment demands. This is because the legal institutions regulating payment-related issues are highly sophisticated, allowing little room for local states to intervene through mediation or negotiation. In contrast, the comparative lack of sophistication in the laws and institutions that regulate social security creates more room for local states to intervene via mediation or negotiation. Therefore, states are more likely to use non-forceful means when intervening in collective actions in which workers make defensive social security demands.

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Biographical notes

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摘要：虽然中国地方政府仍保持对工人集体行动的高度警觉，但他们并非总是打压工人的行动。地方政府有时反而会默许工人行动，甚至采取怀柔策略安抚工人。究竟有哪些原因可以解释政府回应工人集体行动的不同方式？基于一份2011年至2016年发生在广东省1,491起工人集体行动案件的样本，我们发现工人集体行动中所提出的诉求类型会影响地方政府作出何种反应。当工人们提出涉及薪酬类的防御性诉求时，地方政府更可能会强力干预工人集体行动。相反，地方政府更可能采取非强制性策略来回应工人行动中涉及社会保险类的防御性诉求。

关键词：工人集体行动；压制；调解；工人诉求；罢工；南中国

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