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Military Support of Citizens' Challenge in the Asian Industrialized Countries

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When do militaries in the newly industrialized countries of East and Southeast Asia support their governments, when do they support citizens' challenge of government, and when do they launch coups? We propose and test a theory of military behavior using data from across East and Southeast Asia between the 1970s and 2008. The results corroborate the model's predictions to make four contributions: First, the model provides a framework of military behavior for countries to expand study beyond coups or the absence thereof. Second, the findings bring to focus the influence of citizens on the military's behavior, an aspect largely overlooked in scholarship of the region. Third, the necessary conditions—weak economy and galvanized citizens' challenge—that affect the military's behavior vis-à-vis citizens and the government highlight the strategic interaction treatment. Fourth, this study broadens systematic treatment to enrich empirics and theory-building for the political economies of these countries. ***Keywords:*** *military behavior, citizens' influence, galvanized challenge, strategic interaction approach, illiberal regimes, democratic regimes, East and Southeast Asia, military professionalization, military fracture, developmental militarism*

When do militaries in the newly industrialized countries of East and Southeast Asia (hereafter abbreviated as AICs) support their governments, when do they support citizens' challenge of government, and when do they launch coups to seize political control?[1] A large literature on military behavior focuses on its coup potential, probably due to its virtually absolute monopoly of force and coercive power. Yet, empirically, the militaries in the AICs exhibit a range of behaviors beyond support for or coup against the governments; this includes supporting citizens' challenge, such as in South Korea in 1987 when military commanders rejected mobilization against citizens, or Indonesia in 1998 when the military refused to impose Suharto's martial law or quell students' protests (Oh 1999, 93; Han 1988; Lee 2009). Clearly, restricting

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the study of military support to its coup potential fails to situate the empirical range of military behavior. More importantly, an expanded treatment across the range considers critically when military behavior undergirds and when it jeopardizes the political and economic environs. This is particularly relevant for the AICs where the militaries were seen as supporting or even bracing governments responsible for the economic performance prior to democratization in the region (Haggard and Kaufman 1997; Haggard 2004; Kwon 2005; Bunce 2003; Ames 1987). Probably more so than other regions, then, military behavior is integral to the stability and development of the political economies of the AICs.

In this article we propose and test a theory of military behavior in the AICs. In particular, drawing on insights from military studies and the accountability literature, we formulate arguments for military behavior in the AICs and test the arguments with data from South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia between the 1970s and 2008,[2] that is, across illiberal as well as democratic AICs. Illiberal AICs comprise those regimes that are not democratic institutionally or procedurally.[3] Briefly, we contend the following: In the illiberal AICs, when economic conditions are weak and citizens challenge the government, the military supports citizens' challenge if the challenge galvanizes; however, when economic conditions are strong and citizens challenge the government, the military supports the government. In democratic AICs, which include newly democratic AICs, the military does not support citizens' challenge of the government or support the government against citizens' challenge or launch a coup across weak or strong economic conditions (i.e., it does not take sides or seize political power). Thus, the conditions that trigger the military to change behaviors or switch its support to citizens' challenge against the government in less-democratic AICs do not precipitate similar switches in democratic AICs. By this proposed framework, then, poor economic conditions and expectations of galvanized citizens' challenge are necessary conditions for the military to switch support from governments in less-democratic AICs; when economic conditions are good, the military does not switch support. Further, the framework predicts that in democratic AICs, the military generally does not take sides or seize power in the face of poor economic conditions and citizens' challenge. And, under the framework, coups are rare events; this rare-event aspect means that individual country studies, rather than pooled cross-country ones, may undergird a robust understanding of coups that avoids potential statistical bias. At the same time, it also emphasizes that a focus on coups does not lead to generalized, systematic insights. The predictions of military behavior here, then, fill

theoretical and empirical gaps regarding military behavior toward the stability and development of the political economies of the AICs.

Our approach considers the military as strategic: the military interacts strategically with other players—namely, the government and citizens—to achieve its goals. The strategic interaction treatment considers players' choices to reach political, social, or economic goals are constrained by each other's behaviors and the structure of the game (Haggard 2004; Guo 2009; Chan 2003; Mason and Clements 2002; Yap 2005; Ames 1987). This departs from the decision-theory perspective that treats players—particularly the military—as primarily motivated by their own preferences and wants. Under the decision-theory argument, the military's virtual monopoly of coercive power means that it may unilaterally assert its preferences and wants.[4] In contrast, the strategic interaction treatment considers that players' promises or threats—even the military's—may not be credible to distinguish the military's preferences for political intercession from its coercive ability to do so. Importantly, this strategic treatment also takes into account that the structure of the game—specifically, the regime rules and practices regarding the organization, allocation, exercise, and enforcement of authority upon civil society—is different in illiberal versus democratic AICs (Zanger 2000; Lawson 1993; Kitschelt 1992).[5] As will be detailed later in the discussion of the framework, these differences explain in part why the necessary conditions for switches in military behavior in illiberal AICs do not lead to similar changes in democratic ones. The term *citizens* refers to nongovernment voters (i.e., it includes labor, farmers, and production investors). Citizens' challenge galvanizes when it expands across groups. The military's support of the government refers to the military's enforcement of rules, regulations, or orders from the government. The military's support of citizens' challenge denotes that it refuses to carry out government orders to quell challenges. A military coup occurs when the military seizes political control.

The AICs are interesting for study in at least three ways: First, the Asian AICs are generally poor in natural resources.[6] Resource paucity limits players' options; in particular, unlike their counterparts in resource-rich countries, players are unable to use resources to cloud choices or outcomes (Haggard and Kaufman 1997; Collier 2010; Nepstad 2013). Second, the symbiosis between the military and the government in the AICs, especially prior to democratization in several of these countries, provides a clear baseline from which to evaluate military behavior. In particular, if the findings here show that the military switches support from governments under specifiable conditions, then those conditions

are likely generalizable to countries with less symbiosis between the government and military. Third, notwithstanding regional and cultural commonalities, military behaviors in the AICs span the spectrum: they include those that monopolized coercive power and, mostly, supported one-party rule or authoritarian governments (South Korea and Taiwan before democratization) and those that staged recurring coups against civilian authority (the Philippines and Thailand). Such variance means that significant results are likely to be generalizable.

We test the arguments across East and Southeast AICs from the 1970s through 2008. The results from rare events logistic analyses of the pooled cross-national data support the arguments: they show that in illiberal AICs, poor economic conditions and galvanized citizens' challenge are statistically significant for explaining the military's switch to support citizens' challenge. Indeed, the odds of the military's supporting citizens' challenge under these conditions are 22.5 times greater than if the conditions are not present. Further, when economic conditions are strong, the military does not switch its support from the government. For democratic AICs, the results show that the military does not take sides in the face of poor economic conditions and citizens' challenge. And, the data corroborate that coups are rare events: of the more than 250 cases across the seven countries for the period from the 1970s to 2008 examined in this study, a total of fifteen coups or coup attempts occurred, only 5.9 percent of the cases. A further breakdown shows only one coup in South Korea (1979), with the rest occurring in two countries: the Philippines (six incidents of attempted coups, all unsuccessful) and Thailand (eight incidents of attempted coups, five successful). Given these circumstances, generalized insights based on all data may not be as useful as analyses based on the individual countries. Case discussions of South Korea in 1979–1980 and 1987 further recommend a focus beyond coups for generalizable insights of military behavior.

This article makes four contributions to scholarship: First, it provides a framework of military behavior to expand study beyond coups or the absence thereof and systematically tests the predictions with data from the AICs. This expands the study of military behavior for theory-building and empirical evaluation that, importantly, bears on the stability and development of the political economies of the AICs. Second, the findings of military support for citizens' challenge bring to focus the influence of citizens, largely overlooked in scholarship of the region. Third, relatedly, the findings of necessary conditions—weak economy and galvanized citizens' challenge—that affect the military's behaviors vis-à-vis citizens and the government highlight the utility of the strategic

interaction treatment for assessing conditions under which players' promises or threats—even the military's—are credible and when they are not. Fourth, this study of military behavior in the AICs broadens systematic treatment to enrich empirics and theory-building for the political economies of these countries.

In the following, we describe the extant literature on military behavior before proceeding to our theoretical arguments. Subsequently, we describe the data and variables for evaluating the predictions from the framework and explain the findings. We present case descriptions from the AIC of South Korea to contextualize the significance of the findings before concluding.

Theories of Military Behavior in the AICs

Studies of military behavior focus on how to control the military, given its clear threat. Recent calls to develop new analytical perspectives on the study of the military's role and behavior cite two reasons why an expanded treatment is needed. First, the restricted study is often narrowed to the study of coups that, while easily identifiable, sidesteps a larger problem of measurement and identification of the military's role and behavior (Feaver 1999; Desch 1999; Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster 2002). Second, extant theories suffer from limited theoretical and empirical generalizability: the military's support of politics is characterized by the absence of coups and not explicitly delineated while explanations for coups may have exceeded the number of coups that have occurred. Importantly, existing studies have elucidated critical considerations for expanding the study of the military and its behavior. Three primary models that pertain to the AICs—military professionalization, developmental militarism, and military-fracture—are described below.[7]

The model of military professionalization argues for constructing civil-military relations to ensure the professionalization of the military corps so that it remains subordinate to civilian authority (Huntington 1957). Specifically, the argument contends that professionalization, which includes civilianization of foreign and military policies, civilian recognition of areas of military autonomy and competence, and nonpartisan military education, fosters the military's focus and responsibility on readiness (Huntington 1957). However, disagreement persists regarding the utility of military professionalization. On the one hand, advocates point to successes, such as Albania and Poland since 1989, and failures, such as Indonesia under Sukarno and Suharto, to show the direct relationship between the military's professionalization and its restraint

(Danopoulos and Chopani 1997; Alagappa 2001). On the other hand, critics point to instances where professionalization backfired in Brazil, Pakistan, the Philippines under Marcos, South Korea in 1979–1980, and Nigeria (Nordlinger 1977; Clifford 1998; Fitch 1998).

The model of developmental militarism extends from studies of bureaucratic authoritarianism; the literature cites the military's involvement in the planning, organization, and implementation of large-scale agrarian and industrial development projects to conclude that the military extends its role into its country's politics and policymaking in order to pursue economic development (Stepan 1973, 1988).

Specifically, studies contend that militaries in the industrializing nations, such as South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, Chile, and Paraguay, are able to achieve scales of production to pursue economic development more economically, competently, and quickly than their civilian governments because of the formers' technical and professional skills and the command hierarchy (Oh 1999; Ball 1981). By the developmental militarism argument, the achievement of high economic performance, the ability to create effective civilian institutions that replace the military's development role, and the removal of key military hard-liners and personnel bent on achieving goals quickly will erode and eventually phase out the military's political involvement. However, the model leaves unanswered this question: given the consideration here that the military intercedes easily, will it intervene again if civilian institutions fail in their goals?

As opposed to the preceding models that focus on military behaviors motivated by external conditions, the military-fracture model considers military behavior based on internal organizational dynamics and structure of incentives. In particular, the model considers that incentive structures in the military—including allocation of resources, offices, and perquisites—may foment conflict and splits that lead the military or parts thereof to switch support (Lee 2009; Chandra and Kammen 2002; Nepstad 2013). This is more so in illiberal regimes, where the governments are prone to foster divisions in the military to preempt challenges. By the military-fracture model, the military's coercive monopoly is overstated since the various units that comprise the military divvy up coercive power and potentially pose as countervailing forces to each other. More importantly, the divisions—in the context of poor allocations or unpromising or unclear career development—motivate military officials to seize opportunities for redress, either by supporting citizens' challenges or through coups. However, the military-fracture model raises the question: given that the military is usually composed of divisions—the army,

navy, air force, marine corps, reserve force, national guard, military police, military intelligence, the garrison command, and security councils that function as executive bodies for military affairs (Federation of American Scientists 2006)—what specific aspects of military divisions constitute necessary conditions to lead to switches in military allegiances?

The review here reveals important findings from the literature: for example, the professional militarization model calls attention to the need to relate incentives to the military's conduct. Similarly, the developmental-militarism model intimates that economic conditions may be used to signify government performance that may, in turn, be relevant to military behavior. And, the military-fracture model emphasizes the relevance of incentives to military behavior while underlining that divisions in the military undermine the ease of its political intercession. Still, the overriding concern with evaluating and preventing the possibility of the military's challenge or usurpation of civilian political authority has prevented broader assessments of military behaviors and the conditions that lead to these other behaviors. Our treatment of the military as strategic addresses this neglect.

The Military as a Strategic Actor Framework

We contend that the military interacts strategically with the government and citizens to achieve its goals. In particular, we build on extant military and accountability studies to focus on two conditions—economic performance and structure of the game—that contextualize the credibility of interactions between the military, government, and citizens, to influence their subsequent choices. To recap, structure of the game refers specifically to the regime rules and practices regarding organization, allocation, exercise, and enforcement of authority upon civil society. In the following, we detail the arguments to show how economic performance and structure of the game affect players' credibility in illiberal and democratic AICs.

Economy and Structure of the Game in Illiberal AICs

How do economic performance and structure of the game contextualize the credibility of interactions between the military, government, and citizens? We discuss, in turn, the credibility of the government, citizens, and the military. The government prefers to stay in office (Haggard 2004; Guo 2009; Bunce 2003; Ames 1987; Gandhi 2008). A large literature on government accountability notes that *weak economic conditions* reduce the government's credibility to deliver political goods, particularly wel-

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fare-based public goods, as well as economic goods that underpin support for the government that enables its stay in office; this is even more so in the illiberal AICs where economic goods constitute the primary basis of consent from the governed citizens (Moon and Ingraham 1998; Hahm and Kim 1999; Lee and Haque 2006; Guo 2009; Mason and Clements 2002). Resource paucity in the AICs limits players' options, particularly the government's, to use resources to buy time or influence other players' strategies and, hence, the outcomes; at the same time, the resource paucity of AICs means that it is pressing to obtain economic cooperation from citizens to avert further downturns (Yap 2003).

In general, citizens want more political input, concessions, or inclusiveness since these increase their share of political or economic goods, and more so during weak economic conditions to offset the reduced economic goods. Citizens are highly credible in challenging the government during weak economic conditions, given that the opportunity costs of time and effort to challenge the government are lower in a weak economy than a strong one. Further, the potential gains from government concessions are higher in a weak economy. The weak economy also undermines the government's support and the government's ability to pay rents to maintain support (Gandhi 2008). As a result, the demands from non-government actors credibly threaten to morph into larger-scale challenges for greater government accountability under weak economic conditions.

The government's options in the face of citizens' demands, then, are (a) provide the political concessions or political goods, to either co-opt or respond to these demands; or (b) use the military to quell citizens' challenge. The accountability literature finds that the government chooses to provide concessions or political goods during weak economies. Nevertheless, if the government chooses otherwise, its option is to use the military to repress citizens' challenge.

In general, the military prefers to maintain its institutional integrity, or maintain cohesion and reputation across its ranks (Haggard and Kaufman 1997; Mason and Clements 2002; Beeson 2008; Ames 1987; Bunce 2003; Weeks 2003), and do so under conditions of the most resources and the least costs. If the government makes concessions and these placate citizens, the military is not pressed to act; otherwise, the military's options are to support the government, support citizens' challenge, support neither and launch a coup, or not take sides and not launch a coup. The last option, not taking sides and not launching a coup, is not credible: given that governments in the illiberal AICs are generally supported by the military, a neutral stance translates in essence into withdrawal of support for the government. Supporting the government in the face of credible citizens' challenge is costly; more importantly, the essential task

of securing citizens' cooperation in the resource-poor AICs for the immediate and medium term remains unaddressed. What about the option of supporting neither and launching a coup? By the military-fracture model, the military is typically divided, and more so in illiberal regimes where the governments foster divisions to preempt challenges. Launching a coup, then, is an attractive option only under limited circumstances, such as when the military is cohesive (Lee 2009). Among the options, then, supporting citizens' challenge is least costly and, importantly, viable in the immediate and medium term. Thus, the military's preferred option in a weak economy under the illiberal structure of the game is to support citizens' challenge against the government.

Under good economic conditions, the government's credibility to deliver political or economic goods is not jeopardized, while citizens' threats that challenges against the government will galvanize (i.e., expand across groups) are not credible, given the opportunity costs of time and effort to challenge the government are higher in a strong economy. Further, the potential gains from government concessions are lower, given the strong economy. The strong economic conditions also improve the government's ability to pay rents to maintain or enlarge that support. A strong economy, then, upholds the government's credibility while undermining the credibility of citizens' challenge. The military may support the government, support citizens' challenge, support neither and launch a coup, or not take sides and not launch a coup. As before, the option of not taking sides and not launching a coup is not credible. Supporting the government in the face of not-credible citizens' challenge is not costly and probably consistent with the status quo while supporting the citizens' challenge, which is not credible, is costly. Launching a coup in the resource-poor AICs still requires the additional task of securing citizens' cooperation in the resource-poor AICs for the immediate and medium term. Under these circumstances, the military's preferred option is to support the government when economic performance is strong.

Economy and Structure of the Game in Democratic AICs

Whereas the illiberal AICs generally underpin support for the system with economic goods, democratic AICs provide political or social goods, in addition to economic ones, to shore up public support. Indeed, a democratic AIC's facility and capacity to regularly deliver political goods—contestable political succession, regularized competition, civil and political liberties, and freedom of association and expression—underlies a differentiation between the *performance of the democratic system* from the *government's policy performance*, such as economic success (Hetherington, 1998; Mishler and Rose 1997; Mattes and Bratton 2007; Duch

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2001; Yap 2013). With democratic AICs, then, the political or social goods fill in for failures to perform economically.

How do economic performance and structure of the game contextualize the credibility of interactions between the military, government, and citizens in the democratic AICs? *Weak economic performance* erodes the government's credibility to deliver economic goods, but the government's performance is differentiated from the political goods delivered through the political system. Citizens may challenge the government for more political and social goods, and their challenge is credible. Faced with such challenges, the government may (a) provide the political concessions or political goods, to either co-opt or respond to these demands; or (b) use the military to quell citizens' challenge. Given that democratic AICs are assessed on their facility and capacity to regularly deliver political goods, option (a), even if costly, progresses a country internationally; further, it broadens domestic support for the government. On both counts, the immediate- and medium-term interests of eliciting citizens' economic cooperation are achievable. In contrast, option (b), even if less costly, narrows international and domestic support for the government, to the detriment of the immediate- and medium-term interests. Under these conditions, the government's preferred choice is to respond to citizens' challenge by increasing political concessions or political goods.

Notwithstanding the outcome of interactions between the government and citizens, the military retains the options to support the government, support citizens' challenge, support neither and launch a coup, or not take sides and not launch a coup. In democratic AICs, supporting the government and supporting citizens' challenge against the other are not credible options, given that the democratic system offers less costly ways to arbitrate between the government and citizens. That is, the "not take sides and not launch a coup" option is less costly than taking sides, and provides the same rewards through the democratic system. There remains the option of launching a coup; however, that option is costly and with the immediate- and medium-term burden of eliciting citizens' economic cooperation. Given these circumstances, the military's preference is to not take sides.

With strong economic performance, the government's credibility is retained while citizens' challenges are not credible, the political performance of the democratic system is not jeopardized, so that the military is even more prone to adopt the "not take sides and not launch a coup" stance.

In sum, the framework here proposes that in illiberal AICs, poor economic conditions and expectations of galvanized citizens' challenge are

necessary conditions for the military to switch support from governments in illiberal AICs; when economic conditions are good, the military does not switch support. Further, the framework predicts that in democratic AICs, the military does not take sides or seize power in the face of poor economic conditions and citizens' challenge. And, under the framework, coups are rare events. Next, we describe the data and variables for testing.

Data and Variables for Testing

In this section, we set out the hypotheses for the statistical tests and describe the variables used to evaluate when militaries in the AICs support their governments, when they support citizens' challenge of the government, and when they launch coups to seize political control. Our primary interest is military behavior, and we contend that the military behaves differently under illiberal versus democratic AICs (which include newly democratic AICs), given the choices of the government and citizens and the structure of the game in the regimes. Our data comprise the AICs of South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia between the 1970s and 2008, that is, for illiberal as well as democratic AICs. The hypotheses are as follows:

> Hypothesis 1: In the illiberal AICs, when economic conditions are weak and citizens challenge the government, the military supports citizens' challenge if the challenge galvanizes; however, when economic conditions are strong and citizens challenge the government, the military supports the government.

> Hypothesis 2: In democratic AICs, the military does not support citizens' challenge of the government or support the government against citizens' challenge or launch a coup, across weak or strong economic conditions (i.e., it does not take sides or seize political power).

Data Subsets

The data comprise two subsets—one consisting of illiberal AICs and another of democratic regimes—for evaluation. We rely on the popular Freedom House data series, further corroborated against the Polity IV

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dataset, to configure the two subsets, using the not free or partly free in Freedom House to code illiberal regimes (scores below 6 in general for democratic-autocratic variable in Polity IV) and free in Freedom House (generally positive scores above 6 for democratic-autocratic variable in Polity IV) for democratic ones.[8] A significant disagreement between the Freedom House and Polity IV indicators exists for Thailand: Freedom House considered the country as partly free between 1992 and 1997, while Polity IV gave the country a score of 9 between 1992 and 2005. Based on country experts' reports, we coded the period as illiberal for analyses.

Dependent Variable: Military Behavior

The variable of interest is military behavior. Military behavior is difficult to operationalize because using ordinal values for different aspects of behavior, such as support for government, coup, or support for citizens' challenge, is inherently unsatisfactory at its best and misleading at its worst (Coppedge 2002; Casper and Tufis 2003). As a result, existing quantitative studies of militaries generally dichotomize behavior for study, although that amputates information (Coppedge 2002, 37). Our study of military behavior develops a new operationalization, military switches of support, to capture whether the military switches support from the regime. Specifically, we operationalize military behavior as switching from support of the regime to two other possibilities. Thus, for illiberal regimes the military switches support to citizens' challenge or to coups; for democratic regimes the military switches support to an illiberal alternative or coups.

This new operationalization improves upon the dichotomization of military behavior so that we take advantage of the subsets of illiberal and democratic regimes as useful status quo positions of military behavior to add analytical information. We create the military-switch variable from the following sources: country experts' assessments, the Center for Systemic Peace (CSP)'s *Coups d'Etat, 1946–2010* (2010). Thus, for illiberal regimes, country experts' assessments of how the military behaves—in particular, carrying out government orders to suppress citizens' challenge, refusing to carry out orders, or challenging the government for political rule—are codified as "no-switch," "switch to support for citizens' challenge," and "switch to coup," respectively, for analysis. For democratic regimes, country experts' assessments of how the military behaves—in particular, not joining citizens' challenge of the government and/or suppressing the challenge, joining citizens' challenge, and launching a coup—are coded as "no-switch," "switch to support for

citizens' challenge," and "switch to coup," respectively, for analysis. The *Coups d'Etat* data series documents military coups since 1946 (Marshall and Marshall, 2011);[9] we use the series to capture military switches to coups.

Independent Variables: Economic Conditions and Citizens' Challenge

The independent variables of interest are economic conditions and citizens' challenge. We follow the literature to use two variables, growth and unemployment, so that the depth and breadth of economic performance are captured (Treisman and Gimpelson 2001; Kahane 2009). For consistency and interpretation, we use change in unemployment so that it is consistent with economic growth, which captures change. Also, to ensure that the effects are correctly imputed, we use lagged variables.

The other independent variable of interest is citizens' challenge measured. Our longitudinal data, which range from pre- to democratization periods, pose complications for common measures of citizens' challenge such as withdrawal of electoral support or demonstrations.[10] We follow the literature to consider two measures to capture citizens' challenge of the government: *withdrawal of resource investments* and *strikes* (Haggard and Kaufman 1997; Zafirovski 1999; Yap 2011, Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; Gandhi 2008). The two measures capture a minimum division of citizens into two groups, labor and business industrialists, with different preferences who are variously affected by economic performance and require disparate government responses. The use of resource investments follows recent literature that finds that resource investments buttress a government's tenure while disinvestment from the economy undermines the government's stay in office (Yap 2011; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; Gandhi 2008). We use percentage change in real private production investment to capture business industrialists' investments or disinvestments. Studies also consider strike activity, particularly under authoritarian regimes, to carry political import (Haggard and Kaufman 1997, 61; Ames 1987; Zafirovski 1999; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; Gandhi 2008). For consistency in interpretation, we use change in strike incidents as a measure (Vernby 2007; Ames 1987; Colomer 1991).[11] To ensure that the effects are correctly imputed, we also use lagged variables of citizens' challenge.

Additional Control Variables

Military studies point out that the government may try to buy off the military so that it deters or ends citizens' challenge. To capture these

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payoffs in the analysis, we operationalize the government's payoffs to the military as *real growth in defense spending*. Defense spending is a useful proxy of the government's payoffs to the military for three reasons. First, among incentives to the military, defense spending is the most systematically documented and tangible.[12] Second, government expenditures rank among the most important pieces of legislation passed in any year to manipulate political support or survival, and defense spending remains a high priority for the military and its advocates (Ames 1987; Kwon 2005; Beeson 2008). Third, defense spending is not transferred in one lump payment to the military; this rules out potential military "cheating" behavior, such as the military's offering support to the government in order to obtain the resources but supporting citizens' challenge instead so as not to incur fighting costs. Defense spending refers to spending on defense and the military and includes equipment, facilities, welfare, education, and training of military personnel; thus, wartime expenses and war preparation, including purchases of major weaponry, are not represented in budgetary allocations but captured as special, extraordinary, or emergency executive requests.[13] We use real growth in defense spending, that is, percentage change from previous year in constant spending.

We evaluated the utility of other controls variously used in the literature, including interstate conflict, legislative fragmentation, and real growth in the United States as a proxy of world economic conditions, to ensure the results are not fragile. The controls were not statistically significant and deflated the overall fit of the model. Given that they are not theoretically or empirically germane, these controls are not adopted in the interests of parsimony.

To summarize, we operationalize a new variable, military switches from supporting the regime, to broaden the empirical measure of military behavior. Five independent variables are used: growth in real per capita GDP, change in unemployment, growth in real private domestic production investment, change in strikes, and growth in real defense spending. Next, we describe the tests and findings.

Tests and Results

To test the theory and predictions, we use data collected for the AICs of South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia between the 1970s and 2008, and organized into illiberal and democratic regimes using Freedom House and Polity IV indicators as previously described. The hypotheses tested are as follows:

Hypothesis 1: In the illiberal AICs, when economic conditions are weak (captured by lagged decrease in per capita GDP *and* lagged increase in unemployment) and citizens challenge the government (captured in lagged decrease in percentage change in private domestic investment in production or lagged increase in strike activity), the military switches to support citizens' challenge if the challenge expands across groups (i.e., lagged decrease in percentage change in private domestic investment in production *and* lagged increase in strike activity); however, when economic conditions are strong (captured by lagged increase in per capita GDP *and* lagged decrease in unemployment), the military does not switch support.

Hypothesis 2: In democratic AICs, across weak and strong economic conditions, the military does not take sides or seize political power when citizens challenge their government (captured in lagged decrease in percentage change in private domestic investment in production or lagged increase in strike activity); it does not switch to support citizens' challenge of the government or support the government against citizens' challenge or launch a coup.

The results support the theory's predictions if in illiberal regimes the military switches from supporting the regime to supporting citizens' challenge under weak economic conditions when the challenge galvanizes, but does not switch from supporting the regime if economic conditions are strong. The theory is also supported if in democratic regimes the military generally does not switch support from the regime in the face of citizens' challenge and weak economic conditions. Our operationalization of military behavior allows us to evaluate the conditions under which the military switches support from the status quo operating in the illiberal or democratic country. Consequently, even though we offer no hypotheses of the conditions for military coups, we are able to report results of the military's switching from the status quo to coups.

In general, the results support the theory set out here. Thus, for the illiberal regimes, weak economic conditions and citizens' challenge are positively related to the military's switching support from the regime to citizens' challenge; for democratic regimes, the military generally does not switch support from the regime, even in the face of citizens' challenge and weak economic performance. Table 1 reports the results of

Table 1 Regression Results of Military Behavior Under Less Democratic Regimes

Dependent Variables	Switch to Civilian		Coup	
	Coefficients (std errors)	Odds Ratio	Coefficients (std errors)	Odds Ratio
Growth in real defense spending	0.003 (0.033)	1.003	-0.014 (0.024)	0.986
Lagged growth in real per capita GDP	-0.012 (0.15)	0.988	0.011 (0.157)	1.011
Lagged change in unemployment	0.702** (0.349)	2.018	0.258 (0.537)	1.294
Lagged change in the number of strike activities	0.006** (0.003)	1.006	-0.002 (0.008)	0.998
Lagged growth in real private production investment	-0.019 (0.047)	0.981	0.051 (0.031)	1.052
Constant	-3.274*** (0.871)		-3.685** (1.129)	
LR chi^2 (probability)	9.5 (0.091)		3.0 (0.70)	

Total number of observations: 160

*p<0.1, **p<.0.05, ***p<0.01

military switches from illiberal regimes to support of civilians' challenge or coups, while Table 2 reports the results for military switches from democratic regimes to illiberal regimes or coups.

What do the results mean? In Table 1, the results show that lagged change in unemployment is statistically significant and positive in predicting the military switch of support from the regime while lagged growth in real GDP is negatively related to military switch, although the variable is not statistically significant. For citizens' challenge, lagged increase in the number of strikes is significant and positive in predicting the military switch of support from the regime while lagged growth in production investment is negatively related to military switch, although the variable is not statistically significant. The odds ratio reports that a lagged increase in strikes increases the odds of the military's switching support from the less democratic regime by 0.6 percent (odds 1.006), which means that an increase of ten strikes increases the odds of the military's switching support by 6 percent. The results reported in Table 2 show, as predicted by the theory, none of the variables are statistically significant

Table 2 Regression Results of Military Behavior Under Democratizing Regimes

	Switch to Civilian		Coup	
Dependent Variables	Coefficients (std errors)	Odds Ratio	Coefficients (std errors)	Odds Ratio
Growth in real defense spending	0.091 (0.104)	0.091	0.067 (0.047)	1.069
Lagged growth in real per capita GDP	0.169 (0.239)	1.184	-0.123 (0.127)	0.884
Lagged change in unemployment	1.393 (1.323)	4.027	-0.430 (0.441)	0.651
Lagged change in the number of strike activities	0.001 (0.002)	1.001	~0 (0.001)	~1
Lagged growth in real private production investment	0.009 (0.077)	1.009	0.031 (0.044)	1.031
Constant	-2.09 (2.379)		-2.786** (1.195)	
LR chi^2 (probability)	2.7 (0.74)		3.2 (0.66)	

Total number of observations: 66

*p<0.1, **p<.0.05, ***p<0.01

in explaining military switches from supporting the existing democratic regime to illiberal regimes or coups. Indeed, of the sixty-six total cases under democratic regimes, only two saw the military switch support from the democratic regime to an illiberal regime and both occurred in Thailand (1976 and 2006), while five were attempted coups—all unsuccessful—in the Philippines following democratization in 1986. Not surprisingly, these switches fail to represent broader patterns or trends in the cross-national series to be statistically meaningful.

While the results from Table 1 show that the variables of interest—citizens' challenge and economic conditions—are all in the right direction, only two are statistically significant. What does that mean? One explanation is that the theory suffers from its success: the more correlated the variables measuring citizens' challenge or economic performance, the more that collinearity reduces the statistical significance of one or more of the variables capturing the phenomenon.

One option to address this problem that also further elucidates the results is to stress-test the theory, such as for outliers or thresholds.[14] How-

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ever, the large variance in the cross-national dataset means that such stress tests do not present meaningful results (Coppedge 2002). Thus, consider, for instance, that the dataset comprises Singapore, which, with one exception in 1986, generally witnessed no strike activity since 1979 while South Korea saw a peak of strike activity that exceeded 1,600 strikes; likewise, consider, for instance, that a 1 percent increase in real per capita GDP in South Korea where the average is 6.4 percent is likely to have different effects than the same increase for Thailand, which averaged real per capita GDP growth of 1.35 percent during the same period. Stress tests, thresholds, or outliers, then, may not be reasonably applied for pooled data such as this.

Another alternative is to capture the concepts—weak economic conditions and galvanized citizens' challenge—by combining measures on different dimensions (Coppedge 2002, 37). In particular, Coppedge (2002, 37) calls this the acceptable compromise: it is based on recoding continuous variables toward "a low level of measurement" such as interval data in order to "bundle" these interval data to capture more dimensions of a concept. Doing so for concepts such as economic weakness is particularly useful since it does not compromise the interpretation of the data.[15]

Accordingly, we recode the variables that capture economic condition and citizens' challenge for additional analysis and interpretation. Specifically, we reduce the economic condition variables (i.e., real per capita GDP and change in unemployment) into dichotomies before combining them to capture weak versus strong economic conditions. Likewise, we reformulate citizens' challenge (i.e., production investment and strike activity) into dichotomies before combining them to capture galvanized citizens' challenge. With the recodes, weak economic conditions are captured by negative growth and increases in unemployment, both depth and breadth of economic weakness, while galvanized citizens' challenge is represented by the concurrence of negative production investment *and* increases in strike activity.

Table 3 reports the results of the analyses of military switches from illiberal regimes based on the recoding of economic conditions and citizens' challenge. Columns 1 and 2 report the regression results and the corresponding odds ratio for the effects of weak economic conditions on military switches, columns 3 and 4 report the results and odds ratio for the effects of galvanized citizens' challenge on military switches, and columns 5 and 6 show the results for a combination of weak economic conditions and galvanized citizens' challenge. The odds ratio in column 2 shows that the military is seven times more likely to switch support

from the illiberal regime under weak economic conditions than if the economy is not weak. Similarly, the odds ratio in column 4 shows that the military is almost fifteen times more likely to switch support from the illiberal regime when citizens' challenge is galvanized, while column 6 shows that when the economy is weak and citizens challenge the government, the odds of the military's switching from supporting the illiberal regime increases by 22.5 times compared to when the conditions are not present.

As a final assessment, Table 4 presents the cases where economic conditions are not weak or citizens' challenge is not galvanized for illiberal and democratic regimes. The results here clarify that for illiberal regimes, the military generally does not switch support when economic conditions are not weak, or when citizens' challenge is not galvanized. For instance, the numbers reveal that only 2 of 127 total cases of illiberal regime years where economic conditions were not weak saw the military switch away from supporting the illiberal regime. The results also show that for democratic regimes, the military generally does not switch support (i.e., it does not take sides or seize political power). Thus, even when citizens' challenge is galvanized in democratic regimes, there were

Table 3 Regression Results of Military Support Switch from Less Democratic Regimes[a]

Dependent Variable:	Columns 1 & 2		Columns 3 & 4		Columns 5 & 6	
Military support switched from less democratic regime	Coeffs (std errors)	Odds Ratio	Coeffs (std errors)	Odds Ratio	Coeffs (std errors)	Odds Ratio
GDP growth slowdown and higher unemployment in the previous year	1.950** (0.879)	7.030	(0.047)			
Investment crowd-out and strikes in the previous year			2.719** (1.102)	15.171		
Combination of the four factors					3.070*** (0.91)	21.542
Constant	-3.905*** (0.704)		-4.340*** (0.992)		-4.044*** (0.703)	
LR chi^2 (probability)	4.9 (0.026)		6.1 (0.014)		11.4 (0.001)	
Total number of observations: 157						

*p<0.1, **p<.0.05, ***p<0.01

Note: a. Under weak economic conditions and galvanized citizens' challenge.

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Table 4 Military Behavior in Less Democratic and Democratizing Regime-Years

	Switch Support from Regime	
	No	Yes
Less Democratic Regimes		
Economic conditions not weak (per capita GDP not slowed, or unemployment not increasing)	121	2
Citizens' challenge not galvanized (production investment not declining, or strikes not increasing)	124	1
Democratizing Regimes		
Economic conditions not weak (per capita GDP not slowed, or unemployment not increasing)	52	1
Citizens' challenge galvanized (production investment declining, or strikes increasing)	7	0

zero instances where the military switched support away from the regime.

In sum, the results using different assessments yield consistent support for the theory to show the following: in illiberal regimes, the military switches from supporting the regime to supporting citizens' challenge under weak economic conditions when the challenge galvanizes, but does not switch from supporting the regime if economic conditions are strong. Further, in democratic regimes, the military generally does not switch support from the regime in the face of citizens' challenge and weak economic conditions (i.e., it does not take sides or seize political power). And, the empirical evidence corroborates that coups are rare events, per the theory set out here.

Case Discussions of South Korea, 1979–1980 and 1987

In this section, we add flesh to the theoretical framework of military behavior with case studies of South Korea in 1979–1980 and 1987, to assess its predictive success against extant theories described previously. The cases are interesting: they comprise a military coup in 1979 that is

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followed by the military's repression of citizens' challenge in 1980 and the military's rejection of mobilization against citizens in 1987.

What do we expect to see in the comparison? Briefly, the comparison emphasizes that weak economic conditions and galvanized citizens' challenge motivate the military to support or, at the least, acquiesce to citizens' challenge.[16] In particular, the framework here predicts that in the illiberal AICs, weak economic conditions precipitate citizens' challenge against the government. If citizens' challenge fails to broaden, the military does not support citizens' challenge; when citizens' challenge broadens, the military supports or acquiesces to that challenge. Importantly, extant theories as well as the framework here failed to predict the South Korean coup, given that coups are rare events. However, while extant theories also failed to predict the military's mobilization against citizens in 1980 as well as its acquiescence of citizens' challenge in 1987, the framework here forecasts military behavior in both instances. The following details the cases.

South Korea's economic feats of the 1960s and 1970s slowed down by the late 1970s; by 1979, the country's double-digit inflation had cut significantly into incomes and wealth (Haggard 1990; Clifford 1998; Lee 1980; Oh 1999). To control inflation and stabilize the economy, austerity measures including a tight monetary policy and lifting of price controls were adopted, and a midnight curfew imposed (Clifford 1998; Lee 1980). Pockets of discontent developed; some that ignited into protests, such as the female workers demonstrations against the bankruptcy closing of the Y.H. Industrial Company, and the Pusan-Masan student demonstrations, were crushed (Lee 1980; Oh 1999). As international disapprobation grew, conflict among the political elites on the government's missteps and course of action boiled over. This led ultimately to the assassination of President Park Chung-hee in November; in December, Prime Minister Choi Hyu-hah, a long-serving "bureaucrat," was elected to fill the presidency (Lee 1980, 70). Meanwhile, a seizure of power occurred within the military, led by Major General Chun Doohwan of the Defense Security Command, a military intelligence unit, and cofounder of the Hanahwoe (One Association) secret association that drew on members of the South Korean military academy (Lee 1980; Oh 1999). With this 12–12 coup, senior military officers in command were removed, and the Hanahwoe members took over the reins of military control.

Against this backdrop, President Choi signaled a series of political and social loosening, including the restoration of the civil rights of political dissidents, that gave rise to the Seoul Spring, a period that saw a

wave of protests and demonstrations sweep South Korea. As the demonstrations grew larger and demands more insistent, reports circulated that General Chun Doo-hwan may manipulate the situation in his favor: the general's portfolio included a recent appointment as director of the Korean Central intelligence Agency (KCIA). Rumors also spread that hardliners were calling for a military crackdown on the protesters (US Government Statement 1989). While the protests had grown large, US sources note that the demonstrations could be contained without military intervention; nevertheless, at 0001 hour, May 18, full martial law was imposed across the country and opposition political leaders including Kim Dae-jung, Kim Young Sam, and Kim Jong-pil arrested (Lee 1981; Clifford 1998; US Government Statement 1989). In the wake of the military crackdown, a massive protest gathered in Kwangju; when the protesters defied dispersion, the military opened fire. The Kwangju massacre would go down as one of the bloodiest domestic crackdowns in South Korean history (*New York Times,* August 29, 1996). Following the Kwangju massacre, Chun was elected to the presidency through the machinations of the electoral college in June 1980; to further consolidate and tighten social, political, and economic control, Chun waged a "purification campaign" to clamp down on the media and broadcasting, arrest political opponents, and disband political parties (Oh 1999; Clifford 1998; Lee 1981; Suh 1983). Nevertheless, these efforts did little to legitimize President Chun's takeover of the government, and his seven years in office would be afflicted with protests and challenges.

How well does the framework fare against extant theories in predicting the 1979–1980 events in South Korea? Neither the framework nor extant theories predicted the coup. Still, the framework here anticipated subsequent events: in particular, by the framework, weak economic conditions and expectations of galvanized citizens' challenge are necessary conditions for the military to support citizens' challenge. Studies show that while the protest was large, it was also mostly concentrated in Kwangju and did not broaden widely across groups. Thus, for instance, the "middle-class . . . participated to a lesser degree" while businesses were unnerved by demands for political, social, and economic changes (Fowler 1999, 273; Haggard and Kaufman 1995). As events show, the failure of citizens' challenge to broaden worked to the detriment of the protesters as the military chose to repress the challenge.

In comparison, an examination of events in South Korea in 1987 shows that South Korea's growth sputtered in the early 1980s and did not achieve the double-digit growth of the 1960s and 1970s; instead, growth struggled to reach an average of 5 percent in the first half of the

1980s. For an economy trying to recover from the oil shocks of the late 1970s, the growth rate did not ease pressures: unemployment averaged 4.4 percent, compared to 3.6 percent between 1975 and 1979. Labor participation numbers show that even the 4.4 percent unemployment rate underestimated the breadth of economic weakness: in particular, aggregate labor force, averaging 58 percent in the late 1970s, fell in the 1980s, with a low of 53.9 percent in 1984 (Richardson and Kim 1986). This means that the unemployment rates are probably underestimated. Further, the country's thin growth was largely financed by foreign aid and loans: until 1986, imports outstripped exports while the country's foreign debt exceeded 30 percent of the country's gross national product (Savada and Shaw 1992; Jeon 1994). Practically, this means high interest rates for loans, which is a disincentive for investments; this crimped the labor market further, particularly for the self-employed and temporary or nonregular workers, while adding downward pressures on real wages (Richardson and Kim 1986). These economic weaknesses explain in part the ongoing protests in the 1980s against President Chun following his election to the presidency in 1980.

For his part, the president and his government adopted structural reforms to resuscitate the economy from its negative territory in 1980; at the same time, to placate protesters or, at the least, not increase their numbers, he promised repeatedly during his term to step down in 1987 after a single term in office. In 1986, he even convened a legislative committee that included opposition leaders to discuss new constitutional revisions (*Korea Annual* 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1986, 1987).

Finally, the years of tight controls on wages, labor conditions, money supply, and fiscal spending paid off as the economy climbed out of the doldrums in 1986; conveniently, it seems, in 1987, Chun tried to postpone constitutional revisions. In response, a surge of protests and demonstrations, the "6-10" struggle, comprising workers, the middle class, and students, rose to challenge him (Oh 1999; Han 1988). In the face of this galvanized challenge, Chun's anointed successor, Roh Tae Woo, a military man and a key supporter from the Hanahwoe secret military association, and the military responded by acquiescing to demands for democratization and an accelerated process to revise the constitution and institute direct presidential elections. December 1987 saw the reinstatement of direct presidential elections and the resumption of civilian politics to usher in democratization for South Korea (Oh 1999; Han 1988).

How well does the framework fare compared to extant theories in predicting the 1987 events in South Korea? South Korea's economy for the first half of the 1980s was weak; equally important, the unstable in-

ternational economy did not bode well for the export-oriented South Korean economy (McKibbin 1989; Großer and Weinert 1986). And, the years of tight structural reforms had taken their toll on labor as well as small businesses. The citizens' challenge, then, was galvanized from weak economic conditions under an illiberal regime; at the prospects of President Chun's backpedaling of constitutional and political reforms, the country saw a surge of protests and opposition. The military framework predicts that the military chooses strategically to support or acquiesce to galvanized citizens' challenge against the government in a less democratic AIC when the economy is weak; for South Korea in 1987, then, the prediction is spot-on. The other theories do not perform as well. Thus, the military professionalization theory does not explain the anointment of Roh Tae Woo, while the development-militarism model also fails to predict military behavior, given the unstable economy. The military-fracture model suffers as well, although some note that anointed successor Roh Tae Woo may have gambled on splits among the opposition rather than retracted support from President Chun in acquiescing to protesters' demands for democratization.[17] However, by that account, President Chun would not have had to postpone constitutional revisions to delay democratization in the first place.

In summary, the case descriptions provide additional information that shows the military framework in this article compares favorably against extant theories for predicting a broader range of military behavior. In conjunction with the statistical findings, they recommend the strategic interaction approach that underlies the framework for predicting military behavior.

Conclusion

Although military behavior has long been a subject of interest and study, the focus on its ability to overthrow governments has underspecified military behavior and contributed to miscalculations of whom it supports and when. For the AICs, the overemphasis on the military's coup potential is particularly problematic, given that military behavior is integral to the stability and development of the political economies of these countries.

This article broadens specification of military behavior: it develops and tests a theory of military behavior to clarify when militaries in the AICs support their governments, when they support citizens' challenge of government, and when they launch coups to seize political control. Specifically, building on military studies and the accountability litera-

ture, we formulate a strategic interaction theory of military behavior that predicts the following: in the illiberal AICs, when economic conditions are weak and citizens challenge the government, the military supports citizens' challenge if the challenge galvanizes; however, when economic conditions are strong and citizens challenge the government, the military supports the government. In democratic AICs, the military does not support citizens' challenge of the government or support the government against citizens' challenge or launch a coup, across weak or strong economic conditions (i.e., it does not take sides or seize political power). We test these predictions with pooled cross-national time series data from the AICs of South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia between the 1970s and 2008, for illiberal as well as democratic, including newly democratic, AICs. Importantly, the theory here sees coups as rare events; this is corroborated by the dataset that shows only fifteen coups and coup attempts across all seven countries studied through the entire period, with fourteen of them occurring in two countries, Thailand and the Philippines.

The results of a series of tests support the theory to clarify that the conditions that trigger the military to change behaviors or switch its support to citizens' challenge against the government in illiberal AICs do not precipitate similar switches in democratic AICs. By this proposed framework, then, poor economic conditions and expectations of galvanized citizens' challenge are necessary conditions for the military to switch support from governments in illiberal AICs; when economic conditions are good, the military does not switch support.

More generally, the theory and findings here are useful for providing a framework of military behavior for the AICs to expand research beyond coups or the absence thereof and systematically test the predictions with data from the AICs. Also, the findings of military support for citizens' challenge bring to focus the influence of citizens, largely overlooked in scholarship of the region. Relatedly, the findings of necessary conditions—weak economy and galvanized citizens' challenge—that affect the military's behaviors vis-à-vis citizens and the government highlight the utility of the strategic interaction treatment for assessing conditions under which players' promises or threats, even the military's, are credible and when they are not.

Is there a value to the theory beyond the cases studied? Clearly, the model is generalizable to industrializing countries that are resource poor, given that resource paucity limits the strategies of the interrelating participants. Yet, we have also tested the framework of military behavior here with resource-endowed countries including Malaysia, Thailand, In-

donesia, and the Philippines, and these have not contravened predictions. Of course, it is instructive that the cases of coups are concentrated in Thailand and the Philippines, which enjoy resource endowments; this clarifies the availability of a short-term strategy that resource-poor countries do not possess. The unmistakable reminder seems to be this: resource endowment is not a viable alternative to bargaining as a strategy in the long run (Haggard 1999, 31). It behooves governments facing citizens' challenge under weak economic conditions to pay heed.

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Appendix: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used

	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min.	Max.
Less Democratic Regimes					
Percentage growth in defense spending	160	19.09	78.50	-90.93	974.35
Real growth in per capita GDP	160	4.96	3.96	-9.77	12.74
Change in unemployment	160	-0.001	0.98	-4.60	4.40
Change in strike activity	160	17.52	98.15	-295.0	629.0
Real growth in private production investment	160	11.63	14.67	-42.97	72.610
Democratizing Regimes					
Percentage growth in defense spending	66	7.76	12.14	-30.79	42.49
Real growth in per capita GDP	66	3.38	3.72	-11.00	10.60
Change in unemployment	66	0.06	1.06	-4.18	4.20
Change in strike activity	66	126.09	875.53	-1876.0	3473.0
Real growth in private production investment	66	8.41	12.68	-46.41	39.46

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Notes

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1. The AICs include South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. See Haggard (2004) for a discussion.

2. The Asian AICs in this study comprise the list of East and Southeast Asian countries excepting Communist countries. See, for example, the Asian Development Bank. The Communist countries are excluded because data for several critical variables used in this study are not reported or only intermittently available.

3. We thank Stephan Haggard for suggesting clearer classifications of the AICs. In using illiberal, we follow Schedler (2002, 37)'s ideation of "specific, diminished subtypes" that inhabit the vast gray zone short of fully democratic.

4. As will be discussed in the literature section, extant studies of the military do not generally address the different divisions in the military. Such a treatment does not impute unanimity within these sets of players; rather, it is a simplification to achieve tractability for theory-building and empirical testing. Equally important, empirical evidence shows that there are dominant leaders as well as strategic solutions—including selective incentives, assurance games, tipping points, and leadership—that lead different factions to nevertheless adopt one ultimate behavior. See, for example, Deng (1997), Moore (1995), van Belle (1996), and Hunter (1998).

5. See Zanger (2000) for a discussion of the definition of regime; see also Lawson (1993) and Kitschelt (1992).

6. Some, such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, have richer resource endowments. However, in the case of the Philippines, such resource endowments remain largely untapped or underdeveloped.

7. The following review focuses on civil-military studies that explain the military's behavior in illiberal nations. Feaver (1999) reviews studies that extend to civil-military relations within democracies.

8. While the Polity IV standard democratic threshold is 6, it is interesting that except for Malaysia (4) there are no other cases in the AICs in this study that fell in the positive range but below 6.

9. We consider two categories reported by the CSP: successful and attempted (failed) coups given that the codebook considers that coverage for the remaining two categories—coup plots and alleged coup plots—were "more questionable." See Marshall and Marshall (2011, 1).

10. For instance, the use of electoral support to capture citizens' behavior is less appropriate in authoritarian states that transition to democracies because of the ambiguities in the meaning or effect of the vote in the predemocratization period.

11. For studies such as this where the interest lies in strikes as a reflection of discontent, incidence of strikes remains a widely used indicator, obtained from the International Labor Office or the national statistical boards of the respective countries. See, for example, Ames (1987), Vernby (2007), and Colomer (1991). Other more comprehensive measures of strike activity, such as worker days lost from strikes per 1,000 salaried workers, are more appropriate for clarifying characteristics of strikes, such as hazard rates or duration dependency. See discussion in Bennett (1999).

12. Other monetary and nonmonetary incentives that are not systematically documented include personnel control and promotion, education, health and housing, greater autonomy, unilateral evaluation of defense needs, assessments of needed weaponry or systems (which may provide kickbacks), and the development of a defense industry (from which there may be kickbacks or prospects of a second career for retired officers).

13. We note that this classification of wartime preparations and war expenses is not unique to the Asian AICs. Thus, for instance, until changes adopted by the Obama administration in the United States, military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan since September 11, 2001, were through supplemental appropriations and not the regular budgetary process (*New York Times*, June 16, 2006; February 28, 2009). In South Korea, war preparation and expenses fall under the combined Korea-US Forces and do not fall in the regular budget. See Ministry of National Defense (Republic of Korea), *Korea Herald*, "Roh Backs Military Spending Hike," June 23, 2003. For Taiwan, see Central News Agency, "Defense Ministry to Take Another Stab at Publicity for US Arms Deal," March 3, 2005; "Defense Budget Changes 'A Grueling Decision': Defense Minister Lee," August 5, 2005. In the Philippines, defense appropriations comprise two main categories: regular operating expenditures and force improvement expenses.

14. We thank an anonymous reviewer and Stephan Haggard for these suggestions, although we are unable to implement them due to pooled dataset.

15. Consider the following examples of combining data. For continuous data (a) if the real per capita GDP grows by 4 percent but unemployment increases by 2 percent, the combination leads to –8. Again, for continuous data, (b) if real per capita GDP declines by 2 percent while unemployment increases by 2 percent, the combination is –4. Yet, it is not clear that the first scenario (a) is twice as bad as the second (b); indeed, some may consider that the second (b) is worse. With interval data, the results are more intuitive: for (a), the positive per capita GDP growth translates as +1, while the unemployment translates as –1. This compares against (b), where real per capita growth is coded as –1 and the unemployment is –1. In this instance, scenario (b) is comparably worse than scenario (a) and, more importantly, shows that weak economic conditions are captured by several dimensions.

16. We thank Stephan Haggard for pointing out that acquiescence is more apt than support for describing the military's stance on citizens' challenge.

17. We thank Stephan Haggard for the advice to account for Chun-Roh's consideration of the opposition split.

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