

science addresses many new and relevant issues; for example, from a recent experiment, a nasal spray of the hormone oxytocin increased individuals' willingness to trust others (see Kosfeld *et al.*, 2005). Greater awareness of the relevance of such findings to social science could be the catalyst for some novel presentations that would serve to advance, rather than simply to elucidate, attempts to further understanding of an individual's autonomy and freedom.

G. R. Steele

Lancaster University Management School

REFERENCES

- Dennett, D. C. (1997) *Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology* (Harmondsworth: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press).
- Dennett, D. C. (2004) *Freedom Evolves* (Harmondsworth: Allen Lane, Penguin Press).
- Kosfeld, M., Heinrichs, M., Zak, P. J., Fischbacher, U. and Fehr, E. (2005) Oxytocin Increases Trust in Humans, *Nature*, 435 (June 2), pp. 673–76.
- Plotkin, H. (1994) *The Nature of Knowledge* (Harmondsworth: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press).

Donald Rutherford (Ed) *Biographical Dictionary of British Economists* (Bristol: Thoemmes Continuum, 2005) 2 vols., pp.xxv, 1330, \$630, ISBN 1-84371-030-7.

Enoch Soames—a dispirited *fin-de-siecle* poet from Preston, Lancashire—sold his soul to the devil to find out what the reference books would say about him in 100 years' time. Transported to the British Museum in 1997 he found one solitary mention, by an “authority” who believed him to be a fictitious creation by Max Beerbohm.

As a matter of fact he was, but one wonders which of the economists born, say, around 1800 (the median date of birth in this Dictionary is 1796) would have been surprised to be in, or out of, Donald Rutherford's compilation. If one could travel back in time to give advice, then some good tips would be: take an interest in monetary theory, the poor laws or how to deal with the national debt. If you are no great shakes analytically then try an economic experiment (utopian community, novel method of poor relief) instead or, if this is too exacting, rise to fame in some other field and have strong opinions on economic subjects. Being a woman will neither help nor hinder you (more on this later.) Be Scottish (seventy-nine entrants were born in Scotland and thirty-eight even died there.) There is nothing to gain by arranging to die a violent death (to date only one economist, the regicide John Cook, has been hanged drawn and quartered, though William Prynne (1600–69) did have his ears cut off.)

However one defines an economist, it is likely that ninety-five percent or more of them are alive today. That half the entrants here were born before 1800 might seem remarkable. Partly it comes about because living economists, with two exceptions, are excluded, but is it also because more has meant worse? Comparisons are difficult for all the obvious reasons, but one does have a sense that, as more university and government economists become available for inclusion, others who would have

made it 100 years earlier get pushed out. Because there was no such thing as a professional economist in the eighteenth century, economists were also merchants, commodity speculators, shipping insurers, civet cat breeders, civil servants, part-owners of brick-and-tile works, hack writers, convicts, journalists, political agitators, government spies, poets, newspaper editors, and novelists. I have just listed the main occupations of Daniel Defoe.

This in itself points to the anachronism of trying to decide which twentieth-century economists might have got in if judged by eighteenth-century criteria. But John Strachey, W. H. Mallock, Sir Leo Chiozza Money, and Harold Wilson are maybe unlucky not to be in here. The Dictionary in fact includes no prime minister (though Roy Jenkins says, wrongly in this reviewer's eyes, that Hugh Gaitskell would have been one had he lived.) But it does include a man who was born at 10 Downing Street and one who died there (Stafford Northcote, during a difficult interview with Lord Salisbury), and there are Chancellors of the Exchequer aplenty (Vansittart, Lowe, Goschen, Snowden, Dalton, and Gaitskell). Some economists are not actually omitted but their importance gets submerged. C. F. Bickerdike's demonstration in 1906 that any large country can gain by imposing a tariff is lost in a list of incomparably smaller achievements, and we are told almost everything about Robert Owen except what went on in his factories that was special. Wicksteed's *Common Sense* needs much more than the short perfunctory paragraph it gets (in fact how is it that Wicksteed only gets one page *in toto* while his dull contemporary Sir William Ashley gets seven—two more than Adam Smith?) Dickens as a critic of industrial capitalism is quickly skated over. Indeed his entry is the most bizarre in the book, making him out as a kind of racist ogre on the strength of his treatment of Mrs. Jellyby in *Bleak House* and the fact that a character in *Pickwick* has the same name as a figure in an allegedly racist cartoon in *Punch* thirty years later. (To be fair, his two biographers also contribute some excellent entries, notably on William Foster Lloyd (1794–1852).)

Other entrants seem lucky to be in. It is stretching it by any criteria to call Shute Barrington (1734–1826), a charitable bishop of Durham, an economist. Isaac Barrow (1630–77) appears because he exerted an influence on Newton who went on to develop principles eventually taken up by mathematical economists. People who expressed occasional opinions on economic subjects get in because they were eminent elsewhere (such as John Lilburne the Leveller, c.1614–57). The historian Henry Buckle (1821–62) is here, apparently because he thought that a country's interest rate indicated how democratic it was. William Temple, archbishop of Canterbury in the 1940s wanted more welfare and less competition—though those tempted to ask which archbishop has ever wanted anything else should head for the entry on the ferociously “right-wing” John Bird Sumner (1780–1862).

Compared with the *New Dictionary of National Biography* there is a dearth of small-scale gems, though Morgen Witzel and Marjorie Bloy, between them, provide dozens of apt and pointed sketches. The outstanding entries are without exception big pieces about big economists. This reviewer's education was especially advanced by Harro Maas on Cairnes on methodology and *The Slave Power*; Roger Backhouse on Hawtrey; Richard Sturm on Hume; and David Collard on Pigou. Noel Thompson demonstrates that the “Ricardian socialist” Hodgskin was at sea with Ricardo's ideas and in violent opposition on almost everything to his alleged

“twin” William Thompson. But Geoffrey Hodgson on Malthus, Peter Groenewegen on Marshall, and Dale Miller on Mill are also excellent, while Dennis O’Brien’s entries on Hayek and Robbins are not just superb in their own right but beautifully complementary to one another. Robert Leeson sets the record straight on A. W. Phillips; far from drawing a crude unemployment-inflation tradeoff that forgot about expectations, he actually suggested adaptive expectations to Friedman and “had been working on what became known as the Lucas critique several years before Robert Lucas.” Had Phillips’ ideas been properly assimilated, Leeson concludes, “New Classical economists would have been unable to portray Old Keynesians as a soft target” and, more dubiously, “nor would the monetarists have been able to capitalise on the great inflation” (p. 936).

Leeson finds Phillips “an admirable and fascinating person” and there is some refreshingly earnest devotion by some of the biographers towards their subjects (Thirlwall on Kaldor, Harcourt on Brian Reddaway). Noel Thompson (again) contributes a splendidly enthusiastic essay on Cobbett, although one wonders why the succeeding piece on Cobden is only a third as long. Praise is, of course, sometimes mixed; in the middle of a highly congratulatory entry on Maurice Dobb we read that “his attitude adapted, continuously and apparently quite effortlessly to the Party line” (p. 330). And after hearing about G. D. H. Cole’s barely comprehensible proposals to tie everyone’s life up in a network of guilds, communes, planning committees, and meta- and meta-meta-bodies to keep the aforementioned in line with each other, we are told that he was “an individualist.”

Some economists this reviewer had thought insignificant—or never heard of—get a major boost. Thomas Brassey’s nineteenth-century anticipation of the idea of efficiency wages was everything that economics should be—rigorous, relevant, and verified by benevolent experiment on a lucky work-force. Samuel Brittan uses his entry on Norman Angell (1872–1967) to attack “the frequent belief that the U.S.A. desired or needed to dominate the Middle East for the sake of oil without realising that the Middle East needed to sell the oil as much as the West needed to buy it.” (p. 15) Angell, in fact, sounds like the Samuel Brittan of his time and one comes away with enhanced admiration for both of them. Nicholas Barbon (c.1640–98) seems to have been unerringly right about everything, while the philanthropist and free trade campaigner Sir Thomas Bernard could do with a full-length biography. Perhaps Jonathan Fowler (who has just finished a Ph.D. on him) will oblige. Donald Rutherford himself achieves a double with William Playfair (1759–1823) and Samuel Read (1779–1855). Playfair, author of *An Inquiry into the Permanent Causes of the Decline and Fall of Powerful and Wealthy Nations*, is a kind of up-market Toynbee with his 3000-year canvas, not to mention his invention *en passant* of the bar chart and the pie chart. Read is yet more remarkable. After demolishing the labor theory of value, along with the Ricardian idea that agriculture does anything special to determine the rate of profit, he went on to demand old age pensions, predict that prosperity would lead to a lower birthrate, and call for a paper currency in the hands of a politically independent central bank.

Not everyone will read these two volumes cover to cover, and there are plenty of out-of-the-way gleanings even from a quick browse. “Beggars should not be choosers” was coined by Francis Bacon (1561–1626). David Champenowne and Alan Turing built the first chess computer, the “Turochamp,” though it could barely beat beginners

(Mrs. Champenowne.) There appears to be no link between Giffen and Giffen goods (just as well—they don't exist). Goschen turned down the Viceroyalty of India. Hobson, surprisingly, was dubbed “jester-in-chief” for his ready wit. George Holyoake (1817–1906) was the last man to be imprisoned on a charge of atheism and Thorold Rogers, apparently, the first clergyman to unfrock himself. Rogers's lectures were merely “racy” but many entrants are singled out as inspiring or even spell-binding lecturers. Economists you would want to be taught by include Alexander Gray (1882–1968), though whether his custom of introducing his lectures with a piece on the organ counts as a plus or a minus Donald Rutherford does not say. Implausibly, no one seems to have been a dull lecturer, with the possible exception of Ephraim Lipson (1881–1960) described by a student (p. 681) as “a very useful lecturer. He said everything twice very slowly so that you could take it all down.” (Today he might get a teaching award.) There must be a sin of omission here, just as there is, presumably, in some of the personal biographical details: if economists really have as few wives and children as recorded here, they must be the most rebellious Malthusians on the planet.

Only twenty-one of the 614 entrants are women, but that seems about right, insofar as the threshold of merit for getting in appears to be the same for both sexes. There are two pairings of great-grandfather and great-granddaughter (William Paley and Mary Marshall; F. D. Maurice and Joan Robinson); and Gregory Moore reminds us (correctly in this reviewer's eyes) that Leslie Stephen had a daughter who wrote several unreadable novels. Bloomsbury as a whole is mercifully absent from the entry on Keynes.

As we said at the start, specialists in poor relief and the national debt are extremely well represented in these volumes, and with a wide choice of solutions for both problems. William Bailey (d.1773) thought the entire cotton industry could be relocated to the nation's workhouses, while John Craig (1766–1859) would have fine-tuned the situation with his proposal that “no illiterate would be allowed factory employment under the age of 12, unless an orphan” (p. 276). The Napoleonic wars produced a spate of proposals for dealing with the national debt. Francis Blake thought the State should ask everyone earning more than £100 a year to shoulder “their share” of the debt and repay it or pay interest on it, as they pleased. James Hodges wanted to pay off the debt by calling in all privately held gold and silver plate, while Horne Tooke thought the government should simply stop paying interest on it. But it was, of course, Ricardo who said you could repay it in a few years with a tax on property and no one would suffer because of what is now known as “Ricardian equivalence.”

“British economist” is defined as someone who spent at least ten years of his or her active life as an economist in Britain. This must be why, for example, Thomas Paine isn't in. Were the editors right to exclude Ireland? Were there thought to be so many Irish economists that they would have required a third volume, or so few that leaving them out was no great loss? We leave these questions unanswered and congratulate Mr. Rutherford and his team for a work you soon will be wondering how you managed without.

John Maloney
University of Exeter