

taking the 1940s as his point of reference, a moment when winning state power was still a highly meaningful objective.

Free elections and the right of previously excluded groups to participate politically were important, but the ability to turn this into effective political power and a domestically accountable economic project had been severely reduced by the time the first free elections were held in the two countries in 1994. Wood is fully aware, of course, that the context of neoliberal globalization favored a negotiated settlement in both cases. It reassured elites that by relinquishing the labor-repressive model of accumulation they were not by any means being forced to give up economic power. "Elites could assume with some confidence that international financial agencies and the global mobility of private capital would discipline any post-transition government that encroached too severely on holders of wealth, professionals, and other globally mobile economic elites" (p. 200). International aid and financial flows were forthcoming in both cases to assist elites in the economic transition to global competitiveness. This context limited the redistributive effects of the settlements on the poor, as Wood acknowledges in her epilogue. It also limited the relevance of electoral participation and democracy to their everyday lives.

Winning control of the state (which the former Salvadoran guerrillas of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation party have not yet done but certainly could in the future) was

no longer a guarantor of propoor policies. Both El Salvador and South Africa are today renowned for their high level of social violence and crime, the ineffectiveness still of their judiciaries, and the persistence of political corruption. It is the capacity to gain access to the informal U.S. labor market that provides livelihoods for many Salvadorean families, not Salvadorean government policy or economic productivity within El Salvador. In this sense, Wood's emphasis on the goal of democracy may prove to be misplaced as a measure of insurgent success and achievements.

The main accomplishment of the insurgents may have been to force the path of capitalist modernization. The costs of economic restructuring were diminished when balanced against the costs of defending the old repressive political economy. This economic transition may prove in historical terms to be at least as significant as the political one. It may also give us important insights into the contemporary civil conflict in Colombia; Wood concludes that if a peace process there is to endure, it must be self-enforcing. Colombia also can be seen against the background of an economic elite confronting the costs and challenges of capitalist modernity. Will the insurgents tip the balance in favor of a peace process that would enable this to happen at the cost only of the political participation of guerilla forces, who lack an alternative economic project to cause elites much anxiety at the ballot box?

International Relations

Disarmed Democracies: Domestic Institutions and the Use of Force. By David P. Auerswald. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000. 184p. \$44.50.

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This book focuses on the evaluation of six hypotheses regarding the effect of variation in democratic domestic institutions on foreign policy decision making and crisis management. (1) If a national election is immediately forthcoming, then executives will be reluctant to initiate international conflicts or make threats. (2) If an executive's office tenure is subject to legislative confidence, then that executive will be reluctant to use force or engage in coercive diplomacy absent a strong probability of immediate success. (3) Executives subject to legislative confidence will have domestic incentives to send strong signals of resolve internationally. (4) Executives who deal with legislatures that can overturn or hinder the use of force will be reluctant to use force or make coercive diplomacy threats. (5) If the legislature attempts to overturn or curtail the executive's coercive diplomacy threat, then that signals international opponents of a divided democracy, regardless of subsequent executive actions. (6) If the legislature can overturn or hinder the executive's use of force but is extremely divided, then the executive will be less reluctant to use force than he might otherwise be.

Auerswald derives these hypotheses from a theoretical structure based on the assumptions that executives value personal survival over national survival, national survival over staying in power, and holding onto power over any single policy preference. Because he analyzes no cases in which personal or national survival are at stake, the most important assumption for this book is that executive political leaders want to stay in office.

Auerswald acknowledges that his hypotheses might best be

investigated with large *N* aggregate analyses, but he argues that there are not enough cases in which democracies threaten or use force against opponents who could not endanger national survival to support such analyses. Therefore, he selects crucial cases in which a few democracies with different institutional structures deal with the same or similar crises. He focuses on domestically strong pure presidential systems, premier-presidential governments, majority parliamentary governments, domestically weak pure presidential and premier-presidential governments, and coalition parliamentary governments.

To evaluate the effect of these different institutional arrangements and the validity of his hypotheses, Auerswald analyzes the policies and reactions of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States to the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis and the 1995 Bosnian War. He also examines a set of cases, or examples, of coercive diplomacy, such as the American attempt to compel Syria to withdraw from Lebanon in 1983, the attempt by the United States to compel Iraq to remove its troops from Kuwait in 1990 and 1991, the successful attempt by the British in 1964 to persuade the Indonesians to halt their raids on Malaya, the crisis leading to the 1982 Falklands War between the United Kingdom and Argentina, and French threats aimed at compelling Libya to withdraw its troops from Chad in 1978 and 1983. In the course of these case studies, Auerswald attempts to evaluate the relative effects of power disparities and *realpolitik*, and public opinion, as well as variations in domestic institutional arrangements on foreign policy decision making.

Auerswald finds for the most part that his hypotheses are valid. Some of his conclusions are more convincing than others. At least one of his hypotheses—how legislative efforts to overturn an executive's attempt at coercive diplomacy signals to international opponents that the "democracy is divided"—seems to verge on the tautological. The logic

behind another hypothesis—if the legislature can overturn or hinder an executive's use of force but is extremely divided, then the executive will be less reluctant to use force than he might otherwise be—is not all that persuasive. What if the legislature is not divided but firmly united in support of the executive's use of force? If united support is the alternative to a divided legislature, then one might guess that a divided legislature actually would make an executive more reluctant to use force.

The hypotheses tend to be worded in such a cautious, guarded fashion that “invalidating” them is difficult. One might wish, for example, that they had focused on the actual probability of using force, rather than on whether the executive is more or less reluctant to use force. (It is easy to suspect that for almost every international crisis in which force is contemplated, some official somewhere at some time expresses reluctance.) When the focus is on single cases, one cannot deal very well with such probabilities. Force either was or was not used in a given case.

On occasion the author appears reluctant to see disconfirming evidence. One of the more straightforward hypotheses asserts that as elections approach, executives will be reluctant to initiate conflicts or make threats. In the discussion of the Falkland crisis from the British point of view, Auerwald fails to see evidence that tends to confirm a contrary hypothesis: As elections near, executives will be tempted to initiate conflicts in order to divert attention from domestic problems and/or to achieve some international success to improve electoral prospects. He does note that when the British government threatened Indonesia in order to compel it to cease attacks on Malaya, the upcoming elections seemed to provide a motivation for the government to “threaten massive reprisals and . . . quickly implement them” (p. 103). The author does not point out that this example runs counter to the hypothesis about the alleged pacifying effect of imminent elections.

Nevertheless, the case studies are in general carefully and competently done, and they will serve to enhance the reader's understanding of the dynamics and outcomes of all the decisions and events on which they focus. Occasionally, one gets the feeling that the author seems destined to find either that a case analysis supports one of the hypotheses or that the implicit “all else being equal” clause appended to each hypothesis is violated in a way that makes it clear why apparently disconfirming evidence is not really disconfirming. Still, the logic of the case selection and the author's lucid explication of crisis processes and outcomes make this book overall a successful attempt to evaluate the effect of institutional variations among democratic governments on foreign policy decision making.

Nuclear Strategy in the Twenty-First Century. By Stephen Cimbala. Westport, CT, and London: Praeger, 2000. 211p. \$65.00.

Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons. By T.V. Paul. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000. 227p. \$60.00 cloth, \$27.95 paper.

Nuclear Monopoly. By George Quester. New Brunswick, NJ, and London: Transaction, 2000. 234p. \$44.95.

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The arrival of a new administration in Washington typically sparks debate about possible redirection of a range of American policies, including strategic nuclear policy. These three books come at a time of reevaluation of American

strategy, which also has prompted American allies and others to reexamine entrenched assumptions about mutual assured destruction, the relationship of nuclear offense to defense, and the international power structure. *Nuclear Strategy in the Twenty-First Century* fits into a long tradition of general strategic reevaluations. The volumes by T.V. Paul and George Quester focus on nuclear restraint—the former on why some states have denuclearized and some have refrained from building nuclear arsenals, and the latter on why the United States did not forcefully prolong its nuclear monopoly when it appears it could have done so.

Stephen Cimbala has produced many valuable works on nuclear strategy and international conflict. The present volume explores key questions facing American strategists at the start of the new century, including the value of weapons of mass destruction in the “postnuclear age”; the ability of the United States to retain its unique status over time, given the challenges that may be expected to arise from China and Russia; and the future of nuclear proliferation. Cimbala draws on Western, Chinese, and Russian writers on strategy to interpret the evidence of the post-World War II era, with special attention to the Cuban missile crisis.

Cimbala argues that the nuclear peace since 1945 has been much more a result of luck than of any predictable, systematic effects or well-established theory of nuclear deterrence. Taking issue with the systemic theories of Waltz and others, Cimbala argues that nuclear competition has sprung up in places such as South Asia and the Middle East, where the rivals view one another with a visceral hostility that far outstrips the Soviet-American rivalry when it began. He takes up a version of the agent-structure question and asks whether it is wise to consider system structure as a distinct framework. He notes that systems theories have certain advantages, such as allowing simpler expression and fewer variables on which to focus. But systemic approaches are acceptable only if two criteria are satisfied: The theory must lead to insights that are “accurate” and “not otherwise attainable” (p. 74). Cimbala contends that neither is met.

In the chapter on the Cuban missile crisis Cimbala argues that nuclear arsenals are much more dangerous than the peaceful resolution has led many authors to conclude. He insists that the crisis was not a moment of glory for either side; instead, it was a result of serious and mutual mismanagement. He judges the principals quite harshly, charging that the crisis resulted from “a series of political and military blunders committed by governments in possession of large arsenals and small brains” (p. 62). This represents a distinct rethinking of Cimbala's earlier account (*Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War*, 1994), in which he praised the two leaders' abilities.

Cimbala argued in *Military Persuasion* that, in light of intelligence that the United States had a substantial strategic forces advantage (17 to 1), President Kennedy's decision not “to press Khrushchev to the limit . . . demonstrated an innate shrewdness on his part plus an intellectual comprehension of the problem of inadvertent escalation” (1994, 14). Cimbala adds that Khrushchev was “smart enough” to see the potential dangers of recklessness. Khrushchev's initial gamble of emplacing missiles in Cuba “miscarried . . . [but] Khrushchev played this weak hand very skillfully. In fact, from the standpoint of a process-oriented approach to decisionmaking, he played it brilliantly” (1994, 15). The account of Kennedy's advisors differs in much the same way in the two books. ExComm's structure and performance is lauded in the 1994 book (p. 107), but in the current volume Cimbala speaks of “erratic personalities, uncertain decision-making pro-