
Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine: Three Techniques for Institutionalization

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Japan's level of defense expenditure relative to the size of its economy has long been uniquely low among the major industrialized countries. As of 1995, Japan's expenditures stood at 0.96 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).¹ Even adding to this the approximately 0.3 percent of GDP devoted to pensions for retired personnel, the level of spending is considerably less than that of major Western states such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany, as well as industrialized Asian states such as South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Singapore. Furthermore, these relative magnitudes have remained reasonably stable over the past few decades (see Table 1).²

Defense expenditure as a percentage of GDP or GNP (gross national product),³ often referred to simply as "defense burden," has over the past few decades become the standard benchmark for measuring a state's relative contribution to international security.⁴ Because of this, the appropriateness and consequences of Japan's relatively low expenditure of national wealth on defense have been hotly debated both in Japan and abroad. Critics accuse Japan of unfairly exploiting a defense "free ride" to build its economic success,⁵ and others worry that Japan's lack of military capabilities prevents it from becoming a "normal state" whose political role is commensurate

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1. See Japan Defense Agency 1995, ref. 33.

2. Contrary to NATO standards, figures for overall Japanese defense expenditure do not include pensions for retired defense personnel. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, combined benefits to retired personnel (mostly World War II veterans) and to their survivors accounted for as much as 0.6 percent of GDP. However, demographic forces have reduced this level to 0.3 percent as of 1995. See Statistics Bureau 1996, tab. 14-4; and discussion in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 2 February 1983, 46.

3. Until the 1970s, GNP was the more commonly used measure of the size of an economy and hence the denominator against which defense expenditure was compared. Changes in the UN System of National Accounts recommendations have caused most countries to switch over to GDP as their primary measure of national wealth, and this has been reflected in defense expenditure comparisons.

4. See, for instance, U.S. Department of Defense 1989; and U.S. General Accounting Office 1990.

5. See Krauss 1986; and *U.S. News and World Report*, 5 August 1985, 43.

TABLE 1. *Level of defense spending as a percentage of GNP/GDP^a, selected countries*

Country	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1994	1994 GNP ^b	1994 GNP/capita ^c
Japan	1.3	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	2,642	21.1
United States	8.0	7.8	5.9	5.5	6.5	5.4	4.3	6,744	25.9
United Kingdom	6.8	4.9	4.9	5.1	5.2	3.7	3.4	1,049	18.0
France	4.8	4.0	3.9	3.9	4.0	2.8	3.3	1,139	19.7
Germany ^d	5.7	3.3	3.7	3.2	3.2	2.2	2.0	1,588	19.5
South Korea	3.8	4.0	5.1	5.7	5.1	4.4	3.6	459	10.3
Taiwan ^e	9.0	8.8	6.9	7.9	6.6	5.4	5.0
Malaysia ^e	2.7	4.6	4.0	5.7	5.6	3.8	3.9	166	8.4
Singapore	..	5.8	5.3	6.1	6.7	5.1	4.8	53	21.9

Sources: Data for defense spending were taken from *Military Balance*, various issues, International Institute for Strategic Studies; data for GNP and GNP per capita were taken from World Bank 1996.

^aGNP was used as the basis for calculations until 1980, after which GDP was used (see footnote 3).

^bIn billions of U.S. dollars, Purchasing Power Parity.

^cIn thousands of U.S. dollars, Purchasing Power Parity.

^dFigures for Germany up to 1990 refer only to the Federal Republic of Germany.

^eFigures for Taiwan and Malaysia for 1980 refer to 1979 amounts.

with its economic role.⁶ Among the most prominent manifestations of this debate are the U.S. Congress's amendment to the 1988 U.S. defense budget demanding that Japan raise its defense spending to at least 3 percent of GDP, as well as the Japanese cabinet's 1 percent of GNP limit on defense spending announced in 1976. However, despite the controversy over Japan's low defense contribution, there has been a notable lack of theoretically informed attempts to explain its causes or why it persists despite Japan's emergence as an economic superpower.

Systemic Approaches

Perhaps the most prominent sources of possible explanations for levels of defense expenditure are the major systemic approaches to international politics: neorealism and neoliberalism. Neorealism and neoliberalism agree that states are primarily self-interested⁷ and seek to ensure their own survival,⁸ disagreeing (among other things) on the extent to which this causes states to pursue relative gains in power.⁹ However, the precise implications of each approach for a particular state's defense expenditure

6. Ozawa 1993, 102.

7. See Baldwin 1993, 9; and Keohane 1993, 273.

8. Powell 1994, 320–21.

9. For discussions of the contrasting assumptions and implications of the realist and liberal approaches, in both their traditional and newer versions, see Keohane 1984, 7–11; Grieco 1988, 488–90; Nye 1988, 238–41; and Baldwin 1993, 4–8. For analysis of conditions under which relative goals can be seen as an instrumental factor in maximizing absolute goals, see Powell 1991; and Niou and Ordeshook 1994.

depend on the clarification of a number of issues, including the relative contribution of military, economic, and other capabilities to power;¹⁰ the effect of one type of capability on the level of other capabilities;¹¹ and the amount of power necessary to ensure survival.¹²

Moreover, though both approaches are consistent with or even predict the formation of military alliances, neither has unambiguously specified how military responsibilities will be distributed within such alliances.¹³ A notable characteristic of Japan's defense policy is its close dependence on the United States via their mutual security treaty and its incorporation within the United States' greater security framework for Asia. Clearly, Japan's relatively low defense burden is integrally tied to the disproportionately large burden borne by the United States within their alliance. However, saying that the latter explains the former begs the question of why the burden is spread so disproportionately. Systemic approaches, and most approaches to international politics, would view as incomplete any explanation that attributes one state's policies to another state's policies. Rather, variations in state policies must ultimately be traceable to variations in state positions within the international system.

Given that U.S. burden-sharing with other allies in NATO and in East Asia is much less asymmetrical than with Japan, it is difficult to argue that the United States' position as a military superpower by itself provides an adequate explanation for Japan's relatively low military burden. Hence, some set of characteristics distinguishing Japan's position from that of other major allies must be included to explain Japan's status as an outlier and the United States' decision to supply military protection to Japan despite the resulting asymmetry. Here, although the systemic approaches do not generate exact predictions, they do suggest certain characteristics that influence levels of defense expenditure.

First, no matter how much a state seeks to expand its military capabilities, it will be constrained by the amount of economic resources it can channel into such a buildup, which one can assume is a function of the surplus that remains after the basic consumption needs of the population are met. Alternatively, the greater a state's economic capabilities, arguably, the more it can benefit from an incremental positive change in the total provision of defense in an alliance.¹⁴ The first point suggests that a

10. Neorealism accepts that nonmilitary capabilities may contribute to power but does not specify the exact extent. See Waltz 1979, 131. For discussions of the difficulty of conceptualizing power unidimensionally, see Keohane 1983, 522–24, 527; and Baldwin 1993, 15–22.

11. For instance, the debate on the relationship between military capability and economic growth. See Payne and Sahu, 1993. For an investigation with relation to Japan, see Matsuyama, Kojina, and Fukuda 1993.

12. Neoliberalism accepts that some minimum amount of power may be necessary to ensure survival, whereas neorealism does not imply that survival always necessitates expansion of power to its maximum possible extent. See Keohane 1983, 529; Waltz 1979, 118, 127; and Waltz 1986, 334.

13. Systemic theories are just beginning to deal with the question of distribution within cooperative arrangements; see Powell 1994, 339–43. For an analysis of distribution with relation to international economic agreements, see Krasner 1991.

14. This point is emphasized in the public-goods literature on NATO burden-sharing, originating with Olson and Zeckhauser 1966. Note, however, that it relies on the implicit assumption that the value of a successful common defense to a state is proportional to the size of the state's economy.

state's defense expenditure as a percentage of national wealth will, *ceteris paribus*, tend to rise with its per capita wealth, whereas the second point suggests it will rise with the total size of its economy. The case of the United States, which has the world's largest economy, one of the highest per capita incomes, and expends a relatively high percentage of its wealth on defense, lends some support to this argument. However, it clearly does not fit the case of Japan, which has gone from being a relatively poor country to a very wealthy one with little change in its defense burden. It is certainly true that, as Japan's economy and per capita income have risen, it has come under growing political pressure to increase its share of responsibility for international security.¹⁵ Nonetheless, despite these pressures, there has been no significant movement to bring Japan's defense policies more in line with those of its allies.

On the other hand, no matter how much a state seeks to minimize defense expenditure, the desire to survive will usually dictate sufficient independent military capability to prevent immediate threats to its territory integrity, such as quick-strike attacks that occur before its alliance partners have a chance to respond. That being said, the greater threat a state faces, the more it will benefit from an improvement in the common defense. Both points imply that states who are geographically more vulnerable to attack will, *ceteris paribus*, spend a higher percentage of their national wealth on defense. Since Japan is an island, it enjoys an ocean buffer between itself and its main adversaries. However, Japan must also deal with close geographical proximity to two possible superpower adversaries (Russia and China), whereas the countries of Europe and Southeast Asia each face only one close possible superpower adversary, and the United States enjoys a sizable distance between it and all of its possible major adversaries. Moreover, Japan is situated near the highly volatile Korean peninsula. Overall, Japan's geographic location "renders it difficult to defend against a hostile power," and its relatively small size "render a defense in depth impossible."¹⁶ While more subtle geographical considerations also have an influence on threat levels, it is unclear why they would uniquely favor Japan over other countries.

One alternative way of measuring the level of threat faced by a state is by gauging public opinion. Though public opinion is an indirect and subjective measure, it has the advantage of encompassing a wide range of factors that may be relevant to threat calculations. Furthermore, one would expect it to have significant validity as a predictor of state behavior in those countries where governments are democratically elected. Overall, no evidence suggests that the Japanese public perceives that their country has unusual immunity from military threat, alliance or not. A recent poll shows that 85 percent of Japanese respondents believe at least one country poses a military threat to Japan's security.¹⁷ Furthermore, a recent poll showed that only 49 percent believe that the United States would provide assistance if Japan were attacked.¹⁸ Nonetheless, only 6 percent believe that Japan's defense expenditures ought to be

15. See lists in Hook 1996, 69–72, 81–86.

16. Simon 1988, 46.

17. *Yomiuri Shimbun* poll, 3 June 1994, question 11, reported in Office of the Prime Minister 1994, 490.

18. *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* poll, March 1995, reported in Ladd and Bowman 1996, 30.

increased.¹⁹ For comparison, similar polls taken in the United States show that only 43 percent of respondents believe that at least one country poses a military threat to the United States.²⁰ In fact, one great paradox about the Japanese public's strong opposition to full-scale rearmament is that it coincides with equally strong doubts about Japan's security.²¹

Therefore, factors linked to the international system provide incomplete explanations for Japan's low level of defense expenditure relative to its economic resources. This is not to say that systemic factors are irrelevant. Such factors can be seen as providing a set of constraints under which Japanese policy formation takes place. Large system-level changes that make Japan much more wealthy than all its allies or uniquely vulnerable to attack will increase pressures on it to build up its military capability. Alliance structure, likewise, can be seen as an intervening variable between the characteristics of states and their defense policies. However, these factors by themselves cannot explain why Japan's past and current policies have ended up being quite different from those of other countries facing comparable system-level constraints.

Just as importantly, none of these factors addresses the distinctive process of defense policy formation in Japan, a process in which symbolic boundaries and images seem to take on a powerful, almost religious significance that transcends practical economic or security considerations. The continuing vitality of these symbols is shown by events such as the monumental battle in 1992 over the marginal participation of a few hundred Japanese soldiers in UN peacekeeping forces. The fact that the peacekeeping proposal (which subsequently had to be toned down even further) generated greater opposition than the earlier \$12 billion contribution to Operation Desert Storm shows that the desire to minimize economic sacrifice cannot be a sufficient explanation for the Japanese public's opposition to increased rearmament.

The incompleteness of systemic explanations suggests that domestic factors are essential to explaining the anomalous nature of Japanese defense policy. True comparative analysis cannot be done without examining in detail the internal arrangements of a wide range of comparable states, something that is admittedly beyond the scope of this article. However, the existence of Japan as an outlier among states suggests that examination should begin there by looking for distinctive domestic institutions that reduce its level of defense expenditure below that which would be expected given its position in the international system.

19. Japan Defense Agency 1995, ref. 70.4.3.

20. CBS/*New York Times* poll, 2 December 1991, question 19, reported in Roper Center *Public Information Online*, question ID USCBSNYT.120291, R46; and CBS/*New York Times* poll, 10 October 1991, question 13, reported in Roper Center *Public Information Online*, question ID USCBSNYT.101091, R14.

21. This position is reflected in the mass media; in the 1980s, it was noted that editorials pages in mainstream Japanese newspapers often carried dire warnings about the Soviet military threat alongside polemics against any attempt to increase defense spending. See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 29 May 1981, 37.

In the following sections, I focus on three such institutions: the “antiwar” Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, the informal 1 percent of GNP ceiling on defense spending, and Japanese public ideology concerning national defense, arguing that each constitutes a significant barrier to full-scale rearmament. However, rather than simply invoking such factors as ad hoc exogenous explanations for defense policy, I place them within a larger theoretical context. Furthermore, I attempt to account for their origins and to explain their continuing effectiveness in light of major changes in domestic and international conditions. In the final sections of the article, I discuss my findings in light of their implications for more general theoretical issues regarding the origins and effects of institutions, as well as for substantive issues regarding the future of Japanese defense policy.

Three Techniques for Institutionalization

This article addresses the formation and persistence of the postwar Yoshida defense doctrine in light of three separate ways in which political leaders can institutionalize their policies. “Institution” is defined broadly in the article, referring to a stable pattern of interactions within a shared set of beliefs, whether or not these beliefs are derived from any formal structure. Institutionalization refers to any process that embeds certain policies into an institution.

The first type of institutionalization occurs through incorporation in formal rules (i.e., laws, constitutional clauses, and judicial rulings) and organizations, with the implication that there are costs associated with changing these later, even when the political will to do so exists. The second type is through the promulgation of informal boundaries that serve as “focal points” for bargaining and conflict, therefore affecting the chances that policy change will occur. The third type is through propaganda that directly influences public ideology concerning a policy and its effects.²²

Only the first category fits squarely within conventional political science theories on institutionalization—these theories assume that rational actors optimize their material welfare, using beliefs that are based solely on logical inference from accessible information about their environment. The second and third categories, though they do not enter into conventional theories, do not contradict the assumption of rationality. In fact, they fill an indeterminacy in rational choice theories created by the existence of “multiple equilibria” in sequential interactions by rational actors in situations of strategic uncertainty. In such cases, information-based beliefs are insufficient to allow actors to select a single, optimal action; hence, conventional theories cannot predict how the actors will behave.

The first type of institutionalization involves structural change, that is, changes in the physical and legal environment within which political actors engage in bargaining and conflict. These changes in turn are perceived by actors, influencing their

22. For a similar categorization, though one focusing on the influence of ideas on policy, see Goldstein and Keohane 1993.

logically derived beliefs and hence their behavior. The second and third types, on the other hand, involve changes in actors' beliefs that are not the result of logical inference from information. The second type involves beliefs that are acquired because one particular set of choices in the environment is "highlighted" and becomes the basis for actors' expectations about the actions of others. The third type involves changes in the internalized ideologies of actors, which in this case are caused by their reactions to political propaganda.

In each category, there are constraints on the types of institutional "engineering" techniques that can be effective. Only certain types of formal organizations and rules effectively structure future action. Only certain policy commitments will be viewed as significant focal points by actors on both sides of an issue. Only certain types of propaganda will be received openly and internalized by the public. Therefore, explanation will not only have to include a description of the institutionalization technique but also the reasons why the particular technique and the way it was implemented were successful.

I focus on the role played by postwar Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru and his successors in enacting and entrenching a defense doctrine linked to minimal spending and dependence on the United States. The importance of the "Yoshida school" of politicians in devising the Japanese defense doctrine has itself long been recognized, and the doctrine has been seen as a major component of the broader "Yoshida doctrine" of passivity and dependence in foreign affairs.²³ Nonetheless, no concerted attempt has been made to link Japanese defense policies to larger theories of institutions and policy formation. By focusing on three techniques for institutionalization, this article shows how Yoshida and his followers successfully entrenched the Yoshida defense doctrine, thereby reducing the possibility that it would later be revoked in favor of full-scale rearmament. In subsequent sections, I describe in greater detail the nature of each particular institutionalization technique and how Yoshida and his followers successfully made use of them to perpetuate the doctrine.

Formal Rules and Organizations

The most obvious way in which policies can be institutionalized is through the generation of formal rules and organizations, which are difficult to change later even when political support for the policies has declined significantly. There are a number of reasons why this may be so.²⁴ First, the overarching structure of government attaches certain transaction costs to the formulation and modification of formal rules; these in turn place pressures on the limited time and clerical resources of lawmakers and judges.²⁵ Often such transaction costs are built into the system: altering a constitution, once it is in place, generally requires a super-majority. In a common law

23. See Dower 1979; Ōtake 1988; Kataoka 1991; Ōtsuka 1992; and Pyle 1992.

24. For a related description of some ways in which formal rules and organizations can be insulated from future change, see Moe 1990, 136–37.

25. Shepsle 1991, 354–56.

system, existing judicial interpretations of laws usually take precedence over possible new ones. Second, creation of the physical and technical organizations necessary for implementing and enforcing formal rules involves certain sunk costs, which then must be partially or completely sacrificed if the rules are abandoned. Hence, those who seek to overturn the rules must consider the sunk costs in addition to the relative desirability of each set of rules once they are in place. Third, formal rules and corresponding organizations can create an interest group: Bureaucracies, once they are created, function as a pressure group, seeking to preserve their own organizations and to maximize their access to resources.²⁶ Furthermore, expenditure also creates client groups among those who benefit from the bureaucracy's expenditures.²⁷ To the extent that bureaucrats and their clients are effective in generating pressure, they can increase the amount of external political force that is needed to overturn the existing organization and the amount they must be offered to be "bought out" from their opposition to change.

Because the Yoshida defense doctrine *limits* as well as legitimates defense spending, the creation of interest groups probably has no simple effect in this case. One would expect the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) bureaucracy created by the Yoshida doctrine to support its abandonment if this leads to higher levels of defense spending and full-scale rearmament but to protect it against those who advocate unarmed neutrality. However, the costs of formulating rules and building organizations can be shown to be quite relevant and to work in general toward the preservation of the doctrine.

Among the formal rules that influence Japanese defense policy, the most prominent is Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, which states:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.

Although Article 9 officially renounces the use of force as a method for settling disputes, it has been interpreted very loosely and has not proven to be an obstacle to formation of a military in the form of the SDF. Moreover, it can be revised given sufficient political support. Hence, if Article 9 has had a role, it must be analyzed rather than taken for granted.

Of course, Article 9 was not Yoshida's idea (its exact origin is unclear)²⁸ and was part of the draft of the revised constitution that was handed to the Japanese government by the Government Section (GS) of the Supreme Command for the Allied

26. Niskanen 1971, especially chap. 4.

27. Noll and Weingast 1991, 250–51.

28. Both Douglas MacArthur and initial postwar Prime Minister Shidehara Kijūrō claimed that the idea originally came from Shidehara. See MacArthur 1964, 302–303; and Shidehara 1974, 211. However, this is viewed as a possible attempt by both to increase the legitimacy of the article in the eyes of the Japanese public. See Masumi 1983, vol. 1, 125–30; and Kataoka 1991, 36.

Powers (SCAP) and later accepted in modified form by the Diet. Because of this, its existence must be attributed to Douglas MacArthur and his GS staff members rather than to the efforts of Yoshida and his allies.

However, Yoshida played an important role in entrenching Article 9 and preventing its early revision. He had a strong personal desire to minimize rearmament of any kind, stemming from his fears that rearmament would jeopardize Japan's economic recovery, his strong aversion to the Imperial military establishment, and his desire to minimize worries on the part of neighboring countries.²⁹ However, the United States exerted intense pressure for Japanese rearmament in the wake of Cold War tensions and the Korean War, and in 1950 Yoshida was forced to set up a "police reserve" force, which eventually became the "Safety Forces," and then the SDF. During the early 1950s the United States requested an initial force of 325,000 to 350,000 ground troops, over three times the size of the force Yoshida eventually brought into being.³⁰ During this period, Yoshida made the crucial decision to proceed with creation of armed forces under the auspices of the constitution rather than to seek a revision that would unambiguously permit them to be created. He did this despite the fact that this contradicted his earlier public statements that Article 9 disallowed any sort of rearmament whatsoever, even for self-defense.³¹

The framers of Article 9 seemed to believe that it allowed rearmament for defensive purposes, although they thought it would be too inflammatory to put such words directly in the article. In fact, the beginning phrase of the second paragraph of the article was inserted by future Prime Minister Ashida Hitoshi with the explicit intention of leaving room for eventual limited rearmament and was approved by GS Public Administration Division Head Charles Kades with that in mind.³² Subsequent court decisions have largely supported this view.³³

Nonetheless, a strong plurality of Japanese public opinion at the time supported revision of the constitution. In two *Yomiuri Shimbun* polls taken in February and April 1952, 47 and 42 percent, respectively, were for revision, whereas 18 and 17 percent, respectively, were against it.³⁴ American support for revision was provided, among other ways, in the unlikely form of Vice President Richard Nixon, who made a famous speech in 1953 admitting America's "mistake" of inserting Article 9 into the constitution in 1946.

If Yoshida had thrown his weight behind revision, it is also quite possible that the Diet would have supported him. Under Article 96 of the Japanese constitution, a constitutional amendment requires a two-thirds majority in both houses, upon which it is submitted to a public referendum, where a simple majority is sufficient for passage. During the last five years of Yoshida's term in office, a coalition between the

29. See Yoshida 1962, 112, 146; and Ōtake 1988, 17–19.

30. Dower 1979, 38587, 430–34.

31. See *ibid.*, 378–84; and Ōtsuka 1992, 158–62.

32. See Ashida 1987, vol. 7, 318–20; and Kades 1989, 224, 236–38. As with Article 9, some controversy exists about the original author of the Ashida amendment. See Kōseki 1988, and 1989, chap. 9.

33. Katzenstein and Okawara 1993, chap. 4, sec. B.2, and the appendix.

34. Fukui 1970, 214.

Liberals and the Democrats (later Progressives) controlled two-thirds or more of the House of Representatives. Yoshida's main challenger among the Liberals after 1952 was the depurged Hatoyama Ichirō, who was a strong advocate of revision. Former Democratic leader Ashida Hitoshi, who had always favored rearmament, favored revision from 1952 on, whereas Shigemitsu Mamoru, who took over the enlarged and renamed Progressives after being depurged in 1952, took a similar stand. Certain elements of the Progressives, led by Miki Takeo, were clearly against revision, but this was counterbalanced by the possible support of right-wing Socialists led by Nishio Suehiro. The situation in the House of Councillors was less clear, with minor parties and independents of unknown views holding a large number of seats. Clearly antirevisionist members, however, fell far short of a sufficient coalition to block amendments.³⁵

Although Article 9 could plausibly be interpreted to allow for limited rearmament for defense of the Japanese mainland, it has generally been agreed among both proponents and opponents of revision that its invocation against "war-making potential" disallowed offensive weapons or any projection of armed forces outside of Japanese territory.³⁶ That this interpretation still carries political weight is illustrated by the fact that the 1992 law that allowed SDF troops to participate in UN peacekeeping operations was passed only under the condition that such troops be sent into operation without arms. Hence, it provided Yoshida with an ideal pretext for resisting later pressure by the United States for full-scale rearmament, a move that he felt would jeopardize Japan's economic recovery from World War II. According to Miyazawa Kiichi, Yoshida told him that Article 9 gave Japan "the perfect reason" to resist American pressure for rearmament, as "devious" as this was.³⁷

Because Article 9 inhibits full-scale rearmament and because a constitutional amendment requires much higher levels of support for passage than does a mere change in law, it provides a clear formal barrier to abandonment of the Yoshida doctrine. This was illustrated when Yoshida was finally thrown out of power in an intraparty coup and succeeded by Hatoyama Ichirō, a strong proponent of full-scale rearmament and constitutional revision. Although prorevision forces were roughly on par with antirevision forces in the Diet, a two-thirds majority in the lower house would have required the support of the Yoshida faction, which eventually became the Satō and Ikeda factions of the newly formed Liberal Democratic party (LDP), and this support was not forthcoming. This can explain why Hatoyama, once in power, put constitutional revision on the back burner and focused his energies instead on asserting an independent foreign policy by pursuing a peace treaty with the Soviet Union.

Subsequently, public opinion began to turn against revision of Article 9, a phenomenon whose causes will be examined later. Currently, it is unlikely that either house

35. For a discussion of the views of Hatoyama, Ashida, Shigemitsu, and Nishio, see articles by Ōtake Hideo, Itō Takashi, and Tsutsui Kiyotada in Kataoka 1992, 55–78, 100–118, and 119–32, respectively; as well as Ōtake 1988, chap. 3, secs. 1, 3.

36. Watanabe 1993, 42–44. For a recent official interpretation, see Japan Defense Agency 1993, 87–89.

37. Miyazawa 1956, 160.

of the Diet would vote in favor of revision, even if only a simple majority were required. Nonetheless, the decision to keep Article 9 provided a strong bulwark against revision during the crucial period when support for rearmament was relatively high.

Some might question how strong a formal barrier Article 9 really is, given that it has already been reinterpreted once by Yoshida for reasons of political expediency. However, Yoshida's reinterpretation merely brought his views into accordance with those of the framers of the article, whereas a further reinterpretation would recreate a contradiction. Furthermore, given that this interpretation of the article was already quite liberal, any further significant loosening would probably leave it restricting nothing whatsoever, and therefore would be very difficult to defend. It is worth noting that neither Hatoyama nor fellow rearmament proponent Kishi Nobusuke attempted to assert that full-scale rearmament was allowed by Article 9—even this would have been quite in keeping with the political agenda of both prime ministers.

An additional consequence of the Yoshida doctrine is that it and Article 9 have shaped the structure and mission of the SDF as well as the way in which they coordinate their mission with that of the U.S. armed forces in the Pacific. The structure of the SDF has been designed primarily around the concept of “basic defense,” which focuses on repelling limited and small-scale aggression against Japanese territory while depending on U.S. aid for defense against larger attacks.³⁸ Though the basic defense concept was first formalized in the 1976 National Defense Program Outline, it reflected to a large extent the existing criteria for defense planning. Moreover, the restriction on the projection of forces overseas has been taken quite seriously, as exemplified by the decision in the 1960s to remove bomb sights from F-4 airplanes after they had been purchased.³⁹ In a later case, bomb sights were not removed from F-15s on the premise that it was primarily an interceptor and could not readily be used for strikes overseas.

Any attempt to radically increase defense spending would require a major change in the mission of the SDF, and this in turn would require a wholesale transformation of its internal structure, as well as the structure of the entire U.S.–Japan security strategy. Given the sunk costs that would be sacrificed in making such changes, it is quite reasonable to assume that spending money on greatly expanding the mission of the SDF would be a less efficient way of improving collective security than spending an equal amount of money on subsidizing U.S. or UN military activities. This may account for why U.S. defense professionals seem to be more content than U.S. politicians with the existing size of Japan's defense establishment. In one widely noted statement, then–U.S. Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci said that there was no need for “dramatic leaps in Japan's defense spending. I would not know how to tell them how to spend within the roles and missions we have agreed upon.”⁴⁰ It also accounts for why calls for greater Japanese contributions to international security are more often requests for cash rather than for rearmament.

38. Japan Defense Agency 1993, 80–81.

39. Maswood 1990, 28.

40. *Chicago Tribune*, 21 August 1988, C-5.

Creating Focal Points for Political Bargaining

The importance of focal points for conflict and bargaining has been recognized in the social science literature since Schelling's pioneering work, but the concept has only been applied to analyzing politics outside of the area of international security studies.⁴¹ This resurgence of interest stems in large part from the realization among rational-choice theorists, in a variety of fields, that their conventional assumptions about how political actors make decisions lead to indeterminate predictions under many plausible sets of assumptions about political environments and the structure of interactions. This is particularly true for analyzing cases of long-term repeated strategic interaction, where in most cases very few conceivable outcomes can be ruled out.

This has prompted renewed interest in the procedures by which actors make decisions when rationality is insufficient to point out an optimal action, particularly in those cases where this is caused by the mutual uncertainty of actors about the future actions of other actors. This in turn has placed the spotlight back on how actors' expectations converge and how they can correctly anticipate each other's actions given strategic uncertainty.⁴² As Schelling noted, convergence can occur when certain possible sets of mutual actions stand out in some way, even if the cause of this salience is not directly related to the costs and benefits of each action.⁴³ Furthermore, focal points may stand out not because of "natural" prominence, but because of their links with previous actions, either by the interacting actors or by others. Because of this, focal points can be "constructed."⁴⁴

If this is true, however, it is true that actors can sometimes influence the outcome of events to their own advantage by preemptively ensuring that certain sets of actions will be highlighted. In doing so, they can shape the expectations of other actors and make it rational for them to "cooperate" in generating this advantageous outcome. Therefore, creation of focal points is not simply a way to "solve" mutual collective action "problems" but also a way in which actors try to induce actions that result in their preferred outcomes. An examination of the politics of Japanese defense policy shows how this can occur.

Japanese prime ministers have been very active in putting forth numerous informal "principles" concerning Japanese defense, despite the fact that these principles have no binding legal power. The most prominent of these principles include the "three nonnuclear principles" and the "three principles of weapons export," enunciated by Satō Eisaku in 1967; and the 1 percent limit of GNP on defense spending enunciated by Miki Takeo in 1976. Each of these pronouncements has been made at the cabinet level and none has been introduced into law; furthermore, there is no specified penalty for violating them. This lack of formal institutionalization, however, has not prevented these principles from becoming important barriers to changes

41. Schelling 1960.

42. Kreps 1990.

43. Schelling 1960, chap. 3.

44. Garrett and Weingast 1993, 176–77.

in Japanese defense policy. In effect, they play the role of “semiconstitutional rules”⁴⁵ that delineate the political limits of Japanese defense. But how can this be so?

One can see a possible strategy behind these pronouncements by examining the political positions of the prime ministers who made them. Satō was a politician of the Yoshida school, whereas Miki was notable for being a “dove,” whose views on defense were often closer to that of the opposition Socialist Komeitō and Communist parties than to other members of the LDP.⁴⁶ Because of this, and because of the general high degree of contention over defense issues, any attempt to introduce these policy principles into law would have led to internal party battles that might have jeopardized their own positions.

Nonetheless, despite the lack of formal legal status or enforcement procedures, these pronouncements have had a strong impact on the formation of defense policy in the Diet. Lawmakers opposing rearmament, particularly those in the opposition, have been quite adamant in viewing the pronouncements as quasi-sacred barriers that should never be crossed and have asserted that their abrogation is the first step onto a slippery slope leading to full-scale rearmament. As a result, they have poured enormous political resources into ensuring that the barriers are not crossed, even by the slightest amount.

The notion of focal points can help to illustrate why this might be so. In the absence of clear barriers, the strategic interaction between proponents and opponents of rearmament can be seen as one of mutual equilibria. The different parties can take a stand on defense at any of an infinite number of points, and each party is uncertain about the stand that the others will take. However, if we assume that neither side wants to risk a bruising political battle in the Diet, a substantial incentive exists to develop a prior “consensus” on defense, although each side clearly wants the consensus to be on its own terms.

This situation more or less mirrors the state of strategic uncertainty that makes focal points salient in abstract models. In this case, one can view strongly enunciated and highly publicized policy principles as attempts by relatively pacifist LDP leaders to highlight a certain boundary as a focal point. In order to be effective, of course, the highlighted boundary must be sufficiently close to the ideal preferences of both pro- and anti-rearmament Diet members that each would agree to policy at that point rather than risk an all-out-battle, even if such a battle might lead to a more preferred policy. An additional dynamic to this interaction is that the prime ministers who set the policies are as interested in shaping the choices of their own party members as they are in shaping the choices of the opposition. In this sense, it is a type of “nested game” involving both intraparty and interparty dynamics.⁴⁷

An illustration of how these focal points affect politics can be shown by Nakasone Yasuhiro’s attempts to breach the 1 percent barrier on defense. Nakasone, unlike

45. Katzenstein and Okawara 1993, 129.

46. The fourth major opposition party, the Democratic Socialist party, has traditionally been relatively hawkish on defense. For a rundown of the positions and strategies of the opposition parties on defense issues, see Chūma 1985, 100–10.

47. Tsebelis 1990, especially chap. 5.

Miki, had long been a proponent of full-scale rearmament and revision of Article 9. In 1955, he gained dubious notoriety as composer of the “Constitutional Revision Song.” He also claimed responsibility for prompting Nixon’s famous “mistake” speech of 1953. Nonetheless, he was forced by political expediency to pay lip service to the 1 percent limit during his first few years in office. However, slowing economic growth rates and increasing pressure from the United States eventually led to a situation in 1985 where he could realistically push for spending beyond the limit.

Because of the inevitable outcry from the opposition, other LDP leaders were hesitant to push for a clear-cut break with the limit. Instead, the cabinet agreed to a plan under which planned official spending would be kept at 0.997 percent of GNP but where standard pay raises for SDF personnel would probably (though not certainly) cause the barrier to be broken sometime during the fiscal year. The advantage of this ruse was that it made the timing of the breach vague and unclear. Furthermore, it forced the opposition to oppose pay raises for rank-and-file public employees in order to prevent the breach from occurring. Because of these complications, the opponents were unable to formulate a clear plan to counter it. Instead, they maintained public avowals that the 1 percent limit would never be broken while failing to mount a strong attack against the defense budget.

Despite the apparent success of this plan, Nakasone personally felt that the 1 percent limit policy should be explicitly revoked in order to inject an air of realism into the defense debate and to clearly communicate to the United States Japan’s cooperativeness on security matters. Because of this, he later publicly announced his intention to revoke the 1 percent policy. This led to a huge outcry, including threats by the three dovish opposition parties to conduct an indefinite boycott of Diet sessions, bringing legislative proceedings to a halt. This in turn caused three factions of the LDP (Fukuda, Suzuki, and Kōmoto) to oppose his decision and to threaten to abstain in any vote of no-confidence against him. Because of this, Nakasone was forced to abandon this decision, although the backdoor breaching of the limit proceeded as planned the next year.⁴⁸

As noted earlier, these events point out how actors can attempt to highlight certain focal points in order to secure some advantage in determining the outcome of interaction under strategic uncertainty. However, they also show how actors on either side (who may not be internally unified) can later also try to reobscure or reinterpret the location of these focal points by changing elements of the environment around them. However, there are usually constraints on the extent to which such reobscuration or reinterpretation can occur. In the case of the 1 percent limit, these constraints were determined by the extent to which vagueness in the wording of the Miki principle allowed for different interpretations. In addition, neither side would ever agree to a reinterpretation that left them worse off than the expected benefits from all-out conflict.

48. For a discussion of these events, see Shiota 1987; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 26 September 1985, 52–53; and Keddell 1993, 126–56.

Influencing Public Ideology

A final way in which political leaders can institutionalize their policies is through direct efforts to influence public ideologies. Analysts of political interaction have increasingly attempted to show that political “entrepreneurs” can influence public ideology and that this can have a decisive effect on later political actions.⁴⁹ Katzenstein and Okawara have recently asserted that much of Japanese defense policy is shaped by “social norms.”⁵⁰ However, there is a shortage of explanations of how and when entrepreneurs will be successful in shaping ideology or how social norms are formed. Hence, the purpose of the following section will be to show not only that Japanese political leaders were able to directly affect Japanese public ideology but also why they were able to do so.

The most noteworthy trend in Japanese public opinion about defense since World War II is the dramatic decrease in support for full-scale rearmament. Support for an increase in military expenditures shrank from 24 percent in 1969 to an all-time low of 6 percent in 1993, support for decreasing expenditures increased from 14 percent to 20 percent, and support for the current level of expenditure rose from 45 to 59 percent.⁵¹ Support for revision of the constitution for the purpose of having a “regular armed forces” shrank from 37 percent in 1955 to 13 percent in 1991, whereas opposition grew from 42 percent to 81 percent.⁵² A more recent poll shows that while 50 percent of respondents wished to revise the Japanese constitution in some fashion, only 21 percent of the revision supporters wanted to do so in order to clarify or alter the role of the SDF.⁵³ The forced resignations in 1978 of SDF Chief of Staff Kurisu Hiromi over his criticism of the SDF’s lack of autonomous defense ability and in 1993 of Japan Defense Agency Director General Nakanishi Keisuke over his remarks in favor of an amendment to the constitution to permit full-scale rearmament show the depth of opposition on this issue. At the same time, however, overall support for Japanese defense in its current form (the SDF and the mutual-security treaty) rose from 41 percent in 1969 to 69 percent in 1993.⁵⁴

What emerges out of this data is evidence that the Japanese public has developed a certain sense of satisfaction with the status quo, supporting both the existence of the SDF but also severe limitations on its size and mission. Further evidence of this can be shown by polls taken during the period in 1992 when the Diet was deliberating over SDF participation in UN peacekeeping activities. Fifty-eight percent of respon-

49. See Taylor 1987, 24–26, and 1989, 145–48; North 1981, 51; Moe 1980, 114, 125; Popkin 1979, 259–66; and Rogowski 1985.

50. Katzenstein and Okawara 1993, chap. 4, sec. B.1.

51. Japan Defense Agency 1993, ref. 58.3, and 1995, ref. 70.4.3.

52. See Umemoto 1985, tabs. iv–9; and *Asahi Shimbun* poll, 12 February 1991, question 23, reported in Office of the Prime Minister 1991, 453.

53. Respondents who favored revision were allowed to pick as many reasons for revision as they wished; *Yomiuri Shimbun* poll, 3 July 1995, questions 10 and 10.SQ1, reported in Office of the Prime Minister 1995, 548.

54. Japan Defense Agency 1993, ref. 58.10, and 1995, ref. 70.4.1.

dents opposed such participation, whereas 33 percent favored it. Furthermore, 59 percent thought there were “problems” with such participation in light of the constitution, whereas 27 percent did not.⁵⁵

One important factor behind this mind-set is the dominant public perception that the main benefit of SDF activity has been to administer aid during natural disasters, rather than to provide national security. The percentage taking such a view has remained relatively stable over the past two decades, moving from 71 percent in 1969 to 73 percent in 1981 to 73 percent in 1993. On the other hand, the percentage taking the view that national security has been the main benefit has gone from 8.3 percent to 9.3 percent to 7 percent during the same period.⁵⁶ One possible explanation for this apparently bizarre consensus lies in the strategy that Yoshida used to “sell” the SDF to the Japanese public. Because he realized the controversy that would arise from any overt emphasis on martial virtues, he attempted to minimize them at every turn. When he acquiesced to the creation of the National Police Reserve in 1950, he insisted that they were not a military force and that they were not a form of rearmament. This was despite the fact that they were staffed in large part by former officers of the Imperial Army and possessed machine guns, artillery, and tanks.⁵⁷ When pressed by the United States in 1951 to expand the police reserves so that they could assist in collective security, he proposed they be called “Safety Forces” (*hoantai*) rather than military forces (*guntai*) and insisted publicly that their primary purposes were the maintenance of internal order and the provision of assistance during natural disasters.⁵⁸

Even when the Safety Forces evolved into the SDF (*jeitai*), he focused on its “friendlier” qualities in order to build support. In particular, he had the force devote its resources to much-publicized rescue work during floods, typhoons, and fires.⁵⁹ Throughout, he continued to de-emphasize the military aspects of the SDF, insisting that it possessed no war-making potential. This policy of promoting a softer image of the SDF was continued by Yoshida’s protégés Ikeda and Satō in the 1960s and even today remains a significant part of the SDF program.⁶⁰ For instance, in fiscal year 1992, participation in disaster-relief operations totaled 368,941 personnel (meaning that each SDF member was involved in an average of two operations), 46,856 land vehicles, 3,415 airplanes, and 42 ships.⁶¹

The public opinion data shown earlier seem to indicate the success of these efforts; the SDF has developed a reputation as being excellent in disaster relief but of dubious use in protecting national security. Furthermore, the public has expressed solid

55. *Asahi Shimbun* poll, 11 March 1992, questions 9 and 10, reported in Office of the Prime Minister 1992, 486.

56. Japan Defense Agency 1993, ref. 58.6, and 1995, ref. 70.3.2.

57. Dower 1979, 384–85, 437–38. For a useful inside account of early Japanese rearmament, see Kowalski 1969.

58. Kataoka 1991, 93.

59. Yoshida 1962, 189–90.

60. For a thorough discussion of the Yoshida doctrine’s reinforcement by Ikeda and Satō, see Pyle 1992, 21–36.

61. Japan Defense Agency 1993, 361.

support for maintaining it in its current form. Given this rather constrained view of the usefulness of the SDF, it is quite clear why the Japanese public has strongly opposed a major expansion in military spending. As noted in the beginning of this article, the opposition to SDF expansion cannot be attributed to a perceived lack of a security threat on the part of the Japanese public. On the other hand, an explanation that incorporates the public's existing image of the SDF can explain this opposition in light of continuing feelings of military insecurity.

The question, then, is why the Japanese public was willing to accept and to apparently internalize the notion that the primary use of their military forces was not military at all. A possible explanation can be taken from psychological theories of dissonance.⁶² Although many versions of dissonance theory exist, they are generally consistent with the assumption that individuals will alter their preferences and beliefs to minimize possible clashes between these and their past actions.⁶³ This assumption is also consistent with the assumption that individuals will act as rational utility-maximizers given preferences and beliefs; hence, it can be used as part of an integrated model of behavior.

In this case, it is clear that, after World War II, most of the Japanese public was fed up with war and with militarism. Furthermore, there was a pervasive suspicion of the influence that a strong military might have in politics. This is reflected in public opposition to attempts to recreate a full-scale armed forces. At the same time, Japan was from the late 1940s under relentless pressure from the United States to rearm. Given the public's recognition of Japan's dependence on the United States, it chose in large part to acquiesce itself to the existence of the SDF rather than to resist it. In order to minimize their levels of dissonance, the public, necessarily, adopted a view of the new forces that was consistent with both their opposition and their acquiescence.

It was at this point that Yoshida acted as an "ideology entrepreneur," selling the idea that the SDF was not a bona fide military force but rather a friendly search-and-rescue squad that also dabbled in defense matters. Furthermore, the real efforts that he had the SDF devote to disaster relief made this belief at least somewhat plausible; thus, he offered a dissonance-reducing idea to the public, which was "hungry" for it.

Besides shaping the Japanese public's image of the SDF, Yoshida and his disciples Ikeda and Satō were on the forefront in selling the public a new self-image as a uniquely peaceful people with a special role to play on the world stage. Article 9, rather than being a foreign imposition, became the symbol of this uniqueness. Ikeda promoted the "low profile" role that rejected the foreign policy interventionism of other industrialized countries, and Satō won the Nobel Peace Prize for his two sets of "three principles." Government propaganda has long sought to portray the Japanese public as passive victims in World War II, rather than its active instigators. Like the belief in the generally "soft" nature of the SDF, the induced "peaceful" preferences of the Japanese allowed the majority of the public to come to terms in a very positive

62. Originating with Festinger 1957.

63. Aronson 1991, chap. 5.

way with the fact of military defeat and the necessity of being a dependent state in security matters.

The important characteristics of internalized ideology, however, include not only its causes but also its effects. Once an ideology is internalized and becomes the basis for rhetoric and action, it becomes “sticky” and cannot easily be abandoned when circumstances change. In the case of the postwar Japanese public, the fading memories of World War II militarism, changes in Japan’s relative economic might, and the decline in the United States’ willingness to shoulder responsibility for the common defense have created reasons for a redefinition and enlargement of Japan’s defense role. However, the internalized belief that the SDF is a pseudomilitary force whose primary use is in disaster relief makes any attempt to promote it as an autonomous and self-standing military force seem somewhat ludicrous. Furthermore, expansion of Japan’s military forces strikes at the heart of the by-now-entrenched self-image of the Japanese as a uniquely peace-seeking people. Given these preferences and beliefs, support for full-scale rearmament remains an irrational act for the majority of the Japanese public, despite domestic and international structural changes.

As this article argues, much of the unique content and style of current Japanese defense policymaking can be traced back to the influence of Yoshida and his followers.⁶⁴ This is so despite the fact that Yoshida probably had less formal power at his disposal than any other postwar head of government. For most of his time in office he was the leader of an occupied country and was in effect a vassal of a superior power (the United States) and its local representative (MacArthur). Anyone who disliked his decisions could simply appeal them over his head to SCAP. However, his skillful manipulation of Article 9 and of the image of the SDF shows how mastery of institutional design and ideology can overcome such formidable obstacles and how lasting policy legacies can be generated from relatively small amounts of power.

Theoretical Implications

One rather obvious implication of this analysis is that it reemphasizes the need to look beyond a state’s position in the international system in order to explain its defense policies. Japan’s growth in wealth has created major pressures for it to rearm, yet this has not resulted in a defense burden at a level approaching that of similarly wealthy states. Japan’s geographical exposure to threat, even if not uniquely disadvantageous, does not confer on it any unusual advantages over other states, and the subjective perception of threat among the Japanese public is not unusually small. As mentioned at the outset, this does not imply that international systemic factors play no role in Japan’s defense policies. Changes in the international balance of power that significantly increase the level of external threat or decrease the relative ability or willingness of its allies to contribute to the common defense will certainly increase

64. This is certainly the view of Yoshida’s antithesis, Nakasone Yasuhiro. See the dialogue between Nakasone and Masataka Kōsaka in *Voice* (May 1991): 27.

the pressure on Japan to fully rearm. Hence, the lack of any uniquely strong systemic pressures for rearmament have enabled its domestic institutional arrangements to play a major role in shaping its defense policies. At the same time, international systemic factors cannot be seen as sufficient explanations for Japan's defense policies, since no clear evidence indicates that systemic pressures are significantly weaker for Japan than for other countries with higher levels of defense expenditure relative to their economic resources.

Even the disproportionate responsibility borne by the United States vis-à-vis Japan within their mutual security arrangement needs to be explained in terms of systemic and unit-level characteristics rather than simply invoked as an exogenous factor. This extreme asymmetry cannot be fully accounted for by the systemic position of the United States, since this would imply that an equal asymmetry ought to exist in its relationships with other allies. Nor, as just mentioned, can it be explained by the systemic position of Japan. Therefore, it is important to examine domestic institutional factors in order to generate an adequate explanation. In fact, one plausible reason why the United States is willing to maintain the current relationship despite the burden involved is its awareness of Japan's domestic constraints. These constraints allow the Japanese government to credibly commit to only limited rearmament even if the United States dramatically reduces its military presence. The United States must maintain the status quo or risk creating a power vacuum in the Pacific. As in many other cases, domestic constraints here are actually sources of bargaining strength in international negotiations.

The analysis has a number of implications for *how* domestic institutional factors ought to be examined and, therefore, for the theoretical literature on institutions. Generally, the analysis emphasizes the need to examine cultural characteristics of institutions as well as structural ones. Three techniques for institutionalization were discussed: the creation of formal rules and organizations, the promulgation of informal boundaries that serve as focal points for bargaining and conflict, and the use of propaganda to shape public ideology. Of these, the first is primarily structural in nature, whereas the latter two are primarily cultural.⁶⁵ Furthermore, although the first type of institutionalization is widely discussed in the literature on policymaking and institutions, discussions of the latter two are rare.

Arguably, one major reason why such analysis is so rare is the lack of theories explaining how focal points are created or ideology is induced. More generally, we need theories that explain culture endogenously rather than invoking it as an exogenous *deus ex machina* and that clearly specify the relationship between culture and the actions of policymakers.⁶⁶ The preceding analysis of the Japanese defense policy

65. This corresponds roughly to the distinction between "economic" and "sociological" approaches as defined in Brian Barry's 1970 analysis of democracy; see Barry 1970. This terminology, however, may be somewhat anachronistic given current trends in both economics and sociology.

66. See, for instance, *ibid.*, 96; Peter A. Hall, *Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France*. Cambridge: Polity, 1986, 34; Robert Bates, "Macropolitical Economy in the Field of Development," in James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle, *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 54; and Ruth Lane, "Political Culture: Residual Category or General Theory?" *Comparative Political Studies* 25 (October 1992): 362–87, 386–87.

may provide some clues as to how to construct such theories. By looking at the interaction between structural uncertainty and the generation of shared beliefs and values, it is possible to explain why certain beliefs and values exist and how they influence behavior rather than simply positing that they do.

The history of the 1 percent limit shows that the location of focal points, rather than being accidental characteristics of the surrounding environment, may be determined purposefully and can become contested territory in the strategic interaction between actors over policy. In particular, where multiple equilibria exist but where different equilibria are favorable to different sets of actors, each set of actors will attempt to use rhetoric and other forms of discourse to publicize certain potential focal points. If these actors are successful in making their discourse the most prominent one, as Miki was, the remaining actors will develop expectations about each others' behavior that will make it optimal for them to make their own actions coincide with the focal point. This highlights the important advantage of leadership and the prominent bully pulpit it provides. This bully pulpit allows the leader to dominate the rhetorical agenda, allowing the leader to become the focal point "setter" rather than one of the "followers."

Once a focal point becomes established as a behavioral equilibrium, it will be difficult, but not impossible, to dislodge. One way in which dislodging might occur is through a major change in one set of actors' payoff structures such that these actors prefer the payoff resulting from unilateral violation of the focal point equilibrium to their equilibrium payoff. Another, more subtle way in which equilibria might change is if future leaders exploit ambiguities regarding the precise location of the focal point, thus allowing possible violations to go unpunished. If the leaders are eventually able to create significant dissensus among different actors regarding the focal point's location, the focal point may no longer serve as an effective guide to behavior. This is what the LDP cabinet did in 1985 and 1986 through their ruse over SDF salaries, thus diffusing opposition to breaching the 1 percent limit.

A leader's bully pulpit can again be a source of advantage with regard to induced ideologies, allowing the leader to determine which among a set of candidate ideologies will become predominant within a population that is collectively experiencing dissonance from a common source. To be sure, this does not mean that a leader can simply impose any ideology on the population. Rather, given conditions of dissonance, individuals will be receptive to any among a limited set of ideologies that can help resolve it. However, more than one alternative might satisfy this dissonance-resolving purpose, and a leader could use power over the rhetorical agenda to determine the one that is most widely circulated among the general public and hence is adopted most widely.

Moreover, the ideology adopted may have implications for the member's future actions, something that a leader can potentially exploit in choosing to publicize one ideology over another. Yoshida could have chosen to resolve the public's dissonance over the formation of the SDF by seeking to emphasize the political differences between the unsupervised, imperialistic prewar armed forces and the postwar, democratically controlled postwar armed forces working within the auspices of the Western alliance. This might be called the "Adenauer doctrine" with reference to postwar

West German policy.⁶⁷ Yoshida chose not to do so and instead emphasized the SDF's nonmilitary nature because, at that time, he did not want to create any public demand for full rearmament. The consequences of his choice were as he had hoped, though he later came to regret the sheer extent of his success and its effects on the lack of "reality" in Japanese defense policy.⁶⁸

Policy Implications

Generating a major change in the level of Japanese defense spending will be difficult without transforming some basic characteristics of the Japanese defense policymaking process. Japanese military spending patterns are entrenched in ways that go beyond the simple preference on the part of policymakers or the public to avoid costs. Therefore, foreign pressure for major increases in spending within the present framework will generate political resistance far beyond that associated with increased public spending in other areas.

Given this, one method for addressing the issue of burden-sharing has long been advocated by the Japanese government, that is, substituting financial contributions in other areas, such as foreign development assistance or financial backing of multilateral military operations, for military spending. This solution, however, may be seen as inadequate by elements of the Western public, as well as those within Japan who believe that an increased military presence is a precondition to a more assertive role in international politics. For them, the preferred policy alternative may be to look at the causes of this policy immobility in order to discover how to overcome it.

The analysis in this article suggests several possible strategies for those who seek to increase Japan's military presence. The effect of the 1 percent barrier can be negated by simply changing the way Japan officially calculates its levels of defense spending, adding pension commitments to the total. Doing so, even without any substantive change in policy, will raise official defense spending significantly above 1 percent, making the barrier far less relevant for future debates. This effect could be reinforced by blending pensions into an existing item in the defense budget (similar to the way they are currently often blended with civil service pensions), therefore making it difficult to determine their exact magnitude. Likewise, the entrenched public view of the SDF can be changed by reducing its role in natural disasters or spinning this role off to a separate organization. Such a move could be justified on grounds of efficacy, at any rate, given the inadequacies in Japan's disaster relief capabilities revealed by the Kansai earthquake. This will force the public to confront the SDF's indisputable military role, hence more closely tying perceptions of security needs with those of the SDF. Finally, the formal structural barriers to increased defense spending are the most difficult to surmount. Constitutional revision will require a super-majority in favor of this in the Diet, one that seems unlikely to form in the

67. For a comparison between Konrad Adenauer and Yoshida, see Ōtake 1988, chap. 1; and Ōtake 1986.

68. Yoshida 1963, 202–206.

foreseeable future. Redesigning the mission of the SDF will unavoidably involve short-term costs associated with transforming the basic defense infrastructure. Nonetheless, one possible strategy may be to begin such a transformation within the current level of spending in order to set the stage for higher spending later on.

Even if higher defense spending is seen as desirable by Japan's Western allies, however, none of these steps will be accomplished by the simple application of foreign pressure; they require commitment on the part of Japanese politicians to making such changes politically manageable rather than to using political resistance as an excuse for maintaining the status quo. Given the current economic downturn and instability in domestic politics, it would be unrealistic to expect such a commitment in the immediate future. Nonetheless, the passing of the Yoshida school and the fact that many younger generation politicians seem positively disposed to Japan's reemergence on the international stage may perhaps portend a different direction before the end of the century.

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