

## REVIEWS

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PHILIP LIEBERMAN, *Human language and our reptilian brain: The subcortical bases of speech, syntax, and thought*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000. Pp. 221. Hb \$39.95.

CHRIS KNIGHT, MICHAEL STUDDERT-KENNEDY, AND JAMES R. HURFORD, *The evolutionary emergence of language: Social function and the origins of linguistic form*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. xi, 426. Hb \$74.95.

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The two volumes reviewed here thumb their noses at the 1866 ban by the Linguistic Society of Paris on publications concerning language origins – a ban imposed by those august guardians of public faith in linguistic science because of the disreputable, speculative, nonempirical character of language origins scholarship. Yet nose-thumbing has been on the rise in the past two decades, even alarmingly so. Why? Have we witnessed epochal new empirical or conceptual breakthroughs that would warrant the overturning of that sober 19th-century decision?

The answer is yes, but also no. One major research development from the 1970s onward has been the efforts to teach language to nonhuman primates. The results of that research, however, are not central in these two volumes. So what has motivated them?

Philip Lieberman's book is his fifth, since 1975, on the subject of language origins. His earlier writings were concerned especially with vocal tract evolution and speech production, and this has been an area of significant increase in empirical understanding. Everyone must surely agree that it has proven impossible to teach nonhuman primates actually to speak a human language, regardless of one's assessment of the capacity of those nonhumans to understand spoken language or to produce language through gestural signs or other semiotic devices. Consequently, speech physiology and vocal tract evolution loom large in understanding the course of language evolution in humans.

The present book, however – though an organic outgrowth of Lieberman's earlier work – taps into a different, albeit equally rich, vein of empirical investigation: the study of brain structure and functioning. In this volume, we enter into the world of functional magnetic resonance imaging, tracer studies of neural circuitry, clinical investigation of brain lesioning, and the relationship of all of these to the production and perception of spoken language. Indeed, *Human lan-*

*guage and our reptilian brain* might serve as an accessible introduction to brain research for those interested only or primarily in language.

Language for some time has been thought to be localized in the neocortex, the evolutionarily most recent outer layer of the brain. Lieberman by no means denies the importance of the neocortex, but he is at pains – as indicated by the phrase “our reptilian brain” in the book’s title – to look to evolutionarily ancient portions of the brain to fathom the origins of language. Of special importance for him are the basal ganglia (the putamen, caudate nucleus, and palladium), which “are located deep in the cerebrum” and connect us to our reptilian past.

Why the basal ganglia? The short answer is that they are involved in the coordination of motor activity, cognition, and emotion, and the coordination of speech perception and production is one key to the development of spoken language. Significantly, the basal ganglia are also important for sequencing and syntax.

Yet, as in the case of some of Lieberman’s other works, it is difficult to state what he is arguing for without simultaneously stating what he is arguing against. The enemy here, as in other of his writings, is the linguist Noam Chomsky and his followers. In particular, the book is an argument against the idea, attributed to Chomsky, that there is a genetically transmitted brain module or organ that is responsible for syntax. Simultaneously, it is an argument against the so-called “big bang theory” that syntactic ability, and hence language, arose all at once in an evolutionary leap.

Lieberman’s argument is that there is no single language module or organ, but rather what he calls a “functional language system” made up of many different brain structures, including the basal ganglia, that are involved in activities other than language as well as with language proper. For Lieberman, language evolved gradually as part of the overall evolution of the brain through its role in facilitating the adaptation of human organisms to their world. As language evolved, it proved useful for that adaptation.

From the perspective of social and cultural approaches to language, it is significant that Lieberman conceptualizes language as “a learned skill” and “not an instinct.” Brain evolution – that is, evolution of the “functional language system” – facilitated the learning of language, but Lieberman’s approach views language as part of the social environment to be internalized through processes of learning.

Like Lieberman’s book, Knight et al. is another installment in a series of publications; this one is the second set of papers resulting from an “International Conference on the Evolution of Language.” Its predecessor was *Approaches to the Evolution of Language: Social and Cognitive Bases* (Cambridge University Press, 1998), edited by the same three, but with Hurford in the lead. Both volumes are organized into three parts: one dealing with the social functions of

language in relationship to language origins, another dealing with the emergence of phonology, and a third concerned with syntax.

Unlike Lieberman's book, the major advance giving rise to this volume is not the understanding of brain structure, which plays very little role in these 22 chapters. Rather, it is – for six of the core contributions, at least – the use of computers to construct agent-based models and run simulations of language evolution.

Noteworthy from a social perspective on language is that many of the simulations show language emerging through cultural evolution, rather than, or in addition to, biological evolution. Kirby, for example, proposes that, once our ancestors had the ability to acquire new signs through learning, “the dynamics introduced make the emergence of compositionality [and, hence, syntax] inevitable without further biological change” (p. 321). While Hurford's model assumes that our ancestors had some syntactic capability (presumably due to biological evolution), he too is at pains to show that “general linguistic rules are favoured by a completely nonbiological mechanism, namely the social transmission of language from one generation to the next” (348).

At the level of phonology, de Boer's simulations show how a defined system of sounds can emerge within a community of interacting agents. The emphasis is on communication as social interaction. As he puts it: “This effectively decreases the number of linguistic phenomena that have to be explained by biological evolution” (177).

The models, even while focusing on cultural evolution, do not exclude biological evolution as a factor. Livingstone & Fyfe, for example, examine the co-evolution of speech and physiology, with speech leading the genetic evolution of human physiology toward the support of “improved language capacity” (199). From such coevolution, “hominids developed differences from other primates, among them increased brain size and a supralaryngeal vocal tract” (199).

I would be short-changing this rich and complex volume were I to mention only those papers concerned with agent-based computer modeling. Among the papers on the emergence of phonology, we find, if not empirical breakthroughs, at least new developments in the study of prelinguistic sound imitation by children from birth to 18 months of age. Vihman & DePaolis argue that “a capacity for facial and vocal matching is in place as early as the first three months of life” (133). They go on to link a timeline for early childhood communicative development (birth to 18 months) to one for hominid evolution (5 million years BP to present) – though here (as in many of the other papers) our French predecessors must be peering down their ghostly noses in disapproval.

In a related contribution, McNeilage & Davis examine the same period in early childhood development, once again linking imitative sound acquisition to phylogeny. Their specific focus is the transition from babbling (around seven months) to more language-like syllable production. The intriguing point here is that, although chimpanzee infants too babble (albeit much less than humans), the

babbling does not give way to the subsequent stage found in humans. In the babbling stage, as described by McNeilage & Davis, there are rigid constraints on the relationship between vowels and consonants. These constraints give rise to determined sequences of sounds, such as we find in primate vocalizations. In other words, there are mechanical constraints on paradigmatic substitution within syntagmatic slots. The transition involves a freeing up of these constraints, such that true paradigmatic substitution (the hallmark of Saussurean structure) begins to develop.

In addition to phonology and syntax, six of the papers – the first six in the volume – look at the relationship between communication and social interaction. The authors ask: What does language accomplish within social interactions when compared with other communicative forms such as gesture? Jean-Louis DeSalles argues that communication is not about reciprocal altruism, contra some social interactional assumptions. Rather, speaking confers “a selective advantage on the speaker” (62), thereby setting in motion processes of natural selection. Camilla Power proposes that the primal function of language may be as a kind of “vocal grooming,” wherein solidarity emerges out of patterns of concealment and revelation of knowledge. And Chris Knight looks at language in relationship to play as a form of social interaction.

If there is, from my perspective, a major lacuna in both of the volumes reviewed here, it is the absence of a semiotically sophisticated consideration of signs, such as one finds, for example, in Terrence Deacon’s work. What are the characteristics of the semiotic forms we are trying to explain? How does communication take place? And what light does an analysis of how communication takes place shed on the possible origins of language? None of the writings reviewed here actually considers these questions.

I have been asking whether we have witnessed major empirical or conceptual breakthroughs in language origins research that warrant so much nose-thumbing at the 1866 ban. And I have been arguing that these two volumes answer “Yes.” There have been breakthroughs in the area of brain research, in computer modeling of evolutionary processes, and even in child language acquisition research.

The other side to the answer is “No.” We continue to grope for answers without direct evidence of language origins, just as our 19th-century ancestors cautioned. Our plight is that of the hapless fellow who searched for his keys under a street-lamp, not because he had lost them there, but because it was there that he could see best. We can study brains; we can construct computer models; we can investigate child language acquisition; but that is not the same as directly studying language origins. Yet one cannot help but feel, perusing these two energetic and hopeful volumes, that we are getting closer. The game is afoot. There is excitement in the air. These two volumes furnish clues that stir our imagination and fill us with wonder, causing us to throw ancestral caution to the wind.

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IAN GLYNN, *An anatomy of thought: The origin and machinery of the mind*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. vi, 456. Hb \$35.

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In this highly ambitious book, Glynn attempts to provide a description of both how the brain works and how it has developed. Taking an interdisciplinary approach (he is a physiologist by training), he relies on insights from a wide number of disciplines, including psychology, neurology, anthropology, linguistics, artificial intelligence, psychiatry, physiology, and even philosophy. He is interested in providing answers to some perennial and interconnected questions that relate to the mind: “What kind of thing is mind? What is the relation between our minds and our bodies and, more specifically, what is the relation between what goes on in our minds, and what goes on in our brains? How did brains and minds originate? Can our brains be regarded as nothing more than exceedingly complicated machines? Can minds exist without brains” (p. 4). Although his arguments are rather technical, the book is intended for a nonscientist audience.

The book’s 24 chapters are arranged into six sections. In the first part, “Clearing the ground,” (chaps. 1–5), Glynn begins by acknowledging that his approach stoutly rejects what he calls the commonsense view of the mind, namely the belief that there exists a reciprocal relationship between physical and mental events. His starting position rests on three premises: (i) We can be sure about the existence of the minds only of humans and some other animals; (ii) our minds (as well as those of other animals with minds) are the results of evolution by natural selection; and (iii) “neither in the origin of life nor in its subsequent evolution has there been any supernatural interference – anything happening contrary to the laws of physics” (5).

In this part, Glynn cogently discusses evolution by natural selection, the importance of Darwin, and the evidence from comparative anatomy, embryology, and fossils that supports the theory. His position is that this evidence is simply overwhelming. Glynn also delves into the perplexing topic of the origin of life, and he attempts to answer the core question of whether life could “have arisen as the result of a series of plausible events of the kind that we know do occur – events that are compatible with the known laws of physics – or do we need to involve some other agency, some vital force or higher intelligence?” (79). He believes that the answer is clear, and that the work done in the past 70 years by scientists shows “There is very good evidence that life on earth started between three and a half and four billion years ago, that all known forms of terrestrial life have a common origin, that the substances found in living organisms, and that the behavior of such substances can, in principle at least, be synthesized from mate-

rials not derived from living organisms” (79), and that the behavior of these materials is compatible with contemporary physics.

Part Two, “Nerves and nervous systems” (chaps. 6–11), is a discussion of the nature of nerves, what they do, and how precisely they do it. Glynn also writes about what he poetically calls “The Doors of Perception,” that is, how our sense organs work.

In the final section, Glynn presents what he calls a “Cook’s Tour of the brain.” Patterned after Thomas Cook’s famous grand tours, designed to give travelers a general impression of an area with minimal discomfort, Glynn gives a general tour of the human brain (with six helpful figures). The next section, “Looking at seeing” (chaps. 12–15), is an examination of what it means “to see.” Here Glynn briskly takes the reader through four ways by which the brain receives and uses data from the eyes – the psychophysical, neurophysiological, neurological, and computational approaches.

Part Four, “Talking about talking,” (chaps. 16–18), looks at language and the brain. In it, Glynn writes in detail about abnormal speech (because “the study of abnormal speech in patients with normal hearing and normal vocal tracts reveals much about the way the brain handles language,” 259), and about the structure and evolution of language. He also examines popular misconceptions concerning the “left brain/right brain” debate, pointing out that the situation is not as simple as commonly believed. “It is clearly wrong, then, to think simply of a dominant hemisphere; Milner’s results show that a hemisphere may be dominant for language and not for handedness, or vice versa” (279). Even in regard to language, “lateralization is more subtle than appears at first sight. A spoken sentence is characterized not only by its vocabulary and grammar but also by its prosody or intonation” (279). Glynn believes that it is actually the right hemisphere that is responsible for the emotional aspects of speech.

In his discussion of language, Glynn presents a very general overview of Chomsky and the idea of an innate, universal grammar. In support of Chomsky’s theory, Glynn asserts: “The existence of an innate universal grammar implies the existence of some genetically determined neural machinery capable of providing the restrictive framework within which the acquisition of an actual language can occur. Ultimately, we may hope to understand the nature of the neural machinery and its behavior, but meanwhile there is no reason to doubt its existence” (290). He also provides some evidence showing that the acquisition of certain grammatical rules by children is genetic. Glynn concludes his section on language by arguing that our knowledge of language areas in the brain is still very incomplete, and even more limited than our understanding of the visual areas.

The fifth part, “Thinking about thinking” (chaps. 19–21), concerns the topics of memory, how many kinds of memory there are, how memory as well as the emotions operate, and the complex connection between nerve cells and networks and depression, addiction, schizophrenia, and consciousness. In the final section, “The philosophy of mind, or minding the philosophers” (chaps. 22–24), Glynn

robustly takes on the controversial field of philosophy. While conceding that the philosopher Hilary Putnam was correct when he said “Any philosophy that can be put in a nutshell belongs in one,” Glynn states, “That is a risk I have to take” (367). He starts off by examining three standard philosophical approaches to the mind-body problem: behaviorism, functionalism, and identity theories. He proceeds to show the inadequacy of each position, concluding that functional identity theory is currently the most tenable explanation. Identity theory basically says that mental states are not functional states, but rather behavioral tendencies associated with physical states. In other words, mental processes are viewed as being essentially identical with the brain’s physical processes (and not the result of these physical processes). He then looks at the problem of free will and morality.

In the epilogue, Glynn concludes by saying that, although scientists have made amazing progress in discovering how the brain works, “the area in which we can be least confident of progress is, alas, the missing explanation of our sensations and thoughts and feelings” (413). In fact, he states that we still have no idea how to explain consciousness, but he also holds out the hope that a more complete understanding of the way large groups of nerve cells function and are connected will be the initial step in providing the answer.

In conclusion, *An anatomy of thought* is a clear, concise introduction to how the mind works. I am not qualified to comment directly on the neuroscience parts of the book, but the cognitive neuroscientist Antoine Bechara has written in a review (Bechara 2001) that the science behind the book is excellent, and that it could be as an effective textbook. Bechara also says the work is “somewhat behind the times as far as current theoretical developments as far as current theoretical developments regarding the neural basis of decision making, emotion, and consciousness” (2001:43). But for anyone working in the language field and wanting to know about the physical nuts and bolts that constitute the brain, this appears to be the book to read. I was continually struck while reading this work how much progress has been made by scientists in describing the human mind, and Glynn communicates this progress well. I recall reading, as a high school student, a revised edition of Issac Asimov’s classic *The human brain*, which first appeared in 1965, and the amount of new information that Glynn gives versus what Asimov presented is simply astonishing. For example, Glynn claims that the longstanding puzzle of what nerves do, and precisely how they accomplish it, is now “largely solved” (86).

Glynn’s ability to synthesize a large amount of information from a wide variety of disciplines is impressive, and he is not afraid to offer his opinions on a large variety of opinions and fields. But the book does, at times, suffer from the classic problem that plagues all books that take an interdisciplinary approach to a complex topic, because so much detailed and technical information must be presented in short, easy-to-understand and general terms, and issues and arguments have to be greatly simplified. Specifically, I felt two areas in the book to be problematic.

First, the section on language is a tad too short and general. It would have been more informative if Glynn had discussed in greater detail subjects like why he feels

there is support from the field of neurology for Chomsky's position, how much of language is built into our genes, and the precise role of experience in learning a language (to explain this, he relies on Derek Bickerton's research on Hawaiian languages in the 1970s, but I found his description both confusing and dated).

The second problem I had with the book deals with Glynn's characterization of the philosopher Colin McGinn's position in chap. 22. In the past 10 years, McGinn has argued persuasively for the position that the reason why certain longstanding philosophical problems, like the mind-body, have failed to be solved simply resides in our cognitive limitations; in other words, these problems are beyond the capacity of the human intellect, in the same basic way that cats cannot do calculus (or even simple mathematics). Glynn criticizes this thesis because "Sadly for me, and I suspect many biologists, the suggestion that there are grounds for thinking that we may be constitutionally unable ever to solve what is now the most challenging problem in biology does not exhilarate though it may chasten. And since there is a good chance that the hypothesis is wrong, the invitation it offers to set the problem aside is an invitation that it would be unwise to accept" (386).

Unfortunately, these comments misconstrue what McGinn is in effect arguing. As McGinn points out in *The mysterious mind*, biologists (and other scientists) need not worry about their research:

We can still describe the contents of consciousness, and we can investigate how these contents vary from the underlying neurophysiology. We can still 'do' the psychology of consciousness, conceived as the study of consciousness in mental functioning. Nothing I have said puts paid to the scientific research programs currently dedicated to unraveling the neural correlates of different conscious states. All I have said is the PHILOSOPHICAL mind-body problem cannot be solved: the problem of explaining how brains can give rise to consciousness in the first place. (1999:214–15).

In fact, it is curious that Glynn would object so strongly to McGinn's position, since McGinn's theory generally fits with the tenor of *An anatomy of thought*, and Glynn stresses throughout the book the lack of progress that has been made on this topic. The point is that the massive and seemingly unbridgeable gap between the mental and physical (for centuries, the puzzle of consciousness has defied solution by some of the world's greatest minds), and what McGinn calls "the hardness and heaviness" (1999:214) of this problem, provide good grounds for concluding that this particular philosophical problem is probably ultimately unsolvable.

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SUSAN GAL AND KATHRYN WOOLARD (eds.), *Languages and publics: The making of authority*. Manchester, UK, & Northampton, MA: St. Jerome, 2001. Pp. vii, 184.

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A major theme of this collection (which first appeared as an issue of *Pragmatics*, vol. 5, no. 2, 1995; the new publication includes revisions) is the concept of the public sphere, as this stems from early work by Habermas (1989 [1962]). However, the Habermasian notion of the public sphere as a category of bourgeois culture (denoting the site for the emergence of free rational discourse among individuals uncoerced by state-institutional structures) constitutes only one rubric of the thematic unity of the work under review. Contributors to the volume, in addition to being critical of Habermas's opus, continue an earlier concern in linguistic anthropology with a constructionist perspective on languages and publics, on the one hand, and the significance of reflexivity in the very practice of the field, on the other. In these two interrelated respects, the volume is an important contribution to our understanding of how concepts of languages are invented, constructed, and negotiated in historical, power-loaded contexts that also provide for a parallel construction of multiple public spheres. These spheres are partial and skewed, and, most of the time, they operate in such a way that mystifying ideological discourses take over the task of legitimating and institutionalizing inclusions and exclusions, while pretending to speak for all, or to present linguistic entities as natural products having little, if anything, to do with human agency and invested interests.

As Susan Gal and Kathryn Woolard observe in their introduction, the public spheres are not to be understood as sites involving only face-to-face interacting human groups. They can also be conceived as textual spaces, as contextualized and recontextualized interested voices, and as strategies or logics for the legitimation of power or the imagination of forms of subjectivity. This point constitutes one of the most significant merits of the volume, since it allows us to study the various spheres not as things – that is, as monolithic, reified structures in a Saussurian-Durkheimian mold – but as ideologically mediated social processes.

Judith Irvine examines the 19th-century European imagining of African languages within the purview of the ideological construct of “Family Romance.” An initial ideology of linguistic “fraternity” (notice, not “sorority”) is being gradually replaced by racialized and gendered hierarchies. In the realm of this ideology, African languages – if classifiable into genetic families at all – are projected as icons of perceived racial distinctions, such that white race and languages rep-

resent the male member, whereas black Africa along with its languages stands for the female member. Language scholars of the era reviewed by Irvine, focusing on referentially transparent grammatical gender systems of the nominal category, built a chain of iconicity that radiates from language out to the construction of African mentalities, social organization, religion, and so on. Irvine's pathbreaking contribution constitutes an indispensable part of a growing research paradigm on the colonial encounter and the historically determined development of Western linguistic "science" (see also Leiris 1969).

Susan Gal in her chapter addresses the heated twin debates surrounding the genetic classification of the Hungarian language (external boundaries) and its proper reform (internal boundaries) to meet the needs of an elite nationhood in the making, as well as the advance of capitalism in linguistically and ethnically heterogeneous 19th-century Hungary. Far from being the product of "objective" science, linguistic theories and national images here are deeply embedded in ideologically mediated social processes. Gal's fine analysis foregrounds the partiality and selectivity on the part of nationalist (or even not so nationalist) intellectuals in their struggle to construct linguistically grounded national images. Selectivity and partiality are widespread ideological strategies in modern European history – for instance, in Third Republic France, when history had to be avoided in order to construct an effective national image (except, of course, for the obvious *nos ancêtres les Gaulois*). Before 1789, history recalled monarchy and church; since 1789, history was a divisive rather than unifying force (cf. Hobsbawm 1983:272).

In addition to the dialectic between languages and publics, however, textual bodies of knowledge can be constructed out of interactions. Richard Bauman in his contribution illuminates Schoolcraft's textual practices in building an almost reified, unified object: Chippewa folklore. This Schoolcraft achieved by playing against each other two fundamental axes of what he saw and constructed as Chippewa narratives: form vs. content, and literary vs. ethnological. Thus, he became an authoritative voice in the making of academic discourse, providing us with angles from which to see a certain culture. As just one example of the relevance of Bauman's discussion, we could observe that his analysis dovetails nicely with broader concerns about the relations between native textual productions and the analytical products or theories of those who decide on their inclusion in or exclusion from the literary canon (for a discussion of the contesting paradigms of essentialist, instrumentalist-pragmatic, and historicist criticism with enormous consequences for the fate of American Indian literature, see Krupat 1989).

Michael Silverstein offers a profound analysis of Ogden's Orthological English, endorsed and legitimized by a public constructed on the basis of academic institutionalization and biographical gravitas. Ogden's orthological BASIC attempts to erase every other register of English but the one that is most purified referentially, reaching directly into the realms of cognitive clarity in an indexical vacuum. Presented in the trope of objective thought, and thus as an icon of its

referent, orthological English, without the “unnecessary” burden of grammar and deictics, becomes a powerful tool in the service of interests of imperial politics (see also Irvine’s analysis of Africanist discourse on African nominal classes and their alleged capacity to radiate iconically out to social structures). In this and some of his other recent works, Silverstein makes the important leap (already in preparation some time ago) from the initial causes of linguistic ideology (semi-otic constraints) to its in-order-to or final causes.

Jane Hill, in one of the most original contributions in linguistic anthropology, and part of a series of other publications by her, examines the subtleties of the use of Mock Spanish (earlier termed as Junk Spanish) in the public sphere. Mock Spanish is a register of English which, by exploiting in a limited manner inflectional and derivational resources of the Spanish language along with semantics, reproduces the subordinate status of Mexican-Americans in public talk. For its use to be effective, one has to have access to negative stereotypes of this ethnic group. But because it is originally a register of the private sphere, it is constructed as resistant to censoring. It thus profits from the leaky boundary between public and private along dimensions such as social spaces, speakers, topics, and styles in order to perpetuate covert racist discourse in arenas, such as the public sphere, where such discourses are supposedly not allowed. Hill’s chapter reaches into the heart of what one might call the POLITICAL RELEVANCE of contemporary social theory.

As we further learn from Joseph Errington’s phenomenologically sound contribution on Java, the theoretical garb disguising a national language as a clear opponent to other languages in the area (equating the national with the referentially clear and decontextualizable code suitable for the modernist version of the nation-state), in the traditional rubric of diglossic variants, cannot exhaust the complexities of the geosocial space in which both Bahasa Indonesia (a dialectal development out of Bahasa Maleyu) and Multistylistic Javanese interanimate each other. Using the Javanese language to do state work, one builds on Javanese’s exemplary status radiating to speakers and sponsors (see also Errington 1998). Members and audiences of Javanese publics, as intersubjectively aging consociates, allow the most abstract typification of contemporariness – the state – to penetrate moments of their daily life, but deflected through *basa* Javanese (Schutz 1967).

Bambi Schieffelin discusses the shifting contexts for the production of evidence in Kaluli society. She recruits to this goal some of the subtlest and most sophisticated tools of linguistic ethnography. Kaluli people under the impact of the colonial encounter themselves become agents of change. The book as a locus of legitimized knowledge in transformed speech events (literacy lessons and Christian sermons) is both a source and a means of social change. New evidentials are called on to perform this complex task in discourse, and Kaluli people are in the process of reimagining themselves as a new public. The author succinctly observes that the encoding of authority, knowledge, and truth is a linguistic as well

as a social phenomenon. Schieffelin's piece dovetails nicely with the emerging genre of research into the culture of colonialism and postcolonial conditions, which is also relevant to other essays in this collection (Errington 2001:19–39).

Jacqueline Urla addresses most directly the issue of the public sphere. Basque free radio constructs alternative public spheres that function as *agents provocateurs* toward both Castilian-Spanish hegemony and normalizing Basque standardization ideology. In free radio programming, a bottom-up strategy is embraced through the adoption of subversive speech (rudeness, slang, colloquialism) that speaks to multiple realities rather than promoting a unified, officializable space. Free radio communities function almost as proto-communities – as emergent communication communities that break the one-way flow of communication to make the HEARER SPEAK. Messages are made messages, not transmitted ones, providing for alternative peoplehoods in a dialectic between the local and the transnational (Willis 1990:135, 141; also Lee in this volume).

Benjamin Lee addresses the complex issue of the emergence and construction of new subjectivities and their legitimation. Print capitalism offers a non-face-to-face potential for new imaginings and restructurings of narrative prose (literary, daily press, or philosophical) implicating authors, readers; and narrated characters – in a process of interchangeability and through the medium of secular time (in an Andersonian line of thinking) – promote forms of *we-ness* quite different from pre-modern ones. The foundation of modern democracy, “we the people,” is performatively but not smoothly created. Paradoxes and contradictions appear. France and America reach their constitutional stage with different solutions as they face the need to create a legitimate ground for the body politic out of initially unconstitutional conditions. Lee's analysis is a welcome example of a semiotically informed combination of political theory and anthro-political linguistics.

This volume constitutes an important stimulus for further research in the domain of public spheres, linguistic ideologies, and colonial and postcolonial studies, and it exemplifies a very sophisticated research agenda that is indispensable to all those interested in practice, agency, social change, and ideologically mediated construction of local and translocal sociopolitical arenas.

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PIETER MUYSKEN, *Bilingual speech: A typology of code-mixing*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xvi, 306. Hb \$ 59.95.

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*Bilingual speech* takes research on code-mixing a step further toward achieving a better understanding of the differences in what in the past has been referred to simply as the mixing of two languages in the sentence (or intrasentential code-switching). In addition, Muysken presents the state of the discipline of language contact in the year 2000 from the perspective of the grammar and structure of language contact phenomena. He brings together and analyzes an extensive set of language pairs from a wide variety of communities and social contexts. Good familiarity with such varied multilingual data provides the author with a strong base on which to support his three-way classification (INSERTION, ALTERNATION, and CONGRUENT LEXICALIZATION) of code-mixing phenomena at the sentence level.

The book is organized in nine chapters. Chap. 1 summarizes the main proposals put forth in the code-mixing literature, along with a brief introduction to Muysken's three-way classification of code-mixing data. Chap. 2 discusses, with data, several issues related to the interaction of typologically different languages with distinct grammars and lexicons. Chaps. 3, 4, and 5 present each of his three code-mixing types with reference to specific questions raised by different data sets. Chap. 6 takes up the role of a specific set of closed class items or functional categories, and the non-equivalence between languages of syntactic categories such as nouns, verbs, and adjectives. Chap. 7 examines the often special behavior of bilingual verbs. Chap. 8 seeks to link the different mixing patterns with different bilingual communities and also with the various sorts of extra-linguistic factors that may influence the mixing types proposed. Finally, chap. 9 looks at the way these patterns of mixing contribute to language shift. According to Muysken, no single explanation of code-mixing accounts for the variety of mixed structures that have been described in bilingual settings. The shortcomings of the three models in the field that are perhaps best known – Poplack's (1980) variationist perspective, Myers-Scotton's (1993, 1995) 4-M model, and DiSciullo et al.'s (1986) generative grammar government constraint – are discussed in light of concrete problems raised by the code-mixing data.

The three processes of mixing are constrained by different structural conditions tied to paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations. Code-mixing at the sentence level is limited by the grammars of the participating languages, but to determine a grammar for a sentence is not always a straightforward task. This is a special problem because researchers in the field do not agree on what sentence-level syntax is in specific terms, nor on whether sentence-level syntax is manifested at a surface or abstract level. Some of the criteria that have been put forth for assigning a grammar to a code-mixed sentence are (i) the language with the greatest number of lexical items; (ii) the language of the major sentential functional categories (i.e. tense, INFL); (iii) the surface word order of the sentence; and finally (iv), the language of the main verb that determines the argument structure of the sentence. Diagnosing the matrix-language grammar of a mixed sentence becomes more complicated when the languages participating in code-mixing share these key grammatical features. On a syntagmatic plane, code-mixing may develop more complex interactions between two grammars depending on the categorial/grammatical equivalence construed by bilingual speakers. Different communities tend to adopt one of the mixing processes proposed, but the mixing practices of a community are not fixed and absolute. Rather, they may undergo change in processes of shift or convergence. There are also communities that use more than one strategy.

INSERTION involves the incorporation of lexical items or entire constituents from one language into a structure of another language. This is a form of unidirectional language influence. In order to explain code-mixing, there is no need for Poplack's distinction between "borrowings" and "nonce-borrowings": both phenomena can be considered instances of insertion. A generative syntactic approach that assumes categorial equivalence and functional elements as heads of syntactic constituents explains cases of insertion. Muysken centers on noun constructions in order to illustrate this notion, although he explicitly recognizes that insertion can be extended to include other categorial constructions. At the level of observation, code-mixing of noun constructions is the most frequent kind of switching observed in most language pairs, but in a formal syntactic analysis, not all noun constructions can be analyzed in the same way. This is illustrated in the discussion of the difference between Dutch/Moroccan Arabic and French/Moroccan Arabic mixing.

ALTERNATION is defined as the switching between structures from separate languages. The boundary of the switches may be a clause, or some peripheral element such as a discourse marker or tag form. The grammars of two languages are being used in an autonomous or independent way. The syntactic connections between alternating constructions involve constituents that have been adjoined; thus, they are not basic to the clause structure. The absence of bounded syntactic relations or selection (i.e. argument, syntactic role or subcategorization) makes code-mixing a strong candidate for being classified as alternation. This contrasts with insertion in that alternating forms have not been incorporated in a nested

structure. As a result, there are no syntactic dependencies. At a discourse level, alternation also corresponds with what has been described as intersentential code-switching, where a single speaker may say one utterance in one language and another in a different one. Several issues are raised by alternating structures. The doubling of prepositions observed by Poplack in Finnish-English code-mixing and by Nishimura in Japanese-English code-mixing has not been explained adequately by any code-switching models. Muysken claims that these instances of doubling are alternation and are thus evidence for an adjustment taking place in the planning of the sentence. Another type of phenomenon is what Poplack has identified as “flagged switching.” In this case, Muysken argues that these hesitations (as observed by Poplack with Finnish-English mixing) are ways of drawing attention to the switch in language, and they are simply efforts on the part of speakers to overcome conflicts in word order or linearization patterns. Regarding the transition point between two alternating constructions/structures in cases where the linear order of words in the sentence is parallel, it may be the case that this equivalence plays a role at the level of sentence processing, allowing for switches or alternation even when there are grammatical links between the different parts of the sentence. Finally, an unresolved syntactic question that Muysken raises is whether (i) the sentence containing alternation should be dominated by a language A or B structure, or (ii) whether it is the sum of constituents from language A and B, or (iii) whether it is simply a non-language-specific node (i.e., sentence CP or IP), in which case categorial equivalence is assumed.

CONGRUENT LEXICALIZATION is the third category of code-mixing distinguished. It is defined on a purely observational level as the combination of items from different lexical inventories into a shared grammatical structure. Both languages contribute to the grammatical structure of the sentence, which in many instances is shared. This point raises the question of what aspects of the two grammars can be different and which must be alike. A definite answer is not provided, although different data sets are examined with respect to this point. Congruent lexicalization as opposed to the mixing which fits insertion or alternation types is basically the same as dialect/standard variation and style-shifting in the Labovian sense. Evidence from Giesber’s study of the dialect in the Dutch town of Ottersum shows, according to Muysken, that the mixes occurring in this community are instances of congruent lexicalization. Another important feature of congruent lexicalization is that it involves what Poplack calls “ragged” or “non-constituent” mixing, where the elements incorporated from a different language do not form any syntactic unit that would permit a formal syntactic account as with insertion. Multi-word mixing (of both constituents and non-constituents together) is expected because the two languages being combined for the most part share the same grammatical structure. Some additional features of congruent lexicalization include bidirectional code-mixing with frequent back-and-forth switches, language pairs with homophonous diamorphs, and many mixed collocations and idioms. An important point regarding congruent lexicalization is that

it is related to language change through processes of structural convergence. The observable grammatical similarity between the two mixed languages and the cognitive ability of speakers to establish equivalence even when surface structure may not be identical point to a totally different strategy of mixing than one sees with insertion and alternation.

A relevant question raised by Muysken is whether bilingual communities can be characterized by the type of code-mixing pattern they adopt. The author proposes a classification for both stable and immigrant bilingual communities undergoing language shift. While the major part of the book is dedicated to the processes and constraints on the different types of code-mixing, it is explicitly recognized that a structural explanation of bilingual data is only one dimension for understanding code-mixing; one needs to take into account other dimensions, including the structural resemblance of the languages, the stage in the process of language shift, level of bilingual proficiency, community attitude toward code-mixing, and the fixedness of language norms in the community.

*Bilingual speech* makes an important contribution to the field of language contact. It is not, however, an introductory text for persons wishing to find out about code-mixing from a more general perspective. Familiarity with the issues and debates in the area of code-mixing and bilingual research is helpful in order to understand variations in synonymous terms adopted throughout the book to refer to various language contact phenomena. A formal knowledge of generative linguistics is also needed to follow some of the discussions. Several typographical errors are present in the text, which sometimes make it difficult to follow certain examples and lines of argumentation, but these errors do not invalidate the claims put forth. This is an obligatory reference for those working in the field of language contact from a grammatical perspective. It is a clear point of departure that future researchers cannot ignore if they seek to give a comprehensive explanation of the code-mixing facts that Muysken presents in his book.

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PAUL SAENGER, *Space between words: The origins of silent reading*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997. Pp. xviii, 480. Hb \$75, pb \$25.95.

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This is an impressive, fascinating, and exasperating work of scholarship, based on an astonishingly exhaustive survey of manuscript codices produced in the British Isles and western continental Europe between the 7th and the 13th centuries. Saenger traces the transition from continuous to word-divided script, which,



he contends, reflects a fundamental shift in style from reading aloud to reading silently.

Few people, not even most linguists, know that Western classical languages were written for many centuries in *scriptura continua*, with no spaces or other marks of separation between words. This practice is a bit of a puzzlement, since word spacing developed in cuneiform quite early and was standard in almost the oldest Semitic scripts. Yet the fact is that although words were separated in the earliest Greek writings, the majority of ancient documents are not word-separated. Latin is especially striking, since the most recognizable ancient exemplars of the classical written language are the imperial monuments, whose inscriptions are easily readable in a script still standard today, with words separated by a centered point. But these monuments are misleading: Written Latin lost these separation points soon after classical times, and most early medieval Latin manuscripts are in *scriptura continua*, with no spacing or punctuation between words, a fashion acquired from the more prestigious Greek.

Saenger (S) attributes this apparently retrograde development in Greek and Latin to the advent of vowel letters. Because Greek and Latin had vowel letters, which were not present in the Semitic script on which Greek was modeled (and which never became fully standard in any of the major Semitic languages), it was possible to sound out written Greek and Latin without any word separators. And since medieval readers read aloud, there was no call for word spacing. Word spacing, though, facilitates silent reading, and so the two developed hand in hand, says S. But how this development took place, where, and why, make for a fascinating tale.

The book begins with an advertisement for interdisciplinarity, a section of chap. 1 entitled "The physiology of reading," which reviews the literature on the relation between script and reading. Saenger's major point here is that scripts in which individual words are recognized easily lend themselves more readily to rapid silent comprehension. Word separation is the simplest device for ensuring quick recognition of words in succession, while *scriptura continua* forces one to read a text aloud before beginning to search for its component words. I must confess that, after reading this chapter, it is even more of a mystery to me why the Greeks, and then the Romans, should have abandoned spacing in the first place, despite the various rationales that S provides.

The major part of the book is devoted to following the history of word separation, by both spacing and other means, through European manuscripts written in roman script. S traces a line that begins in Ireland before 700 CE and proceeds east through Britain and Germany, then south through France and finally to Italy. We have come to expect medieval innovation to come from Ireland, but S detects a singular impetus in this instance: Syriac, the language of many early church documents, whose writing system was the first of the Semitic ones to use full vowel markers. The argument for Syriac influence is all contained in a single page-long footnote and is based largely on previously surmised Eastern influence in early Irish manuscript illumination and other decorative arts, though there is one reference to

traces of Syriac textual variants in Irish Latin Bibles (the only nonspeculative piece of evidence). The other (and to my mind much more plausible) reason that S gives for why word separation might have begun in the British Isles is that Latin was a foreign language for its Irish and British learners. We even find bilingual glossaries in Britain by the time of Bede, who died in 735. S argues that word-spacing was more important for second-language learners than for readers whose own language was closer to Latin, because picking out word units from oral recitation is a formidable task for nonnative speakers of the language being read.

Medieval scribes used a variety of devices besides spacing to mark off words. Other orthographic conventions point to the awareness of words as units. These include word-initial and word-final capitals and abbreviations for certain word endings (e.g., *-tur*, *-us*, *-bus*, and *-orum*). Abbreviations for entire short words like *et* and *est* (analogous to modern &) are similarly indicative. Finally, markers of word continuity across lines (similar to the modern hyphen), the inverse of word separation, appear simultaneously with separation, corroborating S's basic claim of a cognitive shift in the manner of reading to whole-word recognition.

Half of the main text of the book (pp. 100–242) is devoted to a detailed exposition of the geographical and historical progress of word separation from Ireland and England across Europe to Italy (Spain was separately influenced by Arabic, which, being Semitic, had never lost word separation). The level of detail in this core half of the book is truly remarkable. One chapter, for example, is devoted to the three major French intellectuals of the late 10th century: Gerbert of Aurillac (d. 1003), Abbo of Fleury (d. 1004), and Heriger of Lobbes (d. 1007). S argues that all three used separated script regularly. Abbo explicitly admonished students to take care to separate words properly in speech and writing. The following chapter covers their students, especially Gerbert's student Fulbert of Chartres (d. 1028), Fulbert's students (for whom we have manuscript copies), and authors of unseparated works, who, S claims, showed less interest in Aristotelian logic and Arabic science.

Indeed, S argues that word separation went hand in hand with both the Benedictine reform (which emphasized the individual private study that silent reading facilitated) and the flowering of Scholasticism through to the 14th century. In the end, he goes so far as to identify word separation as the prime mover behind such intellectual innovations as the textual expression of intimate feelings, innovations in book production, grammatical theory, and the language of mathematics.

I found S's central argument both fascinating and fully convincing. Unfortunately for linguists, though, he makes a number of subsidiary claims about language that are much weaker and much less well-supported than his main theme. Anyone who wants to think sensibly about writing systems – what Peter Daniels calls GRAMMATOLOGY – must first ask what the relation is between written and spoken language. Linguists since at least Saussure have understood very well that language is essentially spoken, and that writing is a device for recording language, not a form of language. Unfortunately, this question, whose answer is

axiomatic for linguists, is seldom even asked by others who work with language. Even psycholinguists and computer scientists interested in natural language processing assume that written language and spoken language are equivalent, or that they differ only in their medium of transmission, not in their essence. If writing and speech are indeed simply different forms of language, it is reasonable to think that they could influence each other, but linguists who have searched for the influence of writing on speech have found precious little, apart from a few examples of spelling pronunciation (e.g., pronunciation of the ⟨t⟩ in *often* or the ⟨l⟩ in *folk*). Only at the level of vocabulary, where greater reading proficiency leads reliably to larger vocabulary size, is there any real evidence of the effect of written language, but vocabulary size is not a structural aspect of language.

So, when S says that the change in medieval Latin word order from the relative freedom of classical authors to the relative fixedness of medieval Latin in SVO and AN order, and concurrent increase in the use of function words, arose “as Latin became an analytical language consciously molded to be an unambiguous vehicle for expressing logical distinctions,” a development which he attributes at least in part to the advent of silent reading, any linguist must pause. Medieval Latin became more analytical because the Romance descendants of Latin, whose speakers were the primary users of Medieval Latin, had become more analytical as a result of the loss of case forms. Nor does SVO or AN order have anything to do with analyticity or logic. It is indeed fascinating that the Scholastics should have believed that certain word orders were more logical or natural than others, but they were only being deceived by their own native grammars.

I make my criticism reluctantly, since the main point of the book is so well supported and so clearly correct, but S would have been well served by having a linguist read the book before publication. Besides questioning the dubious assumption about the relation between speech and writing that led S to his even more dubious conclusions about the effect of silent reading on language, a linguist would have caught some other slips, a few of which I enumerate here. On p. 2, S places Vietnamese with the Chinese language group. On p. 4, he notes the prevalence of Chinese characters in more difficult texts in Korean; however, modern Korean writing has virtually eliminated Chinese characters, to the point where Korean religious texts that use these characters are regarded by Koreans as written in Chinese, not in Korean. On p. 9, he refers to “Hindu” languages, a term no linguist would use. On p. 10, he remarks, “In Hebrew, the introduction of vowels in the manuscripts of the High Middle Ages resulted in the evolution of not fully separated Masoretic script”; however, the Masoretic text, complete with vowels, was codified long before the High Middle Ages, all the oldest extant Masoretic manuscripts are fully separated, and the completely exceptionless use of final letter forms and Masoretic punctuation makes any decrease in the space between words irrelevant to the question of word separation in Masoretic.

These linguistic lapses, though, should not detract from the great strength of the book, which is its clear demonstration of the rise of separated text and the relation

between this separation and silent reading. My only regret is that S reached too far in trying to connect this new kind of reading to a shift in language and thinking.

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ULRICH AMMON (ed.), *The dominance of English as a language of science: Effects on other languages and language communities*. Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2001. Pp. xiii + 478. Hb. DM 256.00.

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That English is today's dominant language of science in almost all countries is stating a trivially obvious insight. Many a triviality, however, reveals less generally agreed-upon, or even hitherto unknown aspects upon closer inspection. Thus in the present case, it may not even be clear what we mean by "dominant language." Do we simply have in mind PREVALENCE, i.e., the language being used more frequently than others, or do we imply – in the literal sense of the word – DOMINANCE of some persons over others BY MEANS OF THE LANGUAGE in question? It seems that both meanings make sense in the present context and can be explored as to their reality.

This statement is an opening point for the discussion on the effects of the dominance of English as a language of science on other languages and speech communities. The global search for a common auxiliary language that allows unprecedented possibilities for international cooperation, and the resulting prevalence and dominance of English in science, vary in kind and degree, as well as in effects, across language communities and countries. The volume under review is an outstanding one with respect to both thematic diversity and depth of analysis in most of its essays. Since Fishman et al. 1977 edited the first collection of essays on the spread of English, numerous valuable books on the status of English as a global language have been published (Flaitz 1988, Doyle 1989, Kachru 1992, Pennycook 1994, Hartmann 1996, Fishman et al. 1996, Crystal 1997, Ryan & Zuber-Skerritt 1999), but there is no doubt that Ulrich Ammon has edited an extremely innovative and insightful volume.

This volume includes 22 contributions divided among four thematic sections. The articles in section 1 deal with general problems or give overviews of various countries. Heather Murray & Silvia Dingwall compare the dominance of English at universities in Switzerland and Sweden; Grant McConnell describes the expansion of English as a language of science and communication in East and South Asia.

The second section is dedicated to countries with a history of English-language dominance (e.g., Australia, Israel, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and the Philippines). Richard Baldauf's rich comparative records and the original research findings are fascinating, though it is a bit disappointing that almost all the data were collected before 1989.

Twenty-five years ago, Fishman et al. argued that "English is used internally for official purposes in non-English mother-tongue countries ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY in countries presently or formerly under the political or economic hegemony of English-speaking powers" (1977:55). If this were still true, the second section could be the last one in this volume. However, during recent decades the situation has changed dramatically, and this change becomes clear to the reader in the next two parts.

The third section comprises articles on countries that have always, or at least in recent times, used languages for science different from, or in addition to, their own indigenous tongues (e.g., Finland, Sweden, and Hungary). For these countries, adjustment to the recent prevalence of English means only shifting from one foreign language to another, if a shift is necessary at all. Such a shift, in fact, has taken place in all of the analyzed cases.

The fourth section depicts countries and language communities that until recently have used their own language as an international language of science. For them, one would think, it must be extremely hard to adjust to today's ANGLIFICATION of scientific communication. This phenomenon becomes noticeable in some of the cases, especially France (discussed by Claude Truchot) and Germany (by Ulrich Ammon).

Though it is obvious that delimitation between these types of countries and language communities is not clear-cut and at times is arbitrary, the editor's decisions concerning the site of each specific situation in the general context seems reasonable, except perhaps for Australia. However, beyond the analysis of each of the specific cases (which are undoubtedly very important by themselves), the main impact of this book can be summarized in a number of broad-spectrum questions.

This collection evidently demonstrates that what would seem relevant exclusively for the sociology of language (the book was published by Mouton de Gruyter as the 84th volume in the "Contributions to the Sociology of Language" series, edited by Joshua Fishman) is, in fact, indispensable for all whose fields of professional specialization are linked to sociology, communication, educational research, and political science. Sixty years ago, in 1938, Otto Jespersen attributed the phenomenal growth and spread of English language to "political ascendancy" rather than to any intrinsic superiority in the language or cultural superiority in its speakers. De Swaan's (1998) suggestion to analyze the world language system in terms of political sociology has been taken forward by some of the authors in this volume. Most of the above-mentioned issues are discussed in brief by the editor in the Introduction, and more profoundly by Robert Kaplan, Miquel Siquan, and other contributors.

It seems almost self-evident that the native speakers of the prevalent scientific language have less difficulty using it both passively (in reading and oral understanding) and actively (in writing or speaking) than nonnative or foreign-language speakers do, and therefore that the former have advantages over the latter in communicative situations that require the use of English. It is easier for them to produce utterances and texts in line with the existing native-speaker norms. Higher investment in language learning and additional costs of producing linguistically adequate texts are additional problems with which nonnative speakers have to struggle. These difficulties extend beyond the individual scientist and scholar to publishing companies, and even to all firms for which science and scientific communication are economically essential in countries where English is not the native or at least a widely used official language. This state of affairs makes the editor argue for “equity for nonnative speakers of English.”

Nonetheless, the possible disadvantages for scientists who are native speakers of English should not be entirely forgotten. English-speaking scientists typically seem to be less and less inclined to study foreign languages, and, as a consequence, they are unable to take notice of publications in languages other than English. English-speaking scientists tend, however, to stress this point in order to calm complaints about their otherwise enormous privileges.

The English-speaking scientists’ advantages extend far beyond what has been mentioned above. For one thing, they enjoy their prestigious language’s halo effect: Texts tend to be valued more highly if written in English. In addition, the English-speaking countries, or their scientists and scholars, are credited with inventions and innovations that in reality were made elsewhere but did not become known earlier for language reasons.

The spread of English in science and other fields limits the use of other languages, even within their home countries. Writing theses in English is widely tolerated, if not the rule, in non-English-speaking countries, especially in the natural sciences but also in the social sciences. Many countries have introduced English-language teaching in order to attract more foreign students, who are not always willing to learn the native language.

The preponderance of English in science and other domains affects the other languages even internally. In most cases, modernization of terminology occurs mainly by way of loans from English that are borrowed rather than using indigenous linguistic resources. Will such terminology further distance the lay population from the realm of science? By arguing that “this would hardly be compatible with democratic ideals,” Ammon offers an important challenge to contemporary social research.

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SURESH CANAGARAJAH, *Resisting linguistic imperialism in English teaching*.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. viii + 216. Pb. \$24.95.

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As eighth-grade students of English in a “periphery” community school in India, we were assigned to discuss and to appreciate a piece of prose, from our textbook, called “On not answering the telephone”; it was a satirical piece demonizing telephones because their existence and use flouted all tenets of British English linguistic etiquette. None of us in that class had a phone in our homes, and none of us had any desire to learn the alien etiquette. We were interested only in learning the language to the extent that it could help us realize our immediate and, perhaps, future goals. This was our tacit response, and resistance, to English linguistic imperialism: awareness of the pragmatic rewards of English-language acquisition and use, but negation and denial of the cultural hegemony of English. This dynamic of ideological imposition and resistance (and appropriation) forms the core of Canagarajah’s book, *Resisting linguistic imperialism in English teaching*.

The book presents a critical ethnography of the sociolinguistic acts of resistance to what Phillipson 1992 has termed “linguistic imperialism.” Although there are several critics and critiques of linguistic imperialism (see Kachru 1992, Davies 1996, Brutt-Griffler 1998), Canagarajah’s work stands out in that it presents a detailed case study of English language teaching (ELT) in Sri Lanka to demonstrate the various complexes of classroom dynamics that resist and transform English-language acquisition and use. The book presents a strong argument against using mainstream (CENTER) pedagogies for PERIPHERY communities and offers instead a socially sensitive, critical-reflective pedagogical

framework that uses concepts such as RESISTANCE, TRANSFORMATION, and APPROPRIATION to capture faithfully the micro-discursive process of classroom dynamics. The critical-ethnographic methodology Canagarajah uses yields the logic of linguistic practices of resistance – the ways in which the periphery (Tamil) community “appropriates English to dynamically negotiate meaning, identity, and status in contextually suitable and socially strategic ways, and in the process modifies the communicative and linguistic rules of English according to local cultural and ideological imperatives” (p. 76).

Using a micro-social approach to ELT, Canagarajah presents an understanding of the RELATIVE AUTONOMY of classrooms, arguing that classrooms are important sites of cultural struggle where the cultural preferences of the text, the teacher, and the taught are seen in conflict, all interconnected and linked to the outside world in complex and largely unpredictable ways. He notes:

It is important to understand the extent to which classroom resistance may play a significant role in larger transformations in the social sphere. To say the signs of critical thinking, writing, or reading mean that students are assured of political and material empowerment is to exaggerate matters. To think that such signs are indications of imminent political transformation and social reconstruction is to simplify such processes. Although the school has an obvious connection in the reproduction of power structures, material and ideological realities have a life of relative autonomy that needs to be tackled in its own right. (196)

The complexity of the classroom dynamic and its relation to the larger social structures and processes in the outside world are examined in terms of three pedagogical imperatives: (i) Mainstream pedagogies – those that are developed in center countries such as USA and UK – are inadequate for the pedagogical contexts of the periphery countries (Sri Lanka, India); (ii) RESISTANCE to mainstream pedagogies develops critical consciousness; and (iii) the tutor as well as the tutee must APPROPRIATE English to fit their own local needs. The bulk of the book describes how these three imperatives are empirically motivated, theoretically justified, and pedagogically negotiated in periphery communities.

Chaps. 1–3 give a theoretical, methodological, and historical overview of a CRITICAL PEDAGOGY. The critical-theoretical orientation adopted in Chap. 1 displaces and discredits mainstream pedagogies for periphery communities, examining closely the texts and contexts of resistance and conflict in periphery classrooms. This approach claims that the teaching material, knowledge, discourse conventions, and identities of teachers and students are heterogeneously constituted, steeped in conflict, and implicated in the exercise of power (35). This claim is augmented in chap. 2, where it is argued that all research methods must be sensitive to issues of power, its historical constitution, and its contemporary practices. Chap. 3 describes historical instances of resistance and appropriation that inform the micro-discursive processes of classroom life.



Chaps. 4–7 examine students' and teachers' resistance to the cultural dominance of ELT pedagogy. Students resist mainstream pedagogies introduced through text books and teaching methods by scribbling marginalia in the text-book that reflect the ongoing political-nationalist struggle or the dominant religio-linguistic discourse of the community. Teachers' resistance to cultural domination is more subtle, expressed mainly in terms of the inconsistencies between their declared teaching philosophy and its classroom implementation. Although British/American English is the sole medium of instruction, the classroom analysis reveals (i) strategic code-switching between Tamil and English taking place all the time, and (ii) the use of Sri Lankan English as the pedagogical norm. Yet, as Canagarajah argues, creative engagement with both dominant and native discourses provides the resource for critical expression and resistance.

The concluding chapter offers a solution to English linguistic imperialism in periphery communities. Canagarajah argues for multiple systems of English (181), much in the (unfortunately unacknowledged) spirit of Quirk (1985:3): "different standards for different occasions for different people – and each as 'correct' as any other." In this way, argues Canagarajah, students can be taught "that any dialect has to be personally and communally appropriated to varying degrees in order to be meaningful and relevant for its users. This would lead to the pluralization of standards and democratization of access to English" (181).

In sum, the book offers a systematic presentation of arguments for a critical pedagogy in ELT in periphery settings, claiming that a proper analysis of micro-discursive practices in the classroom can inform a theory of language teaching and learning in general, and of ESL teaching and learning in particular.

That said, I must point out what seems to me to be the issue of the generalizability of acts of resistance, as made visible in a critical pedagogical approach, to other periphery settings. The Sri Lankan ELT classrooms investigated in this book represent a special case of periphery settings, so the generalization of these findings to other periphery settings will be fraught with errors. A comparable case study, I hazard to guess, can in fact be made for ELT in Kashmir, where the ethno-political tensions are – albeit with minor obvious differences – of the same nature as the tensions in Jaffna, the physical setting of Canagarajah's work.

I also find problematic the theoretical-conceptual division of English-using communities into center and periphery. This division ignores the historical and functional contexts of acquisition and use in different periphery communities that have been rather skillfully, and relatively uncontroversially, characterized as the OUTER and EXPANDING circles of English by Kachru 1990. Conflating the outer and the expanding circle contexts/countries into PERIPHERY contexts/countries misses the important sociolinguistic generalization that there are systematic and significant differences between India (outer circle) and Japan (expanding circle) in terms of the range and depth of English use, as well as the structure, functions, and contexts (norms, models, curricula, etc.) of English-language teaching and learning. These differences invite different micro-discursive properties of class-

room dynamics and could help to set up a typology of resistance and appropriation that would result in a more informed theory of ELT.

Even though the book dichotomizes the English-teaching world into center and periphery, it does not discuss the existence of various peripheries within the ELT periphery where RESISTANCE and APPROPRIATION are not even a possibility, mainly because of the educational and institutional practices that limit access to English (Ramanathan 1999). These peripheries consist of those groups who are “typically the most economically and educationally handicapped” (Ramanathan 1999:213).

To conclude, the book is exhaustively researched and well written, though more examples of the ethnographic data would have supported the critical-theoretical perspective advanced in it. Readers might quibble with Canagarajah’s interpretation of the students’ scribbles on the margins – it does take quite a leap of faith and imagination to see sexual drawings as logically related to the students’ resistance to English – but it is certainly an innovative and potentially productive methodological exercise, if used carefully. The book will certainly find an audience among those who wish to learn about ELT beyond “what goes without saying.”

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LEANNE HINTON & KEN HALE (eds.). *The Green Book of language revitalization in practice*. San Diego & New York: Academic Press, 2001. Pp xvii + 450 pp. Hb.

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A brief editors’ note about the title of this book begins with the following statement: “The title of this volume is an answer to another publication, the UNESCO

*Red Book on endangered languages.*” It ends by making a vow: “We hope this *Green Book* will be of use to everyone who wants it to be no longer necessary for their language to be listed in the *Red Book*.”

Indeed, green is the color of grass and treetops, of wood and rainforest; green is the color with which ecological movements identify; green is the color of the spring season, associated with renewal and, why not? – revitalization. In the past two decades, extensive research has been undertaken on language shift and language death, aiming at a better understanding of the linguistic and societal dynamics involved in both. Language attrition deserves special interest too. In the past decade, increasing awareness arose of the extent to what local language loss is actually threatening global language diversity, and scholars, language activists, and opinion- and policy-makers became progressively conscious that decided and concerted efforts in the field of language preservation could not be deferred. Not all linguists are aligned alike with respect to this issue, but I like to think they overwhelmingly share this consciousness. (cf. Ladefoged’s controversial view vs. Hale’s and collaborators’ and Dorian’s in *Language* 68 [1992] and 69 [1993]. I commented on this controversy in “Els lingüistes i les llengües amenaçades,” *Els Marges* 50:75–81 [1994].)

In a way, language maintenance stands opposite language shift or language death, but language policies addressed to language maintenance should not be confused with policies addressed to language revival or revitalization. Furthermore, reversing language shift may pursue varied aims, depending on the historical and social context. Properly, the *Green Book* deals with revitalization cases and efforts. This means that, more often than not, their common aim is the creation of a new generation of more or less fluent speakers of a decaying or fading language. It is my contention that for language revival to succeed somehow, there should remain some basis to act upon – just as there is no revival of fire without live coals among the ashes. This is confirmed by cases such as the most successful example of language revival: Hebrew, which had been retained as a sacred language and even as a language for business. The Ni’ihau community, whose children were the only present-day children to be first-language speakers of Hawaiian (p. 136), is one foundation upon which the revival of this language rests.

Another term in the book title is relevant: “in practice.” This means that the book offers narratives of language revitalization experiences rather than a lot of theoretical or conceptual reflections on it, although these are not missing. Revitalization experiences dealt with in this book are, first and foremost, community-based and community-controlled (51); that is, they proceed from the bottom up, since what is at stake, after all, is a matter of peoples’ self-determination. Communities are the ones to set their goals, to choose their way, to overcome impediments, to try their methods. They may be helped by external specialists to a certain degree, but they are the agents of the enterprise. Of course, revitalization may then become somewhat institutionalized. Also, experience acquired and material elaborated in one case may be useful to another. Thus, the revitalization of

Hawaiian (129–76), inspired by the Maori experience (115–28), is one of the most interesting cases among the range covered by the book. This range includes Native American languages, mainly but not only from the US – whether from the mainland, like Navajo (87–97, 203–15, 389–410), or from islands, like Hawaiian (133–44, 147–76) – as well as Australian (277–82) and other Pacific languages (Maori, 119–28; Hawaiian). Finally, Europe is represented by the Celtic languages Welsh (107–13) and Irish (301–11).

The volume is strongly oriented toward the American experience. The common feature that all the chosen languages share is that they became endangered under the pressure of English, though in several cases after suffering pressure from Spanish, as in the case of the Pueblo languages (63–73, 75–82). In this sense, it was relevant to include a brief description and evaluation of US bilingual education programs during the 1970s and 1980s. These were implemented as a consequence of the Bilingual Education Act (1968) and a series of US Supreme Court decisions. A relatively liberal policy toward minority languages prevailed during this period. At first, bilingual education was aimed at immigrant and Spanish-speaking children, but Native American communities were quick to grasp this opportunity. This meant federal funds for Indian school projects. Bilingual education was controversial: Some saw its goal as “transitional,” and others thought of it as oriented toward language “maintenance” (41–42). Indian communities took it to be a maintenance program, while the federal government hesitated, until finally the transitional view of bilingual education prevailed (68–69). In spite of this merely transitional goal, funding progressively decreased. Some states have recently dropped bilingual education, and others may follow.

Languages dealt with in the book show different pre-historic and historic depth: Many of them are rooted in a long distant past; further, some Indian languages were written or somehow represented well before the colonial encounter (prototypically, through the Mayan hieroglyphic system). If we take other types of “visual representation of ideas” as the way preliterate peoples recorded their narratives, then Sioux or Navajo ideographic pictures may be considered (242); in the Old World, a variety of Celtic was written in Ogham script in the early centuries CE in Ireland, and after the introduction of Christianity and the roman alphabet in the fifth century, Irish developed a rich literature. Other very old languages, by contrast, were not written until the first half of the 19th century (Hawaiian); the development of Cherokee and Cree syllabaries also date from this period. Documents from the old days may be an aid to modern standardization. As for new writing systems and literacy, a remark must be made beyond their description. Although we Western people are used to thinking of script as something inherent to language and something that may improve language maintenance, the same response is not always found among indigenous communities. They may refuse it, perhaps thinking that it is not right to let strangers know their ancestral language, or they may assign to writing no other domain than school teaching. In some contexts, writing

may not improve language learning, the oral channel being more suitable because of either pedagogical strategies or local linguistic ideologies.

These remarks lead in a natural way to the relevant issue of the relation between language and culture. Three points should be made here. First, insofar as “language is the key to and the heart of culture” (9), school-based revitalization has its shortcomings, for it may be difficult to recover patterns of culture in the schoolroom. Second, traditional cultural practices are to be learned and enacted, but the aim of revitalization is to achieve a language that can function in modern life. Hypertraditionalism is to be avoided. Finally, all this implies that new forms of discourse should be acquired and properly used, be they traditional (storytelling, ceremonial speech, etc.) or modern (essay, political discourse, etc.). In addition, the relationship between claims for language and culture revitalization and claims for land and civil rights go hand in hand.

A great deal of discussion in this volume concerns teaching methods, procedures, and results. Linguistic immersion is seen as one of the most fruitful methods, especially if applied in the preschool phase; in some cases, it is extended beyond the school context and reaches family life or community interaction. The so-called master-apprentice language learning program (217–26), by which a master fluent speaker and a younger learner work together as a team to get language and other cultural knowledge passed on, deserves special mention. In general, the authors emphasize communication-based rather than grammatical methods, and immediate intercommunication in the indigenous language between teacher/master and learner. Establishing community educational programs sometimes demands imagination in order to deal with political or legal impediments (17; 136–37).

Training of teachers is urgent and, among other methods, the master-apprentice methodology has proved promising where practiced (183; 217–26). In other cases, universities (Inuttut and Innu), colleges (Navajo), and special institutes or indigenous associations – in contact with universities – offer teacher-training programs. This is the case with the American Indian Language Development Institute (AILDI), which, developing from the first Yuman Language Institute, soon reached far beyond this language family to include other languages, mainly Tohono O’odham, Hopi, and Western Apache (371–78). Another such effort is the Oklahoma Native American Language Development Institute (ONALDI), which emphasizes Oklahoma languages (378–81). Both institutes emphasize the necessity of heritage language skills and language-teaching skills.

Language itself may be conceived as a survival technology. The first language-based technology is writing, upon which I commented above. The import of the so-called “new technologies” for revitalization efforts is discussed in this book, and examples are presented. The point is highlighted by Hale: As a matter of principle, technology is neutral (277, 282). This assertion cannot conceal that the effect of radio and TV broadcasting has been devastating to endangered lan-

guages, but it reminds us of the extent to which these technologies can help language revitalization. Irish radio stations (300, 304–10) and Welsh TV (111–12) are instances. Video offers new possibilities – for instance, the dubbing of *Bambi* into Arapaho (293–94). Existing resources on endangered languages on the Web are enumerated and briefly described, and their advantages and limits considered (331–43). Building virtual communities of speakers and strengthening real ones through the use of technology are to be enhanced.

The book is divided into nine parts (Introduction; Language policy; Language planning; Maintenance and revitalization of national indigenous languages; Immersion; Literacy; Media and technology; Training; Sleeping languages). The content of these parts totals 33 chapters by 33 authors, though there is no one-to-one correspondence between authors and chapters. Strategically, one of the editors briefly introduces the reader to the languages on which the following one or more chapters are based. Both Hinton's and Hale's introductions to languages are informative not only in terms of location, genetic relationship, cognates, structural features, and current status, but also about its impact on recent debates in language description (e.g., the Navajo system of classificatory verbs), linguistic theory (e.g., the analysis of verbal stems in Maori), or notions in linguistic scholarship (e.g., the contribution of Karuk to the debate on linguistic relativity, or the contribution of Southern Paiute to Sapir's "psychological reality of phonemes"). Chapters themselves deal mainly with revitalization experiences and/or general issues. Maps make clear the geographical locations of the endangered languages treated. Information on the editors and authors and a useful index of topics close the volume.

Hale's arguments in favor of language diversity, known from elsewhere, rely both on the linguists' interest in diachronic linguistic reconstruction and synchronic theoretical linguistics – their outcomes are not the same if certain languages are missing or unknown – and, importantly, on peoples' right to preserve their particular human inheritance, a shared cultural and verbal knowledge that is scarce human wealth, as water is a scarce and necessary resource for life. If this knowledge gets lost in its natural context, it is lost forever. Increasing professional and public awareness and communities' involvement in independently emerging revitalization movements around the world offer some reasons for optimism. The *Green Book* will help these communities to take advantage of one another's striving for success. The enterprise of compiling the information contained in it testifies to another reason for optimism.

NOTE: After this review was submitted to the editor of *Language in Society*, I received the sad news of Ken Hale's passing. I dedicate this review to his memory. May remembering him make us more sensitive to the case for saving endangered languages, and more responsible to our commitments as linguists and social scientists.

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MANFRED G. KRUG, *Emerging English modals: A corpus-based study of grammaticalization*. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2000. Pp. xv, 332. Hb DM148, US \$74 (approx.).

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“Grammaticalization,” to quote what is probably the best known definition of the term, “consists in the increase of the range of a morpheme advancing from a lexical to a grammatical or from a less grammatical to a more grammatical status, e.g., from a derivative formant to an inflectional one” (Kuryłowicz 1965:69). As far as studies of grammaticalization in English are concerned, the history of the modals has been the focus of considerable attention in recent years. Manfred Krug’s (K’s) book is an important new contribution to this area of ongoing research.

There is a definite emphasis on corpus data in K’s book. For historical data, the main sources are the Helsinki and the ARCHER corpora, and for present-day English K draws mainly on the British National Corpus (BNC), especially its spoken segment of about 10 million words. Besides following historical change from one period to the next within a corpus, or from one corpus to the next, K also employs the apparent-time approach, making use of age-group information within a single corpus.

K’s central claim is that in English grammar a category of what he terms “emerging modals” should be distinguished as distinct from central modals. In K’s conception, the class of emerging modals has four members that come closest to being prototypical: HAVE TO, (HAVE) GOT TO, WANT TO, (BE) GOING TO.

Under the heading “Prototypical properties of an emerging modal,” K lists the following:

- (i) It takes TO infinitives only.
- (ii) It takes DO support under negation and in interrogatives.
- (iii) It consists of two syllables, which consist of
- (iv) four phonemes. These in turn typically follow the order /CVCə/, where the second consonant is alveolar . . . (230)

To these K adds the fifth property of a “high discourse frequency” and the sixth property of “commonly realized assimilation processes at the (former) word boundary between the verb and *to*” (230).

As is clear from the properties listed, K places a great deal of emphasis on phonological considerations in his study. When listing the items that come closest to being prototypical members of the category of emerging modals, K does not specifically mention the forms *gonna*, *gotta*, and *wanna*, but presumably the phonological properties listed in (iii) and (iv) relate to these forms, rather than to

*going to*, *got to*, and *want to*. The *gonna*, *gotta*, and *wanna* forms are, of course, more common in the spoken language and in representations of spoken language than in the written medium.

There may be a slight tension in the proposed clustering of the prototypical properties as conceived by K. For instance, high discourse frequency does not necessarily go with the most prototypical form, as defined in properties (iii) and (iv) – not even in the spoken medium. Thus, as is clear from K's admirably explicit calculations, the number of *wanna* forms in the spoken part of the BNC is much smaller than the number of the fuller form *want to* (p. 154).

The contracted forms, *gonna*, *gotta* and *wanna*, in fact form a focus of interest for K in the book. For instance, regarding the relation of *wanna* and *want to*, he argues that the two variants “exhibit different syntactic properties” (159). Further, he puts forward the proposal that all three contracted forms, *wanna*, *gonna*, and *gotta*, display what he calls “paradigmatic iconicity” (252f.).

Not surprisingly, K also traces shifts in the meanings of what he takes to be emerging modals. Regarding the forces driving such shifts, he gives prominence to the role of pragmatic inferences, rather than to metaphor. The following may be regarded as a synopsis of this part of his argument:

It was suggested that subjectification and other types of pragmatic inferences are not only crucial in the development of epistemic from deontic senses, a point which is commonly stated in the literature on modality; they also seem to be operating in the rise of modal from nonmodal semantics (e.g., ‘lack’ > ‘volition’; ‘possession’ > ‘obligation’). (255)

There is no doubt that K's book is an important contribution to work on English modals. He is quite aware of and honest about potential limitations of corpora that are meant specifically to represent the spoken language (37ff.), and over all, his use of electronic corpora is impressive. With the help of the corpora, K is able to shed important new light on the history of the modals that he has chosen for detailed study. The reader may be slightly less sure about the applicability of mathematical formulas to the study of linguistic change (225ff.), but on the whole, K's discussions of historical change and of ways in which it spreads carry conviction.

At the same time, K might perhaps have paid slightly more attention to the syntactic analysis of the proposed new class of marginal modals. He apparently envisages monoclausal structures for them. For instance, when discussing WANT TO, he writes:

The fact that contracted *wanna* is not only possible but indeed common in natural discourse indicates that in the vast majority of uses a monoclausal modal analysis is superior to a biclausal purposive reading (*in order*) *to*. (140)



A few lines later, he goes on:

Semantic considerations exclude a purposive reading of the *to* complements in present-day English and, significantly, for almost all examples put forward in the above discussion of the historical stages, too. (140)

The reader may wonder if K is here equating the possible motivation for a biclausal analysis of *want to* and *wanna* with the purposive interpretation of *to* complements of the verb. In this connection, it may be asked whether *want to* and *wanna* do not regularly impose a semantic role on their subjects, in a way that *going to* and *gonna*, for instance, do not (cf. *It's gonna rain*; *There's gonna be trouble*), and whether this difference might not be reflected in a syntactic difference between the two types of verbs. Further, if *want to* and *wanna* impose a semantic role on their subjects, there arises the possibility that the semantic role of the subject of *want to* and *wanna* is different from that of the following predicate, as in *I wanna be tall*. The difference of the semantic roles can be represented easily enough in a biclausal analysis, as is traditionally done on the basis of control, but from the point of view of this question, K's conception of a monoclausal approach might have benefited from further elucidation.

There may be some issues that deserve further comment, but over all, K's book is a welcome and stimulating addition to the literature. It is written in an admirably lucid style throughout, which enhances its appeal. Those interested in grammaticalization and the analysis of English modals, their history, and their current state will certainly benefit from reading this book.

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KORMI ANIPA, *A critical examination of linguistic variation in Golden-Age Spanish*. (Berkeley Insights in Linguistics and Semiotics, no. 47). New York: Peter Lang, 2001. Pp. xx, 254. Hb \$57.95.

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This book is about variation in 16th-century Spanish between forms and patterns that triumphed and those “archaisms” that did not, with a focus on the latter. The goal is to investigate resistance to language change. Contrary to the widespread

assumption that this was a period of rapid changes, Anipa shows the intricacies of persistent variation during the Golden Age, drawing on literary data and a novel source: the testimony of contemporaneous grammarians.

The Introduction proposes the “tug-of-war” theory of variability, based on the ideas of speaker resistance and linguistic continuity in variation, building on work by the Milroys (e.g., Milroy 1992). The 13 grammars surveyed, from Antonio de Nebrija (1492) to Gonzalo Correas (1625), with careful reading provide information about variability – not only through their description but also their prescription or proscription of forms – from which social and linguistic factors influencing variable usage may be inferred (cf. Poplack, Van Herk & Harvie 2002). Five literary texts from the same period provide contexts of occurrence for the less favored variants of the selected variables. Their persistence is examined by discovering patterns of occurrence and communicative functions for speakers of the time.

Chap. 3 looks at the functional roles of the first person singular present indicative forms *so*, *esto*, *vo*, and *do* ‘I am, I am (located), I go, I give’ (which changed to *soy*, *estoy*, *voy*, and *doy*). The grammars indicate that the *o* variants continued to be used in speech after they had been restricted in writing. Only in the *Retrato de la Lozana andaluza* (1524) do they appear, a fact that Anipa attributes to its speechlike character (though this also happens to be the earliest work considered). Not surprisingly, the *o* forms are favored in songs, proverbs, and idioms, which are conservative “fixed” environments. Other occurrences may have psychological explanations, such as “unpleasant state of mind” in Lozana’s *¿So yo vuestra puta?* ‘Am I your whore?’ when she scolds her servant Rampín in a fury.

Chap. 4 analyzes variation between forms with [j] versus the velar insert [g] in the verbs *caer*, *traer*, *oír*, *huir*. Third conjugation (as opposed to second) and subjunctive mood (as opposed to indicative) were slower to change, and *caer* ‘fall’ was slower than *traer* ‘bring’. These findings, I think, support a frequency effect, whereby high frequency forms/contexts change faster (cf. Bybee & Thompson 2000).

Chap. 5 concerns variation between *haber* and *tener* plus direct object to express possession. The tabulation of the literary data show an overwhelming preference for *tener*, with relative frequencies for *haber* dropping from 8% and 17% in *Lozana* (1524) and *Lazarillo* (1554) to less than 1% in *Buscón* (1604) (I calculated these percentages from raw figures provided in Table 5.2; providing percentages in the tables would have been helpful.) *Haber* is robust in the “idiom-like expression” *haber menester* ‘have need, there is a need’, which in fact makes up half of all *haber* tokens. The author suggests that etymology (popular or otherwise) – *menos* ‘less’ + *tener* ‘have’ – and the avoidance of redundancy promoted the retention of *haber* in this collocation. (Etymology and redundancy, however, do not appear to have an effect in such present-day uses as *de donde* ‘from (from) where’ and *de a de veras* ‘for (for) real’.)

Another distribution pattern identified is the co-occurrence of *haber* with words expressing “some form of sensation,” for example, *miedo*, *temor* ‘fear’, *lástima* ‘pity’, *gozo* ‘pleasure’. A nice example of the type of detailed, speaker-based analysis Anipa provides is the discussion of variation in an utterance by Lozana, *¡Vosotras tenéis los buenos días y habéis las buenas noches!* Lozana is addressing her friends, also prostitutes, and in that context this may be interpreted as ‘HAVE a good day and do ENJOY the night’, enjoyment having a sexual connotation, in line with the usage of *haber* with words of sensation (115). Nevertheless, the preponderance of *haber menester*, as well as the lexical pattern with sensation words, to me is an indication of the limited productivity of *haber* already in the period under study.

Chap. 6, “Future and Conditional,” examines variation between full (*teneré*), metathesized (*terné*), and epenthetic (*tendrê*) forms in high-frequency disyllabic second and third conjugation verbs (the latter variant eventually won). The grammarians’ mention of all three variants, combined with the lack of full forms in the literary data, lead to the conclusion that non-syncopated forms were confined to speech. Furthermore, contrary to the renowned grammarian Cuervo, Anipa proposes that the metathesized (rather than epenthetic) forms were more common in speech than in writing, attributing their high relative frequency in *Lozana* to the colloquial features of the text.

The case of *devria* vs. *deberia* receives special attention as a case of “homonymic clash.” *Dever* and *deber* were a minimal pair, the former an auxiliary of obligation, the latter a lexical verb meaning ‘owe’ (debt). Modern Spanish *deber*, with both uses, would exemplify lexical loss or fusion. An alternative view is, of course, that this is a case of polysemy and grammaticization: The obligation (auxiliary) use is limited to particular constructions, that is, “in combination with other verbs” (131); furthermore, other languages use the same form for both debt and obligation (e.g., Modern Greek *ofeilo*). The discussion here rests heavily on the attribution of a semantic difference by the grammarian Correas. However, in the quest for an ordered view of language whereby each particular form must be associated with a particular function, one response of grammarians (and not a few linguists) to variability – when ignoring or stigmatizing variant forms fails – is to ascribe semantic differences to them (Poplack et al. 2002:89). In any case, Anipa provides a hypothesis that may be tested in earlier texts with variation between full and syncopated forms.

Variation between synthetic (*tomarélo*) and analytic (*tomarlo he*) futures/conditionals is also considered. The review of the grammars reveals that, contrary to broadly accepted wisdom, the analytic forms persisted through the first half of the seventeenth century, underscoring that “basing linguistic conclusions on writing only . . . misrepresent[s] reality” (151). Distribution patterns in the literary texts support an initial-position syntactic effect in favor of analytic forms. Another, hitherto unmentioned-on, facet of variation in future expressions discov-

ered by the author is that *tener*, in addition to *haber*, appeared in analytic future and conditional constructions, as in *llegar tienes a la presencia de César* 'you will arrive in the presence of Caesar' (156–7).

Chap. 7 concerns *d*-ending (*tomad*) and *d*-deleted (*tomá*) plural imperative forms, the former now standard in Peninsular Spanish. *D*-deleted forms were used with *catar* 'try', *mirar* 'look', and *andar* 'go on' as attention-getting interjections, as opposed to their basic meanings. On the other hand, in favor of *d*-ending forms may have been the categorical occurrence of high-frequency monosyllabic verbs, such as *id* 'go', *sed* 'be', *dad* 'give'. Of interest is the discussion of the effect of co-occurring third person object clitics, which nearly always resulted in "metathesized" *ld* sequences (*tomaldo* 'take it'). Anipa argues that this would be a case of "false variation," since tokens of imperative + *l*-initial clitic could well be counted as instances of *d*-deleted rather than *d*-ending forms, the *d* appearing in the *ld* sequence on the strength of the metathesized pattern (180). If we consider probability matching by language learners as a mechanism of change (Labov 1994:588ff.), *d*-ending forms would have been promoted by their apparent higher frequency.

Chap. 8 offers close scrutiny of the functions of address formulas, including *Tú*, *Vos*, *Vuestra Merced*, third person pronouns (*el, ella*), and verb forms with no pronoun, taking into account speakers, their interlocutors, and the situation, especially its psychological dimensions. Anipa motivates a categorization of instances of changing from one form to another as either "address switching" or "address mixing." His in-depth analyses in this chapter bear out his statement that "it may be erroneous to conclude that something is haphazard just on the basis of its complexity" (208).

The book makes a major contribution to historical studies of Spanish by bringing to bear the grammarians' testimony and demonstrating the pitfalls of exclusive reliance on literary sources. It was a pleasure to read linguistic analyses that put speakers (in this case, literary characters) at the center. Though I am not convinced that a formal tug-of-war theory is needed for variationists, I see how diachronic studies from the perspective of the losing variants can provide insights. This book is very engagingly written, and I will use at least parts of it next time I teach a course on the history of Spanish.

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GEOFFREY LEWIS, *The Turkish language reform, a catastrophic success*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. 190. HB \$65.00.

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Geoffrey Lewis's book traces the history of Turkish language reform with fascinating style. The reader is provided with rich and well-selected examples, and the translation from Turkish to English is excellent. The author's experience of Turkey and his competence in Turkish are clear throughout. He states that the book has two purposes: to acquaint the general reader with the history of Turkish language reform, and to provide students at all levels of Turkish with some useful and stimulating reading matter. Lewis is successful on both counts. Furthermore, the book is significant in that it sheds light on the fact that, although language reform is not a well-known aspect of the Kemalist revolution, it played a vital role in the creation of the Turkish national identity. In other words, the aim of Turkish language reform was not simply to "purify" the language by eliminating foreign words and foreign grammatical features; rather, it was part of a nation-building project.

Although developing this argument was not one of the author's main purposes in writing this book, he does explore the ideological dimension of language reform to some extent. Lewis reflects on the ideological choice that was made in the Kemalist period regarding language and its continuity. This is done through an analysis of Ottoman Turkish, and an attempt to explain the spirit of the 1920s and 1930s in the context of the creation of a nation and the conditions under which people became devotees of Turkish. The Ottoman language, which was a mixture of Turkish, Arabic, and Persian, was an administrative and literary tongue that was quite foreign to ordinary people. Thus, in creating the national language, the Kemalist revolution chose the language of the ordinary people – Turkish, not Ottoman. As Lewis clearly points out in chaps. 2 and 3, the issue of language, including modification of the alphabet, is a very important one. This had been the focus of study for many intellectuals, particularly during the second half of the 19th century. Examples include the work of Ahmet Cevdet in 1851; research on language purification by Ali Suavi, Süleyman Pasha, Şemsettin Sami, and Şinasi; and the founding of the Turkish Association in 1908.

The juxtaposition of "catastrophic" and "success" in the book's title reflects the paradox of the Turkish experience with language. Language reform was, in a

way, “catastrophic,” since it paved the way for the emergence of an extreme view on purification. This view impoverished and sterilized the language, and it led to the introduction of the Sun Language Theory. Ali Fuat Başgil correctly defined this theory as a “disease of fakery,” in a quotation cited by Lewis in chap. 4. Lewis’s analysis of the Sun Language Theory in chap. 5 refers to a number of different views, including Atatürk’s position. The author explains that, upon considering the views of foreign scientists, Atatürk ceased to believe in the Sun Language Theory and language purification, with a special reserve for technical terms. Lewis correctly states that the Sun Language Theory and language purification lost popularity before Atatürk’s death, and that Atatürk gave up the idea of encouraging them once he realized purification was leading to a dead end – that is, serious depletion of the language. In fact, Atatürk decided that he himself would save the language from that dead end.

On the other hand, language reform was a “success” in that it helped to minimize, if not eliminate, the gap between the language of intellectuals and the language of the people. Alphabet reform was the main element that closed this gap. Although it is not elaborated on in the book, alphabet reform was also a success because it westernized Turkey to some extent, breaking some ties with the past and with Arab influence.

Lewis is supportive of alphabet reform but states his opposition to extreme purification. His position can best be understood through his emphasis and positive views on Aydın Sayılı. Sayılı did not reject purification altogether but was against letting the old words die. He favored using whatever word, old or new, best expressed the meaning, and he felt that retention of old words was essential to express nuances in circumstances where pure Turkish (öztürkçe) was not rich enough. This approach is close to the one that Atatürk adopted, as demonstrated in many of the speeches he gave during the last years of his life.

In chap. 11, Lewis asks two basic questions: Has this reform eliminated the gap between the language of intellectuals and the language of ordinary people? And has it impoverished the language? His answer to the first query is that language reform has broken down this particular barrier. However, in studying the new Turkish, Lewis points to a new gap between intellectuals and non-intellectuals, one that he says has been caused by purification and the influx of English. This view that the spread of pure Turkish and the influx of English have created a new gap is easy to criticize. First, English has changed the language of both ordinary people and intellectuals. Second, it is not true that all new words have been accepted by society in general. Some of them died almost at birth, and there are many examples in the book. Clearly, this view does not disregard the fact that impoverishment of language varies from one social group to another, which is a sociological reality in all societies. However, it should be remembered that the gap that existed before language reform was due to the use of two different languages, Ottoman and Turkish. In more recent times, the new single language has

come under the influence of a foreign language in response to global changes. The perception of this situation as a form of impoverishment or a new gap is open to discussion in the context which Turkish society is selectively constructing and reconstructing its language.

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ROB AMERY, 'Warrabarna Kurna!' *Reclaiming an Australian language*. (Multilingualism and Linguistic Diversity, 1.) Lisse, The Netherlands: Swets & Zeitlinger, 2000. Pp. xx, 289. Hb \$63.00.

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Many linguists believe that the revitalization of moribund languages, where there may only be a handful of elderly fluent speakers left, is a noble (if not also nearly impossible) ideal for those native communities involved in such work; and this is not to mention the reintroduction of a long-dead language, such as the South Australian language Kurna (pronounced [ga:na]), spoken on the Adelaide Plains until the last native speaker, Ivaritji (a.k.a. Amelia Taylor), died in 1929. Rob Amery challenges the standards by which language revitalization programs are judged as successful, while giving us a step-by-step method for the reintroduction and revalorization of an extinct native tongue, which he calls the Formulaic Method. This detailed case study of the beginning stages of Kurna language revival will be of interest not just to linguists involved in the field, but especially to community members and other nonspecialists who are somehow connected with lesser-used languages and language revival efforts. Amery's work is also an important contribution to the emerging field of ecological linguistics and its application to language planning issues.

Amery's main thesis throughout the book is that the cultural constructs and worldview of linguists, especially of what constitutes a "natural language," along with the metaphors we employ in our terminology and professional jargon, have influenced and predetermined how we as a field view the "revival" of "dead" languages. The results are often viewed as inauthentic copies of the original at best, or at worst, as merely relexified versions of "healthy" spoken languages. Two examples of how mainstream attitudes on what kinds of languages are worthy of study have affected the direction of research within the field are worth mention. These are the criticisms leveled against Kesva an Taves Kernewek (the

Cornish Language Board) and its promotion of neo-Cornish, and the dearth of sociolinguistic studies of artificial languages, such as Esperanto, which now can claim not only native speakers but also diverse registers and dialects.

Amery writes that we must take into account the language attitudes of the community members, and language programs should not outpace what the community is ready for or desires. In the case of the Kurna community, they do not believe their language has died. It is merely “sleeping” and needs to be gently awakened. Amery uses the term “language reclamation” to stress the native community’s efforts to reclaim their identity and heritage through the reclaiming of their native language. This terminology avoids any implication that the replacement of English by Kurna as the everyday means of communication within the community is the only measure of success for Kurna language-revival efforts. The author has been the key linguist involved in working with the Kurna community. His book reads at times like a personal confession, since he has included numerous quotes from his fieldnotes and candidly discusses his mistakes and failures. He also allows the Kurna people to speak for themselves throughout the book, both in praise and in criticism of the Kurna language programs, and of the author’s key role in them.

Amery looks to the emerging field of ecological linguistics to inform his ideas concerning language revival. The term “ecology of language” was originally coined by Einar Haugen (1972:325) and defined “as the study of interactions between any given language and its environment.” Haugen stressed that the ecology of a language “is determined primarily by the people who learn it, use it, and transmit it to others.” Amery sees the proactive nature of an ecological approach as beneficial to applied linguists and language-revival activists, since “language revival involves reshaping the language ecology through a process of consciousness-raising and rebuilding relationships” (p. 39). Amery also stresses that language activists must be clear on the differences between the communicative functions of a language and its symbolic functions. It is much more feasible for a community to revive the symbolic functions of a language, without necessarily changing their language of communicative function. Amery believes that language-revival efforts should “focus on more immediate goals that are achievable” (207), such as reintroducing stock phrases in Kurna into the everyday speech of Kurna people, the use of Kurna in signage and cultural tourism, reintroduction of Kurna personal names, and raising the visibility of the language in the non-Kurna community in general.

He has achieved these small but important steps in the revival of Kurna by using the Formulaic Method, which “entails building up a stockpile of speech formulas of increasing complexity that will gradually replace English in conversation” (211). He argues that this is the most practical method of reintroducing a language, such as Kurna, which is no longer spoken, although he does admit that “not too much progress has been made yet” (215), a situation he attributes to the identity politics and internal politics within the Kurna community.



What has been more important in the limited but nevertheless impressive success of Kaurna revival is the role of the local schools in the Adelaide area. In 1986, the Australian federal government introduced a new policy stressing the importance of studying a foreign language. In 1989, funds were obtained through a federal agency for “awareness raising activities” in local Aboriginal languages within the greater Adelaide area. By 1992, Kaurna language workshops were being held to design and develop resources for teaching the language, and a year later, courses in the language were being offered at a local community college. Shortly thereafter, Kaurna language programs were instituted at the senior secondary level as well. The teaching of the language has created a need for Kaurna language teachers, and at the same time it has generated enthusiasm for the language and its revival within the Kaurna community. The Kaurna language activists have created both a niche for the language and, most important, economic opportunities for speakers of Kaurna. This has been one of the key factors in the overwhelming success of the Welsh language movement – one has to create job opportunities for speakers of minority languages in order to encourage the perpetuation of those languages.

The first contact between the Kaurna and Europeans occurred in 1836, with the establishment of the South Australia colony. Good relations between the Aborigines and the European settlers were a serious concern of the colonial officials, and the Kaurna were afforded a certain amount of respect. There was a general interest among some Europeans in the natives’ language and culture. The first missionaries to the Kaurna arrived in 1838, and their work would prove to be fundamental to language reclamation efforts among the Kaurna community in the 1990s. These two Germans, Clamor Wilhelm Schürmann and Christian Gottlieb Teichelmann, from the Dresden Missionary Society in the former Kingdom of Saxony, produced within eighteen months the most comprehensive linguistic records of the Kaurna language that are extant today. Kaurna was also used as the language of instruction in the missionaries’ school from 1839 until 1845, at which time they were told to quit teaching in the language by the governor of the colony. Afterward, the Kaurnas’ fortunes quickly changed as more settlers came to the plains surrounding Adelaide, along with other Aboriginal groups. By the 1850s and 1860s, the Kaurna were being described as “extinct.” Then, in 1919, Ivaritji was discovered in Pearce Point by Daisy Bates. Ivaritji worked with two other linguists besides Bates before her death in 1929, and the Kaurna language was thought to have “died” with her.

The modern Kaurna language movement traces its beginnings to 1985, when a prominent member of the Kaurna community, Georgina Williams, approached the School of Australian Linguistics at Batchelor in the Northern Territory for help in reviving the Kaurna language. Amery documents events since that time in a very detailed fashion, describing how decisions on such issues as Kaurna phonology, syntax, neologisms, and borrowings from English have been made by the community in conjunction with the author as the community’s “official” linguist.

Most decisions have been based on the initiative of individual Kaurna people working with Amery, who tries to enforce a sort of “pure” Kaurna – or, as he writes, “only grammatically well-formed and complete utterances which draw to a maximal extent on Kaurna grammar as we know it from the nineteenth century” (209). He does admit that his own purism has often been at odds with the actual practices of Kaurna language enthusiasts: “I often introduce corrections and changes, much to the annoyance and frustration of language learners” (146).

This book offers much food for thought to those of us directly involved in language revitalization efforts by offering an alternate model to communities involved in language revitalization efforts that potentially promises a much higher rate of success, because of its much more realistic expectations. Amery encourages us to see “reclaimed” languages not as a replacement for currently spoken languages, but rather as auxiliary languages with their own special niches that carry heavy symbolic weight within their communities. As Amery points out, reclaiming one’s language is an important step in reversing the legacy of colonialism, promoting a people’s identity, and celebrating their survival.

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KENDAL KING, *Language revitalization processes and prospects: Quichua in the Ecuadorian Andes*. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 2001. Pp. 253.

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Studies of language erosion, especially erosion in the advanced stages, are hard to do, and they do not always make for light reading. In evaluating the findings, readers need to maintain a healthy distance between what the evidence actually shows and what they imagine it might show in a hypothetical other world. For bilingual educators, for example, understanding the course of language displacement is a part of our work that we have tended to neglect. Kendal King’s investigation of the shift to Spanish in the Saraguro (Quichua-speaking) communities of southern Ecuador marks another advance in this important aspect of the study of bilingualism.

In situations like these, field investigators often draw back from stark assessments, the descriptions that we as outsiders, already on our way back home, elect to file away. By and large, the hesitations are justifiable. In regard to the conse-

quences of a published negative appraisal of, for example, a school program, would we always be on hand to make the necessary qualifications and to rectify misinterpretations? In this case, King's evaluation of bilingual instruction in the two communities studied (chap. 5) provides us with a much-needed corrective. Justifiable hesitations aside, evaluators sympathetic to bilingualism and pluralistic school language policies in Latin America are happy to report on even the attempt to incorporate the indigenous language (IL) into the curriculum, and they often skip the details when it comes to reporting any evidence of effective teaching.

Before setting the scene, chap. 1 lays out some pertinent theoretical considerations. These are taken up again in the concluding chapter, "Prospects and processes." The distinction that we are asked to consider is that between Fishman's (1991) "reversing language shift" (RLS) and "language revitalization." King makes a good case for at least exploring the possibility that the two concepts are not referring to the same thing:

*RLS*: restoration of the eroded language as a mother tongue, i.e. the reinstatement of intergenerational transmission in child first language (L1) acquisition.

*Revitalization*: promotion of new uses of the language and expanding it into new domains, "not necessarily attempting to bring the language back to former patterns of familiar usage, but rather to bring the language forward to new users and uses." (26)

Skeptics may ask: If the RLS goal of child L1 acquisition (e.g., in a situation of advanced displacement of the IL) is excluded, what else is there, in the long term? Since one of the domains on which the author attempts to shed some light is schooling, the distinction does appear to be useful. For example, a number of consequences would seem to follow from the answer one might offer to the question regarding the role of the indigenous language in literacy learning: Can the IL (through the implementation of one or another variety of bilingual education) contribute to closing the achievement gap for Indian children? This question, accepting the author's RLS/revitalization distinction, can now be posed independently from the "broader" consideration of the long-term prospects of language maintenance. In other words, might the expansion of the IL into language use domains associated with schooling (a potential revitalization objective) result in higher levels of general achievement, school completion, and literacy learning? If the accumulated evidence tips the balance from inconclusive to negative, the general idea of the IL crossing the traditional diglossic boundaries would lose a good part of its remaining credibility; and reflection on any interesting distinction between RLS and revitalization would probably turn out to be of little consequence. On the other hand, if research turns out to confirm the intuitively plausible notion that, for at least some segments of the IL-speaking population, general literacy development is facilitated by some kind of dual language instruction, then the merits of this program option can be assessed apart from the ques-

tion of the long-term viability of the language as a mother tongue. All this is prompted by King's attempt to separate out some of the components of Fishman's RLS model. A related backdrop to the discussion would be the different perspectives on the application of the concept of diglossia, especially in the case of indigenous bilingual speech communities in which the social imbalances "distribute" IL and NL so disproportionately as to suggest a different way of thinking about displacement and revitalization/RLS.

In chap. 2, we get a broader view of the national and regional context. The shift to Spanish in the two localities under study, however, is conditioned by factors that make this case exceptional in some ways: Quichua is the Amerindian language with the greatest number of speakers (upwards of 12 million), a widely recognized and secure legal status for bilingual instruction, and visible efforts in the area of language planning (e.g., standardization). This last factor introduces interesting perspectives and tensions at the community level that are discussed at some length – tensions, for example, that would be specific to a situation like that of Quichua, and similar to that of the other major ILs of the Americas, such as Guaraní, Aymara, the Mayan languages, or Náhuatl). The chapter concludes with an outline of the author's "participant observation" approach. The choice of the research sites, Lagunas and Tambopamba, makes for a set of contrasts that appear to offer the possibility of both some interesting description and analysis of the explanatory kind. The community of Lagunas, more successfully integrated into the bustling market economy that centers on the provincial center on the Pan-American highway, finds itself more advanced along the road of language shift than the relatively more remote Tambopamba, which nevertheless appears to be not far behind.

In the contrastive analysis of the perceptions of diglossia in Lagunas and Tambopamba, King describes what appears to be a systematic relationship between aspects of ethnic identity and the marking of this identity symbolically through language use. In Lagunas, where the "boundaries" that distinguish residents of this prosperous town from the nonindigenous population of the provincial center are less sharply drawn than in Tambopamba, displaying knowledge of Quichua (even though this is on average more difficult for Lagunas bilinguals) is more conscious and deliberate. Again, this aspect of metalinguistic awareness may be related to the special circumstances of certain ILs that enjoy a measure of prestige within their respective nation-states. The interpretation does have a ring of plausibility to it. One example from our own observations in central Mexico perhaps offers another glimpse at the same phenomenon. On the occasion of a public presentation of findings from our project given in the state capital of Tlaxcala, one of our analysts approached a man who during the discussion had offered a lengthy and eloquently executed poem in Náhuatl from the classical period of this IL's literary tradition. However, what really impressed our native-speaker analyst was the (at first disconcerting) confirmation that the orator had in fact feigned competence in the language, a competence that apparently he had mostly lost

over the years; his proud display now turned to embarrassment as he hastily slipped away from the hall, evading even a proper leave-taking exchange.

King's analysis deserves more study, though keeping in mind the need to consider more parsimonious interpretations, which she in fact alludes to in her description of Tambopamba. As one of our Tlaxcalan informants points out regarding these kinds of self-conscious displays: "I can go out barefoot in the street because everyone on the block knows that I own a nice pair of shoes."

Readers (of a more positivist bent, perhaps) may detect a tendency to rely on a rather narrow sample of informants (the degree of representation of which is assumed) to draw broad and categorical distinctions. In particular, in regard to the report of community-wide language competence profiles (chaps. 3 and 4), which should be more data-driven anyway, one is left with the sense that categories such as "fully-bilingual," "Spanish-dominant," and "Quichua-dominant" lack some precision. Bilingual competence is difficult enough to estimate by direct methods (measures of observed performance); reliability gets even fuzzier when we depend on self-reports, and even more problematic when the reports of a select few are about the competence of others. These considerations come to the fore when we try to judge very strong claims: "All Lagunas parents hope that their children do not 'stop being indigenous' . . . all parents view the adoption of mestizo or white styles negatively" (81). Of the "thirty and under age group" in Lagunas, "none speak [Quichua] fluently" (77). The defect is not so much in the author's application of procedures, which are unobjectionable the way they stand, but rather in a particular sub-genre of ethnographic reporting associated with "participant observation" that arguably enjoys a wide acceptance in the field.

Readers familiar with some of the present reviewer's attempts at ethnographic investigation will recognize the above as both critique and self-critique. Going on to speculate beyond what the actual findings can directly support is an indispensable part of hypothesis formulation, to help lay the groundwork for the design of a new generation of experiments, descriptive studies, and ways of looking at things that are still not well understood. In the reporting of empirical research, it is still important, however, to signal the shift in the discussion where we begin to contemplate what the data could have shown, or what they might have shown under different circumstances – not just for the benefit of the unsuspecting reader, but also for ourselves, for the purpose of keeping track, during the discovery process, of how little we are reasonably sure of. Over all, though, readers of all methodological predispositions will find in this study a rich vein of hypotheses to reflect on, most appropriately in the speculative and theoretically sound concluding chapter.

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