state" (p. 193); indeed Dutch policy makers would have gone further if they had not been "bound by national and international legal prohibitions on differential treatment" (p. 210).

This book enables a much deeper understanding of the drivers of selective solidarity, rather than perpetuating the notion that welfare retrenchment happens in toto. Particularly impressive is the focus on how the discourse on the economic costs of immigration is constructed. It is rare that such framing effects are systematically examined to shed light on the politics of selective solidarity. Investigating the intricacies of social rights across time and space for different categories of migrants can be challenging, even tedious work. This book succeeds admirably by tracing the processes of the politics of IEWRs, combining rich detail without losing sight of the overall theoretical framework. To my knowledge this is the first book to examine welfare chauvinism at such a fine level of granularity in a comparative perspective and across time.

Yet the very approach this book takes also makes it susceptible to a variety of critiques. For instance, concepts such as "national identity" or "political culture" feature prominently in explanations as to why IEWRs are successful or not. One could quibble whether these concepts are used in too reductionist a way or a bit too cursorily. This is not to say that variations in political culture and national identity might not have the asserted effects on IEWRs. However, it is simply assumed that these concepts have the expected effects, but the precise mechanism remains underspecified. The author does attempt to shore up these assertions by marshaling quotes from personal interviews with parliamentarians and civil servants, but this is thin ice to skate on, particularly given when the interviews were conducted. The ones for Sweden and the Netherlands were conducted in the winter and spring of 2011, and most of the interviews for Canada were conducted in the summer of 2011. For a book that is published in 2019, these interviews are outdated, especially given that the Mediterranean refugee crisis unfolded in the fall/spring of 2015–16 and had a profound effect on how the Dutch and Swedes perceived migrants and immigration. Fortunately, the other types of evidence such as election results, parliamentary debates, public opinion surveys, and other policy documents are of more recent provenance, making the empirical findings more credible. Finally, it is not clear which of the three explanations—framing of economic costs of immigration, national identity and political culture, or the domestic/EU/international legal environment—are more or less important in explaining the politics of IEWRs across the three cases. Although the author makes a plausible argument about the weights that each of these claims contribute to the overall outcome, it is still based on a good bit of his interpretation of the evidence.

These critiques notwithstanding, this is an impressive contribution. It follows Karl Deutsch's dictum that "truth lies at the confluence of independent streams of evidence." By examining and weighing different types of evidence, and applying a variety of methods, Koning's triangulation strategy succeeds in telling a convincing story of the central drivers of IEWRs. This book is a welcome departure from the burgeoning literature on welfare chauvinism, which too often relies almost exclusively on public opinion surveys. By emphasizing the interconnections of national identities, welfare state regimes, the framing of the economic costs of immigration, and political party dynamics, this book weaves a rich tapestry of policies that unfold over time and are then carefully compared based on a theoretically derived framework that is applied equally to all three cases. It will be enjoyed by those who study the dynamics of change in the social rights of immigrants in a comparative setting.

When Democracies Deliver: Governance Reform in Latin America. By Katherine Bersch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. 236p. $100.00 cloth.

Movement-Driven Development: The Politics of Health and Democracy in Brazil. By Christopher L. Gibson. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2019. 328p. $90.00 cloth, $30.00 paper.
doi:10.1017/S1537592719004110

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Latin American countries struggle with high levels of inequality, clientelism, and insecurity, partly because of weak institutions that are unable to provide basic services. Many academic and media outlets focus on these challenges for development. Against this backdrop, the two books reviewed here tell a success story. They examine the causes of successful state capacity building in Brazil. In *When Democracies Deliver: Governance Reform in Latin America,* Katherine Bersch accounts for effective public sector reform in Brazil (and failure in Argentina), and in *Movement-Driven Development: The Politics of Health and Democracy in Brazil,* Christopher Gibson explains the causes of health improvements. Both authors agree that developing institutional capacity takes time, so they trace policy development over more than two decades. They also both agree that successful institutional reform has to happen within the state. For Bersch, the agents of change are "insider" technocrats, whereas for Gibson they are activists in the state ("pragmatic publics"). Both books should be mandatory reading for anyone interested in the long-term process of building successful state capacity amidst adversity.

Bersch is interested in explaining when and how Latin American states develop strong, accountable, and transparent institutions. This is a crucial question because stronger institutions deliver better and more services to

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719004110 Published online by Cambridge University Press

the population. Gibson's focus is on the consequences of these strong, accountable institutions, asking how Brazil's cities increased their residents' access to health care and reduced infant mortality rates since the mid-1980s. The answer to both authors' questions lies in long-term state capacity building. Bersch studies the effectiveness and durability of changes across 25 years in Argentina's and Brazil's health and transportation sectors and finds that incremental change strengthens institutions more than do structural overhauls. Civil servants in place for long periods of time are crucial for supporting slow (and successful) change. Similarly, for Gibson the answer lies in long-term subnational officeholding by pragmatic activists over a span of 30 years. Both time and actors inside the state are key for guaranteeing successful institutional reforms and a reduction in infant mortality.

Gibson's *Movement-Driven Development* focuses on social movement activists in the state as the main motor of social development in Brazil. He argues that Brazil was able to increase health access and reduce infant mortality by 70% because the health care movement's (*Movimento Sanitário*) activists held office atop the subnational state. These practically minded actors—"pragmatist publics"—mobilized ideologically diverse political parties to set up institutions that maintained the ideals of the constitutional reform with the goal of continuing to occupy those institutions in the future. More specifically, Gibson shows how members of this movement ("*sanitaristas*") had a state-building project in mind: they leveraged public health directorships in cities to expand their capacity to provide basic public health. This is his main theoretical contribution: although previous studies have emphasized the role of the *sanitaristas* in the advancement of a universal, decentralized, and participatory health system in Brazil, this book systematically conceptualizes these civil society actors and state–society relations as pragmatic. In this way, these are different from Leonardo Avritzer's "participatory publics" analyzed in *Participatory Institutions in Democratic Brazil* (2009). The goal of the "pragmatist publics" is not to involve the population in policy making but to create institutions that will favor their own members to hold positions within them. These actors seek social change, but achieve it through occupying important positions in the bureaucracy; they are also able to produce change by working with ideologically moderate politicians. Pragmatist publics leverage their privileged position and fluency in the language of political elites to the advantage of their cause ("social code-switching").

Gibson's goal is to explain subnational variation in health development across Brazil's major cities. Social development is maximized under two conditions: a lack of monopolistic control over the subnational executive by far-right clientelist parties and pragmatist publics' long-term occupation of democratic offices. The book identifies three trajectories of participation for civil society, or "health democratization." First, in a "participatory programmatic" trajectory (in Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, and Recife), *sanitaristas* occupied the health secretariat from which they and their allied populist health activists in councils strengthened the state and made it accountable to civil society. Second, in a "programmatic trajectory" (in Curitiba and Fortaleza), *sanitaristas* also occupied positions of power but lacked the more deeply participatory monitoring of the previous pathway. Third, in a "minimalist" trajectory (in Salvador and Rio de Janeiro), *sanitaristas* did not have the opportunity to occupy directorships because of the context of consistent right-wing party rule and patronage. Whereas the first two paths produced "robust development," the third generated "non-robust development" or a local state that was unable to effectively deliver health care.

Bersch's *When Democracies Deliver* is also interested in institutional development, but at the national level. Contrary to earlier understandings, Bersch shows that radical reform (the "powering" view) is less effective than piecemeal reform. Its demonstration of the cognitive-psychological microfoundations for the superiority of incremental reform is the book's first contribution to the rational choice and historical institutionalism literatures. Wholesale reform increases the chances of making mistakes and producing more enemies. Those in charge of carrying out these reforms tend to be "outsiders" (to the public sector)—elected officials and their technocrats with less expertise; they also tend to have shorter time horizons and are thus reliant on problematic cognitive shortcuts. Conversely, gradual problem-solving reform processes tend to be conducted by experienced ("insider") technocrats with less bounded rationality; the process allows for learning and adjustment and thus making fewer mistakes along the way. Small changes within institutions are also more sustainable and protect bureaucratic autonomy.

The second central theoretical contribution of this book is to embed these microfoundations for reform success into broader macrofoundations. Bersch finds that wholesale reform is adopted more frequently in the health and transportation sectors of Argentina than in Brazil. Along the lines of Arend Lijphart's consensus and majoritarian *Patterns of Democracy* (1999), coalition multiparty governments in Brazil promote gradual change, whereas single-party cabinets in Argentina encourage radical reform. Power concentration produces informational shortcuts and rapid reform because election cycles are short, high-level appointees leave with the executive, and reform is easy due to like-minded and cohesive groups of appointees. These powering reforms generate crisis and, consequently, a new round of wholesale reform. Conversely, power sharing in coalitional presidentialism slows down reform processes, produces less extreme proposals, includes permanent technocrats, and allows for deliberation and loosening the bounds of rationality

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Both works are excellent examples of the importance of extensive field research in political science. Over a span of four years, Bersch conducted more than 200 interviews with ministers, policy makers, politicians, and members of civil society, among others. She analyzed these qualitative data through a controlled comparison of Argentina's and Brazil's health and transport sectors and process-tracing within cases across a span of 25 years. The process-tracing is particularly powerful: it shows, for example, that the rare instances in which Argentina engaged in gradual reform and Brazil in wholesale reform produced positive and negative repercussions, respectively. Gibson conducted more than two years of fieldwork during which he collected original quantitative and qualitative data on *sanitarista* officeholding across time in Brazil's major cities. He analyzed these data following a mixed-methods strategy, combining pooled time-series regressions, fuzzy sets, and subnational comparative historical analysis. All three methodological approaches aim to answer the same research question: the role of *sanitaristas*' holding office in increasing access to public health and reducing infant mortality. The regression identified associations, the fuzzy sets specified conditions, and the case studies explained the mechanisms by which holding office leads to social development.

These two books nicely complement and challenge each other in a number of ways that merit further research. On the one hand, Bersch shows that overhaul reforms are decidedly inferior to gradual change. In Gibson's case, however, *sanitaristas*' influence emerges in the context of a complete overhaul of the system: a transition to democracy, a constitutional reform, and a sweeping health reform (as Lindsay Mayka convincingly shows in *Building Participatory Institutions in Latin America,* 2019). One may wonder whether the *sanitaristas*' type of influence was uniquely successful because of this window of opportunity that entirely reformed the system. Although it took years for the institutions discussed in Gibson's book to be consolidated, the structural reform of federal legislation is partly what started this process and what, arguably, made it successful. In other words, is it possible that a wholesale reform succeeds in the long term in the presence of "pragmatic publics"? On the other hand, whereas Bersch's focus is on the national level, Gibson studies the local level. This difference opens up questions regarding the unit of analysis of each of these books. Does *Movement-Driven Development* travel to the national level? In scaling up the unit of analysis, it is plausible to argue that having pragmatist activists occupy top offices at the national level also strengthens state institutions. Santiago Anria's findings in *When Movements Become Parties* (2018) seem to point in that direction. In the case of *When Democracies Deliver*, scaling down the unit of analysis would mean incorporating the possibility that slow institutional change emerges from the subnational level, especially in the case of the large two federations included in this book.

Inequality After the Transition: Political Parties, Party Systems, and Social Policy in Southern and Postcommunist Europe. By Ekrem Karakoç. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. 352p. $95.00 cloth.

doi:10.1017/S1537592719004079

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The post-1989 transition from communism in Central East Europe (CEE) has been quite disappointing to those who expected that states in the region would "rejoin the West" as market democracies. Inter alia, most of these states have not consolidated political parties, party systems, or stable governing coalitions. Most have also become increasingly inegalitarian over the past 30 years. Ekrem Karakoç's important book presents a fresh argument that links these two outcomes, explaining how and why volatility in their political systems produces and reproduces socioeconomic inequality in new democracies. He shows that greater volatility in CEE political systems produces more social spending and that this spending is targeted toward the middle class and largely excludes the poor. Beginning with a comparative case study of Poland and the Czech Republic, he then extends the argument to the relatively new democracies of Turkey and Spain. In the process, Karakoç contributes to the welfare state literature by proposing a new structured relationship among political institutions, social strata, and distributive outcomes in new democracies.

The author begins with evidence that the poor, defined as the bottom quintile in each case, vote at lower rates than other social strata. As nonmobilized, least-likely voters, they have relatively little to offer candidates and parties in elections. Karakoç advocates analyzing electoral politics not in terms of the "median voter" but of the "median likely voter," who is nonpoor. Nonvoting by itself likely disadvantages the poor in distributive politics, but Karakoç argues that this disadvantage is exacerbated in systems that have high levels of political volatility and weak, unstable coalition governments. In such systems, where parties often fail to survive from one election to the next, political leaders constantly craft and recraft strategies to attract voters by promising them social benefits. Societal groups that are organized and vote at relatively high levels —unionized workers and especially pensioners—represent the best prospects for electoral support, so benefit most from social expenditures. The poor get the least. However, the groups that obtain benefits form few and weak attachments to parties, at least in comparison to electorates in established European democracies. Turnover in governing parties is high and coalitions fragile. As long as parties face constant uncertainty and are always at risk of losing

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