different arrays systematically shape leaders' power: Roughly speaking, with *disinterest*, a member's audiences care little about the issue, leaving the member free to follow party leaders' wishes. With *consensus*, audiences are in agreement, and so party leaders have limited ability to influence a member's vote. With *generalized conflict*, audiences disagree, leaving a member uncertain how to vote—and creating opportunities for party whips to sway the member. Finally, with *cross pressure*, a member's audiences favor one course of action but party leaders want the opposite; this is when whips are most likely to go to the greatest lengths in attempting to shape a member's decision.

Because whipping uses scarce resources, however, leaders decide strategically when to whip a question or issue, largely reserving it for votes that are close. Other factors that affect leaders' choices are the size of the party, actions of the other party, presidential involvement, and polarization. Leaders are sometimes able to sway members' audiences to the party position, thereby indirectly shaping a member's vote choice. But one of Evans's major claims is that constraints on whips and leaders impede their ability to induce support from members.

The book emphasizes whips' informational role within their parties: Much of their job is to serve as information conduits between leaders and members, most notably by conducting whip polls in which they survey party members about their positions on a prospective vote, by conveying leaders' goals to party members, and by conveying party members' concerns or objections to leaders. Another role is to bargain on behalf of leadership; when whips sway members' votes, it often happens via agreements in which the whips offer side payments or concessions to members, rather than through coercion or intimidation.

This is easily the most extensive study of whips ever undertaken, in no small part because whip poll data and many documents illustrating the workings of the whip system have never before been assembled on this scale. One of Evans's accomplishments is to have collected data on roughly 1,500 whip polls, as well as countless memos and other documents, from former members' papers in archives around the country. Combining those materials with personal interviews and the accounts of others, the author presents an unprecedented look inside the whip process. The book prioritizes quantitative methods in some chapters and qualitative methods in others, but always intermixes them to good effect. Much of the second half of the book is devoted to four chapters that take close looks at whipping during four different time periods, respectively: the "Textbook" period (1955–72), the period of growing individualism (1973–82), the period of reemergent partisanship (1983–94), and the era of Republican majorities (1995–2002). These chapters offer vivid portraits of the ways that whipping has worked at different times and how it has evolved. Although *The Whips* is mostly about the House, there is also a chapter about the Senate.

Readers will occasionally find the distinctions between behavioral and spatial models to be too sharply drawn, relying on narrow constructions of spatial models. For example, at one point Evans asserts that "legislative deviations from centrist viewpoints in the chamber . . . have become the *sine qua non* for [empirically demonstrating] party influence" (p. 45)—which overlooks the breadth of studies of parties' effects in Congress. And in some places, the tone suggests that the behavioral and spatial models are mutually exclusive, while in other places it treats them as compatible. Clearly, some elements of Evans's behavioral perspective and elements of spatial theories complement each other; in fact, one of the exciting things about this book is that it lays a strong foundation for future theoretical advances that combine different approaches. These are minor criticisms, though, that do not undermine the work's main points about preferences being incomplete and endogenous to the lawmaking process.

The foregoing barely scratches the surface of the book's content or contributions; unfortunately, space constraints preclude more detailed discussion here. But the book is densely packed with findings and arguments that either augment or contravene conventional accounts of party power—such as the claim that making party votes "explainable" to members' audiences is one of party leaders' most significant sources of leverage, or the finding that whips were actually quite effective during the supposedly weak-party Textbook Congress period. A close read offers many fascinating and intriguing insights into Congress's decision making. And, in the end, *The Whips* constitutes a worthy guide to anyone seeking to better explain congressional decisions.

Vaccine Court: The Law and Politics of Injury. By Anna Kirkland. New York: New York University Press, 2016. 288p. $40.00 cloth.

doi:10.1017/S1537592718003808

— Jeb Barnes, *University of Southern California*

Political struggles over the dangers of vaccines are as old as vaccines themselves. In 1721, a smallpox epidemic swept through Boston and controversy erupted over the practice of variolation, a crude precursor to vaccination. The educated elite vehemently opposed the practice, while Cotton Mather, a central figure in the Salem witch trials, was one of its leading proponents. Conflict was intense, as the opponents of variolation attempted to burn down Mather's house in protest. Fast-forward to today, and questions about vaccinations, their risks, and who should decide vaccine policy remain bitterly contested.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592718003808 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Anna Kirkland takes on the politics of modern vaccination in her superb book, which centers on the vaccine court, an administrative tribunal created by the Vaccine Injured Children's Compensation Act of 1986. One is immediately struck by the multidisciplinary nature of the analysis. Kirkland seamlessly weaves together literature from political science, law and society, political theory, public administration, health policy, and gender studies. At its broadest level, the vaccine story as told by Kirkland reveals the confluence among law, medicine, health policy, and the politics of family and motherhood and a cultural clash between those who frame health policy in terms of highly individual (and typically affluent) lifestyle choices (Eat kale! Do Pilates! Don't smoke!) and policymakers who stress collective benefits and the provision of public goods.

From the perspective of political science, however, the book's most central questions concern the ability of the vaccine court to address complex social and policy issues. Here, the analysis engages long-standing debates about the efficacy of courts-as-policymakers. The findings of this literature run the gamut. On one hand, Gerald Rosenberg famously argued that even celebrated examples of judicial policymaking, such as *Brown v. Board of Education*, largely fell flat, representing a "hollow hope" at best and, at worst, political "flypaper" that traps activists with limited resources in a largely feckless mode of advocacy (*The Hollow Hope: Can Social Litigation Bring About Social Change*, 2008). By contrast, Matthew E. K. Hall, looking at many of the same cases, shows that the Supreme Court often matters, even in contexts where we might expect it to struggle to make an impact (The Nature of Supreme Court Power, 2011).

Scholars who look beyond the Supreme Court paint a similarly discordant picture. Robert Kagan argues that American courts are often extremely costly, slow, and unpredictable, creating a system that manages to be too cumbersome for ordinary claimants to use and too erratic for large organizations to plan for (*Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law,* 2001). Indeed, in the context of vaccines, the threat of large and unpredictable jury verdicts in tort law arguably contributed to the exit of some manufacturers from the field of childhood vaccines altogether in the 1980s. Others, like Charles R. Epp, maintain that the "fertile fear of litigation" can provide a means to challenge the status quo and eventually stimulate policy change, as legalized forms of accountability can provide both a catalyst and a template for reform (*Making Rights Real: Activists, Bureaucrats and the Making of the Legalistic State*, 2009).

Kirkland takes a slightly different tack and asks: Does the vaccine court provide a useful forum for sorting out contentious debates over health policy that hinge on medical science? Her largely positive answer is surprising at first glance, at least if one believes that courts—whatever their form—are prone to "junk science." The gist of her argument, however, is that the vaccine court should not be judged by its ability to "transcribe science into law" (p. 200) but by its capacity to create a site of social and political contestation that promotes justice. From this vantage, while far from perfect, the vaccine court has many virtues. First, Kirkland argues, it has democratized the debate by giving families a forum to air grievances about scientific issues, which are typically left to experts in other forums. Second, the vaccine court has encouraged scientific inquiry by requiring experts to develop studies that would withstand scrutiny in court and by giving scientists time to complete crucial studies before rendering judgments. (Here, the vaccine court has a distinct advantage over ordinary courts where judicial verdicts and science can be out of sync.) Third, it provided a mechanism for holding anti-vaccine activists accountable for their claims. According to Kirkland, their eventual losses in the vaccine court undermined their credibility in promoting an anti-vaccination policy agenda. She contends that we can see these virtues in the autism cases. Here, activists were given an opportunity to challenge the medical establishment while being required to marshal persuasive evidence.

The collective effect has been to safeguard our "immunization social order" (p. 2), which is a set of institutions, policies, and practices that encourages vaccinations to be seen as a civic duty, produces high levels of vaccinations, and provides clear health benefits. The vaccine court has buttressed this social order not only by encouraging more studies and debunking bogus claims but also by providing a remedy to people—however small the number—that suffer from vaccinations from no fault of their own. (The vaccine compensation system supports immunization in a more direct way: It provides greater certainty for vaccine manufacturers about the potential liability, which allows them to plan and insure against the risk of vaccine-related injuries.)

This book is primarily about the details of the vaccine case and its implications, but it also embodies many of the virtues of rigorous qualitative research. For starters, it puts to rest the old cliché that case studies involve "small n." There are literally thousands of observations in Kirkland's analysis across multiple levels of analysis. More than that, it teaches crucial lessons about measuring complex phenomena. It reminds us that single "social facts" can have multiple meanings within political discourse. For example, scientific consensus on the benefits of vaccines is a well-established fact, but it means very different things to contending stakeholders. Pro-vaccine regulators see it as legitimizing their views, while vaccine opponents see it as further evidence of a lopsided, skewed vaccine industry. The analysis brings our attention to the political processes through which different interpretations struggle for dominance and how the institutional setting of this process

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592718003808 Published online by Cambridge University Press

matters. It would be hard to capture this dynamic (and crucial) aspect of politics in a spreadsheet.

Of course, the trade-off for all of this depth is breadth. There are always questions about the generalizability of case studies—questions that Kirkland acknowledges. But *Vaccine Court* is an impressive reminder of the value of meticulously researched, theoretically nuanced case studies that illuminate important policy issues and contribute to core disciplinary debates.

Class Attitudes in America: Sympathy for the Poor, Resentment of the Rich, and Political Implications. By Spencer Piston. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018. 248p. $99.99 cloth, $29.99 paper.
doi:10.1017/S1537592718003936

— William W. Franko, *West Virginia University*

The United States is commonly thought of as a "classless" society in the sense that most people do not think in terms of social class distinctions, and as a result, the role of class in politics is largely irrelevant (Richard Reeves, "Classless America, Still?" Brookings Institution Research Memo, 2014). In the rare instances where hints of social class do find their way into American politics, discussions of class are focused on the public's criticism of the poor and admiration of the wealthy. American individualism leads people to view the poor with disdain. Those who are unsuccessful are seen as lacking personal traits like ambition and work ethic. The rich, conversely, are looked up to as examples of what happens when people work hard. Americans perceive the wealthy with admiration and hope to someday join their ranks.

While this story about class in the United States may sound familiar, it may also be untrue. This is the argument made in Spencer Piston's *Class Attitudes in America*. Piston suggests that contrary to conventional wisdom, class attitudes are not only common among the American public but that these views also play a substantial role in shaping political preferences.

The book focuses on developing two specific, class-related concepts: sympathy for the poor and resentment of the rich. Using open-ended survey responses, Piston demonstrates that people regularly mention the terms "rich" and "poor" when asked to consider what they like and dislike about the two major parties and presidential candidates. This suggests that when the public is asked to think about politics in their own words, they often think in terms of class. Furthermore, mentions of the rich are often negative and characterized by resentment. People tend to view the rich as receiving more than they deserve. When referencing the poor, however, respondents generally discuss the group in sympathetic terms. These comments indicate that the poor have less than they deserve and that the government should do more to help them.

Clearly, this description of class politics in the United States directly contradicts the conventional portrayal just summarized. How, then, have both popular and academic accounts of class in America missed so badly in their understanding of the importance of class among the public? Piston offers several explanations, but two seem particularly consequential. First, since Americans do not appear to be divided along class lines, many scholars have assumed that class is politically unimportant. We know very little, however, about how the public thinks about other class groups, like the rich and the poor, and whether these attitudes influence political preferences. Second, scholars have also mistakenly concluded that the United States does not have more redistributive policies because there is little public support for more redistribution. Of course, public opinion does not always translate into public policy, and so it is still possible that class attitudes about the rich and the poor influence support for redistribution among the public.

In addition to the open-ended survey responses, Piston offers a robust set of analyses showing that sympathy for the poor and resentment of the rich are fairly prevalent with the public, are attitudes that persist over time, and are distinct from other well-known concepts like political ideology, egalitarianism, and attitudes about race. Using novel measures of class attitudes and original survey data, including a number of well-designed survey experiments, Piston demonstrates that class attitudes have a substantial influence on the public's support of redistributive policies and vote choice. Those who have sympathy for the poor and those who resent the rich are more likely to favor a variety of policies, ranging from government aid to the poor and the homeless to tax increases on millionaires. These same attitudes are found to increase support for political candidates who are viewed as being more likely to help the poor.

While the book certainly provides a new perspective on class politics in the United States, it also raises some new questions. Piston's approach to understanding class attitudes emphasizes the role of outgroup perceptions of the rich and the poor. But if outgroup attitudes are central to the way that most of the public thinks about class, by definition these same people must be part of some ingroup. The author does not spend much time exploring how the members of the public view their own class positions relative to their outgroup attitudes, and so it is not clear how he sees this potential intergroup dynamic playing out. If there are differences in how people tend to view their own class status (e.g., working class, middle class, etc.), these distinctions may help us better understand variations in attitudes about the rich and poor and how they are developed. We might think differently about the political implications of class attitudes, for example, if sympathy for the poor is disproportionately present among those who view themselves as belonging to the upper-middle class versus those belonging to the working class.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592718003808 Published online by Cambridge University Press