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HISTORIOGRAPHICAL REVIEWS

ENGLISH 'NATIONALISM', CELTIC PARTICULARISM, AND THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR*

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ABSTRACT. *This review suggests that recent historiography on nationalism can help us to see that the English Civil War was, in part, a conflict about national identity and ethnic difference. It argues that, even before the war began, the supporters of the parliament were associated with a narrowly intolerant strain of Englishness, and that this helps to explain why the Celtic peoples of Wales and Cornwall rallied to the king. During 1642–4, parliament's close links with the Scots – together with the presence of many foreign mercenaries in the roundhead armies – prevented the identification of parliament's cause with that of England itself from becoming absolute. Following the creation of the New Model Army, however – an army from which 'strangers' of all sorts were deliberately excluded – relations between the Scots and parliament rapidly deteriorated, and it became possible for the parliamentarians to make an unequivocal appeal to English patriotic sentiment. The defeat of the king – and of the Welsh and Cornish troops who had done much to sustain his cause – was the result.*

As the entrenched assumption that 'nationalism' was a product of the modern age begins to break down, so whole new vistas of historical inquiry are opening up before us.[1] The prospect is especially dazzling, perhaps, for historians of England, who are beginning to accustom themselves to the notion that England may have been not only the archetypal nation-state, but the very cradle of 'nationalism' since as early as the tenth century. This view, brilliantly advanced in a number of recent studies,[2] has the potential to transform our understanding both of narrowly English and of wider British

* I am most grateful to Gerald Aylmer, George Bernard, Alistair Dougall, Alastair Duke, and John Oldfield for their comments on an earlier draft of this review.

[1] For classic statements of the 'modernist' position, see E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and nationalism since 1780: programme, myth and reality* (Cambridge, 1992), especially pp. 3, 5, 9–10, 14–45; B. Anderson, *Imagined communities: reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism* (London, 1995), pp. 4–5, 11–12, 90; and E. Gellner, *Nations and nationalism* (Oxford, 1983), pp. 34–5, 38, 138.

[2] See, for example, M. T. Clanchy, *England and its rulers, 1066–1272: foreign lordship and national identity* (London, 1983), especially pp. 240–62; L. Greenfeld, *Nationalism: five roads to modernity* (London, 1993), especially pp. 6–7, 14, and 29–87; Patrick Wormald, '*Enga Lond*: the making of an allegiance', *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 7 (1994), pp. 1–24; J. Campbell, 'The united kingdom of England: the Anglo-Saxon achievement', in A. Grant and K. Stringer, eds., *Uniting the kingdom? The making of British history* (London, 1995), passim; and A. Hastings, *The construction of nationhood: ethnicity, religion and nationalism* (Cambridge, 1997), passim, especially pp. 4–5.

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history – and, indeed, of the interlocking series of national and quasi-national histories which lie in the interstices between them. By studying the ways in which the English viewed themselves during the pre-modern period, we may come to a better understanding of the ways in which they reacted to others – and of the ways in which others reacted to them. This review suggests that such an approach may profitably be applied to the events of the 1640s – and that anxieties about 'nationhood' were central to the English Civil War.

For over 350 years the Civil War has held a peculiar fascination for the English. The search for its causes has preoccupied generations of scholars and the perspectives which have been gained as a result of this long-running game of historical hunt-the-thimble are incalculable. Yet so overwhelming has been the concern to elucidate the causes of the Civil War that the conflict itself has often been somewhat cursorily treated[3] – and recent shifts in historical fashion have had the effect of pushing the events of 1642–6 still further from the historiographical limelight. As English scholars – keen to build on the work of historians of Ireland and Scotland and to refute charges of Anglocentrism – have rushed to embrace a 'British' perspective of the mid-seventeenth-century crisis, so the English Civil War has been increasingly relegated in status.[4] In many ways this shift in emphasis has been immensely valuable and productive. Yet it would be a mistake to conclude that there is nothing left to say about the Civil War in England – or, for that matter, that the general approach adopted by the new breed of British historians cannot be improved upon and refined. Much of their work so far has been 'top-down', rather than 'bottom-up' in its approach: it has been concerned to elucidate the inter-relationships which existed between the 'great men' of England, Scotland, and Ireland, rather than those which existed between the ordinary inhabitants of those countries.[5] In addition, British historians have tended to concentrate on Irish and Scottish reactions to the English rather than exploring English reactions to perceived threats from the so-called 'Celtic periphery'.[6] Finally, they have tended to articulate their arguments in terms of kingdoms rather than peoples, thus privileging certain ethnic groups at the expense of others.[7] This review sets out to restore the balance by exploring how popular

[3] Richard Cust and Ann Hughes, 'Introduction', in Richard Cust and Ann Hughes, eds., *The English Civil War* (London, 1997), pp. 7, 22.

[4] Conrad Russell's description of the English Civil War as merely 'the fourth round in a ten-round battle' – *The causes of the English Civil War* (Oxford, 1990), p. 218 – has proved enormously influential. For a recent attempt to reassert the primacy of the conflict in England, see John Adamson, 'The English context of the British Civil Wars', *History Today*, 48 (1998), pp. 23–9.

[5] N. Canny, 'The attempted Anglicization of Ireland in the seventeenth century: an exemplar of British history', in J. F. Merritt, ed., *The political world of Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, 1621–1641* (Cambridge, 1996), p. 158; Cust and Hughes, 'Introduction' pp. 10–11; and R. Samuel, *Island stories: unravelling Britain, theatres of memory, volume II* (London, 1998), p. 33.

[6] For some honourable exceptions, see K. J. Lindley, 'The impact of the 1641 rebellion upon England and Wales, 1641–1645', *Irish Historical Studies*, 18 (1972), pp. 143–76; Joyce Lee Malcolm, 'All the king's men', *Irish Historical Studies*, 21 (1979), pp. 239–64; Cust and Hughes, 'Introduction', pp. 8–10; and E. H. Shagan, 'Constructing discord; ideology, propaganda and English responses to the Irish rebellion of 1641', *Journal of British Studies*, 36 (1997), pp. 4–34.

[7] For some cautionary remarks on this subject, see J. G. A. Pocock, 'The Atlantic archipelago and the War of the Three Kingdoms', in John Morrill and Brendan Bradshaw, eds., *The British problem, 1534–1707: state formation in the Atlantic archipelago* (London, 1996), pp. 180–1, 183–4.

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fears about group identity were aroused in the kingdom of England during the Civil War: not only among the English but among their Welsh and Cornish neighbours too.[8]

I

Throughout the early modern period the pride and self-confidence of the English nation was proverbial. Girdled by the seas which protected it from foreign invasion, England formed a precociously homogeneous whole, both in administrative and in ethnic-linguistic terms, while its rulers exercised an increasingly firm dominion over the 'Celtic' peoples who inhabited the regions to the north and west. Cornwall, once an independent British polity, had been incorporated into the English state as far back as the tenth century; Wales, effectively subordinated during the middle ages, had been formally assimilated in 1536–43; Ireland had been ruled by England's monarchs as a separate kingdom since 1541.[9] With the uniting of the two crowns of Scotland and England in the person of James I in 1603, English power in the Atlantic archipelago appeared to have reached its apogee. Yet less than forty years later, that power collapsed to its lowest point for centuries.[10] Rebellion in Scotland in 1637–9 was followed by English military defeat in the north in 1640 and rebellion in Ireland in 1641. By January 1642 Charles I had lost control of two of the three kingdoms which his father had bequeathed him, and both the Scots and the Irish had succeeded in carving out a de facto independence for themselves.

English pride was thoroughly humbled by these events – and national fears and insecurities thoroughly aroused. Having been ejected from the territories which they had long regarded as their own back yard – and having been made all too painfully aware of the inadequacies of English military power – thousands of Englishmen and women succumbed to an almost hysterical fear of foreign invasion during 1641–2.[11] As historians have frequently observed, the violence of their reaction was in part a reflection of the strength of anti-Catholicism in English society.[12] Even before Charles I's accession many godly Protestants had suspected the existence of a deep-laid 'Popish plot', designed to subvert England's liberties and deliver the country into the hands of foreign Catholic powers. Such fears were exacerbated by the events of the Personal Rule, exploited by the crown's political opponents during the early 1640s and brought to fever pitch in the aftermath of the Irish rebellion.[13] Yet the fear of foreign assault which permeated the country at this time did not involve Catholic foreigners alone.

[8] For previous suggestions that the behaviour of the Welsh and Cornish might merit closer consideration, see Mark Stoyle, *Loyalty and locality: popular allegiance in Devonshire during the English Civil War* (Exeter, 1994), pp. 232–41; and Pocock, 'War of the Three Kingdoms', pp. 181, 184.

[9] Malcolm Todd, *The South West to AD 1000* (London, 1987), pp. 273–4; J. Gwynfor Jones, *Early modern Wales, 1525–1640* (London, 1994), pp. 75–90; S. G. Ellis, *Ireland in the age of the Tudors, 1447–1603: English expansion and the end of Gaelic rule* (Harlow, 1998), pp. 150–2.

[10] Adamson 'English context', p. 27.

[11] Lindley, '1641 rebellion', pp. 151–5, 159–62; Brian Manning, *The English people and the English revolution* (London, 1991), pp. 68, 77–9, Anthony Fletcher, *The outbreak of the English Civil War* (London, 1981), pp. 138, 200–3, 214–15.

[12] R. Clifton, 'The popular fear of Catholics during the English revolution', *Past and Present*, 52 (1971), pp. 34–43, 54; Peter Lake, 'Anti-popery: the structure of a prejudice', in Richard Cust and Ann Hughes, eds., *Conflict in early Stuart England: studies in religion and politics, 1603–1642* (London, 1989), pp. 92–5; and Shagan, 'Constructing discord', passim.

[13] C. Hibbard, *Charles I and the popish plot* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1983), passim; and Clifton, 'Popular fear of Catholics', pp. 29–31, 39–41.

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Supporters of the crown had long been stoking up fear of the Calvinist Scots, and throughout 1642 rumours continued to circulate that armies of Protestant Danes, as well as Catholic Spaniards and Frenchmen, were preparing to descend on England.[14]

By the time that Charles I established himself at York in March 1642, many English people had come to believe that hordes of foreign enemies were poised to invade.[15] And as the country fell apart into two armed camps during the following months, some, at least, made their choice of political allegiance primarily according to their perception of which side would best protect the national interest. Richard Baxter concluded that 'if both their causes had been bad as … each other, yet that the subjects should adhere to that party which most secured the welfare of the Nation'.[16] And that Baxter himself, together with hundreds of thousands of other Englishmen and women, eventually decided that it was parliament's party, rather than the king's, which was the most likely guarantor of the nation's welfare is hardly surprising. As Gardiner observed long ago, Charles I – 'born of a Scottish father and a Danish mother, with a grandmother who was half-French … with a French wife, with German nephews and a Dutch son in law' – was hardly a figure around whom English patriotic sentiment could easily rally.[17]

Parliament, on the other hand, was a potent symbol of nationhood. As the body which was held to articulate the wishes of the entire realm – a body which was physically composed, moreover, of men drawn from every part of England – it had long been identified, in an almost mystical sense, with the nation itself.[18] Parliament's traditional roles as the guardian of English 'liberties' and the upholder of the Protestant religion made its intimate connection with Englishness clearer still.[19] So did the fact that most MPs came from the south and east of the kingdom, the districts in which English national consciousness was most deeply rooted and unambiguous. Since the reign of King James, if not before, those who were most firmly opposed to 'new courses' in government and to 'innovations' in religion, those who were most deeply outraged by any slight to the institution of parliaments, had styled themselves – and been styled by others – as 'patriots'.[20] The parliamentarian party of the 1640s grew out of this

[14] For rumours of Danish invasion, see *Commons Journals* (*CJ*), II, *1640–1642*, pp. 487, 535; Fletcher, *Outbreak*, p. 234; Devon Record Office, Exeter, Book 73/1 (James White's Chronicle), fo. 111; and British Library, London (BL), Thomason Tracts (TT), *The Danes plot discovered against this kingdom*, 23 Mar. 1642.

[15] Lindley, '1641 rebellion', p. 161; Mark Stoyle, *From deliverance to destruction: rebellion and civil war in an English city* (Exeter, 1996), p. 170; Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 201–3, 214–15, 233–4. As Professor Fletcher observes (p. 223), most 'were preparing not for Civil War, but for a national state of emergency'.

[16] M. Sylvester, ed., *Reliquiae Baxterianae, or Mr Richard Baxter's narrative of the most memorable passages of his life and times* (London, 1696), p. 39.

[17] S. R. Gardiner, *History of the Great Civil War, 1642–1649* (4 vols., London, 1893), II, p. 202.

[18] Conrad Russell, 'The nature of a parliament in early Stuart England', in Howard Tomlinson, ed., *Before the English Civil War: essays on early Stuart politics and government* (London, 1983), p. 133.

[19] Greenfeld, *Nationalism*, pp. 38–9, 44–5, 50–1; and R. Cust and P. Lake, 'Sir Richard Grosvenor and the rhetoric of magistracy', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 54 (1981), pp. 40–53, especially p. 52.

[20] See R. Cust, ed., *The papers of Sir Richard Grosvenor, 1st Bart., 1585–1645* (Record Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, 134, 1996), pp. xx, xxvii; and Richard Cust, 'Politics and the electorate in the 1620s', in Cust and Hughes, eds., *Conflict in Stuart England*, pp. 134–67, especially pp. 145, 150, 155.

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patriotic political tradition, and during the Civil War the two concepts of 'patriotism' and 'parliamentarianism' became ever more closely intertwined.[21]

Despite parliament's initial closeness to the Scots, many individual parliamentarians clearly believed their party to be the party of Englishness. Thus Edmund Ludlow explained that he joined the roundhead army in 1642 because 'I thought it my duty … as an Englishman … to enter into the service of my country', while a group of Suffolk countrymen averred in 1643 that 'so longe as they remember themselves to be English-men, they will not forgett to love and defend an English Parliament'.[22] Such comments were legion during the 1640s and the perception of the parliamentarians as patriots proved a remarkably enduring one thereafter. Sympathetic historians continued to refer to the parliamentarians as 'the patriotic party' until well into the last century,[23] and it was only with the rise of explanations of the Civil War centring on 'class'[24] that the identification of the parliamentary cause with that of England itself began to be abandoned by historians. Today that association is too often overlooked. Yet all the evidence suggests that the perceived conjunction between parliamentarianism and Englishness was of immense importance in shaping popular attitudes at the time – not only in England, but in the neighbouring dominion of Wales too.

II

Wales's role in the Civil War has been unaccountably neglected.[25] Until very recently, most general studies of the period paid little or no attention to the experiences of the Welsh, and even now historians continue to assert that there was no uniquely Welsh dimension to the Civil War, and that the Welsh behaved very much as their English neighbours did between 1642 and 1646.[26] Bearing the previous history of Wales in mind, such an assumption seems inherently unlikely. Although Wales and England had been formally united since 1536, and although the Welsh gentry class became increasingly Anglicized thereafter,[27] the common people of the two countries remained strikingly different. On the eve of the Civil War, 'the vast majority' of Wales's c. 400,000

[21] Roundhead military commanders, extolled as 'patriots' by their supporters from the moment the conflict began, were being feted with such titles as 'England's Worthies' and 'England's Champions' by 1645–6. See, for example, BL, TT, *A true character of Worcesters late hurly burly*, 22 Sept. 1642; and BL, TT, *The Scottish dove*, 11–18 July 1645.

[22] C. H. Firth, ed., *The memoirs of Edmund Ludlow* (2 vols., Oxford, 1894), I, p. 38; Clive Holmes, ed., *The Suffolk committees for scandalous ministers* (Suffolk Records Society, 13, Ipswich, 1970), p. 47.

[23] See, for example, G. M. Trevelyan, *England under the Stuarts* (London, 1925; 1954 edn), pp. 162–3; and, more generally, R. C. Richardson, *The debate on the English revolution* (Manchester, 1998 edn), pp. 44–7, 58, 69, 81, 95–6. The 'patriotic' interpretation of the Civil War has never been more cogently advanced than in the work of S. R. Gardiner, see, *History*, I, especially pp. 18, 153, 204; II, especially pp. 171, 177, 202, 258; and III, especially pp. 69 and 80–1. Like every other historian of the period, I am heavily in Gardiner's debt.

[24] See Richardson, *Debate on the English revolution*, pp. 110–11.

[25] There are only three book-length surveys of the conflict in Wales, see J. R. Phillips, *Memoirs of the Civil War in Wales and the Marches* (2 vols., London, 1874); Ronald Hutton, *The Royalist war effort, 1642–1646* (London, 1982); and Peter Gaunt, *A nation under siege: the Civil War in Wales, 1642–1648* (London, 1991).

[26] This is true of even the most perceptive historians of the period, see, for example, Morrill, 'British problem', p. 6; and Peter Gaunt, *The British Wars, 1637–1651* (London, 1997), p. 8.

[27] Gwynfor-Jones, *Early modern Wales*, pp. 31–5.

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inhabitants still spoke Welsh.[28] They continued to live in isolated rural communities, quite unlike the towns and villages of southern England; they continued to preserve their distinctive traditions; and they continued to nurse a concealed resentment against their 'Saison' (Saxon) neighbours who, after centuries of conflict, had not only defeated them and incorporated them into the English state, but who also, all too frequently, looked down upon them as boors and half-wits.[29]

Amicable co-existence between the Welsh and the English was by no means preordained then, and that the two peoples got along together as well as they did during the 150 years which preceded the Civil War in large part reflected the political dexterity of the reigning monarchs. Henry VII himself was of partially Welsh parentage, and he and his successors had striven to improve Anglo-Welsh relations. At the same time, they had taken care to flatter Welsh self-esteem and to ensure that Wales was provided with sufficient 'constitutional accommodation' to mask the true extent of English dominance. Much stress was laid on the uniquely close links which existed between Wales and the crown: on the Welsh ancestry of the royal house, for example, on Wales's status as a royal principality and on the fact that the monarch's eldest son was its prince.[30] Wales also remained under the special jurisdiction of the Council in the Marches, again emphasizing the extent to which it was regarded as distinct from England proper.[31] There were other ways, too, in which the Tudor monarchs encouraged the Welsh to view themselves as honoured partners of the English rather than as despised vassals. Thus the term which had long been used to denote the Welsh – 'Britons' – was appropriated to refer to *all* the subjects of the crown, while 'home rule' was effectively conferred on the Welsh gentry.[32]

More important than any other factor in reconciling the Welsh to English rule, however, may well have been official recognition of the myth of the 'British origins' of the English church. During the early years of the Reformation the Welsh had clung tenaciously to the old Catholic faith (at least in part, perhaps, because they disliked what were felt to be 'English' innovations).[33] Determined to remedy this situation, the Elizabethan regime had ordered the translation of the scriptures into Welsh. Crucially, the Welsh clerics charged with this task had prefaced their completed translations with quasi-historical introductions, which repeated and elaborated the old tradition that 'the true faith of the Reformation was a restoration of that which had flourished in the early Celtic church'.[34] The public promulgation of this thesis was of immense

[28] A. H. Dodd, *A short history of Stuart Wales* (London, 1977), p. 87; Gaunt, *Nation under siege*, p. 8.

[29] Gwynfor-Jones, *Early modern Wales*, pp. 8–9, 12–14; and Penry Williams, 'The Welsh borderland under Queen Elizabeth', *Welsh History Review*, 1 (1960), pp. 34–5.

[30] J. Gwynfor-Jones, *Wales and the Tudor state: government, religious change and the social order, 1534–1603* (London, 1989), p. 78; Gwynfor-Jones, *Early modern Wales*, pp. 1–2, 85–6; and P. R. Roberts, 'The union with England and the identity of "Anglican" Wales', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th ser., 22 (1972), pp. 49, 58.

[31] Peter Roberts, 'The English crown, the principality of Wales and the Council in the Marches, 1534–1641', in Bradshaw and Morrill, eds., *British problem*, pp. 118–147, especially p. 128.

[32] Dodd, *Short history*, p. 84; and Brendan Bradshaw, 'The Tudor reformation and revolution in Wales and Ireland: the origins of the British problem', in Bradshaw and Morrill, eds., *British problem*, pp. 39–65, especially pp. 52–3.

[33] Bradshaw, 'The Tudor reformation', pp. 45–6.

[34] G. Williams, *Recovery, reorientation and reformation, Wales, 1415–1642* (Oxford, 1987), p. 460; Roberts, 'Anglican Wales', pp. 66–9; Gwynfor-Jones, *Wales and the Tudor state*, pp. 93–7.

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importance because it enabled the Welsh to see Protestantism not as an alien faith which had been imposed upon them by the English, but rather as their own traditional faith reborn in the Church of England.[35] Thanks in part to this radically altered perspective, Wales gradually embraced Protestantism over the next forty years: albeit Protestantism of a very conservative, traditional kind, almost devoid of the puritan zeal which was so commonplace among members of the reformed faith in England.[36]

By the end of the sixteenth century it seemed that, thanks to a mixture of good luck and judicious royal policy, Wales had been firmly 'jointed in' to the English state. The rule of the first two Stuart kings, which was generally beneficent as far as Wales was concerned, did nothing to alter this happy situation.[37] It was only as the authority of the Caroline regime began to crumble during the early 1640s that the essential fragility of the partnership between England and Wales was exposed, and the dark forces of ethnic hatred re-emerged. The process seems to have begun in England, where the view of the Welsh as 'outlanders' – ridiculous and uncivilized at best, treacherous and semi-barbarous at worst – had never been wholly abandoned.[38] During the early 1640s, as fears of some sort of foreign attack or domestic insurrection grew, increasing numbers of Englishmen began to turn a suspicious eye towards Wales. Those who were most suspicious of the Welsh tended to be critics of royal policy, perhaps because such individuals – coming as they did from a puritan, 'patriotic' tradition – were peculiarly sensitive to real or imagined threats to English nationhood, perhaps because they had long regarded religiously conservative Wales as a citadel of popery.[39]

In 1640 and 1641 rumours circulated in England that 'popish armies' were being assembled in Wales.[40] Following the Irish rebellion such whispers became louder and more persistent and in late 1641 a full-scale panic was caused in London by reports of a papist plot centring on the Catholic earl of Worcester's castle in Monmouthshire.[41] These scares fanned the flames of anti-Welsh feeling in England – and reinforced the suspicions of the nascent parliamentarian party that the Welsh were disaffected to their cause. Such suspicions were in great measure justified. As we have seen, the Welsh had every reason to venerate the crown. It was the Tudors who had granted them their special privileges, and Charles I and his eldest son who symbolized, in their very persons, the constitutional accommodation which had been granted to Wales. Parliament, on the other hand – which included only a handful of Welsh MPs – had a much weaker claim on Welsh affections.[42] And during late 1641, as 'oppositionist' MPs

[35] Roberts, 'Anglican Wales', p. 67.

[36] Dodd, *Short history*, p. 68; Gwynfor-Jones, *Wales and the Tudor state*, pp. 96–7; Williams, *Recovery, reorientation and reformation*, pp. 476, 482; G. H. Jenkins, *Protestant dissenters in Wales, 1639–1688* (Cardiff, 1992), p. 9.

[37] Williams, *Recovery, reorientation and reformation*, pp. 473–5, 479–80.

[38] Dodd, *Short history*, p. 87; A. H. Dodd, *Studies in Stuart Wales* (Cardiff, 1952), p. 59.

[39] For the early Stuart view of Wales as 'a Catholic heartland', see P. Jenkins, *A history of early modern Wales, 1536–1990* (London, 1992), p. 111.

[40] Williams, *Recovery, reorientation and reformation*, p. 485; Dodd, *Short history*, p. 90.

[41] *CJ*, II, pp. 317–18; R. Webb, ed., *Nehemiah Wallington: historical notices of events occurring chiefly in the reign of Charles I* (2 vols., London, 1869), II, p. 45; BL, TT, *A great discovery of a damnable plot at Rugland Castle in Monmouthshire*, 12 Nov. 1641; and BL, TT, *A plot by the earle of Worcester in Wales*, 15 Nov. 1641.

[42] In 1601 there were just twenty-nine Welsh MPs in a House of Commons with 462 members, see S. G. Ellis, 'Tudor state formation and the shaping of the British Isles', in S. G. Ellis and S. Barber, eds., *Conquest and union: fashioning a British state, 1485–1725* (London, 1995), p. 62.

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in the Long Parliament launched determined attacks on royal authority, meddled with the jurisdiction of the Council in the Marches,[43] and, worst of all, challenged the doctrines of the established church, unease at the drift of events at Westminister began to spread throughout the principality.

In England itself, meanwhile, the growing conviction that the Welsh were unwilling to espouse the cause of further reformation had exacerbated anti-Welsh feeling among supporters of the parliament. Clear evidence that this was so – and that the swelling tide of English criticism was causing great alarm in Wales – appeared in early 1642 when a petition was presented to the Commons in the name of 'many hundred thousands, inhabiting within the thirteene shires of Wales'. This hitherto unnoticed document encapsulates the sense of puzzled hurt which pervaded the principality on the eve of the Civil War. Having stressed Wales's loyalty to both king *and* parliament, the petitioners complained that 'notwithstanding, we are disrespected, and shamefully derided with ludibrious contempt, more than any other Countrey what so ever, wherefore we beseech you that the authors, urgers or suggesters of the same may be found out … and suffer exemplary … punishment for their reproaching us'. If steps were not taken to end 'this Epidemicall derision of us', the petitioners went on, 'it … will become a great discouragement to all our Countreymen'.[44] There was a clear warning to parliament here – but it was a warning that was ignored.

During the first half of 1642 a stream of violently anti-Welsh pamphlets poured off the London presses: pamphlets which not only ridiculed the country's inhabitants, but also sought to reawaken old English fears about Welsh political aspirations – by claiming, for example, that there were plans afoot to call a 'Welsh parliament'.[45] As the accusations levelled against the Welsh in the capital grew ever more defamatory, so the inhabitants of the principality aligned themselves ever more closely with the king. Only a political victory for Charles I, it seemed, could protect the Welsh from the virulent new strain of English xenophobia which was so evident in his opponents' camp, and as a result the king increasingly came to be regarded as a national – as well as a politico-religious – champion in Wales.[46] It is this which chiefly explains why, when Civil War eventually broke out, almost all Wales declared for the crown. The Welsh were not just demonstrating an abstract loyalty to Charles I, they were signalling their determination to protect Wales's position within the Stuart state – and, indeed, the very identity of Wales itself – from what they perceived to be a resurgent English threat.

To many English parliamentarians, the principality's declaration for Charles I in 1642 represented Welsh rebellion on a grand scale: even more threatening, in its way, than the revolt of Owain Glyndwr over two centuries before. Anger and fear proliferated throughout the whole of southern England and during the first two years of the war

[43] See P. Williams, 'The attack on the Council in the Marches, 1603–1642', *Transactions of the Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion* (1961), pp. 18–22; and Roberts, 'Council in the Marches', pp. 145–7.

[44] National Library of Wales, Wb. 7844, *The humble petition of many hundred thousands, inhabiting within the thirteene shires of Wales*, 12 Feb. 1642.

[45] BL, TT, *Newes from Wales: or the Prittish parliament*, May 1642. See also Mark Stoyle, 'Caricaturing Cymru: constructions of Wales and the Welsh in the London press, 1642–1646', in Diana Dunn and Peter Gaunt, eds., *War and society in medieval and early modern Britain* (Liverpool, 2000).

[46] See BL, TT, *Two petitions presented to the king … at York*, 8 Aug. 1642, in which the Welsh petitioners begged for 'protection' from the king.

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parliamentary pamphleteers did everything they could to exacerbate English dislike of the Welsh.[47] Soon animosity between the two peoples was spiralling out of control, as the English were encouraged to believe that the king's Welsh soldiers were 'enemies to the English nation', greedy for 'fertile … English soyle', while the Welsh were assured by the royalists that a roundhead victory would lead to the wholesale slaughter of Welsh men, women, and children.[48] For English parliamentarians the Civil War had by now become, at least in part, a struggle to reassert England's dominance over Wales: while for Welsh royalists it had more than ever assumed the aspect of a struggle for national survival.

III

If the tensions which existed between the English and the Welsh have been neglected by previous historians, those which existed between the English and the Cornish have been virtually ignored. Standard accounts of the Civil War continue to treat Cornwall as if it were just another English county. Yet this is to miss the significance of Cornwall's unique cultural heritage. The Cornish, like their Welsh cousins, were descended from British stock. For centuries they had defended their homeland – a bleak, jagged peninsula in the extreme south-west of Britain – from Anglo-Saxon incursions. And even after Cornwall had finally been conquered and absorbed within the English state, the Cornish had retained many of the marks of a separate 'people' (most notably their own Brythonic language, which continued to be spoken in the far west of the county right up until the Civil War).[49] Throughout the medieval and early modern periods the Cornish, like the Welsh, were treated with lofty disdain by their English neighbours, who mocked them as uncivilized peasants.[50] Many Cornish people, for their part, nursed a bitter sense of grievance against the 'Saxon' invaders who had subjugated their forefathers – and in 1497 and 1548–9 these simmering ethnic tensions had helped to fuel several violent rebellions in the county.[51]

Cornwall, like Wales, presented special problems of governance, then, and in Cornwall, as in Wales, the English crown had long sought to mollify its Celtic subjects by providing them with special marks of royal favour and at least an illusion of residual autonomy. As Wales had been made a royal principality, so Cornwall had been made a royal duchy; as the English kings' eldest sons had been created princes of Wales, so they had also been created dukes of Cornwall; and as Wales had been placed under the special jurisdiction of the Council of the Marches, so Cornwall had been placed under the special jurisdiction of the stannaries – royal institutions which oversaw the local tin-

[47] Stoyle, 'Caricaturing Cymru', passim.

[48] BL, TT, *The Welchmans declaration*, 17 Sept. 1642 (sic, actually 1643); J. Washbourn, ed., *Bibliotheca Gloucestrensis: a collection of scarce and curious tracts relating to … Gloucester* (3 vols., Gloucester, 1823), I, p. 119.

[49] Mark Stoyle, 'The dissidence of despair: rebellion and identity in early modern Cornwall', *Journal of British Studies*, 38 (1999), pp. 423–44.

[50] D. Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders* (London, 1992), p. 89. I owe this reference to Alastair Duke. See also *Calendar of state papers, Venetian* (*CSPV*), *1202–1509*, pp. 266, 311–12, 314; *CSPV*, *1527–1533*, p. 294.

[51] Stoyle, 'Dissidence of despair'; and Mark Stoyle, 'Cornish rebellions, 1498–1648', *History Today*, 47 (1997), pp. 22–8.

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mining industry, and which bestowed remarkable privileges on many thousands of Cornishmen.[52] In one respect, indeed, Cornwall enjoyed an even greater degree of constitutional accommodation than Wales, for the Tudors – perhaps wishing for more political antennae in this notoriously rebellious county – had created many new parliamentary seats there. As a result Cornwall, which had only around 90,000 inhabitants in 1640, boasted no fewer than forty-four MPs: more than any other county (though by no means all of those elected were native Cornishmen).[53]

Cornwall's generous parliamentary representation, combined with the fact that it had been far more thoroughly 'Anglicized' than Wales, might lead one to suspect that the Cornish would have been less alarmed than their Welsh cousins by the emergence of the parliamentarian party in England during 1641–2. Yet in fact this was not the case. By threatening the established church – a church held to be built on Celtic Christian foundations – and by attacking the authority of the crown – that same authority which underpinned the duchy and stannary organizations on which Cornwall's unique constitutional status depended – 'opposition' MPs in London offered, albeit unintentionally, as grave an affront to Cornish 'national pride' as to its Welsh equivalent.[54] By countenancing, if not positively encouraging, the spread of a xenophobic, 'English nationalist' form of political rhetoric, moreover, they added insult to injury. Under these circumstances, resistance to parliament's policies was almost bound to develop in Cornwall. A Cornish petition in defence of the established church appeared as early as February 1642, and over the following months Cornish public opinion moved ever more firmly behind the king.[55] By April it was being whispered that 30,000 men stood ready to resist the parliament in Cornwall, and soon roundhead sympathizers were alluding to the possibility of a Cornish military incursion into England itself.[56]

Unlike most of the Welsh counties, Cornwall contained a vigorous and well-organized parliamentarian faction.[57] Parliament's Cornish supporters were mainly gentlemen and clerics, however, and their influence was largely confined to the far east of the county, where Cornish cultural distinctiveness had been most heavily eroded. Everywhere else – and especially in the Cornish-speaking west – it was the king's partisans who were most numerous, and in September parliament's Cornish adherents were forced to call for outside assistance. News that 'foreign', English, forces were preparing to intervene in Cornwall caused general panic, and in October some 10,000 Cornishmen rose up in arms under the command of the local royalist gentry and chased

[52] For the stannaries, see G. R. Lewis, *The stannaries: a study of the medieval tin miners of Devon and Cornwall* (Truro, 1965 edn), especially pp. 35–7, 39–41, 86–7, 107, 157.

[53] It has been calculated that 86 per cent of the Cornish burgesses were 'outsiders' in 1601, and that 'the proportion of outsiders returned by Cornish boroughs was twice as great as it was in boroughs elsewhere in England and Wales', see J. Chynoweth, 'The gentry of Tudor Cornwall' (Ph.D. thesis, Exeter University, 1994), pp. 185–6.

[54] For the attacks launched on the stannary jurisdiction in the Long Parliament, see Anne Duffin, *Faction and faith: politics and religion of the Cornish gentry before the Civil War* (Exeter, 1996), p. 177.

[55] BL, TT, *The petition of the county of Cornwall* (Feb. 1642); *CSPV*, *1642–1643*, pp. 17, 101–2; and R. N. Worth, ed., *The Buller papers* (Plymouth, 1895), pp. 49–51.

[56] Bodleian Library, Oxford (Bod.), Tanner MSS, 63, fos. 21–2; *Lords Journals*, IV, *1628–1642*, p. 275.

[57] Mary Coate, *Cornwall in the great Civil War and Interregnum, 1642–1660* (Truro, 1963), p. 32; Duffin, *Faction and faith*, especially pp. 186–96.

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the pro-parliamentarian 'traitors' out of the county. Within days all Cornwall was held for the king, and within weeks a Cornish royalist army had been raised.[58]

As one might expect, Cornwall's 'rebellion' sparked off intense hostility in the parliamentary press. The poisonous effusions of the London pamphleteers, combined with the sense of betrayal which many parliamentarians felt at Cornwall's decision to side with the crown, reawakened the old English suspicion of the Cornish, and the string of victories which the Cornish army won during 1643 did nothing to soothe parliamentarian feelings.[59] Anglo-Cornish relations were further exacerbated by the Lostwithiel campaign of 1644. In this, the greatest royalist victory of the war, Essex's parliamentary army was trapped in Cornwall by the king's forces and smashed to pieces. No one contributed more to Charles's victory than the Cornish, who had been driven to fury by this new 'foreign invasion' of their county, and who fought the roundheads tooth and nail. For English parliamentarians, the defeat of their main south-eastern field force – Essex's 'prodigious ... [army] of Cocknies' as it was termed by one Irish royalist[60] – at the hands of the despised Cornish was little short of a national humiliation. Gripped by an intense desire for revenge, they began to disparage the Cornish in the same terms as the Welsh and Irish – as 'inhumane, barbarous commoners' – and to swear they would give them no quarter.[61] The Cornish themselves came to believe that none would be spared if the parliamentarians ever recrossed the Tamar.[62] Thus, in Cornwall, as in Wales, the Civil War increasingly took on the aspect of an ethnic conflict.

IV

The enthusiasm which Wales and Cornwall exhibited for the royalist cause did nothing to strengthen Charles I's fragile credibility as an English national leader. On the other hand, it did less than one might imagine to weaken that credibility still further. This was chiefly because, over the preceding centuries many, quite possibly the majority of, Englishmen and women had come to accept the Cornish as honorary English and the Welsh as – if not quite this – then at least as 'the closest ... of foreigners'.[63] It was the existence of such attitudes which enabled many English royalists to fight – albeit somewhat sniffily – alongside their Welsh and Cornish allies even as they were being denounced in the roundhead camp as 'barbarians' and 'heathens'. Parliamentarian claims that the Welsh and Cornish were 'foreigners' initially failed to convince a large proportion of the king's English subjects then, and so did parliamentarian claims that they, rather than their opponents, represented the true party of Englishness. This wider

[58] Stoyle, *Loyalty and locality*, pp. 232–6; M. J. Stoyle, 'Pagans or paragons?: images of the Cornish during the English Civil War', *English Historical Review*, III (1996), pp. 302–4; John Stucley, *Sir Bevil Grenville, 1596–1643* (Chichester, 1983) p. 115.

[59] Stoyle, 'Pagans or paragons', pp. 303–7.

[60] T. Carte, ed., *A collection of original letters ... found among the duke of Ormonde's papers* (2 vols., London, 1739), I, p. 52.

[61] Stoyle, 'Pagans or paragons', pp. 308–11; and BL, TT, *England's troubles anatomised*, 11 Oct. 1644.

[62] BL, TT, *Mercurius veridicus*, 26 July to 4 Aug. 1645; J. Vicars, *The burning bush not consumed: England's parliamentarie chronicle* (London, 1646), pp. 375–9.

[63] Morrill, 'British problem', p. 6; and Williams, *Recovery*, p. 464.

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failure must partly have reflected the fact that, during the first year of the Civil War, parliament had been as guilty as the king of calling in foreign assistance.

Scottish professional soldiers were the first arrivals: many joined the parliamentary army in 1642–3.[64] There were Scottish volunteers on the king's side too, of course,[65] but they were less numerous and less visible than their parliamentarian compatriots, many of whom bore exalted military rank: in summer 1643 Scottish professional soldiers commanded no fewer than five of the eleven regiments of Sir William Waller's army.[66] The high profile of the Scottish volunteers caused growing resentment in the parliamentary ranks, even prompting a violent affray between English and Scottish officers at Westminster Hall in March 1643.[67] And to the uncommitted and the straightforwardly royalist, the ubiquity of Scots professionals in the roundhead armies was a constant reminder of parliament's close links with England's traditional northern enemy. Equally damaging to parliament's public image was its use of military professionals imported from abroad. The role which European mercenaries played in the Civil War has never been properly explored. A good deal of attention has been paid to the foreign soldiers of the king, most notably his German nephew Prince Rupert.[68] Yet it is too often forgotten that, during the initial stages of the conflict, soldiers from the continent were highly visible in the parliamentarian ranks too.[69] Several Dutch and French officers served in the original roundhead army of 1642,[70] while Hans Behre, soon to become one of Essex's most trusted cavalry commanders, was a German, who led a troop composed entirely of 'strangers'.[71] Foreign professionals like these did much to enhance the military effectiveness of parliament's forces. Yet by taking the decision to employ such men, parliament – like the king – ran the risk of alienating ordinary English people, who took it for granted that continental mercenaries were, by their very nature brutal, untrustworthy and, above all, addicted to plunder and rapine.[72]

[64] References to such men are legion. See, for example, *Calendar of state papers, domestic* (*CSPD*), *1641–1643*, pp. 367, 401; *CJ*, II, pp. 855, 890, 939, 941, 978, 993; and R. Bell, ed., *Memorials of the Civil War, comprising the correspondence of the Fairfax family* (2 vols., London, 1849), I, p. 29.

[65] Exhaustive research has identified a total of thirty Scottish field officers who served in the king's army, see P. R. Newman, 'The royalist officer corps, 1642–1660: army command as a reflexion of the social structure', *Historical Journal*, 26 (1983), p. 953.

[66] John Kenyon, *The Civil Wars of England* (London, 1998), p. 45; and John Adair, *Roundhead general: the campaigns of Sir William Waller* (Stroud, 1997), p. 116.

[67] For this affair, see *CJ*, III, *1642–1644*, pp. 3, 5, 13, 22, 25; and BL, Additional MSS, 31,116, Whitaker's Diary, fo. 33r. Parliament took the incident seriously enough to issue a declaration forbidding such quarrels, see BL, TT, *A declaration of parliament concerning a late difference between officers of the English and Scottish nation*, 23 Mar. 1643.

[68] For the king's foreign soldiers, see I. Roy, 'The royalist army in the First Civil War' (D.Phil. thesis, Oxford University, 1963), especially pp. 106, 143–6; Ian Roy, *The royalist ordnance papers, 1642–1646* (vols. I and II, Oxford Record Society, 43 and 49, 1963 and 1975), passim; Newman, 'Royalist officer corps', pp. 945, 953; P. R. Newman, 'The 1663 list of indigent officers considered as a primary source', *Historical Journal*, 30 (1987), especially pp. 892–3; and Joyce Lee Malcolm, *Caesar's due: loyalty and King Charles, 1642–1646* (London, 1983), pp. 91–3, 112–13. For the most recent account of Rupert, see Frank Kitson, *Prince Rupert: portrait of a soldier* (London, 1996).

[69] Ian Roy, 'England turned Germany?: the aftermath of the Civil War in its European context', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 28 (1978), pp. 131–2.

[70] BL, TT, *The list of the army … under the … earle of Essex*, 14 Sept. 1642; and *CJ*, II, p. 939.

[71] Philip Tennant, *The Civil War in Stratford-upon-Avon: conflict and community in South Warwickshire, 1642–1646* (Stroud, 1996), pp. 82–4; Adair, *Roundhead general*, pp. 149–50, 207; *CSPD*, *1644*, pp. 89–91, 97.

[72] Malcolm, *Caesar's due*, p. 92.

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As armed 'strangers' flooded into the land during 1642–3, English people of all political persuasions grew increasingly frightened and angry, and the pamphleteer who predicted that, until the war was brought to an end, 'England will not be England, but … Babel perpetually' would have found many to concur in his opinion.[73] Popular conviction that England was being overrun by foreigners was greatly strengthened by the arrival of 8,000–9,000 troops from Ireland to serve the king during winter 1643–4. Howls of outrage against this influx of 'Irish rebels' were at once raised in the London press – and to this day the king's 'Irish' soldiers remain among the best-known 'foreign' participants in the Civil War.[74] This being the case, it is somewhat ironic that the vast majority of these troops were not native Irishmen at all, but Englishmen who had previously been shipped over to Ireland in order to fight the insurrectionists there.[75] Charles I's apologists were quite unable to convince public opinion that this was so, however, and throughout the rest of the war many continued to believe that the king's armies were full of Irish soldiers.[76]

The horrified public reaction to the arrival of the English–Irish forces made it harder than ever for Charles to convince his English subjects that he had their interests primarily at heart. Yet the intervention of Scotland on parliament's side in 1644 presented him with a chance to turn the tables on his opponents. Despite, or perhaps in part because of, the union of the two crowns, English distrust of the Scots remained extremely strong during the early seventeenth century.[77] The events of 1637–40 had turned this distrust to extreme dislike among the supporters of the king, while even among his opponents many had grown increasingly suspicious of the Scots' intentions.[78] The withdrawal of the Scottish army from England in 1641 had briefly stilled English fears but, as we have seen, the influx of Scottish fighting men during 1642–3 revived them. When it became clear that a fresh Scottish army was preparing to march into the north in late 1643 – this time at parliament's express invitation – the royalists saw their chance to exploit the growing popular antipathy towards the Scots while at the same time challenging their opponents' English nationalist credentials.

The king's subsequent decision to summon a royalist parliament to Oxford to consider the Scots' 'invasion' was clearly intended not only to undercut the authority of the Westminster parliament, but to convey the impression that Charles, as England's ruler, was co-ordinating a national response to a national emergency. A proclamation issued at the time made the royalists' desire to appeal to English nationalist sentiment very plain. Having asserted that the Scots were bent on nothing less than 'a designe of Conquest', it went on to urge 'a Union of English hearts, to prevent the lasting miseries which this Foreign Invasion must bring upon this Kingdome'.[79] Over the following months the need to eject the 'northern invaders' from English soil became a constant

[73] BL, TT, *An encouragement to warr*, 13 Oct. 1642.

[74] Charles I's 'Irish troops' still make regular appearances in histories of the conflict, see, for example, Malcolm, *Caesar's due*, pp. 113–21; and Martyn Bennett, *The Civil Wars in Britain and Ireland, 1638–1651* (Oxford, 1997), pp. 205–6, 234.

[75] J. Barratt, 'Native Irishmen', *History Today*, 49 (1999), p. 61.

[76] Even some royalists believed this, see Lindley, '1641 rebellion', pp. 170–5.

[77] Kenyon, *Civil Wars of England*, p. 16.

[78] Conrad Russell, 'The British problem and the English Civil War', reprinted in Cust and Hughes, eds., *English Civil War*, pp. 121–8; Russell, *Causes*, pp. 15–16, 38, 122, 125, 187.

[79] J. F. Larkin, ed., *Stuart royal proclamations*, II: *1625–1646* (Oxford, 1983), pp. 987–9. See also Gardiner, *History*, I, pp. 259–60, 299.

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refrain of royalist propagandists[80] – and there can be no doubt that it struck a chord with many thousands of English people. Popular antipathy towards the Scots was expressed on numerous occasions during the Civil War, most notably in the West Midlands, where the arrival of a Scottish army in 1645 aroused violent local hostility.[81] According to later oral tradition, one straggling Scottish soldier was baited to death with dogs after he had been captured by the infuriated country folk.[82]

The anti-Scottish card was, potentially at least, one of the strongest in the royalist hand. Yet it was also a card which Charles I – thanks to his own Scottish background, his special fondness for the Scottish people, and even, perhaps, his innate humanity – was incapable of playing with any genuine conviction.[83] Throughout much of 1644–5 the king attempted to square this circle by adopting the characteristic Caroline device of saying one thing while doing another. Fiery anti-Scottish rhetoric was thus produced for public consumption, while at the same time Charles continued, in private, to surround himself with Scottish courtiers,[84] to appoint Scottish officers to his armies,[85] and to angle for an alliance with the Scots against the parliament.[86] Quite how long it took for the contradictions between the king's public and private stances to become common knowledge is hard to judge. Yet by mid-1645, at the latest, Charles I's never terribly convincing claim to be England's national champion against the Scots had acquired a sadly hollow ring. A door of opportunity now stood open to his domestic enemies – and it was a door through which they were already poised to step.

As we have seen, there had always been those in the parliamentary camp who disliked fighting alongside the Scots and other foreign 'soldiers of fortune'. Many English roundheads had felt deeply ambiguous about the decision to call in the Scots in 1643, and when the Scottish army occupied the north of England during 1644 but made no move to march south against the king, suspicions began to fester among the parliamentarians that their allies had no intention of seeking conclusions with the royalists, but were simply out to grab what they could for themselves.[87] As the conviction that 'strangers', on both sides, were prolonging the war in order to profit from England's misery grew, so disputes between English parliamentary officers and

[80] See, for example *CSPD, 1644*, p. 14; Edward Walker, *Historical discourses upon several occasions* (London, 1705), pp. 43, 53, 96; and BL, Harleian MSS, 6804, fo. 53.

[81] Roy Sherwood, *The Civil War in the Midlands, 1642–1651* (Stroud, 1992), pp. 147–8; Tennant, *Civil War in Stratford-upon-Avon*, pp. 127–33.

[82] J. Webb and T. W. Webb, *Memorials of the Civil War … as it affected Herefordshire* (2 vols., London, 1879), II, p. 396.

[83] Clarendon termed Charles I 'an immoderate lover of the Scottish Nation', see Richardson, *Debate on the English revolution*, p. 35.

[84] K. M. Browne, 'Courtiers and cavaliers: service, Anglicisation and loyalty among the royalist nobility', in John Morrill, ed., *The Scottish national covenant in its British context* (Edinburgh, 1990), pp. 157, 162, 166, 167, 171, 175.

[85] In late 1645 'most' of the officers in the king's lifeguard were reported to be Scots, see C. E. Long and Ian Roy, eds., *Richard Symonds's diary of the marches of the royal army* (Cambridge, 1997 edn), p. 242. For a Royalist commission of March 1645 authorizing Colonel George Maxwell to recruit 'all such officers and souldiers of the Scottish Nation who will … put themselves under his commaund', see Bod., Rawlinson MSS, classis C, 125, fo.108.

[86] In May 1645, for example, see E. Warburton, *Memoirs of Prince Rupert and the cavaliers* (3 vols., London, 1849), III, p. 98.

[87] See, for example, *CSPD, 1644–1645*, pp. 98, 103, 104–5, 120–21, 162–3, 174; and, more generally, Sylvester, *Reliquae Baxterianae*, p. 49.

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their foreign allies multiplied.[88] And by no means the least of the motives which prompted Cromwell and others to push for a reorganization of parliament's military forces in late 1644 was their desire to create an army that was more entirely English than any which had gone before: a force which those with 'true English hearts, and zealous affections towards the weal of our Mother Country' might be proud to acknowledge their own.[89]

Very few of the Scottish and European officers who had served parliament with such distinction during 1642–4 were appointed to the New Model Army.[90] And from the moment that army strode forth on to the public stage, its public spokesmen and image-makers seized every chance to stress its intensely English character.[91] Even the care which was taken to prevent its troops from plundering may have been intended to convey the message that this was an English army, which respected the rights and property of English civilians, as the polyglot forces of the king did not. Following parliament's victory at Naseby in June 1645 – a victory which not only shattered Charles I's main army, but also laid bare his negotiations for military assistance from abroad – the perception of the New Model Army as the army of England itself quickly took root. By July, parliamentary pamphleteers were terming it 'a great blessing … that in all our battailes and armies formerly, there hath been a mixture with some of other Nations; but in this Armie … there was not one man but of our owne Nation'.[92]

That ordinary people all over southern England began to flock into the New Model Army during summer and autumn 1645 may well have owed as much to their conviction that this force would finally liberate them from 'outlandish' military rule as anything else. And, as tension between parliament and the Scots mounted[93] and Charles continued to make overtures to his northern subjects,[94] the final piece of the jigsaw was about to fall into place. The king, it seemed, his party in England in tatters and his military forces increasingly confined to the Celtic periphery of the kingdom, was seeking to put himself at the head of an unholy alliance of Scots, Irish, Cornish, Welsh, and other 'outlanders' in order to bring his recalcitrant English subjects to heel. Faced with this appalling prospect, public opinion across England swung ever more firmly

[88] See, for example, *CSPD, 1644*, pp. 89–91, 97, 155, 161–2, 487, 491, 494–5, 524; and Gardiner, *History*, I, pp. 368–70; II, pp. 2–3, 23.

[89] W. C. Abbott, ed., *The writings and speeches of Oliver Cromwell* (2 vols., Cambridge, 1937), I, pp. 314–15. The 'nationalist' implications of the military reorganization of 1644–5 have gone largely unnoticed by previous historians of the New Model Army, see, for example, I. Gentles, *The New Model Army in England, Ireland and Scotland, 1645–1653* (Oxford, 1994); and Mark A. Kishlansky, *The rise of the New Model Army* (Cambridge, 1979).

[90] Sylvester, *Reliquae Baxterianae*, p. 48; R. K. G. Temple, 'The original officer list of the New Model Army', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 59 (1986), pp. 54–70, especially p. 55 nn. 33 and 35, p. 56 n. 41, p. 60 n. 72, p. 62 n. 105, p. 64 n. 123, p. 68 n. 150; and Gentles, *New Model Army*, p. 21.

[91] This trend reached its climax in the 'official' account of the New Model Army's wartime campaigns – Joshua Sprigge, *Anglia rediviva: England's recovery* (London, 1647) – a work which is dedicated to 'All True English-men', and suffused with English nationalist imagery.

[92] BL, TT, *The Scottish dove*, 11–18 July 1645.

[93] See *CJ*, IV, *1644–1646*, pp. 194, 220, 264, 273, 283, 298, 301, 305, 339; *CSPD, 1645–1647*, pp. 105, 114–16, 149, 177–9, 200–1, 215; Warburton, *Memoirs*, III, p. 62. The New Model Army's grievances against the Scots are well chronicled, albeit retrospectively, in Sprigge, *Anglia*, pp. 20, 23, 25–6, 28, 30, 92, 96–7, 179, 257, 280.

[94] In August and November 1645, for example, see Gardiner, *History*, II, p. 285; and III, pp. 1–5, 45.

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behind the parliament and all but the most die-hard English royalists began to abandon their allegiance. By the end of 1645 the Civil War in England was effectively won, thanks in large part to parliament's success in securing a near-monopoly on English nationalist sentiment. Yet where did this leave the Welsh and Cornish?

It left them, as usual, hopelessly outnumbered and exposed. If England's initial collapse into chaos during 1641–2 had permitted the semi-independent Welsh and Cornish polities of the past to flicker back into a sort of spectral half-life – and if, under the subsequent extraordinary pressures of war, these geo-political revenants had briefly moved still further from shadow towards substance[95] – Parliament's forcible reunification of England in 1645 heralded the imminent exorcism of their troubled spirits from the body politic. Parliament now had ample military means at its disposal to restore Cornwall and Wales to the English fold, and all that remained to be seen was the degree of ruthlessness it would employ in doing so. Herein lay perhaps the most dangerous challenge that the parliamentary leaders had to face in their struggle to reknit the kingdom. Had they heeded the urgings of their more rabidly nationalist supporters and permitted English soldiers to overrun Wales and Cornwall with fire and sword, the reverberations would have rung down through the succeeding centuries. Fortunately, wiser and more humane counsel prevailed. Thanks in part to the endeavours of Welsh MPs in London,[96] parliament's official attitude towards the two Celtic regions had long been growing more conciliatory and during 1645–6 great efforts were made to rein back vengeful roundhead soldiers on the one hand, and to soothe the fears of the king's Celtic followers on the other.[97] These tactics, which had they been employed in 1641–2 might well have prevented Charles I from gathering a substantial army in the first place, succeeded – when combined with overwhelming military force – in detaching from him his last remaining allies in the kingdom during 1645–6. By August 1646 both Cornwall and Wales had finally been reduced by parliament – and the English reconquest of Britain had begun.

[95] For a scheme to set up a semi-independent statelet in Cornwall in 1645, see M. J. Stoyle, 'The last refuge of a scoundrel: Sir Richard Grenville and Cornish particularism, 1644–1646', *Historical Research*, 71 (1998), pp. 44–9.

[96] R. N. Dore, ed., *The letter book of Sir William Brereton, volume I* (Record Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, 123, 1984), pp. 21–3, 248–9, 259, 294–8, 320.

[97] For parliamentarian attempts to win over the Welsh, see Malcolm, *Caesar's due*, pp. 196–7; Stoyle, *Loyalty and locality*, pp. 238–9; *CSPD, 1645–1647*, p. 341; *CJ*, IV, pp. 242, 264–7; and National Library of Wales, Civil War Tracts, 204, *A declaration of the Lords and Commons*, 8 Sept. 1645. For similar attempts to win over the Cornish, see Stoyle, 'Pagans or paragons', pp. 317–19; Bell, *Memorials*, I, p. 286; and Abbot, *Cromwell*, pp. 372–3.

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